Maritime Forces and Counter-Insurgency

TIM BENBOW

Introduction
The role of maritime forces often tends to be overlooked and under-rated. In his 1993 book,
A History of Warfare, John Keegan wrote: ‘A brief but dramatic air and ground war has been
fought in the Gulf’.1 Just because the role of maritime power in Desert Storm escaped the
notice of many analysts does not mean there was none; it played a very significant part even
in a conflict of precisely the type that might be expected to minimise its contribution.2
In no area is this sea blindness more apparent than counter-insurgency (COIN). The
extent to which the maritime contribution is neglected in this literature is truly striking. For
example, consulting the index to a recent book by a British academic on UK counter-
insurgency reveals a reference to the ‘Royal Anglian Regiment’ but neither to the Royal Navy
nor the Royal Marines.3 Both of these are also conspicuous by their absence in the index of
another general account, though it has an entry for the Royal Air Force (RAF).4 A similar gap
can be found in one of the standard texts on the subject, Beckett and Pimlott’s Armed Forces
and Modern Counter-Insurgency. Whilst the title of the collection refers to ‘armed forces’,
each of the chapters within refers solely to armies. The introduction acknowledges that ‘most
modern counter-insurgency is far from being a purely military problem’, and stresses the need
to co-ordinate with non-military actors such as the police and Special Branch (the British
equivalent of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation); yet there seems no parallel recognition
of the contribution of armed services other than the army.5 Paget’s classic Counter-
insurgency Campaigning does not mention the Royal Navy in the index although there are
two references in the text.6 A leading academic journal in the field, Small Wars and
Insurgencies has, in its 16 volumes between 1992 and 2005, published 337 articles, none of
which concerns maritime forces in COIN.7 This neglect extends even to maritime specialists
and professionals. The principal British journal in this area, the Naval Review, included just
two articles on COIN between 1945 and 1995.8 One work on small wars does include a
chapter, no less welcome for being just three pages long, on ‘The influence of sea power.’ It
concludes, persuasively: ‘Small wars, in fact, admirably demonstrate at times the value of sea
power as affecting land campaigns, and a treatise on the conduct of operations of this nature
would not have been complete without drawing attention to this.’ The fact that Charles

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Callwell, an army officer, wrote these words in 1899 shows that not all analysts have
overlooked the role of maritime power.9
The lack of attention devoted to maritime forces in counter-insurgency could be for
two reasons. Either they do not have a significant role in such operations, or they do but it
tends to be underestimated and misunderstood. This article will argue for the second of these
two explanations. It will do so, first, by examining in overview the ways in which maritime
forces can contribute to COIN and, second, by assessing the historical evidence from British
campaigns waged during the Cold War. This era provides a broad range of cases, while
Britain is a useful example as a state with much and varied experience of COIN. The article
will conclude that maritime forces can and often do play a significant part in counter-
insurgency, both directly and in the support that they offer the other armed forces involved.
Naturally, the military contribution to any successful COIN campaign – which must
complement and be subordinate to the overall political strategy – will be ‘joint’, involving the
three services not simply co-operating but working together in a unified manner.10
Nevertheless, a successful joint campaign requires a firm grasp of the strengths and
weaknesses of all the different assets at the disposal of commanders – an awareness which is
hindered by the lack of attention paid to the contribution of maritime forces.

The Maritime Contribution to COIN

This section provides a survey of the characteristics of maritime forces and an explanation of
how these might apply to counter-insurgency.11 ‘Maritime forces’ are defined by the British
Ministry of Defence as: ‘Forces whose primary purpose is to conduct military operations at
and from the sea’.12 This definition leaves some possible grey areas. First, it would
encompass marines, even though in COIN campaigns these have often operated ashore for
prolonged periods; unlike regular infantry, of course, they retain the ability to conduct
specialised amphibious operations as required. Second, it would exclude Army soldiers or
helicopters from the Army or Air Force deploying from ships; these would best be viewed as
operating from maritime platforms, although not themselves maritime forces.
UK Maritime Doctrine defines ‘insurgency’ as: ‘An organised movement aimed at the
overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.’13
Clearly, in practice, there is no absolute dividing line between this phenomenon and others
such as terrorism (which insurgents can use as a tactic, or which can occur outside the context
of an insurgency), various forms of insurrection, rebellion or disorder, and piracy and other
criminal activities. Forces involved in COIN must be able to cope with this fluidity in the

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spectrum of conflict and military operations, which is something with which maritime forces
are quite familiar. Their tasks tend to be divided into three categories: military (where combat
is used or threatened), constabulary (law enforcement, where combat is not the main means
used and any force is minimal), and benign (where there is no role for force, such as in
disaster relief).14 There is considerable overlap between these activities, similar to the ‘three
bloc war’ concept that is usually applied to land forces. Hence, activities conducted by navies
in support of COIN operations will often overlap with other military, constabulary and benign
tasks.15
Many of the general characteristics of maritime power make it particularly well suited
to power projection and expeditionary operations.16 The ability to use international waters
provides access and mobility which allow maritime forces to get where they are needed,
without having to rely on the availability of and permission to use foreign bases or overflight
rights. The versatility of maritime forces allows them to perform roles across the spectrum of
operations from warfighting to benign, and to switch between them rapidly. Their sustained
reach and lift capacity allow them to support themselves and also to carry and support land-
based forces. Poise and leverage mean that maritime forces can remain deployed for extended
periods, with as much or little visibility as required, and exert influence in support of national
policy.
These broad qualities are useful for power projection in general. Some features of
maritime forces are particularly relevant to COIN. First, they have a low political and
diplomatic footprint ashore in comparison to land-based forces. This feature might well be
desirable for regional allies, for the local population that is to be influenced, or for decision-
makers concerned about a large and vulnerable commitment ashore. Second, maritime forces
can be held ready, as visibly as desired and in international waters if required, with the ability
to conduct a wide range of missions, either simultaneously or sequentially – for example,
enforcing a maritime embargo at the same time as deterring a local state and standing ready to
reinforce or withdraw forces ashore. Third, both within one theatre of operations or between
several, maritime forces possess an inherent mobility, responsiveness and flexibility which,
crucially, they can lend to land and air forces. Fourth, maritime forces from different states
can more easily work together than is the case with land or air forces, which has the political
and diplomatic appeal of allowing friendly states to show support tangibly as well as to share
the burden. Finally, whilst the relative vulnerability of maritime forces has long been a
contentious issue, against the typical threats faced in COIN operations, warships and afloat
support tend to be less vulnerable than forces deployed ashore.

