RULE 116

Section 1
G.R. No. 164258, August 22, 2012
ESTRELLA TAGLAY, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY AND
LOVERIE PALACAY, RESPONDENTS.

Brief summary:
A Criminal Complaint for Qualified Trespass to Dwelling was filed by private
respondent against herein petitioner with the MCTC. Upon Arraignment, petitioner
pleaded not guilty. It appearing that private complainant Loverie Palacay was a minor
during the commission of the crime, and pursuant to Republic Act. No. 8369 and Circular
11-99, is hereby transferred to Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Digos City, for proper
disposition. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. RTC
issued its assailed Order [7] ruling that it acquired jurisdiction over the case when it received
the records of the case as a consequence of the transfer effected by the MCTC. The RTC also
held that even granting that there was defect or irregularity in the procedure because
petitioner was not arraigned before the RTC, such defect was fully cured when petitioner's
counsel entered into trial without objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned.
Hence, this petition.

FACTS:
 The instant petition arose from a Criminal Complaint [2] for Qualified Trespass to
Dwelling filed by private respondent against herein petitioner with the 5 th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta. Maria-Malita-Don Marcelino, Davao del Sur on
June 19, 2001.
 Public Prosecutor filed an Information[3] against her on November 19, 2001.
 Upon arraignment on June 7, 2002, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
 It appearing that private complainant Loverie Palacay was a minor on June 2, 2001,
the date of the incident, since she was born on August 7, 1983, per Certification dated
August 15, 2002 issued by Municipal Registrar Josephine A. Marquez, this case, upon
manifestation of Prosecutor Perfecto P. Ordaneza and pursuant to Republic Act. No.
8369 and Circular 11-99, is hereby transferred to Branch 20, Regional Trial Court,
Digos City, for proper disposition.
 Witnesses were then presented by the prosecution. Prior to the presentation of the
final witness for the prosecution, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.
 RTC issued its assailed Order [7] ruling that it acquired jurisdiction over the case when
it received the records of the case as a consequence of the transfer effected by the
MCTC; that the transfer of the case from the MCTC is authorized under
Administrative Matter No. 99-1-13-SC and Circular No. 11-99; that there is no doubt
that the offended party is a minor and, thus, the case falls within the original
jurisdiction of Family Courts pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369.
 The RTC also held that even granting that there was defect or irregularity in the
procedure because petitioner was not arraigned before the RTC, such defect was fully
cured when petitioner's counsel entered into trial without objecting that his client
had not yet been arraigned. Furthermore, the RTC noted that petitioner's counsel has
cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner should be arraigned anew before the RTC and that her
arraignment before the MCTC does not count because the proceedings conducted therein
were void.

RULING:
Yes. The Petitioner should be arraigned anew before the RTC.
It is settled that the proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction,
including its decision, are null and void.[24] Considering that the MCTC has no jurisdiction,
all the proceedings conducted therein, including petitioner's arraignment, are null and void.
Thus, the need for petitioner's arraignment on the basis of a valid Information filed with the
RTC.
Here, it is also true that petitioner's counsel participated in the proceedings held
before the RTC without objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned. However, it is
wrong for the RTC to rely on the case of People v. Cabale, People v. Atienza and
Closa[26] and People v. Pangilinan, where the accused in the said cases were belatedly
arraigned. The Court, in these three cases, held that the active participation of the counsels
of the accused, as well as their opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses
during trial without objecting on the ground that their clients had not yet been arraigned,
had the effect of curing the defect in the belated arraignment. The same, however, cannot
be said in the instant case. There is no arraignment at all before the RTC. On the other
hand, the arraignment conducted by the MCTC is null and void. Thus, there is nothing to
be cured. Petitioner's counsel also timely raised before the RTC the fact that her client,
herein petitioner, was not arraigned.

On the issue of Jurisdiction of the RTC over the case:

Petitioner’s contention:
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because Circular No. 11-99, which authorizes
the transfer of Family Courts cases filed with first-level courts to the RTCs, is applicable
only to cases which were filed prior to the effectivity of the said Circular on March 1, 1999.
Petitioner argues that all Family Courts cases filed with first-level courts after the effectivity
of the said Circular can no longer be transferred to the RTC; instead they should be
dismissed. Considering that the Information in the instant case was filed with the MCTC on
November 19, 2001, petitioner avers that the MCTC should have dismissed the case instead
of ordering its transfer to the RTC.
SC Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
Court agrees that the Resolution of this Court in Administrative Matter No. 99-1-13-
SC and Circular No. 11-99, issued pursuant thereto, is applicable only to Family Courts cases
which were filed with first-level courts prior to the effectivity of the said Resolution on
March 1, 1999.[20] This is evident in the language used by the Court in the third "Whereas"
clause of the subject Resolution wherein it was stated that "pending the constitution and
organization of the Family Courts and the designation of branches of the Regional Trial
Courts as Family Courts in accordance with Section 17 (Transitory Provisions) of R.A. 8369,
there is a need to provide guidelines in the hearing and determination of criminal cases
falling within the jurisdiction of Family Courts which have heretofore been filed with first-
level courts." The operative word, as correctly cited by petitioner, is "heretofore" which
means "before this" or "up to this time."[21] Moreover, Section 1 of the same Resolution
directs all first-level courts, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the subject
Resolution, to take an inventory of all criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts which were filed with them (first-level courts), to prepare an appropriate
inventory and to submit the same to the Court Management Office of the Office of the
Court Administrator. Logic dictates that only those cases which were filed prior to the
issuance of the Resolution shall be included in the inventory and, therefore, shall be subject
to transfer by first-level courts to the appropriate RTCs. The necessary implication then is
that all cases filed with first-level courts after the effectivity of the Resolution on March 1,
1999 should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
In the present case, the Information was filed against petitioner on November 19,
2001. Thus, the MCTC is already bereft of any authority to transfer the case to the RTC as
the same no longer falls under the coverage of Circular No. 11-99. What the MCTC should
have done was to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [28] The
purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even
of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to
inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him. [29] As an
indispensable  requirement  of due  process,   an  arraignment  cannot be regarded lightly or
brushed aside peremptorily.[30] Otherwise, absence of arraignment results in the nullity of
the proceedings before the trial court.[31]
2. ANTONIO GAMAS and FLORENCIO SOBRIO, complainants, vs.
JUDGE ORLANDO A. OCO, in his capacity as presiding judge of Municipal Trial Court,
Polomolok, South Cotabato and PNP SPO4 WILLIE ADULACION in his capacity as public
prosecutor of MTC-Polomolok, South Cotabato, respondents.
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1231. March 17, 2004.] (formerly OCA IPI No. 97-287-MTJ)
Nature of the Case:
This is a complaint for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law filed by
complainants Antonio Gamas and Florencio Sobrio ("complainants") against Judge Orlando
A. Oco ("respondent judge"), former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court,
Polomolok, South Cotabato ("MTC Polomolok") and SPO4 Willie Adulacion ("respondent
Adulacion"), a "police prosecutor" in the MTC Polomolok.
Facts:
1. Complainants allege that they are the accused in a case for theft which was pending
in the sala of respondent judge. According to them, respondent Adulacion enticed
them to plead guilty to the charge, apply for probation, and thus avoid imprisonment.

2. Respondent Adulacion, who had allegedly prepared a draft decision embodying his
suggestion, conferred with respondent judge, and handed the draft decision to
respondent judge.
a. After reading the document, respondent judge signed it, told complainants " O,
plead guilty man kamo" ("O, you're pleading guilty"), and handed the document
to a clerk.
b. Respondent judge told the clerk to read the contents of the decision to
complainants and to instruct them on what to do. The clerk read the contents
of the document to complainants and asked them to sign it. Complainants
signed the document upon respondent Adulacion's assurance that once the
police apprehend the rest of the accused, the police will revive the case and
respondent Adulacion will present complainants as "star witnesses."
Complainants later found out that what they signed was an Order ("3 October
1996 Order") finding them guilty of theft and sentencing them each to
imprisonment for six (6) months and one (1) day.

