The Migration Question, Political Parties and the Cypriot State of

Dissensus

Nicos Trimikliniotis

(Chapter in Party-Society Relations in the Republic of Cyprus, Political and Societal Strategies,
eds. Charalambous, G. and Christophorou, C., Routledge, 2016, pp.)

Introduction

This chapter examines the relation between Greek-Cypriot political structures and
migration/migrants, focusing particularly on political parties and party politics. The chapter
considers how the migration issue has become a subject of political discourse and
disagreement in the Greek-Cypriot public sphere by assessing how subaltern migrants are
depicted. It illustrates that migrants, who are by no means a homogenous group, are in fact
social and political subjects operating as a substantive and active force of change in economy,
politics and society over the last quarter of a century. However, about 90% of migrants, the
subaltern migrant workers, are absent in terms of linkage, representation and participation in
political parties, with a partial exception of AKEL (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού,
Progressive Party of the Working People). Whilst there are structural reasons for this,
imposed by an authoritarian immigration regime plagued by ‘the Cyprus problem’, there is an
increasing ideological/political rift, as the migration issue is becoming a key issue in what is
shaping up as a societal dissensus.

Cyprus is an archetype of a ‘border society’ (Panayiotou 2012). It is an island society, well

integrated in the regional economic system as well as the geopolitical system of the region. It
operates as a border economy, operating as a bridge and a capitalistic hub in the eastern
Mediterranean. Until the collapse of the banking system in March 2013, it was listed as one
of the high-income island economies, an off shore financial centre with associated tourism
(Bertram and Poirine 2007). The so-called ‘Green Line’ as the buffer zone is but a cease-fire
line since 1974, patrolled by one of the longest stationed UN peacekeeping forces
(Constantinou 2008; Trimikliniotis 2013). Another crucial feature, which has emerged over
the last quarter of a century, is the importance of racialized migrant labour, which makes the
country comparable to the other southern European and Mediterranean island economies.
Interestingly, Cyprus is the country with the highest share of female immigrants (55.2 %).
Racialized migrant workers are here referred to as subaltern migrants and are to be

1
distinguished from the elite migrants, who are highly skilled holders of prestigious posts in
businesses. On both sides of the barbed wire precarious migrant labour is a crucial feature in
the accumulation regimes and the developmental models, which is radically affecting
economic development and society at large.

Historically, Cypriot society has been multi-ethnic/multicultural; co-existence with the

Turkish-Cypriot community and with the three constitutionally recognised minorities
(Maronites, Armenians, and Latins) dates back to several centuries. This aspect of the history
of the country is often ignored, as the history of the conflict, the war and the de facto partition
since 1974 has dominated the debates and literature about Cyprus (Trimikliniotis and
Demetriou 2014). The Cyprus problem is affecting society and politics in multiple ways. An
influential author discussed the ‘sickliness of Greek-Cypriot political thought’ that
ideologically entraps politics in a conventional and cyclical perception of the political
problem (Kitromilides 1998-1999). The ‘dialectic of intolerance’ fails to challenge the
dominant social and political forces (Kitromilides 1981: 451-453). Others castigate
undemocratic elements and the deficiencies in observing the constitution (Ierodiakonou,
2003); or ‘the atrophy of civil society’ and ‘clientelist corporatism’ (Mavratsas 2003). Whilst
such critiques are insightful, the general thrust of their common premise, i.e. the deficient
modernization thesis does not properly capture the complexity of Cypriot society. Some
blame the ‘people’ for racism, ignoring how racism and anti-immigration ideologies are often
generated and reproduced as institutional logics and state-related processes. Anti-
immigrant/racialist politics, however, is not merely ‘political opportunism’ whereby political
parties ‘tail behind’ a xenophobic, racist and anti-immigrant public opinion; it is something
deeper and structurally connected to the state.

Migrants, economic development and the advent of the crisis and austerity era:
Unwanted ‘working hands’?

Migrants, TCNs (Third Country Nationals) and EUNs (European Union Nationals), make up
over one fifth of the economically active population. However, they are seen as a temporary,
transitional feature, often referred to in official documents as ‘working hands’ to meet labour
shortages (Planning Bureau 1989). Essentially, the permit regime for TCNs was, from its
inception not designed as an integration regime; it has grown over time to resemble an
eclectic ‘Europeanised’ version of a model in between the ‘Gastarbeiter model’ based on

2
four-year visas for TCNs and the Kafala system in the Middle Eastern countries (Pande 2013)
that ties the worker to the employer (Pande and Trimikliniotis 2015).

Consequently, up until the end of 2010 there was no integration policy, no civic rights or
other settlement-related features. The integration aspect came as an ‘add-on’ feature,
introduced through Cyprus’ EU (European Union) membership and to some extent from the
political conjunctures in 2010 which allowed for an opening that took into account human
rights and labour rights (Interview with former Minister of Interior). That marked a drastic
change affecting the migrant population that has had a major impact on the economy, work
and different sectors of the labour force (Gregoriou et. al. 2010). Prior to EU accession, it was
estimated that over half of the economic growth up until approximately 2004 should be
attributed to the work of TCNs (Christofides et. al. 2007).

More than a decade after accession, which brought in some thousands of EUNs, Cyprus has
changed dramatically. The economic and banking collapse has resulted in mass
unemployment and closure of businesses in industries employing migrants (in construction,
retail etc.). Since 2012 Cyprus has had negative net migration, , i.e. -629 in 2012 and -12,078
in 2013 (Cyprus Statistical Service 2014: 143). Even though no distinction is made between
Greek-Cypriots and third country nationals emigrating, the essential point is that as a result of
the crisis and deliberate government policies Cyprus is no longer an attractive destination for
migrants.

