CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Atty. Edgar RamonES Lara

Article III
Bill of
Rights
 A Bill of Rights is a list of the
most important rights of
citizens. The purpose is to
protect these rights against
infringement by the state. It is
a limitation on the intrusion
on these rights by the state.
•
Republic of the Philippines
v. Sandiganbayan, GR No.
104768, July 21, 2003.
• a) Was the Bill of Rights, in general, and
the right against unreasonable search and
seizure and the exclusion of illegally
seized evidence, in particular, not availing
from February 25 to March 26, 1986? (the
interregnum)
• b) Is a Bill of Rights or a Constitution
necessary in order that a person may
exercise and be protected by his rights?
 Section 1. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal
protection of the law.

Due process of law clause; equal

protection of the laws clause.
•
Bill of Rights contain mandates against
the state. Why?
Does not govern relations between
private persons.

As a general rule, the Bill of Rights

applies to filipino citizens and aliens
alike.
Exception?
• Police power. (Ermita Hotel and Motel
Operators v. Mayor of Manila, GR No. L-
24693, July 31, 1967).
• May be delegated to local governments.
(Legaspi vs City of Cebu, GR 15911,
December 10, 2013)
Test of a valid Ordinance. (Fernando vs.
St. Scholastica’s College, GR. No.
161107, March 12, 2013)
• Cannot go beyond mere regulation into
prohibition. (De la cruz v. Judge Paras,
GR No. 42571-71, July 25, 1983)
• Local governments cannot contravene
the judgment of congress not to
prohibit gambling. (Magtajas v. Price
Properties, 234 SCRA 255, 268 (1994).
• Rights protected under the due process
clause of the constitution.
•
• The exercise of police power is subject
to judicial inquiry.
• The principal yardstick against which
the exercise of police power may be
measured. US vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85,
1910.
• The extent of the right to life that is
protected by the constitution.
• The right to liberty is not simply
freedom from bodily restraint.
• The extent of the right to property that
is protected by the constitution.
• Hierarchy of rights protected by the
constitution.
• Primacy of human rights over property
rights demonstrated.
• Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills
Co., Inc., 50 SCRA 189, 1973.

