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Geometry and spatial reasoning, Handbook of Research on Mathematics

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___________-18_-_________

GEOMETRY AND SPATIAL REASONING

Douglas H. Clements
STATE UNIVERSITY Of NEW YORK AT BUFfALO

Michael T. Battista
KENT STATE UNIVERSITY

Spatial understal'ld lngs are necessary for Interpreting, understanding, and

appreciating our inherently geometric world . (National Council of Teachers
of Mathematics, 1989, p. 48)
Geometry is gmp!ng space ... that space In which the child lives, breathes
and moves. The space that the child must learn to know. explore, conquer.
In order to liye, breathe, and move better in It. (Freudenthal, In Nnional
Council of Teachers of Mathematics. 1989, p. 48)
Ar islng out of practical activity and man 's need to describe his
surroundings. geometric forms were slowly conceptual/led until they took
on an abstract meaning of their own. Thus from a prKticaJ theory of earth
measure. there de ... elo ped a growing set of relatlom or theorems that
culminued in Euclid's Ele ments, the. collection, J)'nthe.sis, and elabon.tiOfl
of all this knowledge. (Fehr. 197]. p. ]70)
Equations are JUSt the boring part of mathemuics. I attempt to see things
In terms of geometry. (Hawking. NuiOflal Research Council, 1989, p. ]5)

School geometry is Ihe study of those spatial objects, relation-
ships, and transformations m;u have been formali7.ed (or malhe-
matized) and the axiom:uk mathemaliC"JI systems th:1I have
been constructed 10 represent them. Spatia! reasoning, on the
exher hand, consists of the set of cognItive processes by which
menla! represemations for Spatia! objectS, relationships, and
transform31ions are conSlrucled and manipulated. Clearly, ge-
ometry and spada! reasoni ng 3re strongly imerrelated, and most
mathematiCS eduallors seem to include spatial reasoning as
pan of the geometry curriculum. Usiskin (1987), for instance,
has desc ribed four dimensions of geomeU)'~ (a) visualization,
draWing, and construction of figu res; (b) Study of the spatial
aspects of the physical world: (c) use as a vehicle for repre-
senling nonvisual mathematical concepts and relationships; and
Cd) represemation as a formal mathematical system. The first
three of these d imensions require the use of Spatial reasoni ng.
When the term "school geometry" is used, it almost unl·
ver:sally refer:s to Euclidean geometry, e"en though there are
numerous approaches to the study of the topiC (for exam·
pie, synthetic. analytic, transformational, and vector). The tradi-
tional, secondary school version of geometry is axiomatic in na-
rure, elementary school geometry IraditiOnally has emphasized

The :.Iuthors gratefully acknowledge the helpful commenlS pllJYided by David FU)'5, Brookl)T1 College, and Sh:.lron Senko Mlchlg;ln St:lte UniversJrr.
nme to prepare this materi3! was p3111:.l1l1' provided by the National Science found:l(]on under (jr.ult No. MDR-8651668. An)' opinions, tinding5.
and conclusions or retommendations e.'l:pressed in thiS publlcation are those of the authors and do 1101 necessarily refleCI the "Jews of the N3tlon:.lJ
Science Foundation.

420

measurement and Informal development of those basic con-
ceptS needed in high school. According 10 Suydam (1985) thert!
is a great deal of agreement mar the goals of geometry instruc-
tion should be 10
• develop logical thinking abililics;
• dellelop spatial intuition about the real world;
• impan me knowledge needed to study more malhe mallCS;
",d
• teach the reading :md interpretation of mathematical argu-
mentS (p. 481).
The National Counal of Teachers of Mathematics (1989) e(ll'-
lim/11m Standards [.111s for all students 10
• identify, describe, compare, mode!, draw, and classify gea-
melric figures in twO and three dimensions;
• develop spatial sense,
• e,"plore the effects of transforming, combining, subdiViding,
and changing geometr,ic figures;
• understand, apply, :lOd deduce propenies of and relation-
ships between geometric figures, including congruence and
sJmilarlry;
• develop an appreciation of geometry :'IS a means of describ-
ing and modeling the physical world;
• explore synthetic, transformauonal, and coordinate approach-
es to geometry, with college·bound srudents OIlsa required 10
develop an undeCSIanding of an 3.xiomatic system through
investigating and comparing various geometric systems; and
• e,"plore a vector :lpproach to certain aspens of geometry.
This chapter contains seven major sections. First, srudents'
~rformance in geometry is bnefly summarized as a back·
ground 10 theemire research corpus. Second, research on three
m:ljor theoretical perspealves on the developmenr.of geomet-
ric thinking-Pilget, the van Hieles, and cognitive sdence-
is reviewed. Third, the establishment of wth In geometry is
discussed, hlghlighting both theoretical and empirical work.
Founh, the relationship between spatial thinking and mathe-
matics, the narure of Spatial reasoning and Imagery, :md al-
tempts 10 reach spatial abilities are considered. The fifth sec-
tion, representations of geometric Ideas, includes Issues rei:lted
to conceprs, diagrams, manipuladves, and computers. Sixth, we
examine group and cross-culrural differences. Finally, broad
conclusions are drawn from this research corpus.
STUDENTS' PERFORMANCE IN GEOMETRY
According 10 extensive evaluallons of mathematic; learning.
eJemen[3ry and middle school srudents in the United Stales are
falHng 10 learn basic geometric concepts and geometric prob-
lem solving; they are woefully underprepared for the study or
more sophisricaled geometric concepts and proof, especially
when compared 10SlUdents from Other nations (Carpenter, Cor-
bin, Kepner, lindquist, & Heys, 1980; fey et aL, 1984; Kouba et
al.. 1988, Stevenson, lee, & Stigler, 1986: Sligler, Lee, & Steven·
GEOMETRY AND SPATIAL REASONING • 421
sao, 1990). For instance, fifth graders from Japan and Tall,V',m
scored more than £wice as high as US srudents on a geometry
test (Stigler et aI., 1990). Japanese students in both first and
fifth grades also scored much higher (and Taiwanese students
only slightly higher) than US. students on testS of visualization
and paper-folding. Sligier el al. (1990) postulate dmt the laner
results may be due both 10 Japanese classrooms' heavy reliance
on visual representations for concepts and to expectations that
Japanese srudents become competem a[ drawing. Da[a from the
Second International MathemalicsStudy(SIMS)showedthat.ln
geometry, US 8th and 12th gt3ders scored at the 25th inter·
n:llional percentile or below (McKnight, Travers, Crosswhite, &
Swafford, 1985; McKnight, Travers, & Dossey, 1985).
UslSkin (1987), dtlng data from the 1982 US. Nalional As-
sessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), reponed that fewer
than 10% of 13-year-olds could find the measure of lhe th ird
angle for a triangle, given the m~ure of Lhe other £wo angles;
o nly 20% could find Lhe length of the hypolenuse or a right
triangle given its legs. ( He concluded tllat a greater number
of srudents could do the more difficult computatio n because
it Is laughtto more srudents.) [n the 1986 NAEP, Koub" et al.
(1988) reported srudents' performance at identifying common
geometriC figures, such as parallel lines and the diameter of a
circle, :lcceptable, but srudents' performance with figures nOI
frequendy encountered in elleryday life, such as perpendicu-
lar lines and the radius ofa circle, were reported as defiCient
Performance dealing with properties of figures, visualization,
and applications was poor, For example, only 60% of sevenlh
grade srudems could Identify the image of an object reflected
through a line; only about 10% of seventh graders could find
the area of a square, given tile length of one of Irs sides (56'*'
found the area of a rect:lrlgle, given the lengths of 1/5 sides):
and less than 10% of seventh graders could Identify which Set
of nu mbers could be the lengths of the sides ora trlangJe(even
though 66% could do it if segments were gillen). Apparently,
srudents can handle some problems much bener If the prob-
lem is presented ViSually rather than verbally (Carpenter et al"
1980; Driscoll, 1983b; Kouba el aI., 1988).
TIle siruation is even worse :n the high school level. FirSl,
only about half of all high school students enroll in :I geometry
course. or those e nrolled at the beginning of the school year
only 63% were able to correctly identify mangles that were
presented along with disrractors (Usiskin, 1987), According to
the 1978 NAEP in mathematics, only 64% of the 17-year-olds
knew thaI 3 rectangle Is a parallelogram, only 16% could find
the area of a region made up of two rectangles, and lust 9%
could solve the problem "How many cubic feel of concrete
wo uld be needed to pave an area 30 feel long and 20 feet
wide with a layer oj inches thick?" Of 17·year-olds that bad a
full yea r of high school geometry, only 5796 could calculate the
volume of a rectangular solid, 5496 could find the hypotenuse
of a righl triangle whose legs were multiples of 3 and 4, and
34% could find the area of a right triangle. Only 52% of enter·
ing secondary students could state the area of a square when
1/5 sides Wefe given (Usiskin, 1982). On the 1986 assessme nt,
11th-grade studentS who had n01 taken high school geometry
scored at about the same level as seventh graders (Undquist
& Kouba, 1989), There were few performance differences In
visualization between those srudents who had taken geometry
422 , LEARNING FROM INSTRUCTION
and those who had not, -although there were large differences
on items requiring knowledge of geometric propenies and on
lppliCltions less than 2;% of ll!h-grade srudents correcrly
identified which figures h.,d lines of symmetry, whether they
had taken geometry o r nor (even [hough symmetry is srudied
mroughout elementary and middle school). Even more incri m-
in:\ling of the curriculum is the faCt that only about 30% of high
school geomeuT students enrolled in a course for which proof
was a go::!1 were able to write proofs or exhibit any undersmnd-
ing of the meaning of proof (Senk, 1985: Suydam, 198;). It is
no wonder that doing proofs was the least liked mathematics
lopic by 17-year-olds on the 1982 NAEP and rhat less than ;0%
of the students rated the topic as ImpormnL
This depressing picture of students' knowledge of geome-
try is el:1bor.lled through :t consideratiOn of srudenlS' miscon·
ceptiOns, Here are some e."amples (Clements & B:misra, 1989;
Fuys, Geddes, & Tischler, 1988; Hoffer, 1983):
• :10 angle mUM h:tve one oorlwntal r:Iy
• ;J. right :mgie is an angle that points to the right
• to be a side of a figure a segment must be venical
• a segment is nOt a diagonal if it Is vertical or horlzonmi
• II square is nOt a squ:lre if its base is nor horizontal
• the only way II figure can be a triangle is if It is equilateral
• the height of a triangle or paral1elogr:tm is a side :ldl:lcem to
the boISe
• the lingle sum of a quadrilateral is the same as ilS area
• the Pythagorean theorem Cln be used to caicul:lte the area
of a rectangle
• if a shape has four sides, then If is a square
• the are;! of a q uadrilateral can be Obtained b)' tr:msforming
it into a rectangle with the same perimeter
Apparently. much learning of geometric concepts has been rote.
Propenies, class inclUSions, relationships, and implications are
freq uently not perceh'ed (MaybenT, 1983).
A primary cause of this poor performance may be the cur-
riculum, both in what mpies are treated and how they are
tre:ued, The major focus of smndurd eiemenlllry and middle
school curncob is on recognizing and na ming geometric
shapes, ",ri tmg the proper symbolism for simple geometric
conceplS, developing skill with measurement and construction
tools such as a compass and protractOr, and using formulas In
geometric measurement (PoneI', 1989; TIlomas, 1982), TIle.se
curricula consist of a hodgepodge of unrel:Jted concepts with
no s}'slematic: progression to higher levels of thought-levels
requisite for sophistiCned concept development and substan-
tive geometriC problem solvmg. In addition, teachers oftcn do
not teach even the impoverished geomeny curriculum that
is available to them, Poner, for instance, reponed whole dis-
trictS in which Counh- and fifth·grade teachers spent "virtually
no time teaching geome[Ty~ (Poner, 1989, p. 11 ). E\'Cn wben
mugtll, 8eom~try t'.'as lhe topiC most frequently Identified t\S be-
Ins taught merel y ror "e:(posure"; that is, geometry was g iven
only brief, cul1iOry coverage. The SIMS data ror the eighth·grade
level indicated th:llteOlchers rated the opponunity to learn ge-
ometry much lower than the opportunity to learn any other
10piC (MCKnight. Travers, Crosswhite, & Swafford, 198;). AI. the
secondary level. the Ir:tditional emphasis has been o n formal
proof, desp1te the r.IC:t the students are unprepared to deal with
It. Indeed, as Usiskin (1987) summarizes
' 1lere Is no SCOmel'1· curriCtJluflT ~l tile elementary .school level. As
a result, snldeolS enter high school nOi knowing enoogh geometry \TJ
succeed There i5 a geometry CtJrriculum ~t the second:1!)' level, bUI
onlr about half of tile Sludenl,.S encounter II. and onlr about ~ third or
tlle5e studenlS understnnd 11. (p. 29)
THE DEVELOPMENT OF GEOMETRIC THINKING
Piaget and Inhelder; The Child's Conception of Space
nuo Major Tbemes. Two major themes of Piager 3fld Inhelder's
( 1967) influential theory on children's conception of space will
be discussed. First, representallons of sJXlce 3re constructed
through the progressive organiZ3t10n of the child·s moror and
internalized actions, resulting in operational systems. There-
fore, the representatiOn of sp3ce is nOl a perceptual -re3ding
off" of the spacial environment, but is the build·up from prior
active manipulatiOn of th:1I envlronmcnt, Second, the progres-
sive organizatiOn of geometric ideas follows a definite order,
and this order Is more logical th:m hIStorical In th;lt initially
topo logic:tl relations (for example, connectedness, enclosure,
and continuity) are constructed. and lmer projective (rOOilin-
e:rrity) 3nd Euclidean (:lIlgulariry, par.dlelism, and distance) re-
l:lIions. This has been termed the topological primacy thesis.
It is important to reiterate thai P!;lget and Inhelder were
diSCUSsing the child·s ability to represent space. lhey m3intlin
that perce ptual space. is construCted early in the sensorimOtor
period. Nevertheless, perceptual space precludes me deve.lop-
men! of representatiOnal. or conceptual. space. in that its devel-
opmeO! also embodies the topological primacy thesis, It, too,
is constructed rJ(hcr than exiStent fmm me OUtset of develop-
ment. Representational space, in addition, reflectS propenies of
logical operation:lJ thoughL
7bpologica l Primacy and Constnlctivism
H.vnc £\10!r<CE. Piaget and Jnhelder·s first experiments pro-
vide cvidence supporting bolh the themes of constructivism
3I1d topological primacy. Children t'.'ere asked to explore hid-
den oblects tactilely (haptic perception) and to either draw
these objens or match them with d u plicates, Preschool chil-
d ren were reponed initially to discriminate objects on the ba·
sis of topological features, such as being closed or otherwise
topologically equivalent. Only later could th~'discriminate rec-
tilinear from curvilinear forms a nd, finally, among rectilinear
closed shapes, such as squares and diamonds.
Piaget a nd Inhe!der claim mat the development of more
sophisticated spatial concepts Involves increasingly systematiC
:md coordinated action. During the first &ages of development,
children are basically passive in their explorations. For exam-
ple, children mily louch one pan of a shape, and this action
results in a tacrile perception; touching anothe r pan involves
another action and perception_ When children regulate such

:lctions by establishing relations among them, an accurate rep·
resentation of the sh:lpe can be built. For example, the system·
atic return to each movement's starting poin! allows the pans
of the figure to be synthesized. It is when each menial action
becomes reversible lim it can be distinct yet coordmated WJth
every other action into a coherent whole,
From lIlis perspective, then, abstraction of shape is not a
perceptual abstraction of:l physical prope~ but [5 the resuh
of a coordinalion of children's actions. Children ~can only 'abo
suact' the ide:l of such a rel:ltion as equ:di[)< on the b<lSis of
an :letion of equalizatiOn, the idea of a Straight line from the
action of followlIlg by hand or eye without ch:lnging direction,
and the idea of an :Ingle from tWO Intersecting movementS"
(p, 43),
DRAWlNa I(\')Of/<Clt BeclUsc making :I drawing is an act of rep-
resentation, nOt of perception, Piaga :md Inhelder claim th:lt
inac(Ur.lIe draWings reflea the inadequacy of mental lools for
spa!ial representation. Lndeed, the inability of young children
to draw a copy of even simple shapes Is taken as :In indica·
tion that coordination of actions, rather d1lln passive percep·
tion, lies ill the foundation of the conceptual development of
Sp3ce They al.so claim that children's drawn copies of geomer·
ric shapes represent fopological fe'.\tures first For ex:lmple, at
Siage a (before the age of 3) no purpose o r aim can be dis-
cerned; children simply scribble. AI subst:lge IA ( up to about
age. 3 years 11 months), a circle Is dr.l'\V11 as an irregular dosed
curve, and squares and trianglcs are not dislinguisht:d from cIr·
cles, While children do not distinguish between straight·sided
and curved figures, there is a correct rendering of topological
properties (for example, dosed paths with small closed paths
inside, on, or outside them). .An obvious objeCtion to such :lr-
gumenlS is th:lt inaccuracies in drawing might be :mribut3bJe
to motor difficulties, However, Pfaget and Inhelder do nOt <lC-
rept such arguments, providing supponive examples like the
child who could draw a pine !Tee with brandles at right angles
bUI not a square.
AI. stage II (aOOUl age 4), there is a progressive differentia·
tion of Euclidean shapes. TIle criterion for this stage is the suc-
cessful reprocluaion of the square or rectangle. Euclidean reo
lationships, such as angle and indination, develop only slowly.
Only at stage III (:lbout 6-7 years) are all problems overcome,
for example, Piaget and Inhelder state that at least tWO )'t!ars of
work is reqUired 10 pass from copying the square to copying
the rhombus, demonstrating that construction of a "Euclidean
shape- requires more than a correa visual impreision. Such
a taSk involves a complex interplay of :lctions. To Piaget and
Inhelder, then, topological relationships develop first because
they represem the simplesl organization of those actions from
which shape is abstr:1cted (for example, the dissociated ele-
mentS of primitive motor rhythms in .scribbling). Other rela-
tionships develop over loog periods of time.
Projective Space. To Piaget and inhelder, the difference be-
~en topological and projective or Euclidean relations con·
cerns the way in ..... hich the different figures o r objectS (Ire reo
lared to one anOther. The former are internal to a particular
figure; the larter invoke relations between figure and subject
GEOMETRY" AND SPATIAL REASONING • 423
(projective) or between figures themselves (Euclidean). Projcr·
tive relalions begin psychologically, :1( th~ point when the figure
Is no longer viewed in isolation but begins to be considered
in relation to a point or view. For e!\<Imple, the concept of [he
strnightline ~sult5 from the child's act of Inking aim, or sight·
ing. Children perceive 11 Straight line since the earliest ye.1~, of
course, but they cannot pl:lcc objcc15 along a strnight path nor
par:lllellO the edges of a table. Instead, they tend to follow the
edges of the tlble or curve the line tow'Jrd such a path. This
is not a percepcu:d problem; they realize th:tt the line is nO!
Straight. but they cannol construct an adequ(ue representatiOn
10 make it so. They possess only an intuiLive, spalial represen-
tation, an Internalized imitation of previous perceptiOns that
can be :lltered by distracting perceptual configurations (e.g.,
the edges of a table). Internal representation is based on op·
erations and ClIO , dlerefore, limit the Influence of perceptual
configur.lIions. Thus, at :lbout 7 years of age, Str:l~ght paths are
cOllStructed by chi ldren spomaneouslyalming or sighting along
a trajectory, putting themselves in line with the two poSlS to be
linked by the straight line,
Such findings are confirmed b~' experimentS such as the
uthree mountains" taSk, in which children had to construct a
scene from the perspeclive of a dol!. For each new position of
the doll. young children methodically went about their task of
re-creating the appropri:lIc viewpoint, but it :llways turned OUI
10 be from the same perspective. their own. Thus, Plaget and
Inhelder infer that chlldren must constrUCt systems of reference
nOl from famt1i3rity born of experience, bUI rather, from opera-
tionallinking and coordination of all possible Viewpoints, each
of which they are conscious. They conclude that such global c0-
ordination of viewpoints is tile basic prerequisite in construCl-
lng Simple prOjeCtive retlltions. For although such relmions are
dependent upon a given viewpoint, nevenheless :I single poim
of view cannot exist in an isolated fashion, but necessJrily en-
tails the construction of a complete sy~em linking together all
points of view.
Euclidean Space. Piaget and Inhelder next investig:lte the de-
velopment of notions presumed 10 be intermediate between
the prOjective and Euclidean spaces. for example, the idf".l of
constructing s imilar figures. These experimenTS illustrate the
gradual procurement of angle and parallelism conceptS during
middle childhood. Finally, in the development of Euclidean
space, children come to ·see·' objcc15 as located In a 1"\\.'0-
dimensional frame or reference. That is, Plagel and Inhelder
challenge the claim th:lt that the re is an innate lendency or
ability to organize objects in :t [WO. o r three-dimension:1l ref·
erence frame. Sp3tial awareness does nor begin with such an
organization: rather, the frame itself is a culminating poim of
the developmem of Euclidean space.
To lest this hypothesis in the case of horizontality, children
were shown jars half·filled with colored Mter and asked 10
predict the spatial orientalion of the water level whe n the jac
was tilted. For venicality, a plumb line was suspended inside
an empty jar, which was similarl~' tilted, or children were 3.Sked
to draw trees an a hillside. Children initially were incapable of
repreSenting planes; the waler, for example, was represented
by a scribble. AI. Ihe neA"t stage, the level of the water was
424 • LEARNING fROM INSTRUCTION

always drnwn perpendicular to the sides ohhe jal', regard less of

lilt Satisfaction with such dnlwings was in no way underm ined
even when an aCtual ~"'3ter-filled tilled jar was placed next 10 the
drnwlng. !t is, then, quile striking "how poorly commonly per-
ceived evenlS are recordcd in the absence of a schema within
which they may be organlzed~ (p, 388), Somelimes, senSing
that the water moves towards the mouth of the jar, children
raised the level of the watcr, still keeping the surface perpen·
dicular 10 the sides. Only at the final stage (at about 9 years
of age) did children ostensibly draw upon the larger spatial
frame of reference-the tabletop-in order (0 3scenain the
horizontal.
Ultimatel}\ the frame of reference constituting Euclidean
sp:!(,e" is analogous to a container made up of a ne[Work of
s ites or positions. ObjectS within this container may be mobile,
but the positions are statio na ry. From the simultaneous organi·
zation of all possible positions in three dimensions emerges Ihe
Euclidean COQrdlmlie system, This org,miz.:Jtion is rooIed in
the preceding construction o f the concept of straight li ne (as
the m;:J.;ntenance of a constant direCtion of lrave!), parallels, and
angles, followed by the coordination of melr orientalions and
indin:ltions, This le:lds to:l gradu:l1 replacement of relations of
order and distance between objects with similar relations be-
[Ween me positions memselves. It tS as if a space were emptied FIGURE 18-1. Shapes such as those On the left were considered
of objectS so as to organize the space itself. Thus, intuition of Euclidean by Piaget and Inhelder In their haptic perception I!)(_
sp:!ce is not a "reading" or ;nn:lle apprehension of the prap- perimena! those on the right were considered to be topo!ogial
enies of obieCl~, bur a system of relatiOnships born in actions forms.
performed on these objects,

Criticisms o[ Pioget mulltlJJelder's Wbrk. As with much of

me Genevan work, Piaget and Inhelder's theory of children's
concept of space has been widely innuemial and widely criti-
cized. One criticism has been that Piaget and Inhelder's use of
tenns such as topological, separation. pro."imity, and Euclidean,
as well as the application of these and related concepts to the
design of their studies, are nOt mathematically :lccurme (Darke,
1982; Kap:ldla, 1974; Martin, 1976a),
Related to this criticism is the problem of classifying fIg-
ures :IS (opological or Euclidean. Ellery figure possesses bOth
mese characteriStics to an equillalent degree (that is, one
cannOl discuss an exclusillely Euclidean figure), but Pi:lget
and Inhelder's experiments depend o n il mutually exclusive
classification of figures intO these rn'O catego ries Funhermore,
because many oflhe: figures they used were topologically equill-
alem (see Figure 18.1), one cannot be cenaln whether young
children's choices were made on the basis of topological char-
acteristics (Manin, 19700). It is not dear why some anomalies
such as the.se are dismissed as lack of drawing skill, whereas
others, such as the in:lbUlry to draw a square's straight sides,
are not Given such problems, replicatille research is critical.
Otber ResemY;b 011 tbe TlJeory. Researchers closeJ~ repllClting
Piaget and Inhelder's experiments halle generally confirmed
their findings (Laurendeau & Pinard, 1970; Lollell, 1959; Page,
1959; Peel, 19;9). Howeller, even within these srudies ambigu-
ities arise. For example, several researchers reponed that even
at the earliest ages (2-3 years) children can disdnguish be-
tween curvilinear and rectilinear shapes, contrary [0 the theory
(Lewell, 1959; Page, 1959).
However, il is still possible ma[ children show a bias toward
topological lIersus Euclidean charaaeristJcs. Here, 100, basically
corrobor.1tive results have been mixed with tho.'it' contrary to
predictions, For example, curvilinear shapes were identified at
least as easily as purponedly topological ones (laurendeau &
Pinard, J970; Lovell, 1959).
Several studies have :llIempted to ameliorate me problem
of ambiguiry by showing children a tCSt shape and then, after
its removal, asking children 10 idemify a shape most like it.
Esry 0970; cited in Darke, 1982) found that 4-rear-olds clas-
sified the topologically equivalent shapes to be most like the
original. However, older groups of children chose them as least
like the original. OIIeraIJ, the author claimed Pi:lget's thesis was
.supponed wim the important condition that distortions from
the original were not substalltial; this, however, Is a marie ron-
cept as it in"'OllIes measurement (see also Cousins & Abrnwnel,
1971:Jahoda, Deregowski, & Sinha, 1974), Manin (1976b) used
a sel of shapes and three 113fiants: A was topologically equi v-
alelll (0 the model, while B and C, though nOt stricti)' equiv-
alent 10 the model in a Euclidean SCrLo:e, presCf\'eC! as many
Euclidean propenie$ of the model as consistent with [he faer
that they had been altered 10 eliminate a pan!cular IOpological
property. Thus, Band C preserved propenies such as sLf3ight-
ness, curvature, line segmel1llength, and angle size that A failed
to preserve. But B failed to preserve connectedness and C var-
Ied closed ness. Four-year--olds tended 10 choose the topOlogi-
cally equivalent copy as the worst copy of the model less often
man older children did. BUt, the worst scores were at or abm"e
chance levels :lnd, mus. did not suppon Piaget and Inheldds

