Briefing B–29 crews
on Siniju.
The Air Campaign
Over Korea
Pressuring the Enemy
By C O N R A D C. C R A N E
T
he staff of Far East Air Forces
(FEAF) conducted the first
systematic study of meas-
ures to produce a negotiated
settlement in a limited war through
airpower some fifty years ago. As both
the conflict and truce talks continued,
stalemate on the ground and ineffec-
tive interdiction inspired Brigadier
General Jacob Smart, FEAF deputy
commander for operations, to look for
a better way to utilize resources. He di-
rected Colonel R.L. Randolph and
Lieutenant Colonel Conrad C. Crane, USA (Ret.), is a research professor at the
Strategic Studies Institute in the U.S. Army War College and the author of
American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953.
78 JFQ / Spring/Summer 2001
DOD
Lieutenant Colonel B.I. Mayo to find a
means of unhinging the communist
forces in North Korea. The result
prompted a new vision for employing
airpower—pressuring enemy leaders to
abandon the fight.
Out of the Blue
Randolph and Mayo began by ex-
amining the interdiction campaign,
which had focused on cutting rail lines
to force the enemy to move supplies
primarily by road. Planners hoped that
Fifth Air Force aircraft could cause
enough attrition of enemy trucks that
front line armies could not be sup-
plied. This had not worked despite

over 15,000 railway cuts and the de-
struction or damaging of 199 bridges.
Enemy repairs, night movement, and
MiG–15 jet fighter attacks foiled FEAF
efforts to close transportation routes.
Randolph and Mayo also observed that
the daily enemy mortar shell require-
ment could be carried by one truck or
100 men with A-frames. It was virtu-
ally impossible for interdiction to halt to break off the talks, once with sus-
such traffic. In addition, FEAF losses
were heavy. The campaign had cost
the communists had twice used the
excuse of air attacks on the negotiating cal about the efficacy of
venue to break off the talks
243 aircraft destroyed and 290 heavily
damaged, and only 131 were replaced.1
The study recommended that all
assets other than those required to
maintain air superiority “be employed
toward accomplishing the maximum
amount of selected destruction, thus
making the Korean conflict as costly as
possible to the enemy. . . . ” Targets
were reprioritized based on effects on
the enemy, vulnerability to available
weapons, and probable cost of attack-
ing them. Candidates included hydro-
electric plants, locomotives, vehicles,
supplies, and specific structures in
cities and villages, especially those ac- Clark personally from then on, freeing
tively supporting enemy forces. Based
on this study, Smart planned to deem-
phasize interdiction and concentrate
on the new targets to “bring about de-
feat of the enemy as expeditiously as
possible” rather than “allowing him to
languish in comparative quiescence
while we expand our efforts beating up
supply routes.” He knew that the well
dug-in enemy was under no real pres-
sure on the front line and needed lim-
ited supplies to sustain operations in a destruction rather than delay and dis-
stalemate. Smart also believed that de-
stroying such targets should impair the
morale of civilians who provided logis-
tic support, though he acknowledged
that selection would be difficult not
only for operational reasons but be-
cause of uncertainty about what deci-
sionmakers thought would work.
The commander of U.N. Forces
and U.S. Far East, General Matthew
Ridgway, USA, had made an initial de-
termination to influence negotiations
with airpower, but his resolve was
tempered by his disappointment in
the interdiction campaign and early
battles with the Joint Chiefs about
bombing both North Korean ports and
Pyongyang. He also was hesitant to
risk disrupting the peace talks. The
communists had twice used the excuse
of air attacks on the negotiating venue
pect evidence and another time in the
wake of an actual U.N. bombing error.
Ridgway’s successor,
General Mark Clark,
USA, was not as skepti-
airpower nor as reluc-
tant to confront the
Joint Chiefs, who were
increasingly frustrated by inter-
minable armistice discussions.
Clark believed the communists
only responded to force. Moreover, he
had great respect for air interdiction.
During World War II, he commanded
an army in Italy, where Operation
Strangle caused the enemy great logistic
difficulty and produced some success,
even though it did not result in a swift
conclusion. When Smart and Lieu-
tenant General Otto Weyland, the FEAF
commander, approached their new boss
about air pressure strategy, they found a
willing listener. Weyland dealt with
the Far East Command staff of target se-
lection and reinforcing Clark’s belief in
the importance of hitting targets in rear
areas.