• Two aspects of due process of law: the

procedural and substantive aspects.
• Procedural due process is a guarantee
of procedural fairness.
• There are different sets of requirements
of procedural due process in judicial
proceedings, in administrative
proceedings and even in student
discipline cases.
• Requirements of procedural due
process in judicial proceedings: Banco
Espanol Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil 921
(1918).
• The requirements of procedural due
process of law in administrative
proceedings. Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil
635 (1940).
• The requirements of procedural due
process in student discipline cases.
Guzman v. National University, 142 SCRA
699 (1986).
• Considered the heart of due process.
• Whether in judicial or administrative
proceedings, the heart of procedural due
process is the need for notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
• The heart of substantive due process is
the requirement of "reasonableness" or
absence of the exercise of arbitrary
power.
•
• US v. Toribio, 15 Phil 85 (1910).
• Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
SCRA 659, 1987.
• Rubi v. Prov'l Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil
660 (1919).
• The principle of presumed validity of
statutes. Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,
20 SCRA 849 (1967)
• Publication and clarity of laws as a
requirement of due process: Tanada v.
Tuvera, GR No. 63915, December 29
1986.
• The rule requiring publication for the
effectivity of laws applies not only to
laws passed by congress. (Republic v.
Pilipinas Shell, GR No. 173918, April 8,
2008).
• Void for vagueness rule. (People v.
Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 (1988)
• A law that is utterly vague is defective
because it fails to give notice of what it
commands.
• When is a law vague? (Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, GR No. 148560,
November 19, 2001)
• The guarantee of equal protection.
(Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90
Phils 83 ,1951)
• The equal protection clause recognizes
the power of the state to act upon
factual differences between individuals.
• The problem, thus, in equal protection
cases is one of determining the validity of
the classification made by law.
• Requirements for a reasonable
classification: (1) must rest on
substantial distinction; (2) must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
• Farinas v. Executive Secretary, GR No.
147387, Dec. 10, 2003.
•
• Tiu v. CA, GR No. 127410, January 20,
1999. The constitution does not require
absolute equality among residents.
• International School Educators v.
Quisumbing, GR No. 128845, June 1,
2000. Equal pay, equal work.
• Smith, Bell and Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil
136 (1919). Alienage as basis of
classification.
• Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA 538,
(1994).
• The doctrinal supports in the
constitution to achieve a reasonable
measure of equality: the Preamble
proclaims equality as an ideal; the
command to promote social justice in
Article II, Section 10, and Art XIII.
• the Commission on Elections is given
broad powers in order to implement laws
seeking to equalize political opportunities;
• so is the command of the constitution
to prohibit political dynasties;
• Article III, Section 11, expressly
guarantees free access to the courts;
• and Article XIV commands the state to
make quality education accessible to all.
•
• Section 2. The right of the people to be
secured in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against
unreasonable search and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable,
• Purpose: To protect the privacy and
sanctity of the person and his house and
other possessions against the arbitrary
intrusions of the state;
...and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to
be seized.
Purpose:
Provides for the conditions under which a
valid intrusion maybe made, as it spells
out the requisites of a valid warrant.
• (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause;
• (2) probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge;
• (3) such judge must examine under oath
or affirmation the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce;
• (4) the warrant must particularly describe
the place to be searched and the person
or things to be seized.
• May a private person or entity be held
liable for illegal search under Section 2,
Article III. Silahis International v. Soluta,
GR No. 163087, February 20, 2006.
• At what point does an inspection (say
in a check point) become a search in
the sense of Section 2. Valmonte v. Villa,
185 SCRA 665 (1990); People v. Escano,
GR No. 129756, January 28, 2000.
• Probable cause (In general).
• Probable cause is such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the issuance
of a warrant that is in them sufficient to
induce a cautious man to rely upon them
and act in pursuance thereof.
• Probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest / search warrant.
• The quantum of evidence needed to
establish probable cause is probability,
not absolute or even moral certainty.
Microsoft v. Maxicorp, GR No. 140946,
September 13, 2004.
• Probable cause for a search warrant
need not point to a specific offender.
• But it must point to some specific
violation of our criminal law.
• Probable cause for a warrant of arrest
must point to a specific offender.
• Webb v. De Leon, GR No. 121234,
August 23, 1995.
• Stonehill v. Diokno, GRL-19550, June
19 1976. The description of the offense
simply as "violation of the Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws" made it
impossible for finding probable cause.
• Central Bank v. Judge Morfe, GR L-
20119, June 30, 1967. The failure of the
witness to mention particular individuals
did not necessarily prove that he had no
personal knowledge of specific illegal
transaction.
• Under the 1987 constitution, only a
judge may determine probable cause
for the purpose of issuing a warrant.
• The prosecution determines probable
cause for the purpose of filing an
information.
• People v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
126005, January 21, 1999.
• Must the Judge personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses?
• Soliven v. Judge Makasiar, 167 SCRA
988) (the Luis Beltran case)
• Four instances where probable cause
is needed to be determined:
(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the
investigating officer;
• (2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the
judge;
• (3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113: By a peace
officer or a private person;
• (4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge;
•
• ..."personally"
• The word "personally" defines
determination of probable cause by the
judge, not his examination of witnesses.
• Purpose of requiring particularity of
description in a search warrant.
• Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil 886
(1920).
 Warrantless search and seizure may be
allowed
• (1) search incidental to an arrest;
(2) search of moving vehicles;
• (3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
• (4) customs searches;
• (5) where there is waiver of the right;
• Also rule on exigent circumstance and the
stop and frisk rule.
• Search incidental to an arrest. Moreno
v. Ago Chi, 12 Phil 439 (1909).
• Search incidental to an arrest cannot
be made in a place other than where
the suspect is arrested. Nolasco v.
Pano, 147 SCRA 509 (1987).
• Search of moving vehicles. Papa v.
Mago, GR No. L-27360, February 28,
1968.
• Search of moving vehicles: Extensive
