[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 1
EFFECTS OF POSSESSION
Possessor vs. Owner
SPOUSES ELPIDIO APOSTOL and AMELIA APOSTOL,
petitioners, vs .COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES
EMMANUEL CHUA and EDNA L. CHUA, respondents.
For me: Since this case is under the topic: Possessor vs Owner.
I think ang Possessor kay Spouses Apostol; Owner ka kay
Spouses Chua.
Caveat: Rely at your own risk. hahaha
Facts:
Respondents (Spouses Chua), filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against the petitioners (Spouses Apostol).
Respondents alleged, that they had contracted with the Spouses
Pascua (Paulo and Georgina) for the purchase of a parcel of
land. The petitioners verbally assured the respondents that they
would vacate the property within 10 days from the execution of
the sale. The petitioners then acknowledged that their stay in
the property was only upon the tolerance of its former owners.
Spouses Pascua executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over
the property and the improvements thereon in favor of the
respondents. The respondents were issued TCT (TCT 87610)
over the property. However, despite demands, the petitioners
refused to vacate the property.
Respondents’ special and affirmative defenses and
compulsory counterclaim, (flashback about sa sale sa property)
they alleged that Luz B. Pascua was the owner of the parcel of
land with an area of 315 square meters. She sold a portion
(285.32 square meter) of the property to the respondents.
The parties executed a memorandum agreement
covering the property where the respondents agreed that the
balance of the purchase price would be paid in installments.
Then, a deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of
the respondents over an unsegregated portion (29.68 square
meters) of the property and, later, a deed of confirmation of
deed of absolute sale with waiver over the said property.
Petitioners filed a complaint against the Spouses Chua,
the Spouses Pascua, and the Register of Deeds for annulment
of deed of sale and TCT, and for reconveyance with damages.
The petitioners alleged that they had been in possession of the
property since 1973 and their adverse claim over the property
was annotated Entry No. PE 8812.
Luz Pascua died but Paulo Pascua did not inherit the
property from her because the same had already been sold to
the respondent. (OMG MOMENT: If you asked yourself, sino si
Luz? I think nanay siya ni Paulo. Wala pud sa facts gi mention
kung unsa iyang relationship with Paulo. Mao na ang lisud sa
walang label, di ka kahibaw if kamo or dili or magnanay mo. So
maningkamot ang mga studyante.)
Issue:
Who is entitled to the lawful possession of the subject property?
Ruling:
THE RESPONDENTS
We held that it is an accepted rule that a person who has a
torrens title over the property, such as the respondents, is
entitled to the possession thereof. We declared that the
registered owners are entitled to the possession of the property
covered by the said title from the time such title was issued in
their favor. Moreover, the fact that the respondents were never
in prior physical possession of the subject land is of no moment,
as prior physical possession is necessary only in forcible entry
cases.
N.B. MAO RA NI NA RULING ANG RELATED SA TOPIC.
Further Readings! 
Gi apil nalang pud nako ang decision sa MeTC for further
readings:
1. THE SC AGREED WITH THE CA. THE CA REVERSED THE
DECISION OF THE RTC AND REINSTATED THE DECISION OF
THE MeTC. Basically, we need to read the decision of the MeTC
to completely understand the ruling of the SC
The MeTC ruled that having acquired the property from the
Spouses Pascua, and being the registered owners of the
property, the respondents are entitled to the possession. The
Court holds that plaintiffs are the ones entitled to the material
or physical possession of the subject property. This is so
because they have sufficiently established their title over the
premises in question. They have shown that they are the
registered owners of the subject premises as evidenced by TCT
No. 87610 issued in their name by the Registry of Deeds, which
property they acquired from its former registered owners, the
Sps. Pascua. Hence, as an incident to their ownership over said
property, plaintiffs are entitled to its possession.
2. ALSO PLEASE CHECK PAGE 374 OF PROPERTY BY DE LEON,
Topic: Better right to possess even against owner of the
property.
3. If you have questions, please message sa akong messenger.
Thank you
AYSON VS. ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CARPO
Facts:
• Petitioner has been in possession of three parcels of
land in Pampanga being the owner thereof.
• Petitioner mortgaged said properties to Philippine
National Bank and were subsequently foreclosed after failing to
redeem within the prescribed period.
• The Bank sold one parcel of land to the respondent
herein and a new TCT was issued in favor of the latter.

• Petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC for the
annulment of respondent’s TCT and the deed of sale between
the Bank and the respondent as well as for reconveyance and
damages.
• With the said civil case pending, respondent sent
demand letters to petitioner to vacate the premises.
• Respondent filed a complaint with the MTC for
ejectment with damages. The MTC rendered a decision in favor
of respondent ordering petitioner to vacate subject property.
RTC rendered decision affirming with modifications the MTC’s
decision.
• Petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA assailing the
jurisdiction of RTC.
Issue:
Nature of the right of possession of respondent over the
property.
Ruling:
One who has never been in possession of a property may
acquire better right to possess as where he acquires title to it
through a sale between him and a mortgagee thereby divesting
the mortgagor of ownership and the right to retain possession
thereof.
Respondent was able to present evidence showing that after the
foreclosure of the property, petitioner failed to redeem it within
the redemption period. Thus, the latter was divested of her
ownership and right to retain possession thereof. Respondent
acquired a better right to possess the property after acquiring
title to it through a sale between her and the mortgagee-bank.
The CA correctly held that Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals was
applicable to the controversy. The continued occupation of the
property by petitioner was merely tolerated by respondent.
Consequently, the former was bound by an implied promise that
she would vacate the premises upon demand. Her failure to do
so justified respondent's action for ejectment filed in the MTC.
Remedies of Person Deprived of Possession
DANILA & SUPREMA DUMO ET AL. V ERLINDA ESPINAS,
ET AL. GR 141962; 2006
Facts:
Petitioners allege that they are the owners-possesors
of a parcel of sandy lands (beach resort) with all the
improvements thereon.
Sometime in 1995, respondents filed a civil case for
Quieting of Title against Sps Saldana. The decision was in favor
of the herein respondents. However, it was not enforced (for
some reason that the court did not elaborate).
Subsequently, in 1996, the respondents, with force,
intimidation, threat, and armed with bolos, etc. took it upon
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 2
themselves to take possession of the property and deprived the
petitioners of possession despite the protestations of the
petitioners who were in actual possession of the property during
that time. The petitioners also alleged that the respondents
demolished all the improvements thereon.
Petitioners filed a case for forcible entry. The
petitioners also prayed for an award for actual damages, lost
earnings, moral damages, and attorney’s fees.
Respondents arguments: they purchased the lot from Carlos
Calica; the taxes were declared under their name; the land has
already been surveyed; that in the civil case against Sps Saldana
they were declared as lawful owners
(Note: The facts did not state who the Sps Saldana are and why
the respondents filed the civil case against them, and also as to
how petitioners acquired possession of the property)
MTC: petitioners were able to prove their right of possession;
defendants were ordered to pay actual damages, lost earnings,
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees
RTC (on appeal by respondents): reversed the MTC’s decision;
all the award for damages were deleted (same reason with the
SC), the attorney’s fees was also deleted for lack of basis
CA: Reinstated MTCs decision but deleted the award for actual,
moral, and exemplary damages. Petitioners appealed as to the
damages, still denied.
Issue: Should actual, moral, and exemplary damages be
awarded?
Ruling:
NO. It is a settled rule that in ejectment cases the only
damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property.
The issue raised in an ejectment case is the right to
lawful possession, it follows then that the damages which can
be awarded are those that the plaintiff sustained as mere
possessor. It does not include damages which the plaintiff may
have suffered but do not have a direct relation to the loss of
material possession.
Lastly, although the computation for the lost earnings
could have been considered as compensation for the loss of the
use and occupation of the property, there was no evidence to
sustain the same.
(The petitioners also contested the deletion of the award of
damages by the RTC considering that it was not raised by
respondents in their appeal, but the SC said that the RTC did
not err in deleting the award for damages considering that the
RTC reversed the ruling of the MTC. In fact, it would be
inconsistent if the RTC did not delete the award for damages.)
CORPORATION V TREYES