The economic crisis and austerity have generated transformations in politics as the old ‘social
questions’ have been opened anew. At the societal level, the problem of migrants’
integration is becoming one of the major issues of the ideological and political cleavage, in
what can be seen as a dissensus (Trimikliniotis 2012), a phenomenon that has only partially
been translated into political party politics so far.

Immigration, exceptionalism and party politics

The ideas that Cypriot society is simply ‘not modern enough’ and requires ‘modernisation’ to
‘catch up’ with the rest of Europe is problematic. To properly appreciate Cypriot civil society
one has to grasp the process of the transformation of Cyprus from a colony to a post-colonial
state, which was structured and internalized by global and regional conflicts and deep
contestation for hegemony between the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot political

3
forces. This is why we have a resulting in a distorted public sphere, which shaped Cypriot
civil society accordingly.

The migration issue lends itself as a key issue in understanding the relationship between
state-party-society. This as the result of a massive transformation from the 1990s to meet
labour shortages, which led Cyprus to open its doors to migrant workers, who now form over
one fifth of its working population, with certain sectors dominated by migrant labour
(Planning Bureau 2012).1 Most domestic workers originate from South East Asia and
especially the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and India. The main sectors, in which migrant workers
are employed, are agriculture, manufacturing, construction, hotels, restaurants, and trade. In
the latter three sectors, the majority of migrant workers originate from Central and Eastern
Europe and, particularly, the Balkans. In the former three sectors, which are low skill, low-
status, and hard working environments, a significant number of Asian workers are employed.
Overall, long term immigrants work and reside under a more favourable regime have a better
chance of getting acquainted with rules and procedures, and of joining trade unions. Their
salaries tend to be higher and many have their families with them. The number of irregular or
undocumented migrants is estimated between 25,000 and 35,000. Irregular migration is the
subject of fierce public debates in the media and amongst social partners. The immigration
issue has become the additional crucial factor transforming the ideological/political divide;
this is structurally connected to the nation formation, social and economic issues. There are
various aspects here: the first is structural aspect which has imposed an migration
authoritarian regime on migrants in what has been falsely depicted as a ‘consensus’ and the
second is the ideological, political and technocratic divide over the subject of ‘migration
management’, ‘order’, ‘cohesion’ etc. The second aspect is particularly relevant to the party
system in Greek-Cypriot politics.

The structural aspect is super-imposed by longer-term processes related to the

state/society/economy in a divided country under the general rubric of exceptionalism. Any
understanding of the question of migration within party discourses has to take this as a given
political fact that economic development is premised on an authoritarian migration regime, a
particular ‘state of exception’ (Constantinou 2008; Trimikliniotis 2009; 2013). Expounded
originally by Carl Schmidt the logic that exceptional situations require that rules of legal

1
Non-Cypriots make up 21,6% of the labour force. The total population of Cyprus is just over one million;
the population in the southern part of the country under the control of the RoC is 838,897, whilst the
population in the unrecognized ‘TRNC’ (north) is hotly debated.

4
normality be suspended to conserve the order of things (Schmidt 2005; Agamben 2009). The
migration regime in Cyprus is both increasingly Europeanized and simultaneously localized.
Migration regimes are typically found in many liberal capitalist states. When it comes to
immigration and asylum, the EU legal order has by and large supplemented and modified
rather than replaced the national legal order. Over and above, the Cypriot migration state of
exception has certain vital specificities derived from the particular historical antecedents that
shaped the so-called ‘Cyprus problem’.

There is a ready-made tradition in the form of Supreme Court jurisprudence from the 1960s,
the so-called ‘doctrine of necessity’, which grants wide executive discretion due to the
exceptional measures required (Trimikliniotis 2013). This is the legal and policy setting the
migration regime operates upon. Moreover, the migration regime is premised on the logic of
temporary cheap labour for the purposes of development as a strategic decision in the late
1980s. At the time, the Government responded to the labour shortages by introducing a
system of migrant labour, based on sharp distinctions between two classes of migrants: (a)
elite migrants, who would invest, and/or bring their entrepreneurship, know-how and
networks, whose presence would be as stable and permanent as possible; (b) the vast majority
of migrant workers, who would be temporary for jobs Cypriots were not interested. TCNs
have a worse situation than EUNs, however the vast majority of EU migrant workers are also
subaltern migrants.

An indication of how elite migrants operate and have linkages with Cypriot state and political
elites is exemplified in the system devised for citizenship acquisition for rich investors. TCNs
may acquire citizenship via a fast-track system, if they can bring large sums of money in the
form of investments in the country. Following the bail-in crisis in 2013, the newly elected
government introduced an enhanced citizenship-for-investment scheme,2 whereby the
Council of Ministers decides the naturalisation of foreign business people and investors who
do not otherwise fulfil the requirements of the law. For 2013 a total of 1221 persons were
naturalised and for 2014 a total of 1807. From these, 134 (11%) and 721 (40%) were
honorary/exceptional cases for the respective years. By far the most numerous groups on the
basis of their previous nationality are the Russians, followed by the Ukrainians.

2
Cyprus Council of Ministers decision, 19 March 2013. Available at:
http://eudocitizenship.eu/NationalDB/docs/CYP%20Decision%20of%20the%20Council%20of%20Ministers
%20 dated%2019.3.14.pdf [Accessed 20 April 2014].