theory, [n addition, '1-year-olds sacrificed topologica[ properties
in their selections as freely as did 8-year-olds,
A difficulty In designing such e:.:perimems is in quamify-
ing the degree of equivalence of the shapes. Geeslin and Shar
( 1979) modeled figures via 3. finite Set of points on 3. grid.
Degree of distortion was defined as the sum of displacements
of these points. The authors postulate that children compare
twO figures in terms of the amount of "distortion" ne~S5ary
to transform one figure Into another, after an attempt at super-
imposition using rigid motions and dilations. This model re-
cei\'ed Strong support. In agreement with other research, chil-
dren preschool to grade 4 were cognizant of both topological
and Euclidean properties and of how these properties distm-
guished varIants. A smull number of students 31 each level fu -
vored either topologJcal or Euclidean properties. Note that, as
the authors admit, these studies dealt with percepdon, while Pi-
aget and [nhelder specifically address representation. Funher,
the mQdel is mOt'e predia:ive than i[ is explanatory.
In sum, resull$ of many o f the Piagetian studies may be an ar-
tifact of the particular shapes chosen and the abtlitles of young
children to identify and name Ihese shapes (Fisher, 1%5). If
U"Ue, however, this does not support a strong version of the
topological primacy thesis. It may oot be topological proper-
lies as a class which enable young children 10 identify cer-
U1in shapes, Visually saJjem properties (such as holes, curves,
and corners), simplicity, and familiarity-rather than topologi-
cal versus Euclidean properties-may underlie children's dis-
crimination.
Similar problems have been found in drawing experiments
(Cadwell, 1963. Lovell , 1959). i'l"lartin ( 1976b) reponed that the
dr:lwings of 4·year<llds dId not reflect predominantly topolog-
ical features. He ~uggested that il may not be attentio n to topo-
logical properties th:u en3bles children to draw homeomor-
phic copies; rnther, II may be their increasing coorcUnarion
of Euclidean or proiective properties, given thal the coordi-
nation or such propenles automatically preserves topological
properties. Thus, despite evidence that many young children
produce a circle when drawing a square, results do not con-
firm a strong topological primacy position. Research i~ needed
mal uses other lechniques to Infer children's imernal repre-
sentations and that more closeJy examines children's 3aions
and thoUghts in the process of drawing shapes. For exam·
pie, one research program has confirmed a hierarchical devel-
opmental sequence of (a) reproduction of geometriC figures
requiring only encoding (that is, building a matching configu'
rJtion of shapes with the original constantly In Sight), (b) repro-
duCllon requiring memory (building a matching configuration
from recall), and (c) lransformation involving rotation and vi-
sual perspe<:1ive·talldng (building 3. matching configuration ei-
ther from recall after a rotation or from another·s perspective);
preschool children are able to perform 3l only the first two
1e.'C1s (Rosser, Lane, & Mazzeo, 1988).
Research on children's construcrion of a fnune of reference
for Euclidean space-a coordinate system-similarly has re-
vealed alterations and elaborations of Piagel and Inhelder's the-
ory. For example, young children are more competenl, and aoo-
lescenrs and adults are less competent, than the theory mighl
suggest. Regarding the laner, nOl all high school seniors or col-
lege students are successful on Piaget"s tasks designed 10 as-
GEOMETRY AND SPATiAL REASONING • 425
sess an underlying Euclidean conceptual syslem (liben, 1978;
Mackay, Btal.endale. & Wilson, 1972; Thomas &,Iamison. 1975)
On the other hand. it appears that young children's grasp of
Euclidean spali!l! relationships is more adequate than the the-
ory positS, Very young children can orient a hOfizonml or ver-
tiC:lI line in space (Rosser, Horan, Mattson, & M3.7..teo, 1984).
Similarly, 4- to 6-year-old children Cln extrapolate lines from
positions on both axes and determine where they intersect
(Somerville & Bryam, 1985). Plagetian theory seems correct
in posrulaling thaI the coordination of relallons develops after
such early abilities. Young children fail on double·;L'(is orien-
tation taSks, even when misleading perceptual rues are elim-
inated (Rosser et al., 1984). Similarly, the greatest difficulcy is
in coordinating twO e:;:trapolations, dt..'"Veloping al the 3- to 4-
year-old level, with the ability 10 e:\1.rapolate those Jines devel-
oping as much as a year earlier (Somerville, Bryant. Mazzocco,
& Johnson. 1987).
These resultS suggest an initial Inability to utilize a concep--
tual coordinate system as an organizing spatial framework. Nev-
ertheless. it Is Instruclional1y significanl thill, by the lime they
enter school, children can use coordinates when these are pro-
vided for them, even If, in facing traditional wks, they are not.
yet able or prediSposed spon13neously to construct coordimllcs
for themselves.
However, performance on coordinate tasks is influenced by
a variety of factors at all ages. Performance on horiZOntality
and venicality tasks may reflect bias toward the perpendicular
in copying angles, possibly because Lhis reference is learned
early (IbbotsOn & Bry.tnt, 1976). RepresentatiOns of figures
are also diStorted, either locally by angle bisection or by in-
CfC3Sing symmetry of the figure as a whole (Bremner & Thy-
lor, 1982). Finally, performance on these Piagetian spatial tasks
correlates wiLh disernbedding as well as with general spatial
abilIties (Uben, 1978). Such results indicate a general tendency
10 produce symmetry or simplicity in constructions which con-
found the traditional Plagetian interpretatiOn (Bremner '"'* Tay-
[or, 1982; Mackay et aI., 1972).
Such multlple determInation of performance also choraa!:!r'
izes the literature on perspective·taking abilltiesl Piaget and In-
heider'S projective space. For example, perspeCtive-laking tasks
are easier If the children move around the objectS or are pro-
vided a model of the room, suggesling the locations of the ob-
Jeas are coded individually with respect to an external frame-
"WOrk of landmarks. Thus, coding the location of small objeCIS
may develop from association (coincidence) with a single ex-
ternal landmark, TO proximity to a single landmark, to distance
from severnl landmarks. By age 5, and poSSibly as early as 3,
children encode the location of small objects with respeCt to a
framework of landmarks. Such encoding continues into adult-
hood ( Newcombe, 1989), implying that the development of
projective sJl'lce may involve !lot JUSt the coordination of view-
pointS but abo the establishment of an e;«tern:lJ framework For
both perspective· caking and coordinate system abilities, the key
may be the construction and selection of increasingly coordi-
nated reference systems as frameworks for spatial organizalion.
Conclusion. Overall, while not tmally disproven, the topo-
logical primacy theory Is nex supponed. It may be Ihal chil-
dren do not construct firsl lopological and later projcaJve and
426 • LEA.RNING FROM lNSTRUcnON
Eudide,m ideas. Rmher, It may be that ideas of all types de·
velop over lime, becoming incre:lSl!lgly inregrmed and syn·
theslzed, These ide:JS :Ire originally intuitions g rounded ill
:u:tlon-bui!ding, drawing, ':l1ld perreiymg, Thus, research Is
needed ro ideml!)' the specific, original inwitions and ideas
that del'dop :md the order in which they deyeJop. For e1>:am·
pie, children mlghlleam to coordinate certain actions thm pro-
duce culVilinear shapes before coordinating those mat produce
rectillnear ones (Martin, 19700), although theoretical e.'(piana-
tlons of s uch sequences are lacking. Observed bcl;: of synchronv
bern-een perceptual and conceplOal abilities suppons Piagel's
consll"U([ivist position (Rosser et aI., 1964), bUi speCific cogni·
tive constructions gener.lIly h:lve nOl been idemified
Such research should a lso e.-;;plore the deform:nlons that
d lildrcn do accept in their represenCllion of figures. For ex·
ample. some children ecru-.lle an ~almost clo:sed~ figure with a
closed l'arianL Previously une:~plored factors such as lal1guage,
schooling, and the Immediate SOCial culture also dem:lnd :llten-
lion ( Darke, 1982), Piagetian imerprel:lliOnS of students' per·
formance on tusks tOO often emphasize logical fallures :It the
e:\-pense of uncovering the developmem of Ideas not yet
dilTerenti:ued and integrated; thus, new approaches are ....-ar·
ramed. In any case, it appcilrs that certain Eudlde;tn notions
are present :u an early age (Rosser et al.. 1984: Rosser et :11.,
1988) and, contrary 10 Piaga and Inhelder and interpreters
(peel, 1959), even preschool chUdJ'en Ill:IY be able to work
with cenain Euclidean ideas.
Similarly, results regarding Piaga and lnhelder's constructS
of projective and Eudide-Jn space reveal dlat young children
ha\le basic competencies in esl:lblishing spatial frame'NOrks
that could be effcoively bull! upon in the classroom. How,
ever, we should probably e.-;;peCt, in students of all ages, 0 gen·
era! Gestalt lendenC}' 1O....~lrd S~'1l1fnetry and simplicity, for t',..'(-
ample. in matching and reproductiOn [;J.Sks, Research is needed
10 identify instruction fociJilaling the construction and selection
of increasingly sophisticated reference systems for o rganizing
sp:l1ial information
Researchers ha\'e tended nOt to d iscuss Piaga and Inhelder'S
second maior theme: Children's representation of sjXlce is nO! a
perreplllal "reading off" of their spatial environment, but is con·
SlfUCled from prior aaiye manipulatio n of thOt environment
This is surprising, in that most of Piaget and Inhelder's re-
sults do suppon this hypothesis al least implicifi)' (results from
one study, Wheatley & Cobb, 1m, provide direct support, as
discussed in a succeeding section). More anlcul:lled research
from a constructivist position is needed. In this regard, we tum
brlenv 10 other work consistent With this critical Idea
fischbein (]987) argues that people's intuition of space is
not inn:lle and not reducible to a conglomerate of sensori:ll
Images, Space represenwtions constitute a complex s}'Stem of
conceptions-although not necessarily formuloted e1>:phcidy-
which exceed the dma ilt hand and the dom:J.in of pert-eption
In general. Subjective space is an imerprel.1t10n qf reali~, nOt
a reproduction of it It is shnped by :lnd exceeds experience.
Consistent with Piagct's constructivism, Fischbeln'S theory fur-
ther e lobor:ues the n:lture of the intuition of space. To begin,
Imuition is not merel y :l renection of objectiYely given space
propenieSi ramer, it is a ~highly complex system of e.xpecra·
tions, and programs of ;!([ion, rebted 10 Ihe movements of OUr
body and its pans, which constitutes dle intuition of space'
(p. 87). 111OS, inruitions consist of sensornnOtor and imeJlec.
lOal skills organized into a system of beliefs and expectations
thot constitute an implicit theory of space. MOSt important, intu-
itions thus constructed are enaCtively meaningful: they are sub·
jectively self-evident because they e:\-press the direCt behavioral
meaningfulness of an idea
For e.'(ample, the nOlion of Stro.ight line seems self·evldenL
A sophisticated adult is convinced that one may go on e:\1.end-
illg the line indefinitely, or thm by following the straight line
one uses the shonest path to re:lch :l given point. These :tppe:tr
uncquiyocal ~faClS,~ propenies of the "obiea~ C:lJled a Straight
line. However, the srraight line is an obslraclion. not a percep-
tual object.. It Is a convention based on lLxioms which could be
chonged. It is through e:\1.fapolation from a beh:lVioral mean·
ing thar one tends to believe in the absoluteness of the concep-
tiOn. People know that they can draw :t str:tighl line, recognize
a straight line, and run along a s traight IUle 10 reach a goal in
minimum distance. The\' imbue the nOlion with Ihe qualities or
unequivocal el'idence and credibilily because II is behaviorally
meaningful,
HOweyer, building intuition based on experience CUts both
WilYS. The liOlit:ltions ofhum:1Il f'..)[perience accou m nOl o nl y for
the adaptive and organizing functions of intuitions, but also for
distorted or erroneous represemations of reality. Thus. space in·
tuitions, like other intulfions, do not del'elop inevitablr into in-
creaSing correspondence '>'.1th pure logiC or mathematiCS. as a
reading of Piaget may suggest. ImuitiYe represent:ltions of space
are non-homogeneous and anisotropic (exbibiting properties
with different values when measured :llong a.xes in different
directions). For example, people tend to anribute absolutely
priVileged direaions to space. such as " up~ and "down. ~ They
view space as cemefi.--d (for eX:lmple, at one'S home) and hav-
ing increasing densl!)' as one approaches the centratioll zones,
with the effect th:lt diSl:lnces are increas!nglyampllfied upon ap-
proach. Thus, our intuitive represenL'ltion of space is a mixture
of possibly contradiCtory properties, all reltl1ed to our terrestrial
\lfe and our behavioral adaptive constr:tints (Fischbein, 1987).
The van Hleles; Levels of Geometric Thinking and Phases
of Instruction
Lewis Of Geometric Thougbt. According to the theory of
Pierre and Dina V'..lIl Hiele, students progress through levels
of thought in geometry ( Ii:In Hide, 1959: Ii:In Hide, 1986. van
Hiele·Geldtlf. 198<1). from;l Gcsllllt·like visual level through in·
creasingly sophislicated levels of description, analysis, abstr:lc-
don, "nd proof The theory has the follOWing defining charac·
leristics;
• learning is a discontinuous process. That is, there are ~jumps~
in the learning curve which reveal the presence of discrete,
quolllUtl\'el}' different levels of thinking.
• The leYels are sequential and hierarchical, For srudems to
function adequalely at one of the adV3J1ccd leyels in the van
Hiele hierarchy. they musl have mastered large portions of

the lower levels (Hoffer, 1981), Progress from one level 10
lhe nexr is more dependent upon instruction than on :lge
or biologiClI matUrluion, Teachers C:ln reduce subject rTUlner
10:l lower level, leading (0 rOle memorization, bUi students
cannOL bypass levels and still achieve understanding (mem-
oriz:1l!on is nO! an important feature of:lOY level), Acquirill8
understanding requires working Ihrough cen-ain phases of
instruCtion.
• Concepts Implidtiy underslood at one level become e.xplic-
iIly underSIOOCI :u the neX! level. "."1 each leyellhere appears
in an extrinsic way tlm which "'as Intrinsic:lt !.he preceding
level. At the boISe IeI'd, figures were in fact also determined
by their propenics, but someone thinking al this level Is not
aware oflhese propenies" (v:ln Hide, 195911985, p. 146).
• Each level has its own language. "Each level has its own lin-
guistic symbols and ilS own SYSlem of relallons connecting
these symbols A relarion which is 'correCt' :It one level can
~I itself to be Incorrect .It another. Think. for example,
of a relation between a square and :I rectangle. Th'o people
who reason at different levels cannot underStand e3ch OLher.
Neither can manage to follow the thought processes of the
Olher" (van Hide, 1959f1985. p . 246). lnnguage strucrure Is
a critic:tl factor in the movemem through the levels.
Both the number and numbering of the levels h:tve been
variable. We shall Initially descnbe the van liielcs' original five
levels and laler discuss a sixth. Our r.uionale is twofold. First,
although van Hiele's recent works have described three rather
!.han the original fiye leyels, both empirical evidence (reviewed
In succeeding sccrlons) and the need for precision in psycho-
logically oriented models of learning argue for maintaining
finer delineations. Second, lhe empiric-.ll evidence also sug·
gests 11 level that is more basic man v:m Hide'S ~visual " leve1.
There have been several differem numbering systems used for
!.he levels; we have adopted one s}'Stem and have transposed
!.hose of e:lch researcher (0 this scheme for conSiStency's sake.
lLva I· VISUAL. Initially, students idemify and opcrate on
sh.apes and other geometric configurations according to meir
appearance. They rCf.'Ognize figures as visual gestalts, and, thus.
they are :able to mentaily represent these figures as vtsual im·
ages. In identifying figures, they often use visual protOtypes;
stUdentS say that a given figure Is a rect3J1gle, for instance, be-
cause kit looks like a door.- They do not, howevcr. !luend 10
geometric properties or 10 dl:lra(leristic traits of the class of
figures represented. That IS, although figures are determined
by their propenJes, students at this level ore not conscious of
the properties. AI this level. students' reasoning Is dominated
by percepllon, for example, they might diStinguish one figure
from W10lher Without being able 10 name a single property of
either figure, or they might fudge that two figures are congru-
ent because they look the same: "There Is no why. one iuSt sees
1(' (van Hlele. 1986, p. 83). During srudents' transition from the
Y!sua] to the descriptive level , classes of visual objects begin 10
be associated with their charaCteristiC propenies
AI: the visual [cYCl, !.he objects about which StudenlS reason
are classes of figures recognized visually as "the same shape:
For Instance, by the statement "This figure is a rnombus.~ the
GEOMETRY AND SPATIAL REASONING • -427
student means "1his figure has the shape I h:lYe learned 10
(':Ill ·rhombus' · (van Hiele, 1986, p 109) The end product of
this re:lSOning IS the creation of conceptualizallons of figures
thru ru-e based on the e.xpliCit recognition of their propenlC5
(that is, after this conceptual construction, the srudent is ar
level 2),
lE.'EL 2 : OESClUl'fT\vAtw.mc. Upon reaching the second lcyel.
StudenLS recognize and can characterize shapes by their prop-
enies. For instance, ::I student might think of a rhombus as a
figure with four equal Sides; so the term ~ rhombus" refers to a
collection of "propenles tb:1\ he has learned to call 'rhombus"'
(Yan Hiele, 1986, p. 109). Students see figures as wholes, but
nO\V as coJ\et:tions of propenies rather than as visual gestalts;
me image begins to fall into the background. Propenie.s are
eStablished experimentally by observing, measuring, drawing,
and modeling. SOldeJ)ts discover Ihut some combinations of
propenies signal a class of figures and some do not; thus. the
.seeds of geometric Impl1cation are planted. StudenlS at this
level do not. however, see relationShips between classes of fig·
ures (for e.xample, :I student might ('ontend th::lt a figure is nO{
a rectangle because il is :J square).
At !.his leyel, the objeCts about which students reason arc
classes of figures, thought about in terfl'lS of the selS of proper·
ties thac the students :lSSOCinte with those figures. The product
of this reasoning is tile establishment of relationships between
and !.he ordering of propenies and classes of .IigtJfCS.
lL\'El. 3: AIIs"r!!.IcrfRsl..\no:w.. At Level 3. students can form air
strna definitions, distinguish bet~...eefl necessary and suffidem
setS of conditions for 3 concept. and understand and sometimes
even provide logical argumenlS in the geometric domain, They
can clasSify figures hierarchically (by ordering their proper-
ties) and give informal argumentS to JUStify their classifications;
a square, for e.~mple, is identified as a rhombus because it ('81\
be thought of as a ~rhombus with some extra properties.~ 1hcy
can discover propenies of dasses of figures by Informal deduc-
tion. For example, Ihey might deduce that in :any quadrilateral
the sum of the angles must be 3600 because any quadrilateral
can be decomposed into twO triangles, each of whose angles
sum 10 180°,
As studenls discover propenies of various shopes. they feci a
need to organize the propenies. One property can signal other
properties. so definitiOns C3fI be seen not merely as descrip-
tions bur as a method of logical organization. It becomes dear
why, for example. a square Is a rectangle. This logical org3J1iza·
tlon of ide:lS is the first manifeslatlon of aue deduction How-
ever. the students stili do nor understand !.hat logical deduction
is the memod for establishing geometric truths.
At this level. the objei.."tS about which students reason are
propenies of classes of figures. Thus, for inStance, the "prop-
enies are ordered, and the person wlU know that the figure is
a rhombus iflt satisfies the definition of quadrangle with four
equal sides" ( V'.lI1 Hiele, 1986, p 109). The product of this rea·
soning is the reorganization of ideas achieved by Interrelating
propertieS of figures <lnd classes of figures.
IL\'EL 4 FOItlt.u. DmucnoN. Students establish tileorems wi!.hin
an axiomatic system when they reach Level 4. They recognize
428 • LEARNING fROM INSTRUCTION

the difference among undefined terms. definitions. axioms, nnd

o f, 7\~
theorems. They are capable of constructIng original prool's; that
is, they can produce a sequence of SUltemems m:n
logically ju s-
tifies a conclusion as a consequence of the "givens."
At this level, students can reason formally by logically illler-
preling geometric statements such as axioms, definitloos, and
theorems. The objects of their reasoning are relationships be·
[ween properties of classes of figures, The product of their
reasoning is the establishment of second-order relationships-

~D
rel:lllonships between relationships-expressed in terms of
logical chains within a geomelric system,

lE\u 5: R/OOW,IIETA.\L\Tllf.\LATIC.U. AI the fifth level students rea·

son formally about m:nhematicill systems, They can study ge-

~
ometry in the absence of reference models, and they can reason
by formally m:tnipul:lIing geometric Sl,lIemeOlS such as J.."I;ioms,
definitions, and theorems. The objects of Ihis reasoning are re-
lationships between form:l.l construCts, The product of their 12
reason ing is the escablishmenl. e labor:ulon. and comparison of
axiomatic S)'Siems of geometry. 14 \

Reset/reb 011 tbe Levels. As with the work of Pi:lgel and In-
helder, van Hide's theory has been Infl uemial and extensively
studied. Research results will be discussed under the rubric of
several critical questions.
sruoum' GEOlttT'IUC
00 '0'11': VAN tUEU: l£IIIUl ACCt!1!.\TB.Y DESCRIBE
'O'ItNlU.'«o? Generall~
empirical research, from both the U.S. and
abroad, has confirmed that the van Hiele levels are useful in
describing students' geornelric concept de~'elopment, from e l-
emenl3ry school to college (Burger & Shaughnessy. 1986: Fuys
et aI., 1988; Han, 1986: Hoffer, 1983; Wirszup. 1976). For e."I;am-
pIe, Usiskin (1982) found that about 75% of secondary Students
fit the van Hiele model (it should be noted th:u the percent-
age classifiable at a level varies with the instrumem and scoring
scheme). Burger and Shaughnessy (1986) adminiStered clinical
inrerviews to students from kindergarten 10 college. They re-
poned that sNdenrs' behaviors were generally consistem with
the I13n Hieles' original gener.!! description of the levels, For
e.'(lImple, students were to identify and describe all the squares,
rectangles, parallelograms, and rhombuses in a sel of quadrilat-
erods similar to those: in figure 18.2. Students who included im'
precise visual qualities and irre levant attributes ( for example,
orientation) in describing the shapes while omitting relevam
anribUles were assigned to Level 1. References to visual protO-
types (~a rectangle looks like a door") were frequent among
swdents assigned 10 this level. Students who l'Ontrasted shapes
and Identified them by means of their propenies v,'ere assIgned
Level 2. One girl, for e;(llffiple, said that rectangles have -two
sides equal and parallel to each other. "!Wo longer sides are
equal and parallel 10 each other. and thC}' connect at 90 de-
grees" (p. 39). Squares were not included Studems who gave
minimal characrerizadOI1 of shapes by rererencing other shapes
were assigned Level 3 (for example, a square is a parallelogram
that has all the properties of a rhomb us and a rectangle). One
srudent frequently made conjecru res and anempled 10 verify
lhese conjectures by means of formal proof, Indicating Level 4:
thinking.
FIGURE 18--2. QuadrUatenls to be ldentiOed.
The e ....istence of unique linguistic struaures at each Je\'el
has been supponed in that, for example, ' rectanste~ means
different things 10 students at different levels (for example, a
visual gestall \'5. a "bearer of propenien (Burger & Shaugh-
nessy, 1986; Fu~'S et al., 1988; Mayberry, 1983). In sum, the levels
appear to e:'(ist and describe studenlS' geome~ric de~'elopmenl,
validated through both interviews and written assessments.
.lIM. 'O'IE I.fVEts DISCREl'E? IS 11fEllE A Dlsc.oSTlNUny IIElWEEN 1£\_
as? Soviet research seems to Indicate a positive answer (Hof-
fer, 1983; wlrszup, 1976). O n me whole, however, results are
mixed. First, sever.ll researchers have reponed that srudems
in transition are difficult to classify reliably (Fuys et aL, 1988;
Usiskin. 1982); this is especiall}, true for levels.2 and 3 ( Burger
& Shaughnessy, 1986), Difficulties in deciding between levels
wefe conSidered by these researchers as evidence questIoning
the discrete nature of the levels.
Fuys et -al. (1988) developed and documented a working
model of the van Hiete levels and characterized the geometriC-
thinking of sixth and nimh graders. The researchers used sL~
to elgh[ 45-mlnute instructional-assessment interviews, which
a llowed them 10 chan studentS' ability to progress within and
between le\'Cls as a result of inscruclion. Thev determined both
an entry level and 11 potential level (the lev~l demonstrated :!f-
ter instruaion). Whereas some of the studeoLS appeared to be
on a plateau. there were also those who moved flexiblv 10
differenl levels d uring the le:lChing episodes, an e ntry I~I
assessment alone might have underestimated their abi lities
(V}'SOlSky, 1934!l986). Further, there W'dS instability and oscil-
lation between the levels In several cases. Similar results were
observed in II teaching experiment on polyhed ra ( Lunkenbei n,

1983). Continuil}' rnthcr than jumps in learning was frequemly
observed.
Do snJDENTS Mf.\SON· AT THE SA)!E VA.'ll HIElE I.£I'l1S ACrosS TOPICS' TIlis
questIon IS also relevant to the issue of the discreteness of
the levels. and evidence on this quesllon is similarly mixed. A
test of consensus revealed that pre-service elementary teach-
ers were on different levels for different concepts (Mayberry,
1983), as were middle school (Mason, 1989) and secondary sru·
dents (Denis, 1987). Similarly, Burger and Shaughnessy (1986)
reponed trun studentS exhIbited different preferred levels o n
different taSks. Some even oscillated from one level to another
on the same taSk under probing. The researchers characterized
the levels as dynamic ramer th:1O static and of a more cominu·
ous nature than their discrete descriptions would lead one 10
believe. Gutierrez and jaime (1988) compared the level of rea·
soning of pre·service teachers on three geometric: topics: plane
geOmetry, spatial geometry (polyhedra), and measurement. The
levels reached across (opics were not independent, but the dal3
did not suppon the theorized global nature of the levels. The
researchers h}'PO(hesizeci thai as sNdents develop, the degree
of the globaJil)' of the levels is not constant, but increases with
leve.l. That is, as children develop, they grasp increasingly large
"10C"3lilies" of mathematical t'omen! and thus understand larger
areas of mathematics.
Fu)'S el ai, (1988) agreed that when firsl studying a new con-
cept, students frequently lapsed to Level 1 thinking. 1l\ey main'
tained, howe\ler, that students were quickly able to move to the
higher level of thinking they had reached o n prior concepts.
The researchers, therefore, claim that these results support the
comerttlon that a srudertt's fXJlential level of thinking remains
stable across concepts. The queslion is stili open, but there has
been the suggestion that assessment instrumems must be topic
speCific (Senk, 1989).
Do TIlE l..EVI!!S FOIUI\ ~ tltE!WICHY? Research more consistently
indIcates thar the levels are hierarchical, although here tOO
there are exceptions (Mason, 1989). For example. Mayberry
(1983) employed Gutman'S scalogram analysis to show that her
tasks representing the levels formed a hiernrchy ror pre·servlce
teachers. These results were replicaled by Denis (1987) for
!\teno Rican secondary srudents. Gut.l~rrez. and Jaime (1988)
reponed similar analysis and results, bUi only for Levels 1 to
4; Le\lel 5 was found to be dIfferent in naNre from the mher
levels. Most other researchers did not test the hypothesis In
:1 Similarly analytic manner; nevertheless, they interpret their
results as supporting this hypothesis (Burger & Shaughnessy,
1986; Fuys el aI., 1988; Usiskin. 1982).
Thus, the levels appear to be hierarchical, although there
remains a need to submit thiS hypothesiS to rigorous tests As
the van Hides posited, however, this does nOl imply a matura-
tional foundation. fiTS( , assignments to levels does 001 seem to
be strictly related 10 :lge or grnde (Burger & Shaughnessy, 1986;
Mayberry, 1983). Second, development through the hiernrchy
appeals to proceed under the influence of a teachlng!leaming
process (Wlrszup, 1976).
WHAT IS TIlE MOST IlASIC lEVa; nuT IS, OOES " lZI'£I. 0 EXIST? As. pre·
vlously mentioned, there Is evidence for d\e existence of a Level
GEOMETRY AND SPATIAL REASONING • -429
o more basic than Ihe \IlUl Hide's "visual" level. For example,
9-34% of 5e(:ondary sludents have fai led 10 demOflStflne think·
ing cnarncterisllc of e\-·en the visual level: 26% of the students
who beg:lll the year at Level 0 remained at Level 0 al the end
of the year (Usiskin, 1982). Such stability "Olrgues for the exiS-
tence of le\lel 0 (Senk. 1989). likewise. 13% of the response
patterns of pre-service teachers do not meet the crilerion for
Le\lel 1 (Mayberry, J983). finally, sludents who emer a geom-
etry coul"Se at Level 1 perform significantly bette.r lit writing
proofs thl1n those who enter at Le\'el a (Senk, 1989).
This issue is nm resolved, however. FUYS et 31. (1988) sped·
fied thai 10 be "on :t level" students had 10 conSistenlly e.xhibil
behavIors indianive of mat level. They also slate, however, that
level 1 is different from the other levels, in that srudents may
not be able to e.xhibillhe corresponding behaviors (thai is, they
may not be able to name shapes). According to the researchers,
these students should not be described as "nOl yet 3t level 1."
Nonetheless, they do demark such behaviors as "weak Level
I t In a later work. Fuys (1988) hypothesizes th:lt srudents with
weak levell thinking are using one of ReWs (1987) case-based
models as :I foundation for their concepts, ralher than a more
sophisticated, rule-based model, Whether this actually argues
for a separate level or for sublevels is as yet an open question.
However, the bulk of the evidence from van HieJe-based
research, along with rese:lrcn from the Piagetian petSpective.
ind!c:lIes the existence of thinking more primitive than, and
probably prerequisite 10, van Hiele's level 1. Therefore, we
postulate the follOWing additional level:
lEvEL 0: PllE-tw:OGl'lmo,'1. At the pre-recognition level. children
perceive geomeuic shapes, bUI perhaps because of a defiCiency
in perceplUalllct]vity, may artend to on ly a subset of a Shape's
visual characteriStiCS. They are unable to identify many com-
mon shapes. They may distinguish between figures that are
curvilinear and those thaI are rectilinear but nOt among fig-
ures in the same clasS; that is, they may differentiate between
a square and a circle, but not belWeen a square and a trian-
gle. Act'ording to Plaget, ~il is one thing to perceive a circle
or a square and quite another 10 reconstruci a visual image
of it 10 the point where it can be picked out from a group or
models, or drnwn after a purely tactile exploration" (Plaget &
Inhelder, 1967, p, 37). Thus, sNdents at this level may be un-
able to Identify common shapes because they lack !he ability to
form requisite \lisua1 images. 1"hese images presuppose mental
representations constrUcled from the t'hUd's own actions. TI13t
is, "The image is 3t first no more lhan an Internal imitation of
previously performed actions, then laler, of actions capable of
being performed" ( Piaget & JMelder. 1%7, p. 449).
AI this level, the "obieC1S~ about which sNdents reason are
specific visual or tactlle stimuli; the product of this reasoning
Is :I group o{ ligures recognized visually as ~the same shape."
SHOI1lD ornER OW!AC"1UISncs OF TIlE U\"EI.S Bf. CO/'ISIDERfO? Levels
are complex struCtures involving the de\lelopment of both
conceptS and reasoning processes (Burger & Shaughnessy,
1986), In addition, researchers have emphasized the impor-
tance of several interrelated nOtiOns: intent, belief systems, and
metacognition. fuyseral. (1988) posit thaI at each level students
must become aware of what is expected, intentionally thinking
.. 30 • LEARNING FROM INSTRUCTION
in a cenain way. For example, students at higher levels used
such language as ~e:.. pbin; "pro ... ide 11," ~clinch it," and "be
[cchnic:I.J" In luStifying their re:lSOning. Students :1[ lower levels
believed thaI they should respond to a usk on paper e;"3ctly
as It appe:lred (for example, ch:mglng lIS orientation is not :d-
lowed). More of these students labeled an oblique o btuse tri-
angle (! "triangle" when a manipul:l1ive tri:lIlgle was used ( fuys
et aJ., 1988)_
Actu:dl)\ meracognitil·e knowledge al~'3~'S has been an im-
plICit p'Jrt of the van Hiele model, in its emphasis on intem and
insight, or ullderst:lnding. According to HorTer (1983), S(\Idents
show such understanding when they perform competently and
Intentionally 3 method that resolves an unfumiliar problem.
TIley understand wllill they are doing, why they :m: dOing it,
and when It should be done. Ir certain beliefs, intelltions, :md
the related metacognitive and even epistetnic knowledge char-
auerize each level, they need 10 be funher artirul:ued and In·
carper-ned into the model.
WfV,T l£\'[U Of TlUN\(ING AAf EVlM:EO GIVEN "TlWlmOl'W.." INSTlII.iC·
llCY.'W. p.w.or,,~!S?Once the basic char:lCterisucs of the model
have been generJIl)' validated, the questiOn ariSes: What le~"Cls
of geometric thinking 3fe achieved b~ students in their present
educational en ... ironment? Srudies by Pyshkalo and Stolyar indio
cated a significam number of Soviet students were perceiving
shapes o nly IlS wholes Students stayed at level I for a consid-
erable time; by the end of grade 5, only 10-15% reached Level
2 ( note that Soviet studems enter grJde I at age 7, compared to
age 6 in the US.). This delay \\-'35 even greater with respeCt to
solids, for which there was no noticellble leap untt] the seventh
grade ( Prshkalo, 1968, Wirszup. 1976)
or the 16 sl)'1.h graders they stud Jed. Fuys (l988) found that
19% were un i forml~' at Level I, fOCUSing on shapes as a whole
without analyzingshupes In terms of their properties. e ... en after
instruction. They could identify famil iar shapes singly, bur not
in complex configurations and sometimes nOl. in different or;·
enmuans They had greal difficult}' "'1th the concept of angle.
TIley galned only a little le...el 1 knowledge-...isual thinking
about shapes ~md parnllellsm-from work with manipulati ...es-.
The authors described these students -as "geometry depri ... ed."
Another 31 % made progress within Levelland were progress·
ing toward Level 2. The final 50% began with le\'Cl 2 thinking
and progressed toward Level 3. Nevenheless, they had to re-
... iew some Le\'eI 1 knowledge and firm up ideas at Level 2.
Some made deducti...e arguments, but most equated "proor
with generalization by e."amples (inductl...e reasoning).
The ninth graders similarly fell intO three groups. As with the
lowest group of sixth gr'.dders, about 12% of the ninth graders'
liwe school experience with geometry, coupled with langu~ge
:md memory difficulties, resulted in l.e\'ell performance. They
seldom realized that they could figure things out in mathem:n·
ics by thinking about them, and progress within Le ...el 1 was
limited. The H% in the middle group functioned 91 Level 2,
with lapses to l.e ...el I. They knew familial' shapes in terms
of their properties. but had no knowledge of paralJelograms
and tf".lpezoids. Another 44% performed consistentl y at Le ... el
2, with progress to Level 3, working more rapidly and confi·
dently. They were not only thoughtful and inventive about the
problems they were dOIng but were also renective about their
own thiJ,king.
Secondary students do not fair much better. M:m~' srudenrs
who have studied geomeHY formally are nonetheless on Le....
els 0 to 2, nOt le ... el 3 or 4: almost 40% finIsh high school
geometry below Level 2 (Burger & Shaughnessy, 1986; Suy.
dam. 1985; USiskin, 1982). In fact. because many students have
not developed Level :3 thought processes, they may nOl benefit
fronl ndditional work in form~l geometry because their know!·
edge and the information presented In the textbook will be
org'.miz.ed differently.
WHAT !£\"E.l5 01' TlU'''~lsG 00 TIl\D1T10)l.IL rt:\'TlI(lOG R£fl£CT? Gi ...en
the sorry Slate of studentS' level oC geometric thinking, it is
nmural to :15k what levels arc promoted by textbooks. Fuys et
:II. (1988) anal~'Zed several current geomecry curricula as evi-
denced by AmeriClll teXl series (grJdes K-8) in light of the van
Hiele model. Four components of geometry lessons were ana·
Iyzed: the aim, expository material. exercises, and related test
and review queslions. Not stJ rprisingl~', te."tbook series were
found to be deficient in this aspect. Most work invol ... ed n3m·
ing shapes and relations like par:lllelism, and SlUdents were
only infrequently asked [0 reason with tlte fi&1Jre5.
Most questions were answerable at Level L There 'MlS lit·
tie Level 2 or above thinking required in the lesson5 or tests,
staning only slightly in grades 7-8. A\'er<lge srudents would nOl.
need to think above Levell for almost all of tlleir geomeuy
experiences through grade 8. There were some jumps- across
lC\'eis; for example, exposition might occur lit a higher level
titan the e,,,ercises TopiCS were repeated across gr<ldes ,It ute
same level; the researchers termed this a ~circular" rather than
a ~splrar curriculum. \X'orse, perhaps, propenies :and relation·
ships among polygons were sometimes nOl taught dearly or
correctly.
Similar analyses of older Soviel te.'Ubooks (those wrinetl be·
fore severJI major reforms) re ...ealed the absence of any system·
atic choice of geometric m:nerial1 large gaps in its study, and a
markedly late, one·sided acquaintance with m:my of the most:
import:lnt geome.tric concepts (Wirszup, 1976). Only about 1%
of all problems dealt with geometry. This left sixth-grade sru-
dents, from the \'ery first lessons. doing work correspond·
ing to the first three levels of geometric development simul·
taneously.
PI)CUes of lnstrllctloll. The van Hlele model includes more
tllan levels of geometriC thinking. Accordi ng to the van Hieles,
progress from one level 10 the next depends little on biologi-
ca.l maturation or de ... elopment; instead, it proceeds under the
influence of a teaching/learning process. The teacher pla}'s a
special role in facilitating this progress, especially in providing
guidance about expectations (Fuys et aL. 1988). Gi ...en that van
Hide level and achievement account for 40% [0 60% of the
variance in Writing proofs, much of a student's achievement in
this area is directly controlled by the teacher and the curricu·
lum (Senk, 1989).
The V3Jl Hide theory, though, docs nOf suppon an "absorp-
lion theory" model of learning and te1ching. The van Hides
claim that higher levels are achie ...ed nm ... ia direct leacher