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 Maritime power, then, has several characteristics that offer distinct advantages for
counter-insurgency. What are its limitations? Principal among these is the caveat that applies
to all armed forces in COIN: that is, military means however skilfully used will only be, at
best, part of the solution. Second, more than in warfighting operations, the focus of the
military element of COIN will be on ground forces. Third, although maritime forces can
reach further inland than is often appreciated (as demonstrated in land-locked Afghanistan in
2001), and this is improving with advancing technology, their impact ashore does decline as
the distance from the sea increases. Fourth, warships are desirable, prestigious targets, albeit
difficult ones for insurgents to attack. While they are very elusive in open waters, when
operating close inshore – as they are likely to in a COIN campaign – or in ports or choke
points further off, they are still a potential target.
Given these strengths and limitations, what contribution can maritime forces make to a
COIN campaign? One reason for the neglect of maritime forces in counter-insurgency is the
fact that, inevitably, coverage focuses on events ashore and how these are influenced by
activities conducted at sea might not be immediately obvious. This is presumably due to the
fact that although non-state actors such as insurgents will often seek to use the sea,17 they are
most unlikely to have anything approaching conventional naval forces, so classic sea battles
will rarely be a feature of COIN. However, even in conventional wars against a major sea
power, gaining command of the sea was never an end in its own right but rather was sought
for what it subsequently allowed you to do; maritime forces can have a significant influence
on events on land. In their eagerness to dissociate themselves from the ‘blue water’ theories
of the Cold War era, naval analysts often quote the eminent naval strategist, Julian Corbett:
‘Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have
always been decided – except in the rarest cases – either by what your army can do against
your enemy’s territory and national life or less by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible
for your army to do.’18 Perhaps this statement goes a little too far towards self-abnegating
humility, since it suggests that the only contribution of maritime forces to campaigns ashore is
what they allow armies to do. Some of their roles are, indeed, associated with enabling the
army or air force to conduct operations. This would include providing strategic lift to the
region concerned, transporting land-based forces within the theatre or helping with their
enormous logistical requirements. Other activities conducted by maritime forces at sea may
be less visible but still provide useful support to land-based forces, such as providing
command and control, communications, intelligence and surveillance, or sea-based logistics
assistance to other forces.

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 Crucially, maritime forces can have a direct impact on events ashore, beyond assisting
the army to operate there. Even in the early 20th century, when Corbett was writing, naval
gunfire could be a formidable asset and since then, it has hugely improved in range and
accuracy and has been joined by naval aircraft and missiles, for a formidable maritime strike
capability. Maritime forces can also conduct amphibious operations, from small raids to
large-scale landings. Clearly, the scale of strike or ground combat operations is considerably
less when performed by maritime forces than would be the case with ground-based forces.
This distinction, however, is more significant in major conventional operations against a
regular army; in a COIN campaign, many of the specific uses of force in the form of infantry
operations or strikes can be relatively small and hence within the capabilities of maritime
forces. Their other attributes mention above, not least their mobility and flexibility, make
them particularly suited to this role in COIN.
Since the Cold War, accounts of maritime power have tended to focus on operations
from the sea, with a consequent neglect of operations at sea. These too are significant, and
not only in allowing the activities mentioned above to take place. Maritime activities that are
conducted at sea yet still have a significant indirect impact on events ashore include presence
and patrolling; surveillance and intelligence gathering; blockades against people, funds or
weapons; deterring states from entering a conflict; and countering any operations that
insurgents might attempt to conduct at sea against shipping or economic installations, or from
the sea against ports or other coastal targets.

Historical Examples
The previous section provided a overview of the attributes of maritime power and its
advantages and limitations in counter-insurgency. This survey can now be fleshed out and
illustrated by some historical examples. These are taken from British experience during the
Cold War period. The UK has been selected as a focus because it had a wide range of
experience, across several decades and in different parts of the world. This is not to suggest,
of course, that there is no useful experience elsewhere, such as France in Algeria,19 or the US
in Vietnam,20 in both of which maritime forces played a significant part. Naturally, there have
also been campaigns (such as the Soviet Union in Afghanistan or, to take a British example,
the campaign against the Mau Mau in Kenya) in which maritime forces played little or no
direct role. Nevertheless, the examples below demonstrate the contribution that maritime
forces can make to a COIN campaign, even if they do not do so in every one. There were
other British campaigns in which maritime forces made notable contributions, including

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Palestine,21 Aden,22 Oman and, of course, Northern Ireland,23 as well as recent and ongoing
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Insurgency is a wide and varied phenomenon and there
were many campaigns which might not be described as counter-insurgency, being shorter-
term and less eye-catching, but are sufficiently similar to offer useful comparisons.24 For this
reason, one such case (the East African mutinies of 1964) is included below.
A final caveat to be borne in mind is that the historical context of the cases explored
below might well reduce the wider applicability of any conclusions. Nevertheless, many
useful parallels can be drawn, and in some cases the similarities to contemporary cases are
more striking than the differences. It is not suggested that any one of the cases considered
below is a perfect comparison for today but, rather, that taken together they provide some
indication of the contribution that maritime forces can make to counter-insurgency.

