11. MAGISTRADO VS.

PEOPLE, 527 SCRA 125

FACTS:
Private respondent Elena Librojo filed a criminal complaint against accused Francisco Magistrado before
the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City. An information was filed against the accused for perjury before
the MTC of Quezon City.
The Information alleged that the accused subscribed and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before a notary
public stating that he lost his Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of TCT. The same affidavit was used by
accused to support his Petition for Issuance of New Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Certificate of TCT filed with
the RTC of Quezon City. A verification was again signed and sworn into by the accused before the notary
public. However, the contents of the same affidavit, already known to the accused, are false. It was later
found out that the property subject of the TCT was mortgaged to respondent Librojo as collateral for a loan.
As a result, respondent suffered damages and prejudice due to the deliberate assertion of falsehoods by
the accused.
Subsequently, petitioner-accused Magistrado filed a motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of a
prejudicial question. Petitioner alleged that the two civil cases (for recovery of sum of money and for
cancellation of mortgage) were pending before the RTC of Quezon City, and that they must be resolved
first before the present criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City denied the motion. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the two civil cases (for Recovery of Sum of Money and for Cancellation of Mortgage)
constitutes a prejudicial question that would warrant a suspension of the criminal case of perjury?
HELD:
No, a prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve
the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in
the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity “that the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal case,” therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither
is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.
In concluding the case, the Court stated that “it is evident that the civil cases and the criminal cases can
proceed independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish
the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case of perjury.
12. PIMENTEL VS. PIMENTEL, 630 SCRA 436
Facts:
Respondent filed a criminal case against his husband Petitioner of parricide. During the pendency of the
case, respondent instituted a civil action of nullity of her marriage with the petitioner on the ground of
Psychological Incapacity. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in
the criminal case filed against him before the RTC. RTC and CA denied the motion of the petitioner finding
that there was no Prejudicial Question. Hence this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants
the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner?
HELD:
No, The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this
case, the Information for Frustrated Parricide was filed before the Civil Case was instituted. Clearly, the civil
case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil
action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of
the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which
punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of
his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” The relationship between the offender and the victim
distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
13. J.M. DOMINGUEZ VS. LICLICAN, 764 SCRA 338 (7/28/15)
Facts:
During the annual stockholders meeting of petitioners the election for its new set of directors was
conducted. This event was presided by then company’s officers. Conflict ensued when petitioners were
allegedly not allowed to vote on the ground that they are not registered stockholders of JMD. Petitioners
walked out the meeting, while the election pushed through and elected the Respondents. Petitioners filed a
civil case against the Respondent to nullify the said election. While the case was pending, respondents
withdrew money out of the JMD account that led the Petitioner filing a qualified theft against the
respondents alleging that they are not authorized to withdrew money of of JMD’s account. RTC issued a
warrant of arrest against the Respondents. Respondents appealed to the CA to nullify the arrest alleged
existence of a prejudicial question. CA ruled in favor of the respondents. Petitioner filed a motion stating
that the Prejudicial Question was already resolved in their favor which cure the defect of the order of the
RTC. CA ruled in negative, hence this case.
Issue:
Whether the subsequent resolution of the prejudicial question did cure the defect of not recognizing the
said question
HELD:
No, The resolution of the prejudicial question did not, in context, cure the grave abuse of discretion already
committed. The fact remains that when the RTC, issued its challenged Orders, the Judgment in favor of
petitioners was not yet rendered. Consequently, there was still, at that time, a real dispute as to who the
rightful set of officers were. Plainly, the RTC Judge should not have issued the challenged Orders and
should have, instead, suspended the proceedings until Civil Case was resolved with finality. To grant the
instant petition and rule that the procedural infirmity has subsequently been cured either by the Judgment
or by Judge’s inhibition would mean condoning the continuation of the criminal proceedings despite, at that
time, the existence of a prejudicial question. Such condonation would create a precedent that renders
inutile the doctrine on prejudicial question, such that the court trying the criminal case will be permitted to
proceed with the trial in the aberrant assumption that the resolution of the prior instituted civil case would
benefit the private complainant in the criminal proceedings.
14. FENEQUITO VS. VERGARA, JR., 677 SCRA 113
Fact:
Respondent filed a case against the petitioner for falsification of public document, the City Prosecutor filed
the information to the MeTC. The Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of
Probable Cause. The MeTC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of probable cause. Respondent
appealed to the RTC. RTC granted the appeal and ordered the MeTC to proceed with the trial. Petitioner
petitioned to the CA to review the RTC decision. CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Petitioner when to the SC to
petition the review of the decision of the CA. Hence this case.