Facts:
The case is about the lease agreement of a fishpond by a certain
CGR Corporation, to a claim of a certain Benedicto in Negros
Occidental, with due approval of the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture for 25 years.
Sometime in 2000 the said fishpond was corralled off by a
certain Treyes and its milkfishes including the fingerling was
harvested thereof. In lieu with the actions of Treyes the
corporation filed for a case of forcible entry and a separate
complaint for damages.
The camp of Treyes opined that the action for damages should
not prosper because of the res judicata and for forum shopping.
The RTC dismissed the separate action for damages, as
damages can only be awarded with the final judgement on the
Forcible Entry case.
Issue: Whether or not a separate action for damages should
prosper even with a pending Forcible Entry case?
Ruling:
Yes. The separate action will prosper, that is because the
separate action was for the damages incurred by the
respondents harvesting of the milkfish and its fry’s, the
desecrating of the chapel and the saints contained therein; it
has nothing to do with unpaid rent and compensation for the
use of the property, attorneys fees, and cost.
Secondly, there is no res judicata because in a forcible entry
case the court has no jurisdiction aside from the damages
incurred in the forcible entry and not damages outside the
realms of such. Forum Shopping cannot be appreciated because
the element of final judgment is absent.
WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORP VS CA GR 97637
Facts:
Wilmon Auto Supply, Iloilo Multi Parts Supply Corp, Southern
Sales Corp and 3 other invididuals are lessees of a commercial
and bodega owned in common by the Locsins. The leases were
embodied in a uniformly worded deed with Lourdes Locsin to
represent the Locsins. The contract contains a “Reservation of
rights” clause which says:
"Reservation of rights. — LESSOR reserves the rights to sell,
mortgage, hypothecate or encumber the property so long as it
requires the purchase(r) or mortgage creditors to respect the
terms of this lease contract; provided further that LESSEE shall
be duly informed about LESSOR's plan to sell the property."|||
After the expiration of the period, the property was sold to Star
Group. The deed with SG says, “Vendee shall henceforth deal
with the lessees and occupants of the properties herein sold
without any further warranty or obligation on the part of the
Vendors”
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 3
SO now Star Group filed a case of unlawful detainer against all
the lessees which the lessees refused and impugned on the right
of SG to eject them.
Lessees: Our leasehold rights were violated because (1) we
were not accorded right to preemption, (2) buyer was not
required to honor the leases, and (3) we were denied our option
to renew lease after the expiration.
Issue:
W/N action for unlawful detainer against the lessees (due to the
expiration of the lease agreements) should be suspended with
the lessees action invoking their right to preemption
Held:
The petitioner cited numerous precedents and jurisprudences to
back up their claims [irrelevant na sa case] which the SC said
which do not present current and prevailing doctrine. They are
actually deemed as exceptions to the general rule. Thus, these
cases are not on point to the case at hand.
It may well be stressed in closing that as the law now stands,
even when, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, "the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership," the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have
the undoubted competence to resolve "the issue of ownership .
. . only to determine the issue of possession. PETITION
DISMISSED.
Overview of the cases they cited:
Orellano Case: That no lot should be sold to the landowner to
anyone else unless the tenant renounces his right in a public
act.
Quimbao vs Osorio: The contract in which the plaintiff’s cause
for ejectment was founded has been cancelled by the
administrative court.
DE LUNA VS CA
PRINCIPLE: The possession of the property by the tenant
redounds to the benefit of the landowner, since possession may
be exercised in one's own name or in that of another.
FACTS: De Luna alleged in the ejectment case that he is the
owner of the subject lot and that on December 18 and 19, 1971,
defendants Octavio Daclison, Oscar Crispin, and private
respondents Juan Dimaano, Jr. and Gerino Doble entered the
land and began plowing it; and that said defendants fenced the
land with barbed wire on January 15 and 16, 1972 and began
planting sugar cane on February 5 and 6, 1972, despite his
objections. For his part, defendant Dimaano, Jr. raised that
petitioner was not the owner of the property, alleging instead
that the owner thereof was Agustin Dequiña, Jr., Dimaano, Jr.
contended that the property was originally owned by Agustin
Dequiña, Sr., who had declared the property in his name for

taxation purposes in 1906. Upon the death of Agustin Dequiña,
Sr. in 1945, he was succeeded by his son Agustin Dequiña, Jr.,
who possessed the property from 1945 up to February 1972,
when the same was leased to defendant Dimaano, Jr. Agustin
Dequiña, Sr. happens to be the uncle of petitioner, the former
being the elder brother of the latter's mother, Apolonia Dequiña.
ISSUE: WON petitioner established prior possession.
RULING: YES. Petitioner has shown that he had prior
possession of the property. The prior possession of petitioner
was established by the testimony of his witnesses, notably that
of his tenant Epigenio Dilag and Victor dela Cruz. While
petitioner admitted that he declared the property for taxation
purposes only in 1957, he had possessed the property beginning
1953 at the very latest, when he leased the same to Epigenio
Dilag, who in turn possessed the same until respondent
Dimaano, Jr. entered upon the property in 1972. The possession
of the property by Dilag since 1953 redounds to the benefit of
petitioner, since possession may be exercised in one's own name
or in that of another.
Moreover, there is evidence to the effect that petitioner
possessed the property even earlier than 1953. Petitioner's
witness, Victor dela Cruz, who lived about 400 meters from the
land in controversy, testified that he had witnessed the delivery
of the property to the petitioner and his mother Apolonia
Dequiña by Agustin Dequiña, Sr. in 1938, when they and their
brothers and sisters partitioned among themselves the
properties of their deceased parents. He further testified that he
saw petitioner and his mother cultivate the land from 1938 to
1941, and that he leased the land from them from 1944 to 1952.
On the other hand, respondent Dimaano, Jr. had failed to prove
that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. possessed the property prior to his
possession, much less the ownership of the latter over said
property.
SEMIRA V CA
FACTS:
Juana Gutierrez owned a parcel of land- Lot 4221 which
she sold to private respondent Buenaventura An (An). Stated in
the deed of sale executed in 1961 were the estimated area of
the lot and its boundaries.
An entered the premises observing the boundaries of
the lot and not the area given.
He then acquired 2 other lots: one located on the east
of Lot 4221 from spouses Hornilla (son of Juana) and another
lot from Santiago Asi.
In 1972, An sold Lot 4221 to his nephew, Ramirez and
spouse evidenced by a deed which described the area of the lot
and the boundaries same as the deed in 1961 with the exception
of the boundary on the east which was changed from “Juana
Gutierrez” to “Buenaventura An” to reflect the acquisition by An
of the adjoining lot.
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 4
Ramirez occupied the lot observing the boundaries
stated in the deed; applied for a new tax declaration but was
denied due to an existing mortgage executed by An in favor of
Taysan Rural Bank which was settled only in 1979
In 1979, Ramirez sold the lot to petitioner Semira but
the area stated in the deed was 2,200 sq m and not 822.5
appearing in the previous document. As delimited by its
boundaries, the lot is actually much bigger than 822.5 sq m as
confirmed by the Taysan Cadastral Mapping Survey conducted
in 1974, hence the change to 2,200 sq m.
Semira entered the premises and began constructing a
new rice-mill HOWEVER a complaint for forcible entry was filed
against him by An with the MCTC claiming that Lot 4221 was
only 822.5 sq m and that the excess forcibly occupied formed
part of his lot which he acquired from Hornillas.
While case was pending, An applied for and was issued
an OCT for the lots he purchased from Hornillas and Santiago
with a combined area of 19,606 sq m BUT the title was issued
for 20, 833 sq m where no explanation was given.
Case was initially dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as
the court ruled that the issue of prior physical possession could
not be resolved without deciding first on the ownership.
HOWEVER upon view of the passage of BP Blg. 129 w/c took
effect Aug. 14, 1981 providing that MeTC, MTC and MCTC w/out
distinction may try cases of forcible entry and detainer even if
the question of ownerhip is raised in the pleadings and
possession could not be resolved w/o deciding ownership, the
trial court modified its earlier resolution and adgjudged Semira
as the rightful and lawful owner and possessor of the area in
question and cannot be ejected therefrom.
RTC reversed: An had possessed the lot earlier than
Semira; CA affirmed
ISSUE: WON possession cannot be decided independently of
the question of ownership
HELD:
YES. Where land is sold for a lump sum and not so
much per unit of measure or number, the boundaries of the land
stated in the contract determine the effects and scope of the
sale, not the area thereof. Hence, the vendors are obligated to
deliver all the land included within the boundaries, regardless of
whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that
recited in the deed. This is particularly true where the area is
described as "humigit kumulang," that is, more or less.
ART 1542: In the sale of real estate, made for a lump
sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure
or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price,
although there be a greater or less area or number than that
stated in the contract.
The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables
are sold for a single price; but if, besides mentioning the
boundaries, which is indispensable in every conveyance of real
estate, its area or number should be designated in the contract,