5
With wide discretion by the Council of Ministers as a manifestation of state sovereignty,
there is a generous outcome for elite migrants. The schemes contain social class-based
criteria, which raises questions of double standards; the vast majority of TCNs, including
refugees, who have resided for years in the country face serious bureaucratic and other
barriers in accessing citizenship.

The Left-Right ideological/political divide of parties

The division of party system along the left-right ideological/political lines is augmented as
the traditional left-right divide is mediated by factors that seem to crosscut the divide. They
can be viewed as ‘axes of the political divide’ in Greek-Cypriot politics in three fields: (a) the
socio-economic order; (b) the Cyprus problem; (c) the social issues axis (i.e.
multiculturalism, homosexuality, abortion, and religious freedom/recognition), which
generate a sharp cleavage. The immigration issue is central here as it is connected to the
process of nation formation, as well as to a bundle of social and economic issues (see
Trimikliniotis 2005a; 2005b). This schematic divide illustrates the analytical divisions that
exist, where the question of migration has been a crucial aspect in the ‘social questions’ in
political discourses. Given the specific historico-political context of Cyprus and the
protracted ‘ethnic conflict’ or ‘national problem’ that keeps this micro-state divided, coupled
with the fact that immigration is a very recent phenomenon stretching only twenty-five years
back, the political divide over the policies towards migrants and immigration does not
necessarily correspond to other European contexts. Nevertheless, we can observe that since
EU accession, debates in the Greek-Cypriot public domain have been increasingly informed
by debates in other EU countries, mostly Greece and to a lesser extent the UK. It can be
safely assumed that forces on the traditional political Right generally tend to be more
xenophobic, racist and anti-immigrant than those of the centre or left; however, closer
examination is required.

Political parties are undeniably important in Greek-Cypriot politics; however not only this is
often overstated, ignoring deeper structural forces at play, but often the critiques of the
dominance of parties are closely connected to the assumption that Cyprus suffers from
‘deficient modernisation’ or ‘civil society underdevelopment’; in liberal discourses anti-
immigrant discourses and xenophobia are often blamed on the same assumptions. However,
the way the migration question is played in Greek-Cypriot politics undermines some of these
assumptions. In the postcolonial context of Cyprus, it is false to assume that there is a

6
homogeneous thing as ‘the party’ in general: party formations vary significantly from the
structures which pivot around a traditional or charismatic leader, who runs a clientele, to tiny
sectarian groupings of the extreme right through to mass modern parties. The ideological and
political divide distinguishes parties in their modus operandi, their organisational structure,
membership, style and very politics they espouse; for instance the way the mass Cypriot
communist party, AKEL (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού, Progressive Party of
Working People), approaches migrants and migration is very different from the way
approached by the other mass party of Cyprus, DISY (Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός -
Democratic Rally) which is the party of the traditional Hellenocentric right. We can certainly
juxtapose certain parties in Cyprus, which resemble what can be termed as a ‘traditional
clientelistic’ and ‘backward’ formation to the Weberian ideal type of parties as ‘rational-
legal’ formations of the modern era to realize group goals, which are according to ‘the
children of democracy’ (Weber 1991:102). However, to assume that the former would
necessarily or somehow automatically be more inclined towards intolerance, prejudice and
racism when compared to the latter is certainly inaccurate. Racism and anti-immigrant
ideologies and practices are often found and legitimised in rational-legal settings and ‘pro-
modern’ parties; the example of Nazism in Germany is the most obvious example.

The assumption that the maltreatment of (subaltern) migrants is somehow the result of ‘civil
society deficiencies’, i.e. Cypriot society is simply ‘not modern enough’, must be at least
qualified, if not questioned on a fundamental basis. Cyprus demonstrates a type of advanced
modernisation in late capitalism premised on two strategies: expansion of finance and
banking capitalism with related services on the one hand; and on the other hand, cheap labour
via super-exploitation of subaltern migrants in order to achieve high levels of growth and
continue its ‘economic miracle’. It is therefore not a question of ‘more modernisation’ that
would enable Cyprus to ‘catch up’ with the rest of Europe, but the kind of modernisation, that
combines a different kind of politics that addresses migration, racism, gender and class.
Eastern Mediterranean societies, in the post-Ottoman settings in Middle East, subjected to
British colonialism generate levels of sophistication in the social structures and institutions
and forms of co-existence, wars/conflicts over the years.

As regard the migration issue, it seems that political parties not are the key drivers and real
decision-makers. Rather, other state structures, such as immigration authorities, police, the
attorney general’s office, the judiciary operating in conjunction with civil society institutions,
such as tycoon-owned media and businesses, are instrumental in generating the domestic

7
immigration regime. Despite the formal commitment to equal treatment, human rights and
fair treatment of migrants, EUNs and TCNs, there is another ‘deeper’ level of policy-making.
This is reproducing and amplifying the racialisation of migrants and anti-immigrant politics.
Political parties, particularly those of the right and/or of nationalistic leanings, are
increasingly used as vehicles for promoting such policies and the anti-immigrant politics of
racial hatred and xenophobia. It has not been ‘the party’ as such that has led these politics;
rather these parties seem to tail behind opportunistically in what they perceive as a trend in
their constituency, or at least try to compete against racist/anti-immigrant ‘entrepreneurs’ and
newcomers in politics who try to find a quick way to the top using anti-immigrant discourse.
It is only after accession to EU that anti-immigrant/ racist politics has become a crucial theme
in party competition.

Linkage, representation and participation of subaltern migrants: From invisible

Gastarbeiter to an emerging constituency?