Issue:
Whether the PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report submitted as evidence by respondent to
the prosecutor’s office, showed that the findings therein are not conclusive and, thus, insufficient to support
a finding of probable cause.
HELD:
No, a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
15. BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION VS. REYES, 687 SCRA 524
Facts:
Josefa “Jing” Reyes offered her services to petitioner as the latter’s real estate agent in buying parcels of
land in Calamba, Laguna, which are to be developed into a golf course. She informed the petitioner that
more or less then (10) lot owners are her clients who were willing to sell their properties. Convinced of her
representations, petitioner released the amount of P23,423,327.50 in her favor to be used in buying those
parcels of land.
Reyes, instead of buying those parcels of land, converted and misappropriated the money given by
petitioner to her personal use and benefit. Petitioner sent a formal demand for Reyes to return the amount
of P23,423,327.50, but to no avail despite her receipt of the said demand.
As such, petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of Estafa against Reyes before the Assistant Prosecutor’s
Office of Makati City. The respondent admitted that she in fact received the said amount from the petitioner,
but she gave the money to a certain Mateo Elejorde whom she filed a criminal case for misappropriating
the said funds. That she has no intention to take the said amount for her personal benefit. The prosecutor
found probable cause against the respondent and filed information before the RTC. Respondent appealed
the said resolution of the prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice, which was first denied but subsequently
granted on reconsideration. DOJ ordered the prosecutor to withdraw the said information. Petitioner asked
the CA for review with was denied. Hence this case.
Issue:
Whether probable cause exist in filing the information against the accused
HELD:
Yes, that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a preliminary investigation. A preliminary
investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine
whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof. That in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines
whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not
call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on
the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence. Precisely, there is
a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.
16. ABANADO VS. BAYONA, 677 SCRA 595
Facts:
Petitioner filed an information to the MTC and raffled to the respondent. Petitioner requested the court to
issue a warrant of arrest to the accused in the said information. All documents was submitted the the
petitioner except the denied resolution of the Investigating prosecutor. The Respondent ordered the
petitioner to produced the said resolution which the petitioner refused as it he is not mandated to produce
the said document. The respondent filed a contempt case against the Petitioner which the petitioner
retaliated by filing this administrative case.
Issue:
Whether the MTC has jurisdiction in conducting a preliminary Investigation
HELD:
No, the conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function.30 Thus, the courts must
consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting preliminary investigations
whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. The DOJ-NPS Manual states that the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only “as far as practicable.”
Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules.
17. HEIRS OF NESTOR TRIA VS. OBIAS, 635 SCRA 91
Fact:
Engr. Nestor Tria, RD of DPWH Region V was shot by a gunman while waiting to board his flight to Manila.
He was brought to a hospital but died the following day from the lone gunshot wound on his nape. NBI
Regional Director Alejandro R. Tenerife, Chairman of Task Force Tria, recommended to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the indictment of Obet Aclan, Totoy Ona, and Atty. Epifania “Fanny”
Gonzales-Obias, for the murder of Engr. Tria. During the preliminary investigation, respondent filed her
Counter-Affidavit denying that she was in anyway involved with the killing of Engr. Tria, and further
asserted that from the totality of evidence gathered by the NBI, it has not established prima facie the
existence of conspiracy as to implicate her in the death of Engr. Tria.
The Prosecutor issued a resolution directing the filing of an information for murder against Aclan and Ona
but dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence as against Obias. Petitioners appealed to the DOJ,
assailing the Prosecutor’s order to dismiss the charge against Obias. As such, Justice Secretary Cuevas
issued a Resolution directing the Prosecutor to include Obias in the information. The DOJ was convinced
that the sequence of events and respondent’s conduct before, during and after the killing of Engr. Tria
undeniably points to her complicity with Aclan and Ona.
Respondent Obias, along with Aclan and Ona, filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ’s resolution, to
which the DOJ denied. An Information against Aclan, Ona, and Obias was then filed with the RTC.
Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the DOJ under the provisions of Administrative Order No. 18,
series of 1987. In a letter dated December 3, 2001 addressed to respondent’s counsel, the DOJ denied
respondent’s notice of appeal on the ground that pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 1266 dated
November 4, 1983, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 58 dated June 30, 1993, appeals to the OP
where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged is “reclusion perpetua to death,” shall be taken by
petition for review.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of her notice of appeal. However, the DOJ
denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration stating that the proper procedure is the filing of an appeal
or petition for review with the OP and not before the DOJ. Hence, the case was considered closed and
terminated.