search without warrant could only be
resorted to if there is probable cause.
• Aniag v. Commission on Elections, 237
SCRA 424 (1994).
• Where marijuana sticks fall before the
eyes of a police officer.
• People vs. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144 (1993).
• Requirements for a warrantless search
and seizure of evidence in plain view.
• People v. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 413,1992.
• (1) there must be a valid prior intrusion in
to a place; (2) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who
had the right to be where they are; (3) the
illegality of the evidence must be
immediately apparent; (4) it is noticed
without further search.
• The discovery must be inadvertent.
People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993).
Customs inspections:
• Requirements of a warrantless search
and seizure to constitute as waiver of
the constitutional right.
• De Gracia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689,
reiterated in People v. Barros, 231 SCRA
557 (1994).
• Implied conformity is not consent.
People v. Compacion, GR 124442, July
20, 2001.
• Spouses Veroy v. Layague, GR 95632,
June 18, 1992.
The waiver must be understood to cover
only what is included within the terms of
the language.
• Warrantless search and seizure:
Exigent circumstances:
• Warrantless search and seizure: Stop
and frisk rule:
• Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990).
• Same requirements for search warrants
and warrant of arrest.
• Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil 739 (1956).
• A John Doe warrant of arrest is valid
provided it satisfies the requirement of
particularity of description.
People v. Veloso, 48 Phil 169, 1925.
• A warrant of arrest against 50 John
Does is not valid.
Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA
599, 1988.
• Warrantless arrest is generally illegal.
• The cases when a person may be
arrested even without a warrant is
summarized under Rule 113, Section 5,
Rules of Court:
• Flagrante delicto rule.
• People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1968).
• A warrantless arrest cannot be effected
three months or even six days after the
commission of the crime.
• People v. Salvatierra, GR 104663, July
24, 1967.
• Entrapment may or may not be allowed
depending upon the circumstances.
• People v. Doria, GR 125299, January
22, 1999.
• A buy bust operation is a form of
entrapment.
• People v. de la Cruz, GR 83260, April
18, 1990.
• When the validity of an arrest
challenged.
• (People v. Cabiles, GR 112035,
January 16, 1998).
• An application for bail not considered a
waiver of the right of an accused to
question the legality of his arrest.
• Okabe v. Judge De Leon, GR No.
150185, May 27, 2004.
• The right to privacy is the right to be
left alone.
• Hing vs. Choachuy, GR 179736, June 26,
2013
• Section 3. (1) The privacy of
communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable except upon lawful orders of
the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation
of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
•
• The privacy of communication and
correspondence is not absolute.
• Section 3 allows intrusion into the
privacy of communication and
correspondence.
• What are the conditions for such
allowable intrusion?
 The court may order intrusion based on
the requirements of probable cause in
Section 2 (Art. III).
• (because the intrusion into communication
and correspondence is one kind of search)
• The implementing statute on the subject is
RA 4200 known as the Anti Wiretapping
Law, as amended by the Human Security
Act of 2007 (RA 9372).
• Meaning of the exclusionary rule under
paragraph 2, Section 3.
• The exclusionary rule bars admission
of illegally obtained evidence for any
purpose and in any proceeding.
• How evidence declared inadmissible
disposed of.
• (Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 (1987)
• Exclusionary rule: Evidence unlawfully
obtained by private individuals does not
come under the exclusionary rule.
• People v. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57
(1991). In the absence of governmental
interference, the constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked against the state.
•
• Section 4. No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression or of the press, or the right of
the people to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of
grievances.
• Freedom of expression: The foundation
of our free, open, and democratic
society. (Carpio)
 Speech, expression, and press include
every form of expression, whether oral,
written, tape or disc recorded.
• The two prohibitions on the
abridgment (curtailment) of the
freedom of speech, of expression or of
the press.
• Prohibition of prior restraint and
prohibition of subsequent punishment.
• Prior restraint.
Official governmental restrictions on the
press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or
dissemination.
• Unconstitutional prior restraint.
• (Chavez v. Gonzales, GR No. 168338,
February 15, 2008).
• Subsequent punishment:
• The mere prohibition of government
interference before words are spoken or
published would be an inadequate
protection of the freedom of expression if
the government could punish without
restraint after publication.
• Media and Judicial Process: When the
right to free speech and of the press
collides with the right of the accused to
a fair trial.
• AM 01-4-03-SC Re: Sec. of Justice v.
Sandiganbayan, June 29, 2001.
• AM 10-11-5-SC Re: Petition for Radio and
TV Coverage of the Maguindanao
Massacre Cases, June 14, 2011.
• Media and the right to privacy: Ayer
Productions v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861
(1988).
• The freedom of speech is not absolute.
• Freedom of speech may lawfully be
impinged or restrained.
• There must be standards for the lawful
restraint of the freedom of speech.
• The acceptable standards for the
restraint : the dangerous tendency rule,
the clear and present danger rule and the
balancing of interest rule.
• The dangerous tendency rule: Speech
can be curtailed or punished when it
creates a dangerous tendency to bring
about the evil which the state has the right
to prevent.
• The clear and present danger rule:
It is founded on whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such
nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the evils that
congress has a right to prevent.
• The balancing of interests test:
• The function of the Court is to balance
the interests served by legislation against
the freedoms affected by it.
• Freedom of expression is not absolute.
(Justice Carpio, Inq., April 9,2020)
• Four exceptions when the State may
impose prior restraint, or subsequent
punishment, on the exercise of freedom of
expression, namely: pornography, false or
misleading advertisement, advocacy of
imminent lawless action, and danger to
national security.
• The very high bar or standard to hurdle
before the State can successfully
invoke these exceptions. The State
must establish that the expression creates
a clear and present danger of an evil that
the State has a right and duty to prevent.
The danger from the expression must be
extremely imminent, and the evil must be
substantive and extremely serious.
• Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission On
Elections (GR No. 205728, January 21,
2015):
• The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) does not have the
competence to limit expressions made by
the citizens — who are not candidates —
during elections.
• Why regulation is unconstitutional:
Regulation is inconsistent with according
fullest opinion and debate by the
