#3

ENGINEERING AND MACHINERY CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 52267 January 24, 1996
Facts:
Almeda and Engineering signed a contract, wherein Engineering undertook to fabricate, furnish and
install the air-conditioning system in the latter’s building along Buendia Avenue, Makati in consideration
of P210,000.00. Petitioner was to furnish the materials, labor, tools and all services required in order to
so fabricate and install said system. The system was completed in 1963 and accepted by private
respondent, who paid in full the contract price.
Almeda learned from the employees of NIDC of the defects of the air-conditioning system of the building.
Almeda spent for the repair of the air-conditioning system. He now sues Engineering for the refund of
the repair. Engineering contends that the contract was of sale and the claim is barred by prescription
since the responsibility of a vendor for any hidden faults or defects in the thing sold runs only for 6
months (Arts 1566, 1567, 1571). Almeda contends that since it was a contract for a piece of work, hence
the prescription period was ten years (Hence Art 1144 should apply on written contracts).
RTC found that Engineering failed to install certain parts and accessories called for by the contract, and
deviated from the plans of the system, thus reducing its operational effectiveness to achieve a fairly
desirable room temperature.

Issue:

1) Whether the contract for the fabrication and installation of a central air-conditioning system in a
building, one of “sale” or “for a piece of work”? CONTRACT FOR PIECE OF WORK.
2) Corrollarily whether the claim for refund was extinguished by prescription? NO.

Held:

1) A contract for a piece of work, labor and materials may be distinguished from a contract of sale by the
inquiry as to whether the thing transferred is one not in existence and which would never have existed
but for the order, of the person desiring it. In such case, the contract is one for a piece of work, not a sale.
On the other hand, if the thing subject of the contract would have existed and been the subject of a sale to
some other person even if the order had not been given, then the contract is one of sale.
A contract for the delivery at a certain price of an article which the vendor in the ordinary course of his
business manufactures or procures for the general market, whether the same is on hand at the time or
not is a contract of sale, but if the goods are to be manufactured specially for the customer and upon his
special order, and not for the general market, it is a contract for a piece of work .
The contract in question is one for a piece of work. It is not petitioner’s line of business to manufacture
air-conditioning systems to be sold “off-the-shelf.” Its business and particular field of expertise is the
fabrication and installation of such systems as ordered by customers and in accordance with the
particular plans and specifications provided by the customers. Naturally, the price or compensation for
the system manufactured and installed will depend greatly on the particular plans and specifications
agreed upon with the customers.
2)The original complaint is one for damages arising from breach of a written contract – and not a suit to
enforce warranties against hidden defects – we here – with declare that the governing law is Article 1715
(supra). However, inasmuch as this provision does not contain a specific prescriptive period, the general
law on prescription, which is Article 1144 of the Civil Code, will apply. Said provision states, inter alia,
that actions “upon a written contract” prescribe in ten (10) years. Since the governing contract was
executed on September 10, 1962 and the complaint was filed on May 8, 1971, it is clear that the action has
not prescribed.
#4

DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. NAPOLEON N. ARAGONES

461 SCRA 139 (2005)

A contract for the delivery at a certain price of an article which the vendor in the ordinary course
of his business manufactures or procures for the general market, whether the same is on hand at
the time or not, is a contract of sale, but if the goods are to be manufactured specially for the
customer and upon his special order, and not for the general market, it is a contract for a piece of
work.

Del Monte Philippines Inc. (DMPI) entered into an agreement with Mega-Engineering Services in
joint venture with WAFF Construction System Corporation (MEGA-WAFF) represented by Edilberto
Garcia (Garcia), wherein Garcia will supply the installation of modular pavement in DMPI‘s
warehouse. In this regard, Garcia as a contractor entered into a supply agreement with Dynablock
Enterprises represented by respondent Aragones, to supply labor, materials, equipment and the like.

