COMMENCEMENT OF ACTIONS
acquire jurisdiction because BNP improperly paid
ALBAY VS FGU INSURANCE
FACTS:
 FGU filed a collection sum of money against
ALBAY amounting to 114k.
 ALBAY by answer file a counter claim alleging that
FGU owes the former of 104k and premium
reserves of 500k.
 FGU move to dismiss ALBAY counterclaim for
filing it not within the reglementary period and for
non-payment of dockets fees hence court will not
acquire jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N ALBAY counterclaim is exempt from not
payment of docket fees?
DOCTRINE/RULING:
 ALBAY filed a permissive counterclaim, in order
the court will acquire jurisdiction the plaintiff
should pay the docket fees. Same rule applies in
permissive counterclaim, third party claims just
like in initiatory pleading.
MERCADO VS CA
FACTS:
 Mercado is a distributor of SMC’s beer products in
quiapo manila.
 SMC provides 7.5M credit line to Mercado and the
latter executed Certificate of deposit from
Chinabank worth 5M and surety bonds from
EASCO worth 2.6M with hold-out agreement.
 Mercado was in default of payment therefore; SMC
notifies CBC to withdraw the said SD.
Mercado filed to RTC to annul the hold-out
agreement and SMC filed its answer with
counterclaim and third-party complaint against
EASCO.
 Mercado died and represented by the heirs
contesting that court has no jurisdiction for non-
payment of docket fees when SMC files its answer
with counterclaim.
ISSUE: W/N SMC counterclaim need to pay dockets fees in
order for the court to acquire jurisdiction?
DOCTRINE/RULING:
 SMC filed a compulsory counterclaim and does not
need to pay a docket fees. It is considered as
compulsory counterclaim when: (1) answer
necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim; (2) falls within the
jurisdiction of the court and (3) does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties over
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
PROTON PILIPINAS VS BANQUE DE NATIONALE DE
PARIS
FACTS:
 Proton avails credit facilities from BNP with
corporate guarantee from other corporations to
assure the payment.
 Proton failed to comply with its obligation.
 BNP filed a complaint with the RTC.
 Proton filed a motion to dismiss that RTC did not
the docket fees prescribe by the clerk of court.
ISSUE: W/N RTC has no jurisdiction on the complaint filed
by BNP against Proton for improper payment of docket
fees.
DOCTRINE/RULING:
 As a general rule, the filing of the initiatory
pleading, the court may relax the payment of the
fee and payment must be within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. In this case, BNP merely
relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court
which turned out to be incorrect (not in bad faith).
Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the
responsibility of reassessing what respondent must
pay within the prescriptive period, failing which
the complaint merits dismissal
RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS VS FORMARAN
FACTS:
 RSB obtained loan from Tan and Obiedo
amounting to P95M with executed mortgage over
the 5 parcels of land.
 RSB defaulted payment hence, Tan and Obiedo
executed the MOA in mortgage.
 RSB filed to RTC for declaration of nullity of deed
of sale and pays docket fees amounting to 13K
assessed by COC.
 Tan and Obiedo filed a motion to dismiss because
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction because it is a real
action and RSB should pay full payment of dockets
fees based on the value of the property.
ISSUE: W/N RSB should pay additional docket fees?
DOCTRINE/RULING:
 Payment of Docket fees is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional. It appears that RSB filed a real action
because it involves recovery of title and possession
of property. Hence, docket fees should be based on
the tax declaration or zonal value of the BIR
whichever is higher. There was intention by the
plaintiff to defraud the government. Hence,
warrant the dismissal of the petition.
SLU VS COBBARUBIAS
FACTS:
 Cobbarubias is a professor from SLU and an active
member of the union faculty.
 There is CBAs containing provision for teaching
employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation.
 Cobbarubias failed to meet the yearly evaluation
and she was forced to file a leave for 1 regular
semester and suspended all the benefits for that
period.
 Cobbarubias filed a case in DOLE and submitted
the issued to VA but the latter dismissed the case
and Cobbarubias appeal under rule 43 (petition for
review) to CA but she failed to pay filing fees. She
filed a motion for reconsideration and the CA
reinstated the petition.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in reinstating the petition despite
upon appeal she fails to pay filing fees within the
reglementary period.
DOCTRINE/RULING:
 Appeal is not a natural right but a statutory
privilege, hence, appeal must be strictly in
accordance with provision set by law. Non-
compliance with the procedural requirements shall
