SPOUSES RAFAEL BENITEZ AND AVELINA BENITEZ, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RENATO MACAPAGAL and ELIZABETH

MACAPAGAL, respondents.

G.R. No. 104828. January 16, 1997.

-PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:

-Petitioners Rafael and Avelina Benitez purchased a 303-square-meter parcel of land with
improvement from the Cavite Development Bank, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title on
January 22, 1986.

-On July 17, 1989, private respondents purchased a property, a 285.70 square-meter-lot covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title, adjacent to that of petitioners. After a relocation survey was
conducted, private respondents discovered that some 46.50 square meters of their property was
occupied by petitioners’ house. Despite verbal and written demands, petitioners refused to
vacate. A last notice to vacate was sent to petitioners on October 26, 1989.

-On January 18, 1990, private respondents filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan,
Branch 58, a case for ejectment against petitioners. The MeTC of San Juan decided in favor of
the former, ordering the petitioners and persons claiming rights to vacate and surrender
possession of the subject to the private respondents and to pay damages.

-On appeal, the RTC of Pasig affirmed the decision holding that the controversy is one of
encroachment or overlapping of two adjacent properties but a case where the defendants (now
petitioners) is constructed on the plaintiffs’ (now private respondents) property thus have the
right to demand that defendants remove the portion of the house standing on his realty.

-The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC, it held that petitioners are fully aware
that they encroached on the property of the private respondents. Petitioners cannot claim good
faith as against the respondents and as builders in bad faith, they cannot demand that
respondents’ sell the disputed portion but can be ordered to dismantle the structures at their own
expense as provided by law. In the interim that their structure remains, they pay rent until the
same is removed. Thus this petition.

-The petitioners question the validity of the imposition of rental, the denial of their claimed
preemptive right to purchase the encroached portion, and the propriety of the CA’s finding of
bad faith on their part. They also insist that the MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case because
its real nature is one of accion publiciana or recovery of possession, not unlawful detainer; that it
is not forcible entry because private respondents did not have prior possession of the property;
and it is not unlawful detainer for the petitioners were not tenants of the private respondents nor
vendee unlawfully withholding possession thereof.

-Private respondents countered that petitioners are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the MeTC after they voluntarily participated in the trial on the merits and lost; that there is no
law giving petitioners the option to buy the encroached property; and that petitioners acted in bad
faith because they waived in their deed of sale the usual seller’s warranty as to the absence of
any and all liens and encumbrances on the property, thereby implying they had knowledge of the
encroachment at the time of purchase.

ISSUE:

-Whether the action for ejectment and the award of rental is proper;

-Whether the petitioners as possessors has the option to buy.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the occupation of the land by the petitioners prior to private
respondents’ purchase thereof does not negate the latter’s case for ejectment. Considering that
private respondents are unlawfully deprived of their possession on the encroached land and
within the one year reglementary period, ejectment is the proper remedy. The award are damages
and not rental, and are recoverable in cases of ejectment under Section 8, Rule 70 of Rules of
Court.

Moreover, the right to sell and not to buy belongs to the owner of the property as provided by
Article 448 of the Civil Code. Thus, there can be no pre-emptive right to buy even as a
compromise as this prerogative belongs solely to the landowner.

PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (Now known as TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE

AND ENTERPRISE ZONE AUTHORITY), petitioner,

vs.

MARCOSA A. SABANDALHERZENSTIEL, PEDRO TAPALES, LUIS TAPALES, and

ROMEO TAPALES, respondents.

G.R. No. 196741. July 17, 2013.

-PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City.

FACTS:

-Petitioner Philippine Tourism Authority is the owner of the subject property and other parcels of
land located in Brgy. Basdiot, Moalboal, Cebu since February 12, 1981 when it bought the same
from Tri-Island Corporate Holdings, Inc. (Tri-Island). It had then been in actual, physical,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the subject property and had declared the same for
taxation purposes.

-Sometime in 1997, however, respondents Pedro Tapales, Luis Tapales, Romeo Tapales
(Tapaleses), and Sabandal-Herzenstiel by force, strategy and stealth entered into the 2,940 square
meter portion of the subject property, on which they proceeded to cut down some coconut trees,
introduced improvements and fenced the area.