Thereafter, Argones started to do his obligation. The deadline however was not met. After
the installation, Aragones failed to collect the payment from Garcia. Then, Aragones sent a letter to
DMPI saying that instead of paying Garcia, DMPI should directly pay him. But this did not happen.
Hence Aragones filed a complaint for sum of money with damages against Garcia and DMPI before
RTC.

RTC ruled in favor of Aragones, it held that DMPI and Garcia are jointly and severally liable. DMPI
appealed to Court of Appeal (CA). However at CA, the court affirmed RTC‘s decision. Hence, DMPI
filed this petition. It contends that the supply agreement between Garcia and Aragones is a contract
of sale to which DMPI was not privy, hence DMPI cannot be held liable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Supply Agreement between Aragones and Garcia is a contract of sale

HELD:

Contrary to DMPI‘s claim that ―save for the shape, there was no consideration of any special needs
or requirements of DMPI taken into account in the design or manufacture of the concrete paving
blocks,‖ the ―Supply Agreement‖ is replete with specifications, terms or conditions showing that it
was one for a piece of work.

As reflected in the highlighted and underscored above-quoted provisions of the

―Supply Agreement,‖ as well as other evidence on record, the machines Aragones was obliged to
fabricate were those for casting the concrete blocks specified by Garcia. Aragones did not have those
kind of machines in his usual business, hence, the special order.

Under Article 1467 then of the Civil Code, a contract for the delivery at a certain price of an article
which the vendor in the ordinary course of his business manufactures or procures for the general
market, whether the same is on hand at the time or not, is a contract of sale, but if the goods are to
be manufactured specially for the customer and upon his special order, and not for the general
market, it is a contract for a piece of work. The ―Supply Agreement‖ was decidedly a contract for a
piece of work.

Following Art. 1729 of the Civil Code which provides that those who put their labor upon or furnish
materials for a piece of work undertaken by the contractor have an action against the owner up to the
amount owing from the latter to the contractor at the time the claim is made.

Aragones having specially fabricated three casting machines and furnished some materials for the
production of the concrete blocks specially ordered and specified by MEGA-WAFF which were to be
and indeed they were for the exclusive use of MEGA-WAFF, he has a cause of action upon DMPI up
to the amount it owed MEGA-WAFF at the time Aragones made his claim to DMPI.
#5

Sps. Ramon Lequin and Virgina Lequin vs. Sps. Raymundo Vizconde, et al., G.R. No.
177710, October 12, 2009.

There can be no doubt that the contract of sale or Kasulatan lacked the essential element of
consideration. It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has
been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void abinitio for lack of
consideration. Moreover, Art. 1471 of the Civil Code, which provides that “if the price is simulated, the
sale is void,” also applies to the instant case, since the price purportedly paid as indicated in the contract
of sale was simulated for no payment was actually made.

Consideration and consent are essential elements in a contract of sale. Where a party’s consent to a
contract of sale is vitiated or where there is lack of consideration due to a simulated price, the contract
is null and void abinitio.

A contract, as defined in the Civil Code, is a meeting of minds, with respect to the other, to give
something or to render some service. For a contract to be valid, it must have three essential elements:
(1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and
(3) cause of the obligation which is established.

The requisites of consent are (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it
refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. In De Jesus v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, it was explained that intelligence in consent is vitiated by error, freedom by violence, intimidation
or undue influence, and spontaneity by fraud.

Article (Art.) 1330 of the Civil Code provides that when consent is given through fraud, the contract is
voidable.

Tolentino defines fraud as “every kind of deception whether in the form of insidious machinations,
manipulations, concealments or misrepresentations, for the purpose of leading another party into error
and thus execute a particular act.” Fraud has a “determining influence” on the consent of the prejudiced
party, as he is misled by a false appearance of facts, thereby producing error on his part in deciding
whether or not to agree to the offer.