teUing, but through::. suitable choice of exercises Also, "chil-
dren themselves will determine when the moment 10 go to the
higher level has come" (P V3.n Hu?le, person~1 communication,
Sept 17, 1988). Ne\'enhe!ess, without the teacher, no progress
would be made, For each phase, we will describe the goal for
sludent learning and the teacher's role In providing instruction
thaI enables thiS le:Jrning.
'''e
PUME 1: IlIf'OIIIoIA11Q,";. studems become acquaimed widl
the content domain. The teacher discusses materials dari ~ing
this content, placing !.hem :u the child's disposal. Through mis
discussion, the teadler learns how students imerpret the Ian·
guage and provides lnform:uion to bring sludems to purposeful
3CIion and perception,
PHAsE 2: GUIllEt) ORlf.NrAno~. In this phase, studenl5 be<ome
acquaimed widl the ob/a'1.S from whJch geomelric ideas are
ab5tracted. TIle goal of Instruction during Ihis ph:l5e is for StU·
denlS to be actively engaged in e..,<ploring oblects (for e....:lmple,
folding, measuring) so as to encounter the princlp.11 connec-
tions of the nerwork of relations thm is 10 be formed. The te:lch-
ers' role is to direct swdents' :lctiviry by guiding them iD ap-
propri:lle e..,<plor.uions-earefully structured, sequenced tasks
(often one·step, eliciting specific responses) in which students
manipulme ob/eas 50 as to encounter specific conceptS :tnd
procedures of geomeuy. Teachers should choose mmerials and
taSks in wh ich the largeted conceplS und procedures are salient.
PI!A5~ 3: O:PUClTATlOl'I. Stuclenfs become conscious of the rela-
tions and begin to ebborate on their intuitIve knowledge Thus,
in this phase, children become e..'<pliCitly aware of their geo·
metric conceptualizations, describe these conceprualizmions in
their own language, and !earn some of the tradjtional mathe-
mztieal langu:lge for the subject maner. The teacher's role is
to bring me objects of Study (geometric objects and ideas, re-
lationships, patterns, and 50 on) to an esplicit level of :lware--
ness by leading students' dIScussion of them in their own lan-
guage. Once students have demonstrated their' awareness of
lUl object or study and have discussed it in their own words,
the teache r introduces the relevJm mathem:lIical termi na-
,,,,,,,
f"Iw;E 4: FI!Et: OIl1fNTATIO.'1. Children solve problems whose
solution req ui~s the synthesis and Utl!iz:ltion of lhose con-
cepts and relations previously elabor.ued. They learn to orient
themselves within the "network of relations" and 10 apply the
relationships to solving problems. The te3cher's role is 10 se·
lea. appropriate m:lIerials and geometric problems (with mul·
tiple solution pams), to give inslfUctions to permit various
performances and to encourage students to reneet and elab-
Orate on these problems and their solutions, and to intro-
duce terms, concepts, and releV3.nt problem-solving processes
as needed
PH..st: 5: trnGR~no.,,;. Students bu ild a summ:lf)' or aU they
have learned abou t the objects of study, imegraring their knowl-
edge into a cohercm network that can easily be described and
applied. The language and conceptualizations of mathematiCS
GEOMETRY AND SPATIAL REASONING • 431
are used to describe this ne~'ork. The teacher's role is to en"
courJge slUdems to renea on and consolid1te their geomet-
ric knowledge, increasing empha.<;is on the use of m:lthemat·
ieal SU'UClUteS 35 :l framework for consolidation Fin:1I1Yt the
consolid:llcd ideas are summarized by embedding them in the
structurJI orgnnlz:JliQrl of formal mathem:tlics. At Ihe comple-
tion of Phase 5, a I'CW lel'el of thought is .mained fOf the topiC
studied.
CriticallsSIles
IssuES REGARDING lFI'D5 Of TUIHI(II(G. There ure problems With
the research on the veraciry of the theorized levels. For ex-
ample, Fu~'s et at ( 1988) interpret their results lIS supporting
Iheir validif}\ However, they also daim support for 'I'dn Hiele's
recent ch<lractenzation of Ihe model in terms of three levels'
vi1.ua] (previously levell, according 10 these rese:Jrchers), ana-
lytic (previously 2), and theorelical (previously 3-5). They Slate
th:u van Hiele agrees with Ihis interpretation, but they cuution
[haL the three· level model may not be sufficiemly refined to
characterize thinking, especially considering their findings that
sll.ldents progressed IOW:lrd Level 3 with no sign ofaxlom:llic-
thinking There Ofe (Wo additional problems with the three--
level model, however. First, it seems Ih:tt van Hiele describes
the new visual level as combining aspeas of the preViOUS levels
1 and 2; Iherefore, the mapping (rom one model 10 the olher
IS not unambiguous. Furthermore, if levels can be changed and
combined, their hypotheSized discrete, hier3rchic:t1 psycholog·
Ical natu re must be queStioned. In l related vein, we have seen
reports of both Stronger and weaker performances at cen:lin
levels, and Q\'erlaps between levels: the question is, how wide
a band can be permitted before the nOlion of hierarchic;d de·
pendency d isintegr:lles?
It is nOl even dear when a student is ":It" a level. What does
it mean for sludems to mink of shapes in terms of their proper·
t1e..~? Do swdents achieve Level 2 when they evi nce cognizance
of the characteristics of shapes, or must they identify specific
propertieS? When do students thin k p'imlltily in lenos of prop·
erties' Do they have to identilV properties of specific shapes or
classes of shapes?
Funher, should srudents' thinking be characteriz.ed as ·al ~ a
single: level~ For CX!lmple, GUlh:rrel.,};Jime, and Forruny (991)
3ltempt to take into account students' capaciry to use each vall
Hiele level rather than assign a Single level. They use avec·
tor with four components to represem me degree of ,lCqulsi·
lion of van Hiele leve!.s I through 4 (for example, one student
might have a grade component for l evel I of 96.67%: level 2,
81,50%; Level 3, SO.OO%: and leveJ 4, 3.75%; the researchers
could nOl measure Level S to Iheir satisf:lClion). They found
many students who are apparently developing rwo consecutive
levels of reasoning slmultaneousl}', and hypothesized these reo
suits from mathematics instnlction thar leads studenl$ to begin
the acqUisition of level n + I before level /I h3d been com·
plelel}, acquired (Gutierrezet a!., 1991). Such alternate concep-
tua!izmions of levels of thinking need 10 be explored, as they
ma~' bring into question the very nature of the levels: that is,
the levels seem 10 have !':lee validity, but if the number of lev-
els is malleable and if performance Is spread across levels and
432 • LEARNING FROM INSTRUCTION
determined by what is taught, then it Is uncle'Jr whether the
levels are more logical or ps~chologJcal.
Another problem with the levels is Ihe observed lack of
~discomi nuitl~ in learning." Some have defended the theory
in the face of thL~ evidence. claiming mat the observations may
rellen cominuit)' nor in learning but rather in teaching (Fu~'S
et aI., 1988: NolTer, 1983). This is an open question, but a prob-
lem wim the defense is that it makes II vinua[Jy Impossible
to disprove the theory, a criticism frequentl y waged against
Piagel's theories. If there is a great deal o f "transition,'· then
(also like PJagel) this brings into qu~tion a striCt st:lge inter·
pret::lIioo.
Questions also arise concerning observatiOflS o f reasoning
;n different levels ac~s topics. Some, anempting to make min·
imal eJabor.1tions to the theory, have hypotheSized that these
srudencs can ~quickJ~ move to me higher level of minkingHreo
garding the lower·level !o piC. It is nOt clear e.xactly wh:1I dlis
means. Would others move reliably more slowly, and is this
speed not anributable to other faaors such as learning pcxen·
ual nOl. direcdy tied to levels of thinking?
Thus, it is critical that research be-conducted on valid assess·
ment of v:ln }-Iiele levels. Paper and pencil teSting should be
further refined and ev:llumed ( for a recent discussion of this is·
sue see Crowley, 1990: Usiskin & Senk, 1990; and Wilson, 1990).
Different inrerview lechniques, possibly less dependem on spe-
ciRc educational experiences, should be developed. For exam·
pIe, we have created a trlad polygon saning msk designed to
determine the level of geometric minklng for polygons. These
usks were crelted by the authors and Richard Lehrer. Srudems
are presemed with Ihree polygons and asked, "Which rwo a re
mosl alike? Why?" For e.xample, one srudem. presented with
the following shapes, AD BA C 6. chose Band C, say-
ing thm they "looked the same, except that B Is bem In," She
....HJ.S anending 10 the visual aspectS of the shapes, a Level 1 reo
sponse. After wo rldng with our Logo-based geomcuy currlcu·
lum (Batusta & Clements, 1990), the student chose A and B,
saying that they both had four sides. Thus, she !ended to let
the ovcr.111 visual aspea of the figures fade inlO the background,
anending instead 10 the shapes' propenies, a Level 2 response.
Finally, research is needed on the relative usefulness of statiC
and dynamic approaches 10 assessment. Dynamic approaches,
which can assess "polentia'" level of thInking and the amount of
instruction students need 10 achieve that level, may be more il·
luminating than the more ~1C31 st:llic, or M snapshot," approach
(Vygooky, 193411986).
The way in which students, especially young srudents, learn
geometric concepts has also been questioned. First, research
demonslrates that young children can discriminate some of the
characteristics of shapes, and often think of rwo-dimensionai
figures in terms of paths and mOtions used to conSlruct them
(BaniSla & Clements, 1987: Clements & Batti5la, 1989, 1990;
Kay, 1987). This is inconsistent with the le\'els -as presendy con·
ceived. Secondly, while young children are currently laughl by
a Mtemplate" (Visual protorype) approach to recognizing geo-
metric patterns, Kay (1987) maintains tlUt this is appropria!e if
there is only one such template for each class (this does nOt ap.
ply to hierarchical·based classes), In contrast. Kay provided first
graders with Instruction thaI began with the more general case,
quadrilaler::Jls, proceeded 10 reclllOgles. and then to squares. II
addressed the relevant characteristiCS of each class and me hier.
archical relationships among classes, using lerms that emtxxty
these relatio nships; quadrilaterJI, rectangle-quadrlla!erat, and
square· rectangle. At the e nd of instruction, most studentS iden.
tlfied duraaeristlcs of quadrilatcl"3ls, reaangles, and squares,
and about half identified hierarchical relationships among these
classes, though none had done so previously. Thus, Kay main.
ta ins that tlle van Hie!e theory does nOt capture the full com·
plexily of how young children come to understand geometric
concepts. Some concepts :11\\';lYs will be initially underslood
through inductive processes if the definilion of the concept in·
volves a L"Omplex deductive argument yet can be represented
by a small number of vlsual templates (for example. Hcircle).
If the definition of the concept inl'olves a relatively simple de·
ductive argument and the concept ClnnOt be represented eas·
ily by a template, then init ial understanding will be deductive
(for example, "quadrllateral"). This dichOtomy is similar to V}'.
gocsky's (193"'1986) formulation of spontaneous \'S. scientific
concepts. While both the depth of these first grnders' under·
standing (especially of hierarchical relations) and the gener·
alizations made on the basis of the empirical resUIL<; must be-
questioned, such al!emale hypotheses deserve- further lnves·
tig::ulon. Future invesllgalions should ensure that students are
not simply mi rroring repetitious verbal training: HDirect teach·
ing o f concepts is Impossible and fruitless. A teacher who tries
to do this usually accompli~hes nothing but empty verbalism, a
parrot lIke repetition of words by the child, Simulating a knowl·
edge of the corresponding concepts but aClUal!y covering up a
\'3cuum" (VygOtsl..", 1934/1986, p. 150).
In a similar vein, de VilJiers (1987) concluded that, contr:lf}'
to van HieJe's theof)l hier.1rchical class inclUSion and deduCtive
thinking develop indepe11dentl~ and depend more on teaching
strategy than on v:ln Hjele level. He then describes a success"
ful teaching strategy in which eighth· and n inth·grade studerus
were taught first aboUI quadrilaterals, and how special quadri-
laterals could be obta ined by specifying properties, This ap-
proach was contl"!l5ted-WIth the tradition3.! approoch in which
students associate names of figures wi!h visual prolmypes.
The defin ing qU:llity a.sSO(i~ted ".. ith the name is therefore determined
by the Visual perception of the figure ... We believe thaI Ihe obsefy.I.
lion lh:u children thInk of shapes:lS:I l\t101e without explicit rererefl~
to !heir romponCl1Il;. is the direct ~ult of our IIClually leaching chil·
dren from Ihe sum 10 thInk of shapes lIS a whole 3nd In terms ofvlsual
proto()pe5,:lnd with no refC'ren~ 10 th6r components" (p ]9)
However, the author makes this claim based on experimentS
with students imellecrually capable or attending to propenies.
Our research, for Instance, indicated that afler being taught
about me properties of squares and rectangles, many first
gr.1ders explain why they say that squares tire special ldnds
of rect!lJlgles by simply saying ~beca use the teacher told us"
(Battista & Clemencs. 1990). However, the critidsm of the van
Hiele levels raised by de VlIlIers, that the levels are very depen·
dent on the curriculum , is certainly worthy of funner research.
He concluded that funher research on the level at which both
hieiMchit-a1 classification and deduCtion occur Is needed.

Such questions lead to the conclusion th:u, while van Hiele
research has added to our knowledge considerably, the corpus
has nO'- yet been structUred so as to simultaneously res[ aher-
n3te hypotheses (for example, finding siudems whose behavior
seems to suppan a charac[erislic of the levels does not provide
:I strong test of competing hypotheses for the given behavior).
In addi[ion, the van HieJe theory describes students' behaviorsj
we also need [0 aCCOunt for Ihem Research needs to address
such questions :IS:
• Ho w specifically is studenLS' knowledge represented and
StnlCtured at each level? Ate new operations and conceptS
always construCted out of those th:lt came before, as in Pi-
aget's theory?
• Do levels repre5(:nt discrete stages of major knowledge re-
organization? That is, ClIn the leI-'els properly be described as
Slages? For instance, do they satisfy the following crIteria as
described by Steffe and Cobb (1988):
1. Constancy: some propelly, St:lle, or activity remains
constant throughout each stage;
2. Inco"/Xlmtion: the earlier Stage must become [ncor-
petated in the ne.xt;
3 , Order invariance: the stages must emerge develop-
mentally in a constant order: and
4. Integration, Ihe structUral propellies that define a
given SIll8e musl form an Integrated whole.
• Canweoperatlonalizc the levels? MoS(.srudles have used differ-
em testing instruments, some of which are contem-oriemed,
....ilile others are process-oriented. In addition, Fuys (1988)
has suggested that the mode of presentation-verbal, pIcto-
rial, or concrete-mighl influence srudcnts' performance on
such tasks. 6ec',1use the levels dearly depend on instruction,
we muSt be especially careful to consider the relationship be-
tween instruction and levels in all furore research.
• E:"actly what ideas do sTUdenLS construct and what mental
operations must be attained in learning geometry? How does
this developmenl occur in the early ye:Hs?
• Does a transition from one le vel to the next depend on the
acquisition of cemin typeS of knowledge, a restructuring of
knowledge, or both? Does this vary by topiC, especially topics
outside of plane geometry?
• How can level of thinking be related to, yer diStingUished
from achievemem (Senk. 1989)?
• What curriculum factors help facilitate transitions from one
level to the next? thIs brings us 10 the neXt .set of critical
issues.
Issur.s IU'GAAOIl'iG 1l-tl'l.lo,nONS fOIl 1l'.ACIliltG. Theory and research
from the van li iele perspeCtive has strong Implications for in-
sltUC\lon; moSt of these implicatiOns have not been adequately
addressed in the research ilter2ture,
• Edut:a1ional goals for letJels of /birlking, Opportunities for
the construction of geometriC ideas should be olfereJ early.
Students do not reach the descriptiVt: level of geometry in
pan because they are nOl offered geometric problems In their
early years (van Hide, 1987). 111is ·pcoiooged period of gec-
GEOMETRY AND SPATIAL REASONING • 433
metric Inaalvity" (Wirszup, 1976, p. 85) in the early grades
leads to "geometricly dep rived" child ren (Fuys et aI., 1988).
• Van Hlele suggested that the initial focus of the srudy of ge-
ometry mUSt have as its goal the an:3inmenl of the second
level of Ihought: ~Geometric figures must become the bearer
of their properties~ (Wirszup, 1976, p. 88). He said that the
subsequent focus of this Study should be the attainment of the
third leve] of lhought, StudenLS should understand the rela·
tions that connect propenies of figures and begin to logically
order the properties of shapes. MOSt researchers agree that
dchieving level 2 and 3 lhinking is an import:lnt goal of pre-
secondary geometry instruction. Ar whal age van Hiele be-
lieved students should attain these levels, however, remains
In doubt In certa:in writings, he indicates that StUdents In
grades 1 to 5 should concern themselves with deepening
thinking af Level 1 and that higher levels should nOt be val-
ued more highly than lower levels ("There are no arguments
to push towards a descriptive level, the visual level is so ex-
tensive that the subiectS there willlas[ for years,~ P. van Hide,
personal communication, Sept. 27, 1988). However, in other
\'Vfitings, both van Hide and other researchers emphasize
the goal of Level Z thinking earlier-for instance, by the end
of the primary grades (Wirszup, 1976). Such a goal may be
anainable. The familiarity of an experlmenral class of second
graders with [he geomeuy of solids enabled them to reach
level 2, surpassing seventh graders In me ttaditlonal curricu-
lum (Wirszup, 1976)_ The Russian researchers also claim that
me period of accu mulating f<lclS induCtively should nol. be
extended 100 long: they urge that simple deductions be en-
cou~ed in elemenL9.ry school. It Is imponam to continue
study of these issues, because research consistently indicates
that learning is rote if levels are skipped (WirS7.up, 1976).
• Language. Impredse language plagues srudents' work in ge·
omelry and is a critical faaor in progressing through the
levels ( Burger & Sha ughnessy, 1986; Fuys e t aI., 1988: May-
berry, 1983). Instruction should carefully draw distinc tions
betl\'een common usage and mathematical usage ( Battista &
ClemenlS, 1990; Clements & Battista, 1990; Fuys e l aI" 1988).
Teachers need to constantly remember that children's con-
ceptS unde rlyi ng language may be vastly different than teach-
er.; think (Burger & Shaughnessy, 1986; ClemenLS & BanlSla,
1989). Thus, when mathemalical language is used roo early
and when the teacher does nOl use everyday speech as a
poim of reference, mathematical language is learned without
concomitant mathem:llical understanding (II3n Hiele·Geldof,
1984).
• Ma"ipulatiues and "real world" objects. language, of course,
rcsLS on a foundation of real·world experiences; beginning
wltll such experiences is strongly indicated by research,
The Ocductive s}'Stem of Euclid rrom which a few things h3ve been
omilled CilfInOl: produce an elementary geometry. In order to be" el·
ementar}\ one VI~U have 10 S{21't from the world as perceived and as
alread}' partially gloOOl1)- knowll ~' the children, The objective should
be 10 analyze mese phenomen:l and 10 establish a logical ft'ladonship.
Only through an approoch modified in mat VI'll¥!:an a geometf)' evolve
mat ma), be called elementary according to psychological principles.
(V3l1 Hie le-<.ieldof, 1984, p. 16)
434 • LEARNING f ROM INSTR.UCnON
Students should m:lrllpulme co ncrete geometric shnpes :lOd
m:neri:lis so thallhey Cln "work OUI geometric shapes on their
own" (p. 88). Funher research has concurred th:n students re-
spond favorably to initial imroductio n o f concepts in re:1l ~'Orld
5ellings rind th:lI m:1flipulallves :lre impOn:'lnt and helpful. es-
pecially (It the Levels 0 and 1 The visual :tppro:lch seemed nOI
oo l ~' to maint<lin s1Udenl imerest but also 10 assist studentS in
creating defini tio ns and conjectures and In g:lining insight into
relmionships (Fu~'S el a\" 198H). Considering Ihls info mJ:uion,
along with the deficiencies noted in texlbooks , iI is imper:lIive
Ih:\! teachers flOl rel~' solely o n the te;.;t
PIIASES 01' l;<STlttJcno~ TIle phases of instructio n lire ine:-arica·
bl~' connected With the levels of th inking, :md poIcmially mo re
import:m[ for educ:tlion: therefore, It is surprising and unfonu-
11:lIe Ihat hllie rescarcil other Ih:1\1 the van Hieles' has examilled
the phases directly_ One Study indiClled that 20 d:lI's of phase-
based inStrudion signific:u1tI~' raised high school students' \l;m
Hiele level of thought (more so from Level I to Level 2 than for
:tnl' other levels). but it did nOl result in g reater ;lchievcmcm
ill suud:lfd comem or proof writing (Booango, 1988). Addi-
tion:!l studies ;lrc oorely needed, especially gil'en un resolved
questions and concems regarding the phases; for example:
• Ho\'l' ;lre the phases of instruction rel:llcd to the levels of
thinking? ~l l'POtheticall~', students must be led b~' the tetlcher
Ihrough ~1l fh-e phases 10 reach e!lch new le':e!' HO\vc\-er, cer-
win phases (for ex:ullple, :2 and 3) IIppe!lf to require of SIU-
dellL~ ~-pes of th inking Il1m:!re bound 10 ~ gwen level (fo r ex-
ample, level 2). Van Hiele ( 1959) crillctZ.ed pj;lgel and lnhelder
(1967) for attaching his · St:lges of del'eJo pment" to o ne (pre-
oper:niomll) period, bUIl'll1l Hieles' ph3Ses ma\' make the up-
poshe n1is(:J.ke 111 being too flexibleund IterJI:tbleJJcross levels,
• Should the teaCher unempt 10 proceed IinearJ~' through the
ph:I5C5. or :Ipproach them as recursive wllhi n e ach level?
• sho uld the IC'Jcher introduce many concepts :lnd gUide- Stu-
demoS through the le\'els 00 each of them il1 parallel, or work
through the levels (sar to level "2 o r 3) '"'''tll:l single concept
and Ihen use this as sca.ffolding to de\'elop higher levels o f
th inking for olher concepts?
• Is there a need for differentiation between ped:\80Sical rlp-
pro:lches for differem types of learning omcomes, such :lS
concepts, skills, or problem-solving abililies?
• Wlm is the role of automatlz:uiol1 and pr~cl ice?
• TIle fi nal phases \'I'ould seent to enh:lIlce IT:lnsfer; must tmns-
fer also be aided through the provision of systcm:nic spaced
reviews, which include a varlen' of problems?
COGNITIVE SCIENCE: PRECISE MODELS OF
GEOMETRIC KNOWLEDGE AND PROCESSES
A thi rd nKilor Iheoretical perspective t h ~1 has been applied
10 underst:lnding sludenL~· learning of geometry is lhat of cog-
Illli\'e scien~ This field !lIIemplS to intqjr.ll.e research and the-
oretiC":tl work rrom psycholO!n', philosophy. lingUiStiCS, :lIld ar-
I1fi cial intelligence.
Ande"soll s M odeJ o/Coglliriofl. One cognitive .science model,
Anderson's (1983) ACT". postulates (W() ~'Pes of knowledge:
declamfiue andprocedll lYll DecbNlive knowledge [s "knowing;
that"; for eXllmple, postulates and theorems ~'Ould be stored
in schemas :JIang with knowledge about their funclion, form,
und preconditiOns. Procedufill knowledge, "knowmg how," is
stored in the form of p rodudion systems, or sets o f conditlon-
:Jctlon p:lirs_If the condillon, or cognitive contingenq' that spec-
Ifies the clrcumsmnces under \'I'hicll the production can apply.
matches some existing panerns of dcdnrm i\'e knowledge, the
IICt lOn IS performed (us u:!JJy adding new elementS to work-
ing memory; ~l:l\ is, the store of information the S}'Stem can
cUI·remly ttccess)
According 10 the ACT' model, all knowledge Initially comes
In declarmive form and m usl be interpreted b~' gener:tl pro-
cedures ( for example, one uses genel':ll. recipe-foJlo'""i ng pro-
cedures to cook :t new d ish using the decla ralh-e knowledge
re:td in a. cookbook). TIms. ptocedur:t! lea.rning occurs only in
e:-o:ecuring :t skill; one leams b~' doing. When declarmive infor-
npIlo n is in the form o f direct instructions, step-by-step Ime r-
pretltion is Straightforward. However. it1formatio n b usu:lI1~' nor
tim direcL In the Glse of high school geomet:l1, slUdems nlly
use declarmil'e infor m:ttion to provide dat.l required b~' gen-
eml problem-SOlving operators, such:lS general sean:h. sequen-
tial decomposition of problems, means-ends :mal}sis, inferen-
tiul re:lsonl ilg. or making ,malogies between worked eX:tmples
and new problems Importantly, geomett:' te:.;tbooks assume
student f:!clllt}' WIth such opermors and virtually never d irectly
specify which procedures should be applied. This [lSSumption
is sometimes mistaken _ For exam ple. several studems sludied
b\' Anderson :til had misunderstandings ;Ibou t how one de ter-
mines whether:l st:t!emellt is implied bya rule. In gel1eral. the
behaVIOrs of these 5LUdenlS all beginning proof problems was
Clptured aCOJr:lIel~ by thiS model.
In perfo rming the task, pnxeduraliz:ltion gradual1~' replaces
the o r igin:l! interprellve app lication wi th productions that per-
form the behavior direct l~~ For example, instead o fverbalJy re-
he:lrsing the slde-Mgle-side rule in geometry and figuring o ut
how II applies, studentS bllild a production Ihttt directly rec-
ognizcs the appliGllion. In "Englisll,- such :t produdion might
be-
IF the gO:.l1 is 10 prove .1.\1"2" - 1:J.UV\'iI
:lnd Xl' 2< UV
and 1'2 a V\V
THEN set l subgeal to prove t..X1'Z - LUV\'(/so SAS can be
used
Proreduralization is complemented bl' ;I composlljon pro-
cess combining sequences of produdions. Togethe r, procedu-
r:lliz.1tion and compos ition are called k nowledge compilarion,
the creation of task-specific prodUCtiOns through pmcdce. One
form of suppan fo r the knowledge c()mpil~ t ioll theol1' lies
In protoco ls. One, for example, illustrates Ihe protr-Jcted, te-
diously incremental process initially fo llo tl.'ed b~ a student in
recogn izi ng the application of the SAS postulate 10 ~ problem,
compared to the following recognition on a new t:1Sk five prob-
lems later: -Right off the tOp of mr hend J am goi ng to take a