Kafala, Gastarbeiter and personae non gratae

A major problem in understanding how migrants fit in the party system and each political
party of Cyprus is that the vast majority of migrants, the subaltern migrants, are absent. This
does not necessarily apply to elite migrants, who are part of what Panayiotou in this book
refers to as ‘the invisible elites’. From the perspective of the permanent right to abode, settle,
vote and be elected these migrants are essentially personae non gratae, literally unwelcome
persons. A small number of them have settlement rights as long-term residents and an even
smaller number are citizens; but these are the exceptions. A consensus in the deal allowing
TCNs to enter was that the vast majority are here for reasons of their temporary (guest)
labour; they will not stay for more than four years, hence they cannot obtain long-term
residency rights. This is the basis of the absence of the linkage, representation and
participation of migrant workers in political life. Therefore in terms of the party constitution,
the organisational frame, the modus operandi and the habitus of the party cadres, migrant
workers are there as temporary guest labour, Gastarbeiter; they are not part of the public
sphere, except for some charity cases in rare occasions.

8
From 1990 the criteria for granting permits were premised on the policy assumption that the
employment of migrant workers would be short-term, temporary, restricted to specific sectors
and to specific employers (Planning Bureau 1989;; Trimikliniotis 1999). Various government
officials have been vociferous in raising their ‘concern’ about immigrants in Cyprus and have
been accused by NGOs and International bodies for being ‘anti-immigrant’ and ‘racist’. From
the early 1990s, subaltern migrants were depicted as being a ‘cancer’ in society with
Government Minister C. Aggelidou expressing fears about the creation of ‘another minority
in free Cyprus, totally alien to our religious and cultural traditions’ (KYKEM 1995).

A quarter of century later, the policy predictions proved to be ill founded. The first National
Action Plan for the Integration of Immigrants in Cyprus was approved in 2010 (Trimikliniotis
2009a; 2010a and Trimikliniotis and Souroulla 2006a; 2006b; 2010); however, the official
recognition that the country is a migrant destination has hardly resulted in a consensus in
politics; on the contrary it merely illustrated the dissensus. The Left-wing Government tried
to push the agenda forward responding to the EU policy that provided funding for national
action plan for integration, despite opposition. When the new government came into office in
February 2013, it essentially stalled the process; the new Minister rather than engaging in an
official review of the policy as recommended by the outgoing Minister, he chose an anti-
immigrant rhetoric: At a highly controversial public meeting he attacked irregular migrants
‘for taking the jobs of Cypriots’ and called human rights organisations ‘industries which
invent human rights’.3 Moreover, he gave the Director on Population and Migration a free
hand to pursue repressive policies to expel migrants.

The right to vote

Among the many reasons for the non-integration, non-participation and exclusion of
migrants, most of which are related to the stringent conditions of work and residence, and
moreover the unfavourable immigration regime,. is also the fact that until a few years back,
the standard contract of employment of migrant workers supplied by the Ministry of Labour
prohibited migrants’ political participation; this clause was removed following the
intervention of the Equality Body, in the frame of investigating a complaint about it.

3
Minister of Interior, Socrates Hasikos: “Ο κάθε παράνομος παίρνει το ψωμί από δικό μας άνθρωπο”- [Each illegal
migrant is takiing the bread of our people]., Available HTTP: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5MwX2CEWis
(accessed 4 April 2014)

9
The fact that non-EU migrants have no right to vote at any level4 contributes to their being
ignored by politicians across the board. The few cultural/ self-help / religious organisations of
migrants do not really fill the gap created by the restrictions in their political and civic
participation from the stringent immigration regime, societal intolerance, racism and
discrimination faced across the board and their lack of voting rights (Trimikliniotis and
Demetriou 2008; 2014). Studies converge on the assumption that migrants in Cyprus have
little political activity, at least one that is recognised officially. The Migrant Integration
Policy Index (MIPEX), which locates Cyprus in a generally unfavourable integration
position, provides a point of departure and comparison across the EU: Cyprus is only one out
of five EU member states where the majority of non-nationals are from other EU countries.
Legislative developments have been restricted to the delayed transposition of the EC
Directives on family reunion and long-term residence, as well as some minor amendments to
the laws transposing the two anti-discrimination Directives, in order to bring the transposing
legislation in line with the equality acquis.

Certain categories of migrants were exceptionally seen as potential voters once settled. For
instance Greek nationals, particularly Pontic Greeks, who came to Cyprus early on. In the
1990s and early 2000s Pontic Greeks were depicted as troublemakers by the media but this
has subsided since (Charakis 2005; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2008). Some EUNs and
TCNs settled in Cyprus, particularly if they are professionals and/or married to Cypriots, are
also seen as potential voters. However, these constitute only a fraction of the migrant
population on the island.

It is no surprise, therefore, that political parties have traditionally not been interested in
building links or representing migrants in general; it was not a vote-winner. If anything, it
was more convenient to ignore the subject. Parties have links via funding etc. to the small
minority of the privileged migrants, but little if any links to the vast majority of migrant
workers, who are producers of wealth for Cypriots. It is estimated that 54% of economic
growth between the years 1995 to 2004 is due to the labour of TCNs (Michael et. al. 2005),
hence their labour power allowed for the extension of the ‘economic miracle’. Neither
category was perceived as a potential constituency i.e. parties did not enter the political game
seeking their votes. The former were part of what Panayiotou (in this volume) calls “the

4
Law N. 98(I)/2004 provides for the right of EU nationals to elect and be elected in local elections.

10
invisible elites”, the latter were the opposite, the subaltern, who were visible in work but
‘ought’ to remain invisible in politics.