3. Finding the proceedings highly irregular, complainants sought the assistance of a

lawyer. Upon motion of complainants' counsel, respondent judge vacated the 3
October 1996 Order, ostensibly on the ground that complainants had entered
improvident guilty pleas. Respondent judge scheduled complainants' re-arraignment
on 2 February 1997.

4. In the present complaint, complainants contend that respondent judge is

administratively liable for rendering judgment against them without the benefit of an
arraignment and in violation of their right to be represented by counsel.

5. Respondent judge maintains that there was no irregularity in the issuance of the 3
October 1996 Order. Respondent judge adds that he decided to set aside his ruling
merely out of compassion for complainants.

Issue:
 Whether or not complainants were properly arraigned.

Ruling:

No, the complainants were not properly arraigned.

1. Respondent Judge Failed to Properly Apprise Complainants of their Right to Counsel.

The Constitution mandates that "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . .
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." Indeed, the accused has a right to
representation by counsel from the custodial investigation all the way up to the appellate
proceedings. At the arraignment stage, Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. — Before

arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he
desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has
employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel de officio to defend him.

Section 6 of Rule 116 means that:

[W]hen a defendant appears [at the arraignment] without [an] attorney, the court has
four important duties to comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right
to have [an] attorney before being arraigned; 2 — After giving him such information the
court must ask him if he desires the aid of attorney; 3 — If he desires and is unable to
employ attorney, the court must assign [an] attorney de officio to defend him; and 4 – If the
accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable
time therefor.

Compliance with these four duties is mandatory. The only instance when the court
can arraign an accused without the benefit of counsel is if the accused waives such right and
the court, finding the accused capable, allows him to represent himself in person. However,
to be a valid waiver, the accused must make the waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. In determining whether the accused can make a valid waiver, the court must
take into account all the relevant circumstances, including the educational attainment of
the accused.

In the present case, respondent judge contends that complainants waived their right
to counsel and insisted on their immediate arraignment. However the court find that
respondent judge did not properly apprise complainants of their right to counsel prior to
their arraignment. Consequently, there was no basis for complainants' alleged waiver of
such right.

In his Answer, respondent judge does not deny that when he "arraigned"
complainants, no lawyer assisted the complainants. However, respondent judge asserted
that the attendance of a "lawyer was their (complainants') problem ." Respondent judge
stated that before arraigning complainants, he gave a " discourse [of] their rights as accused."
Respondent judge also stated that since the police caught complainants in flagrante delicto,
complainants told him "a lawyer would not have much use." Respondent judge further
stated that complainants "expressed that they have no money to pay for a lawyer ."
Respondent judge informed complainants "he can give them a PAO lawyer" if they so
desired. However, respondent judge did not appoint a PAO lawyer despite being informed
by complainants that they could not afford a lawyer.

These do not amount to compliance with Section 6 of Rule 116. Respondent judge has
the duty to insure that there is no violation of the constitutional right of the accused to
counsel. Respondent judge is grossly mistaken in saying that securing a "lawyer was their
(complainants') problem." Once the accused informs the judge that he cannot afford a
lawyer and the court has not allowed the accused to represent himself, or the accused is
incapable of representing himself, the judge has the duty to appoint a counsel de oficio to
give meaning and substance to the constitutional right of the accused to counsel.

2. Respondent Judge's Arraignment of Complainants Highly Irregular

Section 1(a), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

Arraignment and plea; how made. — The accused must be arraigned before the court
where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be
made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the
complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and
asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.

[S]ection 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open
court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court [1] furnishing the accused a copy of the
complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then [2] reading the same
in the language or dialect that is known to him, and [3] asking him what his plea is to the
charge.

The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused
understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1
should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of
implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an
accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is,
therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal
thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.

In this case, respondent judge similarly failed to comply with the requirements of
Section 1(a) of Rule 116. Complainants deny respondent judge's claim that he arraigned
complainants by "read[ing] to them [the information] in the dialect they understand and
inform[ing] them [of] the nature of the evidence arrayed [against them]. However, there is
no disputing that respondent judge failed to furnish complainants a copy of the information
with the list of the witnesses.
 Respondent judge may have genuinely desired to spare complainants the travails of
being detained in jail, thus the rush in arraigning them, accepting their guilty pleas,
imposing a light sentence, and granting them probation. While well-intentioned, such
conduct unjustifiably short-circuited the mandatory arraignment procedure in Section 1(a)
of Rule 116.
Section 3.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, et. al., accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013

SUMMARY:
The accused-appellants were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom (capital offense).
Initially, they entered a plea of “not guilty” but they later manifested their desire to change
their plea to “guilty.” The trial judge explained the consequences of such change and when
they were asked if they understood such, they answered in the affirmative. After re-
arraignment and the accused-appellants pleaded guilty, the prosecution was directed to
present evidence.
The RTC convicted the accused-appellants of the crime charged, which was
punishable by death penalty. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with
modification. When the case was certified to the Supreme Court, the accused-appellants
raised that their convictions should be set aside considering that they their plea of guilt was
made improvidently.

FACTS:
1. The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged with
Kidnapping for Ransom.
a. In the afternoon of August 11, 1998, two persons (one of whom was identified
as Theng Dilangalen) went to the residence of Lucia Chan, a fish dealer based in
Manila, at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport alleged
to have been mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her.
b. However, the two were unable to locate said passport so they left.
c. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion identified as
Tony Abao, returned looking for Chan but were told she was out.
d. When the two returned in the afternoon, the fish delivery had yet to arrive so
Chan offered to accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish
allegedly containing the passport. Said offer was declined.
e. Later that evening, Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who
remains at large, returned to Chan’s residence.
f. Chan’s houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by the stairs. Thereat, a
gun was pointed at Chan’s sun, Levy Chan, and the house companions. As a
result, they were able to forcibly drag Chan outside of her residence.
g. Levy (son) thereafter proceeded to the Pasay Police Headquarters to report the
incident.
h. Meanwhile, Chan was forced to board a “Tamaraw FX” van and was warned not
to shout as a gun was pointed at her mouth. She was then ordered to go with
two women, later identified as appellants Ronas and Evad, inside a house where
she was threatened that she would be killed unless she paid P20,000,000.
i. On Aug. 13, 1998, Chan was transferred in a different location. At about 9pm, a
man who was later identified as accused-appellant Mandao entered the room
with a handgun and asked Chan, “Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?”
j. Eventually, Chan was instructed to talk to Levy (her son) through a cellphone
and she gave instructions to get the P75,000 she kept in her cabinet. After
 negotiation, it was agreed upon that Levy was to deliver P400,000 at the
“Chowking” Restaurant at Buendia Avenue, at 2am.
2. On Aug. 14, 1998, Inspector Arnado received information that the abductors acceded
to a P400,000 ransom money. Thus, at about 2am, when four people riding a light
blue “Tamaraw FX” van took the ransom money and headed towards the South Luzon
Expressway, the surveillance team successfully intercepted the van and arrested said
men (later identified as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman).
a. They also recovered the P400,000 ransom.
3. On the same day at about 5am in the morning, the police team led by Inspectors
Ouano and Mancao, who were assigned at the Pasig Area to conduct the investigation
regarding the kidnapping, rescued Chan and apprehended seven of her abductors
(later identified as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and
Ronas).
4. During the October 7, 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, accused-
appellant Karim manifested his desire to change is earlier plea of “not guilty” to
“guilty.”
a. The presiding judge then explained the consequences of a change of plea,
stating: “It would mean the moment you withdraw your previous pleas of not
guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after receiving evidence, as
in fact it has received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will [outrightly]
sentence you to the penalty provided by law after the prosecution shall have
finished the presentation of its evidence. . .”
b. Karim answered, “Yes.”
5. On hearing the clarification made by the trial judge (stated above), accused-appellants
Gambao, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad, and Dukilman
was separately asked if they understood the consequence of changing their pleas. All
of them answered in the affirmative.
6. Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,
the trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it did.