OP dismissed the murder charge. CA affirmed OP’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the OP’s dismissal of the murder charge.
HELD:
NO. In arguing that the CA gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the OP’s dismissal of the murder
charge against respondent, petitioner invoked SC’s ruling in Crespo v. Mogul that any disposition of the
case rests on the sound discretion of the court once an information has been filed with it.
A prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information
where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up its averments, or that the evidence at hand
points to a different conclusion. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against
respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the investigating prosecutor and ultimately,
that of the Secretary of Justice.
The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause is subject
to the power of review by the DOJ. Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of
the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding
information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the
complaint or information with notice to the parties. Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not
lodged with the SC. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or
judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.
However, SC may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the
records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions.
Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is,
or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The
term does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial; it is
not a pronouncement of guilt.
Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial function. It is
essentially an inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be reasonably
charged with a crime. Prosecutor’s control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the
conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in
appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the executive determination was done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not
subject to review unless made with grave abuse.
18. UY VS. JAVELLANA, 680 SCRA 13
An administrative case was filed against Judge Javellana arising from a verified complaint for “gross
ignorance of the law and procedure, gross incompetence neglect of dully, conduct improper and
unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others”, filed by the Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of the
Public Attorney’s Office.

The complaint/allegations involve cases decided and/or were handled by Judge Javallena and his alleged
business relation as co-agent in a surety company. In People vs. Lopez, a case of malicious mischief,
Judge Javallana did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and instead, conducted a
preliminary investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for
arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complaint and her witness had no personal
knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of
said case.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure?
HELD:
Yes, Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
issued warrants of arrest without propounding searching questions to the complainants and their witnesses
to determine the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody. As a result, Judge Javellana
issued warrants of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when a
warrantless arrest had been affected.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary
investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. As
has been previously established herein, the maximum penalty imposable for malicious mischief in People v.
Lopez, et al. is just six (6) months.

Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation in
People v. Lopez, et al. We stress that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to
promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional
rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.[37] Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily
conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.
19. PEOPLE VS. VALENCIA, 214 SCRA 89
 ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; CAN BE FILED WITHOUT A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION AGAINST AN ACCUSED ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT. — A person who is
lawfully arrested without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court should
be delivered to the nearest police station and proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Under said Section 7, Rule 112, the prosecuting officer can file the Information in court without a
preliminary investigation, which was done in the accused-appellant’s case.

ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; DEEMED WAIVED WHEN NOT INVOKED. — Since the
records do not show whether the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the case had
been filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant signified his readiness to be arraigned, the Court can
only conclude that he waived his right to have a preliminary investigation, when he did, in fact, pleaded "Not
Guilty" upon his arraignment.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Alejandro Valencia y Canaria appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
branch 12, in Criminal Case Nos. 89-72061, and 89-72062 1 convicting him of (1) Homicide with the use of
an unlicensed firearm and (2) Less Serious Physical Injuries, the dispositive portion of which is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, ALEJANDRO
VALENCIA y CANARIA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt —
The People's version of the facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General is as follows:
"Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez, her two children, Annabelle and Samuel, Jr., aged five and three, respectively,
and her mother, are residents of 2008 F. Muñoz St., Paco, Manila. At about 9:00 p.m. of March 19, 1989,
as she was about to eat supper, she noticed appellant standing five steps away from the open door of her
house and holding a sumpak, a homemade shotgun. Seized with fear, she closed the door. After a few
moments, she heard a burst of gunfire. This was followed by cries of pain from her children inside the
house. Seeing her children bloodied, she immediately went outside and shouted for help. As she did so,
she saw appellant running away, carrying the sumpak. Two neighbors assisted Jimenez in bringing the
injured children to the Philippine General Hospital (tsn, pp. 2-5, 8, 17, Aug. 7, 1989).
"That same evening, Patrolman Renato Marquez, a homicide investigator, interviewed Jimenez at the
hospital about the shooting incident. Since she was still experiencing shock over the incident, Jimenez
forgot to mention the name of appellant as the one who shot her children (tsn, pp. 4, 14, Aug. 21, 1989).
