DANIEL M.

GALZOTE 1554-17 OCTOBER 23, 2020

TRANSPORTATION LAW
(SUBMITTED TO: JUDGE DINAH JEAN CORNEJO)

CONTRACT OF TRANSPORTATION OR CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE DEFINED

PERFECTION

G.R. No. 145804             February 6, 2003

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners,
vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY
AGENCY, respondents.

Facts:
On 14 October 1993, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the
platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued
that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or
who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the
exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. The
widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint
for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband.

Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioners are liable for the death of Navidad.

Ruling:
Yes, the LRTA is liable for the death of Navidad but Roman is absolved for the liability
for lack of proof to show his culpable act.

Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost
diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.

In this case, while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract
of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers
were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. Thus,
LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from
the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the
common carrier and liable for the death of Navidad.
 TEST TO DETERMINE COMMON CARRIER

G.R. No. 111127 July 26, 1996

MR. & MRS. ENGRACIO FABRE, JR. and PORFIRIO CABIL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET.AL, respondents.

Facts:
On November 2, 1984 private respondent WWCF arranged with petitioners for the
transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in
consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00. On that
day, the bus leaves at 8:00 o’clock in the evening due to some several members were late
which was drove by Petitioner Cabil, the driver hired by Sps. Fabre, of the latter’s minibus. On
their way to their destination, they met an accident due to unforeseen sharp curve in the
highway, with a slippery road due to rain in a running speed of 50 kph which causes to skid to
the left road shoulder, and unfamiliarity of the driver with the area.

Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner were liable for the injuries suffered by private respondents.

Ruling:
Yes, Petitioner were liable for the injuries suffered by private respondents.

Art. 1732 of the Civil Code provides that, “Common carriers are persons, corporations,
firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods
or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.”

In this case, the Fabres actually involves a contract of carriage and did not have to be
engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common
carriers to apply to them because the above article makes no distinction between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity. It also carefully avoids making any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one
offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article
1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population.

As common carriers, the Fabres were found to exercise "extraordinary diligence" for the
safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused by
proof that they exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of their employee. As Art. 1759 of the Code provides: “Common carriers are liable
for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's
employees although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers.” Hence, Petitioners are held liable for the injuries
suffered by private respondents when it shows the negligence on the part of the driver causing
the accident.
 G.R. No. 148496      March 19, 2002
VIRGINES CALVO doing business under the name and style TRANSORIENT CONTAINER
TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. (formerly Allied Guarantee Ins. Co., Inc.)
respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner Virgines Calvo is the owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc.
(TCTSI), a sole proprietorship customs broker. She entered into a contract with San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of 114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of
kraft liner board from the Port Area in Manila to SMC’s warehouse in Ermita, Manila. The cargo
was insured by respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. Upon delivery, the goods were
inspected by Marino Cargo Services and found out that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting
paper and 3 reels of kraft liner board were found damaged. SMC collected payment from
respondent UCPB under its insurance contract. In turn as subrogee of SMC, brought suit
against petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not a custom broker or warehousemen who offers his services to select
client a common carrier.

Ruling:
Yes, a custom broker or warehousemen who offers his services to select client a
common carrier.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code provides that, “Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to
the public." The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity . . . Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person
or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering
such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population.

In this case, there is greater reason for holding petitioner to be a common carrier
because the transportation of goods is an integral part of her business. To uphold petitioner's
contention would be to deprive those with whom she contracts the protection which the law
affords them notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to carry goods for her customers, as
already noted, is part and parcel of petitioner's business.
 G.R. No. L-47822 December 22, 1988
PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO CENDANA, respondents.

Facts:
Respondent Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer, owned two trucks for hauling scrap
materials to Manila for resale. On their return trip, trucks were loaded with cargoes contracted
with various merchants to be delivered to different establishments in Pangasinan and charges
freight rates which were commonly lower than regular commercial rates. He was contracted by
petitioner, an authorized dealer of General Milk Company to haul 750 cartons of milk from its
warehouse in Makati. 150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by respondent himself, while
600 cartons were placed on the other truck respondent’s driver and employee. However, 600
boxes of milk were not delivered because the truck, while on its way to Pangasinan, was held
up by armed men and the driver and his helper were kidnapped.