The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1958

This conflict saw an insurgency by the Malayan Communist Party defeated by what came to
be seen as a distinctive British approach to counter-insurgency, which accorded clear primacy
to political measures supported by a carefully crafted military campaign.25 As usual, most
military operations were carried out on land by ground forces. Nonetheless, maritime forces
had a significant supporting role that belies their usual neglect: whilst Newsinger, for
example, argues that, ‘One factor that was of little importance in the conflict was air power’,26
maritime power does not for him rate even an explicit dismissal. Paget at least makes
reference to the role of maritime forces, stating that, ‘At sea, the Royal Navy controlled the
Malayan coast’, which helped to force the guerrillas back into the jungle.27
Although the insurgents’ campaign was fought wholly on land, their lack of a friendly
border across which to smuggle weapons greatly increased the importance of seaborne supply.
This made a maritime blockade against weapons smuggling highly significant. Indeed, Smith
suggests that the insurgents found their armament stocks diminishing largely as a result of the
‘constant but unspectacular’ blockade.28 This blockade was imposed by a force that was both
joint and combined, including Royal Malayan Navy small craft and RAF flying boats, as well
as Royal Navy warships. It represented a significant effort, as in 1952 alone, more than 1,000
craft were stopped and searched, and it was successful: in stark contrast to the experience of
France in Algeria or the US in Vietnam, no men or weapons are thought to have been landed
from the sea during the emergency.29 The ships undertaking this role could also perform other
useful tasks. For example, in April and May 1952, the frigate HMS Alacrity conducted
patrols, in conjunction with RAF aircraft, stopping and checking suspect boats but also

6
holding meetings with officials, transporting local dignitaries and visiting areas where there
had been insurgent activity.30 This is just the sort of activity that has useful although
unquantifiable benefits in COIN, establishing the presence of the security forces in a routine
and positive way.
Operations from the sea during the Malaya campaign were also significant. Warships
were frequently used to transport members of the security forces by sea and river, for example
when the Malayan Scouts were deployed in this way during Operation Prosaic in March
1951.31 Naval forces were called upon to provide fire support for forces ashore, occasionally
in the form of carrier air strikes – the principal commitment for the carriers at this time was
the Korean War but they provided support in Malaya on the way out to or back from that
theatre – but more frequently with naval gunfire. For example, during 1952 alone the Royal
Navy conducted five carrier air strikes and 39 warship bombardments as well as routine
patrolling and transportation duties,32 which could, of course, be carried out while the
warships concerned were also held ready to provide fire support. At times, this fire support
was provided well inland by taking advantage of rivers, for example in February 1952, the
frigate HMS Amethyst navigated 30 miles up a river to provide fire support for land forces,
and in March 1954 the destroyer HMS Defender travelled nine miles up a river to do the
same.33 A striking example of versatility can be found in June 1954, when the cruiser HMS
Newfoundland was diverted from rehearsals for the Queen’s Birthday celebrations to support
the security forces engaged in Operation Eclipse. Her contribution involved bombarding a
series of areas of the jungle and then specific targets, with the assistance (in a good example
of jointness) of observation by a Royal Artillery captain flying in an RAF aircraft. She fired
267 rounds of high explosive shells and a report from the Army district headquarters stated
that follow-up troops ‘found that all targets had been effectively engaged and destroyed.’34
Two further land operations benefitted from naval support during 1955. Operation
Nassau, between January and August, succeeded in destroying the insurgent organisation in a
particular area: ‘Although these eliminations fell to the ambushes and systematic searches of
the Land Forces, bombardment by Sea, Land and Air Forces played a significant part in
lowering morale.’ Naval bombardment was of greatest value ‘on those occasions where the
targets are inaccessible to land artillery’.35 While the naval contribution in Nassau was
‘useful but not vital’, it was ‘an integral part’ of Operation Rex (March to August 1955), the
aim of which was to destroy an insurgent unit. Naval gunfire tended to have a limited role in
Malaya because the opponent could move inland. This operation, however, took place on a
peninsula where there was no escape and, moreover, where the terrain was very difficult for

7
Army artillery; hence Navy and RAF bombardment was found by Army to be ‘invaluable’.
Since the area was ‘primary jungle’, and hence the only access was by sea, naval small craft
and helicopters were vital for transport, as well as patrolling to prevent resupply or escape.36
This reference to helicopters is significant, as from 1953 onwards, Royal Navy
helicopters were deployed to Malaya and by the end of the emergency they were playing a
key role, notably in providing mobility in jungle terrain. Smith notes that as well as
permitting otherwise invulnerable insurgent bases to be attacked, they also ‘brought
government to the people’, allowing contact that was essential to winning the hearts and
minds of the population.37

Cyprus, 1954-59
The conflict in Cyprus saw the Greek Cypriot organisation EOKA wage a campaign of
insurgency and terrorism in pursuit of ‘enosis’, or union with Greece.38 Although largely an
internal conflict, there was significant external support for the insurgents from Greece, so it
was important for the British to isolate them from resupply as well as to intercept insurgents.
Geography also placed a premium on sea communications, since not only is Cyprus an island
but it also features a great deal of difficult and mountainous terrain. Hence the insurgents
sought to use the sea and the security forces sought to prevent them from doing so, as well as
using it themselves. As the Director of Operations – an Army officer – put it in 1959: ‘In an
island such as Cyprus, whose long coast line is made up of small bays, the opportunities for
smuggling arms and ammunition by sea are many. The island also lends itself to small
amphibious operations to assist in achieving surprise by the Security Forces. In both these
roles the Maritime Forces in Cyprus provided invaluable assistance.’39 The principal
maritime role was to foil attempts to smuggle in arms and ‘undesirable persons’. This was a
truly joint effort, eventually involving two destroyers or frigates, five patrol boats, three Fleet
Air Arm Gannet aircraft and two RAF Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft, ten shore-based
radar stations and coastal observation posts and military patrols ashore. It also had a strong
‘inter-agency’ aspect, requiring support from intelligence and close co-ordination with police
and Customs, who would search suspect vessels and handle security at points of entry.
Command and control arrangements were refined to permit the essential co-operation between
military, police and government; this included the establishment in summer 1955 of a
Maritime Headquarters, which by the end of the year was relocated to a room neighbouring
the chief of staff’s Operations Room ‘for reasons of closer liaison and greater efficiency’.40
The anti-smuggling system had some high-profile successes, such as the seizing in January