be a sufficient ground for the petition’s
dismissal. Thus, payment in full of docket fees
within the prescribed period is not only mandatory,
but also jurisdictional. Here, the docket fees were
paid late, and without payment of the full docket
fees, Cobarrubias’ appeal was not perfected within
the reglementary period.
 Exceptions on strict observance: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a
litigant from an injustice not commensurate with
his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from
the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case;
(6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8)
the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without the appellant’s fault; (10)
peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances
attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of
the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound
discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant
circumstances.  (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
GIPA VS SLI
FACTS:
 SLI filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against Gipa et al.
 SLI alleged that they are the absolute owners of the
contested parcel of land whereas, Gipa et al
believed that they have the right over the land
because their predecessors in interest occupied the
property since the 1950s.
 RTC ruled in favor of SLI and Gipa appeal to CA
but the latter dismissed because it shows that the
appellate court docket fee and other lawful fees
was not paid.
 Gipa shows proof that they paid the docket fees in
RTC amounted to 3000 pesos but the 30 pesos legal
research fee as part of that docket fee was not paid
for 9 months.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in dismissing the case for failure to
pay the 30 pesos other lawful fees?
DOCTRINE/RULING:
 As a rule, the court may relax the payment of
docket fees or other lawful fees in the name of
substantial justice and equity. The party who claims
the exemptions must prove the same and must
adequately explain his failure to abide those rules.
Gipa’s failure to advance any explanation as to why
they failed to pay the correct docket fees or to
complete payment of the same within the period
allowed by the CA is thus fatal to their cause.
Hence, a departure from the rule on the payment of
the appeal fee is unwarranted.
SY-VARGAS VS ESTATE OF OGSOS
FACTS:
 One of the heirs of Ogsos (Kathryn) filed a
complaind for specific performance and damages
against Sy-Vargas for the latters default in payment
of rental fee based on the contract of lease executed
between them.
 Sy-Vargas et al files they answer with counterclaim
alleging that they faithfully complied with their
obligations and Kathryn took the possession of the
property and suffered losses as cause of their
default in payment to their obligations. Therefore,
in their answer with counterclaim they are claiming
for loss of profits plus damages.
 Kathryn moved for the dismissal of case for non-
payment of dockets fees because the counterclaim
is permissive hence requires payment of docket
fees.
 RTC ruled in favor to Sy-Vargas and CA affirmed
the ruling of the RTC that counterclaim made by
Sy-Vargas was a compulsory hence no need to pay
dockets fees.
ISSUE: W/N Sy-Vargas counterclaim is compulsory and
not permissive in nature?
DOCTIRNE/RULING:
 4 TESTS in determining if it is compulsory
counterclaim:
 (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim
and the counterclaim largely the same?
defendant's claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or
refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's
counterclaim? and
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim
and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of
separate trials of the respective claims of the parties
would entail a substantial duplication of effort and
time by the parties and the court?
 The counterclaim made by Sy-Vargas does not
meet the 4 requirements, hence it is permissive
counterclaim and they required to pay the docket
fees. However, the respondents cannot be faulted
for non-payment of dockets fees because the RTC
found such counterclaim as compulsory in nature
and affirmed by the CA. The respondent relied on
the finding the courts and exhibited good faith for
non-payment of docket fees and no intention to
defraud the government. Therefore, the judgement
of monetary awards shall be constituted as lien for
the payment of docket fees.
CAMASO VS TSM SHIPPING
FACTS:
 Camaso signed a contract of employment to TSM
for 6 months as a 2nd mate.
  Camaso during his employment he develops
tonsillar cancer and believing that his sickness was
related to his job.
 The employer (TSM) refuse to shoulder the medical
expenses. Hence, Camaso filed with the LA
petitions for disability benefit, sickness allowance,
reimbursement of medical expenses against the
TSM.
 LA ruled in favor of Camaso but on appeal to
NLRC it was reversed and motion for
reconsideration was denied.