By early July, FEAF target commit-
tee members agreed that a revised tar-
get attack program had to be devel-
oped reflecting new priorities. Smart
cautioned that modifications should
not be regarded as a major policy
change but instead as an emphasis on
ruption. This terminology was in-
tended to minimize Army desires for
more close air support and avoid con-
troversial headlines. The FEAF directive
outlining the new program was pub-
lished in the second week of July. The
highest priority remained air superior-
ity, followed by maximum selected de-
struction, and then direct support of
ground forces.
Crane
New Targets
The first focus for the escalated air
campaign would be enemy hydroelec-
tric plants. In March, Ridgway rebuffed
a FEAF request to attack them, stating
that intelligence did not justify bomb-
ing targets whose primary use was for
the civilian economy, and their de-
struction would not hasten a commu-
nist agreement on armistice terms. He
would sanction attacks only if negotia-
tions were deadlocked or broken off. A
message in May from the Joint Chiefs,
probably intended to goad Ridgway
into action, reminded him that the
most recent directives only specifically
prohibited attacking Suiho Dam on the
Yalu; other power facilities were out-
side restricted areas. On June 11, 1952,
Weyland sent a plan to Clark calling
for bombing all complexes except
Suiho. Meanwhile, the Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Air Force, General Hoyt Van-
denberg, shepherded a proposal which
removed all restrictions on attacks
against Yalu River hydroelectric sites
through the Joint Chiefs. Far East
Command was notified in time to add
Suiho to the list, and Clark approved
the attack.
The addition of Suiho presented
difficulties to planners aside from its
location in MiG Alley. It was the
fourth largest dam in the world. Even
smaller dams were difficult to attack.
Smart reviewed techniques used by the
Royal Air Force in World War II but
discovered they could not be emu-
lated. As a result, penstocks, transform-
ers, and power distribution facilities
were targeted at Suiho as well as other
hydroelectric sites instead of dams.
The difficulty of totally destroying di-
verse objectives limited long-term ef-
fects. Still a successful strike against
Suiho was critical to applying effective
pressure on decisionmakers. While
most other hydroelectric facilities sup-
plied domestic needs, planners knew
that much of the output from Suiho
went to China.
The Suiho raid was a model of in-
terservice cooperation. It began with
35 F–9F Navy jets suppressing defenses,
followed by 35 Skyraiders with 5,000-
pound bombloads, all launched from
Task Force 77 of Seventh Fleet. Ten
minutes later, 124 F–84s from Fifth Air
Spring/Summer 2001 / JFQ 79
■ JFQ FORUM
Force hit the target, while the opera-
tion was protected by 84 F–86s. Within
four days, 546 Navy and 730 Fifth Air
Force fighter-bomber sorties destroyed
90 percent of North Korean electric
power potential. Such joint air opera-
tions would have been impossible
early in the war. The Navy and Air
Force seemed incapable of overcoming
interoperability problems caused by
doctrine and technology. Eventually
each service had its own sphere of ac-
tion. But by 1952 the relationship that
Clark and Weyland had developed
with Vice Admiral Joseph Clark of Sev-
enth Fleet encouraged cooperation.
The next indication of increasing
activity was an all-out air assault on
Pyongyang. Operation Pressure Pump
on July 11 involved 1,254 sorties from
Fifth Air Force, Marine, Navy, Korean,
Australian, South African, and British
aircraft by day and B–29s at night. Psy-
chological warfare leaflets warning civil-
ians to leave the city were dropped be-
fore the strike as part of Operation
Blast, which was designed to confirm
the omnipotence of U.N. airpower and
disrupt industry. Radio Pyongyang was
knocked off the air for two days but an-
nounced when it restored service that
the attacks had destroyed 1,500 build-
ings and left thousands of civilian casu-
alties. Intelligence sources reported that
one extra benefit from the attack was a
direct hit by an errant B–29 on a shelter
used by high ranking officials that
caused up to 500 casualties. The effort
was repeated on August 29 with over
1,400 sorties to achieve the psychologi-
cal benefit of demonstrating an ability
to punish the enemy through airpower
during a conference between China and
the Soviet Union. Smart also scheduled
attacks on targets in the far northwest
as a further signal to attendees.