8
1955 of the Greek ship ‘Ayios Georghios’ carrying arms including 10,000 sticks of
dynamite.41 Although never watertight, it was intended mainly as a deterrent. In this it was
apparently successful; according to one source, Colonel Grivas, the leader of EOKA, had
planned to make the island of Rhodes a supply centre for his campaign but was unable to do
so because of the naval patrols.42 Maritime forces were also used to support military patrols
ashore: ‘Ships and ships’ boats were used successfully in the landing of troops secretly at
night and bringing them out again from pre-arranged rendezvous.’43 Thus, although the
campaign against EOKA was principally waged on land, maritime forces helped to reduce the
level of threat faced by the security forces and provided them with mobility.

East Africa, 1964

The British response to mutinies in East Africa might seem to be a strange candidate for
inclusion in an article on counter-insurgency. However, it is worth mentioning as an
illustration of the breadth of activities with which this subject overlaps, which includes small-
scale and shorter-term interventions as well as campaigns lasting many years. In January
1964, there were serious mutinies in the armies of three newly independent African states. At
the request of the governments concerned, British troops were flown into Uganda and Kenya,
where loyal troops held the airfields. In Tanganyika, however, a battalion of mutineers had
rampaged through the capital Dar-es-Salaam and captured the airfield. The light fleet carrier
HMS Centaur, working up off Aden, was dispatched at the first signs of trouble. Although
designed as a strike carrier and without any training or experience in amphibious operations –
indeed, during the passage, plans for undertaking amphibious landings while still allowing
fixed-wing aircraft operations had to be improvised – she embarked 500 Royal Marines, 24
Land Rovers and a combination of Navy and RAF helicopters. Seven hours after the request
for help from the local government, anti-submarine helicopters landed three companies of
Royal Marines. The landings took place at the football pitch of the rebel-held barracks, which
was risky but was selected to maximise the speed and surprise on which the operation
depended, with naval gunfire support as a diversion. The British forces swiftly ended the
revolt, at the cost of just two mutineers killed, and then consolidated the situation with
security patrols in the capital to reassure the grateful population. A carefully balanced
message was presented to potential mutineers and fearful population alike by a combination
of armed patrols, a Royal Marine band and an ‘air display’ by low-flying strike aircraft from
Centaur. Subsequently, Marines were flown to disarm a second rebelling battalion 340 miles
inland, again with support from intimidating low-level flyovers by Sea Vixen strike aircraft.44

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Once again, the versatility of maritime forces allowed them to switch rapidly between roles
and to deploy as the leading element of a joint response to a problem. Unlike a true COIN
campaign, this problem was solved quickly but it fits into the wider picture of low intensity
operations. Indeed, Hankinson describes it as ‘an armed police intervention at the request of a
recognised Government’; he notes that it hardly bears comparison with a conflict such as
Vietnam, but suggests that nipping the problem in the bud could well have prevented
insecurity spreading.45

Indonesian Confrontation, 1962-67

The Confrontation represented the attempt by Indonesia to prevent the creation of the
Malaysian Federation and to take over some of its constituent parts, in particular Borneo,
resisted by Britain and her local allies.46 It was therefore a state-sponsored insurgency – in
effect an undeclared, low intensity war. According to Mockaitis: ‘the conflict was a hybrid
war, combining low-intensity conventional engagements with insurgency…this hybrid war
demonstrates the extreme fluidity of categories such as “low”, “mid” and “high” intensity
when applied to modern war.’47 The conflict is instructive in the potential complexities of the
operating environment in political, diplomatic and legal terms, as well as militarily. The
undeclared nature of the war, the sensitivities of allies and neutral opinion, and the need not to
alienate Indonesia in a Cold War context all placed tight restrictions on the use of force by
Britain. These constraints were exacerbated by limitations on the size of the forces that the
UK could deploy, given simultaneous commitments in the Middle East (such as Aden) and
East Africa, as well as the top priority NATO area. In the theatre of operations, the close
proximity of Indonesian bases meant that infiltrators could slip over borders, or aircraft could
infringe airspace, with little warning time or ability to attack them at source. This demanded
great care and restraint on the part of the security forces, which were often fired at from
across borders, with their response being tightly circumscribed by complex rules of
engagement which differed between the various Commonwealth contingents involved. At sea
the close proximity of different jurisdictions and disagreement over the precise delineation of
territorial waters, as well as broader disputes over the international law of the sea, added a
further layer of complexity.48 Within this challenging environment, the picture was further
confused by the large number of neutral or civilian vessels, including fishing boats and
traders.
The conflict can be roughly divided into two parts: first, the initial British deployment
in response to a revolt in Brunei that was largely indigenous (though encouraged by