the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is included within
said boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number
specified in the contract; and, should he not be able to do so,
he shall suffer a reduction in the price, in proportion to what is
lacking in the area or number, unless the contract is rescinded
because the vendee does not accede to the failure to deliver
what has been stipulated
Thus, when An sold the lot to his nephew which
incorporated both the area and definite boundaries of the lot,
An transferred not merely 822.5 sq m stated therein but the
entire area circumscribed w/in its boundaries.
An was aware of the difference of the actual area and
the size as when asked by his nephew about it, he explained
that it was to minimize taxes.
Failing to prove prior possession in his favor, An then
cannot be said to have been forcibly deprived of the disputed
portion, hence, his action for forcible entry must fail.
TAKE NOTE! It should be emphasized, however, that
the case before us is merely an action of forcible entry and that
the issue of ownership was decided for the sole purpose of
resolving priority of possession. Hence, any pronouncement
made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be
regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to
the land.
JOSE REYNANTE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. VALENTIN CRUZ
FACTS:
More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as
tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos, owner and father-in-law
of herein private respondents, over a fishpond located at Barrio
Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan with an area of 188.711 square
meters, more or less and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 25618, Land Registry of Bulacan.
During the tenancy, petitioner Jose Reynante constructed a nipa
hut where he and his family lived and took care of the nipa palms
(sasahan) he had planted on lots 1 and 2 covering an area of
5,096 square meters and 6,011 square meters respectively.
These lots are located between the fishpond and the Liputan
(formerly Meycauayan) River. Petitioner harvested and sold said
nipa palms without interference and prohibition from anybody.
Neither did the late Don Cosme Carlos question his right to plant
the nipa palms near the fishpond or to harvest and appropriate
them as his own.
After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs entered into a
written agreement denominated as "SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
NG PAGSASAULI NG KARAPATAN" dated November 29, 1984
with petitioner Jose Reynante whereby the latter for and in
consideration of the sum of P200,000.00 turned over the
fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don Cosme Carlos and
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 5
surrendered all his rights therein as caretaker or "bantay-
kasama at tagapamahala”.
Private respondents thereafter leased the said fishpond to one
Carlos de la Cruz. Petitioner continued to live in the nipa hut
constructed by him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa
palms he had planted therein.
On February 17, 1988, private respondents formally demanded
that the petitioner vacate said portion since according to them
petitioner had already been indemnified for the surrender of his
rights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner refused
and failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2.
On April 22, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for
forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction against
petitioner alleging that the latter by means of strategy and
stealth, took over the physical, actual and material possession
of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of the kubos or huts bordering
the Liputan River and cutting off and/or disposing of the sasa or
nipa palms adjacent thereto.
On January 10, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision
dismissing the complaint and finding that petitioner had been in
prior possession of lots 1 and 2.
On August 8, 1989, private respondents appealed to the
Regional Trial Court and it rendered its decision,in favor of the
plaintiffs and against defendant and hereby reverses the
decision of the Court a quo.
On February 28, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto.
ISSUES:
a) who between the petitioner and private respondents has prior
physical possession of lots 1 and 2; and
b) whether or not the disputed lots belong to private
respondents as a result of accretion.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE
An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and
actual title of the property is never determined. A party who can
prove prior possession can recover such possession even against
the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the
security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical
possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and
detainer even if he should be the owner of the property.
The evidence on record shows that petitioner was in possession
of the questioned lots for more than 50 years. It is undisputed
that he was the caretaker of the fishpond owned by the late Don
Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years and that he constructed a
nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond and planted nipa palms
therein.

On the other hand, private respondents based their claim of
possession over lots 1 and 2 simply on the written agreement
signed by petitioner whereby the latter surrendered his rights
over the fishpond. An examination of the document signed by
the defendant shows that what was surrendered to the plaintiffs
was the fishpond and not the 'sasahan' or the land on which he
constructed his hut where he now lives.
SECOND ISSUE:
With regard to the second issue, it must be noted that the
disputed lots involved in this case are not included in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 25618 as per verification made by the
Forest Management Bureau, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources.
Lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and hence the
property of private respondents pursuant to Article 457 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
"Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters."
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites
are present:
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water;
and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
bank of a river
Granting without conceding that lots 1 and 2 were created by
alluvial formation and while it is true that accretions which the
banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the
current become the property of the owner of the banks, such
accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the
additional area by another person through prescription.
An accretion does not automatically become registered land just
because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a
Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing;
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is
another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land
adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility
of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposit
(the lot in question), by accretion, still their failure to register
said accretion for a period of fifty (50) years subjected said
accretion to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
It is undisputed that petitioner has been in possession of the
subject lots for more than fifty (50) years and unless private
respondent can show a better title over the subject lots,
petitioner's possession over the property must be respected.
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 6
BANES vs. LUTHERAN CHURCH OF THE PHILIPPINES
TOPIC: Remedies of a person deprived of possession
FACTS:
This case arose from the filing of an action by certain members
of the LCP against its President and six other members of the
Board of Directors before the SEC. This resulted in the division
of the LCP into 2 fractions: The Batong/Saguilayan group
(includes herein petitioners) and the Ladlad/Almazan group
(includes herein respondents). In 1992, SEC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction. By virtue of said injunction, herein
respondents with the aid of DILG,PNP and Sheriff of the RTC
tried to dispossess petitioner, as previous clergymen and
occupants of the residential houses owned by LCP. Petitioners
refused to vacate. Thus the main gate was padlocked by
respondents preventing petitioners and their families from going
in and out of said place. Security guards were also stationed at
the premises with an instruction to not allow petitioners entry
and exit.
A month thereafter, petitioners Banes & Del Rosario wrote
letters addressed to the President of LCP requesting them for
extension of their stay in the subject property until they find a
new place to stay in. Petitioners eventually left the premises.
Months later, petitioners filed an action for forcible entry.
ISSUE: WON petitioners were removed from the premises by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
from case (IOW: WON petitioners action for forcible entry may
prosper)
RULING: YES
• There is forcible entry when one is deprived of physical
possession of land by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth.
• All elements necessary for forcible entry were
sufficiently alleged by the petitioners. Two allegations are
mandatory. 1) Plaintiff must allege prior physical possession; 2)
allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the
means provided.
• In such cases, inquiry centers on who has the prior
possession de facto.
• Any of the parties who can prove prior possession de
facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself
since such cases proceed independently from any claim of
ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior
possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.
• To constitute force that would justify forcible entry
cases, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war.
The act of going to the property and excluding the lawful
possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force
over he property which is all that is necessary and sufficient to
show that the action is based on FISTS

IN THE CASE AT BAR:
• True that petitioners Banes & Del Rosario wrote LCP
expressing willingness to voluntary vacate upon finding another
place to live in but this is after finding respondents had
padlocked the premises and used armed men to prevent their
coming to and from the premises. Said letters do not negate the
initial use of force by respondents which constitute forcible
entry.
• However, while we find that there was forcible entre,
we cannot grant prayer of petitioners-sps Banes to be restored
to the subject premises because they are now staying in another
property owned by LCP in Caloocan City without paying rent.
Therefore, they have lost their cause of action to ask for
restitution.
• Situation is different insofar as Sps Del Rosario & Sps
San Ramon, evidence do not disclose that they asked for or were
given by LCP another place to stay in. Thus respondents are
ordered to vacate, surrender and restore possession of the
questioned premises to petitioners Del Rosario and San Ramon.
• This notwithstanding the reality that the stay of
petitioners Del Rosario is dependent on wheter the latter is still
has the privilege to stay in the premises as a clergyman of
respondent. Said issue is best resolved in an action for unlawful
detainer which respondents should have filed against petitioners
in the first place.
• Likewise, the claim that petitioner-sps San Ramon had
no valid lease contract with respondent LCP is not a proper
defense in the forcible entry case.
Possession as Basis for Acquiring Ownership
BALATERO VS IAC [Possession as Basis for Acquiring
Ownership]
Facts:
The property in question was originally owned by the parents of
Josefa Iglupas (mother-in-law of claimant FlorencioBalatero)
and her brother Alejo (father of claimant Anacleto Iglupas).
After the death of their parents, the lot was given to Alejo
Iglupas and his wife Tomasa Ronda. Alejo Iglupas died in 1916
and on May 10, 1968, his widow Tomasa Ronda, and their son
Sovero sold the property to Josefa Iglupas and her husband
Juan Badelles for a consideration of P111.00, which sale is
embodied in a public document denominated 'Escritura de
Compra Venta' In 1918, Josefa Iglupas together with her
husband and children occupied the lot and the old house
thereon and built a new and bigger house on the lot
Juan Badelles died in that house and lot in 1927 and his widow
Jesefa Badelles and her children continued living thereon until
the children became of age and got married; that Josefa I.
Badelles herself died in that property in 1967.
On June 9, 1930, Josefa Iglupas in order to secure a loan of
P68.00 mortgaged the property to claimant Juan Veloso in a
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 7
public document denominated as 'Pacto de Retro Sale that this
loan was paid sometime in 1947, first in an amount of P100.00
and subsequently an additional amount of P300.00.
On April 30, 1954, Josefa Iglupas and her childrens sold a
portion of the lot to Florencio Balatero denominated 'Deed of
Sale Unregistered. The lot was later resurveyed and subdivided
and in a plan duly approved by the Director of Lands, Lot 433
was divided into Lot 433-A with an area of 98 square meters as
pertaining to FlorencioBalatero and Lot 433-B with an area of
118 square meters as pertaining to the Heirs of Josefa Badelles.
Josefa Iglupas Vda. de Badelles had occupied the property from
the year 1918 and up to the time of her death in 1967 when her
'Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land that heirs succeeded her in
the possession thereof; that the property has always been
declared in the name of Josefa Iglupas Badelles and taxes
thereon paid under her name that the portion, Lot 433-A,
acquired by Florencio Balatero was also later declared in his own
name and the taxes thereon also paid by him.
Trial Court:
After consideration of the evidence of the claimants, the court
finds and holds that it is claimant Florencio Balatero who has a
registerable title over Lot No. 433-A and the Heirs of Josefa
Iglupas Vda. de Badelles over that of Lot No. 433-B. There is
no conflict as between the Heirs of Josefa I. Badelles and
Florencio Balatero, hence it is only incumbent upon the court to
treat of theclaims of Anacleto Iglupas and Juan Veloso.
"With respect to claimant Juan Veloso, he was never in
possession of the property. He never for once asserted his right
to possess the same. This only jibes with the claim of the Heirs
of Josefa Iglupas that the 'Pacto de Retro Sale' on which Veloso
bases his claim of ownership was only a mortgage. The
consideration of the pacto de retro sale in 1930 for the amount
of P68.00 is inconsistent with logic if the fact that Josefa Iglupas
bought the property from Tomasa Ronda and Severo Iglupas for
a consideration of P111.00 in 1918 is taken into account. In fine,
Veloso had never any actual possession or control over the
property or any portion thereof which could open into a
registerable title.
Claimant Juan Veloso appealed the decision to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court. The lower court's decision was
reversed and set aside
Issue: WON the transfer was a sale with pacto a retro or an
equitable mortgage.
WON a constructive possession of a land acquired thru a
contract of equitable mortgage will ripen to ownership.
Ruling:
On its face, the contract would show that the disputed parcel of
land was transferred to private respondent Juan Veloso by way
of sale with pacto de retro. However, there are circumstances
present in the instant case which clearly indicate that the
contract should be treated as an equitable mortgage.||| First,
the 216 square meters parcel of land remained undisturbed in