 Camaso, appeal to CA but dismissed on the ground
that Camaso did not pay docket fees when he files
his appeal to CA. Then, Camaso, files his motion
for reconsideration and alleged that he pays the
dockets pays representing check attached to the
appeal before the CA (overlooked by the COC) but
the latter denied for lack of merit citing the
presumption of regularity of official duties (check is
not a mode of payment of docket fees).
ISSUE: W/N CA correctly dismissed the Camaso’s petition
for non-payment of dockets fees?
DOCTRINE/RULING:
 Failure to pay the required docket fees per
se should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of a
case. It has long been settled that while the court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-
payment at the time of filing of the initiatory
pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal
provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a
reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention
on the part of the claimant to defraud the
government.
 In this case, Although, check was not authorized as
mode of payment, but Camaso exerted earnest
effort to pay the required dockets fees. Clearly, he
exhibits good faith and no intention to defraud the
government.
 The Court deems it appropriate to relax the
technical rules of procedure substantial justice.
SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTIONS
DYNAMIC BUILDERS VS PRESBITERO
FACTS:
 Presbitero is a municipal mayor of Valladolid,
Negros Occidental who rendered
decision/resolution in awarding of bidder with
regard to its infrastructure project known as
“Construction Shoreline Protection Project”.
 Dynamic builder is one of the bidders for the said
projects in fact it offered its price to Bidding
Committee considering the former as the lowest
bidder.
 The Bidding Committed awarded the projects to
HLJ Construction and Enterprise as the second
lowest bidder, upon NO OBJECTION received, and
then issue the notice of award.
 The bidding award committee wrote a letter to all
losing bidders about its findings and decision.
 Dynamics filed a protest to RTC annulling the
decision and resolution of Mayor Presbitero and
also files an injunctive relief to Supreme Court
invoking the RA 8975 as amended by the PD 1818
that they are force to file 2 separate actions with
same cause of action because provided on these
laws that SC can only issue that injunctive relief
and prohibits the other courts in issuing of such
relief.
ISSUE: W/N Dynamics builders commits splitting of
actions based on 1 cause of action which prohibits by the
rules of court or committed improper remedy?
DOCTRINE/RULING:
 Builders dynamics relies on these laws that the
Supreme Court has the sole authority to issue
injunctive relief and prohibits other courts issuing
the same not limited only to case involving
infrastructure projects whether national or local
projects – Sec. 3 of RA 8975 provides that no
courts, except the Supreme Court can issue TRO
or PI.
 The SC held that this prohibition shall not apply
when the matter is extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a TRO is
issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will
arise. In other words, the RTC can still issue PI or
TRO when there is a compelling constitutional
violation.
 Therefore, petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
The builders dynamics must file its injunctive
relief together with its petition for annulling the
decision/resolution before the RTC. The RA 8975
is align with the state policies provides that these
safeguards are consistent with the law’s policy for
the expeditious implementation of government
projects that ultimately benefit the public.
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS – REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST
RELUCIO VS LOPEZ
FACTS:
 Angelina Lopez filed a petition for appointment as
sole administratrix of conjugal partnership of
properties, forfeiture of shares before the court
alleging that her husband Alberto Lopez
abandoned her and his 4 children and maintain
illicit relationship with named, Imelda Relucio.
 Imelda Relucio filed a motion to dismiss because
Angelina has no cause of action against her and
pleaded her as a party to the case because some of
the properties were named in her.
 RTC denied the motion and CA affirmed, hence
this petition to this court.
ISSUE: W/N Imelda Relucio is an indispensable party or
necessary to the case?
DOCTRINE/RULING:
 Indispensable party is one without whom there can
be no final determination of an action while
necessary party is not indispensable but who ought
to be joined as party if complete relief is to be
accorded those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of
the action.
  In this case, Relucio is neither an indispensable or
necessary party because when the court issue
judgment against her husband for the accounting of
properties would resolve her petition and that
judgment is valid and enforceable against her