RTC Ruling:
1. Convicted the accused-appellants of Kidnapping for Ransom.
2. Thus, they appealed to the CA.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

1. Affirmed (death penalty) with modification as to the award of moral damages;
2. And since accused-appellant Perpenian was only 17 at the time the crime was
committed, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
3. Pursuant to Sec. 13, Rule 124 as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court
certified the case to the Supreme Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the
records.

ISSUE:
WON the convictions should be set aside considering the accused-appellants’
contention of improvident plea.

RULING:
NO, the convictions should not be set aside.
 In People vs. Oden, the Supreme Court ruled that when the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the trial court is mandated: (1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilty, (2) to
require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability, and (3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
IN THIS CASE, the aforesaid rules have not been fully complied with because the
questions propounded by the trial judge failed to ensure that the accused-appellants fully
understood the consequences of their plea. Particularly, the accused-appellants were not
warned that even if they enter a plea of guilty in cases where the penalty is single and
indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.
HOWEVER, even with the improvident plea, the convictions cannot be set aside
because the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and
the cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment.
If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused,
as it did in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not
merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission of the offense charged.
The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal
significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the
commission of the crime by the accused.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
1. The following guidelines should be observed when a trial judge conducts a “searching
inquiry”
a. Ascertain from the accused himself
i. How he was brought into the custody of the law;
ii. Whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations; and
iii. Under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused
has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats
of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of
the judge’s intimidating robes.

2. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, he should be informed of the
exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the
certainty that he will serve such sentence.
a. Reason: For not infrequently, an accused pleads in the hope of a lenient
treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or
parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse.
b. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these
mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the
admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating
circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
3. On the contention of the accused-appellants that the evidence is insufficient since the
witness, Chan, was not able to positively identify them because of her failing eyesight
due to old age:
a. Bereft of merit.
b. During her testimony, she positively identified the accused-appellants. If she
had not met them before, she could not have positively identified them in open
court. In fact, the participation of these accused-appellants was further
established through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses.
c. Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of
witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. For this reason, its
observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal. They are
conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless,
through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not
been considered.

4. On the degree of culpability: Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in

their respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they were concerned, was not
convincingly established. Dukilman hinges his argument on the fact that he was not
one of those arrested during the rescue operation based on the testimony of Inspector
Ouano. On the other hand, Ronas and Evad base their argument on the fact that they
had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom money.
a. This Supreme Court has held before that to be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every
act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act
of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of
them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. Moreover,
Chan positively identified the accused-appellants and placed all of them at the
crime scenes.
RULE 117

Section 1.
PEOPLE vs. ODTUHAN

Summary:

Respondent filed an omnibus motion to present evidence and to quash the

information for which, according to his contention, the facts alleged in the information do
not constitute bigamy of which he was charged with, and that according to him, his
criminal liability has already been extinguished. The RTC denied the motion and thereafter
denied the motion for reconsideration. Respondent elevate the matter to the CA and it
reversed the ruling of the lower court.

Issue:

Whether or not an omnibus motion to present evidence to quash the information can
be granted.

Ruling:

No. the omnibus motion to present evidence to quash the information cannot be
granted thus, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the ruling made by the trial court.

As defined in Antone, “a motion to quash information is the mode by which an

accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information.” It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information.  The
fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information
is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. 

Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered.  To

be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident
on its fact. Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.  If the motion to quash is sustained, the
court may order that another complaint or information be filed except when the
information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.

Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is
legally married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3)
that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with
Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 
Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is null
and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only an
evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a first
valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage.  This should
not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to
quash.34  It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the
benefit of a full blown trial.  The issues require a fuller examination and it would be unfair
to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the information on
the basis of the document presented by respondent.35  With the presentation of the court
decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded to
the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof.
Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010

Facts:

On 12 March 2007, petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint for

Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. She
alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when
the latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991. On 21 June 2007,
the prosecution filed the corresponding Information before the Regional Trial Court, Pasay
City.

Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved to quash
the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He
informed the court that his marriage with petitioner was declared null and void by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran on 26 April 2007; that the decision became
final and executory on 15 May 2007; and that such decree has already been registered with
the Municipal Civil Registrar on 12 June 2007. He argued that since the marriage had been
declared null and void from the beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of.
Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the
crime of bigamy.

After hearing of the motion, the trial court quashed the information finding that the
first element of Bigamy is missing. It found that the accused Beronilla was actually never
legally married to Myrna Antone. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being
declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." Motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the RTC.

Aggrieved, the case was elevated before the Court of Appeals. However, the CA
dismissed the petition finding that it was infirmed in form and in substance, stating among
others that:

1. The verification is defective;

2. It should be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), being its statutory
counsel in all appealed criminal cases; and
3. there is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the dismissal of the subject
criminal case is tantamount to an acquittal based on the trial court’s finding.

CA denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it sustained
respondent’s motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the
information. Considering the petitioner’s contention that the rulings of the Supreme Court
holding that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information, and that facts contrary thereto are matters of defense which may be raised
only during the presentation of evidence.
Ruling:

Yes, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it quashed the
information.

In Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83754, 18 February 1991, it was held that:

“It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary
to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that it
charges no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in considering a motion
to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will
establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, a reading of the information will disclose that
the essential elements of the offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not proper
therefore to resolve the charges at the very outset, in a preliminary hearing only and
without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination. Given the
circumstances of this case, we feel it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage
of the proceedings and to dismiss the informations on the basis only of the petitioner’s
evidence, such as this.”
Here, we see no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information in the case at
bar. Clearly, the facts alleged in its accusatory portion, which reads:

That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, LEO R. BERONILLA, having been united in a lawful
marriage with one MYRNA A. BERONILLA, which marriage is still in force
and subsisting and without having been legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one
Cecile Maguillo, which subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity.

sufficiently constitute an offense. It contained all the elements of the crime of Bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code hereunder enumerated:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

OTHER ISSUES NO. 1:

 Whether or not the appeal should be dismissed considering that the verification 1 in
the petition is defective. Considering that a pleading required to be verified which lacks a
proper verification shall be treated as unsigned pleading. 2

RULING NO. 2

No, the appeal should not be dismissed.

In Robern Development Corporation v. Judge Jesus V. Quitain, G. R. No. 135042, 23
September 1999, the Court held that, “a pleading is required to be verified only to ensure
that it was prepared in good faith, and that the allegations were true and correct and not
based on mere speculations.”

Here, this, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases, opted to relax the rule in
order that the ends of justice may be served.3 The defect being merely formal and not
jurisdictional, we ruled that the court may nevertheless order the correction of the
pleading, or even act on the pleading "if the attending circumstances are such that xxx strict
compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice xxx may
be served."4

OTHER ISSUE NO. 2

Whether or not the appeal should be dismissed considering that is should be filed in
behalf of the People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all
appealed criminal cases.

RULING No. 2

No, the appeal should not be dismissed.

While it is true that in Republic v. Partisala, No. L-61997, 15 November 1982 , the
Court held that, “the summary dismissal of an action in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, when not initiated by the Solicitor General, is in order. Not even the
appearance of the conformity of the public prosecutor in a petition for certiorari would
suffice because the authority of the City Prosecutor or his assistant to represent the People
of the Philippines is limited to the proceedings in the trial court.”

However, the Court took exceptions and gave due course to a number of actions even
when the respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General.

1
Verification it is part of the pleading wherein it states that a person verifying has read the pleading and that the allegations thereof
are true of his own knowledge.

2
Sec. 4, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10 dated 1 May 2000
3
Hon. Eduardo Nonato Joson, in his capacity as the Governor of the Province of Nueva Ecija v. Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres,
et al., G.R. No. 131255, 20 May 1998 citing, among others, Oshita v. Republic, L-21180, 31 March 1967, 19 SCRA 700,703

4
Id.
 In Labaro v. Panay, G.R. No. 129567, 4 December 1998 , it was held that, “since the
challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines,
we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG
to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment,
we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People
of the Philippines.”

In Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries

Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 137489, 29 May 2002, “without requiring the Office of the
Solicitor General to file a comment on the petition, this Court determined the merits of the
case involving a novel issue…”

And, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of the instant
petition even absent the imprimatur of the Solicitor General. After all, "for justice to prevail,
the scales must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone." 5 To borrow
the words of then Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario in another case where the dismissal of a
criminal case pending with the trial court was sought:

[T]he task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic
society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who [come or are brought to court] are
afforded a fair opportunity to present their side[s]. xxx The State, like any other litigant, is
entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. 6

OTHER ISSUE NO. 3:

Whether or not the filing of petition is in violation of the respondent’s right against
double jeopardy on the theory that he has already been practically acquitted when the trial
court quashed the Information.

RULING NO. 3

No, it does not violate the respondent’s right to double jeopardy.

In Javier v. Sandiganbayan, First Division, G.R. Nos. 147026-27, 11 September 2009 , it

was held that, “Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is
convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent.”

Here, the third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case as (a)
respondent has not yet entered his plea to the charge when he filed the Motion to Quash
the Information, and (2) the case was dismissed not merely with his consent but, in fact, at
his instance.
5
Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, 21 April 2009
6
Tan v. People, supra.
 We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on
account of an order sustaining a motion to quash. More specifically, the granting of a
motion to quash anchored on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
is "not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense."

It will be noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the complaint against
petitioner was based on Subsection (a) of Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court – that
the facts charged in the complaint do not constitute an offense. If this is so then the
dismissal of said complaint will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, for
it is provided in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court [now Section 6 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure] that an order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds
specified in Section 2, Subsection[s] (f) and (h) of this rule [now substantially reproduced in
Section 3, Subsections (g) and (i) of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] xxx. 7

ADDITIONAL NOTE ON THE RELIANCE BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE

MARRIAGE IS VOID AB INITIO AND NO NEED FOR DECREE IS MISPLACED.

The court explained the difference between the case of Morigo v. People (the case
relied upon by the court) and People v. Mendoza (the case argued by the prosecution)

In Morigo case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized

solemnizing officer. Thus, in such case, no decree for nullity is required. (Remember our
discussion in Persons that this is the only instance where the decree of nullity of marriage is
not required)

However, in Mendoza case, the first marriage was actually solemnized xxx.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared
void ab initio.

Thus, the reliance by the trial court that all void ab initio marriages do not require a
decree of nullity is misplaced.

ADDITIONAL: WHAT IS “MOTION TO QUASH”

- In essence it is a MOTION TO DISMISS in criminal cases.

- In Ariel Los Baños, et al. v. Joel Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, 22 April 2009 , “motion to
quash is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint
or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for
defects which are apparent in the face of the Information.”

7
People v. Consulta, No. L-41251, 31 March 1976
 ALL-IN-ALL, ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND CA ARE SET ASIDE AND
THE CASE IS REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
Section 3(a).
RULE 117, SECTION 3 (A)
G.R. NO. 160619 September 9, 2015
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent: SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JESSIE CASTILLO, MELENCIO
ARCIAGA and EMERENCIANO ARCIAGA

Facts:
Castillo, mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, was charged with the violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA
3019, in relation to the illegal operation of Villa Esperanza dumpsite which allegedly
unwarranted benefits and caused undue injury to the residents and students in the area.
Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the Information. Sandiganbayan granted his
motion on the ground that the unwarranted benefits and undue injury must be specified,
quantified, and proven to the point of moral certainty in the Information. Hence, filed
petition for an appeal.

Detailed Facts:
Jessie Castillo, elected municipal mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, was charged with the
violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to the illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza
dumpsite in Molino, Bacoor. According to the Information, he allegedly gave unwarranted
benefits by allowing Villa Esperanza to operate without the requisite Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) and "thereby causing undue injury to the residents and
students in the area who had to endure the stench, flies, rats and mosquitoes emanating
from the dumpsite".

An administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct had previously been filed against
Castillo also in relation to the illegal operation of the dumpsite at the Office of the
Ombudsman and found Castillo guilty of the administrative. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals set aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman and ordered the dismissal of
the administrative complaint against Castillo that he did not violate the DENR notice which
was issued way back in 1998 yet, or before his actual assumption of office.

After arraignment and pre-trial, Castillo filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to
Dismiss or Terminate Proceedings. He argued that the case against him had been
decriminalized by Section 37 of Republic Act No. 9003 and invoked the decision of the
Court of Appeals absolving him of administrative liability. His motion was initially denied
by the Sandiganbayan. Then, Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the same does not charge an offense. He claimed that a
public officer may only be held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 if he
caused undue injury to the government or any private person. Thus, Castillo argued that the
undue injury must not only be mentioned in the Information, its extent must be specified.
Invoking the ruling of this Court in Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, Castillo asserted that the
claim of undue injury must be "specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral
certainty."
 The Sandiganbayan Special Division granted Castillo’s Motion, ruling that undue
injury must be specified, quantified, and proven to the point of moral certainty. Hence, the
People of the Philippines filed this petition under Rule 45 of ROC.

Issue:
W/N an Information alleging the grant of unwarranted benefits and existence of
undue injury must state the precise amount of the alleged benefit as well as prove the
alleged injury to the point of moral certainty.

Ruling:
No, information only allege the ultimate facts constituting the elements of the crime
charge and the details that do not go into the core of the crime need not be included in the
information, but may be presented during the trial.

(Point No. 1 & 2– Sufficiency of Complaint or Information and Information filed against
Castillo and his co-accused is Sufficient)

Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 110 of the ROC state that the Information must state in
sufficient terms the acts or omissions complained, as well as qualifying and aggravating
circumstances, that would enable a person of common understanding to know what offense
is being charged. (Note: 2 purposes for this rule: 1) it enables the accused to prepare his
defense; 2) it allows the accused to if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.)
In this case, the elements of a violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 are: 1) accused must be
public officer; 2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross
negligence; and 3) his action caused any undue injury to any party (including government)
or giving any party unwarranted benefits.
The Court held that the Information sufficiently alleges the essential elements of a
violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. The Information specifically alleged that Castillo is
the Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite who, in such official capacity, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, and conspiring with the Arciagas, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, by allowing the illegal operation of the Villa
Esperanza dumpsite, to the undue injury ·of the residents and students in the area who had
to endure the ill-effects of the dumpsite's operation. As long as the ultimate facts
constituting the offense have been alleged, an Information charging a violation of Section
3(e) of RA No. 3019 need not state, to the point of specificity, the exact amount of
unwarranted benefit granted nor specify, quantify or prove, to the point of moral certainty,
the undue injury caused. It would be illogical, if not procedurally infirm, to require specific
peso amount allegations of the unwarranted benefit and proof of undue injury – to the point
of moral certainty, no less – at this stage of criminal proceedings.The details required by the
Sandiganbayan are matters of evidence best raised during the trial; they need not be stated
in the Information.

(Point No. 3 – Application of Llorente ruling is misplaced)

The validity and sufficiency of the Information was not an issue in Llorente. The
import of the ruling therein is that proof of undue injury must be established by the
prosecution during the trial and not when the Information is filed.
(Point No. 4 – Amendment of the Information)
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court gives clear guidance on this matter. It
provides – “Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is
based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.”
In this case, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend an
Information, where such right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed
time and again in a string of Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to
due process. Hence, even assuming that the Information was defective, the Sandiganbayan
should have first ordered its amendment and not its quashal. Doing so would have saved the
parties from resorting to an appeal to this Court and this case from remaining in the docket
of the Sandiganbayan for a long period.