One form of fraud is misrepresentation through insidious words or machinations. Under Art. 1338 of the
Civil Code, there is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting
parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which without them he would not have agreed to.
Insidious words or machinations constituting deceit are those that ensnare, entrap, trick, or mislead the
other party who was induced to give consent which he or she would not otherwise have given.

Deceit is also present when one party, by means of concealing or omitting to state material facts, with
intent to deceive, obtains consent of the other party without which, consent could not have been given.
Art. 1339 of the Civil Code is explicit that failure to disclose facts when there is a duty to reveal them, as
when the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes fraud.

Facts:

In 1995, spouses Ramon and Virginia Lequin, residents bought the subject lot consisting of 10,115 sq. m.
from one Carlito de Leon. The sale was negotiated by respondent Raymundo Vizconde. 
 
In 1997, spouses Vizconde represented to spouses Lequin that they had also bought from Carlito de
Leon a 1,012 sq. m. lot adjacent to the Lequins and built a house thereon. 
 
As later confirmed by de Leon, however, the 1,012 sq. m. lot claimed by the Vizcondes is part of the
10,115 sq. m. lot Lequin bought from him.

With the consent of the Vizcondes, spouses Lequin then constructed their house on the 500-square
meter half-portion of the lot claimed by respondents, as this was near the road. 
 
Given this situation where the house of Lequins stood on a portion of the lot allegedly owned by
Vizcondes, the former consulted a lawyer, who advised them that the 1,012 sq. m. lot be segregated
from the subject lot whose title they own and to make it appear that they are selling to respondents 512
square meters thereof. 
 
This sale was embodied in the February 12, 2000 Kasulatan where it was made to appear that the
Vizcondes paid PhP 15,000 for the purchase of the 512-square meter portion of the subject lot.
In July 2000, petitioners tried to develop the dried up canal located between their 500-square meter lot
and the public road. However, the respondents objected, claiming ownership of said dried up canal or
sapang patay.

This prompted the Liquins to look into the ownership of the dried up canal and the lot claimed by the
respondents Carlito de Leon told petitioners that what he had sold to respondents was the dried up
canal or sapang patay and that the 1,012-square meter lot claimed by respondents really belongs to
petitioners.

In 2001, petitioners filed a complaint praying for the Kasulatan to be declared as null and void ab initio.

The RTC found the Kasulatan allegedly conveying 512 square meters to respondents to be null and void
due to: (1) the vitiated consent of petitioners in the execution of the simulated contract of sale; and (2)
lack of consideration, since it was shown that while petitioners were ostensibly conveying to
respondents 512 square meters of their property, yet the consideration of PhP 15,000 was not paid to
them and, in fact,they were the ones who paid respondents PhP 50,000.

Upon appeal by the respondent-spouses, CA reversed the ruling.

Issue: 

WON the Kasulatan was null and void. 

But take note, on the issue of consent, the SC said that the Kasulatan was merely voidable. But on the
issue of consideration, it was void. Final ruling - void.

Held: YES
Re: Lack of Consideration

The contract of sale or Kasulatan states that respondents paid petitioners PhP 15,000 for the 512-square
meter portion. On its face, the above contract of sale appears to be supported by a valuable
consideration. We, however, agree with the trial court’s finding that this is a simulated sale and
unsupported by any consideration, for respondents never paid the PhP 15,000 purported purchase
price.

The kasulatan did not express the true intent of the parties
Lack of consideration was proved by petitioners’ evidence aliunde showing that the Kasulatan did not
express the true intent and agreement of the parties. As explained above, said sale contract was
fraudulently entered into through the misrepresentations of respondents causing petitioners’ vitiated
consent.

There can be no doubt that the contract of sale or Kasulatan lacked the essential element of
consideration. 
 
It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but
in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of consideration.
Moreover, Art. 1471 of the Civil Code, which provides that “if the price is simulated, the sale is void,”
also applies to the instant case, since the price purportedly paid as indicated in the contract of sale was
simulated for no payment was actually made.