husband only. Moreover, any judgments in special
proceeding would not affect the petitioner
(Relucio).
DE CASTRO VS CA
FACTS:
 Constante and Corazon De Castro were co-owners
of 4 lots and Antigo authorized to be a broker in
selling of those lots with an agreement of he will be
receiving a commission of 5% based on the selling
price when he sold the parcels of land.
 Antigo sold the 2 lots for 7M to Times Transit
Corporation and he was given of 48K for his
commission. Antigo asserted that he is entitled for
350k as commission based on the agreement. Then,
Antigo filed a complaint against the De Castros.
 De Castros moved for the dismissal of the case
because Antigo failed to implead the other co-
owners of the lots as indispensable parties to case.
ISSUE: W/N the case will be dismissed on the ground of
failure to include the other co-owners of the lots as
indispensable party?
DOCTRINE/RULING:
 Indispensable party is one whose interest will be
affected by the judgment and without whom there
can be no final determination of the case. In this
case, the other co-owner is not necessary to be
impleaded in this case because the contract of
agency is between Constante and Antigo only.
Therefore, the mandatory joinder of indispensable
party is not applicable on this case.
ORQUIOLA VS CA
FACTS:
 Pura Ledesma is the owner of lot 689 in Tandang
Sora, QC. This parcel of land was adjacent to Lot
707 owned by Ped Herminigilda Pedro.
 Pedro sold the lot to Lising Realty.
 Lising Realty subdivided the lots into smaller lots
and some portion of it was sold to spouses
Orquiola.
 Sometime in 1969, Ledesma filed a complaint
against Pedro and Lising for encroaching of lot 689.
 RTC rendered decision against Pedro and Lising
and solidarily liable and ordered writ of
demolition.
 The spouses Orquiola as buyer in good faith appeal
to CA for TRO and they were not impleaded in the
civil case as indispensable party hence, the decision
rendered by the RTC cannot be enforced against
them and this is a violation of due process.
ISSUE: W/N judgement of the RTC in the civil case cannot
be enforced against them for failure to implead them in the
civil case?
DOCTRINE/RULING:
 Failure of the respondent (Ledesma) to implead the
spouses Orquiola as indispensable party to the civil
case the court cannot reach to final determination of
the case. No enforcement of judgment in the
proceeding against the stranger to case because it
will tantamount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION VS OLIVER
FACTS:
 Lim and Oliver – One opened a joint account in the
CBC and obtained a loan of 17M.
 Lim and Oliver – One executed a promissory note
amounting to 16M with mortgage over the parcel of
land located in Munting Lupa, the mortgage was
annotated to the original CTC and the duplicate
copy was given to the bank.
 Some time ago, there is Oliver – Two who is
claiming that she is the true owner of the land and
she did not contract of loan with the CBC. Hence,
she filed a petition RTC to annul the annotation of
mortgage in the CTC and render the mortgage
contract be void and issue clean title to her.
 CBC filed a motion to dismiss for non-joiner of
indispensable party “Oliver – One” (under rule 3
Section 7).
 But it was denied by the RTC Judge and CBC filed
a petition for certiorari praying for the issuance of
writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC judge erred in denying the motion to
dismiss against CBC for not impleading the indispensable
party?
DOCTRINE/RULING:
 An indispensable party is a party in interest,
without whom no final determination can be had
of an action.
 The absence of Oliver – One from the case does not
hamper the trial court in resolving the dispute
between the Oliver – Two (respondent) and CBC
(petitioner).
 Oliver – One participation is to enable the CBC to
file claim against her. Hence, CBC should file a
third party-complaint instead of dismissing the
case.
 The Rule 3 Section 7 will not apply in this case,
instead the Sec. 11 of Rule 3 will apply – non joiner
of parties is not a ground for dismissal. The CBC
should be impleaded Oliver – One on the basis of
the liability to them who falsely contracted a loan.
DAVIS VS PARAGAS
FACTS:
 David, Paragas and Lobrin formed a business
venture named Olympia International Ltd located
in Hongkong.
 Olympia has offices in HK and Philippines.
 David is the one who is in charge in marketing in
the Philippines office.
 David was tasks to remit the money from HK
under the pares pares program which will be
deposited to Olympias RCBC account and then will
pay its planholders and shares of directors.
  Out of 82M which includes the 30% payment for
the subscribers. It was discovered by Lobrin that
only 19M was remitted or deposited to RCBC bank.
 BODs move for the removal of David and David
filed a declaratory relief, sum of money and
damages.
 Paragas and Lobrin filed answers with series
counterclaims. But the parties reach in the comprise
agreement under Olympia as a party and
withdrawal of counterclaims.