guess at what I am supposed to do. the side-angle-side pos-
tulate is what they art' gening tO~ (Anderson, 1983, p. Z3~).
Three differences are nOled: The appliC:Llion of the postul.:l!e is
faster, ute statemem of the postUlate !S no longer verbally re-
hearsed (th,1( is. evoking a de<:!ara\(ve representation imo work-
Ing memory, replete with failures leading 10 inaccur.lcies), and
the original piecemeal application of the posrulale is replaced
by a single step of recogn ition. In sum. learning in this Iheory
Involves! (1) acquiSition of declarative knowledge, (2) appli-
cation of declaralive knowledge to new silU'lI ions by means
of search and 3n3lO&)'. (3) compilation of dom:lin-spedfic pro-
ductions. and (4) strengthening of declar.ltive and procedural
knowledge (Anderson, ~'le, Corbett, & lewis. undated).
TIlUS, an imponam key to success in proof-oriented geom·
elry problem solving is the de\'elopment of data-driven rules.
These rules respond to configurations of information and re-
Sull in nmher development of the problem. For example, ex-
pertS qUickly perceive relations such as triangle congruence,
even without recogn izing al that time how this will figure
in the proof, How might such achievement be fucllltated? In
a succeeding section, the effortS of Andersen and his col-
leagues in building -an AI (anificial intelligence) tutOr based on
this theory wJII help constitute thei r :tnswer to this impomtnt
q uestion.
Grt't"IO~ Model Of Geometry Problem Solving. Greeno's
(1980) modd of geometry problem solving is similar to Aft-
derson's model of cognition, Based on thmk-aloud protocols
obtained from six ninth-grade students. a compUier simulation
w:lS designed that could solve the same problems these sru-
dents were able to solve, and hl the same general "III3)'S the StU-
dents solved them. The simulation is ~ production system within
three types of productions. renectlng the following three do-
mains of geometry required for students to solve the problems
they are given. First. propositions are used in making inferences
(familiar SUltements about geometriC relations, such :IS "Corre·
sponding angles formed by parallel lines and a transversal are
congruent") !halcon.stirute the main steps in geometry problem
solving. Second, perceprual concepts are used to recognize pat-
terns mentioned in the antecedents of many propositions (for
example, the corresponding angles). Third. strategic principles
are used In setting goals and planning (for example, when so-
lution requires shOwing that [W() angles are congruent, one ap-
proach is to use relations such as corresponding angles, another
is to prove thOit triangles containing the angles are congruenr).
Of these three domains, the first tWO are included explic-
itly in instructional materials; howe~"C:r, strategic knowledge is
not References to that knowledge in the materials is indirect
at besl, and most. teachers do not explicitly identify prindples
of SlnItegy in their teaching Srudents must acquire this knowl-
edge through induction from sequences of steps observed In
e:x:1mple solutions. Thus, the induced strategiC principles are
in the form of tacit procedurdl knowledge, invol\ling processes
the student can perfOfnt but cannot describe or analyze. lltese
strategic principles are quIte specific to the domai n of prob·
lems; should they be Ulught directly? G~no suggests that they
should because it" is unlikely that unguided discovery is more
effective than a more explicit form ofin-;truction. If direCt teach-
GEOMETRY AND SPATIAL REASONING • 435
ing is interpreted as the teacher impoSition of prescribed Steps
on students, it contrasts with van Hide's charaCterization of Stu·
dents finding their own My in the network of relations; if it
is interpreted as teacher facilitation of students' construCtion
and development of expliCit aMreness of Str:lIegies. the twO
positions are not disparate.
.Pt1mllel DistrJ"bllted Process/liS (PDP) NetWorks. Other cOB'
nitive science research suggests models with even more
low-level detail For e:-;ample, a PDP (parallel distributed pre-
cessing) nerwork model mighf explain the holistic template
representations of the lower levels In the van Aiele hier:J.rchy
Such a network possesses processing //f lilS, representIng con-
ceptual objectS such as features. ""oreis, or concepts, and con-
nee/iollS, with unlV".ltion weights between these units. It is the
patlern of interconneaions among the units that constitutes the
processing srslem's knowledge strucrure in the domain-what
it knows and how it responds (McClelland. RUme lhart. & The
PDP Research Group, 1986).
How might such PDP netWorks more precisely represent SIU-
dents" knowledge struCtures at different van Hide levels? Dur-
ing dle pre-recognition level, neural nerwork units that recog-
nize cerwln commonly-occurring Visual features are formed ,
dtus, these fearures bemme recognizable. Shapes are "recog-
nized" when renaln patterns of links among features bee."Ome
established and enable- the child to respond 10 any of a class
of visual stimuli.
\Vl1en a sufficient numbe r of VISual fearures become rec-
ognluble and their detectors interconneCled in patterns thai
correspond to common shapes, the child progresses to the
visual level. At this level. networks of detector units serve as
~shape recogniz.ers~ with patterns of lCtiVl!tion representing ini-
lial schema for figures. Figures thar Il)atch visual prototypes
closely enough cause cemin panerns 10 be activated and, in
turn, the figures to be recognized. Properties of figures are
not recognized expliCitly: the visual features thai embody tllese
properties simply activate the protOlype recognizers. These rep-
resentations are not usu:llly reneCted upon by tlle child How-
ever, ....·hen some renection is necessitated (usually by external
requests, such as copying a figure), a panern might be activated,
bUI lhis pattern may be Inadequate. For example, srudents of-
len encode the basic configuration of a polygon rather than the
number of sides, describing a nonconvex quadrilateral as a ~tri­
angle with:l nQl:ch~ or a "triangle with a s ide bent in" (Clement<;
& B3{1iSl3, 1989). With appropriate inslruaion, propeny recog-
nition units begin 10 for m; !hat is, visual features become sen-
tient in isolation and are linked 10 a \lerbal label. The .sludem
becomes capable of renenlng on the visual feaNl-es and, thus,
recognizing the shapes' propenles. evenrually leading to level
2 though!.. While this is all conjecture, il is meant 10 illustrate
a possible cognitive science Interpretation of the current van
Hiele theory. ntere is a frustrating lack of progress in funher
explic:ning such notion-; as Mnetwork of relations~ and ~find his
way about in the field of symbols. ~ These ideas are ime resting
and provocative, bUI they have not progressed 10 any greater
degree of theoretical specificiry than that which they anained at
their inception (for a possible path for elaboration, see Minsky,
1986, p. 131).
.. 36 • LEARNING FROM INSTRUCTION
Resea:rdl has also substantiaIed Ihe PDP-posful:ued existence
of multiple schemas. That is, students may possess severa l dif-
ferent visual subschemas- for figures (for example, a venically-
and a horizoO!a!!y-orienled rectangle) without accepting the
"aver3ge" case (for example, an obliquely-oriented rectangle).
Neumann (l9n) Sludied geometriC patterns consisting of large
rectangles, each with IWO rectangles within iL The patterns var-
ied on three dimensions, the size of the outer recmngle, the
size of the lower rectangle, and the number of siripes In the
upper rectangle, Subjects studied a preponderance of stimuli
with e;\-.:reme values and few inlermediate values of these three
\':Iriables. They were presemed with tesl patterns and asked to
r.ue how confidem they were thaI they had already srudicd that
pattern. Subjects did not average wt"Ja{ they had studied; inste3d,
mey rolled the extremes much higher than the mean value P31-
terns, shOWing th31lhey could extract out of multlp\e fod of
centrality in a stimulus set While not addreSSing mis question
directly, studies on the van Hiele theory are consistent with this
finding (Burger & Shaughnessy, 1986: Fuys et aI., 1988).
As a final example, such a perspective helps explain people's
recognition of a twO-dimensional representaf.ion of a three·
dimensional rube. FirSl, why do we see a line as an edge,
or a region as an area of a three·dimenslonal object? "Our
vision,syslems seem vinually compelled 10 group the OUtputs
of our sensors 1010 endties~ like these (Minsky, 1986, p. 254).
What enables us 10 see those features as grouped together
10 form larger objects? "Our vision-s),slems again are Virtually
compelled 10 represem each of those feanues. be it 3 comer,
edge, or area, as belonging to one and only one larger objcet
31 a time .... Our vision-sYSlems are born equipped, at each of
several different levels, with some son of ,locking· in' machin·
ery thai at every momem permits each 'part: at each level, to
be. assigned 10 one and only one 'whole' at !he next. level"
(Minsiq', 1986, p. 251). How do we recognize !hese objectS as
cubes? Our "memory·frame machinery also uses 'locking-in'
machinery mat permits each object 10 be alt.:iched only to one
frame (thar is, schema] at a time. The end result Is mat in ev·
ery region of the pictUre, the frames must compete with each
other 10 account for each fearure" (r-.·Iinsky, 1986, p. 254). A PDP
model might postulate units representing competing hypothe-
ses concerning each vertex of 3 Necker cube-for example. the
lower left vertex may either be in [he front or back of the cube.
The netwOrk consists of twO intercOflneaed subneeworks, one
corresponding to each of the [wo global lnlerpretations of the
cube. They are murualiy exclusive, and, thus, the spread of ac·
uv:ltion through the netwOrk forces one pattern or the other-
but not both-to be activated at any given mornem ( McClelland
et al., 1986).
The Three Theoretical PerspectiVes
TIle cognitive science models bring a precision 10 models
of geometriC thinking not alwa~'S present In the theories of
Piaget and van HieJe. For example, Anderson's and Greeno's
models Identify knowledge structures and processes in de-
tail, and the PDP models bring explicitness to cemin spe-
dfic aspeCts of students' represenl3tions al lower levels. How-
ever, limitations of the cogni(jve science models also must be
noted. With the small number of subjects usuall}' involved, gen-
eralizabiHlY is a concern. These models lend not to expl3.in
the unsuccessful sludem, processes s uch as conjecturing and
problem-finding, and the med'lanisms of knowledge reslruaur-
ing. Also, it Is not dear that the genesis of all procedural knowl-
edge lies in the compilation of previously·leamed declaradve
knowledge. In fact , it would seem lhat many students in the
current curriculum acqUire mathem:llical Ideas only procedu·
rally, without connecting procedurnllo conceprual knowledge.
That Is, srudents often perform sequences of mathematical pro-
c~s withOUl being able to describe what they are doing or
why, perhaps as visually moderated sequences as described by
O'dvis (\984). MOSt of these models do nOl address students'
development of qualitatively different levels of thinking and
representation, belief sYStems, rnOlivalioo, and meaningful in'
terprelatlon of subJect m;mer, and they de-emphasize dle roles
of sensorimotor llCIivi~', inruilion, and culture in mathematical
thinking (Cobb, 1989: Fischbein, 1987). In fact, slmilaril1cs be-
eween computer simulations and sruciem performance may be
a retlection of paucity of Sirualions In which learning and lead)·
Ing are meaningful. Nevertheless, the theories provide Insights
and useful mel3phors, as well as specific eXplicalions missing
from mOSt Other perspectives.
The theories of Piagel and the van Hleles share cenain im-
portant characterislics. Both, for example, emphasize the role
of the studem in actlvely constructing their own knowledge,
as well as the nonverbal developmem of knowledge thaI is
organized into complex systems. For example, van Hiele em-
phasizes that suct"eSsful students do not learn faCts, names, or
rules. but networks of relallonships lhal link geometric con-
cepts and processes and are eventuaUy organized imo schemal3.
(van Hiele, 1959). Thus, studentS must abstract matllematlCS
from their own systematic patterns of activities. Te-dchers can-
not successfully provide direct help to Sludents who have not
yet altained a certain level. "If you W3Jlt to know how far chil-
dren have made progress, do not wait for their imitation of your
argumentation, but lislen 10 them for what they have found OUl
themselves" ( P: van Hiele, personal oommunicalion, Sept. 27,
1988). Thus, both Piagel and van Hiele strongly disagree with
the belief that good teachers merely e.'q'lain dearly 10 children
10 leach them, Some mechanisms of developrT\ent are also sim-
ilar. Piaget stresses the role of disequilibrium and resolution of
conflicts. Van Hiele implores teachers 10 recognize students'
difficulties, but not avoid ~crises of thinldng," because these
fadlit3te the rrnnsitiOtt 10 the higher level. In addition, both
lend to avoid twO positiOns: (I) the goal of education defined
as unabatedly accelerating developmcm (~we've ldemified lev-
els; now how fast can we get children through them~), and
(2) dle complete devaluation of lhinklng at a lower level once
a higher level Is achieved. Espousal of these positions. however.
can be heard in discussions of some who apply their theories
10 practlce; the wisdom of either stance is unknown.
There are also imponant differences. As previously dis-
cussed, van Hiele emphasizes thai the course of development
Is srrongly influenced by the leachingtlcarnlng process. More
slgnificanti}', van Hlele (1959) criticizes Piaget's belief in logic
as 3 basis of thinking, claiming that logic am only develop on

