I.

Statement of Facts

Rodolfo Yu, in response to bomb threats reported seven days prior was on foot patrol when he
saw two groups of Muslim-looking men situated at each side of Quezon Boulevard. These men
were acting suspiciously with their eyes were moving very fast. As the officers approached them,
they ran in different directions so the officers gave chase. Once Yu caught up with Mandar, who
was part of the group that he was chasing, he searched him and found a grenade in Mandar’s
front waistline. Upon close inspection, Yu allegedly recognised Mandar as part of the group who
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda seven days earlier. He then arrested him and brought him to
the Police Station. There he was informed of his right to remain silent and his right to a legal
counsel. Despite the fact that the petitioner did not have a legal counsel present, Officer Serapio
still proceeded with the inquest. During which the petitioner admitted possession of the grenade.

Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866
for keeping, possessing and/or acquiring a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary
license and permit from the proper authorities. Mandar denied all the charges filed against him
stating that the police searched him and despite finding nothing, arrested him. He claims that the
first time he saw the grenade that was allegedly confiscated from him was in court.

The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a "stop and
frisk and that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and
since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose
of bombing the Mercury Drug Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the decision further stating that the
arrest was lawful on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was
"attempting to commit an offense,”

II. Procedural History

The trial court thus found Mandar guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under
Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, and sentenced him to suffer: The penalty of not less than
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA, as maximum. Mandar then filed a notice for appeal stating that the trial court erred
in holding that the seizure of the grenade was incidental to a lawful arrest and in admitting the
said grenade as evidence since it was a product of an illegal search. The case was forwarded to
the Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the ground that there was probable cause for
the arrest as petitioner was "attempting to commit an offense,”. Since there was a lawful arrest,
the evidence ceases to be inadmissible. Now Mandar is appealing to the Supreme Court.

III. Issues:
 A. Substantive issue:
1. Whether or not Mandar was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866?
B. Procedural issues
1. Whether or not the courts were correct in admitting Mandar’s admission and the
grenade as evidence
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals had proper jurisdiction over the case?

IV. Judgment

Court of Appeals decision is set aside for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said court and, on
ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is reversed and
Sammy Malacat y Mandar is hereby acquitted.

V. Holding:

The court held that the original petitioner’s failed to prove Mandar’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt due to lack of evidence supporting their claims.

VI. Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:

To determine the admissibility of evidence the court looked into Section 12(1) and (3) of Article
III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:

SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him

As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
which reads, in part:

Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
As for valid warrantless searches, Jurisprudence provides that they are limited to the following:
(1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4)
consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk."

VII.Reasoning

On the issue of jurisdiction

No the CA did not have jurisdiction. In determining the appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases,
the maximum of the penalty is taken into account. In this case, the maximum penalty is reclusion
perpetua. Pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 the appeal
therefrom should have been to the Supreme Court hence the decision of the Court of Appeals is
set aside for lack of jurisdiction.

On the issue of admissibility of evidence

Since there was no counsel present during Mandanar’s admission, the statement is inadmissible.
The grenade cannot also be validly admitted as evidence since it was not obtained through a legal
search and seizure. There was no valid warrantless search. First off there can be no incidental
search following a lawful arrest since the warrantless arrest conducted by Yu was not valid. In a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search. The law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made.
Furthermore the search does not fall within the allowable scope of a “stop and frisk”. A "stop-
and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Both of
which are not apparent in this case. First, there was no solid proof that Mandar was part of the
group that attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda as Yu’s claims are uncorroborated. Second, the fact
that Mandar’s eyes are allegedly “moving very fast” is not enough to merit a warrantless search.
Third, there is no ground to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. The alleged
grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and as to the distance
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge could not have been visible to Yu.

On the issue of the petitioner’s guilt

No there was no valid warrantless arrest. The general rule as regards arrests, searches and
seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. Two exceptions are being
called for in this case, the first is in flagrante delicto, wherein a police officer can arrest a person
when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. In this case, Yu merely stated that Malacat was acting
suspiciously because his “eyes were moving very fast”. A genuine reason must exist in light of
the police officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions. In the present case, there is doubt
as to Yu’s claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza
Miranda days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated, which diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and
search Malacat. Moreover, there was nothing in Malacat’s behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were “moving very fast” as he
was not causing any commotion or trouble.

The second is called a “hot pursuit” arrest wherein an offense has in fact just been committed,
and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it. This reasoning is also invalid as Yu’s sole claim that the petitioner is part of the
group who attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda is not enough to prove Mandar’s guilt.
Furthermore, Yu did not, and was not made to, identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the
latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law
enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in cases
such as these. Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during
his custodial investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in
evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of the Bill of Rights as the admission was taken
without the presence of a legal counsel.

VIII.Concurring/Dissenting Opinion

Concurring Opinion - Panganiban, J

In his concurring opinion Justice Panganiban compared the case at hand to different cases he had
before to emphasise the rationale of the majority in acquitting Mandar. He emphasized that under
different circumstances, such as where the policemen are specially trained the same features
displayed by a person will can justify a warrantless arrest or search on him. As seen in the case of
Manalili vs CA wherein “reddish eyes and wobbly walking” were enough for reason the police,
who belonged to the anti-narcotics group, to validly conduct a warrantless search in a known
hangout of drug users. Unlike in this case, the police were just normal policemen and they do not
have the special training to detect bombs so the policemen merely observing that Malacat's eyes
were moving very fast any outward look would not suggest that he was at the time armed and
dangerous. Hence, there was no justification for a stop-and-frisk.

Also in Lacerna, even if the occupants of the taxicab bowed their heads and slouched when they
passed through the police checkpoint. Although suspicions, they did not provide sufficient reason
for the police to stop and investigate them for possible criminal operation; much less, to conduct
an extensive search of their belongings. A checkpoint search is limited to a roving view within
the vehicle. A further search may be validly effected only if something probably illegal is within
his "plain view." In Lacerna, if not for the passengers' free and express consent, the search would
have been undoubtedly declared illegal. Similarly, the fast-moving eyes of Malacat, although
connoting unusual behavior, was not indicative that he was armed and dangerous as to justify a
search on his person.

IX. Additional Comments/Personal Impressions:

I believe that this case serves as a good standard on how courts should handle cases of profiling.
Just because someone is Muslim-looking with shifty eyes doesn’t mean he/she is more likely to
bomb a place. Comparing it to the ratio of the CA which states “We are at a loss to understand
how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade and in the company of other suspicious
character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political tension
ha[d] been enkindling a series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not attempting to
commit an offense. We need not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being a
favorite bomb site especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere possession of an
unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacat's posture is simply too preposterous to inspire
belief.” Despite the fact that the petitioner’s failed to corroborate their testimonies and presented
in admissible evidence the CA still chose to admit the same and pronounced Mandar’s guilt.
Even if he did admit that he had a grenade, there was a high chance that it was forced because
according to his own accounts he was manhandled at the station and his testimony was not given
in the presence of a legal counsel. This case just proves how important it is for courts to uphold
the Bill of Rights because without it, it would be frighteningly easy to frame or falsely convict
people especially if they are vulnerable to profiling.