10
Indonesia); second, the longer phase of infiltration by Indonesian forces into East and later
West Malaysia.
In December 1962, on intelligence warnings of a planned insurrection in Brunei, the
UK rushed in reinforcements with a thoroughly joint response.49 Within four days, over 1,500
troops had been deployed. The failure of the rebels to capture the single all-weather airfield
meant that half could come in by air but the other half were transported in a cruiser,
destroyers and landing craft. The commando carrier HMS Albion arrived from the east coast
of Africa a week later, bringing reserves of troops, vehicles, supplies and, crucially,
helicopters;50 throughout the operation Army and RAF helicopters as well as Navy ones
routinely operated from her flight deck. The roles of maritime forces in this first phase were
providing tactical mobility, which was crucial where the only access was by river or
helicopter; retaking and guarding towns and airfields, relieving besieged police stations and
rescuing hostages; providing logistic support and communications detachments, and
maintaining essential civilian services. Their activities included everything from combat
operations (such as an opposed riverine landing carried out by 89 marines against 150 rebels,
conducted from converted cargo lighters with crews borrowed from minesweepers), to ‘flag
showing visits and patrols with Royal Marines embarked’, including on rivers up to 170 miles
inland.51 After the initial rebellion was broken, by about 20 December, the British forces
sought to pursue and capture the insurgents, to prevent a repeat of the long-drawn out
Malayan conflict. Here, Albion again played an important role, with her helicopters providing
Army troops and Marines with essential mobility and resupply in jungle terrain. They were
also used for the transportation of casualties, prisoners, police, tracker dogs, captured
weapons and food.52 The contribution of maritime forces in this first stage was all the more
striking given that according to the contingency plan for the reinforcement of Brunei, Plan
Ale, ‘There was to be no naval participation in the plan, unless aircraft were found to be
impracticable.’53 The scale of the threat necessitated a larger British force than expected, and
the ability of maritime forces to meet this is further testament to their flexibility and
responsiveness.
After the initial Brunei revolt, from April 1963 onwards Indonesia began to infiltrate
its own forces into East Malaysia across the 1,000 mile land border. Maritime forces played
much the same role here as they had during the earlier Brunei revolt. Albion and then her
sister ship, Bulwark, once again proved particularly valuable as operating platforms for
helicopters. This was especially important when a swift response was required: the 1964
Defence Statement singled out one incident, in which Albion was able to react to a guerrilla

11
attack within 45 minutes, lifting in troops for a successful ambush of the retreating
insurgents.54 Alternatively, when their helicopters were deployed to forward operating bases,
the commando carriers performed a secondary role as ferries for troops, RAF helicopters,
supplies and vehicles.55
Later, in August 1964, Indonesia sought to extend the conflict to West Malaysia and
Singapore where, lacking a land border, any infiltrators intent on sabotage had to enter by sea
or even by air. That month, the dropping of Indonesian paratroopers in West Malaysia
elicited a truly joint response, as they were hunted down by British Gurkha soldiers carried in
Navy helicopters from HMS Bulwark and supported by RAF fighters.56 Concern at the
apparent shortcomings in air defence suggested by this event resulted in another maritime
task, as the cruiser HMS Kent was deployed to the Malacca Straits along with Gannet
airborne early warning aircraft from the carrier Victorious.57 The failure of the aerial option
led Indonesia thereafter to rely on maritime infiltration. Hence, ‘the Navy – in contrast to its
subsidiary role in Borneo – became the most important partner in the combined efforts to
deter and destroy such incursions’.58 The maritime patrols were potentially dangerous; for
example, in 1965 minesweepers intercepted three armed sampans, killing eight infiltrators and
capturing 19.59 These patrols were effective in preventing, and hence also to some extent
deterring, Indonesian infiltration into West Malaysia,60 which could have threatened to
overstretch the already heavily occupied security forces on land.
Given that this was an undeclared war by a hostile state, the possibility of escalation
was a constant concern. Indeed, according to Mockaitis, one explicit aim of Indonesia was to
‘provoke the British into a retaliatory attack across the border that would create a favourable
international incident’.61 Any such escalation would have been deeply undesirable for Britain
in both political and military terms, so there was a need both to deter the Indonesians from
stepping up the level of violence while also avoiding any actions by British forces that could
have the same effect. Were there to be some form of escalation, action at sea was the most
likely starting place, perhaps taking the form of harassment of shipping or deniable laying of
mines, before direct attacks on patrolling warships. Part of the deterrent to any such move by
Indonesia was the presence and capability of Royal Navy forces in the area, not least the air
power of strike carriers, which would have taken a significant part in any retaliatory action
that became necessary.62 They would have been needed because many key targets in
Indonesia lay outside the range of bombers operating from bases in Singapore or Australia.
This was a truly joint, combined and inter-agency campaign, involving routine and
close co-operation not only with the Army and RAF, but also with Malaysian troops and local

12
tribal irregulars, the Royal Malaysian Navy and Royal Malaysian Air Force, troops and
warships from Australia and New Zealand, and also the Marine Branches of the Malaysian
and Singapore police forces. For example, warships at sea would conduct patrols in
conjunction with RAF aircraft, while naval boats carried Army detachments on river patrols.63
Once again, maritime forces played an essential role. Despite the fact that the
infiltrators into East Malaysia principally entered across the long land border, the challenging
nature of the terrain (jungle, mountains, one all-weather airfield and few roads – which
became difficult to use during the rains) placed a premium for movement on using the sea, for
the insurgents and, in particular, for the security forces. Perhaps most significant was the
rapid deployment, in conjunction with air transport, which delivered a decisive counter-stroke
to the initial revolt. Thereafter, maritime power provided the security forces with the essential
rapid mobility, by sea and rivers and from the air, that allowed them to bring an effective
presence to bear wherever needed, reassuring those loyal to the government, firming up
waverers and dealing decisively with infiltrating Indonesians.
Other maritime roles included transporting personnel and equipment (including RAF
helicopters) into theatre; providing tactical and operational mobility within the theatre;
offshore, inshore and riverine patrolling to counter piracy, maritime infiltration and arms
smuggling; search and rescue of downed pilots; amphibious raids and landings;64
bombardment (especially against targets outside the range of Army artillery) and air strikes;
air defence; deterrence against escalation, by providing a force in being that could step up the
use of force if required; providing communications and logistic support, including flying
supplies and also providing helicopter maintenance for both the RAF and the Army; training
and assisting local navy and maritime police forces;65 and conducting a range of activities
related to winning ‘hearts and minds’ such as building projects, medical assistance,
transporting food and supplies to, as well as simply maintaining contacts with, isolated
communities. Once again, the problem of any strict separation of maritime roles between ‘at
sea’ and ‘from the sea’ is clear: the same ships could patrol against infiltration while also
providing a visible presence, and be swiftly re-tasked to support the security forces ashore by
transporting troops, or providing fire support.
A wide range of ships was used, including strike carriers, commando carriers,
amphibious ships and landing craft, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, minesweepers, even
submarines and hovercraft – as well as crucial helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The ships
available were not all ideally suited to their mission. Smith comments that the motor torpedo
and gun boats that would have been ideal for patrolling had disappeared from the inventory of