or
thefound3tiOn earlier levels of thinking, I~'els Plage: 5Uppo,r
~)' ~miSKd~ becaU5e he alre:ldy dlSCOYered 5t1gCS of a dllfer-
ent n:nure By Piag~fs ~stages,- van Hide mean! the sugcs of
1J'it\Siuon (fOt example, from preoperational to c:oncme opera.
oonal thoughtJln /1lOVIng through these three st28O, the child
ftrst does not unlk:l'5t3nd a cenain idea, then f1lOI\.'eS intO l!1ln'
5IriOn and finally underst2nds. van Hide Slates Wt the ~SI28O
and ~r\0d5 described by Pi:Jget are 001 essentially connected
with a particubr age", but are charnaeristic for very many learn·
Ing p~ irre.specuve of the age at winch they take place~
(1959. p 14). While Inlriguing. it should be ncxed thar. these
thtI:e sroge5 ronstltule but a small pan of Piager:'s developmental
tl}~re are also problems with van Hide's claim that II "es·
aped Plagel that me obfect of thought 1$ quite diffen!nt at the
different levels,.so that there can be no questiOn of reasoning
at the first level being based on a m351ery of logical relations
which belong to the third leyel and therefore canOOI yet be
known" (1959, p, 14). First, van Hiele makes a similar misl:lke
tru! he anrlbules to Nager, defining logiC in his own Image,
or from his conslnlned perspective. Second, and more impoe--
twly, Pi3ge1 did hypothesize Um obj«tS of thought differed
!Il different developmental stages, Both theorists beli~ mal II.
aitiallnsuuctional dilemma IS te2Ching about ob;eru lhat are
not yet: objeCtS or refleCtion for slUdems
UttIe ~ has been conduoed on the iSsUes of simi·
Iarities, differences. and potential syntheses d Piagers and van
Hide's theories. 'They appear connected, Denis (1987) Indi·
cated tNt, fOr high school studentS, the van Hide levels ap-
pear to be hterarchlal across C()OO'e(e and formal oper.IltonaJ
PbBaian stageS. She reponed thar only 36% of students who
had taken high school geometry had reached formal open.
rJonaI. SQ,ge, and that mOSI of them atuined only level 3 In the
Y:Ul Hiele hluarchy. She also found :I Significant difference In
Y:Ul Hide Jevel between students at the concrete and formal
opel1llion.,l stages (aJlhough the narure of this relationship is
eqUivocal).
Recall thal the argumem presented (or the exisrence of a
Level 0 Is b~ on a panlal synthesis of the theories of Piaget
and v~n Hl<!le. Gre:ner synthesis might be possible, though,
for ex2mple, \I may be that van H!ele's Level 2 represents a
fttOflStnJCtion on the absU3a/consclouslverbal plane of those
geometric COnctpruallzal\Ons that Piaget and lnhelder (1961)
hypotheslled were first construaed on the percepruat plane
and then ~cted on me represenulionallimaginal plane.
Thus, Level 2 may depend In many ways on what Piaget termed
the con.strucllor1 ol·attiCulaled menul imagery.~ There is a po-
temiaI 2nd a neoed for more deailed work in this area. For ex·
ample, iflVC5tig:llions need 10 consider how visual thinking Is
manifested 9.'hen higher I~els 2re ~. As our d.I$CUSSioru
wtlllndicxe, it 15 doutxful that it is untranSli::lcTne:! and m~ly
.pushed into the background~ by more .sophisti~ w;rys of
thinlting. The same psychological process. Visual thinking, prob-
ably bas a nwnbero( psychologJCLlI~ from primitlve 10 so-
~ed and interconnected with ~ ways of thinking, all
of whkh play dlfferem roles In thinking depending on whim
\ayer 15 aaJY3!ed Swdy of the development must go beyond In·
vestlgatlng only the growth of increasingly .sophistlctted I~'els
GEOMETRY AND SPATIAL REASONING
• '137
of geometric thinking 10 invesllg3l.i"B the continual devel
menl of processes such as visual dunking that appear inJll:-
well deYeloped (Vygotsky, 193411986). Y
In ~1. research thai builds on the strengths oralllh
~I'dica.t pe.rspecti~ ~Igtu. tuve potential. For example. ~
agel s schemes, van 1-lIele5 network of relations, and Cognlu
science's more explicit declarative netwOrks certainly POISSelie
commonalities In their Y)('WS of knowledge stnIcture and . ~
• ' UIS
possible that a symh6iS of these would yield a richer m
. • Ore
veridical model. Ideally, such a model would have the: eYnI '
., of ... _ . ..... lea·
uon UK: cognitive SCience perspective and the developme I
2SpectS of the Piagetian and van Hiele perspectives. nta
ESTABLISHING TRUTH IN GEOMETRY
How do mathetrultlcians establish truth? They use Proof, 1 •
ic:al, deduCtive re150nlng based on axioms. How do they fi~~
truth? Most r~quentJy by methods Intuitlve or empirical I
rure ( Eves, 1912), In faCt, the process by which new mathemat.
ics 15 eStablished 15 belied by the: deductive fonNI in whi h
It is recorded (Lakatos, 1976), In creating mathematics
......~ . .._
Iems are r - ", con~re.s rna""" coumerexamples oITe eel
:.
,pro..,..
"-
-and conf«rures revised; a theorem resul~ when this r~ ,
~t of ide:J5 is ludged to have an5\\'etl!d a Significant questlne-
Rell (1916) dislinguishes three funaions for proof in m ~
mafia: l.Wffiauion, which is con«med ~ith esablishin a
truth ora proposition; il/llmmaIlOn, ..-him is concernedgw~
conveying Insighl 1010 why a proposition is UlJe; and ~'$I' ttl
lisa/OJ, whkh is ocganization of propositions into a dc!du:;a'
S)'S1en1. VII!
In geometry, as in other areas d mathematics, empirical 2nd
deductive methods should Inter2Ct and reinforce each oth
For InSI2nce. often when one is stymied in taking 2 ded er.
live 2PP~, empiriCLI investigations can generate explora~~
possibilities H~er, for most srudents in geometry. ded
tion 2nd empirical merhods are separale domains With dlH<uc-
ent WOlys 10 est:tblJsh correctness (Schoenfeld, 1986). In fa~·
the use of fonmll deduction among students who are '
fng or haye I2ken secondary school geometry Is nearl ~.
.sen! (Burger & Shaughnessy, 1986; USiskin, 1982). AcCOrdl~ ~
Schoenfeld, mosl Students who have had a year of high h' 0
"naI ..... . .. ___ 5(" 001
geometry re ve empl"CI5IS W"UM: approach 10 c. .
-' A_" ' .
cuge ....... compass constructions is an empirical SUe.ss-and
.....nllght·
loop· (Schoenfeld. 1986, p. 243), StudenlS make :I cOo' -test
!.hen lest it by examining their conSUUCtion. If the c : re ,
lion looks sulftcu:ntly accurate, the: srudem Is satisfied that rue·
con)«tUte has been venfied.. -In various problem 5e$5 ' the
denu have rejected correa solutions because they did : '~
suffic~tty 2CCUr:lle and have accepted incorrect solutlons be-
cause they looked good" (p. 243). in one series of intervi
college students were asked to solve a COOSlrucUon prob~'
:after having solved 11 proo( problem !hat pfOllided a solu . m
10 !he consttuction problem - Nearly 2 third of the SfU~on
bqpIn the second problem by making conjectures thai tl lS
viObted the results they had Just proved!" (Schoenfeld 1 ally
p. 1 SO), Evidently, me .studenlS' proof aalVity either had' 988,
ally established knowledge for the students-or the .__ '?- reo
1\S10\'... edge
438 • lEARNING FROM INSTRUCTION
"'35 ~11s~ but Wo15 rompgnmenullzed in such a W3.~ that
it was nex xccs:slble In lhe dam:l[n of COOSlfUctions. Accordmg
to Schoenfeld, in.5(rucuon:a1 Slr:ttegies used in the high school
cb.urooms might be the cause for Ihis comp:mmencaliZ:ltion
Although lheo~ms :lnd dc<Iuction " 'ere used to imroduc:e lind
wlid:ne construC1ions, lhl! emph:lSis was on cooslfuaions as
procedUres-th:1I Is, on skill acquisitiOn
It should be noted dut ~eld's investigation of "em-
pIrical metJlOds~ w:tS restriCl~ 10 srudems' use of conszruc·
t;oos. which :l~ usuall!- taught as procedures with v.tI~ In
..d of themselves Other empirical :lppro3Ches might produ«,
some..mt differem results For 1flS(:loce. constructions on :l
computer nlight be beller for students for (W() reasons. FirSL
computers require more predse spccific:nlon th:1O those done
with p:lper and pendl. Second, bec-dUse the compuTer performs
the constructions, Ihe lencher ctln Ireat the topic less 35 a set
of procedures to be learned, Ihus focusing more on concept
de-Ydopmcm. Even wllh computer construCtions, howe\'er, we
might need 10 worry abom L1le pitfalls of promoting an empirl·
ciSI nppro:lch, for ill5mnce. In commenting on the computer
sofiw;lre Geollle/l'lc SuJ1POSe", Schoenfeld (1986) woodered If
the .tbHltv of the progr:am 10 n.--pe:ll constrUctions aUiomallCllly
would lead Students to be O\'erlr empirical Judah SchW3.1tt.
me softw:tre's author, replied bY recounting an insrance whe~
me opposite ~ 10 have happened. One smdent tried to
conVince another studenl lhal something "ra5 rrue b\' appell·
ing 10 a l:arge rolleaion or confirming e.xamples. Another sw-
dent COUntered 1b.'1 me class had seen 10lS of CQll5IruCtlOns
11\:11 "'''OI"ked ror m:uw examples but l:lIer had fUmed QUI 10
be Incorrect. Thus, ma~obe ~U2 deduction ariSes from em-
pirical approaches, the 1.:lIIer student had, through. e.'\pe~
with empirlasm, dl5CQ\l'el'ed lIS IImiralions. This was certainly
an imponant 51ep to"':Jrd apprectlling a need for the deduc-
ti~ opproach 10 estnbllshlng trum in goomelty. Apparently this
IS nOl an isolmed case As we WIll discuss below, research 10-
dlcalcs mm the Goomer"'c slIpposer's empirical me:lSuremem
:1ppro:lch does 1101 neglllil'el~' afTect students' ability to learn
prool:
Other studies have confirmed the ex istence of slUdem con-
fusion concerning methods of JUSIifying m:llhem:nical state-
menL!i. [n :I sludy by ~lart!n and Harel (1989), pre-service
elementary leachers were usked 10 judge the mathematical cor-
rectness of induclh-e and deduai\'e verifications of statements
For ~dl 51atemem, more Ih:m 50% of the studeol5 accepted
an Inductive argu~t and more ttun 60% :KCepted :t. deduct
live argument :t.S :t \':did m:uhemallCll proof. Fifty-[U'O perrent
:accepted an incorrect dedlKlJve argumeOl as valid for an unb-
miliar Slatemefll FISChbein :Uld Kedem (1981) found dut high
school studentS, Ilfier finding or lerming ;I correct proof for a
5L11ement, maim:l\ned th:u surprises :arro suU possible and that
further checks are rlesit":1b1e In:l srud" of students age 12 to
1;. Galbr:l.lth (1981) found Ih:ll oYer a third of the StUc:ialIS did
noc: under$t;lnd th:u. counterexamples musl suisfr the condit
uoos of:& coojeaure but v\ol:r!e the conclUSion; IS% felt one
countero:ample was not suffiCient 10 disp~ a st:l.t~m
....ccorchng 10 Manin :lnd ltarel, in e~ryday life people con-
5[~r "proor es5em!:dly to be ~wtul convinces me.~ Bell (1976)
suggested thaI "conviction arr",es IT'I05{ frequently as the result
of the nlemal $C2nnln8 of a range of items which bear on the
point In question, lhls resulting evemually in an Integr:uion of
the Ideas into a iudgment~ (p _ 24). According 10 Bell, proof
grQ1\'S 0\.11 of Imernal testing and the resull:Ult acceptance or
rejection d a genenllUlion ~ter. one sub~ the generaliza-
tion to cndeism by (){~, fit"Sl through oral and then through
"Titter! SlOUements that present not onl~t the gener.tlizattoo bul
evidence ror Its vaJidin' in the form of a proof. Thus, .srudetus
will not appreci:lTe the purpose of formal proof unlillhey rec-
ognize the public st3tUS d knowledge lind the resuh.ant need
for public verif\cnion .
Of crucial Imponance he~ 15 Ihe Idea of Imemallestlng.
For a mathem:ltldan, [mernaltests eventually uke the form of
proof, :IS one Ilttempts 10 perform the SOCially accepted crlti,
clsm of one·s argument oneself, However, do srudents perform
thiS testing. :lnd, Ir so, how? When quizzed abour their Justlfica.
tlons for ide:tS, students may refer to general propositions, spe--
Cific Instant iatIons of general proposllions, diagrams, and i~
I:lled results unconnected 10 IUStlficatlons (Talyzina, 1971) Of
course, Ihe lal((!r rwo lusllficttions 3re problematic, the fifSl of
Ihe;e beC'dU5C:. students ofien make unwarr:lIlfed assumptions
basni on dtagrJms, and the .second because StUdenlS an: 18-
noclng the need for one's t"e15Onlng 10 be laid OUt in detail 50
thai It can be ewlu.lled_T:liyzina also found lh:tt ~"OUnger StU-
dents mlXh more often than o.1der studentS recalled a general
propositIOn ruther dun a specific. relev.lnt insunl.iation d tIUl
genel'lll propu!iiuon. II W3S ci:l1med that the latter behavior" "is
ch3l'X1erlsuc of the higher smges of mastering the ability to
solve geometrY problems" (p 98) Thai is, 2. duraCleristic of
more :lccomph.shed thinking In geomeu)' is .. curtailment of
Slep-~'"SIeP, deductive thoUghL
Students' proof Perlomwtce
About one month before the end of the school year, Senk
( 198;) t!!SIW dIe proof-wrhing ability of 1,;20 srudents In ge-
ometry cl:ISseS thlll had siudied the topiC..... proof w.iS consld·
ered correct If all the steps follo ....w logic:J.lIy, even If there
were nlinor errors III notmion, VOC'3bul:l.lv, or names of dle-
O~ntS, Seventy percent of Mudems were correa on a simple
sl:(·stcp proof [n which the)' were: to supplr either the ~
or die sUllement Firl\'·one percent of Students were correct on
a simple proof requiring :an au.'Ci\i:lry line :md in which the
Slud~nts had to wnle bcxh Sl:ttements and reasons themse:]vo.
nlim:·lWo percent of the ~uderK5 could prove tlut the di:tg-
onais of a rectangle are congruent, bUi a mere 6% pr'IJ\-ed :I •
som~hat more difficult theorem thm did not follow directly
from rhe ttbngle<ongrue~ POSlUlates and theoremS.Just3"
d the students ttteived penect scores on the leSl.. On only
thrtt 0( ~ rwelve problems whkh requIred a full proofwere
III 1e3Sl h:alf 01 the students successful. Senk concluded 1h:J1
onlv :lbow 3D'1tt or :111 students in full-year geometrY cour..e5
Uul leach proof re:Kh a 7;% mastery level in proof writing·
Brumfield (1973) queried 52 high $Choat sl1x:1ents...oo had
tlken an accelerated gcometr" course the pteviOUS year and
were headed for an ~th'3.nced placemelll calcuh» course abolll
geometl)~ When asked 10 list as many posrulateS as lhev ~Id
-
remember, 50% of the students liSted nothing at all and 31%
lisled anI)' Statements that were nO( posrulates. Forty percent of
the srudems could nO[ list il single theorem, with many mixing
theorems with a.'(ioms, definitions, and false statements. When
asked to choose one Interesting theorem and prove it, 8] %
of srudenlS did nO( attempt a proof, and only one of the 10
srudems who did was correct. Apparently, even bright stUdents
get very lillIe meaningful m3memmics out of the traditional,
proof·oriented high school geamen), course.
The Development of Proof Skills
• Given students' poor performance on proof writing, it Is im·
perative 10 investigate the development of Ihls importam skill.
What are its components? Wi:la( are the prerequisires for proof
writing? When do children first attempt to ruStify meir conclu-
sions? How do they go aboul it?
Several components for understandIng and constructing
proofs have been suggested by Galbraith (1981): (a) under·
sl3nding -and being able [0 perform an exhaustive check of the
se{ of possibilities requ ired to verify a st<lIemem, (b) detecting
and u[ilizing a re!e\'<lfll panern or principle in !he daro, (c) uti·
lizlng a chain of Inferences wilhout needing to estlbHsh inter·
mediate steps with concrete referents, Cd) recognizing the do--
main of validity of a generalization, (e) correctly imerpreting
statements and definitions, and (f) undel'Slanding the formal
structUre of proof. Van Hiele, Piaget, and other theorists have
offered several different perspectives on the development of
proof skills. Piaget (Piaget, 1928; Plagct, 1987; Piaget, Inhelder,
& Szemlnska, 1960) for example, described levels for the n~
[ions of justification and proof. We will give a broad o\'erview
of these levels (the numbers used for the jevels are a syn!hes1s.
so they do not necessarily correspond to those of Piaget).
Levell Cup to age 7-8). In decisions abom the truth of ideas.
there is a lack of imegration of observa(ions and local cart-
elusions. E:lch piece of d3ta collected or example examined
is treat:ed as a separate eveor not imegrated with others. Ex·
ploradon proceeds randomly, without a plan, and local conclu·
sions may be contradictory. This lack of direction in !.hinking
is due 10 the fact !.hat ~there is nothing here which lends to
make thought conSCiOUS of itself and co~quemly to system·
atize or 'direct' ilS suc~ive ludgments (Piaget, 1928. p 15).
M
Being egocemric, the child attempts neither to see the paint of
View of aflother nor to think 3bout making his or her Viewpoint
understood by others,
At the end of !.his level, there is some degree of Ime·
smtion and more purposeful exploration, Thought is more
direcred, students begin to understand that severa! dues or
examples must be integrated to draw conclusions. Al!.hough
pa[{erns are est3blished empirically, this Is done without at·
tempting to understand why the patterns occur. For instance.
when students were putting together angles of a triangle, they
were shown wharhalJPened for one triangle and asked to pre·
dict what would happen for orhers. The students COUnted the
angles and predicted that shapes with mree angles would pro-
duce semicircles :lrJd shapes with four would produce circles.
GEOMETRY AND SPATIAL REASONING • 439
However, they ignored the size of angles; they did not aRempe
to determine why the pattern occurred.
The child at this level is capable of the most elementary
form of deduction. It ·consists either of foreseeing what 9,'ill
haPJlCn when such and such condItions are given, or in recon·
structing what has happened when such and such results are
given" (Piaget, 1928, p. 66).
Leuel2 (ages 7-8 through 1 1-1"2). N. students begin this level,
they not only make predictions based on empirIcal results, they
begin trying to justify their predictions, Induction and deduc·
lion often connlct. In the angles taSk. !hey atlempted [0 analyze
the angles for each new example. Because they were unable
!O see me sizes of the three angles as imerdepe/'ldent, though,
they were often misled by the appearance of the angles, and
often seemed less advanced than the students OIl Level I. Chilo
dren's Jncow;'ct predictions seemed to lead Ihem to analyze
interrelationships betWeen the angles, bUI they were unable [0
eswblish a general relationship. There is also an amicip3l0ry
character and purposefulness 10 se3rches for information. For
example, students might use information 10 establish classes of
posSibilitieS and nonpossibililies In a searth task.
During the latter pan of this level, inductive generalizations
t:lke place more qUickly and often immediately. E:tch instance
is compared with preViOUS instances. On the angles task, chilo
dren were able to establish a re!mionship between the !.hree
angles of a triangle. Also, there is no longer a contradiaion
between the analysis of the angles in Individual Iriangles and
the inductive generalization aboU[ !.heir sum. "On the contrdtyl
the induction itself which leads the subject to believe that the
angles of any trIangle will yield a semicircle provides an an-
ticipmory schema which guides the composldon of the angles
of new triangles" (p, 204). The discovery becomes universal:
"They always do [form a semicirclet (p. 2(4). Srudents at this
level , however, do nOl establish logical necessity. Even after em·
plrically eliminating all possible a/'ISWers but ohe, one srudem
said ~l prefer opening Other ones {dues], you never know~
(p. 114).
There is the capability of implication for these children
"when reasoning rests upon beliefs and not upon assumptions,
in other words, when It is founded on actual observation. But
such deduclion is still realistic, which means that the child can-
nO( reason from premises Without believing in them. Or even if
he rc-.lSOflS implictdy from assumptions which he makes on his
own, he cannOt do so from those which art." proposed to him"
(pp. 251-52). Thus, although thought is logical, it is empirical
in narure.
Level 3 (ages I1-U and beyond). The dlild is capable of
formal, deductive reasoning based on any :lSSumptlons, The
soundness of the assumptions does not affect the validity of the
argument, Logical necessity is established by the me!.hocl em-
ployed. StudenlS integrate information that has been revealed
by various aaions and decide what information muSt be: ob-
mined from further actions. At leve! 2, "the deficiency !hal reo
mains is the failure to recognize exhaUStivity, which prevenlS
subjects from considering their proofs as suffident even when
!.hey are. Only at Level 3 does progress in [nt~ratlon lead to
440 • LEARNING FROM INSTRUCTION
the conviction that the conditions e5Ulblished as being neces-
sary, when taken togedler, are also sufficient~ (p, 116),
For the angle task, s\Udent.s progressed from simply believ·
ing that the angles Will alW3YS make a semicircle to a belief,
based on logical reasoning, that this must necessarily be so. For
example, they might Slme that the lhree angles make a semicir-
cle because "the angles (at the base of 20 elongated isosceles
triangle) aren'l quite right angles, and the point makes up the
dilference" (p. 205). However, the logical reasoning that is used
by the students is not based on formal mathematics. 50 the stU-
dents may have believed that the three angles must necessarily
form a semicircle, but they usually could not provide :I formal
reason.
In summary, al leVell, the child's thinking is nonreflec-
tive and unsystematic, and therefore, nO! logical. AI Level 2,
thought is logical, but restricted to being empirical, Onlr aI
Level 3 is the child capable of logical deduCtion and of con-
sciously operating within a mathematical system. What causes
progress through the levels? From where does the need for
\'erificalion arise? "Surely it must be the shock of our thought
coming into ContaCl wim tim of Others, which produces doubt
and the desire [0 prove. _ Proof is the outcome of argument"
(Piaget, 1928, p. 20<1). Due 10 contact with others, the chUd be-
come5 ever more aware of his or her 0\\11 thought, becoming
"conscious of the defini tions of me conceplS he IS using" and
acquiring ~a pania! aptitude for introspecting his own mental
expenments" ( p, 243). The child becomes IncreasinglY'3ble to
take the perspective of others. Finally. with the onset of formal
mought, mental experiments, in which reality is constructed by
reproducing In thought sequences of events as they have hap-
pened or were imagined [0 have happened, are replaced by
logical experiments, in which the actUal mechanism for con·
strualon is reflected upon. AI this time, arguments can, In a
real sense, be internalized; "Logical experiment is therefore an
experiment carried OUI on oneself for the det:ection of contra·
diction" ( p. 237).
Van Hiele's View
According to van Hiele, me reasor/ing of srudenlS at the vi-
su31 and descriptive/analytic levels is quite different when they
identifY a figure, For Ihe student at the visual level, the judg-
ment is "based on an observatiOn" (van Hiele, 1986, p. 110),
"There is no why, one JUSt sees il" (p, 83), For the student
at the descriptive/analytic level, the judgment results "from a
ne[W()rk of relations" (p. 110). The thinking of students at the
descriptive/analytic level may involve observation; it may be
that they see an Image whenever they consider a given figure.
TIle image is nO( the basis for judgment; the netwOrk of rela-
rlons is. Even if a figure was Imperfectly drawn (or diSlOrted
on a computer screen), such srudents' thinklng would not be
SWlIyed if they were assured it was the Intention of the dr3wer
[0 make all sides equal. Van Hiete continues that it Is this net·
work of relations that distinguishes between the IWO levels. At
the beginning, o ne does not possess the nelWOrk.
Once a class of shapes is thought of as :I collection of prop-
erties (at Level 2), che relationship between a figure and othce
figures is determined, and can be reflected upon. An elemen·
tary fOflll of associational implication can take place. Hoo;..'CVer,
"What It means to say um some property 'follows' from another
cannot be e~plained" (p. 111). At level 3, in contrast, the con-
tents of statements A and B are not import;lf\I. ~The onlr things
of importance for the further train of thought are the links ex-
isting betv.-een A and B. With these links the new oetworkof reo
lations is conStructed... When this second netwOrk of relations
is present in so perfect a form that its strucrure can be read
from it, when the pupn is able to speak to others about this
Stfucture, then the building blocks are present for the netwOrk
of the third level" (p, 112), A techniC3llanguage develops th:u
make.5 it possible to communicate with others aboUi the es-
semial ide;J.S in the network of relatiOnS ( thaI is, 10 reason),
"WithOut the netwOrk of relations, reasoning IS impossible"
(p, 110), But Wim the power of communication that result.s
from the technical language comes an obligation to "Slick [0 the
necwork of reJ:lIions." That is, with formal re-dSOning come con·
straints, Therein lies the difficulty for many stUdents; mey do
nOt know what the CQnstr.lints are nor do they under.>[and why
they -apply.
According to van Hieie, the Inrultive foundation of proof "be-
gins with a pupil's statemenr that belief in me truth of some as-
sertton Is connected with belief In the truth of other assertions,
The notion of this connection is inruitive. The laws of such a
connection can only be learned by analysis" (1986, p, 124),
LogIc is created by analyzing and abstraaing these laws, lh3t is,
by operating on the network of links between statements. De
V!lIiers (1987) concurs that deductive reasoning firsl occurs at
LeveJ 3, when the network of logical relations between prop-
erties of concepts is established. He continues tha t because
slUdents at lb.'els I and 2 do not doubt the validity of their
empirical observations, proof is meaningless ( 0 them: they s~
j
it as justifying the obvious.
Van Dormolen (1977) describes three levels of proof perfor-
mance and relates them to the van Hicle levels. In the first, lus-
tincations are made for single cases; conclusions are restriaed
10 the speCific example for Which the justification is given (for
e.xample, a particular reClangle). In me .seeond, justifications
and conclusions may be for specific cases, but refer lO collec-
,ions of similar objeCts (for example, the dass of rectangles):
several examples will be considered to illustrate a pattern, with
srudcnts capable of generatlng further examples, In the third,
srudents justify statements by forming argumeniS that conform
(0 Jccepted norms, that is, they are capable of giving formal
proofs, Van Dormolen relates his first level to van Hiele's visual
level of minking, his second to van Hide's descriptiVe/analytic,
and his third to van Hlele's level of formal deduction In whj.:h
srudenL~ altend \0 the properties of arguments. It should be ob-
served that although srudents in Van Dormolen's second level
h3~,(, made progress. their method is fraught Mth potential for
error, For instance, as srudentS reason about a class of shapes
by examining specific cases. they often attend 10 properties of
the p:miculac insl3llces, thus making mistakes about the class
in general.
Van Hiele Leve ls and the Ability to Construct Proofs.
As can be seen from the above descriptions, a proof-oriented
geometry course: requires thinking at least at Level 3' In the
VIln Hic\e hierarchy. However, over 70% of srudents begin high
- GEOMETRY AND SPATIAL REASONING
schOOl geometry at Levels 0 o r 1, and only those Students -~ho
enter at level '2. (or higher) have a good chance of becommg
Illpetcm with proof by the end of the course (Shaughnessy
C; Burger, 1985). II follows, therefore, thai i~S(ruction should
help stUdents aila!n higher levels of geometric thought before
they begin a proof-orlenced study o~ geo",letry. . edge thaI has, by virtue of deduction. been integrated into the
Senk (1989) Investigated the relauonslup between van Hle.ie
levels. writing geometry proofs, and achievement in nonproor
geometry. Students enrolled in full-year geometry classes were
tested in the fall for van Hiele level and entry level geome-
try knowledge. and in the spring for van Hiele level, knowl-
edge'of geomeuy, llnd proof-writing ability. It w~ . found mal
achievement in writing geometry proofs was positively corre-
lated with van Hiele level (.50 in (he fall , .60 in the spring) and
to achievement on nonproof coment (.70 in the spring), Senk
argued chat srudents who stare geometry ar level 0 have little
chance of learning to wrlle proofs , students at Levell have less
than a one-in--three chance, and s tudems at Level 2 have a 50·
50 chance. level -Z Is lhe critical emry leveL Senk nOled thaI
at the end of the school yetr. students at Level 3 or above Sig-
nificantly outperformed on proof students at ~ev:l 2 or below,
but students at levels <I and.5 did not .score slgmficamly bener
than students at Level 3. ( POSSibly tK.."Cluse of the tow number
of studems in the upper lWO levels.) Indeed, 4%. 13%, and 22%
of studems at Levels 0, 1, and 2, but ;7%, 85%, and 100% at
levels 3, 4, and 5, respectively, were classified as having mas·
tered proof writing. These dam seem to s upport that van Hide
level <I is the level at which students master proof, with Level 3
being a tfllnsitionallevel. One might conjecture mat s tudents 3t
LevCI ; probably are not able to do substantial proofs that they
have not seen before (or acrually unders13nd what the proofs
entail or accomplish), However, van Hiele's hierarchical theory
that only s rudents at Levels <I or 5 s hould be expected to con-
sislently write formal proofs was nO{ strictly supponed by the
rese:uch.
Spring achievemem on nonproof coment accounted for 57%
of che Vdriance In proof scores, bot van Hiele test scores ac-
counted for ooly an additional 3%. Although Han (1986) also
found thai van Hide leve! predicted performance on a proof-
writing [est, the relatively small contribution of van Hiele level
to prediction above thal of standard achievement test scores
must be explained (Senk, 1989). It may be due to the d ifficulty
of separating level of thinking from content. (The correlation
between the van Hie!e tcst and coocent was .6.)
A Conflict
There seems to be a great difference in emphasis between
van Hlele and Plaget on how geometric reasoning and proof
develop. For van Hie!e, the emphasis seems. to be on content;
one progres>cs to higher levels of thought In geomeuy when
the netWork of relations becomes suffidently built up, The abil-
I!)' to reason logically in geometry Is dependent on the amount
and organizatiOn of content·speclfic knowledge. According to
Piaget, however, certain logical operations develop in studenLS
independent of the content to which they are applied. These
operations can be applied in a variety of comextS; it is through
~ operatiOM thal new mathematical knowledge is estab-
• 441
lished. For inSlance, if a srudent knows that a rea:angle is a fig-
ure that has opposite sides equal and fou r right angles, and a
square Is a figure that has all sides equal and four right angles,
then the srudent may deduce and intemalize the fact that aJl
squares are rectangles. The conclusion is newly created know!.·
srudent's current cognitive. strucnJre,
In suppOrt of the PiagetiaJI perspective, Driscoll (1983b) has
emphasized me role of cognitive development In me acquisi·
tlon of the ability to construct proofs, claiming chal students
need to be fonnal operational thinkers to completely under·
st:lnd :lnd construCt proofs, AS evidence, he nOled th:u on logic
ilems (rom me 1978 NAEP (on which even the 17·year·olds
did poorly), there was a much grc:lter jump in performance
between the 7· and 13·year-olds than between the 13- and 17·
year-olds. Funhermore, Gardner (1983) suggests that only dur-
ing the formal operational period can individuals deal with the
idea of abstract spaces or with formal rules governing space,
That is, formal geometry c:m be collSl.I\lcted only by Individuals
who can integrate logico-mamematical and spatial intelligence
into a scientific system. McDonald (1999) provides suppon for
the notion that the nature of thought of which a srudent is
capable affects che srudem's construction of knowledge in ge-
o metry. 'rwenty second:uy students classified as forma! opera-
lional and 20 as concrete operational made iudgmenLS about
the similarity of 13 geometric concepts from the area of simi·
larity and congruence, Multidimensional scaling techniques In·
dlcated that prototypical cognitive maps could be drawn for
both the formal and concrete operational students, Further-
more, formal operational srudents' structure of the content was
Significantly more Uke thai of subject maner expertS than that
of the concrete operational students. Finally, in comrast to van
Hiele's theory, Mawn (1989) reported thatlhe reasoning ability
of fourth to eighth graders W3S far beyond what may have been
anticipated, given their low van Hiele level of geometric think·
ing. These slUdems evinced logical thinking Indicative of l.evcl
2, but without knowledge of Specific definitions or geometriC
conlent corresponding 10 that level.
We conclude, then, that this is not a ~chit:ken or egg" type of
problem: there exists a dynamic interplay betv.'een level of rea·
soning and organization of knowledge, An imPJrtant research
issue is the elaboration of this interplay: HOW does the organi-
zation of knowledge depend on the stage of operational think·
ing, and how does the stage of Ihinklng depend on knowledge
organization?
Proof and Instruction
There have been numerous attempts to improve srudem.s'
proof skills by teaching!onnal proof in novel MyS, almost all
of which have been unsuccessful (Harbeck, 1981; Ireland, 1974:
Manln, 1971 ; Sununa, 1982; Van Akin, 1972). An alternate ap·
proach claims that for students 10 develOp an ability with proof,
they must understand its nature, For example, Driscoll (1983b)
reponed a srudy by Greeno and Magone In which college sru·
dents who had had high school geometry but ~ re nOl \lery
good at it were given a two-hour training program on proof-
checking, The insuuctional program not only taught srudent.s
....2 • lEARNING FROM INSTRUCTION
spednc 5tepS 10 follow in chediing;) proof, 1t provided students
the opponuniLy to anal~'Z.e the nature of proofs. The rese;)rchers
found that the e.xperimental students were not onl~' more ef-
fective than control students 111 checking proofs, but th~' did
bener at construaing proofs as well They hypotheslled thaI
students needed to understand the nature of proof and how it
differed from everyday argumentation.
Fuvs claimed th:1( ~me six",h 3Jld ninth graders in their
tetching expcrimem made progress toward level 3 thinking
"by following and summariling deduct.lve explanations. and
givIng deductive arguments" (Fuys, 1988, p. 9) TIlere Wll5 Indi-
cation that some students' inability to do proofs was attributable
to SlUdents believing th:.t lusllfiCltion is something that others
do for them; "this is true because it is a theorem or procedure
I Ie:lmed in cl:lSs."
Bell (1976) suggested that SlicceSS in proof could be pro-
mmed through cooperative in\,estigmions by students in which
conjeaurcs were made and conflicts were resoil'ed by students
presemlng ;trguments and evidence. Fawcett (1938) cOnduoed
a 2-year experiment in geometry with the results supponlng
!.his contention. Students were challenged to develop Iheir o-wn
axioms, definitions, and theorems and to examine. debate, and
IU5l.1£)· their conjeaures. At the end of the [WO years, the e.,\;. students establish truth and how they come to undersl.3lld and
perimemal students scored higher than trndJliontl.l students in
geometry, and both experimental Students and their parents
claimed thaI the students' deductive thinking had improved.
Fawcen also observed student behaviors that indicated an un-
derstanding of proof, behaviors such as asking tha[ significant
words and phrases in st.:uements be Clrefully defined; requiring
evidence to suppan conclusions: analyzing evidence; recognll-
ing, analyzIng, and re-evaluating st:lIed llnd unstated assump-
tions; and evaJU:lling argumen ts.
In a similar vein, Human and Net (1989) reponed success
in a geometr.... course, based on the van Hie1e model, that :u-
tem pled a ~gende introduaion" to deductive and axiom:ltic
thinking. The intent was 10 make proof as meaningful as poSSi-
ble by initi.ally includIng proofs of nonobvious sutements and
by having students formulate !.heir own hypotheses to prove.
The materials began to develop deductive skill by revicwing
some familiar st:ltements about triangles, and then asking stu·