electorate.
• Declarative speech is a specie of
speech by a private citizen who is not a
candidate that may be validly regulated
by law.
• Requisites of a valid regulation.
• The regulation (a) should be provided
by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly
tailored to meet the objective of enhancing
the opportunity of all candidates to be
heard and considering the primacy of the
guarantee of free expression, and (d)
demonstrably the least restrictive means
to achieve that object.
•
• COMELEC may not order petitioners,
who are private citizens, to remove the
tarpaulin from their own property.
• The message in the tarpaulin does not
constitute religious speech the
prohibition of which is a violation of
religious freedom.
• The tarpaulin does not convey any
religious doctrine of the catholic church.
• The expressions on the tarpaulin is not
an ecclesiastical matter.
• The position of the Catholic religion as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting as religious speech.
• Unprotected speech:
• Freedom of expression has never been
understood to be an absolute right. Some
forms of speech are not protected.
• Two types of unprotected speech: libel
and obscenity.
• A libel is a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice, or a
defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
natural or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead.
• To be liable for libel, the following
elements must be shown to exist: (1) the
allegation of a discreditable act or
condition concerning another; (2)
publication of the charge; (3) identity of the
person defamed; and (4) existence of
malice.
• The speech is libelous when the
imputation is public and malicious.
• The imputation is public when the
defamatory statement is made known to
someone other than the person to whom it
is written.
• It is malicious when the author of the
imputation is prompted by ill will or spite
and speaks not in response to duty but
merely to injure the reputation of the
person who claims to have been defamed.
• If a speech is not malicious, even if
defamatory, it is privileged. (Alonzo v. CA,
241 SCRA 51 (1995).
• Every defamatory imputation is presumed
to be malicious, even if it be untrue if no
good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown.
• Are pleadings privileged? Under what
condition may it be privileged?
• (Armovit v. Judge Purisima, GR No.
39258, November 15, 1982).
• The prevailing rule is that parties,
counsels, and witnesses are exempted
from liability in libel or slander for words
otherwise defamatory published in the
course of judicial proceedings provided the
statements are relevant to the case.
• When may criticisms of a public figure
constitutionally protected? When not
protected?
• When the object of criticism is his
strictly private life, defamatory imputations
are not constitutionally protected
expression. When, however, his public
acts are the object of criticism,
constitutional immunity applies.
• The right to assembly and petition may
be impaired. What are the allowable
standards for its impairment?
• Since the right to assembly and petition
is equally fundamental as freedom of
expression, the standards for allowable
impairment of speech and press are also
those for assembly and petition.
• US v. Apurado, 7 Phil 422 (1907).
• Evangelista v. Earnshaw, 57 Phil 255
(1932), the dangerous tendency rule.
• Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil 71 (1948),
the clear and present danger rule.
• JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing, GR
65366, October 25, 1983. The Court
adopted the clear and present danger test.
• The right to peaceably assemble and
petition must be discussed in relation to
Sec. 18, Art. II; Sec 8, Art III; Sec 3, Art
XIII; and also Sec 2 (5) B, Art IX.
• Question: Which rule is more in keeping
with the spirit of the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and petition, the dangerous
tendency rule or the clear and present
danger rule.
• Section 5. No law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference shall forever
be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
• The twin mandates of the constitutional
provision: The non-establishment clause
and the free exercise clause.
• The text of the section is the same in the
35, 73 and 87 constitutions.
• The essence of the free exercise clause
is the freedom of belief. It is based on
the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.
• Reynolds v. US, 98 US 145, the free
exercise clause completely insulated the
realm of belief from state action, leaving,
however, religiously motivated action,
including expression, subject to police
power.
• Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296.
The constitutional inhibition on legislation
on the subject of religion has a double
aspect.
• People v. Fabillar, 68 Phil. 584 (1939).
• American Bible Society v. City of Manila,
101 Phil. 386 (1957).
• Imposition of civic obligations that
conflict with one’s religious beliefs.
• Gerona v. Sec. of Educ., 106 Phil. 2
(1969).
• Ebralinag v. Div. Sup. Of Schools of Cebu,
219 SCRA 256 (1993).
• The non establishment clause simply
means that the state cannot establish or
sponsor an official religion.
• It prohibits the state from passing laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another.
• Austria v. NLRC, GR 124382, Aug 16/99.
• Secular authority has no jurisdiction
over ecclesiastical matters.
• Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 206.
• Concession on taxes on property used
for religious purposes.
• The condition for the exemption is not
just that the property be used exclusively
for religious purposes but that it be used
actually, directly and exclusively for
such purpose.
• Purpose of the provision prohibiting
religious test.
• To allow religious test would have the
effect of formal or practical establishment
of a particular religious faith.
• The case of conscientious objectors.
Can the state compel a person to bear
arms in defense of the country even when
bearing arms is contrary to the person's
beliefs?
• The state may support church social
action centers. Requirements:
• (1) must have a secular legislative
purpose; (2) must have a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
(3) must not require excessive
entanglement with recipient institutions.
• Estrada v. Escritor, AM No. P-02-1651,
2003, 2004.
• Section 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as maybe
provided by law.
• Freedom of movement involves two
rights: The liberty of abode and the liberty
of travel.
• Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 66(89).
• The authority to impair the right to
travel must be based on law.
• The court found this authority in the
totality of executive powers, both stated
and unstated in the constitution.
• Section 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and to papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as maybe
provided by law.
• The rights guaranteed by the provision:
(1) the right to information on matters of
public concern and (2) the corollary right to
access to official records and documents.
• These rights are political rights
available to citizens only.
• The right to access is a self executory
constitutional right.
• Chavez v. PEA-AMARI, GR No. 133250,
July 9, 2002.
• While the evaluation or review is still on-
going, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" on the bids or
proposals.
• Recognized limitations to the exercise
of the right to information
• Section 8. The right of the people,
including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.