DECISION: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated

January 9, 2002 and November 3, 2003 are REVERSED and the Information charging
Castillo and the Arciagas with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 is ordered
REINSTATED. As this case has been pending for almost fifteen years, the Sandiganbayan is
directed to resolve the case with dispatch.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS,et al.

G.R. Nos. 171222 & 174786, 18 February 2015, FIRST DIVISION,(Sereno, C.J.)

The failure by school authorities to take any action to prevent the offenses as provided by
the law exposes them to criminal liability as accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the
institution and its officers cannot stand idly by in the face of patently criminal acts
committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the commensurate duty to
ensure that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.

Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine

Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all new entrants were
required to successfully complete the mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,”
which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001. PMMA were
criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-
Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information
against them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused
and, the failure to include in the Information the material averments required by the Anti-
Hazing Law. Consequently, this petition was filed before this Court questioning the
Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information.

ISSUE:
May the dismissal of the criminal case of the principal accused be invoked as a ground to
dismiss the criminal case of the accomplices?

RULING:
No. That the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the
absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or
even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been
established.

In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation
in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as
established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or
faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against
hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.

First, the Court rejects the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered
an organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes
– but is not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps,
educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships,
corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. Attached to the Department of Transportation and
Communications, the PMMA is a government-owned educational institution established for
the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers.
Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the meaning of the law.
Nevertheless, the Court finds – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must
be granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime
of accomplice to hazing. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful
prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing.

Reason for the grant of motion to quash

Nevertheless, we find albeit for a different reason that the Motion to Quash must be
granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing.
As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological pain and
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts
were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to
aver... this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal
responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing.
An order sustaining a motion to quash would not bar another prosecution. That is, of
course, unless respondents are able to... prove that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.
Section 3(c).
June 7, 2017G.R. No. 200370
MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Summary:
Mario Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. According to the prosecution, a concerned
citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves informing him that a certain alias “Baho” who was later
identified as Veridiano was on his way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. The chief of
police instructed to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna. At around
10:00am, they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo,
Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked passengers to disembark. The police
officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed
weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets. The police officer recovered from
Veridiano a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana, which was later on tested
positive for marijuana. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. He
was then brought to the police station. RTC found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Veridiano appealed the decision of
the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested." The CA affirmed the guilt of
Veridiano. Veridiano moved for reconsideration which was denied. Veridiano filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Facts:
1. In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna,
Mario Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
a. That on or about January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province
of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being permitted or authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody
one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2. 72 grams of
dried marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.
2. On October 9, 2008 Veridiano was arraigned.
a. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
b. Trial on the merits ensured
3. According to the prosecution, at about 7:20am of 15 January 2008, a concerned
citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police
Station, informing him that a certain alias “Baho” who was later identified as
Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.
a. PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO3
Alvin Vergara who were both on duty.
b. Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a
checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.
c. The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.
d. At around 10:00am they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney
coming from San Pablo, Laguna.
e. They flagged down the jeepney and asked passengers to disembark.
f. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for
possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets
4. The police officer recovered from Veridiano a tea bag containing what appeared to be
marijuana
 a. PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials.
b. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights.
c. He was then brought to the police station.
5. At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who
also placed his initials.
6. PO1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally
brought with the seized tea bag to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory.
7. The contents of the tea bag tested positive for marijuana.

RTC Ruling:
 Found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of
marijuana
 Veridiano appealed stating that he was illegally arrested and argued that the teabag is
inadmissible as evidence for being the fruit of the poisonous tree

CA Ruling:
 CA rendered a Decision affirming the guilt of Veridiano.
 That he was caught in flagrante delicto of having marijuana in his possession
 Veridiano argues that the tea bag was seized in violation of his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
 That he was merely seated inside the jeepney at the time of his apprehension.
 Veridiano moved for reconsideration which was denied.
 Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:
I. Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest.
II. Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search against Petitioner.

Ruling:

I. No, there was no valid warrantless arrest.

There are three grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Under Rule 113 Sec. 5 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. -A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
 In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante delicta  arrest
because he was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a
passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers
that would incite suspicion. Furthermore, the warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified
under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since the law
enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner
had just committed an offense.

II. No, there was no valid warrantless search against Petitioner.

People v. Cogaed clarified that there are exceptional circumstances "when searches
are reasonable even when warrantless." The following are recognized instances of
permissible warrantless searches laid down in jurisprudence:
(1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest,"
(2) search of "evidence in 'plain view,"'
(3) "search of a moving vehicle,"
(4) "consented warrantless search[es],"
(5) "customs search,"
(6) "stop and frisk," and
(7) "exigent and emergency circumstances."

In this case, since there was no lawful arrest, there could not be a valid warrantless
search incidental to the arrest. Furthermore, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in
a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to
believe that he had drugs in his possession. Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of
resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the warrantless search. Also, the extensive
search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits of warrantless
searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except for
the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may
either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its
inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

How is this related to Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure?

The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are:

(a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of an accused;
(b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and
(c) any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence
acquired as constitutionally inadmissible.
 Rule 117(c) provides that the accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on the ground that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person
of the accused.

Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must
be raised through a motion to quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived and an accused is "estopped from questioning the legality of his
[or her] arrest."

The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her
active participation during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an
arrest. The reason for this rule is that "the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the accused.

Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an
accused from questioning the admissibility of evidence seized. The inadmissibility of the
evidence is not affected when an accused fails to question the court's jurisdiction over his or
her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the
constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually exclusive consequences
of an illegal arrest.

In this case, the warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid.
Consequently, the tea bag containing marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered
inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution
(fruits of a poisonous tree). There being no evidence to support his conviction, petitioner
must be acquitted.
Section 3(d).
SOCORRO F. ONGKINGCO v. KAZUHIRO SUGIYAMA
GR No. 217787, Sep 18, 2019
 

FACTS:
Respondent Kasuhiro Sugiyama entered into a "Contract Agreement" with New Rhia
Car Services, Inc. where petitioner Socorro is the President and Chairperson of the Board of
Directors, and petitioner Maria Paz B. Ongkingco is a Board Director. Under the
Agreement, Sugiyama would receive a monthly dividend of P90,675.00 for five years in
exchange for his investment of P2,200,000.00 in New Rhia Car Services, Inc.
To cover Sugiyama's monthly dividends, petitioners issued six (6) checks. The first
three (3) checks were good checks, but the remaining 3 checks bounced for having been
drawn against insufficient funds. In a Memorandum of Agreement, Socorro obtained a loan
from Sugiyama amounting to P500,000.00 with a five percent (5%) interest for a period of
one (1) month. As a guarantee and payment for the said obligation, Socorro issued an Allied
Bank Check amounting to P525,000.00. When the check was presented for payment, it was
likewise dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds, just like the 3 other
checks initially issued by petitioners. A formal demand letter was delivered to Socorro's
office, but no payment was made. Thus, Sugiyama filed a complaint against petitioners for
four (4) counts of violation of BP 22.
Both petitioners pleaded not guilty to the four (4) charges. Later on, Socorro and
Sugiyama executed an "Addendum to Contract Agreement," agreeing on a new schedule of
payment with interests, but the obligation remain unpaid.
The MeTC ruled that the first and third elements of violation of B.P. 22 are present,
namely: the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value,
and the subsequent dishonor by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit.
Prosecution, thus, was able to prove the receipt of the demand letter/notice of
dishonor. Despite receipt of the same, both accused failed to pay the face amount of the
dishonored checks or to make arrangement for the full settlement of the same.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the RTC, which affirmed in toto the judgment of
the MeTC. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
On October 24, 2014, the CA rendered a Decision denying the petition for review.
With the CA's denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition
for review on certiorari, raising, among others, the ground that the four information filed
before the MeTC, Makati City do not bear the approval of the city prosecutor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the informations filed before the MeTC bear the approval of the city
prosecutor.