The Big Picture
The way the raids were perceived
around the world revealed various
views on the efficacy of American air-
power. The British press emphasized
the multinational composition of the
strike force and gave equal coverage to
North Korean accusations of nonmili-
tary damage while noting the irony
that antiaircraft guns surrounding a so-
called “undefended city” claimed to
have downed 10 U.N. aircraft. The
80 JFQ / Spring/Summer 2001
Times observed with surprise that the
communists did appear to be more
eager for a cease fire. American cover-
age played up the mass nature of the
raids along with the fires and explo-
sions they caused among stockpiled
supplies. It also pointed out that civil-
ians had received ample warning on
the bombing. Newsreels depicted re-
lentless attacks on military targets by
mass strike warnings were curtailed, tion to the 1.8 million
though occasionally civilians were
given advance notice of raids
U.N. fighter-bombers of five nations,
using footage supplied by the Depart-
ment of Defense. Like the hydroelec-
tric attacks, American papers portrayed
the air activity as part of an initiative
to illustrate to the communists the per-
ils of prolonging the deadlock.
Meanwhile, an Asian delegate to
the United Nations summed up his
fears:
It seems . . . a dangerous business, this pol- the Department of State. It feared that
icy of mass air attacks while the truce
talks are going on. Knowing the Chinese, I
think it likely that they would regard the
signing of an armistice under such military
pressure as a loss of face.
Chinese representatives in Delhi were
characterizing the attacks as “19th cen-
tury gun boat tactics,” assuring Indian
diplomats that the operations would
not affect their forces or negotiators.
U.N. forces expanded the cam-
paign as the world watched. A FEAF
operational policy directive issued on
July 10 outlined the new attack pro-
gram to subordinate units, and they
moved swiftly. Navy Task Force 77 also
participated. Some thirty joint maxi-
mum effort air strikes were conducted
by Navy and FEAF aircraft in the latter
half of 1952 against power, manufac-
turing, mining, oil, railway, and other
centers. On July 20, Fifth Air Force
B–26s began night attacks on commu-
nications centers using incendiary and
demolition bombs as part of the imple-
mentation of operations plan 72-52,
aimed at concentration points, vehicle
repair areas, and military installations
in damaged buildings in towns.
Operation Strike dropped propa-
ganda leaflets on 78 towns warning
civilians to move away from military
targets. Illustrations depicted North
Korean transport routes and support
facilities. The text announced that
U.N. Command knew where all mili-
tary targets were located but wanted to
spare innocent lives. The civilians were
advised to stay away because of de-
layed action bombs. In addi-
leaflets Fifth Air Force
dropped July 13–26, Radio
Seoul broadcast warnings be-
fore each nightly attack ad-
vising civilians in specific
areas to seek shelter. Newsreels called
the bombing operation a “warn ’em,
sock ’em campaign.”
Lieutenant General Glen Barcus,
who commanded Fifth Air Force, an-
nounced the attacks and explained
that radio notifications and leaflets
were a humanitarian effort to mini-
mize casualties. Nevertheless the FEAF
publicity campaign drew protests from
warnings and bombing might be ex-
ploited by enemy propaganda and
harm the U.N. position in world opin-
ion. Weyland, who believed few useful
targets remained in North Korean
cities and towns anyway, relayed the
concerns of both General Clark and
Washington about the release to the
embarrassed Barcus, who said he got
the idea from Weyland’s own public
information officer.
Press releases and mass strike
warnings were curtailed, though occa-
sionally civilians were given advance
notice of raids. But bombing North Ko-
rean urban areas continued unabated.
Even B–29s from Bomber Command
were enlisted in attacks on communi-
cation centers. By early 1953 the com-
mand considered small cities and
towns the only remaining vulnerabil-
ity in the communist logistic system.
Intelligence revealed that they had
been taken over as supply and troop
centers, but there was too much flack
for daylight attacks by light bombers.