Issue:
Whether or not the owner of the truck a common carrier.

Ruling:
Yes, the owner of the truck a common carrier.

The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms: Article 1732. Common
carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their
services to the public. The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids
making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a
regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services
to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or
solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

In this case, private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even

though he merely "back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan,
although such back-hauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or
scheduled manner, and even though private respondent's principal occupation was not the
carriage of goods for others. In addition, a certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for
the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers. That liability
arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without regard to whether or not
such carrier has also complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and
implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other
franchise. Hence, Respondent is a common carrier as defined by the law.
 G.R. No. 101089. April 7, 1993.
ESTRELLITA M. BASCOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO A. CIPRIANO, respondents.

Facts:
Private Respondent Ciprino representing CIPTRADE entered into a hauling contract with
Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation to haul tons of soya bean meal from Manila to the
warehouse of Purefoods Corporation in Laguna. To carry out its obligation, CIPTRADE
subcontracted with petitioner Estrellita Bascos to transport and to deliver 400 sacks of soya
bean meal from the Manila Port Area to Calamba, Laguna. Petitioner failed to deliver the said
cargo because the truck carrying the cargo was hijacked along the way. As a consequence of
that failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency the amount of the lost goods in accordance
with the contract. Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter refused to
pay.

Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner a common carrier considering that there was only a contract of
lease because they offer their services only to a select group of people.

Ruling:
Yes, Petitioner is a common carrier.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as "(a) person, corporation or
firm, or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or
both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public." The test to
determine a common carrier is "whether the given undertaking is a part of the business
engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather
than the quantity or extent of the business transacted."

In this case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in the trucking
business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Furthermore, the above article makes
no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods
or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a
"sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such
service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the
general population. Hence, Petitioner is a common carrier.
 G.R. No. 141910            August 6, 2002
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION and LAMBERT M. EROLES, respondents.

Facts:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver thirty units of Condura
white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the plant site of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While the truck
was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway, it collided with an unidentified
truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.

FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion

Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights
and interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to
the latter from GPS. Since the trucking company failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint
for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles with
the Regional Trial Court, which dismissed the case on the basis that GPS is not a common
carrier.

Issue:
Whether or not Respondent GPS is a common carrier.

Ruling:
No, Respondent GPS is not a common carrier.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as persons, corporations, firms
or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or
both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering their services to the public,
whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive
basis.

In this case, GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries,
Inc., rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a
common carrier.
 G.R. No. 101503 September 15, 1993
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SORIAMONT STEAMSHIP AGENCIES AND KYOSEI KISEN
KABUSHIKI KAISHA, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner PPI. purchased from Mitsubishi International Corporation 9,329.71 metric tons
of Urea 46% fertilizer, which the latter shipped aboard the cargo vessel M/V Sun Plum owned
by Respondent Kyosei (KKKK) on June 16, 1974. Prior to its voyage, a time-charter party was
entered into between Mitsubishi as shipper, and KKKK as shipowner. Before loading the
fertilizer aboard the vessel, four of her holds were presumably inspected by the charterer’s
representative and found it fit to take the load. The cargo was the loaded and sealed properly.

Upon arrival of the vessel, petitioner unloaded the cargo, which took 11 days. A private
marine and cargo surveyor, CSCI was hired by petitioner to determine the outturn of the cargo
shipped and reported shortage of 106.73 metric tons, and contamination of 18 metric tons due
to dirt. PPI sent a claim letter against Soriamont Steamship Agencies, the resident agent of
KKKK. The request was denied, hence, PPI filed an action for damages before the CFI Manila.
The lower court sustained the petitioner’s claim, but such decision was reversed by the
appellate court, which absolved the carrier from liability. The appellate court ruled that the
vessel was a private carrier and not a common carrier by reason of the charter party.

Issue:
Whether or not a common carrier becomes a private carrier by reason of a charter-party.

Ruling:
Yes, a common carrier becomes a private carrier by reason of a charter-party.