13
a Navy that was focussing on total war: ‘For inshore operations the Navy could only offer
minesweepers that were unable to reach half the speed of the fast gunboats the Indonesians
were known to have.’ These minesweepers ‘were slow, undergunned and their thin wooden
hulls stood high out of the water’, but they played an important role in patrolling and transport
as they could carry 200 troops.66 Such vessels could use inshore waters and rivers too shallow
for large warships and also, of course, they existed in the requisite numbers. Nevertheless,
the campaign was not prosecuted solely by small ships. First, these relied on the cover
provided by the combat power of the larger warships, much in the same way as the small
cruisers of imperial ‘gunboat diplomacy’ had relied on the backing of the distant battlefleet.
Second, some more sophisticated capabilities were used, not least for air defence, air strikes
against targets ashore and the operation of helicopters from maritime platforms.

Summary and Conclusions

This article started by bemoaning the general neglect of maritime power in the literature on
counter-insurgency and pointed out that Charles Callwell’s 1899 book Small Wars is an
exception. It is worth briefly noting what he saw as the maritime contribution to small wars
in general, of which COIN campaigns are a subset. He recognised that naval power tends to
favour the regular forces over the irregular, since the latter very rarely have any sort of
Navy.67 This ability of maritime forces to provide an asymmetry favourable to the counter-
insurgents is a useful observation. Specifically, Callwell saw four principal maritime
contributions to small wars: first, amphibious operations, or ‘sudden descents upon a hostile
coast’; second, mobile logistical support, since it ‘enables an army based upon the sea to shift
its base should the course of operations render such a change desirable’; third, in some cases,
it can provide the ‘powerful auxiliary’ of river gunboats; fourth, it ‘secures an admirable
means of transport for his conveyance of supplies and war material to the scene of
operations’.68 The British experience during the Cold War period provides evidence for all of
these contributions and for others as well, all of which equally apply today.
Some of these activities are conducted at sea but, nonetheless, directly or indirectly
influence events ashore. The first task is to assure access to the theatre, securing a level of sea
control sufficient to allow the other activities to be conducted. Other operations at sea include
protection of shipping; enforcing blockades or embargoes against weapons smuggling or
infiltration; providing command, control and communications facilities; air defence;
intelligence gathering and surveillance; acting as a deterrent against vertical or horizontal
escalation; establishing links with and training friendly maritime forces; and establishing the

14
presence of government and security forces. Other maritime contributions to COIN
campaigns have a more visible and direct role, namely those conducted from the sea. These
include providing the joint force with strategic mobility to deploy to the theatre and then
tactical mobility within it,69 inserting, relocating and withdrawing land-based forces, as well
as performing amphibious operations of various types and sizes; providing strikes against
shore targets, by naval gunfire, naval aircraft or missiles; providing supplies and maintenance
for land-based forces as well as for maritime forces operating ashore; reconnaissance and
surveillance by maritime aircraft operating over the land; and conducting various benign and
humanitarian activities to help win over hearts and minds.
As can be seen, then, maritime forces had considerable utility in British COIN
campaigns, even though the forces conducting them were generally designed for global war
with the USSR. However, in practice, a dilemma can arise from the differing requirements of
higher intensity warfare, which demands extremely sophisticated and hence expensive
platforms, and those of COIN, which tends to call for large numbers of platforms that can
undertake risky activities. This problem can be seen during the Cold War period, notably in
the Confrontation where the fast motor boats that would have been ideal had been scrapped.
‘Gisbourne’ concluded his piece in Naval Review by urging the construction of a patrol vessel
for COIN, fast, quiet, with a low silhouette, a good variety of gun armament plus effective
night illumination, armour against small-arms fire, good sea-keeping and at least four days
endurance: ‘if such vessels could be built I believe that their value in terms of cost-
effectiveness might well exceed that of a Polaris Submarine, or even that of a new aircraft
Carrier!’70 Changing ‘Polaris’ to ‘Trident replacement’, some might suggest that the same
applies now. On the other hand, of course, the Royal Navy that successfully waged the
Confrontation with Indonesia was also designed to be able to take on more sophisticated
opponents in higher intensity regional conflicts; indeed, its ability to step up to warfighting
was an important element even within the Confrontation, as a deterrent to escalation. It
would be equally foolish and risky to design a fleet solely for COIN as it would be to design it
purely for higher intensity operations.
Just as in the Cold War period, there is today a dilemma for the Naval Staff between
how far future capabilities should be designed for the more probable lower-intensity small
wars or irregular warfare, as against retaining the more sophisticated capabilities demanded
for the less likely, but more significant, high-intensity conflicts. The former demands larger
numbers of platforms, which must therefore be cheaper and less sophisticated, whereas the
latter requires the most advanced capabilities which reduces the number of platforms