Contrail problems and bright moon-
light which aided night interceptors
limited operations along the Yalu to

one week a month, so medium
bombers spent most of their time hit-
ting airfields and communication tar-
gets in the rest of North Korea.
Clark was pleased with strikes
against both hydroelectric facilities and
Pyongyang and was anxious to con-
tinue the air pressure campaign. Wey-
land gave him a detailed briefing on
FEAF target selection in late July and
said it was unlikely there were any tar-
gets in North Korea of comparable im-
portance to the power facilities. Key
military installations in most cities and
towns had already been hit. Weyland
estimated their destruction at 40 to 90
percent. He indicated that he could
wipe out the remainder of urban areas
but was reluctant because they were
primarily residential. Clark agreed.
Weyland then covered the remaining
target possibilities: Rashin, Sinuiju,
B–29s over
North Korea.
DOD
Uiju, and some metallurgy plants and
installations. Clark offered to check the
remaining restrictions imposed by the
Joint Chiefs on the port of Rashin and
pondered the idea suggested by Wey-
land to conduct preemptive strikes on
Manchurian airfields. Weyland did not
expect Clark to submit the request to
the Pentagon, nor for the Joint Chiefs
to grant it, but Clark did authorize
photo reconnaissance over Manchurian
airfields on August 1.2
Second Thoughts
Some members of the FEAF staff
remained skeptical about the shift
from interdiction to destruction, no-
tably the deputy for intelligence,
Brigadier General Charles Banfill. In
Crane
late August, he sent Smart a detailed
memo questioning the cost-effective-
ness of the program. The enemy had
moved most industrial facilities to a
safety zone in the northeast, which
was heavily defended and out of range.
Smaller targets had been placed under-
ground. But the principal sources of
supply and the most important strate-
gic targets were situated outside of the
country. As Banfill lamented, “We are
somewhat in the position of trying to
starve a beggar by raiding his pantry
when we know he gets his meals from
his rich relatives up the street.” He was
concerned that while FEAF aircraft
searched for the few lucrative targets,
unrestricted transportation was allow-
ing enemy forces to increase their ar-
tillery fire by a factor of ten and triple
U.N. casualties. He concluded that rail-
way interdiction should be resumed
even if it might not prove decisive.
Smart sent back an equally de-
tailed response explaining his rationale
for the new program. Although con-
ceding that most medium bombard-
ment targets that remained in North
Korea were of relatively minor value,
he argued that attacking them was
more useful than interdiction. Political
and military restrictions combined
with a static battle front to make effec-
tive interdiction virtually impossible.
Smart related that the new policy had
elicited a more telling response from
the enemy, as evidenced in their “ref-
erences to our ‘savagery’ by even the
communist armistice delegation.” He
interpreted the increase in enemy ar-
tillery fire as retribution for current air
action rather than use of a surplus
amassed since the curtailment of inter-
diction. He concluded,
I feel that the purpose of any air action is
to bring about defeat of the enemy as ex-
peditiously as possible, not merely to com-
plicate his maintenance of a position in
which demonstrably he not only can sup-
port but actually can replenish himself,
despite our efforts to prevent his doing so.
However, interdiction was deempha-
sized, not prohibited, while air pres-
sure was applied against an expanded
target list.
Occasionally FEAF found a few in-
dustrial targets. Mining facilities were
attacked as well as remnants of North
Spring/Summer 2001 / JFQ 81
■ JFQ FORUM
B–26 bombing
North Korea,
September 1953.
Korean industry mostly concentrated
on the Soviet and Manchurian frontier.
The largest carrier strike of the war oc-
curred in September when 142 planes
from three carriers destroyed the Aoji
oil refinery and attacked other targets
at Munsan and Ch’ongjin five miles
from Manchuria and ten miles from
the Soviet border. The raids caught
enemy fighters and flak defense com-
pletely by surprise.
Hanging Tough
In messages to the Joint Chiefs in
late 1952, Clark stressed “firmness in
negotiations to be supported militarily
by continued heavy bombing attacks.”