Art. 1732 of the Civil Code that the definition of common carrier extends to carriers either
by land, air or water which hold themselves out as ready to engage in carrying goods or
transporting passengers or both for compensation as a public employment and not as a casual
occupation. Jurisprudence provides that the distinction between a "common or public carrier"
and a "private or special carrier" lies in the character of the business, such that if the
undertaking is a single transaction, not a part of the general business or occupation, although
involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the person or corporation offering such service is a
private carrier.

A "charter-party" is defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part

thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or use; a contract of
affreightment by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets the whole or a part of her to a
merchant or other person for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration
of the payment of freight. In this case, when petitioner chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum", the
ship captain, its officers and compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and therefore
continued to be under its direct supervision and control. Hardly then can we charge the
charterer, a stranger to the crew and to the ship, with the duty of caring for his cargo when the
charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so. It is only when the charter includes
both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a common carrier becomes
private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned.
 G.R. No. 125948 December 29, 1998
FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE PATERNO V. TAC-AN, BATANGAS CITY and
ADORACION C. ARELLANO, in her official capacity as City Treasurer of Batangas,
respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under RA No. 387, to contract, install and
operate oil pipelines. Sometime in January 1995, petitioner applied for mayor’s permit in
Batangas. However, the Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on 1993 gross
receipts amounting to P 956,076.04 pursuant to the Local Government Code. In order not to
hamper its operations, petitioner paid the taxes under protest for the first quarter of 1993
amounting to P 239,019.01, claiming that it is exempt from local tax since it is engaged in
transportation business. The respondent City Treasurer denied the protest, thus, petitioner filed
a complaint before the RTC for tax refund. Respondents assert that pipelines are not included in
the term “common carrier” which refers solely to ordinary carriers or motor vehicles. The trial
court dismissed the complaint, and such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Whether or not a pipeline business is included in the term “common carrier” so as to
entitle the petitioner to the tax exemption.

Ruling:
Yes, a pipeline business is included in the term “common carrier”.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a “common carrier” as “any person, corporation,
firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or
both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.”

The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:
(1) He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public employment,
and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods for person
generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;
(2) He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;
(3) He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and over his
established roads; and
(4) The transportation must be for hire.

In this case, based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt that
petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods,
i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for all persons
indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and transports the goods
by land and for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it
from the definition of a common carrier.
 G.R. No. 150255. April 22, 2005
SCHMITZ TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
TRANSPORT VENTURE, INC., INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and BLACK
SEA SHIPPING AND DODWELL now INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES, Respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner, who was in charge of securing requisite clearances, receive the cargoes from
the shipside and deliver it to the consignee Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation warehouse at
Cainta, Rizal, hired the services of respondent Transport Venture Incorporation (TVI)’s tugboat
for the hot rolled steel sheets in coil. Coils were unloaded to the barge but there was no tugboat
to pull the barge to the pier. Due to strong waves caused by approaching storm, the barge was
abandoned. Later, the barge capsized washing 37 coils into the sea. Consignee was executed a
subrogation receipt by Industrial Insurance after the former’s filing of formal claim. Industrial
Insurance filed a complaint against both petitioner and respondent herein. The trial court held
that petitioner and respondent TVI were jointly and severally liable for the subrogation.

Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioner is not a common carrier but a customs broker whose
principal function is to prepare the correct customs declaration and proper shipping documents
as required by law.

Ruling:
Yes, the Petitioner is a common carrier even it was a customs broker.

Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in
the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public. Article 1732 does not distinguish between
one whose principal business activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity. Furthermore, in the case of Calvo vs UCPB General Insurance, the
Court held that as the transportation of goods is an integral part of a customs broker, the
customs broker is also a common carrier. For to declare otherwise "would be to deprive those
with whom [it] contracts the protection which the law affords them notwithstanding the fact that
the obligation to carry goods for [its] customers, is part and parcel of petitioner’s business."