• All it means is that the right to form

associations shall not be impaired
without due process of law.
• Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions v. Sec. of Labor, 27 SCRA 41
(1969). The registration prescribed by the
law is not a limitation to the right of
assembly or association, which may be
exercised with or without said registration.
• Government employees' right to form
unions is guaranteed by Article III,
Section 8, Article IX, B, Section 2 (5),
and Article XIII, Section 3.
• Section 9. Private property shall not be
taken for public use without just
compensation.
• The constitutional provisions on
eminent domain are Article III, Section 9,
Article XII, Section 18 (public utilities),
Article XIII, Section 4 (land reform), and
Article XVIII, Section 22 (idle or
abandoned agricultural lands)
• The right of eminent domain is understood
to be the ultimate right of the sovereign
power to appropriate, not only public but
the private property of all citizens for public
purpose.
• The exercise of the power of eminent
domain is by tradition lodged with the
executive. The power, however, must be
granted by the legislature.
• The power of eminent domain may also
be conferred upon municipal
governments and other government
entities.
• As to the legislature, the power is
inherent.
• For government agencies, local
governments and public utilities, it is only a
delegated power.
• City of Manila v. Chinese Community of
Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919).
• Constitutional limitations on the
exercise of the power: public use and
just compensation.
• Requisites for the exercise are: (1)
there is "taking" of private property; (2) the
taking must be for "public use"; (3) there
must be just compensation
• Public use: Any appropriating of private
property by the state for purposes of great
advantage to the community, is taking for
public use.
• Mataas na Lupa Tenants v. Dimayuga,
130 SCRA 30, June 25, 1984.
• Manisca v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
106440, January 29, 1996.
• Just compensation: It is the just and
complete equivalent of the loss which the
owner of the thing expropriated has to
suffer by reason of the expropriation.
• A statutory determination of just
compensation would be only a prima
facie assessment. In the end, the final
determination of just compensation will
have to be made by the court.
When the filing of the case coincides with the taking

• Who are entitled to just compensation?

- It is not the owner alone.
• When the filing of the case coincides
with the taking, the value of the property
expropriated is determined as of the time
of the filing of the complaint for
expropriation.
• Republic v. Sarabia, GR No. 157847,
August 25, 2005.
• When there is taking before the filing of
the proceedings. compensation for the
property expropriated must be determined
as of the time the expropriating authority
takes possession thereof and not as of the
time of the institution of the proceedings.
• DPWH vs. Tecson, GR No.179334, July
1, 2013.
• Latches and prescription do not apply
against action for compensation in
expropriation proceedings.
• Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of
Borbon and CA, GR No. 165354,
January 12, 2015.
• Just compensation in expropriations
for land reform can be less than market
value .
• Expropriation for resale to landless:
The Guido-Baylosis cases under the 1935
Constitution.
• In Tuason vs. Land Tenure Administration
(1970), the "area test" was rejected.
• Judicial review of the valuation of the
property made by assessors is proper.
• Even when there is a statutory
determination of just compensation due,
the courts may still review its adequacy.
• Judicial Review of the exercise of the
power of eminent domain:
• When expropriation is not done directly
by legislative authority, review is proper.
• When the expropriation is exercised by the
legislature itself, it is not subject to judicial
review.
• Res judicata: The right to exercise the
power is absolute and unfettered by a prior
judgment.
• Didipio Earth Savers v. Secretary, GR
No. 157882, March 30, 2006.
• Republic v. Andaya, GR No. 160656,
June 15, 2007.
• NPC v. San Pedro, GR No. 170945,
September 26, 2006.
• Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 1972.
• Province of Zamboanga del Norte v.
City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334,
1968.
• The power of eminent domain by local
governments: Section 19 of the Local
Government Code (RA 7160).
• The essential requisites of the exercise:
(1) there must be an ordinance authorizing
the expropriation; (2) the power must be
exercised for public use; (3) with just
compensation and; (4) there must be an
offer previously made and the same was
not accepted.
• Section 10. No law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
• What the provision envisions are laws
passed by governmental law making
bodies.
• The law relating to the obligation of
contracts does not prohibit every change
in existing laws.
• Manila Trading Co. v. Reyes, 62 Phil.
461 (1935). What the Constitution
prohibits is the substantial impairment of
contracts.