Washington concurred. The program
deprived the communists of the ability
to support larger forces, enabled out-
numbered U.N. ground forces to hold
their positions, and constituted the
most potent means of pressuring the
enemy to yield to acceptable armistice
terms. At one point the Chairman,
General Omar Bradley, USA, even pro-
posed to intimidate China by threaten-
ing Shanghai with a B–29 raid. The air-
craft would approach close enough to
appear on radar and then veer off and
fly down the coast. The Department of
State disapproved, fearing such a show
82 JFQ / Spring/Summer 2001
DOD
of force might boomerang with allies
and world opinion.
At the same time, agencies in
both Washington and the Far East con-
tinued to be concerned over the com-
munist build-up that threatened U.N.
the Joint Chiefs prohibited public
statements on intentions to pressure
the communists to accept an agreement waned as peace talks
air superiority. The Central Intelligence the search continued for ways to apply
Agency reported increases in aircraft
based in Manchuria and declared that
“Soviet participation in enemy air op-
erations is so extensive that a de facto and, except for delaying an attack on a
air war exists over North Korea be-
tween the U.N. and USSR.” Ironically,
coordination between the Chinese air
force and its Soviet advisors had al-
most completely broken down by mid-
1952, but concerns that Moscow was
running the communist air war be-
came strong enough that the Secre-
taries of the Army and Air Force at-
tempted to persuade the Department
of State to allow more publicity on So-
viet personnel fighting directly against level statements had to treat the air at-
American forces. Planning also contin-
ued on actions to be conducted in case
negotiations broke down or the war es-
calated. Far East Command and the
Joint Chiefs considered air options, in-
cluding attacks on Soviet territory, the
use of atomic or chemical weapons,
and bombing of Chinese airdromes
and communication centers.
They also remained alert for signs
that the air pressure campaign might
be working. In September, Clark sent
an intelligence report to Washington
stating that bombing was breaking
down civilian morale. Cities and towns
which had been hit were “bordering on
panic.” Civilians who had joined labor
battalions because of job and food
shortages or conscription were desert-
ing to return home. They believed air
attacks were the prelude to a general of-
fensive to end the war. The report
noted that Pyongyang feared air attacks
would motivate civilians to join U.N.
guerrillas. Further information pro-
vided to the FEAF target committee
added that the enemy had to send spe-
cial agents to control unrest in cities
hardest hit by air srikes. Clark’s opti-
mism was seconded by the U.S. ambas-
sador to Japan but did not persuade ei-
ther the Department of State or Joint
Chiefs that an armistice was imminent.
They continued to look
for other indications that
air pressure was produc-
ing results. Optimism
dragged into 1953, and
more effective airpower.
The Pentagon supported the ef-
forts by Clark and his subordinates
supply complex at Yangsi because of a
nearby prisoner exchange, approved
all target requests submitted by Clark,
including hydroelectric plants. But the
Joint Chiefs prohibited public state-
ments on intentions to pressure the
communists to accept an agreement
with such operations, fearing that if
their prestige was seriously jeopard-
ized, the communists would find it
difficult to accept an armistice. High
tacks as routine operations based on
military grounds alone. Ironically, the

more raids were directed at achieving
a political settlement, the less that
could be admitted in public as justifi-
cation for them.
The Last Targets
In March 1953 the FEAF formal
target committee began studying the
irrigation system for 422,000 acres of
rice in the main agricultural complexes
of South Pyongan and Hwanghae. The
deployment of North Korean security
units to protect key reservoirs from
guerrillas in the growing season indi-
cated to Banfill the importance of
those targets. His staff estimated that
denying the rice crop to the enemy
would cause food shortages, tie up
transportation by necessitating the im-
port of rice from China, and require
the diversion of troops for security and
repair work. Clark advised the Joint
Chiefs that in case of a prolonged re-
cess in the peace talks, he planned to
breach 20 dams to inundate these
areas and destroy an estimated quarter
million tons of rice, curtailing the
enemy ability to live off the land and
aggravating a Chinese rice shortage
and logistic problem.
That was not the only proposal to
escalate the air campaign. Weyland
held back an attack by Bomber Com-
mand that would have largely obliter-
ated what remained of Pyongyang,
keeping it as another way to ratchet up
Crane
Bombing Korean side
of Yalu River.