The positions of the parties on immigration, the rights of ethnic groups and combating
discrimination are indicative. In 2011 DISY positioned itself5 in favour of ‘lawful’ migration
and against ‘unlawful’ migration. However, when it came to power in 2013 and was faced
with the collapse of the economy, it started encouraging employers to hire only Cypriots. A
few days after his election as President of the RoC (Republic of Cyprus), on 6 March 2013,
Nicos Anastasiades presented a policy proposal to employers and workers’ unions for the
employment of ‘primarily Cypriots’ based on a gentlemen’s agreement. The trade unions
were positively inclined towards this proposal. The Equality Body warned that this policy is
discriminatory violating the free movement acquis.

On migration there are some individual MPs from EDEK (Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Ένωση
Κέντρου, Unified Democratic Union of the Centre) who are vehemently anti-immigrant,
whilst others are more positive. EVROKO (Ευρωπαϊκό Κόμμα, European Party) often
expresses anti-immigrant sentiments but the party with the most xenophobic and racist
discourse is, by far, ELAM (Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο, National Popular Front), which also
receives funding from Greece’s Golden Dawn and regularly engages in anti-immigrant and
anti-Turkish public events and street mobilizations. AKEL is the only party whose official
positions make reference to combating racism and discrimination (e.g. AKEL 2014) but has
no refined policies beyond those designed by the relevant Ministers of the Christofias
government between 2008 and 2013.

Exceptions to the states of exception

AKEL was the first party to see migrants differently, even if it is primarily focused on
defending the indigenous working class: in fact in the beginning the party seemed rather
cautious on fully engaging with migrant workers, as the change of policy allowing migrant
labour was essentially an employer-led strategy to reduce local wages. Once it became
obvious that migrant workers was a permanent feature of society, it decided that the only way
to protect worker wages and rights is to organise them. It has the most ‘advanced’ position
and relation with migrants; there are some migrant party members and the mass allied

5
Press Conference of DISY on immigration policy, 11 March 2011, Nicosia.

11
organisations, such as the trade union, PEO (Παγκύπρια Εργατική Ομοσπονδία - Pancyprian
Labour Federation), and local associations (syllogoi) have connections and members (see
Chapter by Charalambous and Christophorou in this volume). AKEL proclaims to be
internationalist, committed to the cause of the working class; it is the only party with a clear
anti-racist agenda. There are no migrants elected as representatives of political parties,
initiatives and movements. The exception is AKEL, the only party that has a third country
national (now naturalised) in the party leadership; Mohammad Shaban is a member of the
105-member Central Committee of the party.

In general, AKEL has cooperated for some time with migrant and migrant-support groups;
particularly those, which historically have political ties, such as the Palestinians and the
Kurds. However, links are not as strong with other communities, e.g. African or other Asian
groups. For instance, the party maintains long-standing links with the Palestinian community
and these relations are mediated by the political linkages with the Communist Party of Israel
as well as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (Interview with member of AKEL’s
International Bureau). An example of this is the journalist Panayiotis Paschalis, who worked
for Haravgi, the newspaper of AKEL: Paschalis was sentenced to five years imprisonment in
1977 on charges of spying for the Palestinians; he spent two and a half years behind bars,
despite repeated protests by the Cyprus Government (The Jewish Floridian 1978). All he did
was to interview Palestinians and Israelis, Terre Fleener and Sami Esmail (Rubin 1977).
These linkages are strong and are maintained. Moreover, the international bureau and the
migrant bureau of AKEL retain close relations with Left-wing groups and parties within the
Kurdish, the Iranian and the Iraqi communities in Cyprus.

On the question of immigration, AKEL takes a rather cautious approach, largely reflecting
the position of PEO. It gradually became more positive about the issue. At its 18th Congress,
in 1995, pledged that it ‘will work so that foreign workers employed in Cyprus get the same
treatment as their Cypriot colleagues and will decisively fight against possible phenomena of
racism and xenophobia’ (AKEL 1995: 40). Subsequent congresses pledge, in a more decisive
rhetoric, to fight racism. However, ‘illegal foreign workers’ are referred to as ‘a problem’ and
the party calls upon the Government to take ‘drastic measures to put an end to the illegal
employment of foreign workers’. Similar provisions are repeated.

The left (AKEL, PEO, EDON (Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Οργάνωση Νεολαίας, Unified
Democratic Youth Organization)) have come some way from the mid-1990s. The congresses

12
of PEO since 2004 have shifted decidedly into taking an active anti-racist position with a
class solidarity point of reference moving away from the defensive positions which adopted
the ‘job stealing frame’ that views migrants as a cultural threat to the cohesion of the nation.
Whilst the statements by PEO and its newspaper had always referred to ‘defending the rights
of ‘foreign’ workers, insisting that ‘PEO is not against foreign workers’ (Ergatiko Vima
1993), the tone and argument was very different: PEO regularly called upon the government
to take all necessary measures to put an end to the ‘illegal employment of aliens’ (PEO 1995:
64; 66). There is now a distinct shift in the emphasis towards the rights of migrants; however,
employers are still often criticised by PEO members for sacking Cypriots and employing
migrants. The percentages of migrants per trade union sector in PEO, which include EU
nationals (these are not distinguished in their data): For PEO they are all migrant workers
who have specific concerns and require specific organisational approaches.

Table 10.2 about here

Still, reality has it that PEO has thousands of migrant members; even SEK (Συνομοσπονδία
Εργαζομένων Κύπρου - Cyprus Workers Confederation), the right-wing trade union has a
few thousand migrant members. SEK trade unionists claim migrant percentages similar to
PEO, but no data has been made available.