The contract is void ab intio 

Consideration and consent are essential elements in a contract of sale. Where a party’s consent to a
contract of sale is vitiated or where there is lack of consideration due to a simulated price, the contract
is null and void ab initio.

The PhP 50,000 paid by petitioners to respondents as consideration for the transfer of the 500-square
meter lot to petitioners must be restored to the latter.

Otherwise, an unjust enrichment situation ensues. The facts clearly show that the 500-square meter lot
is legally owned by petitioners as shown by the testimony of de Leon; therefore, they have no legal
obligation to pay PhP 50,000 therefor.

Considering that the 512 square-meter lot on which respondents’ house is located is clearly owned by
petitioners, then the Court declares petitioners’ legal ownership over said 512 square-meter lot. The
amount of PhP 50,000 should only earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing
of complaint up to finality of judgment and not 12% since such payment is neither a loan nor a
forbearance of credit. After finality of decision, the amount of PhP 50,000 shall earn interest of 12% per
annum until fully paid.

There was vitiated consent on the part of Spouses Lequin. 

There was fraud in the execution of the contract used on petitioners which affected their consent.
Petitioners’ reliance and belief on the wrongful claim by respondents operated as a concealment of a
material fact in their agreeing to and in readily executing the contract of sale, as advised and proposed
by a notary public.

Believing that Carlito de Leon indeed sold a 1,012-square meter portion of the subject property to
respondents, petitioners signed the contract of sale based on respondents’ representations. Had
petitioners known, as they eventually would sometime in late 2000 or early 2001 when they made the
necessary inquiry from Carlito de Leon, they would not have entered or signed the contract of sale,
much less pay PhP 50,000 for a portion of the subject lot which they fully own. Thus, petitioners’
consent was vitiated by fraud or fraudulent machinations of Raymundo. In the eyes of the law,
petitioners are the rightful and legal owners of the subject 512 square-meter lot anchored on their
purchase thereof from de Leon. This right must be upheld and protected.
#6

Swedish Match v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 128120, 20 October 2004

FACTS:

Private respondent seeks to enforce a contract of sale between it and the petitioner when the latter allegedly
accepted its bid to purchase the former’s shares. Petitioner counters that it did not accept the bid and merely
advised the private respondent to conduct a pre-acquisition audit. The trial court ruled in favor of the
petitioner’s while the CA reversed the same and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

ISSUE:

Was there a perfected contract of sale?

RULING:

There was none. This was caused by the lack of consent or meeting of the minds of the parties regarding the
price of the shares.

In the case of a contract of sale, required is the concurrence of three elements, to wit: (a) consent or meeting
of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (b) determinate subject matter,
and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent. Such contract is born from the moment there is a meeting of
minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.

In general, contracts undergo three distinct stages, to wit: negotiation; perfection or birth; and consummation.
Negotiation begins from the time the prospective contracting parties manifest their interest in the contract and
ends at the moment of agreement of the parties. Perfection or birth of the contract takes place when the
parties agree upon the essential elements of the contract. Consummation occurs when the parties fulfill or
perform the terms agreed upon in the contract, culminating in the extinguishment thereof.

A negotiation is formally initiated by an offer. An offer would require, among other things, a clear certainty on
both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract. Consent in a contract of sale should
be manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to
constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance
constitutes a counter-offer.

Private respondent repeatedly stressed in his letters that they would not be able to submit their final bid by 30
June 1990.With indubitable inconsistency, respondents later claimed that for all intents and purposes, the
US$36 million was their final bid. If this were so, it would be inane for Litonjua to state, as he did, in his letter
dated 28 June 1990 that they would be in a position to submit their final bid only on 17 July 1990. The lack of
a definite offer on the part of respondents could not possibly serve as the basis of their claim that the sale of
the Phimco shares in their favor was perfected, for one essential element of a contract of sale was obviously
wanting the price certain in money or its equivalent. The price must be certain, otherwise there is no true
consent between the parties. There can be no sale without a price. Quite recently, this Court reiterated the
long-standing doctrine that the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element before a
valid and binding contract of sale can exist since the agreement on the manner of payment goes into the price
such that a disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.