RULING:
It bears emphasis that under Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the ground that the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so,
which prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case — referred to in Garfin
and Cudia — pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the offense, which is a non-waivable
ground. The three other non-waivable grounds for a motion to quash the information are:
(1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (2) the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished; and (3) the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
Accordingly, in instances where the information is filed by an authorized officer, like a
public prosecutor, without the approval of the city prosecutor appearing in the information,
but the resolution for filing of the information bears the approval of the city prosecutor, or
his or her duly authorized deputy, and such lack of approval is timely objected to before
arraignment, the court may require the public prosecutor to have the signature of the city
prosecutor affixed in the information to avoid undue delay. However, if the objection is
raised after arraignment, at any stage of the proceeding or even on appeal, the same should
no longer be a ground to declare the information as invalid, because it is no longer a
question of jurisdiction over the case. After all, the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor attached to the information carries with it the recommendation to file the
information and the approval to file the information by the prosecutor, or his or her duly
authorized deputy.
If the information is filed by the public prosecutor without the city prosecutor's or his or
her deputy's approval both in the information and, the resolution for the filing thereof, then
the court should require the public prosecutor to seek the approval of the city prosecutor
before arraignment; otherwise, the case may be dismissed on the ground of lack of authority
to file the information under Section 3(d), Rule 117. This ground may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings, which may cause the dismissal of the case. If, however, the information
is filed by an unauthorized official—not a public prosecutor, like a private complainant, or
even public officers who are not authorized by law or rule to file the information—then the
information is invalid from the very beginning, and the court should motu proprio dismiss
the case even without any motion to dismiss, because such kind of information cannot
confer upon the court jurisdiction over the case.
In this particular case, there is proof in the records that Prosecutor II Hirang filed the
Informations with prior authority from the 1st Assistant City Prosecutor. The records—
which include those of the preliminary investigation accompanying the informations filed
before the court, as required under Rule 112—dearly show that 1st Assistant City
Prosecutor (ACP) Jaime A. Adoc, signing in behalf of the City Prosecutor, approved the
filing of four (4) counts of violation of B.P. 22, after it was recommended for approval by the
Investigating Prosecutor.
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. NO. 152644
February 10, 2006

SUMMARY:
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end which caused
the tailings to gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
The DOJ separately charged petitioners with violation of Water Code of the Philippines
(PD 1067), National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984),  Philippine Mining Act of
1995 (RA 7942), and Article 365 of the RPC for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property. 
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the
Informations were "duplicitous" as the DOJ charged more than one offense for a single act.

FACTS:
1. Petitioners Loney, Reid, and Hernandez are the President, CEO, Senior Manager and
Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining
Corporation, a corporation engaged in mining in Marinduque province.
2. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque.
3. On March 24, 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt.
Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers.
4. In August 1996, the DOJ separately charged petitioners in MTC-Boac, Marinduque with
violation of:
a. Art. 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of PD 1067 (Water Code of the Philippines),
b. Sec. 8 of PD 984 (National Pollution Control Decree of 1976),
c. Sec. 108 of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995), and
d. Art. 365 of the RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
5. Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds:
a. Informations were “duplicitous” as the DOJ charged more than one offense for a
single act;
b. Petitioners Loney and Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident
subject of the Informations took place; and
c. The Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.

MTC Ruling:
1. Initially deferred ruling on petitioners’ motion to quash information for lack of
“indubitable ground for the quashing of the informations.”
2. The MTC scheduled petitioners’ arraignment in February 1997.
3. However, on April 28, 1997, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order granting partial
reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD
1067 and PD 984.
a. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Art. 365 of
the RPC.
 b. It ruled that the Informations for violation of PD 984 and PD 1067 should be
dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the aforesaid violations are
absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of RA 7942.
c. That the prosecution for the violation of RA 7942 is not a bar to the prosecution
for Art. 365 of the RPC.
4. In the hearing of the re-scheduled arraignment, petitioners manifested that they were
willing to be arraigned on the charge for violation of Art. 365 of the RPC but not on the
charge for violation of RA 7942.
5. After making of record petitioners’ manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the
arraignment and ordered the entry of “not guilty” pleas on both charges.
6. Subsequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with RTC-Boac, Marinduque
assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for
violation of RA 7942.
a. This was raffled to Branch 94.
7. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal also with RTC-Boac, Marinduque
assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for violation
of PD 1067 and PD 984.
a. This was raffled to Branch 38.
8. On public respondent’s motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondent’s appeal be
consolidated with petitioners’ petition in Branch 94.

RTC-Boac, Marinduque, Br. 94 Ruling

1. Denied Petitioners’ petition.
2. Granted public respondent’s appeal, and ordered the Informations for violation of PD
1067 and PD 984 and those charges be reinstated.
a. It ruled that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses,
as the acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other. The
elements of proving each violation are not the same with each other.
3. Thus, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

CA Ruling:
1. Affirmed the RTC ruling.
a. That duplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3,
Rule 117].
2. Petitioners filed MR but it was denied.

ISSUE:
WON the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of
charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
should stand.

RULING:
NO, the charges should not be quashed. There is no duplicity of charges.
Under Sec. 13, Rule 110, duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or
information charges more than one offense. Under Sec. 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the
Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in
preparing his defense.
 HERE, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each
Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of
charges as a ground to quash the Informations.
On petitioners' claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the
charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se
felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the
former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are
the special laws enacting them.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
1. A single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one
offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for “the same offense.”
a. In People vs. Doriquez, it was held that two (or more) offenses arising from the
same act are not “the same.”
i. x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or
elementwhich the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
b. Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because:
i. The gravamen of the offense in PD 1067 is the absence of the proper permit
to dump said mine tailings.
ii. In PD 984, the gravamen is the pollution itself.
iii. In RA 7942, the additional fact that must be established is the willful
violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms
and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate.
iv. In Art. 365 of the RPC, the additional element is the lack of necessary or
adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of
the accused to prevent damage to property.
Section 3.
VIRGINIA DIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TIMOTHY DESMOND
(CONSOLACION)
08 JUNE 2016 | Leonen, J. | The Internet and Cybercrime-Relevant Cases

PETITIONER: VIRGINIA DIO

RESPONDENTS: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TIMOTHY DESMOND

SUMMARY:
Desmond filed a libel complaint against Dio arising from purported libelous statement
contained in an e-mail and sent by Virginia Dio to officials of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority.

Dio raised the defense that the Informations are defective for failure to allege "where the
libelous article was printed and first published" or "where the offended party actually
resided at the time of the commission of the offense" and as such cannot be cured by mere
amendment even before arraignment.

The Supreme Court denied Dio’s petition. The Court reasoned that it is not apparent on the
face of the Informations that the prosecutor did not have the authority to file them. The
proper remedy is to give the prosecution the opportunity to amend the Informations. If the
proper venue appears not to be Morong, Bataan after the Informations have been amended,
then the trial court may dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction, as well as lack of
authority of the prosecutor to file the information.

Briefly the Supreme Court declined to preempt the decision on the issue of the “public”
character of the emails which is best left for now to the decision of trial court stating that
“The scope and extent of that protection cannot be grounded in abstractions. The facts of
this case need to be proven by evidence; otherwise, this Court exercises barren abstractions
that may wander into situations only imagined, not real.”

FACTS:
1. This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Regional
Trial Court Order that quashed the Informations charging petitioner Virginia Dio
(Dio) with libel because these Informations failed to allege publication.

2. On December 9, 2002, Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for libel. Two (2)
separate Informations.

3. Dio filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the Informations for failure to allege
publication and lack of jurisdiction which was denied by the trial court.

4. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained that the Informations did not
 substantially constitute the offense charged. It found that the Informations did not
contain any allegation that the emails allegedly sent by Dio to Desmond had been
accessed. However, it found that the trial court erred in quashing the Informations
without giving the prosecution a chance to amend them pursuant to Rule 117, Section
4 of the Rules of Court.