denlS to solve problems by thinking with the aid of these state-
ments. for e:c::tmple: "Given triangle PQR,PQ cPR, and the
exterior angle nt R being lOOo. supply as much addition3! In-
fonnation about the triangle as you can and explain how you
obtained this information."
The results of srudies by Human and Nel, and especi;tlly
by Fawcett, :Ire consistent with an analysis of proof by Hanna
(l989c). She argues that because mathematical results are pre-
sented formally by mathematicians in the form of theorems and
proofs, this dgorous practice is mistakenl ~ seen by many as the
core of mathematiOlI practice. II is then assumed that "learn-
ing mathematics must involve trnining ;n the abiliry to (reate
this fonn" (pp. 22-23), InsU'U(tional tre:ltments that have been
b3Sed on this view have generally failed to accomplish their
$oals, probably because the students are attempting to follow
formal rules unconnected to any actMry they find meaning-
ful. On the other hand. studies that have ancmpled to involve
students in the crucial elements o f mathematical discovery and
discourse-conjectUring, careful reasoning, and the building of
validating arguments that can be scrutinized by olhers -ha~
shown more positive effeCts.
In summary, we have seen that students are eXlremely un-
successful with formal proof In geometry This is disappoint-
ing, given the amount of time in the curriculum devOted to
this goa\. However, our analysis of students' proof-making abil-
ities reveals a far more devastating finding: Students are de-
ficient in their ability to establ ish truth in geometry, and, In-
deed, In all of mlllhematics. They have not developed those
beliefs and schemas that motivate and allow them to establish
mathematical truths. Indeed, if we adopt a constructivist per-
.specti~ on mathematics learning, :IS stUdents coOSU'Ua mathe-
matical meaning and build a nerwork of knowledge in mathe-
madcs, the process by which !.hey establish mathematlCllI trulh
for themselves becomes Vitally imponam. For. in the process
of constructing and restructuring mathematical knOWledge, Stu-
dents must decide what they believe to be mathematical truths.
Each newh' enCOuntered idea is accepted as true or rejected
as false ~ed on current krlowledge and reasoning StfUcrures-.
Each of these decisions, in turn, either buttresses the current
Structures or causes them to be reorganized
Obviously, more research :mention must be devoted to how
utilize proof in their mathem:nlcal thinking. Work such as Pi-
aget's, which docu ments Ihe developmem of knowledge ver-
ifiCllion skills. is imponant; much of this work. though, was
done In a contcxt divorced from formal mathematics, .Are the
same results obtained in situations where students are explor-
ing mathem~tjcs in classroom situations? Can we elaborate on
the levels of verification? What types of tasks and environments
encourage students to progress to higher levels of verifica-
tion? How is students' knowledge organi2ll.tion affected by their
methods of establishing truth?
SPATIAL REASONING
Gardner (1983, p. 8) argues that spatial abiliry is one of
the several "relalively autonomous human intellectual compe-
lences" which he calls ~human intelligences." Spatial thinking
is essential 10 scientific t.hought~ it Is used to represem and
manipulate information in learning and problem solving. The
"metaphOriC :lbility 10 discern Similarities across diverse do-
mains- derives in m:ll1v Instances from ;t manifestation of spa-
tial intelligence" (Gardner, 1983, p. 176). An example is when
scientiSlS draw analogIes berween hum:m society and microor-
ganisms or brain function. Accord ing to Harris (1981), the us.
Employment Service estimates that mOSt technical and sci~­
tlfic occupations, .such as draftsman, airplane designer, ~­
tea, chemist, engineer, physiCiSt., and mathematician, req~Ire
persons having spatial ability at or above the 90th percenule.
The Relationship Between Spada! Thinking
and MathematiCS
Hadamard argued that much of Ihe thinking required In
higher mathematics is spatial in nature. EinStein commented
that his elements of thought were not words, but ~cerui n signs
:md more or less cle~r images which can be voluntarily repro
duccd or combined~ (Gardner, 1983. p. 190). Numerous mathe-
maticians and mathematics educatOrs have suggested that spa-
tial ability and visual Imagery play vital roles in mathematical
thinklng (lean & Clements, 1981: Wheatley, (990). Perhaps un-
derlying this position is lhe recognition that different modes of
thought are used in mathematiCS.
KrutetskiJ (1976), for inst:lnce, refers to (WO different modes
of thought: verbal·loglcaJ and visual-pictorial. He argues that the
balance between these two modes of thought allows for diH'er-
em "ma!.hematical casts of mind" which determine how an indio
vidual operales on mathematical ideas. He classified as analJ'tic.
those srudents who prefer verbal-logical modes of though t In
mathematical problem solving, even for problems that wou ld
yield to a relatively simple visual approach; geometric, those
who prefer visual'plctorlal schemes even on problems more
eas!ly solved with analytic means; and oonnol1lc, those w-ho
have no specific preference ror either verbaJ.1oglc::\1 or visual-
pictorial thinkJng. The theory of hemISpheric specialization of
Ihe brain corroborateS the existence or twO modes of thought
(Springer & DeutsCh. 1981 ). A great deal of phYSiological evi-
dence indicateS that Ihe [WO hemispheres of the brain are spe-
cialized for different modes of thought processing. In general,
the left hemisphere is specialized for an:lIytidlogical thinking
In both verbal and numerical operations; it excels in sequen-
tial taSks, logical reasoning, and analysis of !.he components of
a stlmulus. laoguage is processed in the left hemisphere. The
right hemisphere, on the other hand, predominates for spa-
tialtaSks. artistic endeavor, and body image and seems special·
i1.cd for holistic thinking. "Although the left hemisphere seems
to be as competent as the right in identifying the Euclidean
(and nameable) properties of obJeas (th:1t is, points, lines, and
planes), ills much less c:lJXIble than the rlghl in identifyi ng the
less nameable topological properties such as t.rarIsformatlons
Involving changes in lengths, angles, and shapes" (Franco &
Sperry, 1977, p. 108).
POsitive correlations have been found between spatial ability
and mathematics achievement at all grade levels ( Fennema &
Sherman, 19n; Fennema & Sherman, 1978; Guay & McDaniel,
19m. It is nm difficult 10 see why this relationship exists for
there are numerous conceptS in mathematics that have an 0b-
vious visual dimension. Davis (1986), for example, describes
what "cognitive building blocks" are needed to determine the
area of a rot:lted square on a geoboard. In ~ddltion to mental
'images of squares and triangles, he cites mental representa·
tions of lhe aCts of rexatlng and translaling trJangles, of putting
them logether to make other shapes, and even of CURing apan
squares to get (riangles. Similarly, Soviet researchers have em-
phasized the importance of sp:ltial thinking in geometry, "VI·
SUallzations are used as a basIS for assimilating abstraa (ge-
Ometric) knowledge and Individual concepts" (yaklmanskaya,
1971.p. 145). For instance, understanding the concept of rect-
angle and ilS propenies requires that srudenrs analyze the spa·
tlal relationship of the sIdes of a rectangle-thaI is, understand
·OPPOSite" sides a.nd disting\llsh them from ~adiacem" sides. II
was argued that lcachers should provide :lctivitles for devel-
OPing sntdents' spatial imagination because assimilatiOn wo uld
be "formaliStiC" if the teacher did not develop students' spatial
GEOMETRY AND SPATIAL REASONING • 4"3
images, but provided verbal information about the properties
of figo res i nste:td.
Hershkowia (1989) outlined the role of visualization In the
development of a studenfs conceptualization of a geomell'ic
idea and re.lated this development to !.he van Hide levels. First,
a p('(Xotypical example is used as 3 reference to which possible
exemplars are compared visu:llly (van Hie1e Levell). Second,
the prototypical visual example is used to derive the critical
attributes of the concept (transit ion from Levell to level 2),
which are then 3pplled in judging other figures. Finally, the
critical attributes or properties of the concept are used to judge
whelher figures are Instances of the concept (Level 2), Battista
and Clements (1990) found a similar developmental sequence
among studenlS doing geometry in ;) Logo environment.
Moreover, visual thinking is utililed by many Students in rep-
resenting and operating on concepts that do not inherently con-
tain a spatial aspea (Krutetskii. 1976; Lean & Clements. 1981). Be·
cause. or instruction, for iflSlance, students may think or fractions
and operatiOns on fractions In viSual terms (Clements & Del
Campo, 1989). In fact, heavy reliance on visual ~presentations of
mathematical ideas might be espedaUy imponant at tl1eejemen-
tary school level (Stigler et aI., 1990) because young children
rely more heavily on imagery than do adults (Kosslyn, 1983).
Indeed. Johnson (1987) argues that imagery is what enables
us to utilize our bodily experiences to structure al! thought,
nOt just ma!.hematlcs. There are [WO mechanisms by whIch this
process occurs. The first is the Image schema, ~a recurring,
dynamiC pattern of our perceptual imeractions and motor pro-
grams !.hat gives coherence and structUre to our experience-
(po xiv). for example, the venical schema is the abstr:lct cogni-
tive structure Ihat emerges from our natural tendency 10 em-
ploy an up-down orientation in struCturing our experience. We
encounter this strucrure repeatedly as we perceive objects and
maneuver about the world,
The second concept useful for underslaOding the role of
bodily experience in t11inklng is the metaphor. According to
Johnson, a metaphor is "a pervasive moele of understanding by
which l'o'e project panerns from one domain of experience In
order to structure anOther domain or a differem kJnd" (p. xv).
It is one of the primary cognilive mechanisms by which we
Sll'Ucture and make sense of experiences. Because physical ex-
peftenCe is so fundamental to intellectual development, image
schema become a primary source ror metaphors. "Through
metaphor, we make use of patterns that obtain In our physi-
c::\l experience to organize our more abstract understanding"
(p. xv). For e.xample, the Idea that "more is up." as pan of the
venical schema, IS used 10 help us understand the :tbstract no-
tions of moretless and change in quantity. Johnson argues that
!.he use of image schema as metaphors for understanding air
St.r:lCt notions is pervasive and natural in human understanding.
Even the idea or deduction derives rrom the spatial concept of
~followlng a p:l.th."
Despite the claims for the imponance of Imagery and spa-
tial thinking In mathematics. the relatiOnship between Spatia]
thinking and learning nongeometrk concepts is not straightfor-
ward. for inSiance, Fennema and Tan.re ( 1985) present some-
what conflicting resullS. Students high in spada! abJllty and low .
In verbal abUhy ( high/low students) tended to tranSlale prob-
lems into pictures more completely than lowlhigh students, and
4+4 • LEAJI,NING FROM INST RUCTION
there was some indicadon mat lowlhigh students were less
able to draw and 10 use pictorial represem:ltions than high/low
students. However, when using 3 problem-solving process that
emphasized the use of spatial visu:!.Ilzation, students who had
high spatia! visualization skill solved no more problems than
Students who had low visualization skill. Lean and Clements
(1981) concluded that srudents who process mathematical in-
formltion by verbaHogleal me-.ms outperform students who
process this information visually. Similarly, Hershkowitz (1989)
claimed that the use of im2gery in mathemarical thinking can
cause difficulties. FOf example, if a COllcepl is tied 100 closely
10 a single image, its critical anribute5 might nOI be recognized
or use of the concept in problem·solving situations might be
limited because of over reliance on this image. On the other
hand, Brown and Whe:tdey (1989) reponed 'hat. although the
fifth-grade girls wim low spatial ability thaI they imervleweci
performed well in school mathematics, thcir understanding of
multip!icalion and divisiOn was inSirumental, whereas the high
spalia! girls' understanding was more relational. One high spa-
tial girl, although evincing an exc~lIent grasp of mathematical
ideas and problem solving in the interviews, performed poorly
in school mathematics. Similarly. Thrtre (1990a) suggested that
10th grade. students who scored high on spallal orientation
were betler able to underscand nongeome:ric problems and to
link them to previous work than were students who scored low
In spatial orientatIon.
Thus. there is reason to belieo.·e thaz spacial ability is im-
portant in students' conSlruaion and use of mathematical
concept.s-even nongeometric ones. BUI the role that such
thinking plays In this COOSlruction is elusive and, even in ge-
omellY, multifaceted. For example, in van Hide Levell, one
relies on and is restriaed to visual processing. Al van Hiele
Level 2 and higher, one's use of visual images is constrained
by one's verbalJpropositioml knowledge. Images and transfor-
mations of images incorpor.lte thIs knowledge and, as a result.,
might behave differently at the different levels Finally, there is
the use of imagery in thinking about nongeometric concepts.
One might be manipulating mental entities that have neither
a visual nor a verbal format but are nonetheless opcrated on
by visual-like transJormatlons. Future research should :.mempl
to elaborate t.hese dlfferem types of uses of Imagery and take
care in distinguishing between the qualit::l.tively differenl rypes
of visual thinking.
The Nature of Spatial Abilities
Gardner (1983, p. 173) States thai ~Central 10 spatial intelli-
gence. are Ihe capadties to perceive the visual world accur:lIely,
10 perform transformations and modifications upon one's Initial
pen::eptions. and to be able to re-create aspects of one's visual
experience, even in the absence of relevanl physicl stimuli,"
lWo major components or faClQf5 of spallal msks have been
Identified (Bishop, 1980; HarriS, 1981; ~1cGee, 1979). Spatial
orientation is underst::l.flding and operaling on the relatioo·
ships between the positions of oblem In space with respect 10
one's own position-for instance, finding one's way in a build-
ing. Spatial tliSualiuUiol1 is comprehension and performance of
imagined moveme nts of objectS in twO- and three-dimensional
space. Others have debated the characterization Imo these [WO
factors (Clcmenls, 1979: Elin(, 1987), -and indeed, there Is de-
bate aboul Ihe nature of spalial ability and its measurement
For instance, Bishop ( 1983) has suggesled twO spatial compo-
nenlS that he believes are espedally relevant for mathematics
learning. The first is the abiliry to interpret figural information
and Involves understanding visual representations and vocab·
ulary. The second is the abJlicy foc visual processing. Involving
manipulation and transformatio n of \'isual representatio ns and
images and uanslation of abstract relationships intO visual rep-
resentations. Other autho rs (Guay, McDaniel. & Angelo, 1978)
belit:\'e that the essence of lrue spatial ability is the forma·
tion and lrans{ormaljon of visual images as organized wholes.
They argue that many SO-c'dlled spadal tesls can be done effec·
lively with analytic processing and, thus, are not goOO measures
of spallal ability. Furthermore, there is evidence thai different
groups of individuals use different processes on spatial taSks.
Some represent problems visually: others represent them ver-
bally. Some attend to the whole stimulus at once; others at·
lend to pans of it at a time. Some individuals use processing
aids, such a.~ marks o n paper. ob ject manipulalion. and body
movement·
Imagery
Several researchers have suggested that the most imponan,
determinant of spatial visualization ability is maintenance and
manipulalion of a high quality image of the stimulus, where-AS
others ar8ue thai perfo rmance on most spatial testS is best un-
der51.000 not In terms of imagery but rather in terms of rea-
soning and problem solVing (Eliot, 1987). Ho wever, mOSI faaor
an:lJysts and development3l1slS agree that "persons with well-
developed Spatial skills should be capable of imagining spatial
arrangements of objects from different pointS of view and of
manipulating visual images~ (ClemenlS. 1979, p. 15), Thus, the
concept of image plays a central role in o ur study of spalial
abili[)t
Images are intcrnally perceived, whollslic representations
of objects or scenes thai are iSOmorphic to their referents.
They are mentally changed by continuous tr.U1Sforma(ions cor-
responding (0 physicallransfo rmations. Kosslyn (1983) defines
four classes of image processes: generating an image, inspect-
ing an image 10 answer questio ns about II, transforming and
operating on an Image, and maintaining an image in the service
of some other mental operation,
According to Elim (1987), there is consensus among spalial
researchers about the follOWing four points,
1 The memal processes thai underlie the experience of an
image are simi lar to those thm underlie the perception of
objeCl~ or picrures.
2. An image is a coherem. imegrated representation of a scene
or object from a panlcuJar viewpoint and is open [Q a
perceptual· like process of scanning.
3. An image can be subjcct to apparently continuous mcntal
tranSformations, such as rotations, in which Imermediale
stales correspond to Intermediate views of an acrua! objea
undergoing the corresponding. physical transformation.
<1 Images represem no{only objectS, but also 100errelar\onships
between an objec(s componem parIS and other objects. ThaI
is, ~the funClional relalions among objectS as imagined must
to some degree mirronhe funcllonal reltuJons among those
same obie1:ts as actUally perccived" (Shepard, 1978, p. 131).
While dlere has been much deb:lIe about the physiologi-
~':Il
narure of imagery, ooe noted rese3rcher in memal Imager)'
concludes the follOwing:
Although the brain processes mat underlie a mental Im:lge ~ nOI
themselves be Hke an\, sort of a picture. {he\, must necessarily con·
taln the informadon thaI could In principle. p~nnil the remOStruC1lon
or a plaure wtm a high degree or Isomorphism 10 the exlernal object
imagined.. . _\'V\lat is behind the common tendency to think of a mental
Image as some SOft of a plaure may be the lila thai th~ br.:lil"! process
thai underlies a purelr mental image Is very much like the brain pro·
~ thll is produced by looking at a corresponding plC1ure. (Shep;ird,
1978, p. 128)
Supporting this viev.', Shepard and his colleagues found that
the amoum of lime it takes individuals to Judge whether twO
spatial fonns (rwo-dlmenslonal depictions of three-dImensional
objectS made of congruent rubes) are the same is dependem
o n the number of degrees thal one form must be roGited to
match the other:. Kosslyn's research also supports th is palm of
view. He and his colleagues found, for Instance, that more lime
was required 10 scan grealer distances on a mental image and
mat larger images required more time to scan Ih:l.n smaller
ones. They concluded that their experiments suppon the claim
that "ponlons of Images depict corresponding ponions of the
rcpresemed objea(s) and that the spatial relalions between
ponions of me imaged obreCl{S) are preserved by the spatial
relations between the corresponding ponions of the Image"
( Kosslyn, Reiser, & Ball, 1978, p. 59).
Shepard (1978, p. 128) also nOted that the exlslence of am-
biguous pictUres such as optical Illusions lndicale5 that "nol all
of what is perceived or imagined is contained in (he concrete
picture that is extemally presented or reconslructed" (p. 129).
A mental Image, perceprual or imagined, has a "deep as well
as a surface strucrure. ~ But how are mental Images formed and
how is im~ery related to perceptio n? Let. us rerurn to Piage(;
Perception is the knowledge of objects resulling from dlrerl contact
w!th them. los 3g."111lSl thiS, represenUition or imagination involves the
evocation of obferu in thelral)seflCt' or, whel"! it runs parallel 10 pen:ep-
uon, in Ulelrprc:;;ern:e. II completes perceplu31 knOWledge by reference
10 objects flO! actually perceived.. .. Now In ali probability the lrn<l8e is
an intemali~ed fmlUitlon .,. , and Is conseque.ntly derl~a:I fl"Oln motor
:lct;vlty, even though Its final form Is that of a figural pattem !need on
the sensor)" d:l.la. (Plaget & Inhelder, 1967, p. 17)
As discussed previously, one of Plaget'S experimental lasks
was 10 have children first examine Ilat geometrical shapes with-
out .seeing them and then Identify the shapes by drawing, nam-
Ing, or polming thcm out. or this lask. Plager and lnhelder
sa}', "Clearly, the reaction involves translating tactile-kineSihetiC
impressions from an invisible objecl inio a spalial image of
a Visual kind" ( Piagel & Inhelder, 1967, p, 18), To gain inslgbt
G!:OMfTRY AND SPATIAL REASONING • 445
into how Imuges are constructed, let I.IS e.xamlne Plaget and
Inhelder's description of stages of performance on this taSk.
In Stage 1, (2-4 yrs), the child cannOI construct a complece
image of the geomelrfc figure, "and, :tcmrdlng to whether he
has felt a curved or str.light side o r a paim, he likens the shape
touched 10 a visual shape possessing the same c1\aracter\stlc,
not bothering about the fest of the object or auempting to PUt
logether the 10la1 Structure. " . Il is obvious thaI these errors
are due to inadequate explOratiOn of the objet:ts.•. • to recog-
nize geometrical shapes me child has to explore the whole
contour" (p. 23). Thus, if a child is unable to take in a whole
shape wilh a single tactile cenU"3lion, he or she is compelled to
move his or her hands across the objea to produce a ser!es of
cenlnllions. "The perceptual recognllion of the shape is con-
sequently a result of the co-ordination of these centratiolts "
(p. 38). "The lack of exploratiOn on the pan of children at thiS
St::l.ge may therefore be explained as the result of 11 general de-
ficlency in perceptUal activity Itself'" (p. 24). Children of this
stage could not draw a copy of even Ihe simplest sh:tpes be-
cause. perceptual aClivffJ~ nOt perception, is the source of imi-
tation. That is, since these children failed 10 explore the edges
of the surfaces, they could nor dr,tw the surfaces
In Stage 2 (4-7 yrs), perceptual activity becomes apparent.
A gener.:ll dlsl1nction Is drawn between r\'o'<l mafor classes of s.hlpe.
curvilinear or tyithoul lIngles, and reailinear or with angles, _ II 15
not the str,light line Itself which the child contraSts with round shapes,
but r-,lther ule conJunction of str.Jigh! lines which go to form an angle.
(p.30)
Funhermore, thc child conS(l\JCIS his represent!ldon o[ angle
not as twO imerseoing lines, but rather as the Moulcome of a
palr of movements (of ere and hand) whic h conjoin" (p, 31). In
fuCI, "Euclidean shapes ... arc at least as much absU"aCled from
partIcular actions as they are from thc object to which the :lC-
liOns relate" (p, 31). That is, the Image the child extraCts from
an obiect is what can be constructed from his own actions per·
fonned On the object. Even drawings express an obJea nOI so
much as visually or t::l.clilely perceived, but In terms of the re:-
[aled perceptual activiry However, although perceplUal activity
is capable or being carried to completion d uring Stage 2, the
analysis remains empirical; thus, for complex shapes, il fails 10 •
achieve a synthe:iiS and coordination of perceptua.l ciala based
on reasoning.
During St::l.ge 3 (7-8 yrs), e;~plor,u ion of shapes is still per-
formed by means of the same type of perceprual activity as In
the earlier stages. HO\VC\'er, this acrivity is now directed by an
~operatlonal method which conslslS of grouping the elements
perceived in terms of a generaJ plan, and starting from a fixed
point of reference to which the child can always retUrn." At this
level, the coltstruction of the Image of a shape assembles daw
Into an anticipatory schema that includes possible features such
as straight o r CUl'\led lines, angles, parallels, order, and equal
o r unequal lengths. "In other words, every perceived shape is
:lSSimiJaled to the schema of the actions required to construct
it" (p. 37).
Mosl of the discussion above relates to ~haptjc perception."
The difference between a haptiC and visual centratlon is lhat a
 446 • LEARNING FROM INSTRUCTION
visual centration can t:lke In more elementS ;u the same tim~.
Thus, simple shapes can be visually apprehended in :l single
cemration.
According ( 0 Piaget and Inhelder, "it is one thing to perceh-e
a circle or a square and quite another to reconstruct:t vistlal
image of it to the point where it ClIn be picked out from a group
of models, Of draw it after a purely tactile e..\-plor:l,(fon~ (p_ 37).
But a visual image of a shape presupposes a memal represen-
Illilon , and thus ~rhe image is nO{ a direct outcome of percep-
t lon~ (p, 38) Funhermore, "the power to Imagine the shapes
I'isua.lly when !hey are perceived through the sense of touch
alo ne. is an e.'{pression of the sensorimotor schema involved
in meir perception" (p. <il). Piaget concludes that in all three
stages, ~children are able to recognize, and especially (0 rep·
resent, only !hose shapes which they can actually reconstrua
through their own actions" (p.<i3)
Thus, the mental represematlon of a figure- its image-is
seen by Piaga as an internal imimtion of :lorans. 11le recon'
structiOn of shapes as visual images (so thllt they can be drawn,
for insmnce) "is not JUSt a m:mer of iso!:lting various percep.
tual qualities, nor is It a queslion of extracting shapes from the
objects wilhoul more ado. The reconslnlction of shapes rcSl5
u!X>n an active process ofpurrill8 ill rr?lation, and it therefore
Implies that the abst raction is b-.Ised on !he child's own actions
and comes 3bom through their gradual co-ordln:lIion~ (p. 78).
Although evidence from e.xperimental psychologists has nOl:
been gathered to suppan Piaget's claim for the importance of
aaion, it is ~l( least consistent wim il. For insl:mce, according
, to Kosslyn (1983), images of objects are built OUt of sepa·
rately ~ored pans, such as line segments o r common geometric
shapes, along with information (verbal or nonverbal) specify·
ing how the pans are to be: a rranged relative (0 one another.
Images of figures never before seen could be generated by
amalgamating pans that have been previously generatet! fcom
e.xperience. Using this theory 10 suppon Piaga only requires
us 10 equ:ue Kosslyn's component pans of images (0 memory
tr'.lces of a person's aCiions, physiCiI or perceptual.
Also taking a constructivisl approach to spatial thinking,
Whe31ley and Cobb (1990) claim that individuals give meaning
and structure to spatial panerns based on their e:»periences.
conceptual structures, intentions, and ongOing social internc·
lions, "We do not conceive of the pattern {of shapesl as be-
ing 'OUI there' for the child to caprure visually and store ru
is In her head but believe !hal each child COnslruas through
her actions an image of the pallern which may later be re-
presented and lransformed" (p. 3). These ~aCtJons" can be
phYSical or perceptual, conscious or unconscious. Furthermore,
construaion is nOt necessarily a conscious process; fo r esam·
pIe, when a person gives meaning to a diagram, Ihey mOlY be
unaware of the "meaning·making" process (G. Wheatley, per·
sonal communication. AuguSI 11, 1989). In W11eadey and Cobb's
study, firsi' and second'gl1lde studentS were given five tangrnm
pieces- a medium Irlangle, fWO small lriangles,:1 square, and:l
p:trallelogram-and asked (0 make :I piCtUred square. To help
tile srudems. :1 line diagram showing the placemem of the Ihree
((Jangles was shown 10 studentS for three seconds initially and
at aoy other times the studenlS requested. They found the SIU-
denlS at different levels of performance o n several aspects of
the task. Some interpreted lhe cliagr-Jm as a set of tr[llngular
regions and others 3S :I sel of Jines fonning a deSign. Only
the mOSI advanced students nOl: only imerpreied the diagram
:IS " set of triangular regions but also col1S!ructed the relative
placemem of these triangles. Some srude ms were able to ro-
tate images of the 1,II1gram pieces men1311y and. thus, andcipale
their positions: others delermined the correct orientatio ns by
ph!'5ical Irial and error.
In summary, we h::we seen thai images are internal, wholis·
tic represemalions of oblects (hal are isomorphic to Iheir refer·
ents and can be inspected and trans fanned. The conslruction
of images [s cert:linl~' affeCted by e:»isting cognilive struaure,
but il would be helpful 10 know more about how this acru·
ally occurs and whether it can be controlled. If ~'C accept Ihat
images are based on actions, by whal mechanism are images
derived from these actions? Is the image of an ob!ect simply
a replay of lhe sequence of lCtions involved in perceiving it?
1·1av.: !hen, are Images generatet! in !he absence of objects; !h!l[
is, what ps!'Cho!ogical mechanisms suppOrt Ihe represent:ltiOn
of an imager
Improvement in Spatial Ability
Numerous studies have indkmed that Sp.1tlaJ ability can be
improved through training (Bishop. 1980). Ben·Chaim. lappan,
and Ho uang (1988) reported !hill a !hree--week instrucl!onal
training program significantly Incre:JSCd the splllial visualJzauon
ability for all slUdents in grades 5-8, wllh no ses differences in
the gains. They suggested that seven!h grade may be the Opt;·
mal lime for spatial visualization lralning. 8ishop (1980) found
that srudenlS taughl in primary schools where lhe use of rna·
nipulative materials was prevalent performed belter on teSts of
spatial ability than students who v.-ere in schools lacking use
of such materials. Battista, Wheatley, and T.1lsma (1982) found
thar studenl5' spatial skills improved dur ing !he course of an
informal geomelfY course. However. !here are repons mat no
improvement in sparlal ability results from a standard course in
high school geometry ( Bishop, 1980). There is also evidence-
thai performance on spatial tasks incre:lSes with grade level
(Ben-Ch.lim et al., 1988;John5On & Meade, 1987).
Given the obvious connection between spadal thinking and
tnlnsform3lional geometry, one might hypothesize that work
with the hmer would improl'e skills in !he former AS Fey St:lted,
the "transformation approach makes geometry an appealing,
dynamiC subject thm will develop spatial visualization ability
and also the ability to reason" (Fey et aI., 1984, p. -"\4). In 3gree·
ment with Ihis hypothesis, Del Grande (1986) found dlar such
a geometry unit improved spatial perception of grade 2 Stu·
dents. Williford (1972) also InveSilgated the effects of teaching
the conceptS of rigid motions and congruence. He conduded
that second and third graders learned manual procedures for
prodUCing tr.lOsfOrmltion im::lges, but nm how to perfo rm such
transformations mentally. Kidder's ( 1976) results extend Willi·
fo rd's in that they indicale slUdenLS' ability 10 mentally perform
isomelries wilhoUl training is limited at !he middle and junior
high level. He conJectured !hat "the ability to perfonn trans·
formations at the representational lel'el de rIves from forma!-
operational thought (in a Pi!lgeli:ln sense), and !hal !he Ihineen-
~'ear-o!d s ubjeas of the present study were nOt in !.he formal
operational stage" (p. 50). Ali Shah (1%9) found that perf0""
mance on !hese transformations increased gremly from age 7-8
10 age 10-1 1, but thar only abom 50% of !he laner age. group
mastered these lopics. Moyer (1978) Invesligated whClher, for
children of ages 4 to 8. understanding of a (WOodimensional
iSOmetry is dependeor upon an e:-;plicil awareness o h he phys·
ical motion related 10 the tt'Jnsform;nion. There were no signif.
icant effectS for sUdes and flips (with the trend being a negative
effea for younger children), bUI lhere was a dramalic, benefi-
cial effect for turns. He also found thai a slide task was at leasl
as easy as a flip, and IUrns were most difficult. Finally, Usiskln
( 1972) compared the effects of a transformational approach
to high school geometry to !he traditional approach. Both the
experimemal and control groups s howed significant increases
on a spatiaVperceptive test, although nOl diffcremi3Jly so. Both
groups showed a decline In alrltudes IOwards mathematics, but
only the control group's was SignIficant. it was also fo und thai
girls' anJrudes lOW<lrds mmhemalic.s dedined more than boys'
for both the transformmional and traditional approaches.
REPRESENTATIONS OF GEOMETRIC IDEAS
Concept Images
Vinner and Hershkowitz (1980) claim lhll l In thinJ.ting, peo-
ple do not. use definilions of concepts, bUi rather concepl im-
ages, combinations of all the mental pictures and properties
that ha\'e been associated with lhe concepi. Their research val-
idated not only thal!hesc concept images exisled for a number
of geometric concepts, bUi thai such images could be adv~ rscly
affected by inappropriate instruCtio n. For e:»ample, lhe fact th:u,
for many sludentS, the concept im3ge of an obtuse angle has
a horizon!al ray mighl result from the limited Set of examples
they see In te:>;tS and a "gravit:l!lonlll factor" (that is. 3 figure is
·slable" only if II has one horizontal side, wi!h the other side
ascending). (The findings of other srudies agree that students
limit concepts to studied exemplars and consider inessential
bul common features as essential to the concept; Burger &
Shaughnessy, 1986: Fisher, 1978. Fuys et al, 1988; Kabanova·
Meller, 1970; Zykova, 1969). Components of concepl Images
were also Identified; for elGlITlple, srudems' concept Image for
a right triangle were most likely to include :1 right triangle with
a horizontal and a ven-ical side, less likely ( 0 include a simI-
lar triangle rotated sllghd y, and least likely to Include a right
isosceles triangle with a horizontal hypotenuse. Stud y of .such
concept images may provide useful informatio n abolll errors
!llal srudents make. For example, students who know a cor-
rect verbal descriplion of a concept, but also have a specific
vtsual Image or prototypC associated tightly with thai concept,
may have difficulty applying the verbal deSCription correaly
(Clemenl5 &: BattiSt3, 1989: Hershkowitz et al., 1990. Vinner &
Hershkowitz, 1980).
Aschbein (1987) relates concept images to inru itlon. SuD-
jeas anach a particular presentation [0 the concep4 which has
GEOMETR.Y AND SPATIAL IlEASONING • 447
a strong impaq on !heir cogOflive decisions. Even when the
definition is e.xp l icjtl~ mentioned, most subjects are not able to
respond correctly. 1l1e manner in which a concept functions
in a reasoning process is highly dependent on its paradigmatIc
connections. The filCI of knowing explidtly lhe definition does
nOi eliminate the constraints Imposed by the tacitly intervening
paradigm" (p. 146). This also helps explain StudenlS' resistance
to hierarchical relationships among quadrililterals, The images
anached to elIdl figure [unction cognidvely, not as panicular
cases but as generoll models. Thus, srudents ha\'C to learn the
decisive role of e.xpliCitly defining concepts 10 avoid errors In
using the terms !hal signify them. They have to conStruct a
meaningful syntheSiS of !his definition with II range of e:»em·
plars. Employing such a synthesis of an31~tic and verbal pro·
cesses 10 consrruCt robust concepts is possible, especially for
studentS in grAde .5 and be~'ond ( HershkOWitz et at, 1990).
This formulation is highl)' conslstem with Reirs (1987)
~ ideal ~ model for interpreting malhematical concep(s reli-
ably and efficiently. In f.uniJiar situations, this ]1lodel fi rst ap-
piles no nformal, case-based knowlet!ge (see Fischbeln's [1987]
p3radigmatlc models), then checks doubtful conclusions wilh
e.xplicil fo rmal knowledge. in unfamiliar situations or when·
ever Inconslstendes or needs to make general Inferences arise,
the Ideal model rums directl y to formal know ledge. Nonfo,...
mal knowledge, then, Is still useful in providing checkpoinl5
for more abstract arguments. Reii' found the processes of ef·