Granting arguendo, that the amount of US$36 million was a definite offer, it would remain as a mere offer in
the absence of evidence of its acceptance. To produce a contract, there must be acceptance, which may be
express or implied, but it must not qualify the terms of the offer. The acceptance of an offer must be
unqualified and absolute to perfect the contract. In other words, it must be identical in all respects with that of
the offer so as to produce consent or meeting of the minds.

Respondents’ attempt to prove the alleged verbal acceptance of their US$36 million bid becomes futile in the
face of the overwhelming evidence on record that there was in the first place no meeting of the minds with
respect to the price. It is dramatically clear that the US$36 million was not the actual price agreed upon but
merely a preliminary offer which was subject to adjustment after the conclusion of the audit of the company
finances. Respondents’ failure to submit their final bid on the deadline set by petitioners prevented the
perfection of the contract of sale. It was not perfected due to the absence of one essential element which was
the price certain in money or its equivalent.
#7

ELENA JANE DUARTE, petitioner,                                                   G.R. No. 173038

vs.                                                                                September 14, 2011      

MIGUEL SAMUEL A.E. DURAN, respondent.

Facts:

According to respondent, on February 14, 2002, he offered to sell a laptop computer for the sum of P15,000.00 to
petitioner thru the help of a common friend, Josephine Dy. Since petitioner was undecided, respondent left the
laptop with petitioner for two days. On February 16, 2002, petitioner told respondent that she was willing to buy
the laptop on installment. Respondent agreed; thus, petitioner gave P5,000.00 as initial payment and promised to
pay P3,000.00 on February 18, 2002 and P7,000.00 on March 15, 2002. On February 18, 2002, petitioner gave her
second installment of P3,000.00 to Dy, who signed the handwritten receiptallegedly made by petitioner as proof
of payment.  But when Dy returned to get the remaining balance on March 15, 2002, petitioner offered to pay
only P2,000.00 claiming that the laptop was only worth P10,000.00.Due to the refusal of petitioner to pay the
remaining balance, respondent thru counsel sent petitioner a demand letter dated July 29, 2002.

Petitioner, however, denied writing the receipt dated February 18, 2002, and receiving the demand letter dated
July 29, 2002.  Petitioner claimed that there was no contract of sale. Petitioner said that Dy offered to sell
respondent's laptop but because petitioner was not interested in buying it, Dy asked if petitioner could instead
lend respondent the amount of P5,000.00. Petitioner agreed and in turn, Dy left the laptop with petitioner. On
February 18, 2002, Dy came to get the laptop but petitioner refused to give it back because the loan was not yet
paid. Dy then asked petitioner to lend an additional amount of P3,000.00 to respondent who allegedly was in dire
need of money. Petitioner gave the money under agreement that the amounts she lent to respondent would be
considered as partial payments for the laptop in case she decides to buy it.  Sometime in the first week of March
2002, petitioner informed respondent that she has finally decided not to buy the laptop. Respondent, however,
refused to pay and insisted that petitioner purchase the laptop instead.

Issues:

(1) The timeliness of the filing of the Petition for Review with the CA;

(2) The existence of a contract of sale;

(3) Respondent's entitlement to attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

Held:

The Petition for Review was

timely filed with the CA

That litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days within which to appeal, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration under Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45 of the Rules of
Court; counted from May 27, 2004, the date respondent received the RTC Order dated May 13, 2004 denying his
motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision dated March 19, 2004 or until June 11, 2004, within which to file
his Petition for Review with the CA.  Thus, we find that when he filed the Petition for Review with the CA on June
1, 2004, his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.