• Jurisprudence has established that a valid

exercise of police power is superior to the
obligation of contracts.
• Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in
any manner changes the intention of the
parties, necessarily impairs the contract
itself.
• La Insular v. Machuca, 39 Phil. 567,
1919. To come under the constitutional
prohibition, the law must effect a change
on the rights of the parties with reference
to each other and not with reference to
non parties.
• Lim v. Secretary, 34 SCRA 751, 1970.
The non impairment clause is a limit on
the exercise of legislative power and not of
judicial or quasi judicial power.
• Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil. 125 (1907).
• Reservation clause: Second Sentence,
Section 11, Article XII.
• Section 11. Free access to the courts and
quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
• An indigent
• The provision is the basis for Rule 5,
Section 17 of the New Rules of Court
allowing litigation in forma pauperis.
• Legislation incorporating the concept:
RA 6033 - An Act Requiring Courts to
Give Preference to Criminal Cases Where
the Party or Parties Involved are Indigents
(1969); RA 6034 - An Act Providing
Transportation and Other allowances for
Indigent Litigants (1969); RA 6035 - An
Act Requiring Stenographers To Give Free
Transcript of Stenographic Notes to
Indigent and Low Income Litigants (1969).
• Section 12. (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
• (2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
• (3) Any confession or admission obtained
in violation of this or section 17 hereof
(right against self incrimination) shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
• (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violation of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation
of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
• The provision is based from US
supreme court decisions - the Escobedo
v. Illinois (378 US 478, 1964) and Miranda
v. Arizona (384 US 436, 1966).
•
• Escobedo spoke of the rights of a person
under custodial investigation, like when
the suspect has been taken into police
custody.
• Miranda enumerated the rights available
to a person under custodial investigation
and which must be made known to the
suspect
• Philippine jurisprudence followed the
Miranda and the Escobedo decisions. It
used to be Sec. 20, Article IV, of the 1973
constitution. Now Sec. 12, Article III, of the
1987 constitution.
• For whom do the rights are available:
The rights are available to any person
under investigation for the commission of
an offense.
• People v. Gamboa, GR No. 91374,
February 25, 1991.
These constitutional rights extend only
to testimonial compulsion.
• People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 525, 1987.
While the provision is a protection
against testimonial compulsion, it is
extended to any evidence communicative
in nature.
People v. Endino, GR No. 133026, February 20, 2001.

• Gutang v. People, GR No. 135406, July

11, 2001. Urine sample is admissible.
• People v. Jungco, 186 SCRA 714, 1990.
Photos of reenactment are not
admissible where accused was not
provided with counsel.
• People v. Ordono, GR No.132154, June
29, 2000. These rights do not cover the
verbal confessions to a radio announcer.
• People v. Endino, GR No. 133026,
February 20, 2001. An interview recorded
on video showing the accused
unburdening his guilt is admissible.
• Tanenggee v. People, GR No. 179448,
June 26, 2013. No violation of Section 12
if the questioning was not done by law
enforcement officers but by a bank
employee. The written admission given is
admissible.
• When the rights begin to be available:
• People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 (1994),
follows Escobedo in that the rights begin
to be available only when the person is
already in custody.
• Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294
(1985). The SC sustained General Ver
that the provision covered even persons
NOT YET in custody.
• The 1986 Constitutional Commission
debates manifest the intent to expand the
coverage of the right to situations when a
person under investigation is NOT YET in
custody.
• People v. Maqueda, GR No. 112983
(1995). In an obiter dictum, Justice Davide
adverted to the view in the Constitutional
Commission that the rights are available
even to one who is not yet in custody.
• People v. Domantay, GR No. 130612
(1999); People v. Principe, GR 135862
(2002). RA 7438 has extended the
guarantee to situations in which an
individual has not been formally arrested
but has merely been invited for
questioning.
• RA 7438 (April 27, 1992) – An Act
defining certain rights of persons arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation.
• What rights are made available: (1)
Right to remain silent; (2) the right to
counsel; (3) the right to be informed of
such rights.
• Right to remain silent:
• Under Section 17: An accused; a witness.
• Under Section 12, a person under
investigation has the right to refuse to
answer any question.
• Right to counsel:
• The counsel made available to the person
under investigation must not only be
competent and independent but also
preferably be of his choice.
• People v. Mojello, GR No. 145566,
March 9, 2004.
• When do the rights cease to be
available: The rights under Section 12 (1)
are available when the inquiry is under the
control of police officers. Beyond that, the
rights are no longer available.
• Waiver of the rights: Only if the waiver is
in writing and done in the presence of
counsel.
• People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465, 1985.
• Exclusionary rule: Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of Section
12 (1) and Section 17 shall not be
admissible in evidence against "him".