DOD
pressure if required. He also seems to
have doubted the military utility of the
attack, just as he was skeptical of at-
tacks on the rice irrigation system.
However, his planners convinced him
to authorize strikes on three dams to
wash critical railway lines away as part
of the interdiction program, although
among themselves they considered
that rationale a mode of deception to
deceive the enemy about destroying
the rice crop. Fifth Air Force fighter-
bombers hit the Toksan and Chasan
Dams in mid-May, a most vulnerable
time for newly-planted rice, followed
by Bomber Command night missions
against Kuwonga Dam.
Spring/Summer 2001 / JFQ 83
■ JFQ FORUM
The Joint Chiefs approved the
bombing of two more dams by fighter
bombers to inundate jet airfields at
Namsi and Taechon. Clark knew that
further dam attacks risked a negative
reaction from allies and might affect
negotiations, but he and Weyland be-
lieved the missions were needed to
eliminate the airfields. North Korea de-
cried raids on agricultural installations
and on water reservoirs which were
not military objectives. But communist
complaints about U.N. air atrocities
had been so persistent that they per-
haps were not taken seriously. Or
maybe since no mention was made of
targeting rice crops, reservoirs did not
seem to merit attention in the press as
a particularly noteworhty objective.
Blue on Blue
Press releases from FEAF did not
mention naval air operations, which
increasingly were integrated into the
overall campaign. By June 1953 the
Navy was coordinating target selection
with Fifth Air Force, under the com-
mand of Lieutenant General Samuel
Anderson, who was impressed enough
with Navy cooperation to request its
representation on the FEAF formal tar-
get committee. Weyland indicated
that while he could not order the
Navy to participate because the carrier
aircraft were not under his operational
control, Anderson was to invite the
Navy to send a representative from the
joint operations center. The armistice
was signed a few days later, so the
offer was not extended. Ironically, as
ser vice cooperation increased in
Korea, the Air Staff at the Pentagon
was gathering combat data emphasiz-
ing the superiority of land-based over
carrier-based aircraft to counter Navy
attempts to increase the budget prior-
ity for carriers. Using numbers of sor-
ties and tons of bombs dropped, Air
Force analysts argued that their planes
were far more cost-effective than their
Navy counterparts.
The last few target committee
meetings were dominated by discus-
sion over the exploitation of dam at-
tacks. Proposals included employing
84 JFQ / Spring/Summer 2001
delayed action bombs to deter repairs
and dropping leaflets blaming the con-
tinued air attacks and loss of water for
irrigation on the Chinese. Weyland was
adamant that dam attacks constituted
interdiction and vetoed a proposal by
Smart for mounting a psychological
warfare campaign to warn endangered
populations of the imminent destruc-
tion of dams. Although Weyland and
Clark justified the attacks as interdic-
tion raids, neither planners nor the
communists perceived them that way.
Attacks on Toksan and Chasan led to
the inundation of two railway lines and
many roads as well as villages and rice
fields. A flash flood from Toksan
washed out 27 miles of the river valley,
and both raids sent waters into the
streets of Pyongyang. Bomber Com-
mand delayed its attack long enough
for North Korea to develop counter-
measures, and by lowering the level of
the reservoir the catastrophic results of
the earlier raids were avoided. This
measure also worked for the last two
dams. The communists put more than
4,000 laborers to work on the Toksan
Dam and emplaced antiaircraft de-
fenses around it. Weyland was amazed
at the speed of their recovery. Only 13
days after the strike a temporary dam
had been built and all rail repairs had
been completed. When Clark queried
him about targets on which to exert
more pressure for an armistice, the all-
out blow on Pyongyang was all that
came to mind. Clark had Weyland pre-
pare a message for JCS to get approval
but it was never sent.
Hostilities ended on July 27, 1953.