There was a contract of sale between the parties

As to whether there was a contract of sale between the parties, we hold that there was, and the absence of a
written contract of sale does not mean otherwise.  A contract of sale is perfected the moment the parties agree
upon the object of the sale, the price, and the terms of payment.Once perfected, the parties are bound by it
whether the contract is verbal or in writing because no form is required.
In this case, the contract of sale had been partially executed because the possession of the laptop was already
transferred to petitioner and the partial payments had been made by her.  Thus, the absence of a written contract
is not fatal to respondent's case. 

The award for attorney's fees and 

litigation expenses was proper

Article 2208 of the Civil Code enumerates the legal grounds which justify or warrant the grant of attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation, among which is when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
incur expenses to protect his interest

The interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, however, shall apply from the finality of judgment until the
total amount awarded is fully paid.
#8

Romulo A. Coronel, et al vs. The Court of Appeals, et al

G.R. No. 103577 (October 7, 1996)

FACTS:

Coronel et al. consummated the sale of his property located in Quezon City to respondent Alcaraz. Since the
title of the property was still in the name of the deceased father of the Coronels, they agreed to transfer its title
to their name upon payment of the down payment and thereafter an absolute deed of sale will be executed.

Alcaraz’s mother paid the down payment in behalf of her daughter and as such, Coronel made the transfer of
title to their name. Notwithstanding this fact, Coronel sold the property to petitioner Mabanag and rescinded its
prior contract with Alcaraz.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contract between the petitioner and the respondent was a contract to sell subject to a
suspensive condition.

RULING:

No. The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein made no express
reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land. Unlike in a contract to sell, petitioners in the case
at bar did not merely promise to sell the property to private respondent upon the fulfillment of the suspensive
condition. On the contrary, having already agreed to sell the subject property, they undertook to have the
certificate of title change to their names and immediately thereafter, to execute the written deed of absolute
sale.

Article 1475, in correlation with Article 1181, both of the Civil Code, plainly applies to the case.

Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is
the object of the contract and upon the price.

From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law
governing the form of contracts.

Art. 1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those
already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.

What is clearly established by the plain language of the subject document is that when the said Receipt of
Down Payment was prepared and signed by petitioners, the parties had agreed to a conditional contract of
sale, consummation of which is subject only to the successful transfer of the certificate of title from the name
of petitioners father to their names. In fact, the Court significantly notes that this suspensive condition was
fulfilled. Thus, the conditional contract of sale between petitioners and private respondent became obligatory,
the only act required for the consummation thereof being the delivery of the property by means of the
execution of the deed of absolute sale in a public instrument.

What may be perceived from the respective undertakings of the parties to the contract is that petitioners had
already agreed to sell the house and lot they inherited from their father, completely willing to transfer
ownership of the subject house and lot to the buyer if the documents were then in order. It just so happened,
however, that the transfer certificate of title was then still in the name of their father.
#10

NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH

BUENAVENTURA
G.R. No. 127358                                  31 March 2005
Azcuna, J.

FACTS:

This case was instituted by Petitioner Noel Buenaventura where he stated that he and his wife, Isabel
Lucia Singh Buenaventura, were both psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. The lower court found that petitioner was merely under heavy parental
pressure to marry, and deceived Private Respondent Isabel Singh to marry. Buenaventura was unable to
relate to his wife, as a husband, and their son, Javy, as a father. Moreso, he had no inclination to make
the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he’d rather choose to leave his family than reconcile
with his wife.

ISSUE/S: 

Whether or not, based on the findings of the lower court, the marriage between Buenaventura and
Singh may be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, due to the psychological
incapacity of the petitioner.
Whether or not the award of moral damages to the aggrieved spouse is proper in such cases.

RULING:

Yes. The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as
proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. Psychological incapacity has been defined, as no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
Based on the above definition of psychological incapacity, by declaring the petitioner as psychologically
incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The
award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but
on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his
or her disability and yet wilfully concealed the same.