ISSUE: W/N Olympia is not a party to the case hence

dismissal of the complaint and compulsory claims
because it is personal in nature?
DOCTRINE/RULING:
 Olympia is indispensable party to the case, the
Court has held that the absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even to those present.
The failure to implead an indispensable party is not
a mere procedural matter. Rather, it brings to fore
the right of a disregarded party to its constitutional
rights to due process. Having Olympia’s interest
being subjected to a judicially-approved agreement,
absent any participation in the proceeding leading
to the same, is procedurally flawed. It is unfair for
being violative of its right to due process. 

LBP VS CACAYURAN
FACTS:
 Municipality of Agoo entered into a loan agreement
with LBP in order to refinance the Redevelopment
Plan of Agoo Public Plaza, and some portion of the
plaza was used as a collateral for the said loan.
 Cacayuran as a resident opposed in the loan
agreement as well as by means of its funding. He
claims that it is violative to the law, detrimental to
public interest.
 RTC ruled that loan was void and it was affirmed
by the CA.
 LBP appeal for dismissal that Municipal of Agoo
was not impleaded as an indispensable party to
case

ISSUE: W/N Municipality of Agoo was an indispensable

party?

DOCTIRINE/RULING:
 Failure to implead any indispensable party is not a
ground for the dismissal of the complaint. The
proper remedy is to implead them. In this case,
Cacayuran failed to implead the Municipality, a
real party in interest and an indispensable party
that stands to be directly affected by any judicial
resolution. It is the contracting party and the owner
of the public plaza. It stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment of the case.