TCNs are organised mostly at shop floor level; migrants are not elected in the leadership of
trade unions. This reflects the fact that the vast majority of third country migrant workers stay
in Cyprus on a short term basis and do not have an interest to get settled and be elected in
leadership positions (Interview with officer of migrant support group). Often they feel
intimidated and frightened to be identified as trade unionists for fear of losing their jobs and
getting deported (Interview with trade unionist of PEO).

As for migrant and diaspora associations and organisations, these are little known outside
their own secluded spaces. They are mostly operating as cultural and social associations,
rather than activistic or representation groups. Some, however, aspire to support and help
their members with problems they face but this is done ad hoc, on a case-by-case and
voluntary basis, as they often do not have the resources, capacity, networks and know-how to
play such a role (Interviews with officers of NGOs Future Worlds Centre, Africa Diaspora

13
Association and activist from the Indian community). For instance, the Africa Diaspora
society claims to be in contact with 200 African-origin migrants and regularly meets to
discuss various problems but they cannot address issues that are related to discrimination or
support at the macro level (Interview with a committee member of the Africa Diaspora
Association). Another activist from the Indian community similarly noted the difficulties in
addressing various problems, given that they have no funding or support from the state or
local authorities to take up the cases themselves (Interview with a migrant activist from the
Indian community). Palestinian, Syrian, Kurdish, Iraqi and Iranian groups also exist; they
retain a strong ethnic/national identity and these associations are also quite politicised with
some contacts and networks with various political parties. The Association of recognised
refugees in Cyprus,6 which has some financial and facility support from the UNHCR,
depends heavily on other agencies to address issues related to furthering the rights of
refugees.

It is only trade unions, some NGOs and those EU-funded projects in the municipality multi-
functional centres that address the needs and concerns of subaltern migrants. But few NGOs
have the capacity to offer services, particularly on matters such as combating racial
discrimination and representation on immigration-related affairs. A shelter for women
victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation was run by the Russian Church in Cyprus.
Support for women victims of violence, including a shelter, is offered by the Association for
Handling and Preventing Violence in the Family. Various self-help organisations exist but
require support and training if they are to act as advocates for their communities.
Organisations such as KISA (Κίνηση για Ισότητα, Στήριξη, Αντιρατσισμό, Movement for
Equality, Support, Anti-racism) run a centre supporting migrants; Future Worlds offers legal
advice to asylum seekers. PEO runs a Migrant Workers’ Bureau that combats discrimination
at work. Overall, we are dealing with a civil society-civil society linkage that functions
outside the political sphere.

Political Parties and Discourses of Anti-Immigrant Racism

6
www.facebook.com/AssociationOfRecognizedRefugeesCyprus

14
The party systems in both sectors of the divided society, the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-
Cypriot, have been primarily organised around the Cyprus problem and local issues. Up to
the days of accession to the EU, immigration had been an issue at the level of discourse, but
political parties did not have clearly defined policies that pointed in a definitive way to a
political cleavage. There is a local tradition of far right parties in the Republic of Cyprus,
which are anti-Turkish and far right parties in the northern part of the country, the
unrecognised ‘TRNC’ (‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’), which are anti-Greek. At
least in the south, there were hidden or indirect references to racist politics in the discourse of
the smaller far right parties through a deep suspicion of anything that is Turkish, usually
hidden in and intertwined with anti-occupation discourses and discourses relating to the rights
of Greek-Cypriot displaced persons.

Manifestations of this phenomenon may be found primarily, but not exclusively, in the
discourse of right-wing and nationalist politicians. Particularly in the years immediately
following the change of policy in 1990, there was a ‘defensive’ and xenophobic response by
many trade unionists as well, themselves closely affiliated to political parties (see Ioannou in
this volume). Trade unions gave their consent to the change of policy allowing migrant
workers under certain conditions but they resented the regular violation of the agreed terms
by employers. The attitudes of the trade unions have changed over time and hard-line
positions were softened, as they started recruiting members amongst the migrants themselves.
However, there are two opposite trends/attitudes within the trade union movement as to the
treatment of migrant workers and the gap between them seems to be increasingly widening
over time: (a) those who see ‘foreign’ workers as a ‘threat’ to Cypriot workers, adopting the
typical ‘job stealing’, ‘causing unemployment’ and ‘welfare abusing’ frames and a ‘threat to
national cohesion’, such as the right-wing SEK and to a large extent the social-democratic
DEOK (Δημοκρατική Εργατική Ομοσπονδία Κύπρου - Democratic Labour Federation of
Cyprus) and (b) those who stress the need to integrate and involve the migrant workers within
the trade unions such as left-wing PEO, which has set up a ‘Migrant Workers Bureau’ elected
from the first ever and only one so far trade union-organised ‘Conference of Migrant
Workers’. It has to be noted that both the above contrasting views are on several occasions

15
aired in all unions but a close examination of their discourse in their position papers and
statements shows a clearly predominant opinion or dominant frame in each trade union. The
farmers’ associations, whose members rely on cheap migrant labour, have repeatedly
protested demanding exemption from their legal obligation to pay social security for their
migrant staff; this was based on the ground that these employees are seasonal and the
amounts of money paid by the employers towards their social insurance do not go to the
employees anyway, as there are no bilateral government agreements between Cyprus and
their countries.