the possession of the vendor Josefa Iglupas even after the
execution of the contract. Had Josefa Iglupas really executed a
contract of sale in favor of Juan Veloso, this small parcel of land
should have been delivered to the latter and he would have
taken immediate possession after the execution of the contract
of sale.||| Second, the price or consideration in 1930 of P68.00
is unusually inadequate. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that the same parcel of land was bought by Josefa Iglupas in
1918 for the price of P111.00. If the contract was indeed one of
sale, why should the vendor, Josefa Iglupas sell the parcel of
land for a price almost half of what she paid for it twelve years
earlier. It is common knowledge that the value of real property
appreciates through the years and not otherwise. This fact also
shows that the contract was an equitable mortgage rather than
a contract of sale. The rule is that only the possession acquired
and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for
acquiring dominion. (Article 447, old Civil Code, Article 540, new
Civil Code) As can be gleaned from the facts earlier stated, Juan
Veloso never owned the subject parcel of land because the
contract over the same between Josefa Iglupas and Juan Veloso
was actually an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale.
Where the contract entered into was judicially declared to be
actually an equitable mortgage rather than a contract of sale of
a parcel of land, “constructive posses- sion’’ over the land cannot
ripen into ownership as it cannot be said to have been acquired
and enjoyed in the concept of owner.
FOR RECITS:
The subject parcel of land (Lot 433 Iligan Cadastre) was
originally owned by the parents of Josefa Iglupas: that after the
death of Josefa's parents, Lot 433 was given to Alejo Iglupas
who is married to Tomasa Ronda; that after the death of Alejo,
Tomasa Ronda sold the said lot to Josefa Iglupas for P111.00 as
evidenced by an 'Escritura de Compra Ventra.
In a June 23, 1930 document denominated as "Pacto de Retro
Sale this Lot 433 was sold by Josefa Iglupas to private
respondent Juan Veloso for the amount of P68.00. Whether or
not this contract was really what it purports to be or was an
equitable mortgage is the main issue in the instant petition. prLL
Veloso was never in possession of the property. He never for
once asserted his right to possess the same. The consideration
of the pacto de retro sale in 1930 for the amount of P68.00 is
inconsistent with logic as the property price increase over time
not the other way around. Veloso had never any actual
possession or control over the property or any portion thereof
which could open into a registerable title. And the most
important point, the contract executed between Iglupas and
Veloso was actually an equitable mortgage and not a contract
of sale.
When you are possessing a property in the concept of holder,
as in this case - an equitable mortgage, no matter how long the
possession is, it won’t ripen into ownership. It cannot lead to
acquisitive prescription, either ordinary or extraordinary.
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 8
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V HEIRS OF TESALONA
Topic: Effects of Possession
Doctrine: POSSESSION of forest lands, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into private ownership. Its inclusion in a title,
whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under
the Torrens System, nullifies the title.
FACTS:
The controversy arose from an application for registration of five
(5) parcels of land on the basis of an alleged possessory
information title. The application was opposed by the
government on the ground that the parcels of land are part of
the inalienable land of the public domain.
The subject property is located in Mulanay, Quezon with a total
land area of 7.4343 hectares allegedly originally acquired by
Maria Rosita Lorenzo and the respondents are
grandsons/daughters.
The possessory information title covers only 1.0481 hectares
under the Royal Decrees of February 13, 1894. The Director of
Lands thru the Ass. Prov. Fiscal of Quezon filed his opposition
that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in interest had
sufficient title of the land applied for nor had they been in
possession thereof for a period of at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application and that the
same is public land.
Constancio dela Pena Tan, likewise filed an opposition averred
that he had possessed the land as lessee for a period of more
than thirty five (35) year by virtue of a fishpond lease granted
by the Bureau of Fisheries sometime in 1953.
The lower court granted lots 3,4, and 5 in favor of the applicants
and hereby declares Lots 1 and 2 as owned by the Government
subject to the right of the lessee pending the approval of the
sales application of private oppositor Constancio de la Pena.
The Court of Appeals modified and declared all 5 lots were in
favor of the applicants.
SC found out that Lot Nos. 1 and 2 were classified as swampy
area and were as early as 1955, filled with mangrove trees.
ISSUE: WON, the possession of forest land can effectively use
for registration of title.
RULING: NO. Being swampy area covered by mangrove trees
and the like, these lots may very well be considered and
classified as forest lands. Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule
that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into private ownership. Its inclusion in a title, whether the
title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens
System, nullifies the title. A forested area classified as forest
land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover.

Indicia of Ownership or Possession
BARTOLOME VS IAC (Indicia of Ownership or Possession)
FACTS:
1906 - A 725 sqm portion of Lot No. 11165 was first declared
for taxation purposes (TD No 5708) by Epitacio Batara.
1912 – Epitacio entrusted the subject lot to his cousin Doroteo
Bartolome (owned the lot bounding Epitacio’s property on the
south) when the former left to settle in Isabela.
Epitacio Batara had 2 children – Catalina (had five children) and
Pedro (deceased). In 1912, he entrusted the subject lot to his
cousin Doroteo Bartolome when he left to settle in Isabela –
Maria, Epitacio’s wife, later followed Epitacio to Isabela and
allowed Doroteo to continue taking charge of the property.
1916 - Five years after the death of Epitacio, Maria (wife) with
their grandchildren returned to Laoag (where the property is
located) – discovering the lot destroyed by fire, they boarded in
someone else’s house. One of Epitacio’s grandchildren (Calixto)
constructed a bamboo fence around his grandfather’s lot and he
and his other sibling (Resureccion) cleaned it.
In the same year, Doroteo migrated to Davao – two years after,
he died.
Director of Lands instituted cadastral proceedings over
the subject parcel of land.
Ursula Cid (widow of Doreteo’s son, Bernabe) filed an answer,
claiming ownership of the land (1660 sqm) – claimed that she
allegedly acquired it through inheritance from Doroteo
Bartolome.
Resurreccion (one of Catalina’s children) also filed an answer –
likewise claiming ownership of the land (864 sqm).
However, no further proceedings were held in the
cadastral case.
1934 – Resurreccion verbally entrusted the portion she had
claimed to Maria Bartolome whom she later described as the
daughter of Doroteo Bartolome.
1939 – Ursula Cid and her children migrated to Davao, leaving
their house on the subject lot to a lessee, Severino Ramos –
Maria Bartolome was tasked to receive the rentals. The latter
also paid the taxes until 1958, when Dominador took over the
task.
1950 – Maria Bartolome, leased the lot to Philippines United
Trading – rentals were paid to Dominador until the edifice
housing the company was burned down in 1968. Resurreccion
was given a small amount by Maria Bartolome, in consideration
of the lease contract.
1968 – The CFI sent out notices for the “continuation of the
hearing.”
1969- Maria Bartolome filed in the cadastral case “a motion to
admit answer in intervention” – alleging that she is one of the
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 9
children of Doroteo and that she and her co-heirs had been
excluded by Ursula.
2 months later, Ursula amended her answer – stated that she
was absolute owner of the lot and that she has been in
possession for over 50 years through inheritance from her
husband – Bernabe Bartolome.
No hearing was conducted until 1974.
To buttress her claim, Urusula presented 3 deeds of sale:
1. 1917 – showing that Bernabe and Ursual bought a 374
sqm lot from the spouses Agustin
2. 1913 – executed by Ignacia Manrique in favor of
Bernabe
3. 1917 – executed by Maria Gonzales in favor of Bernabe
and Ursula ceding to the latter 772 sqm of land (this is
the one being claimed by Resurreccion)
RTC ruled:
 Found the lots described in the evidences presented by
Ursula not within Lot 11165 and defective as the vendors
are not the real owners
 Also held that Ursula’s possession of the land after the
claimants had filed their respective answers or after
the declaration of a general default, did not confer
ownership on her because said possession was
interrupted and merely tolerated by all the parties
during the pendency.
CA reversed:
 Found that Ursula’s continuous possession of the lots from
its acquisition and her exercise of rights of ownership over
it vested her with the legal presumption that she
possessed it under a just title.
ISSUE: Whether acquisitive prescription runs during the
pendency of a cadastral case.
HELD:
No. The institution of cadastral proceedings, or at least the
publication of the notice issued, has the effect of suspending the
running of the prescriptive period.
Ursula Cid cannot also assert that prior to the institution of the
cadastral proceeding she and her husband had already acquired
the land through acquisitive prescription. Doroteo Bartolome
was in possession of the whole lot including the portion
entrusted to him by Epitacio until he migrated to Davao.
Granting that the 1520-square meter lot Bernabe Bartolome had
declared as his own in 1925 is within Lot No. 11165, still, the
period from 1925 until the filing of the cadastral case in 1933
failed to give him an advantage. It is short of the 10-year actual,
adverse and uninterrupted period of possession mandated by
Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order that a full and
complete title could be vested on the person claiming to be the
owner of a piece of land.