LOTTE PHIL. CO., INC V DELA CRUZ ET.AL
TOPIC: INDISPENSIBLE PARTY; NON-
JOINDER – EFFECTS
Facts: 1995 until 2000, 7J Maintenance and
Janitorial Services (7J) entered into a contract with Lotte to
provide manpower. In compliance with the contract, and to
accommodate the needs of Lotte for workers, Dela Cruz
were hired and assigned to Lotte as repackers or sealers.
However, Lotte dispensed with their services allegedly due
to the expiration/termination of the service contract by
Lotte with 7J. Respondents were never called back again.
LA declared 7J as employer of respondents and finding 7J
guilty of illegal dismissal. NLRC denied the MR.
CA reversed LA and NLRC and declared Lotte as the real
employer of respondents and that 7J who engaged in labor-
only contracting was merely the agent of Lotte. 
Issue: WON 7J is an indispensable party and should have
been impleaded in respondent’s petition in the CA
Held: YES. An indispensable party is a party in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an
action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is
mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is
necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is the
authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a
case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to
a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real
finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.
Here, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest
because it will be affected by the outcome of the
case.  Hence, the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over 7J. No
final ruling on this matter can be had without impleading
7J, whose inclusion is necessary for the effective and
complete resolution of the case and in order to accord all
parties with due process and fair play.
In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed
to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite
the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to
comply therefor.
Carabeo vs Dingco
Facts:
 Carabeo and spouses Dingco entered into a
contract “Kasunduan sa bilihan ng Karapatan sa
lupa”
 Carabeo agreed to sell their rights over the land
located in Orani, Bataan for 38,000.
 Spouses made a DP of 10,000 and installments
accumulated to 9,100.
 But on the balance of 18,900 Carabeo refuse to
accept because there was still needed to fix about
the on-going squabble.
 Spouses Dingco filed for specific performance on
the RTC and Carabeo as an answer the sales was
void. RTC ruled in favor of Spousesand CA
affirmed.
 During the pendency of the case Carabeo died.
ISSUE: W/N the death of Carabeo would result to the
dismissal of the case?
DOCTRINE/ISSUE::
 Death of Carabeo is not a valid ground for
dismissal of the action because when the actions
involves property rights it will survives. Judgement
is still enforceable against her representative or
successor-in-interest.
De La Cruz vs Joaquin : 162788 : July 28, 2005
FACTS: The case originated from a Complaint for the
recovery of possession and ownership, the cancellation of
title, and damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin against
petitioners in the RTC.  The RTC ruled in favor of
respondent ordering herein petitioners to reconvey the
property upon his payment. Petitioners assert that the
RTC’s Decision was invalid for lack of jurisdiction claiming
that respondent died during the pendency of the case and
there being no substitution by the heirs, the trial court
allegedly lacked jurisdiction over the litigation.
ISSUE: WON the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case
upon the death of Pedro Joaquin?
HELD: NO. When a party to a pending action dies and the
claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a
substitution of the deceased.  The procedure is specifically
governed by Section 16 of Rule 3. The rule on the
substitution of parties was crafted to protect every party’s
right to due process. The estate of the deceased party will
continue to be properly represented in the suit through the
duly appointed legal representative. A formal substitution
by heirs is not necessary when as in the present case, they
themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and
present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions
negate any claim that the right to due process was violated.
The records of the present case contain a “Motion for
Substitution of Party Plaintiff” filed before the CA. The rule
on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction,
but a requirement of due process.  Thus, when due process
is not violated, as when the right of the representative or
heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated
formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity
of a promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for a
deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial
court’s decision.  The alleging party must prove that there
was an undeniable violation of due process.
NAVARRO VS ESCOBIDO
FACTS: Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints
before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with
damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go
prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure
of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession. In his
Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense
that the two complaints stated no cause of action, since
Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with
Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) —
the actionable documents on which the complaints were
based. RTC dismissed the case but set aside the dismissal
on the presumption that Glenn Go’s (husband) leasing
business is a conjugal property and thus ordered Karen Go
to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff
as per Rule 4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Navarro filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA. According to Navarro,
a complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not
be converted into one with a cause of action by mere
amendment or supplemental pleading. CA denied petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest.
HELD: YES. Karen Go is the registered owner of the
business name Kargo Enterprises, as the registered owner
of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will
directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this
case. Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen Go is
the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say
that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because
her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her
husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises.
Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo
Enterprises and the properties registered under this name;
hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these
properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely
the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-
owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The
other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not
even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
accorded in the suit even without their participation, since
the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all
co-owners.
We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable
party in the action to recover possession of the leased
vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma
party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules,
which states:
Section 4.Spouses as parties. — Husband and wife shall sue
or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to
the action, misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable
parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action
as per Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court.
Divinagracia vs. Parilla
Facts: Conrado, Sr. owned a parcel of land.  He had 2
children with his 1st wife and 7 children with his 2nd
wife.  He also begot 3 illegitimate children. Both Mateo, Sr.