In this case, when the Petitioner undertook to transport the cargoes from the shipside of
“M/V Alexaner Saveliev” to the consignee’s warehouse at Cainta Rizal, the Petitioner is already
considered a common carrier as a corporation that holds to the public for the purpose of
transporting goods as business regardless if it owns the vehicle to be used or has to hire one
and for pecuniary consideration.
 G.R. No. 147079             December 21, 2004
A.F. SANCHEZ BROKERAGE INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:
Wyeth-Suaco engaged the services of Sanchez Brokerage for the secure release of the
cargoes arrived from Germany containing oral contraceptives tablet delivered to the warehouse
of NAIA. Wyeth-Suaco being a regular importer, the customs examiner did not inspect the
cargoes which were thereupon stripped from the aluminum containers and loaded inside two
transport vehicles hired by Sanchez Brokerage. Upon instructions of Wyeth-Suaco, the cargoes
were delivered to Hizon Laboratories Inc. in Antipolo City for quality control check. Upon
inspection, it was discovered that 44 cartons containing Femenal and Nordiol tablets were in
bad order. The remaining 160 cartons of oral contraceptives were accepted as complete and in
good order.

Wyeth-Suaco later demanded, by letter from Sanchez Brokerage the payment of

P191,384.25 representing the value of its loss arising from the damaged tablets. As the
Sanchez Brokerage refused to heed the demand, Wyeth-Suaco filed an insurance claim against
FGU Insurance which paid Wyeth-Suaco the amount of P181,431.49 insettlement of its claim.
Wyeth-Suaco thus issued Subrogation Receipt in favor of FGU Insurance and the latter then
brought an action for reimbursement against petitioner Sanchez for the goods delivered in bad
condition. Sanchez refused to admit liability for the damaged goods which it delivered from
Philippines Skylanders, Inc. (PSI) to Wyeth-Suaco as it maintained that the damage was due to
improper and insufficient export packaging, discovered when the sealed containers were
opened outside the PSI warehouse. The RTC dismissed the said complaint; however, the
decision was subsequently reversed and set aside by the CA, finding that Sanchez Brokerage is
liable for the carriage of cargo as a ―common carrier‖ by definition of the New Civil Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioner is a “common carrier”.

Ruling:
Yes, the Petitioner is a common carrier.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code, to wit:Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to
the public.

In this case, Anacleto F. Sanchez, Jr., the Manager and Principal Broker of Sanchez
Brokerage himself testified that the services the firm offers include the delivery of goods to the
warehouse of the consignee or importer, stating: “As customs broker, we calculate the taxes
that has to be paid in cargos, and those upon approval of the importer, we prepare the entry
together for processing and claims from customs and finally deliver the goods to the warehouse
of the importer.” Article 1732 does not distinguish between one whose principal business activity
is the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. The
contention, therefore, of petitioner that it is not a common carrier but a customs broker whose
principal function is to prepare the correct customs declaration and proper shipping documents
as required by law is bereft of merit. It suffices that petitioner undertakes to deliver the goods for
pecuniary consideration.
 G.R. No. 138334               August 25, 2003
ESTELA L. CRISOSTOMO, Petitioner,
vs.
The Court of Appeals and CARAVAN TRAVEL & TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner contracted the private respondent Caravan to arrange and facilitate her
booking, ticketing, and accommodation in “Jewels of Europe” tour. Menor, manager of the travel
agency, delivered all necessary travel documents to the petitioner and advised to be at NAIA on
Saturday, 2 hours before her flight. Without checking the travel documents, the petitioner went
to NAIA on Saturday. However, she discovered that the flight she was supposed to take had
already departed previous day. The petitioner then take another package tour offered by the
respondent. She then filed a complaint for her failure to join “Jewel of Europe” tour due to
respondent’s fault and be reimbursed on the differential cost of the two tour packages. Petitioner
holds that there was breach of contract of carriage and damages.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Caravan Travel & Tours a common carrier.

Ruling:
No, respondent Caravan Travel & Tours is not a common carrier.

A contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain person or association of

persons obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one place to another for
a fixed price. Such person or association of persons are regarded as carriers and are classified
as private or special carriers and common or public carriers.

In this case, respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of transporting either
passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier. Respondent did
not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another since its covenant with its
customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf. Respondent’s services as a
travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking
customers for tours. The object of petitioner’s contractual relation with respondent is the service
of arranging and facilitating petitioners booking, ticketing and accommodation in the package
tour. In contrast, the object of a contract of carriage is the transportation of passengers or
goods. It is in this sense that the contract between the parties in this case was an ordinary one
for services and not one of carriage.