5. Dio stresses that "venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases." Considering that libel is
limited as to the venue of the case, failure to allege "where the libelous article was
printed and first published" or "where the offended party actually resided at the time
of the commission of the offense" is a jurisdictional defect. She argues that
jurisdictional defects in an Information are not curable by amendment, even before
arraignment.

6. Dio argues that the Informations were void as the prosecutor of Morong, Bataan had
no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offenses charged. The
complaint filed before the prosecutor did not allege that the emails were printed and
first published in Morong Bataan, or that Desmond resided in Morong, Bataan at the
time of the offense. In the absence of these allegations, the prosecutor did not have
the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation or to file the information.

7. Dio further argues that publication, one of the elements of libel, was not present in
the case. She asserts that emailing does not constitute publication under Article 355 of
the Revised Penal Code. As there was no allegation in the Informations that the
emails were received, accessed, and read by third persons other than Desmond, there
could be no publication. Further, emails are not covered under Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, at the time the allegedly libelous emails were sent, there
was no law punishing this act.

8. Finally, Dio argues that she sent the emails as private communication to the officers of
the corporation, who were in the position to act on her grievances. The emails were
sent in good faith, with justifiable ends, and in the performance of a legal duty.

ISSUE:

WHETHER AN INFORMATION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH VENUE IS A DEFECT

THAT CAN BE CURED BY AMENDMENT BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT
HELD:
Yes, the failure to establish venue in the Information is a defect that can be cured by
amendment before arraignment.
If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. Rule 117, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court states:

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on

an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the
court shall order that an amendment be made.
 If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.
The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.cr

The Informations here do not allege that the venue of the offense was other than
Morong, Bataan. Thus, it is not apparent on the face of the Informations that the prosecutor
did not have the authority to file them. The proper remedy is to give the prosecution the
opportunity to amend the Informations. If the proper venue appears not to be Morong,
Bataan after the Informations have been amended, then the trial court may dismiss the case
due to lack of jurisdiction, as well as lack of authority of the prosecutor to file the
information
G.R. No. 223099
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
LINO ALEJANDRO y PIMENTEL, Accused-Appellant
Summary:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated February 1 7, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05256, which affirmed the July 26, 2011 Joint Decision rendered
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City, Isabela, Branch 20 in Criminal Case
Nos. Br. 20-6096 & 20-6097, finding accused-appellant Lino Alejandro y Pimentel guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.
On July 26, 2011, the RTC promulgated a Decision acquitting the accused-appellant. On the
same day, however, the RTC recalled the said decision and issued an Order, stating: “Upon
manifestation of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Roderick Cruz that there were Orders that
were inadvertently placed in the record of Criminal Case No. Br. 20-4979 involving the
same accused but different private complainant-victim, XXX, which if considered will result
in a different verdict…”
The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the RTC's Order of recalling and setting aside
the judgment of acquittal was justified. It found that:”… Obviously, with the unintentional
exclusion of the testimony of the private complainant from the records of the two criminal
cases, the RTC could not have made complete findings of facts in the initial decision. The
verdict of acquittal had no factual basis. It was null and void, and should have necessarily
been recalled and set aside”
Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged with two counts of rape, defined and penalized under
Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No.
8369 , of a 12-year old minor, AAA. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of
not guilty and trial ensued.
During trial, AAA testified that accused-appellant followed her, grabbed her, and brought
her to the back of a school. There, accused-appellant removed AAA's shorts and t-shirt, laid
on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Two months later, accused-appellant went inside AAA's house through a window one
night, undressed himself and AAA, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. On both
occasions, accused-appellant threatened to kill AAA if she told anybody what had
happened.
AAA eventually told her mother, BBB, about the incident. BBB brought her to the
Municipal Health Office where she was examined by Dr. CCC. Dr. CCC testified that she
found, among others, deep, healed, old and superficial lacerations in the hymen of AAA and
concluded that these indicated positive sexual intercourse.
Accused-appellant, through his counsel, manifested in open court that he would no longer
present any evidence for the defense and submitted the case for decision.
RTC
July 26, 2011, the RTC promulgated a Decision acquitting the accused-appellant. On the
same day, however, the RTC recalled the said decision and issued an Order, stating:
Upon manifestation of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Roderick Cruz that there were
Orders that were inadvertently placed in the record of Criminal Case No. Br. 20-4979
involving the same accused but different private complainant-victim, XXX, which if
considered will result in a different verdict. The Order dated September 24, 2007, showed
that private complainant-victim, AAA, in the above[-]quoted cases, Crim. Case No. Br-20-
6096 & 6097, has actually testified in Court.
MR(Accused)
Accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory and can neither be withdrawn nor modified, because to do
so would place an accused-appellant in double jeopardy.
The RTC denied the motion in an Order dated July 26, 2011, explaining its denial, thus:
Admittedly, the Court erroneously declared in its Decision that private complainant AAA
did not testify in Court. When in truth and in fact said private complainant took the witness
stand on September 3, 2008 as evidenced by the Order dated September 3, 2008 which was
mistakenly captioned as Crim. Case No. 4979 instead of Crim. Cases Nos. Br. 20- 6096 &
6097 and as a result thereof, the Order dated September 3, 2008 was erroneously attached
by the Court employee to the records of another criminal case entitled People of the
Philippines versus Lino Alejandro, wherein the private complainant is a certain xxx.
Section 14, Article 8 of the 1997 Constitution requires that the Decision should be based on
facts and the law. The Court believes and so holds that the Decision contravenes the highest
law of the land because it is not in accordance with the law and the facts, and therefore, the
judgment of acquittal is invalid. As dispenser of truth and justice, the Court should be
candid enough to admit its error and rectify itself with dispatch to avoid grave miscarriage
of justice.
A Joint Decision dated July 26, 2011 was rendered by the RTC, finding accused-appellant
LINO ALEJANDRO y PIMENTEL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
Simple Rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A paragraph (D) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, he is hereby sentenced to suffer, in each
count, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indentify the victim, minor AAA in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱50,000.00) as moral damages for each count.
CA
Accused-appellant appealed to the CA, contending that the R TC gravely erred in recalling
its previously promulgated decision acquitting the accused-appellant; and for convicting the
accused-appellant despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the RTC's Order of recalling and setting aside
the judgment of acquittal was justified. It found that:
The initial decision of the RTC acquitting the accused failed to express clearly and distinctly
the facts of the case, as the records on which the acquittal was based was incomplete and
inaccurate. Judges are expected to make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and
scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented.
Obviously, with the unintentional exclusion of the testimony of the private complainant
from the records of the two criminal cases, the RTC could not have made complete findings
of facts in the initial decision. The verdict of acquittal had no factual basis. It was null and
void, and should have necessarily been recalled and set aside.
Contention of Accused on Appeal to SC:
1. Accused-appellant argues that despite the RTC's error and misapprehension of facts, it
still had no power to rectify such mistake as said acquittal had attained finality after
valid promulgation.
2. The error committed by the RTC cannot be validly recalled without transgressing the
accused-appellant's right against double jeopardy. He insists that not only was the
 decision of acquittal final and executory, the manifestation of the public prosecutor,
which was the catalyst in having the decision recalled, was equivalent to a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. He also points out that the CA erred in sustaining the
conviction for rape despite AAA's incredible testimony.
3. The OSG did not submit a supplemental brief and adopted its Appellee's Brief before
the CA where it stated that the recall of the earlier decision of the trial court, by
reason of the manifestation filed by the public prosecutor, does not actually result in
double jeopardy. The OSG maintained that what is proscribed under the double
jeopardy clause is the filing of an appeal that would allow the prosecutor to seek a
second trier of fact of defendant's guilt after having failed with the first. It stressed
that here, the OSG only manifested that the court overlooked a fact, which if not
considered, will result to a great injustice to the private complainant. It pressed that
there was no double jeopardy because there was no presentation of additional
evidence to prove or strengthen the State's case.

Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant will be held in double jeopardy due to an error
in lower court’s decision.
Ruling:
Yes, the accused will be held in double jeopardy.
In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of
acquittal is final and unappealable.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy, thus:
Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order
for double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must
concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of
the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned
and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed
without his express consent.21
Here, all the elements were present: (1)There was a valid information for two counts of rape
over which (2) the RTC had jurisdiction and to which the (3) accused-appellant entered a
plea of not guilty. (4) After the trial, a judgment of acquittal was thereafter rendered and
promulgated on July 25, 2011. What is peculiar in this case is that a judgment of acquittal
was rendered based on the mistaken notion that the private complainant failed to testify;
allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with a different case involving the same accused-
appellant. This, however, does not change the fact that a judgment of acquittal had already
been promulgated. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the
appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.
In this case, the RTC was reminded of the fact that private complainant AAA testified
during the trial, only after it had already rendered and promulgated the judgment of
acquittal. The R TC then realized that had AAA's testimony been taken into account, the
case would have had a different outcome. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order recalling
the judgment of acquittal for the purpose of rectifying its error, and thereafter, rendered a
Decision convicting the accused-appellant for two counts of rape. This, however, cannot be
countenanced for a contrary ruling would transgress the accused-appellant's
constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy.
Additional Notes:
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where
there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2)
Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances.
These exceptions do not exist in this case. Here, there was no deprivation of due process or
mistrial because the records show that the prosecution was actually able to present their
case and their witnesses.
A mere manifestation also will not suffice in assailing a judgment of acquittal. A petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed. A judgment of acquittal
may only be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition,
regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the
court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be
violated.
In this case, the acquittal was not even questioned on the basis of grave abuse of discretion.
It was only through a supposed mere manifestation of the prosecutor, a copy of which was
not in the records, that the RTC was apprised of the supposed mistake it committed.
Section 8, Rule 117
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et. al., petitioners,
vs.
PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
G.R. No. 149453
April 1, 2003

FACTS:
1. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were filed against the respondent and
his co-accused with RTC-Quezon City where they were charged with multiple
murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons.
2. On March 29, 1999, the RTC Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution provisionally
dismissing the cases.
3. When the case elevated to the Supreme Court, the SC issued its May 28, 2002
Resolution remanding the instant case to the RTC-Quezon City, for the
determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of said criminal cases.
4. Thus, the instant Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:
1. WON the State can revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
considering the March 29, 1999 Resolution of then RTC Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing
the cases.
a. According to the petitioners, Sec. 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the criminal
cases because the essential requirements for its application were not present
when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution.
i. The petitioners aver that the respondents did not file for a motion for the
provisional dismissal of the cases, but only filed a motion for the judicial
determination of probable cause.
ii. Moreover, the private complainants were not notified of the March 22,
1999 hearing on the respondent’s motion for judicial determination of the
existence of probable cause. The records allegedly indicate clearly that
only the handling city prosecutor was furnished a copy of the notice of
hearing on said motion.
b. On the other hand, the respondent insists that he moved for the dismissal of the
criminal cases.

2. WON the time-bar in Sec. 8, Rule 117 should be applied retroactively.

a. Note that in this case, the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000.
b. The resolution of then RTC Judge Agnir, Jr. was issued on March 19, 1999.
c. Thus, if the time-bar period is applied retroactively, it would mean that the
period would commence on March 19, 1999, the date when the resolution was
issued, and not on December 1, 2000, the date when the new rule took effect.
d. The petitioners contend that the time-bar should NOT be applied retroactively
because if it is, the prosecution will only have one year and three months left to
revive the case, if provisionally dismissed.
 i. Since the criminal cases were for multiple murder, a capital offense,
under Sec. 8, Rule 117, the State should have two years to revive the
cases should they be provisionally dismissed. But if the time-bar is
applied retroactively, in effect, the State would only have one year and
three months left to revive the case (or until March 31, 2001).

RULINGS:
1. YES, the State can revive or refile the criminal cases.
Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that “a case shall not be
provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.” The essential requisites of this paragraph are: (1) the
prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a
provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and
dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy
of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
IN THIS CASE, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second
requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the
prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal
cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause, not the provisional dismissal of the case.
MOREOVER, even if the motion for judicial determination of probable cause
may be considered for the nonce as his motion for provisional dismissal of the
criminal cases, the heirs of the victims were NOT notified thereof prior to the hearing
on said motion on March 22, 1999.

2. NO, the time-bar in Sec. 8, Rule 117 should not be applied retroactively.
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to
enhance and implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings
may be applied retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as
the history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective
application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied
and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in
particular. The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the
malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit
of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.
IN THIS CASE, to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period
commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy
of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with
the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive
provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the
computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in
effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
1. Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a
positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply
its meaning.

2. Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been
revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public
prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been
revived.

3. The raison d’etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that
the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense
or for an offense necessarily included therein.

4. Effect of the case is provisionally dismissed

a. With the express consent of the accused: If a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only
within the periods provided in the new rule.
b. Without the express consent of the accused : On the other hand, if a criminal
case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or
over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or
refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to
oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or
refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.
BONSUBRE vs. YERRO
Summary:

Petitioner charged respondent with estafa but manifested that there was an ongoing
settlement between parties. Though the civil aspect of the case was settled through a
compromised agreement, the prosecutor failed to inform the court about it. The case was
dismissed for failure to present of evidence anchored on respondent’s constitutional right to
a speedy trial. Petitioner motioned for reconsideration but it was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. The dismissal of the case is valid.

Under section 8 of Rule 117, Rules of Court, a case is provisionally dismissed if the
following requisites concur:

(a) The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a
provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for its provisional dismissal;
(b) The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;

(c) The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and

(d) The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of provisional dismissal of the
case.

Note. Karing enumeration dili ni siya ang provision. Mura’g extraction lang ni sa SC
gikan sa provision. Ana akoang pagkasabot guys. Hehehehe.

In the case at bar, none of the foregoing requisites were met. While it may appear
that the respondents consented to a provisional dismissal of the case under the Compromise
Agreement, the prosecution neither presented the same for the court’s approval nor filed
the required motion to that effect such that no order was in fact issued granting the
provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, petitioner’s assertion that the respondents are
estopped from invoking their right to speedy trial is without basis.
SALDARIEGA vs. PANGANIBAN
FACTS:
For failure of the principal witness PO2 Nelson Villas to attend several hearings, the
presiding judge Elvira Panganiban (respondent), ordered that the case against accused
Roberta Saldariega (petitioner) for violation of Section 5 and 11 of RA 9165 be provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused. However, on June 5, 2013, PO2 Villas
moved to reopen the case, averring that his failure to attend was due to the successive
deaths of his father in law and aunt, attaching thereto their death certificates. The
respondent judge granted the motion and order the cases (criminal cases no. Q-1 1-173055-
56) set for hearing. Respondent moved for reconsideration arguing that the provisional
dismissal of the case is considered an acquittal and PO2 Villas had no personality to file the
motion to re-open the case. The respondent denied the motion for reconsideration, hence,
this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-1
1-173055-56 WITH THE CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED BUT PREDICATED ON FAILURE
TO PROSECUTE WHICH VIOLATES THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO SPEEDY
TRIAL IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO AN ACQUITTAL, SUCH THAT ITS REVIVAL WOULD
CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

RULING:

No, the revival of the case did not constitute to double jeopardy.

Under the the law, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach:
(1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of
the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the
accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent.
There are two (2) exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if
the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is
insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has
been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused's right to speedy
trial.

In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is lacking,
considering that here the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done with the express
consent of the accused-petitioner. Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy
with the reopening of the case against her as it is clear that the case was only provisionally
dismissed by the trial court. The requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without
the consent of the accused is not present in this case. Neither does the case fall under any of
the aforementioned exceptions because, in fact, the prosecution had failed to continue the
presentation of evidence due to the absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact of insufficiency
of evidence cannot be established.