fective e;<;pertS fit this ideal model closely and recommends
activities that encourage ilS developmem in srud~ntS, such as
teaching studenl5 concept·interpretation procedures and le tting
them Implement those procedures in various typical and error·
prone cases, !hus compiUng repertoires of know ledge aboul
special cases and common errors.
This line of inquiry is relevant to both lheory and practice;
it is unfortunale, then, thar h has neithe r :Jdequa\ely acknowl-
edged nor buil! upon earlier work. for example, Vygotsky'S
( 1934/1986) conSU"lJct of "word sense" as lhe sum of all !he psy.
chological events aroused in a person's consciousness by !he
word Is In some ways:t more elaborate formulat ion. Word sense
is a dynamic, complex-, fluid whole, whIch has several zones or
unequal stability (the word's definition is o nly one of the zones
of word sense. albei t the most stable and precise zone). A word
acquires Its sense from the context in which it appea rs. in differ-
ent come.-':l5, iI changes its sense. '"TIle primordial word by no
means could be reduced 10 a meft' sign of the concept Such a
word Is rather a picture, Image, menw sketch of !he concept.
It is a work of art indeed. TIla! is why such a word has a 'com-
plex' character and may denote a number of objectS belongIng
10 o ne complex:" (VygO(sky. 193411986. p. 133),
Usfng Diagrams
The Soviel researcher Kabanova·Meller St.1!es ~Mastery of
geomf"U'ic theorems is charaCteriStically accomplished through
!he perceplion of diagrams and is imimateJy conneaed w1!h
!he developmenl of spatial images" (1970, p. 7). To be suc·
cessful with proof problems in which a di3gram is used, SIU'
dents must establish semantic connections in the diagram. The
solution process muSl be ' co nstructive"; !.hat Is, 5{Udcnts must
 +48 • LEARNING FROM INSTRUCTION
form conclusions from me conditions ("exp:lnd~ Ihe condition)
and find new relalionships in me diagram (~aransform~ the di-
agram). Sometimes students derive the solution byexpaLldlng
me condition sle p by Step until it includes me solution; OIher
timeS StUderus represent the solution through a visual image
and then detennine the logical steps required 10 derive It. In
addition, when perceiving a diagram ror a problem, a student
must rocus on what is essential :md dismiss what is nonessen-
tiaL Kabanova'MelJer found that some pupils could nOl do so,
and she antlbuted this inability to the original learning of the
relevam theorems. When learning theorems, studems onen in-
corporated inrormation contained in a specific diagram as pan
of:l theorem (for insUince, thinking that the exterior angle of
a triangle must be obruse be<:ause the diagram given with the
theorem picrured an obruse e:\'1erlo r angle). This information
later constrained the application of the theorem That L~ , the
student did nOt recognize the thCQrem was relev.uu for an-
Dlher problem because the diagram conr:tined an acule exte·
rior angle
As StudentS use a diagram 10 Interpret a theorem, they must
alter the corresponding mcneal Image ~by distinguishing Its
essential as~ du ri ng the abstrJClion process" (p. <16). The
image becomes:l guide for thinklng about and applying the the-
orem.ln a successful teaching experiment using multiple dr:lw-
Ings to illustrate theorems, students learned how the place-
I
ment, direction, and magnitude of geometric e lements in a
diagram might vary within the conditions SCt forth in a theo-
rem. It 'IW.S concluded that
-, The process of abslraCling the essendalll5pecui of a concept or theo-
rem must be lnsepal'llbl\' Hnked \\'ith an lIWlIreness of how the felliures
acrompanylng II dlagnm may Ir.tr)' The pupil, therefore, muSt IC<lm to
formul:!.!.. verba lly the priflciple br which the fellul'I$ 1I5 wt'll :IS the
geometric elementS and their relationships, may val')' in d ifferent dia-
gl"dlnS without desu'O)'lng the sense of the concept or theorem. Unless
the dlagr.uTlS are used in this manner, "lu1'ing the visual ma{Crial Will
be Ineffective. (p. 48)
In a similar veln, Vladimirskli concluded mat the diagram
accompanying die discussion of a geometric Slaremem Is nO{ al-
ways helpful in reasoning (Vladimirskli, 197t). Studems might
mislake features of the diagram as essential features of the ge0-
metric relationship being considered, thus inuodudng irrele-
vant ideas intO the concept Alternately, !I theorem might be
linked 10 only the example diagram given with its statement; the
"visual images corresponding to the relationship being studied
become inen and inflexible" (p. gl), Thus, srudems will be
unable to effectively use th~ meorem in problem solving. The
author found that an Instructional lteaunenl designed to have
students analyze the "syslem of features of a concept" in Ihe
cootext of diagrams was successful in helping studentS' knowl-
edge become unlinked from specific diagrams.
Although these. autho rs diScussed how diagrams affea Stu-
de nts' representatIon of concepts and theorems, it should be
dear that Similar comments about misconceptions -and inStI'UC-
donal remedies could be made about SllJdentS' representation
of geometriC problems. Indeed, there are numerous accountS
of persons arriving at incorrect solutions to problems due to
improper problem representations (Davis, 1984).
Wllile we hlwe been focusing on how diagrams can affect
srudems' representation of conceptS, theorems, and problems,
we should nO( overlook misconceptions th:1t could artse OUi
of StudenL~' lmerpret:llions of me d iagrams themselves. For e.x-
ample. P.arzysz. (1988) reports Ihat srudems often attribute ch:tr-
acteristics of a drawing to the geometric obif'(1 it represents,
fail 10 understand tilat drawings do nOl necess:rrily represem
all known Information about the object represented, (lnd com-
monly attempt 10 drnw figures so that they preserve both vicw-
Ing perspective and studem knowledge about the propenies
of me object being drawn (for example. drawing the base of a
regular p\'ramid as a square instead of a parallelogram).
An Interview With a bright founh-gr.lde studem, referred to
as Kl, at the end of the school year suggestS caution in making
even the most strnlghtforward assumptions about how students
Interpret diagrams (Clements & Battista, 1990). The student was
asked to identify all the rectangles OUt of a set of quadrilaterals
consisting of rectangles, squares, rhombuses, parallelograms,
and trapezOids of various sizes and orientations. lie said thai
[wo parallelograms were "sana like" reaangles, "/ike you're
looking at It a different way, Like you'd look Side-ways or some·
thing: W'hen the Interviewer asked if one of these parallelo-
grams was really a rectangle, KL said "Yeah, it makes It Ifyou're
looking at It, like if it's like a piece or p:tper and you're looking
below it .... " The Interviewer went on to ask what if II MtS a
piece of p:lper that was CUt thai way. KL: ''l1\en it wouldn't be
a rect:tngle: For Kl, the figures dr.lwn on paper represented
pfcltll~· of geometric objectS; they were not consi~red as ge·
ometrlc objectS themselves. In faa, il is true Ihat a pa!3lleio-
gram might very well be a picture of a rectangle drawn in per-
spective. But the fact that KL was almost willing to name such
a plcrure :t rectangle is most inStructive Initially for children,
pictUres :lfe meant to be depictiOns of real objcas. In mathe-
matics, however, pictures are meam to be symbols for conceptS.
KLseemed 10 be [n lransltion between these twO Imerpretations
and was, thus, vacillating between mem. This c,'\ample is espe-
cially Illustrative because it demonstrates the wide discrepancy
that can exist between a child's and a leacher's or teXtbook's
interpretations of a simple diagram.
Driscoll (1983b) relates other difficulties Ihat s.t udents have
with drawings to the notion of concept images discussed :tbove.
For instance, middle school studentS had a great deal or dlffi.-
culN identifying rlghr triangles when they were drawn with a
nonStandard orientllion (legs not venical and horizomal). If
students' conCepl images do nOt include relevant and irrele-
vant anributes of the concept, they become tOO restricted for
proper identification and use of furure examples.
Along with the previously·discussed PDP models, th is re-
search corpus on geometric representations h..'\S suong instruc-
tional ImplicatiOns: There Is a dire need to provide variety in
exemplars and, laler, to hdp students construa a meaningful
verbal synthesis or definition from these exemplars (incl uding
dealing with special cases and common errors). "By'lUlalyzlng
tIle paradigm in the light of the concept, by learning to find
correct examples and counter-examples corresponding to the
concept, the srudent may reach this stage of grasping a concept
which [s not void, related to exemplars which are not misused"
( Fischbei n, 1987, p 152)
Results of research have additional implicatiOns for the
presentalion of e.xamples and nonexamples. Psychological re-
search often implies th:u positive instances are more useful than
mixed negative-and'positive instances, whereas educalional re-
search SUggesL~ the usefulness of nega tive instances (Gi bson,
1985), Wilson's results ( 1986) suggest a resolution; When every
feature of every irrelevant dimenSion was equally likely, POSi_
tive Instances were more helpful In learning, When cenain ir-
relevam features predominate, mixed positlve·and-negative in-
Stances were more helpful. Note th:n the IQrmer is unlikely
in the classroom context (especially considering typical proto-
types ill teXTbooks), and, thus, a mixture will be superior in
most instances, especially for more difficull concepts (Charles,
1980; Gibson, 1985). Funher, strategies for sequendng e.xam-
pies and nol1examples are nOI equally effective. Rational se-
quences (nonexam ples of a concept matched with d ive (gent
examples to focus attention of the critical attributes) are su·
perior to random sequences and can lead (0 a high level of
achievement ( Pe ny & jansson, 198n. Pre-service leachers can
be successfully trained to use such strmegles, Including ex-
emplification moves (presenting example or nonexample) and
charaaerizatlon moves (sl3tements about attribute, re levant Of
not) (Charles, 1980).
The Role of Ac.tion
Mental action is deemed imponam to the learning of geom-
etry by each major theoretical perspective. Recall thal Piaget
and Inhelder claimed children's represem:ltion of space is nOt
a perceptual reading off of their spalial e nvironment, but is
the result of prior active manipulation of that environment,
The second teaching phase in the van Hiele scheme centers
around studenlS' manipulation of objects johnson provides an-
other perspeaive on this imponam issue by arguing for the
tmpOrtance of Image schema as metaphOrs.
1be Use of lIIanfplllali!ll!S. Although there are exceptions
(Anderson, 1957), the maJority of studies verify that the use
of manipulatives should facilitate the construction of sound
representatio ns of geometric concepts. E.xposure to a greater
variety of stimuli positively affects achievement in geometry
(GreabelJ, 1978). Such taC1ile-kineslhetic experiences as body
movemem and manipulating geomelriC solids help children,
especially young children, learn geometric concepts (Gerhardt,
1973; Prigge, 1978). Children also fare bener with saUd cutouts
than primed forms, the former encouraging the use of more
senses (Stevenson & McBee, 1958).
There is empirical support that even for older students, es-
pecially those at lower levels In the van Hiele hierarchy, manip-
ulatives are an essential aid in learning geomeuy ( Fuys et aI.,
1988), Use of manlpu!atives seemed to allow studentS to try OUI
their ideas, examine and reflect on them, and modify them, This
physical approoch seemed 10 maintain student interest, to as·
SiSt srudents in creating definitions and nev.' conjectures, and
10 aid them in gruning InSight imo new relationships, Similarly,
sixth-grade students learn conceptS of veaor space bener with
concrete materials (Lamon & Huber, 1971). Founh graders ben-
efited more from an advanced organizer on motion geomeuy
GEOMfTRY AND SPATIAL REASONING • 449
using concrete models Ihan o ne using applk:nions, whereas
se.vemh graders benefited equally; the younger students may
have been less able to impose the rt:levant relationShips (Lesh
& j ohnson, 1976). Overall, the benefits of manipu]atives hold
al!ross grade level, ability level, and 10piC, given .hat use of
a manipulative "makes sense~ for that topic (Driscoll, i983a;
Sowell, 1989) Hov.'ever, US. textbooks only infrequently sug-
gest the use of manipulalives In geometry, and even when they
do the suggested uses are not aimed at developing higher lev-
els of thinking (Fuys et aL, 1988; Stigler et al.. 199O) In comrast,
me evidently more successful japanese instruction and instruc-
tional materials fearure far gre:lter use of manipulatives (Stigler
et at, 1990). Similarly, Mitchelmore (1980) found that British
s tudents were about.3 years ahead of U.S. children in both spa-
tial and three-dimensional drawing abllity. He suggested that
differences :lrt: an ri butable to different lcaching ~pp roaches, In
that British teachers tend to cake a more informal approach to
geome.try and use more manipulative materials at the elemen-
tary level and more diagrams al higher levels. Another, comple-
mentary possibility is that the curricula refleel each country's
anirude 100000'3rds the use of spatial models.
Unfonunalely, nearly ha lf of K-6 tead\ers reporl that their
studentS use manipulativcs less than once a week, or not :11 all
(Driscoll, 1983a). This m:ly be imponant, because manipulative
use for a school year or looger resullS In Significant differences
of moderate to large size In favor of the manipulative groups;
use of shoner duration often does nOt produce Significant re-
sults (Sowell, 1989). Further, use of manipulatives is not suf-
ficient; simply using manipulatlves does nex: guarantee mean-
ingful leaming ( Raphael & Wahlstrom, 1989). StudentS must be
guIded to reflea on their use of manipulatives and to re late
manipulative models to their informal conceptS.
Ifmanipulatives are accepted as Important, whatofpiaures?
Pictures can be Imponanr; even children as young as 5 or 6
years (but nOI younger) can use information in piaures 10 build
a pyramid ( for example, see Murphy and Wood, 1981). Thus,
piau res can give students an immediate, imuitive grasp of cer-
tain geometric Ideas. However, piCtUres need to be varied so
that s rude nts aren'l led (0 form incorrect concepts (see the pre-
vious discussio ns of concejX images and diagrams). However,
research indicates that it is rare for pictures to Qe superio r to
manipulatives. In faa, In some cases, piCtures may no t differ
in effectiveness from instruction with symbols (SowelJ, i989).
But the reason may not lie In the "nonconcrete narure of the
M
pictures ~ much as it lies in their "nonmanipu lability"; thaI
is, children cannOl act on titem as flexib ly and extensively. ThIs
suggestS investigation of manipulatable piaures such as graphic
compuler representations, the sUb/ect to which we turn. .
The Promise oj Computers. Computers' grnphic capabilities
may also faCilitate the construction of geometric representa-
tions. As with other topics, students instructed in geometry
with compUiers olteo score significanlly higher than those hav-
ing just classroom instruction (AuSl.ln , 1984: Morris, 1983). Even
with children as young as preschool. computer-based programs
are as effective in teaching about shapes as teacher.<Ji reaed
programs (von Stein, 1982) and more effective at teaching
spatial relational concepts than television (Brawer, cited in
ueberman, 1985). Computer games have been found to be
450 • LEARNING FROM INSTRUCTION
milrginaUy effective at promOting learning of angle estlOmuon
skills ( Bright, 1985) and significaOlly more effective than tradi-
tion:t1 Instruction in facilil:ltIng achievement in coordin:ne ge-
o metry ( Morris, 1983), However, opumism about th~ use of
C(')nlpllters must be tempered by considerntion of the findings
of comparative media research_ Decades of pre-computer re-
search comparing the effectS of different media o n achieve-
ment .show basirnUy th~ s:une result: No signifiCllIll difference
(Clements, 1984), A change of curriculum or teaching str.llcgy
may explain the positive results of many comparative studies of
Computer-ASSiSted Instruction. or CAl (Clark, 1983). How~ver,
there are ccruin functions computers can perform that cannot
be duplicated in Other situations,
loGo. Logo represents such an application. We have seen
that children'S inilial representations of space are based on nco
fion (Pjaget & Inhelder, 1967), One im plicatiOn is mal logo
activitIes designed to help children abstrac t the nexlon of path
may provide a very fenile environment for developing their
conceptualiz:tlions of stmple two-dimensional shapes. Logo en·
vironmems are, in fact, action-based. These actions are both
perceptual-watching the tunJe's movements-and physical-
inlerpreting the tunle's movement as physical modon that
could be performed by oneself. By firSt h:lVing children fo rm
paths by walking, then using logo, children can learn to think
of the fUn!e 'S actions as ones that they can perform: mat Is, the
tun Ie's actions become ~body symonic· (Battista & Clements,
1988; Papen, 1980). Because the mathematical concept of p:lth
ClIIl be thought of as OJ record of movement, the pnth concept
may constitute a panicularly good staning point for the srudy of
gt'Ometry. Having studen[5 lIisually scan the side of OJ building,
run their hands 310ng the edge of a rectanguklr roble. o r walk:1
Straight path will give students experience with the concept of
su-aightness, However, this concept can be brought to II more
explicit level of awareness with path activilies in Logo; it is easy
to have StudenlS use the tunle to disco\"er that a straight path
is o ne that has no turning. Thus, such experiences can help
srudents develop a description or formalization of the concept
of straightness.
These and other types of Logo activities might be used to en·
cournge students to progress to Levels 2 (descriptive/analytic)
and 3 (abstractlrelation:ll) in the van Hiele hierarchy. For in-
Stance, with the concept of rectangle. srudents initially are able
only to identify visually presented e.>;amples, a Level J (visual)
activity in the 'lOIn I-Jiele hierarch)'. In Logo, however, Students
can be asked 10 construct a sequence of commands (a pro-
cedure) to draw a rectangle. This · .. , allows, or obliges, the
child to externaJi7.e Inruitive expectatiOns. When the intuition
is translated inlo a progr.lm il becomes more obtrusive and
more accessible to reflection" (Papen, 1980, p. 14;). nut is,
in COll$tructing OJ rectangle procedure, Ihe students must ana-
lyze the visual aspectS of the reaangle and reflect on how its
component pans are pUl together, an aetivity that encourages
Level 2 thinking. Funhennore, If asked to design a recungle
procedure that takes the length and width as lnpUl5, srudems
must construci 3. form of definition ror a rect:lngle, one that
the computer understands. Thus, they begin 10 build intuitive
knowledge aboUI the concept of defining a reaangle, knowl-
edge that can later be imegrnlCd and formalized into l11l ab-
stract definition (a level 3 aCtivity). Asking students if a squ3re
or a parallelogram can be drawn by their rectangle procedure
if given the proper inputs encour:tges studentS to sran ordering
figures logically (another Level 3 activity),
Research suggests that these theoretic-..u predictiOns :] [e
valid. Grade 7 studen[5' work in logo rel:lles closely to theit
level of geometriC thinking (Olson. Kieren, & Ludwig, 1987),
tn addition, appropriate use of Logo helps elementary srudems
begin to make the transItion from the Levels 0 and I to Level
2 of geometric tho ught. For example, Logo experience has
been shown to have a significaml~' positive effect on elemen-
tary school children's plane figure concepts (Clements, 1987;
Clements 8: B:lttiSta, 1989: Hughes 8: Macleod, 1986). This may
be because, as recommended by van Hiele researchers, logo
incorporales impliduy the types of propenies which will be
developed by level I thinkers e.>;plidtl)\ something that te:>.'-
books oflen fail to do (8.'miSt:l & Clements, 1987, 1988, 1991;
FUrs et aL, 1988). logo experience encourages students 10 view
3nd describe geometriC objects in terms of the actions o r pro-
cedures used to conSlruct them (ClemenlS &: Bauista. 1989).
When asked to describe geQrnetric shapes, children with Logo
experience prolTer not only more statementS overnll, but also
more Statements that expliCitly memion components and geo-
metric properties of shapes, an indication of leI'el 2 thinking
(Clements & B3ttista, ]989, 1990; Lehrer & Smith, 1986).
Similar results have emerged in the area of symmetry and
mexion geometrY. Working with a logo unit 00 motion geome-
try, students' movemem to van Hide levels was slow, but there
was definite evidence of a beginning awareness of the prop-
enles of lransformations (Olson et at. i987), Similarly, inter-
mediate grade students in the United StateS were engaged in
symmeO)' and mexion geomeuy activities using eiuler Logo Of
paper and pendl Oohnson·Gemile, Clements, & Battista, 1990).
Interviews conducted with a subsample revealed that both treat-
ment groups performed al a higher level of geometric think-
Ing than did the control grouPi logo students performed at a
higher level than me noncomputer SlUdents o n four of the six
lmerview taSks, noncomputer studenlS performed at a higher
level on one. Both logo and non·Logo groups oUlperformed
the l.'Ontrol group on immedi:lIe :1nd del:lyed post-tests: in addi-
tion, though the twO treaLmenl groups did not significant.ly dif-
fer on u,e Immediate poSt-test, the Logo group outperfonned
the non-Logo group on the delayed post-test. Thus, there was
support for the notion that the logo-based version enhanced
conceprual reco nstruction of previously-learned ideas. Com-
pared to Students using paper 3nd pencil, students using Logo
worked with more precision 3nd exactness (GalJou·DumieJ,
1989; )ohnson-Gemile el aL, 1990). Thus, there IS evidence in
suppon of the hypothesis th:n Logo experiences can help e1e-
meom ry to middle school sTudeo[5 become cognizant of their
mathematical inruitlons and f3cilitate the transldo n from visual
to descriptive/analytic geometric thinking in the domains of
shapes, symmetry; and motions (Clements & Balllsm,I990).
Several research prOjects have Investigated the effectS of
logo experience on srudents' conceptualizations of angle, an-
gie measure, and rolation. In one study. responses of Inter-
mediate grade control students were more likely to refleC1 lit-
tle knowledge of angle or common language usage, whereas
the responses of th~ logo srudents indicated more generallzed,
malhematical1y-oriemed conceptualizations (including angle as
rcxatJon :tnd as a union of twO lines/segme nts/rays) (ClemenlS
& 8.1111513, 1989). Other researchers stud ied how logo might
provide experiences a! the second ilnd third van Hielc levels
for ninth-grade students (Olive, 13nken:tu, & Scally, 1986), logo
students gained more Ihan the control SfudentS on Interviews
that operatlOnalized the 'I:ln Hiele levels for the concept of an-
gle. Sever:tl other researchers ha\'e similar!~' reponed a posi-
tive effect of logo on Students' angle concepts (Kieran, 1986a:
Olive et aL, 1986), although in some sItuations, benefilS dId not
emerge until after more than a year of Logo experience (Kelly,
Kelly. & Miller, 1986-1987).
11'ls line of research also Indicates that students hold many
dllTereru schemas regarding not only angle concept but :11so an-
gle measure. Third graders frequently relate the size of an angle
tQ the length of the line segments that formed its sides, the tUt
of the tOp line segment, the area enclosed by the lri:tngular re-
gion defined by the dr.lwn sides, the length between the sides
(from poInts sometimes, but not always, equidistant from the
vertex), the proximity of the twO sides, or the rum at the venex
(Clements & BattisL'l, 1989). Intermediate grade students often
possess one of twO schemas, In [he ~<j5-9O schema,- slanted
lines are associated with 45" turns: horizontal 3nd venicallines
with 90" turns. In the "protractor schema,· inputs to rurns are
based on usage of n protractor in ·standard" position (thus,
10 have a tunle at home position rurn left 45". students might
use an Input of 135", which corresponds to a protractor'S read-
ing when its base IS horizontal) ( Kieran, Hiller, & Erlwanger,
1986). Logo experlences may foster some misconceptions of an·
gle measure, including viewing 11 as the angle of rotation along
the path or the degree of rotation from the venical (ClemenlS
& Battista l 1989). 10 addition, such experiences do nm repl3ce
previous misconceptions of angle measure (Davis, 1984). For
example, students' misconceptions about angle measure and
difficulties coordinating the relatiOnshIps berween the tunle's
rotlltion and the construeted angle have persiSted for years, es-
pecially if n01 properly guided by their teachers (Hershkowitz
et ai" 1990; Hoyl($ & Suther\:rnd, 1986: Kieran, 1986a, 1986bi
Kieran et al., 1986). In general, however, logo experience ap-
pears to fuctlltate angle measure understanding. Logo children's
conceptualizations of larger angles are more likely 10 reflect
mathematically correct, coherent, abstract Ideas ( Clements &
Baaista, 1989; FindI3},son, 1984: Kieran, 1986b; Ness, 1987) and
show a progression from van Hiele Level 0 to level '2 in the
span of me treatment (Clements & Battista, 1990). If Logo expe-
riences emph!1size the difference be[Ween the angle of rotarion
and the angle formed as the run.le traced a path, misconcep-
tions regarding the measure of rexation and the measure of me
angle may be avoIded (Battista & Clements, 1991 ; ClemenlS &
BaniSla, 1989: Kieran, 1986b).
There (s some evidence that Logo experiences affect mea·
surement competencies beyond the mC'.1Sure of rotation and
angle. Observations show that first graders invent their own
Standard units of measure 10 make Logo drawings, such as a
rectangle with a width of 44 and a length of 88 \ia Fot"Mrd 44
Forv.-an:l44 (KulJ , 1986). Research Indicates that logo can help
you ng children learn about measuremem and aid researchers
in learning more about what young children learn abour mea-
surement. logo provides an arena In which young children m:ly
GEOMETR.Y AND SPATIAL REASON!NG • ..5 I
use units of varying size, define and create their own units,
maintain o r prediCt unit size, and create length rather th3n end
point represenlations through either iter',uh'e or numeric dis·
tance commands. Funher, Logo penuits the child to manipulate
units and to explore transform:nions of unit size and number
of units without the distrncting dexterity demands of measuring
instruments and physical quantity (Campbell. 1987). Working
with kinderganners and firsl graders, Campbell found thai:
1. Children have difficulry adjusting to changes in unit size, es-
pecially \\'hen the unit size is halved. They may be using per-
cepruaUspatial strategies r.lther th3n numerical/mathematical
ones to solve these problems.
2, Children are remarkably aCCUr:.lte when estimating halved
distances, even if the midpoint of the toml distance has to
be imagined.
3. Children understand that a diSTance traversed with a smaller
unit requires a greater number of units than thai same dis-
tance traversed with a larger unit, However, they consiStendy
underestimate the strength of the inverse relationship be-
tween unil size and numerosity of units.
<i. Contrary 10 expectalions, estimation of lines with oblique
o rIentations is usually not more difficult than lines with hor-
izontal or venical o rientations. There were no differences
across grades; a rath~r modest amount of logo experience
(rwo hours) may have helped the kinderganen children ig-
nore th~ problem-irrelevant variables in the .!ip:l.tial field.
In almost all comparisoos, logo children ~'ere more accu-
rate than contrOl children. The comrol children were more
likely TO underestimate dist:tnces, panicularly the longest dis-
tances; have difficulty compenS:lllng for the halved unit sizei -
and underestimate the inverse relationship betWeen unit size
and unit numerosity. The Logo experience may have con-
tributed to estimation accu raql Nevertheless, even inexperi-
enct!d children knew thal ule smaller numbers were to be as-
sociated with the shoner lengths and that progressively larger
numbers would be assigned to progressio:ely longer lengths.
This basic principle of measurement seems to be acquired early
in life and may not be dependent on specific measurement e.x-
periences.
Not all research has been positive. First, it should be noted
that none o[ the srudies have reported students' mastery of the
concepts invesligated, but merely a facilitative effea. Second,
some Sl.udies show no significant differences between I.ogo
and control groups (rohnson, 1986). Third, some studies have
shown limited transfer; for example. srudems from IWO ninth-
grade Logo classes did not differ significantly from control Stu-
denlS on subsequent high school geomet!)' grades and tests
(OLive et aI., 1986).
One problem Is that Students do not aJ~"aYS think mathe-
matically, even when the Logo environment invites such think-
ing. For example, some students rely excessively o n visual cues
and eschew analytical work, such lIS looking for exact mathe-
matical and programming relations wimln the geometry of the
figure (Hillel & Kieran, 1988). The visual approach is not cor·
related with [he ability to visualize, but, instead, refers to re-
liance on the visual ~dat.::l." ofa geometric figure in detennining
srudents' Logo constructiOns (fo r example, ~this lasl side looks
 ..52 • LEARNING FROM INSTRUCTION
like 60 " If)' FORWARD 60"). In terms of van Hiele ~\"els, Ihe
visual approxh 10 solving Logo problems involves reasoning
thalUes ~rween levels 1 and 2, Almough imponam in begin·
nlng phases of learning, continued use of a visual approach
Inhibits children from arriving at mathemalical generaJlz.::l:tiOllS
relaled 10 meir Logo activif}' There may be lin Ie reason for Stu·
detUs 10 abandon vISual approaches unless mey are presemed
with wks whose resoluljon requires an analytical approach, In
addsllon, dialog betw~n te:tCher and srudents is essential for
encouraging higher-level r:osoning. care musl be- taken to help
srudems cSl3bl!sh and reflect upon pam-rommand correspon·
dences; mat is, connections between geometric paths drawn
by the tunle and dle Logo comm:mcis that produce these paths
(Battista & Clements, 1987, 1991: Clements, 1987; ClementS &
Battista, 1990).
In sum, studies thaI have shown me moSt posilive effectS In·
voille carefully planned sequences of Logo aaivjlies and teach~r
medi:nlon of students' work with lhose actJvitles. II would ap·
pear thai Logo's potential to develop geomelIic ideas will be
fulfiUed 10 the extem th3l [eachers 2nd inslIUctional m:uerl·
als properly guide students' Logo experiences. This should in·
dude encouraging sludents to ret1ea on and forge links be-
tween Logo-based procedural knowledge and more uadillonal
conceprual knowledge (Clements & 83nisu, 1989; Le:hrer &
Smilh, 1986),
GWtIlC TOOLS A,'II) CCJtI:Sl1WC1lO. noGlI.-\\IS (Gro~ Stmoosu).
Logo provides 2 powerful and flexible environment for stu·
~nts' repre:sentallon and explor:Uion of geomelric Ideas; Other
compu[et dr2wing and cOflSlIUction programs pfO'Jide less fle,,-
-'• ibllity bUI no less viable learning environments. For eXllmple,
USC of a computer "boxes~ function, which allowed children
10 draw rectangles by stretChing an elearonic "rubber band,·
gllve chlJdren a dlfferem perspective on geomeuic figures (For·
man, 1986). The atea fill funaion, which fills dosed regions
with color, prompted children 10 reflect on such topological
fearu~s as closure. The polent!al of such drawing [ools lies
in the posslblHty thaI children will internalize such functions,
thus constructing new memal tools; research has nOI yet ade·
quately addressed this issue. rnteraction with cenain compU!er
environments may help srudents build less restrlaed concept
Images. For e:wnple, producing random examples of Isosce-
les and righl 1l'Iangies varying il1 shape and orientalion hdped
2-6·year-old children generalize their concepts of triangles to
Include a greater variety of triangular shapes and orlem:nions
(Shellon, 1985),
Computer graphics tools may positively affect spatial skills,
wllh special ~nefilS for girls, Although boys may oUlperform
girls In computet games dealing with spatial ability (Pepin,
Be3ulieu, Mane, & Le:rou", 1985), specially designed computer
graphics modules have been shown to increase the spatial
skills of high school girls to a level significantly beyond that
of boys, although girls Staned whh 2 lower composile mathe-
maries score, after this tr.Ilnlng Ihey had a signlfic:uuly higher
score than boys ( luchin5, Rogers, & Voytuk, 1983).
Present-<l:ty media use twO-dimensional represenwions to
pr-e5I!nt moSt threeod!menslonal information. Research Indl·
cares Utar people find this difficult (Ben-chalm e[ aI., 1988).
Computers aJlowthe d}"amic manipulation oftwO<ilmenskmal
represenuuions of lhn:e-dimensional figures. Osta (cited In
HershkowilZ et aI., 1990) studied this potential using [W()
commercial programs, one in which oper.ulons could be:
performed on three-dimensional objeCtS represented on Ihe
screen and the other, a -paint" program, In which oper.l[lons
could ~ perfonned only on twO-dimensional figur:lIive de·
signs. The programs have constraints tha( necessi[3te the use
of geomemc: propenies rather than JUSt yisual informal ion. OsCl
C(e3[ed problem situations In which srudents modified figures
[0 move between cwo- and three-dimensional representations.
Solution Stra[egies of students in grades 8-9 were StUdied. IV.
first, their work was local, dealing with small pans of figures
dtrough only perceprual strategies; with experience, though,
students considered morc globa! crileria and replaced Ineffi·
cient perceprual srra[egies wi[h strategies based on geometric:
propcnles.
TIle [oeus of construction programs, such as the Geometric
SIiPPOS~/' software series, is to rncilita[e students making and
lesting conjectures. The Supposet programs allow students to
choose a primitive shape, such as a trimgle or quadrilateral
(depending on the specific: progr:llTl), and 10 perform mea·
surcmem oper.uioos and geomelric constructions on It. 'M'le
progrnms record the sequence of constructions and cn au·
lomatically perform it agllin on Olher lriangles or quadrllat·
erals. Thus, students can explore the generaliey of the conse-
quences of constructions. Reports Indicate that Suppose:r cn
be used effectlVel)! In one evaluation, Supposer srudents per·
formed as well as or better than their non·Supposer coun-
terparts on geometry exams (Yerushalmy, Chazan, & Gordon,
1987). In addillon, students'learning went b~'Ond SWldard ge-
ometry content - for e;tample, reinventing definilions, maldng
conlecrures. posing and solving significant problems, and de·
vising orlgln.11 proofs. Making coojeaures did nol come easily
to Sludents and there was much frustr;nioo at the beginning of
the year, but by the end nearly a\l srudents were making con·
jecrurcs on large scale projects and felt the need to lusdfy their
generalizac!ons On sped:illy-designed tests, Supposer students
produced the same or higher level generalizations Iha n the
comparison group, There is confIlaing evidence, however. Fot
example, Bobango (1988) found thaI while Instruction based
on the van Hlele phases using Supposer .slgnjficantl~· raised
Students' van Hiele level of thought, more so [rom Level 1 to
Level 2 (han for my other levels, It did nex result in grea[er
achievement In Sl3l1dard content or proof 'Wri[ing,
We have alre2dy seen that students' imerpretatiOn of dla·
grams Is compJa. A promising finding is that StudenlS make
gains In understanding o f diagr:uns and their limitations us-
Ing Supposer After such experience, they approached diagrams
flexibly. treated a single dia.gr:un as a model for a class of dl·
agrams, became aware Utat this model conuins charaCteris-