"Acting on the report of a barangay tanod, Patrolmen Roberto Cajiles, Romeo de la Peña and Carlos
Castañeda, assigned at the Ong Detachment, Police Station No. 5, conducted an investigation of the
shooting incident in the house of Jimenez. At the time, Jimenez and her injured children were already in the
hospital. Nevertheless, Pat. Cajiles was able to interview the mother of Jimenez, the barangay captain, a
certain Josie, and appellant's brother, Rolando, who all mentioned appellant as the gunwielder. Moreover,
the policemen discovered the presence of six pellet holes and one big hole with the size of the
circumference of a shotgun bullet on the door of the house of Jimenez. Three pellets were also found at the
crime scene (tsn. pp. 3-6; 9, 10, Sept. 4, 1989).
"Early next morning, the three policemen were led by Rolando Valencia to the residence of Sonia Castillo,
his aunt, where he believed appellant was sleeping. The police apprehended appellant there and took him
to the Ong Detachment for initial investigation (tsn, pp. 7, 11-13, Sept. 4, 1989). He was indorsed to the
police headquarters for further investigation in the evening of March 22, 1989 (tsn. p. 7, Aug. 21, 1989). At
12:20 a.m. of the following day, one of the injured children, Annabelle, died as a result of the gunshot
wounds she suffered (Exh. H). The other child, Samuel Jr., who was shot in the right forearm, was
discharged from the hospital one week after the incident, but needed two (2) more weeks for healing (tsn.
p. 3, Aug. 21, 1989).
"On March 26, 1989, Arlyn Jimenez executed a sworn statement (Exh. B) wherein she identified appellant
as the culprit. On March 30, 1989, a certain Ramon Bacnotan executed a sworn statement (Exh. J) and
turned over to the police the sumpak (Exh. A) allegedly used by appellant in the shooting of the two
children."
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the defendant-appellant beyond reasonable
doubt in spite of the fact that there was allegedly no preliminary investigation, and that no sufficient
evidence exists proving his guilt?
HELD:
Yes. The accused-appellant decries the fact that he was denied the right of preliminary investigation. This
is not true.
A person who is lawfully arrested, without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5, Rule 113, Rules
of Court should be delivered to the nearest police station and proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7. Under said Section 7, Rule 112, the prosecuting officer can file the Information in court
without a preliminary investigation, which was done in the accused-appellant's case.
Since the records do not show whether the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the
case had been filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant signified his readiness to be arraigned, the
Court can only conclude that he waived his right to have a preliminary investigation, when he did, in fact,
pleaded "Not Guilty" upon his arraignment.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7, (6a, 17a)."
"SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. - When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed
bythe offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for
bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the
accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a
preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in
this Rule. (15a)
20. PCGG VS. NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ, 773 SCRA
Facts:
An Affidavit-Complaint was filed by the PCGG against former officers/directors of theDevelopment Bank of
the Philippines (DBP), namely, Ferry, Tengco, Zosa, Zalamea, Castell, and Sison, as well as former
officers/stockholders of National Galleon Shipping Corporation(Galleon), namely, Cuenca, Tinio, and
Roque charging them of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g)of RA 3019.
In the Affidavit-Complaint, the PCGG alleged that on October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos
(President Ramos) issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc. Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) in order toidentify various anomalous behest loans
entered into by the Philippine Government in the past. Later on, President Ramos issued Memorandum
Order No. 619 on November 9, 1992,laying down the criteria which the Ad Hoc Committee may use as a
frame of reference in determining whether or not a loan is behest in nature. Thereafter, the Ad Hoc
Committee, with the assistance of a Technical Working Group (TWG) consisting of officers and employees
of different government financial institutions (GFIs), examined and studied documents relative to loan
accounts extended by GFIs to various corporations during the regime of the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (President Marcos) -one of which is the loan account grantedby the DBP to Galleo.
Based on the foregoing, the Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the loans/accommodations obtained by
Galleon from DBP possessed positive characteristics of behest loans, considering that: (a) Galleon was
undercapitalized; (b) the loan itself was undercoUateralized; (c) the major stockholders of Galleon were
known to be cronies of President Marcos; and id) certain documents pertaining to the loan account were
found to bear "marginal notes" of President Marcos himself.23 Resultantly, the PCGG filed the instant
criminal complaint against individual respondents, docketed as OMB-C-C-03-0500-I.
Issue:
Whether or not the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict respondents of
violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019?
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation
proceedings - whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to determine whether
or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he
committed. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr.,44 the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in finding
the existence thereof in the following manner, to wit:
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.45
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Verily, preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is
reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held
responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require
an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.46 "[A preliminary investigation]
is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution's] evidence. The presence and
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed
upon after a full-blown trial on the merits."47 Hence, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or
accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper
than at the preliminary investigation level.