Military Thought: Tactical air defense in the initial period of war http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JAP/is_1_13/ai_n153...

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Tactical air defense in the initial period of war

M.I. Zernov

Tactical air defense is a component part of all combined-arms and joint operations. Therefore, its objective follows from
the operation objective and tasks are determined by the tasks of troops under protective cover. The main objective of air
defense is to prevent casualties and losses among friendly forces from disabling air strikes. The air defense forces and
weapons can achieve it by repulsing hostile offensive air weapons attacks on protected forces and targets (an active
component of air defense) and by troops implementing a set of measures to reduce the effectiveness of hostile airstrikes (a
passive component of air defense). The active-passive-component proportion in tactical air defense is determined first of
all by the prevailing conditions, forms, methods and weapons being employed. Their constant upgrading calls for refining
the role of air defense forces in modern operations. The reason for this is the changing nature of initial operations and the
growing proportion of their air phase which brings to the fore the passive component of air defense.

The main task of ground forces during a hostile offensive air operation (campaign) in the initial period of hostilities will be
to preserve its war-fighting capability and survivability through operational and tactical concealment and deception
measures. Under conditions like that military air defense forces should focus on fighting hostile aircraft to prevent them
from gaining air superiority. In this case air defense forces should not necessarily be rigidly attached to areas held by
troops that are being protected.

The changing structure and character of operations in the initial period of hostilities show that it is impossible to establish
a continuous and firm defensive frontage in a hurry. More probably than not, combat operations will be conducted under
conditions of clusters of fighting in separate sectors with no clearly definable line of contact between the belligerents. In
consequence of this, it will be impossible to establish groups of air defense forces with an integral SAM envelopes
embracing the entire operating area. Based on this, we can clearly discern a trend toward forming mobile SAM envelopes
above tracts of land of limited size, installations and the anticipated hostile aircraft flight routes.

Analysis of combat operations in military conflicts of recent years attests to changing target prioritizing practices. First to
be destroyed under modern conditions are air defense assets, government and military control centers, airfields and
aircraft sitting on them, strategic installations (bridges, river-crossing facilities, rail centers and so on) and only then
dispositions of forces, as they become located. This circumstance makes it possible to formulate the following trend in the
changing role of air defense troops. It consists in the need of employing, in the initial stage of hostilities, dispositions of
military air defense forces not so much for protecting troops as government control centers, strategic installations and
elements of infrastructure of greatest importance as components of the overarching air defense system.

At the present time, manned aircraft as a rule deliver strikes without entering SAM envelopes. In addition, moving at high
velocity, the offensive air weapons fly to their targets skirting the areas where air defense forces and their kill zones are
situated which greatly enhances their survivability. At the same time, unmanned offensive air weapons, precision-weapon
warheads and air-to-surface missiles are always within the range of military air defense weapons when the former engage
protected installations. The difficulties of combating this class of targets, however, necessitate changes in the mode of
combating hostile air weapons. In particular, air defense forces increasingly resort to decoy and disinformation actions to
reduce the effectiveness of precision weapons (false launches of antiaircraft missiles, decoy movements toward false air
defense weapons locations, deliberate going on the air and switching antiaircraft missile systems into emission mode in
certain areas, and so on). Thus, we can formulate another trend in the changing role of air defense forces--giving priority
to decoy and disinformation operations over operations aimed directly at destroying hostile air weapons, which makes it
possible to impose on the opposing side unfavorable conditions for the employment of precision weapons (routes and
profiles of flight to targets, etc.).

The changed proportion of the role of the land and air phases in operations of the initial period of hostilities and the

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Military Thought: Tactical air defense in the initial period of war http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JAP/is_1_13/ai_n153...

results of air way may have a decisive impact on the outcome of entire conflicts. Weapons of ground forces will have
limited capabilities against enemy airfields and air control centers (owing to considerable distances between them and
areas of operations) and, consequently, they will not have any decisive impact on the results of air war. The role of aircraft
of the defending party in gaining air supremacy will be curtailed. In addition, the cycle of combat employment of aircraft is
much greater than the cycle of combat employment of air defense missile systems. Despite that, air defense missile
combined units and units are sited near protected strategic installations in accordance with their tasking designation.
Hence, in planning its strikes against these installations the adversary will also plan in advance measures against these
units which will naturally reduce the effectiveness of their employment. At the same time, military air defense units that
are not rigidly attached to protected installations and conducting active mobile operations can inflict considerable damage
on enemy air weapons not only in the areas of their targets but also en route to them.

All of the preceding, in our opinion, points to a high priority of military air defense in combating hostile air weapons in the
initial period of hostilities.

A distinguishing feature of combat operations at the start of hostilities is the broad range of types of assets involved in the
effort to gain air supremacy. A considerable number of strikes by air weapons are directed against false targets and EW
aircraft. All this considerably complicates the air situation, distorts the real picture for the air defense command and
control centers, makes it difficult to appraise it and come up with decisions on effective employment of military air defense
forces. It is only possible to effectively combat hostile air weapons given complete, timely and reliable information about
the air situation in the area of operations which can be available only when we use methods of procuring it which differ in
their physical essence. This fact prompts the need for mandatory participation of various armed services in information
support for the air defense forces that combat hostile air weapons and this calls for their integrated operation within a
unified system.

We should note in closing that the changing conditions of combat operations at the start of hostilities call for integrating
heterogeneous forces and assets to combat hostile air weapons within a unified air defense system.

Col. M.I. ZERNOV

Doctor of Military Sciences

Col. A.V. SERZHANTOV

Candidate of Military Sciences

COPYRIGHT 2004 East View Publications

COPYRIGHT 2005 Gale Group

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