Furthermore, while it is true that the property had been declared
for tax purposes by Bernabe Bartolome and that, subsequent to
his death, taxes thereon were paid in the name of his son,
Dominador, ownership thereof had not been acquired by
Ursula Cid or her heirs. Aside from the fact that said
declarations and payments were made during the
pendency of the cadastral case, a tax declaration in the
name of the alleged property owner or of his
predecessor-in-interest, does not prove ownership. It is
merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. In the same
manner, neither does the payment of taxes conclusively
prove ownership of the land paid for.
The eastern portion of Lot No. 11165 with an area of 772 square
meters is hereby adjudicated in favor of the heirs of Epitacio
Batara who are herein represented by Resurreccion Bartolome
while the remaining area of Lot No. 11165 is hereby adjudicated
in favor of the heirs of Doroteo Bartolome.
Appealed decision is reversed and set aside.
ALONSO vs CEBU COUNTRY CLUB
[G.R. No. 130876. January 31, 2002.]
Indicia of Ownership or Possession (Please refer to 2nd sub-
issue: char2 nlang na ang others, in case lang mangutana si
Atty.)
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Alonso, who died pendente lite and
substituted by his legal heirs, was the only son and sole heir of
the late Tomas Alonso and Asuncion Medalle.
Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents and records
showing that his father acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate from the Government of the Philippine Islands in
or about the year 1911 in accordance with the Friar Lands Act
(Act No. 1120). The documents showed that the original vendee
of the subject lot assigned his sales certificate to petitioner's
father, who completed the required installment payments
thereon under Act No. 1120 and was consequently issued a
patent.
The Director of Lands executed a final deed of sale in favor of
petitioner's father. However, the deed was not registered with
the Register of Deeds because of lack of technical requirements
as required by law.
Upon investigation of the status of the land, petitioner found out
that the title of Lot No. 727 had been administratively
reconstituted from the owner's duplicate under a TCT in the
name of United Service Country Club, Inc., predecessor of Cebu
Country Club, Inc. (CCCI). Upon order of the court, the name of
the registered owner in the said TCT was changed to Cebu
Country Club, Inc.
Petitioner filed with the RTC, a complaint for declaration of
nullity and non-existence of deed/title, cancellation of
certificates of title and recovery of property against defendant
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 10
CCCI which the trial court decided in favor of the defendant. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court.
Hence, this appeal to the SC.
The SC required the Solicitor General to file comment on the
issue of the validity of the re-constituted title in dispute.
The SolGen submitted stated that on the basis of information
received from the LRA and the LMB, the CCCI had been
occupying the disputed property even before the Second World
War and developed it into a golf course and must have acquired
the property in a proper and valid manner. Nonetheless, the
SolGen emphasized that the CCC’s certificate of title is a
reconstituted title. A reconstituted title does not confirm or
adjudicate ownership of land covered by lost or destroyed title.
And the Government's right to file reversion proceedings cannot
be barred by prescription that does not run against the State.
(Main) Issue:
Who is the rightful owner of the subject land?
Ruling:
Neither Tomas Alonso nor his son petitioner Francisco Alonso,
or the latter's heirs, are the lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in
dispute. Neither has the respondent CCCI been able to establish
a clear title over the contested estate. The reconstitution of a
title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of
title in its original form and condition. It does not determine or
resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate
of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate
covered thereby.
First Issue:
Validity of Cebu Country Club, Inc.'s Title
The issue is factual, which cannot be reviewed in this appeal.
Nevertheless, petitioners assail the validity of the administrative
reconstitution of CCCI's title on 3 grounds:
1. Its source title bears the same number as another title
which refers to another parcel of land:
Ruling: There is nothing fraudulent with the fact that CCCI's
reconstituted title bears the same number as the title of another
parcel of land. This came about because under the laws in force
at the time the title was reconstituted, the titles issued before
the inauguration of the Philippine Republic were numbered
consecutively and the titles issued after the inauguration were
numbered also consecutively starting with No. 1, so that
eventually, the titles issued before the inauguration were
duplicated by titles issued after the inauguration of the
Philippine Republic.
2. There is no recorded transaction of the land from
Tomas Alonso in favor of CCCI (it was reconstituted through
extrinsic and intrinsic fraud in the absence of a deed of
conveyance in its favor):