• People v. Balisteros, 237 SCRA 499,

1994. Against him. The source of the
confession or admission.
• Section 13. All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua where the evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as maybe
provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
• Bail: is a mode, short of confinement,
which would insure the attendance of the
accused at his trial.
• The right to bail is corollary to the right
to be presumed innocent.
• All persons charged with an offense,
before conviction, shall have the right
to bail.
• Where the accused is charged with a
capital offense, a hearing is mandatory.
• The burden of proof.
• Strong evidence.
• The person claiming the right to bail
must be under actual detention or
under the custody of the law.
• Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
115407, August 28, 1995.
• Govt. of Hong Kong v. Olalia, GR
153675 (April 19, 2007), The right to bail
in extradition proceedings.
• Comendador v. Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (91)
• People v. Divina, 221 SCRA 209 (1993).
• Dissenting opinion of Justice Marvic
Leonen: Enrile bail a ‘special
accommodation,’ says SC Justice. (Tetch
Torres-Tupaz, Inquirer, Aug 20, 2015)
• Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
• The due process clause in paragraph
(1), Section 14, is understood to be
criminal due process.
• Criminal due process in Section 14 as
against due process in Section 1.
• (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and ....
• ...and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
• When do these rights become available
to the accused: From arraignment to
rendition of judgment.
• Right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved:
• Malana v. People, GR No. 173612,
March 26, 2008. The "equipoise rule"
• Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, GR No.
96131, September 6, 1991.
Preventive suspension pendente lite
• Right to be heard by himself or
counsel: 3 specific rights - right to
present evidence and to be present at the
trial; right to be assisted by counsel; right
to compulsory process
• Under the right to counsel in Section 14
(2), counsel need not be one who is the
choice of the accused.
• Amion v. Judge Chiongson, AM RTJ-
97-1371, January 22, 1999.
• May the right to counsel be waived?
Yes according to Bernas.
• No according to Lara.
• At what point in the criminal
proceeding is the accused entitled to
counsel: from arraignment to rendition of
judgment.
• Right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him:
• Right to speedy, impartial and public
trial: remedy for violation is dismissal; it is
equivalent to acquittal.
• Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (R.A. 8493)
If the accused is not brought to trial
within the time limit provided by the Act,
upon motion of the accused, the
information shall be dismissed (Sec. 13).
• Right to public trial:
A trial is public when anyone interested
in observing how a judge conducts the
proceedings in his courtroom may do so.
•
• Right of confrontation: Means the right
to meet the witnesses face to face.
• The right has a two fold purpose: 1) to
afford the accused an opportunity to test
the testimony of the witness by cross
examination; 2) to allow the judge to
observe the deportment of the witness.
• Testimony not subjected to cross
examination must be excluded.
Dying declarations is an exemption.
• Estrada vs. Bersamin, et.al., GR Nos
212140-41, Jan. 21, 2015.
• It is a fundamental principle that the
accused in a preliminary investigation has
no right to cross examine the witnesses
which the complainant may present
• Compulsory process: to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf.
• Trial in absentia: A situation where the
trial of the accused may proceed even
when he is absent.
• May occur in two instances; must have
been arraigned; must be present during
promulgation.
• Section 15. The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except in cases of invasion or rebellion
when the public safety requires it.
• Writ of habeas corpus is an order...
• The privilege of the writ is the privilege...
• What is suspended is the privilege of the
writ; not the issuance of the writ.
• The function of the writ of habeas
corpus...
• The effect of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ...
• The suspension of the privilege of the
writ is subject to judicial review.
...under the express provision of the
Section 18, Article VII, of the 1987
Constitution.
• Under the express provisions of
Section 13, Article III, in relation to
Section 18, Article VII, a person
accused (detained) for an offense
covered by the suspension of the writ
is entitled to be released on bail.
• However, there is still a necessity for the
filing of the charges in court first.
• The law on the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
has undergone radical changes in the
1987 constitution: the doctrine on the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ,
on the grounds for suspension, on the
termination of the suspension, on judicial
review, and on the scope and effects of
the suspension.
• Section 16. All persons shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
• The provision guarantees the right to a
speedy disposition of cases. It covers
the periods before, during and after trial.
• Speedy trial in Sec 14 covers only trial
phase.
• Section 17. No person shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself.
• It is justified on the grounds of public
policy and humanity.
• Public policy because if the party is
required to testify, it would place him
under the greatest temptation to commit
perjury; Humanity because it would
prevent the extorting of confessions under
duress.
• To violate the right, it is not necessary that
a categorical admission of a specific
offense be sought.
• What is prohibited is the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication
• Beltran v.Samson, 53 Phil 570 (1929).
• When the accused voluntarily answers an
incriminating question he is deemed to
have waived his right.
• Section 18. (1) No person shall be
detained solely by reason of his political
beliefs and aspirations.
• (2) No involuntary servitude in any form
shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted.
• Paragraph 1:
does not add anything substantive to
the due process clause, nor to the