There is certainly a constituency amongst the Cypriot public that is anti-immigrant. When
examining the party manifestos and the ideological programs of political parties, there is no
observable combination of xenophobic ethno-nationalism (based on the so-called ethno-
pluralist doctrine) and anti-political establishment populism, although there is an emphasis on
other socio-cultural issues, such as more ‘law-and-order’ and a call to strengthen ‘traditional
family norms’. Disparate ideas and ‘concerns’ are all blended in the ideologies and discourses
with various issues taking the lead depending on context, time and expediency. There is
nevertheless some common thread somewhere: they seem to share ‘concern’, which in
practice verges on obsession, on issues such as ‘immigration, national security,
unemployment, culture, anti-communism, globalization, Europe, corruption, moral questions
and identity’ (Hainsworth 2000: 2-3). Most of these elements are strongly present in the
public discourses over migrants in Cyprus.

Yet, there are intra-party differences of such a scale on the subject of immigration that one is
able to observe within the same political party variations, from staunchly pro-immigrant
attitudes and arguments about the positive contribution of immigrants to the economy, culture
and society, to outright hostility and anti-immigrant sentiments. Generally speaking, the
intellectual circles close to the left, whose points of reference are the working class and
internationalist solidarity, as well as some cosmopolitan and liberal circles of the centre-left,
tend to be more sensitive towards immigrant rights. Tolerant sections from the centre-right
and right-wing parties see them with a liberal economic light, as ‘necessary for the economy’,
essentially reflecting more the employers’ positions and interests. However, the left is divided
as to the effect of immigration on welfare and employment rights of Cypriots, reflecting the
trade unions’ general reluctance over the presence of migrant workers as a source of cheap,
docile and unorganised labour to be used by employers against the organised and class-
conscious local working class. Nationalists and conservatives on the other hand are generally

16
hostile to migrants, but the actual attitudes and frames with which they articulate their
opposition tend to vary considerably depending on their constituency, their political leanings
and reasons of expediency, as well as on ideological grounds..

There are elements of a new type of racism connected to the rise of far right violence and
discourses of hatred in politics. In the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, ELAM
contested the elections and received 663 votes (0.22 percent); at the time it received no media
coverage. ELAM reproduced the usual racist slogans claiming that it is the only party that
speaks for the ‘liberation of our enslaved lands, the ending of the privileges of the ‘greedy’
Turkish-Cypriots and for a Europe of Nations and traditions which belongs to the ‘real’
Europeans and not to the ‘third-worldly’ [backward] illegal immigrants’. In the national
parliamentary elections of 2011 ELAM received 4,354 votes, scoring 1.08% of the votes, the
largest percentage amongst the parties that did not elect an MP and quite close to the electoral
threshold of 1.8%. This, in spite the general belief that ELAM is behind several racist attacks
against unsuspecting migrants and Turkish Cypriots, often taking place in public spaces
under broad daylight.

The recently emerging organised racist lobby, with an anti-immigration and xenophobic
agenda, has found affiliates in mainstream political parties and in media outlets. There are
many publications and regular media discourses about the imminent and grave ‘dangers’
from ‘Afro-asiatic’, ‘Muslim-Asiatic’ and ‘Turko-asiatic’ hordes that are ready to invade
Cyprus as part of a plan orchestrated by Turkey to change the demographic character of
Cyprus through illegal immigration; a leaflet was also widely circulated to this effect. 7
Political competition itself is at work here: the emergence of ELAM may have contributed to
the traditional right becoming more stringent on immigration, when in previous years they
wanted to appear more ‘liberal’. An example of this is how the current President, Nicos
Anastasiades switched his immigration rhetoric just before the election of 2013; from an
integration issue he made it into a ‘law and order’ issue. Moreover, one of his first policies
once in office was to punish asylum-seekers by imposing coupons/vouchers rather than
continuing with the monetary benefits they enjoyed until then.

There is an increasingly loud and frequent public discourse, which utilises signifiers to direct
Greek-Cypriots against migrants and Turkish Cypriots, inciting racial and religious hatred via

7
Organisations called ‘Movement for the Salvation of Cyprus’ and ‘Movement for a European Future of Cyprus’ were
set up in 2005; the same people in 2013 set up the ‘Institute for Demographic Policy’, institutionally supported by the
Ministry of Interior.

17
the substitutes of ‘race’ such as other essential or inherent or hereditary characteristics which
derive, not from blood or DNA, but from culture, language, migration and religion, in what
scholars refer to as ‘neo-racism’ (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991). These are regularly
articulated in the mainstream press and media. Media discourses are employing the usual
racist frames comparable to those of other EU countries, such as ethno-nationalistic, conflict-
criminality, welfare-chauvinist, job-stealing, ‘threat to liberal norms’, biological racism and
national specific frames (Trimikliniotis 2005a). A recent study on the role of the media in
migrant integration found that this is lacking in the media in Cyprus: the language of
journalistic discourse rather than promoting the principles of precision, pluralism and the
lifting of stereotyping representations, is instead largely promoting racist rhetoric and
grammar (CUT 2014).

Particular individuals within various political parties, including centre-right mainstream

parties, various newly-formed committees, as well as neo-Nazi groups argue that asylum-
seekers, migrants and Turkish-Cypriots are abusing the Cypriot welfare benefit system
ripping the ‘golden benefits’ (Rotsas 2010) of ‘the Cypriot paradise’ and making Cypriots
‘second class citizens’ (Morfitis 2013). They criticise the Minister of Interior for his ‘liberal’
migration policy,8 sometimes even going as far as labelling him as an agent who conspires to
distort the population and de-Hellenize Cyprus (see Rotsas 2009; Morfitis 2013). Asylum-
seekers, refugees and migrants are described as ‘invaders’ as ‘a fifth column against the
Greek element of free Cyprus’, claiming that ‘Hellenism is threatened from asylum-seekers
as it is threatened by colonists/settlers in the Turkish occupied territories’ (Rotsas 2010).
Such discourses aired regularly by the media are creating a climate, which is conducive to
racial and other hatred. Such is the influence and power of the media that when the Equality
Body embarked upon the drafting of a Code of Conduct on how ethnic communities and
immigrants should be portrayed in the media, the result was a watered-down non-binding set
of guidelines and an extensive explanation of why ‘freedom of the press’ should not be
‘interfered with’.