(7 children) and Cebeleo, Sr. (2) pre-deceased Conrado, Sr.
Santiago, who bought the shares of majority of the heirs of a
property left by Conrado, Sr. He filed a complaint for
partition but did not implead Mateo, Sr.’s children. 
RTC found that through the subject document, Santiago
became a co-owner of the subject land and, as such, has the
right to demand the partition of the same. However,
Santiago did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.’s share over the
subject land, considering that Felcon (son of Mateo Sr.)
admitted the lack of authority to bind his siblings with
regard to Mateo, Sr.’s share.
CA dismissed Santiago’s complaint for partition. It held the
Mateo, Sr.’s children are indispensable parties to the
judicial partition and thus, their non-inclusion as
defendants would necessarily result in its dismissal. 
Issue:  WON the action for partition proper without
impleading Mateo, Sr.’s children
Held:  No because the co-heirs are indispensable parties.
They have rights over the subject land and, as such, should
be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for
partition. 
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be
affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without
whom no final determination of the case can be had. The
party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the
relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other
parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding
is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a
resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court
which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence
of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
(Domingo v. Scheer). The non-joinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.  The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable.
In an action of partition – co owners are indispensable
parties.
ERESA CHAVES BIACO,Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, Respondent.
FACTS:
Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa
Chaves Biaco. While employed in the Philippine
Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager,
Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank.
As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto
executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank
covering the parcel of land which the real estate mortgages
bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco.
When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on
its due date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a
written demand,however, proved futile.
Respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of
mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco
before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served
to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office (Export
and Industry Bank). The RTC ruled against them; a writ of
execution was served on the spouses.
Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court
decision contending, among others, that the trial court
failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served
on her through her husband without any explanation as to
why personal service could not be made. The CA affirmed
RTC decision invoking that judicial foreclosure proceedings
are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential as long as the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner?
RULING:  mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, the
No. The Court ruled that validly try and decide the case. In
a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is
acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of
the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized
and made effective.
In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted
by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court
with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure
proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner is not required, it being
sufficient that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
NOTES:
 An action in personam is an action against a
person on the basis of his personal liability.
 An action in rem is an action against the thing
itself instead of against the person.
 An action quasi in rem is one wherein an
individual is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien
burdening the property.
 Nonetheless, summons must be served upon
the defendant not for the purpose of vesting
the court with jurisdiction but merely for
satisfying the due process requirements.
 A resident defendant who does not
voluntarily appear in court, such as petitioner
in this case, must be personally served with
summons as provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court. If she cannot be personally
served with summons within a reasonable
time, substituted service may be effected (1)
by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (2) by leaving the copies at
defendant’s office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof
in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court.
BPI Family Savings Bank Inc vs Sps Yujuico
G.R. No. 175796 July 22, 2015
 Facts: On August 22, 1996, the City of Manila filed a
complaint against the respondents for the
expropriation of five parcels of land located in
Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of
respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of
land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 261331 and TCT No. 261332, were previously
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, under a First
Real Estate Mortgage Contract. On June 30, 2000,
the Regional Trial Court in Manila (Manila RTC)
rendered its judgment declaring the five parcels of
land expropriated for public use. The judgment
became final and executory on January 28, 2001 and
was entered in the book of entries of judgment on
March 23, 2001. The petitioner subsequently filed a
Motion to Intervene in Execution with Partial
Opposition to Defendant’s Request to Release, but
the RTC denied the motion for having been “filed
out of time.” Hence, the petitioner decided to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted
on the two parcels of land subject of the
respondents’ loan. After holding the public auction,
the sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as
the highest bidder at ₱10, 000, 000.00. Claiming a
deficiency amounting to P18, 522155.42, the
petitioner sued the respondents to recover such
deficiency in the Makati RTC (Civil Case No. 03-
450). The respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint on several grounds, namely: that the suit
was barred by res judicata; that the complaint
stated no cause of action; and that the plaintiffs
claim had been waived, abandoned, or
extinguished. In the reply, respondents objected
and alleged that the venue is improper.
Issues: Whether or not improper venue as a ground for
objection maybe raised at anytime.
Held: No. We underscore that in civil proceedings,
venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be
waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus
expressly stipulates that defenses and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. As it relates to the
place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide
convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict
their access to the courts. In other words, unless the
defendant seasonably objects, any action may be
tried by a court despite its being the improper
venue. 
 No. It is basic that the venue of an action depends
on whether it is a real or a personal action. The
determinants of whether an action is of a real or a
personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of
 Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action
is one that affects title to or possession of real
property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real
action is to be commenced and tried in the proper
court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated, which explains why the action is also
referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of
Court declares all other actions as personal actions.
Such actions may include those brought for the
recovery of personal property, or for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of
damages for its breach, or for the recovery of
damages for the commission of an injury to the
person or property. The venue of a personal action
is the place where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant
or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which
reason the action is considered a transitory one.  established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision
 Based on the distinctions between real and personal
actions, an action to recover the deficiency after the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property
mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect
title to or possession of real property, or any
interest therein.
(Note: deficiency in judgment – is a personal action)
CaseDig: A.L. Ang Network vs. Mondejar
G.R. No. 200804; January 22, 2014
Posted by Stephanie Tuquib on 25 July 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint5 for sum of money under the
Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases6 before the
MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of
₱23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for the
period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.  adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Jaca v.
Due to respondent's failure, petitioner disconnected
respondent's water line for not paying the adjusted water
charges since March 2003 up to August 2005.11
The MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent,
holding that she should be considered to have fully paid
petitioner.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC, ascribing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in
finding that it (petitioner) failed to establish with certainty
respondent's obligation, and in not ordering the latter to
pay the full amount sought to be collected.
The RTC issued a Decision21 dismissing the petition for
certiorari, finding that the said petition was only filed to
circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases
as provided under Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure on
Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that it
cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another
decision directing respondent to pay petitioner a bigger
sum than that which has been awarded.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner's
recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims
case.
HELD:
Yes.
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases
states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall
render its decision on the same day, based on the facts
shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the
court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith
served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision
under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not
allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately
move for its execution.25 Nevertheless, the proscription on
appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings
where appeal is not an available remedy,26 does not
preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general
rule has been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security
Pacific Assurance Corporation,27 wherein it was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that
"the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available
where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:
x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
provides that the special civil action of certiorari may only
be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the course of law," this rule is not
without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of
appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a
party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or
equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the
inadequacy – not the mere absence – of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the
writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.
This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:
Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the
extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an absence of an
appeal nor any "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" in the
ordinary course of law, one which has been so defined as a
"remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and
sufficient not merely a remedy which at some time in the Test of 4 Questions in determining in permissive or
future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x compulsory counter claim:
complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy
which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the 1. Have the same factual issues?
injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior 2. Would a final judgement in a main case res judicata
court or tribunal" concerned. x x x (Emphasis supplied) to the counterclaim if the counterclaim file
separately
In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTC's 3. Logical connection
apprehension that respondent's recourse before it (was only 4. Evidence in the main action disprove the claim in
filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of [small the counter claim
claims cases], because it asks [the court] to supplant the
decision of the lower [c]ourt with another decision directing Negative Pregnant – is a denial pregnant with admission
the private respondent to pay the petitioner a bigger sum
than what has been awarded."28 Verily, a petition for
certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action29 designed
to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment.
Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon
petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the
MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or
dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or
not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously,
whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is
material to the controversy.30

In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner

correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the
propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims
case, contrary to the RTC's ruling.

Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said

petition before the proper forum (i.e., the RTC).1âwphi1 To
be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari.31Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does
not give a party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of
his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy
dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari
against first level courts should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court.32 This
procedure is also in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.33

Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively

within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,34 certiorari petitions
assailing its dispositions should be filed before their
corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner
complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari
before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has
jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in
dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an
improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833
must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper
disposition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision

dated November 23, 2011 and Resolution dated February
16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch
45 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC Case No. 11-13833
is hereby REINSTATED and the court a quo is ordered to
resolve the same with dispatch.

ALBA vs MALAPAHO