guarantee of freedom of speech, press
and expression.
• Paragraph 2:
that involuntary servitude may exist
only when it is a punishment for a crime
for which the party is convicted.
• Return to work order: may it be
challenged as being violative of the
constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude.
Take note of Sec 3, Art. XIII, where
voluntary modes of settling disputes is
preferred.
• Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131
(1975).
• Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not
be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the congress hereinafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
• (2) The employment of physical,
psychological, or degrading punishment
against any prisoner or detainee, or the
use of substandard or inadequate penal
facilities under subhuman conditions shall
be dealt with by law.
• Cruel, unusual, degrading, inhuman as
prohibited punishment under the 1935,
1973 and 1987 constitutions.
• 1935 constitution prohibits "cruel and
unusual punishment". 1973 constitution,
the phrase became "cruel or unusual
punishment". 1987 constitution, the text is
"cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment“
• People v. Mercado, GR No. 116239,
November 29, 2001. Lethal injection is not
a cruel and unusual punishment.
• Heinous crimes
• Paragraph (2) concerns itself with the
manner of treating prisoners in detention.
• When confinement amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment...
• Facilities must be to a level of
constitutional tolerability.
• Section 20. No person shall be
imprisoned for debt or non-payment of poll
tax.
• Simply means that no person may be
imprisoned for debt in virtue of an order in
a civil proceeding.
• But a person may be imprisoned as
penalty for a crime from a contractual
debt imposed in a criminal proceeding.
• Section 21. No person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
• Meaning of jeopardy - being placed in
danger of punishment or annoyance and
vexation of a criminal prosecution.
• The provision consist of two parts: The
first sentence deals with prosecution for
the same offense. The second deals with
prosecution for the same act.
• Requisites to raise the defense of
double jeopardy: (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have
terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must
be for the same offense as that in the first.
• First requisite: Jeopardy attaches: (1)
upon a good indictment; (2) before a
competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4)
after plea.
• Good indictment means that there must
be a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction.
• Competent court means a court that has
jurisdiction over the offense charged or
that it has territorial jurisdiction over the
crime committed.
• Arraignment and plea are the final steps
in the commencement of jeopardy.
• Second requisite: the first jeopardy must
have been terminated –
• Bulaong v. People, GR No. L- 19344,
July 17, 1966.
• Termination of jeopardy may be by
conviction or acquittal. Termination
may also be by "dismissal".
• Without the consent of the accused:
Dismissal, even if not on the merits, if
done without the consent of the accused is
a bar to subsequent prosecution.
• People v. Velasco, GR 140633, February
4, 2002.
• With the consent of the accused:
Even if the dismissal is definite, if made
with the consent of the accused, it would
not be a bar to subsequent prosecution.
The consent of the accused to the
dismissal of his case works as a waiver.
• Based on speedy trial:
If the dismissal is predicated on the
right of the accused to a speedy trial, the
dismissal is on the merits.
• Third requisite: the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense as the first.
• Same evidence test: whether the
evidence needed in one case will support
a conviction in the other.
• Same act (actually mean the same
physical act) that is punished by an
Ordinance and statute.
• People v. Jovelo, 101 Phil. 1213 (1957).
• Yap v. Lutero, GR 12669, April 30, 1959.
• If the single criminal act is impelled by a
single criminal intent, the resultant harm
cannot be split into different offenses.
• Rule when one act violates two
different statutes or two different
provisions of a statute: If the one act
results in two distinct offenses,
prosecution under one is a bar to
prosecution under the other.
• Rule on new supervening fact: Melo v.
People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950).
• Appeals: The protection against second
jeopardy not only means that an accused
cannot be prosecuted a second time for
the same offense but also that the
prosecution cannot appeal a judgment of
acquittal.
• Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA
43 (1986).
• Appeal by the accused:
• Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of
attainder shall be enacted.
• An ex post facto law is one: (1) Which
makes an action done before the passing
of the law, which was innocent when done,
criminal, and punishes such action; (2)
Which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than when it was committed;
• (3) Which changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was
committed; (4) Which alters the legal rules
of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense in order
to convict the defendant
• 5) Which assumes to regulate civil rights
and remedies only but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of right; and, (6)
Which deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which
he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former acquittal or
conviction or amnesty proclamation.
• Ex post facto laws embrace only
criminal or penal statutes.
• Bill of attainder is a legislative act which
inflicts punishment without judicial trial.
• Legislative acts, no matter what their form,
that apply either to named individuals, or
to easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without trial are bills
of attainder prohibited by the constitution.
• People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972). At
issue is the Anti-subversion Act (RA
1700). The lower court declared the law as
a bill of attainder because it "tars and
feathers the CPP" and thereby congress
usurped the powers of the judge and
assumed judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without
any of the forms or safeguards of a judicial
trial.