15
available. Similar dilemmas, of course, face the Air Staff (for example, over the number of
air superiority fighters) and the army General Staff (for example, over the balance between
light, medium and heavy forces). Indeed, for defence policy as a whole, this is perhaps the
most significant issue.
In principle, maritime forces have the versatility and flexibility to perform tasks both
in high-intensity operations and in COIN, and planners naturally seek to retain a balance
across the spectrum of conflict. Yet in practice, the ever-increasing cost and sophistication
required at the high end seems to be at odds with possessing the numbers and the
expendability needed for other operations. The British defence white paper, ‘Delivering
Security in a Changing World’ suggested that information technology networks would allow a
smaller number of more sophisticated platforms to deliver even great effect than at present.71
Yet this assertion overlooks the fact that some effects require numbers. There are ways of
tackling this dilemma, from imaginative procurement concepts to relying on role
specialisation within coalitions. Yet it could still limit the ability of specific navies, as
opposed to ‘maritime forces’ in the abstract, to contribute to counter-insurgency.
In conclusion, maritime forces have a great deal to contribute to a joint, multi-national,
inter-agency COIN campaign, though this is surprisingly overlooked by both counter-
insurgency and maritime specialists. One likely reason for the neglect of the maritime
contribution to COIN is that the analysis of the use of military power often tends to focus on
the sharp end, on ‘kinetic effect’ and destruction. This superficial tendency overlooks the
critical role of shaping the battlespace, creating the conditions in which other forces can act,
and also fails to pay attention to the support needed for forceful action (not least logistics,
intelligence, command, control and communications). It also fails to take into account the
vital ‘non-kinetic’ aspects of COIN, such as winning over the loyalty and support of the
population. Too narrow a focus on blowing things up is misleading in all military operations
but it is particularly misplaced in COIN, where military action is itself only a contributing
element in a wider political-military strategy.
The maritime contribution includes both activities conducted at sea and from the sea,
though this distinction can be unhelpful and even misleading if drawn too strictly. Perhaps
the most significant contributions are, first, shaping the battlespace by ensuring access for the
counter-insurgent and denying the insurgent the use of the sea, and, second, the mobility and
fire support that maritime forces possess, whether exploited by maritime air power and
Marines, or lent to land-based ground and air forces. The flexibility and responsiveness that it
allows is particularly useful against opponents who by definition rely heavily on elusiveness

16
and dispersion. Given that there is no solely military solution to insurgency, there is
enormous value in forces that can precisely calibrate the level of violence according to
circumstances and that also reduce the costs of a prolonged campaign and make them more
bearable, while simultaneously increasing the difficulties and costs faced by the opponent. It
is true that this can make the maritime contribution to COIN rather indirect and slow to take
effect (which is, no doubt, another reason for its neglect). Of course, much the same applies
more broadly to the contribution of military power as a whole to successful counter-
insurgency.

Note
The author would like to express his thanks for the assistance of Captain Chris Page and Kate
Tildesley, the Head and Archivist, respectively, of the Naval Historical Branch.