Ruling: In truth, reconstitution was based on the owner's
duplicate of the title, hence, there was no need for the covering
deed of sale or other modes of conveyance. CCCI was
admittedly in possession of the land since long before the
Second World War, or since 1931. In fact, the original title was
issued to the United Service Country Club, Inc. on November 19,
1931 as a transfer from TCT No. 1021. More importantly, CCCI
paid the realty taxes on the land even before the war, and tax
declarations covering the property showed the number of the
TCT of the land. CCCI produced receipts showing real estate tax
payments since 1949. On the other hand, petitioner failed to
produce a single receipt of real estate tax payment ever made
by his father since the sales patent was issued to his father on
March 24, 1926. Worse, admittedly petitioner could not show
any torrens title ever issued to Tomas N. Alonso, because, as
said, the deed of sale executed on March 27, 1926 by the
Director of Lands was not approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and could not be registered.
On the allegation that CCCI obtained its title by fraud in
connivance with personnel of the ROD: Imputations of fraud
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner
failed to adduce evidence of fraud. "In this jurisdiction, fraud is
never presumed."
3. The technical description was not transcribed in the
title within two (2) years from the date of its reconstitution.
Ruling: This is not a bar to reconstitution of the title nor will it
affect the validity of the reconstituted title. A registered owner
is given 2 years to file a plan of such land with the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office. The two-year period is
directory, not jurisdictional. In other words, the failure to submit
the technical description within 2 years would not invalidate the
title. At most, the failure to file such technical description within
the two-year period would bar a transfer of the title to a third
party in a voluntary transaction.
In sum, none of the grounds has any basis or merit.
Second Issue:
Whether Francisco Alonso is owner of the land
Admittedly, neither petitioners nor their predecessor had any
title to the land in question. The most that petitioners could
claim was that the Director of Lands issued a sales patent in the
name of Tomas N. Alonso. The sales patent, however, and even
the corresponding deed of sale were not registered with the
ROD and no title was ever issued in the name of the latter. This
is because there were basic requirements not complied with,
e.g. the deed of sale executed by the Director of Lands was not
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Hence, the deed of sale was void. "Approval by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the
sale.”
Moreover, CCCI was in possession of the land since 1931, and
had been paying the real estate taxes thereon based on tax
declarations in its name with the title number indicated thereon.
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 11
Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes
are strong evidence of ownership. This Court has ruled that
although tax declarations or realty tax payments are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good
indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his
right mind will be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or constructive possession.
Third Issue:
Action has prescribed or is barred by laches
Yes, An action based on implied or constructed trust prescribes
in 10 years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged
fraudulent registration of the property. Petitioner's action was
basically one of re-conveyance. It was filed on September 25,
1992, 61 years after the title was issued on November 19, 1931,
and 44 years after its reconstitution on July 26, 1948. Thus, the
failure of petitioner and his father to assert ownership of the
land for over 60 years during which the CCCI was in possession
is simply contrary to their claim of ownership. Petitioners’ long
inaction or passivity in asserting their rights over disputed
property will preclude them from recovering the same.
Fourth Issue:
No stare decisis
Petitioners assert that as the Court of Appeals annulled CCCI's
title in the Cabrera-Ingles case, so too must the title in this case
be declared void. In the first place, there is no identity of parties;
secondly, neither the titles to nor the parcels of land involved
are the same. Consequently, the doctrine of res judicata does
not apply.
What is more, the doctrine of stare decisis notwithstanding, the
Court has abandoned or overruled precedents whenever it
realized that the Court erred in the prior decisions. "After all,
more important than anything else is that this Court should be
right.”
Fifth Issue:
Award of attorney's fees
An award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is proper
under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code, one of which is when the court deems it just and equitable
that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered and when the civil action or proceeding is clearly
unfounded and where defendant acted in gross and evident bad
faith.
The Judgment
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. However, we
SET ASIDE the decision of the CA and that of the RTC, Cebu
City, Branch 08.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs . COURT
OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF DEMOCRITO O. PLAZA,
respondents.
Facts: Plaza filed a petition for the registration and confirmation
of title over the subject property alleging, among others, that:
1. by virtue of the deed of sale, he is the owner thereof:
2. he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in OCEN
possession and occupation of the property prior to, and since 12
June 1945;
3. other than himself, there is no other person occupying, or
having any interest over the property; and,
4. there are no tenants or agricultural lessees thereon.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed said registration
maintaining, among others, that:
(1) Plaza and his predecessors-in-interest have not been in
OCEN possession and occupation of the land in question since
12 June 1945 or prior thereto;
(2) the muniment of title and tax declarations as well as tax
payments relied upon do not constitute sufficient evidence of a
bona fide acquisition of the land and
(3) the subject property pertains to the public domain
According to Republic, aside from mere tax declarations, Plaza
has not established actual possession of the property in question
in the manner required by law (Section 14, P.D. 1529). Thus, no
evidence was adduced that Plaza cultivated much less, fenced
the subject property if only to prove actual possession.
Issue: WON the granting of the application for registration is
supported by evidence and is not contrary to law
Ruling: YES.
Proofs of claim of ownership are the tax declarations of Plaza's
predecessors-in-interest, the deed of sale, tax payment receipts
and Plaza’s tax declarations. The evidence on record reveals
that:
(1) the predecessors-in-interest of Plaza have been declaring the
property in question in their names in the years 1923, 1927,
1934 and 1960; and,
(2) Plaza purchased the land in 1966 and since then paid the
taxes due thereon and declared the property in his name in
1985.
Considering the dates of the tax declarations and the realty tax
payments, they are strong evidence of possession in the concept
of owner by Plaza and his predecessors-in-interest. Moreover,
the realty tax payment receipts show that Plaza has been very
religious in paying the taxes due on the property. This is
indicative of his honest belief that he is the owner of the subject
property.
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 12
Therefore, Plaza has proved that he and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in OCEN possession of the subject property
in the concept of owner for a period of 30 years since 12 June
1945 and earlier. By operation of law, the property in question
has become private property.
Doctrine: Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for
a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a
piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
CEQUENA V. BOLANTE, G.R. No. 137944, April 6, 2000
The Principle
Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of
ownership or possession of the property for which such
taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property, they may become the basis of a
claim for ownership. By acquisitive prescription, possession in
the concept of owner — public, adverse, peaceful and
uninterrupted — may be converted to ownership. On the other
hand, mere possession and occupation of land cannot ripen into
ownership.
Facts
The subject land (located in Binagonan, Rizal) was
originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Sinforoso Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the said tax
declaration was canceled and subsequently declared to his
brother Margarito Mendoza. The daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza
– respondent Honorata Mendoza Bolante is the present
occupant. Earlier, Honorata (respondent-daughter) had a
dispute with Miguel Mendoza who is the brother of the
petitioners Fernanda Cequena and Ruperta Lirio. All of them are
children of Margarito Mendoza (the brother of Sinforoso whose
name indicated in the latest tax declaration). When Sinforoso
died in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land and
cultivated it with his son Miguel Mendoza. At the same time,
respondent and her mother continued residing on the lot.
Court a Quo for PETITIONERS
The court a quo resolved the issue of lawful ownership
and possession in favor of the petitioners (Fernanda, Ruperta,
and Miguel – children of Margarito)
Court of Appeals for RESPONDENT
The CA reversed the trial court because it not
convinced on the genuineness of the affidavit that is the basis

of the change of the name in the tax declaration. Furthermore,
the said affidavit is insufficient to overcome the denial of
Honorata (respondent – daughter) and the mother. Lastly,
Honorata’s proof of ownership and their actual, physical,
exclusive, and continuous possession are all better than the tax
declarations issued in the name of the father of the petitioners.
Issues and Ruling
The SC ruled in favor of Respondent affirming the
decision of CA
First issue regarding the admissibility of the affidavit was
skipped; not relevant to the topic
Second Issue: Preference of Possession
Applicable Codal Provision:
Article 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the
same time in two different personalities except in the cases of
co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there
are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the
dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a
title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its
possession or ownership through proper proceedings. (445)
As a general rule, to all intents and purpose, a
possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal
possessor. Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession,
regardless of its character, may recover such possession. Hence,
petitioners did not lose legal possession. However, both sides
acquired possession before 1985. The taxes for the years 1932
to 1948 was paid by the respondent-daugther Honorata. Four
years later, in 1952, Margarito (father of petitioners) start
paying taxes. In 1953, the tax declaration was in his name. After
his death. Miguel continued to cultivate until 1985 when
respondent Honorata and her mother ousted.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the
respondent is the preferred possessor because,
benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the
subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession
thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners'
father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
Third Issue: Possession of Better Right
Article 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in his
favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title
and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. (448a)
The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is
merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven. That
is, one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this
provision, be restored thereto by the means established by
law. Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and
possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case
should be established in one of the ways provided by law.
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 13
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who
between the claimants has proven acquisitive prescription.
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession for ten years. Tax
receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation,
when coupled with proof of actual possession of the
property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership
through prescription.
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming
the subject land, did not acquire ownership. It is settled that
ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless
coupled with the element of hostility toward the true
owner, occupation and use, however long, will not
confer title by prescription or adverse possession.
Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was
public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and
brother arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary
prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two
years (1953-1985), this supposed ownership cannot extend to
the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that
they actually farmed.
We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their
ownership of the disputed land was established before the trial
court through the series of tax declarations and receipts issued
in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Such documents prove that
the holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside from
manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they
announce the holder's adverse claim against the state and other
interested parties.
However, tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or
possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. In
the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership. In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of
the whole parcel has no legal basis.
SERIÑA vs CABALLERO [G.R. no. 127382, August 17, 2004]
Facts:
Dr. Jesus Serinã and his wife led a Complaint for
quieting of title, recovery of possession, and damages. When
Dr. Serinã died, he was substituted by his children, herein
petitioners.
The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are
the absolute owners and have been in actual and constructive
possession for thirty-five (35) years of a parcel of land, located
in Mantadiao, Opol, Misamis Oriental, which their father, Dr.
Seriña, bought from Lucia Vda. de Marbella. They presented a
Deed of Sale showing that Dr. Serina ̃ bought 5 hectares of rice
field. They also showed Tax Declaration No. 4029 issued in the
name of Dr. Seriña which covered a 2.5-hectare rice field. The