tics 001 representative of the class, md added auxili:uy lines
10 diagrams (Ye:rushalmy & Ouzan, 1988; '!erushalmy a .aI.,
1987).
We have also seen Ut3t students have difficulty underStand·
Ing proof; for Ins13nce, they often do nor distinguish between
twO sources of knowledge abom geomelrical Sl2temems, mea·
surement evidence, md deductive proofs. They believe that
measuring examples ~pro\15" a Statement lrue for all members
of an infinite set' andlor thai deducllve proof pertains [0 one
e.xample only. ~'Iany students who held both beliefs SIJlI pre-
ferred the deducti\'C proofs, 00l due to the influence or their
tcachers as much as to the e;o;pla.natory characteristk of the
proofs (Owan, 1989) . Supposer·b~ aaivilies designed 10
change these beliefs engendered a mOYemenr away from con·
sidering measurement evidence as proof (Chuan, 1989; W1ske
& Houde, 1988), although some srudentS still thought there
might be coumerexamples to deductively proven results.
ConSidering POSNesl performance, percentages of students
from f!.'qlCrimental and control groups who prOduced Informal
and formal proofs were about the SlIme [n five comparisons
conduc[ed In one e .....lIuallon, :md grealer for the Supposer
group in the si:rth (Yerushalmy e[ nl.. 1987), The researchers
l1oted, however, thai teachers 100 frequently promo[ed a lin·
ear ordering of data collec[ion and analysIS, conjecrure deriva·
tion, and proof, which ted to nonreflective d3t.a gathering and
obscured the differences between representations of speCific
Instances during dlla collection phases and representa[lons
during conjecrure and proof phases Srudents, then, did I10C
appreciate the different levels of generallf}' these phases rep-
resented. The researchers recommend starting Supposer activo
lties as investigations of a geomell'lc relationship or concept
(Yerushalmyet al., 1987).
Unllke [eXlbook theorems, students believed SUpposer-
generated theorems needed to ~ proved ~rore they could
be accepted as true, leading to ownership of the theorems.
They seemed to engage in van Hiele's Phase 4 learning. ori·
enling themselves wilhin the ne(Work of geometric rela[ions
eurnpen. 1988). In sum, it appears that, with proper suppon
from the' [eacher, studems using SlJppose:r can come 10 under-
Stand the imponance of forlMl proof as a way of establishing
mathematical lrUlh, although this seems to ~ rt' lau~d more to
Bell's IIluminallon funcl ion of proof thm the verification and
S)'S[ematlz:ulon funclions (Verushalmy, 1986), Chv.an (1989), ar·
guing from a philosophy of mathematiCS perspective, suggests
that differences between deduclive lrguments and arguments
based on measurement evidence are nOf. as disti nct. as often
supposed. He offers suggestions for leaching the differences.
including de\'eloping proof as a social process and as an ex·
ploratory and explanatory process, rather Ih.an as an endpolnL
To implement the Supposer's guided Inquiry approach suc-
cessfully, research suggests the need for teachIng Slr3legies that
connect SlUdents' inquiry with the curriculum and encourage
inquiry as a way 10 learn successfully what needs 10 be kf\O\\'n.
In general, leachers in regular classrooms face multiple difficul-
lies using Supposer: however, such struggles seem 10 halle the
potential to change teachm' practice, and lhus change lhe:ir
beliefs about the mean ing of knowing geometry and lhe: ac·
quisition of this knowledge in classrooms Overall, while use
of Supposer was foond 10 demand hard work from and cause
some rru5tJdtion for both texhers and studentS, benefilS were
evident (lampen, 1988. W"lSke & Hou~, 1988; Yerush;tlmy et
aI., 1987).
ltmwG~Nf "T1JfQRII!G: mE GEOMIIT1n' 1\11'011. Another field In
which computers may make a unique contribution is that of
GEOMETRY ANO SPATIAL R.EASONING • 453
inteUlgem rulers. Anderson, Boyle, and Relser (1985) claim that
if is feasible 10 build computer sysrems that are as effecuve as
Imelligenl human "HOrs. 'n\eir Geometry Thtor was based on
a SCI of pedagoglcal prindples deri\'ed from the ACr theory
First, productions in this theory always Include a goal In !be
condition. thus, the: goal strUcture of each problem is made
e.... pliciL Second, students are helped to cope with working
memory demand<; by placing on the compuler screen much
of the information th:1I the ~tudent m!ght forget in Ihe form of
a proof graph. Third, beatuse: knowledge compilation occurs
only during problem solv!ng, formal instruction is made pan
of the problem-solving process, Students are given immediate
feedback on their errors 10 make It e2Sier for them 10 integrate
this instruction in[o new produalons they form .
The Geometry Tumr presenlS the Stmemem [0 be proved at
the lOp of the screen and the given S13temems al the boltom.
The student adds to a developing ~prOQr gr:lph~ by poimlng to
statemenlS on the screen and by typing Informalion. Each log-
ical inference involves a sel of premises, a reason, and a con-
clusion. Reasoning forward, the Student poinlS 10 the premises,
types the reason, points to relev:lOt geometric points in the dla·
gram, and points [0 the conclusion (If already on the screen) or
rypes IL These are conneaed in the proof graph with arrows,
The proof is completed when there 15 a set of logical inferences
connecting me given sta[enlents 10 the stalcmenlS to be proved.
The resultanl proof graph makes concrete IWO :lbsrraa dlarat-
terislies of proof problem soMng: logical relations among the
premises and conclusions and the search process used to find
a correct proof, As the student works, the tutor infef'$ which
rule the srudent applied by determining which one matches
the Studem's response. If correct, the tutor Is sileO!, Otherwise:,
Instruct.ion is given, All Instruction, thus, !s In the contexl Of
solVing problems
Three srudenlS of varying levels of abllley learned geom·
ell')' 'With the Geometry TulOt'. According [0 the researchers.
311 learned geometry successfully and were solving problems
more complex than those usually assigned in classrooms. All
had positive aUlrudes (Anderson el al., 1985). Since this inilial
test. the Geometry Thtor has been used sU(:cessfully in :it pub-
lic high school with four classes, from regular academic lIack
to gifted (Anderson et aI., n.d.). It was repon ed tha[ students
were enthusiastic. For the firS!. year, all groups showed stallsri·
cally Significant improvement from pre- to poSt·test. A second
year's test utilized a comrol group and found similar gains with
a significant difference of the Geometry Thtor srudenlS over
control group srudents, with Improvements of about one stan·
dard deviation. Students unanimously reponed thai they prt=fer
the proof-graph SU'UClure 10 traditional rwo-column proof for·
malS. Further, such use has led 10 Imporuult revisions in the
underlying Acr theory.
Results of other eYaluauons of the program are more co m·
plex. KafuJ (1989) used the Geometry nuor to help srudenlS
do congruence proofs in mree classes. Generally, the GeomClry
nllor was a success. Ail students had positi~ anIrucles toward
!he program and recommended It for other s[udems, all com·
pleted me minimal problem set, and most of them did all of
me additional problems-a te:tcher staled thai this had never
happened before. However, when sNdents used the proof:p:Uh
454 • LEARNING FROM INSTRUCTION
method for noncornpuler Mlrk, their ~rform:lnce decreased
(most also used Ihe St.1.temem·reason method). When uSing
the proof·p:uh method, students tended to reverse the artier
of St:lIemems and re:Lsons and confuse the sequence of step!>
This may indiCl1te :I serious problem ~1th ~ progr.un, for
confusing the sequence of Steps in a proof is an IndiC31ion Ih:u
studenl5 do 001 understand the nature of proof. 1.5 with many
srudents In a Standard ~metry course, these srudents may
have been learning merely how 10 Sllperfidally operate within
a set of rules. ~r obse~d problem Involved the rigidity
of the Tutor. It is nO! cenaln whethe r changes in the progi.un or
length of srudeflts' exposure to the program would amelJor:u:e
these dlfficultles. In another study, experimental srudenr.s S~Ol
30'*' of their lime on the Geometry TInor (Wenheimer. 1990).
Here, the re was no reponed difficulty shifting from proof'8rnph
to two<"Olumn format. 'I\vo expe rlmentlll classes 3vernged 79%
o n a pest·test. whereas the col1lrol class averaged 69% (nbout :l
lener grade in difference). The teacherlresearcher commented
that an Incre:tSe In his individua1iz:ltlon of InSlruction w:lS the
greatest Imp:!ct of the program's use. However, the TIJlor still
makes considerable demands 00 the teacher; in fact, one re·
pon Slated that 2-3 te3chers were needed 10 keep the 1:Jbo.
r:l1ory running smoothly (Schofield & Verban, 1988, note Ihal
software was no! In its final form). These researchers proffered
one addidonal waming: black and female srudems wen! more
IIkelv to e."pres5 hostility tow:lrd or displeasure wllh the. com·
puter lutOf; Although Ihe results are posilille for the ITI05I p:m,
It Is IlOI. clear that the evaluations were adequate 10 lest SN'
dents undersmndlng of proal' In either environment. More re-
search Ih3t investigates sruc!en15' thinking in this environmem
Is needed.
Impllc:u.lons of !his research program are ncx limited to
compuler lutO~. Anderson claims dut one of the reasons why
traditional Instruction is olien so Inadequate is iliAt the teacher
h;lS an inadequate conception of the flow of control in the StU·
dent. His model may illuminate these prDCeS5es. Similarly, the
structures of both problems :lnd processes by which a proof is
generated mighl be more explicitly represented and discussed.
blPUCAnONS AC1IOS5 COMMU fM'IMO.'oj~lum. Severnl findings are
lmrig\Jingly consiStenl across sNdles using different computer
environments. FirSt, researchers and teachers conSistently reo
pon !.h:Jt in such conteXlS studems cannot hide whal they do
nOt undersl2nd. Tlul Is, d ifficulties and misconceptions that are
easily masked by U'adltlonal approaches emerge In computer
environments and muSt be dealt with. leading to some fl"US'
u'lltion on the pan of bolh teachers and srudents but also 10
greater development of mathematics abilities (Clemenr.s & Bat·
liSCll. 1989; Schofield &: verban, 1988, Yerushalmy et ai , 1987)
Second, al least at the high school le-.-el, srudenlS can become
confused regattllng the purpose of differem compooents of a
course; a single location for computer work. discussion, and
lecture may allevl:ne this confusion. A mooltor or projecto r for
group discussions Is noted as essential for all three environ-
ments. (These may 5eem to be lower·level concerns, but an-
ocher- general findIng IS Ihat the Importance and problems o f
!Irranglng and managing hardware and softwdfe must nOl be
underestlmated.) Third, evaluation of learning in such envtron·
menLS must be reconsidered, as traditional approaches did 001
assess the fu ll spe<uum of what w:tS leamed; In some cases,
these appro.1ches made little senst: (for C'xample, when SlU·
dents worked on self·selected Inquiries). On ;u least one issue,
the Y:1rlous environments differed: With !.he Geometry Thtor,
pUlling more wn one srudent at a computer was deemed pat·
t1cularlv unsuccessful (Wenheimer, 1990), but in comrast, ('\'\'0
SNden~ working cooperatively at a computer seemed idealtn
the mo~ exploratory environmentS of Geomenic StlPfJ05er and
Logo. lnd~, one of Ihe strengths of such environments is the
sponcmeous generation of cooperative learning and teaching
(ClemenlS & Battista, 1989; Lampert, 1988; 'emshalmy et al"
1987)
In summa!)'. appropriately.deslgned softw:lrc can engender
higher·lcvel intCr:lctlon with geometriC ideas. Cert:lln computer
e nvironments allow the manipulation of screen obiectS In M)'S
dl:lt asSISt stu~ntS in viewing them as represemati~"eS of 11 class
of geometriC oblects. Th1& apparently develops srudems' ability
to reneel on me properues of the class of objects and to think
in a more general and abstrnct manner. Thoughlful sequences
of computer aCtIvities and leacher mediation of srudents' work
with lho.se activities appear to be critical components of an ef·
fiCldous eduCltional environment_ Perhaps (."Yen mo~ funda·
menul, inquiry environments such tIS the Su(>POser- and logO-
oo.sed environments nppear 10 have Ihe pott!fllinl 10 serve! as
camlystS both in promoting 1e.1Checs' and sruden15' reconcep-
Nalluulon d what it means 10 learn and undersl':md geometry
3J1d In promOling the growth of studenlS' autonomy in m.1th-
ematial thinkJng. Fundamental changes demand considerable
can
elto n on Ihe p:!11 of reachers and for extensive suppon from
leacher eduClitOrs or advisors, from peers, and, u]timatel)\ from
the greater school system and rubure.
GROUP AND CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
\'('e have alrettdy reponed several cross-cuI N ral di!Teren~
in geometry achievement. There have also been srudles of cross·
(UINral differences In spatial reasoning. For IOStance, Mitchel·
more (1976) reported ,hal native Africans of all nadonallllcs
had lower percePNal development when compared to Eul'O'
peans Witll the S3Jl1e age and length of schooling as ~II as
when compared to illiterate Eskimos 3J1d Nonh American In-
dians He also reponed !.hon the spatial Ihinklng of studcntS
In Kingston, JamtliCl1 was about three years behind that of Stu·
dents In Columbus, Ohio. which. In rum, was three ~ears behind
that of students In Bristol, England (MJlchelmore, 1980). He QI·
trlbuted these CIOSS·cuiNraJ differences to various factors such
as physial environment, sod:l1!culruraJ em'lronmem, and me
school m:uhemalics curriculum. Resulr.s from the fourth NAEP
in the US. indiolled that blacks and Hispanics in gr.ides 7 and 11
had more difficulty than whites with graphically presemed In·
formation, measurement, and geomeuy Oohnson, 1989).john.
son and Meade (1987) found that whites' spatial scores IYerc
higher Ulan blacks'. However, the factors that contribute to
Ihese latter [WO dlffe~nces have nal been adequately tOvestl·
gated, On Ihe other hand, researchers have investigaled dlffer-
enres In performance between males and females extensive ly
G ender D irferences
'" GfOmetry. In an examimuion of the mathenUllics ilems from
the 1978NAfp, Fennema and Carperuer(J98I) found Ih3I males
SIgnificantly outperformed females in Ihe areas of gcomeu'}' mel
measurement Fe11l31es' performance was lower than males' for
geometry and measuremeOi for a1lcognllive levels (knowledge,
skill, understanding, application), and 311 ages (9, I}, 17 re"~).
With the d ifference increasing with age. In the 1985 assess·
ment, males OUtperformed females at all grade leveb, bul !.he
differences were significant only at grnde II for geornerry and
8r.ldes 3 and 11 for measurement (Meyer, 1989) Fennema and
carpenler observed large differences between m2les' and fe·
males' performance both for geometry Items thas: were pre·
sented spatia ll y and those that were presented verball)'. Also,
consistent with the hypothesis thaL d!ITerence5 In sp3llal abll-
It)' somehow (ontribute to differences In nlathem:UiC5 achieve·
ment (Fennema & carpenter. 1981), there was some indication
from the sample items discussed III lhe 1985 data Ih"l the m:tle
adVlmtage ~"as greate.r on items presented wlm :m accompa-
nying dlagrotm (Meyer. 1989). Smith and Walker (1988) found
significant gender differences 00 the 10lh grade geomell1' New
York Regents exams, in favor of m2les. They r.ued the difference
as small, and equated It to one·half of a question.
Hann3 (I989a, .1989b) reponed gender dlffel"\!nces for
eighth graders Studied in the Second Ime.rnational M:tthematiC5
Study (SIMS). Overotll, boys scored hlghe.r than girls on 75'*'
of the geomet!)' items; girls scored higher than boys on 25%
Boys' 1T\e".lO score in geometl)' ""as higher !.han girls' ror 18
of the 'ZO rountries- slgnificlmly.\O {or 10, Including the uS
The signlficam differences in mean percenfage5 ranged from
2% (0 6%. Ethington (1990), analyzing a subset of this same
data. found Wt, overall, males did better than females on the
geometry items.
On the other hand, in their study of over 1300 h igh school
students. Senk and Usiskin found equal geometry proof.wriling
skills among males and females, when e,'O(amtning all Sludents
and lust high·achieving sNdents (Senk & USiskin, 1983). They
also found that males significantly outperformed fema les on
the entering and end-of·year geometry tests, but :luribured !.he
latter difference to the former. In coml'ilSt, they found no gen·
der differences in Viln HieJe level at the begin ning of me year,
with males, nevenheless, surpassing females in this respect at
the end of the year (Usiskln, 1982). They con!ectured that the
occurrence of gender differences in geometric problem solVing
and the lack of gender differences In proof Wf'itlng could be
explained by the difference in rormal educnional experiences
relating to Ihese tWO types oC lasks Boys dnd girls do eqUlllly
well on mathematical taSks for which In<lass and out4<lass
experiences are equivalent. Boys might luve more SP:lli2l and
problem-solving expenences than girls, and so they do bener
at Ihese taSks. An alternate explanalion is that gi rls do bener :n
proof ~vrl(in8 because it is a task thal requires Strict. adherence
to a c1assroom·mandated, forma l Set of rules-a ~grammar:
In a sense. This explanation is (Onsistenl with con jecrures by
Badger suggesting that g irls tend 10 -keep to specific methods
that have been approved by their teachers" (1981 1 p. 12) and
by Linn and Hyde (1989) thal "females may be m~ likely than
GEOMETRY AND SPATIAL REASONING • 455
males to use the techniques they Ie:Irned in 5Chool~ (p. 22)
Closely follOWing prescribed procedures CIn cenainly be help.
ful in siNalions where true understandlOg is lacking (as Is the
case with most students and prool').
In a comparison on various measures or geometl1' achieve-
ment, srudents in a SCl.ndard geometry curriculum were com-
pared to students studying the geometry curriculum that was
created by me University ol Chiogo School M3lhematics ProjeG
(UCSMP). Flores (1990) reponed that the UCSMP tmument ei-
ther reduced or reversed the usual gender gap fJYOl'ing m:tles.
However, because the anal ~'Ses were perfonned on :;cores :ld-
lusted for pre-treatment performance on a geometry readiness
te51, we do nOl know how males and females compared in
achievement, only on their gains in achlevemem during Ihe
school year. Despite this cave:)!. the finding indIcates that fur-
mer investigatio n or gender differences in the UCSMP Is war'
ramed. [t is notewonhy thm females SCf!med 10 do beller In '3
curriculum tha t placed he:w}' emphasL~ on reading (an activit}'
in which females have traditionally excelled) and applicatiOns
(in which females have usu;1l1y done mo re poorly).
/ 11 SJxItial Skills.. Fennema and carpenter (1981) hypothesized
that one possible factor 1113t may underlie gender differences
In geometry achievement is sp3tial vi.~u.,lIz:ItI01l M:uhemaliCS
achievement generally correlates with spallal visualization In
the range of .30 10 60, and n'lll\es' spatial scores have con·
siStenr.iy been found to be higher than females' (B:lUisCl &
Clements, 1990; Ben..chaim ~ aI., 1988, Fennema & Tanre,
1985; Tartn!, 199Ob). In her review of gender·relaled spalial
d ifferences, H.arris States that gender differences in favor of
males appear in a broad speclrum of wks and sl1lJ,.1tions and
concludes that gender differences on Sp3lialtask! are -real, not
iIIusory~ (Harris, 1981 , p. 90). Unn and Petersen Stated "Differ-
ences between males and females in spatial ability 3re widely
acknowledged. yet considerable d ispute surrounds the magni·
Nde, natuce, and age of first occurrence of these differences"
(Unn & Petersen. 1985, p. 1479). for InStance, they repon ed
that spatial perception and !"Otat ion tasks were easier for males
man for females but mal tasks characterized by an anal~' ic com·
binatio n o f visual and nonvisual strmegies 'w ere equally dlffituit
for males and females.
Johnson and Meade (1987) adminiStered a b:lIlel)' of spatial
te&s to over 1,BOO public school .sNdentS, grades K-12. They
found that males' spatial ablUt}' exceeded females' bv fourth
grade, wilh evidence that this liu~riorit)' also exiSted :11 !.he
earlier grades but was masked by fem:tles' superk>rlty In ver·
baI skills. (In faa, males' spatial 5COres were significanr.iy higher
than females in gr.Kles 1-4 when reading scores were used as
a covariate). Their data also suggest.s mal the malelft:male dlf·
ference almost doubled starring at the tenth grade. They found
a male spalial ad\'antage {or both blacks and whites.
While il has been argued that the commonly reponed male
superiority in spali.:ll ability is of linlt: (Onsequence, johnson
and Meade su~ that the ~effect sizes are substantial enough
to create a siza.ble male mafority If spatl:1l ability "'ere aClUally to
influence performance levels on imponam 'r.Inables Of SeJL'C'
don rates for renaln occupadons or uaining programs- 0987,
p. 738). For instance, if the mean were used as a selection
456 • LEARNING FROM INSTRUC110N
cutoff, their dllla for 8r:ldes 4-12 Indic:ne that 62% of the boys,
but a ni), 3B% of the gIrlS, would be sdected.
DIm.w<C15 IN STIt\T1:GlES. There are: .several ~pons thaI indl·
c ne ~ relationship between spalial ability and mathem:ulcs
achievement differs for males and females. Llben and Golbeck
(1980) found that scores on Plagetlan horizonrality (water-level)
and venlc::ality taSks (plumb-lme) 9o~re significantly and highly
related to spadal ability for bOys, but nOl for girls (grades 4-12).
Kyllonen, Lohman, and Snow (1984) JOuod we females' verbal
aptitude and males' spatial aptllude each correlnted with per·
formance on a pJper folding wk. And Tarm: (199Ob) found
thaI, although male and female high school sruderus did IlOl
differ on mathematics (goomecrk and oongeomeuic) achle\'e-
ment or spatial orientation (SO) skill, tow SO girls scored much
109.~r in mathematics than did high SO girls and high and tow
SO boys These findings are consistent WIth the hypothesis that
there are diffe~ces in the processe; underlyfng spallal and
geometric thinking to males :lOd females.
Inde<..od, there have been reportS that males prder nonverb:11
modes and females verbal modes of thought (Clements, 1983)
In fact, Thnre (l990b) reponed thai femal es, more than males,
tended to keep a written record of information during problem-
solving. Also, C l em~ntS (1983) found that a much great~r ~{­
c~nl!lge of f~males than ITllIles used an inefficient visu::ti·whote
Str.11eg}' 00 the Dilkrential Aplltude Space Relations test. ~nd
thaI females used 115$ dfecnve concrere strategies and males
used more efficient ab$tnlCt suategJeS on Spoil tal wks. In fact,
gender differences may ~resu h from the propensity of femules
to select and consistently use less efficient or less accurate
Str2leBlfS for these lasks (Linn & Petersen l 1985. p. 1492)
M
Bauista. Wheatley, and Talsma ( 1989) reponed a tendency for
fem:lle pre-service elemenwy teachers er,:oUed In geome-
try nOl 10 use the Str.ltegles that they uSt.-d most effeaivel¥
Banisu ( 1990) found mat males outperformed females in
spalial visualizatiOn and in high school geometry, but thaI there
were no gender differences In logical rea.soo!ng abIlity o r use
of geometric problem-solving srr:uegies. When predicting ge-
omelry perfomuu\(:e, spatial visualization was the most imper-
cmc factor for femal es, whereas logkal reasonmg and, as a sec-
ondary facror, the discrepancy between spatial VIsualization and
logical reasoning were mOSt importanl for males. It was sug-
gested th:lt there is .. fundamem:tl difference in the role that
spatial visualization and logical reasoning play in males' and
females' Ie'Amiog of geometriC ideas. II W25 :llso found that
the more spatial :ibility males, but not females. possessed in
relalloo to their logical reasoning ability, the more likely they
were to use a visualizalion str:l.legy and the less likely to use
:l dr3wing str:lIegy This finding seems to Indicate a fundamen·
al difference In the way t1ut the males and females reprtserll
geometric problems. Males with relativel), higher spatial ability
seemed 10 forego the use of the drawing strategy in preference
for VllIualiZ3tiOfl, perhaps bec3u.!loe their high visualization skills
made them feel drnwtng is unnecessary. Females with relauvely
higher spatial ability, on the other hand. were Olore likely [0 use
a diagram and less likely to use visualization. Simllarly. Thnre
(1989) found that high SO females were more likely than low
SO fentales to use a drawing. but !.here were no differences for
hIgh and tow SO males
Anomer promISing area of Investigation 15 the imer:actlon
of teachers- style along a vlsualtnonvisual continuum and stu-
dents' represenuufonal preference or visualizalion ability Bat-
dSl3 (1990) found that spatial visualizallon was more highly cor-
rc:ialed With geomt:try learn-ng for students In the daMes of a
teacher who emphasized and felt more confidem aboul the role
of visualization In geomelry than a te:Jcher who de-emphasized
and felt less confident about this role. Males scored sl!ght.ly
higher than females in the former teacher's classes, whereas
males scored much higher than females In the Jatler tea~s
classes. Presmeg (1986) found that studentS who were visualiz,
ers seemed to do bener in classes of teachers who neither over-
nor underemphasized visual presemarions, Bishop (1989) sug'
gested that the lauer stUdy C:l:lled into queStIOn the u,sdulness
of SimpliStiC /1.11 stUdies in thiS area. More thoughtful research
is needed that InvestigateS the Imeraction belWeen teachers'
instructional emphases and .students' preference for and ability
with visualization
Thus, there IS l!'IidencesuggCSling mat males and females, o r
at least subgroups thcreof. may differ in the processes they use
10 solve mathcmatics, particularly geometry problems. There
seem 10 be differences along the .sp:ltial dimension. However.
these differences have not yet been adequately in~ig:lted..
More research is needed ;n which students are carefully ob-
selVed and imelVlcwed as they solve problems
BlAIN CJIIt:M'IZATlOfI,v.'[I GENDEII DtnnDIa:5. II has been suggested
by researchers in the phYSiology of the brain thar -sex differ-
e.nces in verbal and spatial abilities may be rehned to differ-
ences in the way thilt those functions are diStributed between
the cerebral hemispheres in males and females" (Springtr &
Deutsch. 1981 , p. 121). For instmee, it tw been conjeaured
wt "both language abilities and spatial abilities are represented
more bliater~lly In females \han In males" (Springer & DeUL'K'h,
1981. p. 123) Further, mis hypahesiS posits thai greater lllt·
erallz:ttion of function (lhat IS, specialization to one side o r
che brain) may be essential for high spatial performance bUt
less laterallzatiOn more imporum for verbal perfo rmance, so
males should be superior In spatial taSks :lnd females In ver-
ballll.Sks. Thus, gender differences in gtomctry perfo nnance-
performance which involves both the spaual and logical modes
oCthought-mlght productively be exammed In terms of these
nvo types of thought.
For example, dr3wings by left-side, brain-iniured patients
tend to be d~lkiem in imernal fearures and in organization
of planning but adequale In overn1l spatial configuration. with
the reverse true for padents wlch injury on the opposlle side.
These differences were mirrored by 5-13·year-oJd boys and
girls asked to drnw a complex figure. "!oJ. the youngest age,
girls drew more Imernal details and more of the discrete pans,
whereas txYts concemr.ued more on the external configuration.
Al. 11 yea~, boys drew their designs in 'long, sweeping, cominu-
ous lines,' whereas girls'~ theirs part by pan' (Waller, 1979,
p. 173). In other words. where stylIStiC differences appeared,
the boys' style tended ro be charaaerisllc or right-hemisphere
processing, the girls' of left-hemisphere processing" (Harris,
1981. p. 103).
It ls important 10 keep In mind the complexity of the re-
search on gender diIferences Such dlffe~nces are observed
in some areas of mathematics but nOl others, on some spatial
tests bUI not Others. In some cultures but not others (Hanna.
1989a). For Instance, while males have performed better than
females on various Spatial taSks, the largest and most conSiS-
tently observed IlIlIle 2dvamage appea.rs on item! requiring
the rapid mental rolarion of figures (Halpern, 1989), with the
source of the difference being identified as the rate of mental
""ation, rIOI ~ccuracy (A1denon, 1989). It has also been found
that training tends to reduce: these differences (Alderton, 1989,
Unn & Hyde, 1989). Gender differences have been anribuled
10 both biological and cultural faCtors and 10 -:a combinauon
of the twO (Geary, 1989). In a meta-analysis, Bat:nninger and
Newcombe (1989) found (a) a weak relationship between par.
riclpanon In spatial activities and .spatIal abiliry. and (b) that
spallal perfonnance an be improved by training. Neither the
partiCip:lllon1aCtivlty relatiOnship nor the Increases in perfor·
mance differed for males and fem.des. Even when there are
no gender differences on a task, It should 00( be assumed chat
males and females art' using the same stralegles (Newcombe,
Dubas, & Baenninger, 1989, Tartre, 199Ob). Finally, linn 2nd
liyde (1989) and Feingold (1988) have :lrgued that cogmtlve
gender differences, Including those in mathematics and spadal
:lbUif}', are declining. Ii:llpem (1989), on the other hand, has
argued that these trends are anifacts of the testing Instillments
and changes in test populations
CONCLUSIONS A ND IMPLICATIONS
Without doubt, geometry is imponant. II alTers us a .......dy 10
interpret and reflect on our physical environment It can serve
as a tool for the study of other topics in mathematics and sci-
ence. More importantl)'. however, spalial thinking, which ob-
viousJy undergirds geometry, has been suggCSted by famous
mathematidanssuch as Hadamard and Einstein to beessentlalto
creative thought in all high level mathematics. Given their im-
portance. therefore, it Is essemial thaI geometry and spalial rea·
SOrting receive grealer anention In Instruction and in research.
A.s t!.'e have seen, and belying itS obvious Importance In
the CUrriculum, StUdents' performance Ifl geometry is woefully
lacking. Neither what StudenlS learn In geometry nor the meth-
ods by whlcll they learn II are satlSf.ttl0ry There ha.s been tOO
little instruCtional altemion given In the United States to Spatial
~nlng.
E\idence supportS a constructivist position on how children
lelm !iplItlal and geometric ideas. Ii appears that there is a
progressive construction of geometric concepts from che per-
cepcual to the conceptual plane, as well as developmental se-
quences In which children buUd increasingly Integrared and
synthesized geometriC schemata. Research ls needed to Iden-
tify the specific cognitive: constructions that children make at all
age levels. especially in the comeXi of supponlve environments
(forexample. those Including manlpulatlves. computer tools, and
engaging tasks). Previously unexplored baors such as language.
schooling, and the immediate social culture deserve anention
In any such research progr.un. Research on geomelric represen-
tations from me cognitive science perspective should aJso be.
Integr:lled In this quest Ideally, such research should Inform
GEOMETRY AND SPATIAL REASONING • 457
us how to build on the su-ength of children'S existing Intuitions
while ultimately :tiding them In transcendlflg the shoncomings
of these Intuitions.
Similarly, research that elaborates and extcnds the van
Hide lbeery is crudal. This perspecdve appears 10 hold much
promise for d1e improvemcol of both research and instruc-
tion. and funher elaboration and e.xplicatiOn of such notions
as "levels of geometric thinking" C:l:n help realize this promise
In addition. man~' of the impliculons Jor instruction previOUsly
described c:m and should be directly assessed in future slud-
les. Espedally crucl:t\ is research on the phases of Instruction,
which has not received ':ldequate :lUemion.
Perhaps the greatest strengths and we-dknesses of che cognl.
live scIence approach lie in lIS ~xtfCme degree of speafiC:l:lion.
It pn.:wldes much-needed details on cognitive processes (and
tbus forces explication o n nmlons too often left vague In other
theories, such as "nenvorks of relallons"). It may in panicular
provide explidtness 10 limited aspectS of srudents' represen-
tations at lower van Hlele levels (for example, visual repre-
sentatrons via PDP representations) and of concep.: formalion.
However, in a quest for m:lchloe-codable formats, some theo-
ries e5Chew such imponanr consllUCtS as belief systems, moti.
vation, 2nd meaningful interpretation of subiect mallet, while
de-empl'wizing the roles of inruillon and rulrure. Thus. a syn-
thesis of cognitive sclern:e, ?iagctian, van Hiele, and Other con·
structivist theorles may yield panlcular riches.
Empowering students with methods by which they can es-
tablish for themselves mathematlc:al truth and, thus, helping
StUdentS develop intellectual autonomy. is 01 crilic::al goal of ge_
ometry h'lStrudion. and indeed or all mathematics instruction.
Currently, Ihis gool i~ trealed in :.t formal sense only m geom·
etry, and, unfonunalely, our inwuolonal anempts at achieving
this goal are failing, While we rruty dismiss fonnal proor a.s
an instructional oblcCtive that ooly the best students need to
master -thus we need not be ovcrly concerned with our Inabil·
ity to leach It-we cannot SO dismiss the proces~ of establishmg
mathernalial truch. It Is the essellCC' of mathematics. without It.
srudents cannot do mathematics. they can only examine non-
critically what cxhers have done. Thus. much more atlention
should be focused on research aimed at discovering how this
Import2l1l proceM develops.. its effea on students' beliefs about
and struCturing of geometry knowledge, and how, for srudenlS,
it C:l:n culminate in giving formal proofS.
Furure investigations need 10 consider how Visual thinkIng
is manifest in higher levels of geometric thinking. It has been
posrulated here that visual thl~ng has a number of p5}'Cho-
logical layers. from primitive to sophisticaled, each of which
plays a different role In thinlting, depending on which layer is
activlltoo
We know a substanCial amount about srudents' learning of
geometric conceptS. We need leaching/learning research that
leads students to COnstrUd robust concepts through a me:tnlng-
ful synthesiS of di~rams and visual hmge:s on the one hand.
and through verbal definitions and analyses on the other. Such
research should address the interrelationships between verbal
and vi~ual processing. It might also srudy how 10 help stu·
dents build on, strengthen, and elaborate their eXisting intu-
itions about space and, ultimalely, develop second-order. ge0-
metric Imullions.

458 • LEARNING FROM INSTRUCTION
Computers can help establish fecund erlVlronmenlS for the
study of students' geometric thinking. Research indiCates that
appropriately des igned software, sud, as logo and the Geomer-
lie. suppose; can engender high le~"els of geometriC thinking.
We need to learn more about the design of engaging taSks and
teacher mediation, especially with an eye 10 using such soft-
W3re as a catalyst for the development of classroom cultures in
which bom teachers and studentS expand melr beliefs about
learning and understanding geomeuy.
We have reported gender differences in both geomelf)' and
spatial reasoning f.lVoring males. If rese'JrChe£5 focus not on
whether such differences exist but rather on their exact nature,
such differences can provide one perspective for investigating
the menIal processes of aU studentS. That is, by Investigating
how males and females reason differently when dealing with
spatial ideas and geometry. we may be able to bener under-
SGlnd me development of geometric and spatial thinking for
all studentS. However, because there is obviously much more
variability in perfo rmance and processing wilbin genders than
between them, we should eventually be able to move beyond
studying gender d ifferences to the study of the dlfferenl cog-
nitive profiles that underlie successful performance in geom-
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