The peak of anti-immigrant action reached a violent point with the anti-racist Rainbow
Festival of November 2010, and the anti-immigrant riots around the event, which created the
political landscape as regards public depiction of what discourse, ideologies and practices can
be tolerated in a democratic polity. The politicization of anti-immigration took a new twist in

8
His reply to the Minister of Interior is hosted on the EVROKO official website
http://www.evropaikokomma.org/main/1,0,837,166- [Accessed 20 March 2015].

18
legitimizing ethno-racial and religious intolerance; however, since 2010 new processes of
anti-racial and anti-immigrant reactions were generated, which are endowing an anti-
immigrant, anti-Turkish agenda as a public issue in Greek-Cypriot politics. These somehow
subsided in 2011-2012 combined with the austerity measures imposed as a result of the
banking and economic crisis, which made the left-wing government the main target for all
opposition groups. By 2013, the new right-wing coalition government took office and its
decision to agree to a ‘haircut’ as part of a ‘bail-in’ package has dominated the political
agenda. However, anti-immigrant politics has re-emerged as a subtheme for those who
attempt to racialize and capitalise on the massive growth of unemployment and increase in
poverty. . There was a heightened anti-immigrant activity of the far right groups and racial
violence against migrants since 2004 (see Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2010; 2012); this
seems to have subsided a little during the Cyprus Presidency of the European Council in July
2012 but it has resurfaced when ELAM attacked the conference in Limassol where former
Turkish Cypriot president Mehmet Ali Talat was the main speaker in March 2014. Cypriot
society is yet to witness the impact of Golden Dawn entering the Greek Parliament on the
type and level of activity of ELAM and the other far right groups, but racially intolerant
discourse has also been prominent in Greek-Cypriot debates over migration. Migrant
integration in Cyprus is engendering old and breeding new forms of racial, ethnic, religious
intolerance and hatred: those on the anti-immigrant right, particularly small but virulent neo-
Nazis and far right groups express an intense feeling of being threatened by the immigration
and the need to re-affirm the ‘national heritage’ of the country, as they see it, via drastic anti-
immigrant action. In the context of what is seen as a ‘national emergency’ of a siege
mentality, whereby ‘the enemy is already in the city’, this means coercion and violence. Any
‘drastic’ acts are depicted as either ‘self-defence’ or ‘legitimate reaction/retaliation’ for the
state’s alleged failure to take resolute action to ‘secure’ the nation’s survival.

Conclusion: The migration issue and parties reconsidered

From the study of the migration issue, there is little to support the notion of the all-powerful
party as the key decision-maker. In fact the central loci of decision-making and power at
large in society are not to be found within and between political parties and as such their
power-logic does not permeate society as a whole. Major aspects regarding the migration
issues – i.e. political, economic, social, ideological and cultural – are not decided, mediated

19
and/or augmented as a result of the operation of political parties. Nonetheless, it is also true
that subaltern immigrants remain subaltern, at least partly, because parties do not help,
approach, or treat them as sources of social capital.

The racialisation processes of migrants are closely interconnected to both the ideologies of
nationalism and racism, as well as to economic exploitation and oppression. The chapter
addressed migration as a political, social, economic and ideological issue in Cypriot politics,
concentrating on Greek-Cypriot politics amongst political parties and the dialectic resulting
from the presence and action of migrants as subjects and objects of political affairs. In
contrast to readings that tend to homogenise migrants, the argument here is that there are vital
differences and differentials between different groups of migrants based on factors such as
class, race/ethnicity, nationality, gender and migration/nationality status and other markers of
social differentiation. There is no ‘automatic’ process, however, in crises which leads to the
denial of migrant or other vulnerable group rights; the policy choices are ideological and
defined by the political and social struggles in the conjuncture. As shown, save for AKEL,
mainstream mass political parties have few visible links with immigrants. Yet, there is a
paradox that there exists a consensus but a dissensus over the issue. On the street and in the
mainstream and social media, this is much more apparent. At least, over the last decade there
has been witnessed the development of numerous initiatives and mobilizations of resistance
to the racialization of subaltern migrants. If the country is to overcome the current logic of
exceptionalism, which serves as a justification for repressing migration and migrants, more
radical rethinking is required.

From this emerges the necessity to fundamentally question and transcend the very logic of
exceptionalism as normal sovereign acts. The dissensus is generated because there has
emerged a serious challenge to the various states of exception, a body of thought that
proposes a wholly different approach to how migrants are being perceived and how they are
structurally located in Cypriot and more broadly European society.

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Interviews

Interview with member of AKEL’s international Bureau, 30 March 2015, Nicosia.

Interview with officer of migrant support group 28 March 215, Nicosia.
Interview with trade unionist of PEO, 20 March 215, Nicosia.
Interviews with officers of NGOs Future Worlds Centre 15 March 2015, Nicosia,
Interview with a committee member of the Africa Diaspora Association, 10 March 215,
Nicosia
Interview with a migrant activist from the Indian community, 15 March 2015, Nicosia.
Interview with former Minister of Interior, 11 Μarch 2015, Nicosia.
Interview with officer of migrant support group, 16 April 2015, Nicosia.

26