petitioners also averred that they regularly paid taxes thereon
since 1947 up to the present.
In his answer, respondent Caballero alleged that he
was the lawful owner, and had been in actual physical
possession of the disputed land since time immemorial. He
averred that the disputed land is part a lot originally owned by
his grandfather, Eustaquio Caballero. He also averred that his
grandfather declared the entire parcel of land for tax purposes
even before the war and that Tax Declaration No. 2442 was
issued in lieu of the records that were destroyed during the war.
This tax declaration indicated that the 119,490 square-meter
parcel of land was located at Pontacon, Iponan, Cagayan de Oro
City.
The RTC dismissed the complaint.
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Issues:
1. Whether the petitioners were able to establish the
identity of the land being claimed by them.
2. Whether acquisitive prescription should be appreciated
in favor of the petitioners.
Ruling:
First Issue:
The CA was correct in concluding that the petitioners
failed to establish that the parcel of land in the possession of
the respondents is the same as that subject of their complaint.
The land described in the complaint appears to be different from
the land described in the Deed of Sale which the petitioners
invoke as the basis of their ownership.
First, the boundaries as alleged in the complaint were different
from what were stated in the Deed of Sale presented by
petitioners.
Second, the complaint states that the property they are claiming
has an area of 2.5 hectares. On the other hand, the Deed of
Sale provides that the subject property has an area of 5
hectares.
Third, the complaint alleged that the property is located in
"Mantadiao, Opol, Misamis Oriental," while the Deed of Sale
shows that the property purchased is located in "Puntakon,
Igpit, Cagayan Or. Misamis."
There was also no showing that Tax Declaration No. 2442 in the
name of Eustaquio Caballero was cancelled.
Moreover, the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 2442 is
different from that covered by Tax Declaration No. 4029.
The petitioners did not present evidence to prove that the land
registered in the name of Eustaquio Caballero was sold to Lucia
Vda. de Marbella or her predecessor-in-interest from whom they
purchased the land subject of their complaint.
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 14
Second Issue:
Since the property has not been clearly identified by
the petitioners, their claim of acquisitive prescription cannot be
considered. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership,
while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction.
Assuming, however, that the disputed land has been
clearly identified, acquisitive prescription will still not lie in favor
of the petitioners because they were not able to prove that they
have been in possession of the property for the requisite number
of years.
The petitioners' argument that the payment of taxes
on the property since May 31, 1948 constitutes proof of their
possession of the subject land for thirty-five years is untenable.
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima
facie proof of ownership of the property for which taxes have
been paid. In the absence of actual, public and adverse
possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does
not prove ownership.
Right of Possessor with Respect to Useful Expenses
(Bad Faith)
RAMEL VS. AQUINO
Principle: Right of Possessor with respect to Necessary/Useful
Expenses if in good faith and if in bad faith
FACTS: (Not so necessary sa topic: there are intervenors in
this case and they were declared as co-owners by the court)
• This case originated from a suit filed by petitioners
(Ramel family) against respondents (Aquino spouses) for
Specific Performance and Preliminary Injunction and Damages.
• Daniel Aquino is the owner of Lot 2080 (14 plus hectare
land) which was mortgage to DBP for 50k. In 1983, the property
was in danger of being foreclosed as respondents had no means
to pay the loan. Thus, they offered to sell to petitioners the 8
hectares of the mortgaged property.
• Petitioners agreed to purchase the property but the
agreement was not reduced into writing. Petitioners were to buy
the property at P13,500 per hectare or a total of P110,700 and
the petitioners would assume the remaining mortgage obligation
of respondents with DBP.
• On that same day, the offer was made and accepted,
petitioners gave respondents an earnest money (5k) and further
additional partial payments were made which were duly
receipted by respondents. Petitioners also made payments to
DBP. (August 1983)
• Respondents also sold the southern portion of the
mortgaged property to petitioners for P2,700.
• Petitioners were allowed by respondents to take
possession of the parcels of land sold. Since then, they allegedly

introduced improvements to the property such as rice paddies,
drainage canal, fence and a house.
• On Nov. 18, 1983, petitioners applied for re-structuring
of the mortgage of loan with DBP for a period of 10 years,
allegedly with conformity of the respondents, which the bank
approved.
• On Oct. 1, 1984, petitioners went to DBP to pay for the
amortization but they found out that respondents had paid the
bank 72k. Petitioners offered to return the said amount to
respondents but the latter refused to accept the offer. Instead,
they told petitioners that they would return whatever they have
paid for the land.
• Hence, petitioners filed an action for specific
performance with preliminary injuction and damages.
• On their defense, respondents alleged that petitioners
agreed to pay them 35k and not 25k, they further alleged that
petitioners defaulted to pay the bank within the period set in the
agreement and even re-structured the loan without their
consent.
• Upon learning of petitioners re-structuring the loan,
respondents decided to revoke the sale.
• Petitioners argue that as possessors in good faith and
in the concept of an owner, they are entitled to the fruits
received before possession was legally interrupted and they
must be reimbursed for their expenses or for the increase in the
value of the subject property may have acquired by reason
thereof.
• On the other hand, respondents claimed that the
petitioners were able to cultivate the land and harvest palay.
• RTC: declared the contract of sale between the parties
as RESCINDED and OFFSET the claim of improvements by
petitioners and the claim of the fruits derived from the land by
respondents.
• CA: affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
• Whether or not there is a legal ground to order the
offsetting of the claim of improvements by petitioners to the
claim of fruits derived from the land by respondents.
RULING:
• We cannot order an offsetting of the claims as did the
trial court and the appellate court. The evidence show that both
parties failed to prove their respective claims. No receipts were
shown to guide the court as to how much were the costs of the
improvements. Likewise, the respondents based their
testimonies on presumptions and calculations not on actual
harvest of the real fruits derived from the land. In the absence
of evidence from both parties on their claims, offsetting is
improper.
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 15
• The right to offset may exist but the question of how
much is to be offset is factual in nature and needs to be proved
by proper evidence.
• Order of offsetting is DELETED for lack of evidence.
P.S. If mag-ask si Atty. about sa rescission and why the court
granted rescission. Mao lang ni i.answer:
• Petitioners committed breach of contract when instead
of paying for the loan within the period agreed upon, they asked
DBP to re-structure the payment of the loan for 10 years and
they did so without the consent of the respondents. The
petitioners committed substantial breach and not just casual and
slight breach.
• As to the argument of the petitioners that rescission
cannot be done because no demand was made upon them either
judicially or by notarial act. SC said that respondents satisfied
the requirements for rescission, when the respondents raised
RESCISSION as a defense in their answer. Petitioners were told
by the respondents that they were rescinding the contract after
the mortgage was re-structured without their consent. Indeed,
it was this declaration by respondents that prompted petitioners
to file a case of Specific Performance with the trial court.
Rights and Liabilities of Possessor in Bad Faith
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS & SEWERAGE SYSTEM v
CA
 FACTS: City of Dagupan filed a complaint against the
former National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
(NAWASA), now the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS), for recovery of the ownership
and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System.
 NAWASA interposed as one of its special defenses R.A.
1383 which vested upon it the ownership, possession and
control of all waterworks systems throughout the
Philippines
 TC: in favor of the CITY on the basis of a stipulation of
facts. NAWASA was found to be a possessor in bad faith
and hence not entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it.
 CA: affirmed the judgment of the trial court and ruled as
follows:
"However, as already found above, these useful expenses were
made in utter bad faith for they were instituted after the
complaint was filed and after numerous Supreme Court
decisions were promulgated declaring unconstitutional the
taking by NAWASA of the patrimonial waterworks
systems of cities, municipalities and provinces without
just compensation.
 Petitioner-Appellant MWSS, successor-in-interest of the
NAWASA, appealed to this Court

 SOLE ISSUE: whether or not it has the right to
remove all the useful improvements introduced by
NAWASA
 The CITY in its brief questions the raising of the issue for
the first time in this Court, inasmuch as it was not raised
in the trial court and CA
 Further argues that petitioner, as a possessor in bad faith,
has absolutely no right to the useful improvements;
 HELD: The procedural objection of the CITY is technically
correct.
 We shall overlook this procedural defect and rule on the
main issue.
 The answer is clearly in the negative. Recognized
authorities on the subject are agreed on this point.**
Article 449 of the Civil Code provides that "he who
builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of
another, loses what is built, planted or sown
without right to indemnity."
 As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful
improvements it had made without right to
indemnity (Santos vs. Mojica, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA
703).
 Moreover, under Article 546, only a possessor in good
faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the
right of retention until reimbursed; and
 Under Article 547, only a possessor in good faith
may remove useful improvements if the can be
done without damage to the principal thing and if
the person who recovers the possession does not
exercise the option of reimbursing the useful
expenses.
 The right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove
improvements applies only to improvements for
pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing
suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not
prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the
time he enters into possession (Article 549, Id.).
 The decision in the case of Carbonell vs. Court of
Appeals cannot be invoked to modify the clear
provisions of the Civil Code that a possessor in bad faith is
not entitled to reimbursement of useful expenses or to
removal of useful improvements.
 In said case, TC and CA: Respondents are Possessors in
GF. On appeal, the First Division of this Court:
reversed.
 On the question of whether or not respondents Infantes
were possessors in good faith, four Members ruled that
they were not, but as a matter of equity allowed
them to remove the useful improvements they had
introduced on the land. Justice Teehankee (now Chief
Justice) concurred on the same premise as the dissenting
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 16
opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma that both the conflicting
buyers of the real property in question, namely petitioner
Carbonell as the first buyer and respondents Infantes as
the second buyer, may be deemed purchasers in good
faith at the respective dates of their purchase.
 Inasmuch as only four Members concurred in ruling that
respondents Infantes were possessors in bad faith and two
Members ruled that they were possessors in good faith,
said decision does not establish a precedent.
 Moreover, the equitable consideration present in said case
are not present in the case at bar.
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court is
affirmed
PELICULA SABIDO and MAXIMO RANCES, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and DOMINADOR STA. ANA, respondents.
Facts:
This case originated from an action for quieting of title
which was filed by the spouses Victor Dasal and Maria Pecunio
against petitioners (Maximo Rances and Pelicula Sabido) on the
question of ownership over two parcels of land (Lots “B” and
“D”.)
The trial court declared the petitioners as owners of
Lots “B” and “D”. The decision became final. However, when the
decision was being carried out to put the petitioners in
possession of Lot B, the Sheriff found (3) persons occupying
portions of Lot "B". One of them was respondent Dominador
Sta. Ana.
Respondent Sta. Ana claimed ownership by purchase
from one, Prudencio Lagarto, of a bigger area of which Lot "B"
is a part. He stated that the two other persons occupying the
disputed portion are his tenants.
Subsequently, an order of demolition was issued.
However, this order was challenged by the respondent and upon
his filing of certiorari proceedings. The SC, set aside the order
of the trial court and remanded the case to the trial court to
determine:
T.N. There are 2 issues pero #1 ra ako gi include kay related sa
topic.
1) Whether or not the private respondent is privy to the
spouses Victor Dasal and Maria Pecunio as the losing
parties in the action below;
Trial court clarified the issue involved in the case.
If there is a privity between the Petitioner (Dominador
Sta. Ana = respondent) and Dasal, then the Petitioner is bound
by the final decision in this CC No. R-396 (2040) against Dasal
and therefore Petitioner is subject to the order of execution and
is bound to vacate the land in question or subject a portion of