-Petitioner made demands to vacate, the last of which was through a letter dated January 5, 1998,
which respondents ignored, prompting the filing of a forcible entry complaint against them
before the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cebu (MCTC).

In their Answer with Counterclaim, the Tapaleses acknowledged that the subject property had
already been sold by its administrator, Josefina Abrenica, to Tri-Island. They, however, claimed
that the sale was tainted with force and intimidation and hence void, including the subsequent
transactions covering the same property. Notwithstanding the sale, they remained in actual and
physical possession of the subject property and even introduced improvements thereon.
Consequently, absent any proof of prior possession on the part of petitioner, they claimed that
the forcible entry complaint must necessarily be dismissed.

-The MCTC ruled that the petitioner is the lawful owner of the property and had been in prior
possession thereof as shown by a deed of sale, tax declarations issued in its name, and its act
leasing portion of the property to others in the exercise of its ownership and possession.
Respondents failed to substantiate their claim and in fact acknowledged the same by an offer to
buy back the same by one of the respondents.

-Respondents were ordered to vacate the subject property and remove all improvements
introduced therein, and pay the petitioner jointly and severally as rental until they effectively
leave the premises. The appeal with the RTC was dismissed due to technical reasons.
Meanwhile, Sabandal-Harzenstiel brought the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision declaring Harzenstiel as the lawful possessor of the property. It held that respondent
failed to establish prior possession of the property. Thus, this petition by PTA.

ISSUE: Whether respondents may be lawfully ejected from the said property.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that respondents failed to establish possession of the subject property
after its sale in 1981 when it was sold by Triplus to the petitioner. They had admitted the same in
their answer that the petitioner exercised dominion over the same by instituting caretakers and
leasing portions thereof to third persons. The petitioners having prior possession, respondents
deprived them of their property through force, intimidation, strategy, threat and stealth. Thus,
respondents may be ejected.
MANUEL LAO, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and BETTER HOMES REALTY & HOUSING CORPORATION,

respondents.

G.R. No. 115307. July 8, 1997.

-PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:

-Better Homes Realty and Housing Corp (private respondent) filed with MTC of Quezon City a
complaint for unlawful detainer. It alleged that it is the owner of a property located in Domingo
Street Quezon City evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title and the same was occupied by
Manuel Lao (petitioner), without rent, on the private respondent’s pure liberality, with the
understanding that he would vacate the property upon demand. Petitioner refused to vacate the
property despite demand.

-In his answer, the petitioner claimed that he is the true owner of the property; that the
respondent purchased the same from N. Domingo Realty and Development, a family company,
but the agreement was actually a loan secured by mortgage.

-The MTC ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered the petitioner to vacate the property. On
appeal, the RTC of Quezon City reversed the decision and ordered the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of merit. It also held that the property was acquired by respondent by deed of sale but the
real transaction is a loan secured by mortgage.

-Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC
and affirmed the decision of the MTC holding that the plaintiff (now private respondent) is the
real owner of the property. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:

-Whether the lower court can decide on the issue of ownership in the present ejectment case;

-Whether private respondent had acquired ownership over the property in question;

-Whether petitioner should be ejected from the premises in question

RULING:
-The Supreme Court held that in ejectment case, the issue is de facto possession and not de jure.
Thus, the MTC does not have jurisdiction decide the issue of ownership, but if it did, it shall be
dismissed on appeal. On the other hand, the RTC might dismiss the same or exercise its original
jurisdiction and decide on the issue on its merits if the parties therein and go to trial without
objection to such jurisdiction.

-The agreement between the parties, as may be inferred from their intention and actions, is not
one of sale of real property but of equitable mortgage, a loan secured by mortgage.

-An action for unlawful detainer is grounded on Section 1, Rule 70 where the possessor of a right
may bring an action against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs. In this case, there was no sale of disputed property. Hence, it
still belongs to petitioner’s family corporation. Private respondent, being a mere mortgagee, has
no right to eject petitioner. Private respondent, as a creditor and mortgagee, cannot appropriate
the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the
contrary is null and void.