17
1
John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993), p.xi.
2
For an account of the role of maritime forces in this conflict, see Tim Benbow, ‘Maritime Power in the 1990-91 Gulf War
and the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia’ in Andrew Dorman, Mike Smith & Matthew Uttley (eds.) The Changing Face
of Maritime Power (London: Macmillan, 1999).
3
John Newsinger, British Counter-Insurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). This
omission is all the more striking given the importance of the Palestine patrol; see note 21, below.
4
Charles Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century (London: Faber and Faber, 1986).
5
Ian F.W. Beckett & John Pimlott (eds.), Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency (New York: St Martin’s Press,
1985).
6
Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), pp.75-7, 171. Colonel Paget’s personal
experience of COIN was gained in Kenya, in which there was no maritime contribution, yet also in Palestine and Aden,
where it should have been enough to be noticed.
7
The figure of 337 excludes very short pieces such as prefaces and forewords.
8
‘Gisbourne’ [pseudonym], ‘Naval Operations in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, 1964-1966’ in Naval Review, Vol.60,
No.1 (Jan. 1967); David Hankinson, ‘Dar-es-Salaam – January 1964’, in Vol.67, No.1 (Jan. 1979). The rules of Naval
Review, as a journal for professional debate, permit citation only ten years after publication. Between 1996 and 2005,
however, there was only one further article published on this subject.
9
Major C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London: HMSO, 1899), pp.22-4.
10
While the explicit emphasis on the joint nature of military operations is relatively recent on both sides of the Atlantic, it is
striking how often the term was used in documents as early as the 1950s. See, for example, a 1955 paper entitled ‘Joint
Operations against Communist Terrorists in Malaya’. National Archives (NA):ADM 1/26140.
11
Useful accounts of the characteristics of maritime forces can be found in Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the
Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass, 2004); and James Cable, The Political Influence of Naval Force in History
(London: Macmillan, 1998).
12
BR1806 British Maritime Doctrine, Third Edition (London: The Stationery Office, 2004), p.271.
13
Ibid., p.264.
14
Ibid., pp.57-8.
15
For the classic account of limited uses of naval force, see James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991: Third Edition
(London: Macmillan, 1994). Some of the examples he lists include actions against bandits or rebels, or during civil wars
and civil disturbances.
16
The following list of attributes is taken from BR1806, pp.28-34.
17
Operations at sea by insurgents are covered in Martin Murphy, ‘The blue, green and brown: insurgency and counter-
insurgency on the water’, in this volume.
18
Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1988), p.16.
19
See, for example, Bernard Estival, ‘The French Navy and the Algerian War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.25, No.2
(June 2002).
20
See Frank Uhlig, Vietnam: The Naval Story (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1986); R.L. Schreadley, From the Rivers to
the Sea: The US Navy in Vietnam (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1992).
21
The Royal Navy blockade of Palestine was a largely constabulary activity, although it coincided with a major British
COIN campaign ashore. The two were connected, not only in insurgent propaganda, but also when Jewish terrorists
mounted attacks on police vessels, Coast Guard radar stations and civil servants, with the aim of hindering the blockade.
See Ninian Stewart, The Royal Navy and the Palestine Patrol (London: Frank Cass, 2002), especially pp.34, 36-7.
22
Aden, for example, saw security forces supported by Royal Navy helicopters and by air strikes from carrier-based aircraft.
Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965, Cmnd. 2592, February 1965, para.66.
23
See, for example, the use of the amphibious assault ship HMS Fearless in support of Operation Motorman in 1972.
Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984 (London: Book Club Associates, 1985),
pp.114, 116.
24
See Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy; Statement of First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates for various
years; Peter Hore (ed.), Royal Navy and Royal Marines Operations 1964 to 1996 (London: Maritime Strategic Studies
Institute Paper number 1, Naval Historical Branch, 1999).
25
On the Malayan Emergency, see Richard Clutterbuck, The Long Long War: The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960
(London: Cassell, 1966); Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber & Faber, 1977), Part III; John Coates, Suppressing
Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency 1948-1954 (Boulder: Westview, 1992). On the ‘British approach’
deriving from Malaya, see Thomas R. Mockaitis, British counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1995), John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat
Soup with a Knife (Westport: Praeger, 2002).
26
Newsinger, British Counter-Insurgency, p.55.
27
Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, pp.75-6.
28
E.D. Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations: 1 Malaya and Borneo (London: Ian Allan, 1985), p.35.
29
Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960 (London: Frederick Muller, 1975), p.372.
30
NA: ADM 1/23646.
31
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, p.170.
32
Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Naval Estimates 1953-54, Cmd 8769 (1953), para.3.
33
Edgar O’Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgency War, 1948-1960 (London: Faber & Faber, 1966), p.135.
34
NA: ADM 1/25556.
35
Flag Officer Malayan Area to CINC Far East Station, 3 November 1955, NA: ADM 1/26140.
36
Flag Officer Malayan Area to CINC Far East Station, 17 November 1955, NA: ADM 1/26140.
37
Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations, pp.35-7.
38
See Kitson, Bunch of Five, Part IV; Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with
Greece (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978); Newsinger, British Counter-Insurgency, pp.84-107.
39
Major-General K.T. Darling, ‘Report on the Cyprus Emergency’, 31 July 1959, para.80, in Naval Historical Branch:
Reports of Proceedings Volume 53A: The Cyprus Emergency.
40
Report by Brigadier G.H. Baker, March 1958, quotation para.63, also Darling report, both in ibid.. Baker was chief of
staff to the governor, and CINC Cyprus, November 1955 to January 1957.
41
Paget mentions the capture of this ship but makes no reference at all to maritime forces in his account of this campaign.
In his conclusion, however, he noted the need for naval anti-smuggling patrols when, as in Cyprus, the enemy are being
supplied from overseas. Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, pp.120, 171.
42
Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt, p.174; she also describes the Royal Navy as ‘the one branch of the security forces which
was not vulnerable to penetration’.
43
Darling report, para.88.
44
This account is based largely on Hankinson, ‘Dar-es-Salaam – January 1964’. See also Statement on the Defence
Estimates 1965, Cmnd. 2592, February 1965, para.74.
45
Hankinson, ‘Dar-es-Salaam – January 1964’, pp.17-18.
46
For general accounts of the Confrontation, see David Easter, Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia 1960-66
(London: Tauris, 2004); Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations; Chris Tuck, ‘Borneo 1963-66: Counter-insurgency
Operations and War Termination’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.15, No.3 (Winter 2004).
47
Mockaitis, British counterinsurgency, pp.16, 38.
48
For accounts of these disputes, see Easter, Britain and the Confrontation, especially pp.99-103.
49
The report on the operation describes it as ‘completely joint’ from the start, and notes the ‘excellent inter-Service co-
operation’ that it involved. HQ Far East Command, ‘Report on Operations in Borneo December 1962 to January 1963’, NA:
ADM 1/28626.
50
Ibid., paras.4-19.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid., paras.17-19.
54
Statement on the Defence Estimates 1964, Cmnd. 2270, February 1964, para.89.
55
Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations, p.54.
56
Ibid., p.72.
57
Ibid., pp.85-6.
58
‘Gisbourne’, ‘Naval Operations’, p.43.
59
Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations, p.92.
60
‘Gisbourne’ suggests that, due to good intelligence, ‘over 80 per cent of all attempted incursions were intercepted’, ‘Naval
Operations’, pp. 44-5; Smith cites a figure of 90 per cent, Counter-Insurgency Operations, p.92.
61
Mockaitis, British counterinsurgency, pp.14-15.
62
Chris Tuck, ‘The Royal Navy and Confrontation, 1963-66’, in Greg Kennedy (ed.), British Naval Strategy East of Suez,
1900-2000: Influences and Actions (London: Frank Cass, 2005), pp.213-16; also Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations,
pp.92-3.
63
NA: ADM 1/28626; also ‘Gisbourne’, ‘Naval Operations’, pp.44-5.
64
According to Grey, there were some Malaysian commando and Special Boat Service operations against Indonesian
islands in the Malacca Strait. Jeffrey Grey, Up Top: The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts 1955-1972
(St Leonards NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1998), p.58.
65
Indeed, the official history of the Royal Australian Navy in the conflict suggests that one of its most significant
contributions was in direct assistance to the Royal Malaysian Navy; Grey, Up Top, pp.34-41.
66
Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations, pp.54, 92; also Tuck, ‘The Royal Navy and Confrontation, 1963-66’, p.207.
‘Gisbourne’ also notes their potential vulnerability to the sort of small arms and rocket launchers that could easily have been
carried in sampans; ‘Naval Operations’, p.44.
67
Callwell, Small Wars, p.22.
68
Ibid., p.23.
69
It is striking that under one of his key lessons for COIN, mobility, Paget refers to ‘good communications by land and air’,
especially helicopters, but does not mention the sea! Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, pp.164-65.
70
‘Gisbourne’, ‘Naval Operations’, p.46.
71
Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper 2003, Cm 6041-I, December 2003, especially paras.4.3-
4.7; Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities, Cm 6269, July 2004, para.1.2.