his house and the surrounding walls to demolition. If there is no
privity then he is not bound by said final decision.
(OMG Moment: If you asked yourselves: Unsa ni na CC No. R-
396 (2040)? I think katung action for quieting of title filed by
sps. Dasal and Pecunio against Sabido and Rances. Please refer
to the 1st and 2nd par. Of this case digest)
The Judge issued a RESOLUTION finding that there
was privity between the respondent and the spouses Victor
Dasal and Maria Pecunio.
The private respondent filed with this Court a pleading.
However, said petition was denied. A series of resolutions were
subsequently issued by this Court denying the private
respondent's motion to reconsider the resolution. Finally, this
Court issued a resolution ordering the return of the records for
execution of judgment.
Trial Court
The petitioners filed a motion for execution of judgment. The
trial court granted it.
IAC.
The private respondent appealed to the IAC, contending that it
deprived him of the alternative choice of paying the value of the
disputed area. The appellate court rendered a decision that the
order/writ of demolition are set aside.
Issue:
*Whether the respondent could not be considered a builder in
good faith as to entitle him to the alternative choice of retention
Ruling:
The Respondent could be considered a builder in good
faith and he is not entitled to the alternative right of
retention
As clearly pointed out by the judge in her resolution
stating that if there is privity between the private respondent
and the spouses Dasals, then the former is bound by the final
decision in CC No. R-396 (2040) which is the case between the
Dasals and the petitioners. However, a confusion was brought
about by the dispositive portion of the resolution when it
recommended to this Court either to order the respondent to
remove all his constructions over Lot "B" or to require said
respondent to pay the petitioners the value of the disputed area
which was already enclosed by a wall constructed by the
respondent.(Please refer sa FURTHER READINGS) This,
nevertheless, was rectified when the SC issued the series of
resolutions denying the respondent's petition and motions for
reconsideration before this Court wherein they stated that the
resolution was in accord, among others, with the order of "which
ordered the petitioner (private respondent) to vacate the
premises.
Hence, it is clear that the private respondent has to
remove all his constructions over Lot "B" and vacate the
premises because this is his only option. Being adjudged in privy
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 17
with the spouses Dasals, he cannot avail himself of the rights
granted to a builder in good faith. Hence, he must remove all
his useful improvements over Lot "B" at his own expense and if
the same have already been removed, he cannot be entitled to
the right of retention or to any reimbursement.
Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides
that 'he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of
another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity.
(T.N.) Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a
possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses
with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under Article
547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful
improvements if this can be done without damage to the
principal thing and if the person who recovers the possession
does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses.
The right given a possessor in bad faith to remove
improvements applies only to improvement for pure
luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no
injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer
to retain them by paying the value they have at the time
he enters into possession
__________________________________________
FURTHER READINGS! 
1. VERY IMPORTANT DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE
RESOLUTION. Mao ni siya ang resolution ni Judge na naka-
boang sa tanan.
6. That therefore, this Court recommends to the
Honorable Supreme Court, that the petitioner be ordered to
remove the entire balcony and the northern portion of the main
house to the extent of about one meter found to be standing on
the private road, as well as the northern extension of the hollow
block walls on the eastern boundary of Lot C that stand on the
private road and to the northern end of Lot B which wall
measures to a total length of about 15 meters from the northern
boundary of Lot B to the southern edge of the private road; or
in the alternative to require the petitioner to pay the
respondents the value of the western portion of the disputed
area which is now enclosed in the wall constructed by the
petitioner; (ang petitioner referred here is the respondent.
2. ALSO PLEASE CHECK PAGE 407 OF PROPERTY BY DE LEON,
Topic: Useful expenses
Possession over Movables
EDU VS. GOMEZ
Facts:
• Subject matter of this case is a 1968 model Volkwagen,
bantam car allegedly owned by Lt. Walter A. Bala of Clark
Airbase, Angeles City.

• The office of the Commission on Land Transportation
received a report from Manila Adjustment Company that the
aforesaid car was stolen from the residence of Lt. Bala sometime
in June 1970.
• Petitioners agents of Anti-Carnapping Unit (ANCAR) of
the Phil Constabulary recognized subject car in possession of
herein private respondent Lucilla Abello and immediately seized
and impounded the car as stolen property.
• Private respondent Lucilla Abello filed a complaint for
replevin with damages.
• Respondent Court of First Instance Judge found that
the car in question was acquired by Lucila Abello by purchase
from its registered owner, Marcelino Guansing, for the valuable
consideration of P9,000.00, under the notarial deed of absolute
sale, dated August 11, 1970; that she has been in possession
thereof since then until February 3, 1971 when the car was
seized from her by the petitioners.
Issue:
WON Lucilla Abello’s possession of the chattel (car) is entitled to
be respected and protected under Art. 559(2).
Ruling:
The acquirer or purchaser in good faith of a chattel or movable
property is entitled to be respected and protected in his
possession as if he were the true owner thereof until a
competent court rules otherwise. In the meantime, as the true
owner, the possessor in good faith can not be compelled to
surrender possession nor to be required to institute an action
for the recovery of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity
bond is issued in his favor. The filing of an information charging
that the chattel was illegally obtained through estafa from its
true owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor does
not warrant disturbing the possession of the chattel against the
will of the possessor.
EDCA PUBLISHING V SPS SANTOS & CA
GR 80298, 26 April 1990
Facts:
A person identifying himself as Prof Jose Cruz (who
was later discovered to be Tomas de la Pena) ordered 406 books
EDCA Publishing. Cruz issued a personal check amounting to
8,995.56 as payment for the books. Later, Cruz sold 120 of the
books to Leonor Santos (respondent) who paid him 1,700.
It was later discovered by EDCA that Cruz was a
fraudster. He was not the Dean of the school he claimed to be
affiliated with. It was also found out that he had no more
account or deposit with the bank, against which he had drawn
the payment check. Cruz was later on arrested. Consequently,
EDCA, with the assistance of the police, forced their way into
the store of the respondents (Santos Bookstore) and seized the
[EH 405 – Property – Effects of Possession] 18
120 books which Santos bought from Cruz. The seizure was
without warrant.
Private respondents then sued for the recovery of the
books. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and
petitioner finally surrendered the books to respondents.
Issue:
Whether Sps Santos unlawfully acquired the books
thereby depriving EDCA of its possession.
Ruling:
NO, since Cruz was able to acquire ownership over the
books, the transfer of the books to Sps Santos is valid.
The contention of the petitioner that Cruz did not acquire
ownership over the books because he did not pay the price
(therefore he could not transfer the books to Sps Santos) lacks
merit.
A contract of sale is consensual in nature and is
perfected by mere agreement as to the subject matter and the
consideration. The provisions of the Civil Code which provides
that ownership shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of
the price is true only if there is a stipulation to such effect.
Otherwise, the rule is that ownership shall pass to the buyer
upon actual or constructive delivery.
In this case, actual delivery of the books have been
made by EDCA to Cruz. Therefore, Cruz acquired ownership over
the books and Cruz, as a consequence, could validly transfer the
books to Sps Santos.
The fact that Cruz did not pay the price is of no material
importance as to the title of the Sps Santos over the books. Non-
payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind
the contract between Cruz and EDCA, but it surely did not impair
the title the Sps Santos acquired over the books.
The remedy of EDCA is not against Sps Santos but
Cruz.