The role of the air pressure campaign in
the settlement was unclear. President
Eisenhower implied at a National Secu-
rity Council meeting on July 23 that he
did not think the agreement was a re-
sult of such threats, although there
were obvious signs that U.S. patience
was wearing thin and that the war
might be expanded. Rumors of Eisen-
hower’s intent to “raise the ante unless
a cease fire was negotiated” were ram-
pant in Korea. But there were other fac-
tors aside from military pressure in-
volved in the communist decision to
sign the armistice. The death of Stalin
and instability in the Kremlin com-
bined with riots in Czechoslovakia and
East Germany gave the Soviet Union a
substantial incentive to disengage from
Korea and also shocked China. Late
gains against ROK troops allowed the
communists to save face while making
concessions for the armistice.
Instead of influencing the armi-
stice talks with a specific operation,
the likely contribution of airpower was
its cumulative effect on both Chinese
armies and North Korean towns
throughout the war. Eighteen of
twenty-two cities were at least half
obliterated, and most villages were re-
duced to ashes. That destruction is
what Pyongyang remembers most
about American airpower, and their
programs to develop missiles and ad-
vanced weapons have been motivated
to an extent by the desire to deter fu-
ture applications of air pressure. JFQ
NOTES
1 Most material in this article is drawn
from Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower
Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953 (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2000); an inter-
view with Jacob Smart by Conrad Crane,
November 2, 1997; R.L. Randolph and B.I.
Mayo, staff study for Far East Air Forces,
“The Application of FEAF Effort in Korea,”
April 12, 1952, FEAF Historical Division,
FEAF Operations Policy, Korea, Mid-1952,
March 1955, File K720.01, 1952 (adden-
dum), Air Force Historical Research Agency,
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
2 Entries for July 24 and 28, and August
1, 1952, Weyland memoranda for record,
File 168.7104-6, 52/06/01–52/12/31, Air
Force Historical Research Agency.
 THE KOREAN WAR FROM THE OTHER SIDE

End Game

B
y 1951, Stalin recognized that
U.S. and communist
his support for the Korean War representatives at
was a disaster. The United Panmunjon,
States and its allies in Europe, July 28, 1953.

galvanized by communist aggression in

Asia, expanded NATO capabilities while
lending sufficient support to carry on
U.N. operations in Korea. For its part,
China realized that prospects for a lim-
ited war and quick victory had vanished
and that it lacked the means to fight a
protracted conflict. Meanwhile, Dwight
Eisenhower became President in 1952 de-
termined to end the war. The new ad-

AP / Wide World Photos

ministration launched a series of diplo-
matic and military initiatives, including
a veiled threat to use nuclear weapons,
although recently released Soviet docu-
ments suggest both the Soviet Union and
China were already prepared to bring the war in taken by the Soviet government after the death of Stalin in
Korea to a close. many ways facilitated the conclusion of the agreement.
A top secret Soviet history entitled ”On the Ko- While in Moscow for Stalin’s funeral, [Foreign Minister]
rean War, 1950–53, and Armistice Negotiations” re- Zhou Enlai had conversations with Soviet leaders regarding
veals the following: the situation in Korea. . . . Zhou Enlai, in the name of the
By the middle of 1951, the situation clearly indicated government of the [People’s Republic of China], urgently
that it was in practice impossible to resolve the unification proposed that the Soviet side assist the speeding up of the
of Korea by military means. Both the Chinese and the Ko- negotiations and the conclusion of an armistice. Such a po-
rean leaders equally were forced to acknowledge this. After sition by the Chinese coincided with our position. . . .
preliminary consultations with the Chinese and Koreans, A special representative was sent to Pyongyang from
the Soviet government on June 23, 1951, put forward a pro- Moscow in March 1953 with a proposal for speeding up
posal for settling the military conflict in Korea. “As a first the peace negotiations. By that time the Koreans also
step,” the Soviet representative declared, “it would be neces- showed a clear aspiration for the most rapid cessation of
sary to begin negotiations for a cease-fire, for an armistice military activity.
with a mutual withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel.” The armistice was signed at Panmunjom on July
This proposal attracted universal attention. . . . 27. Although hostilities were concluded in 1953, no
By the beginning of May 1952, an agreement was formal peace treaty was ever signed. The Geneva con-
reached on all questions, with the exception of the question ference in 1954 failed to resolve obstacles to reunifica-
regarding prisoners of war. Later that question was also re- tion. The Soviet Union, China, and North Korea
solved on a mutually acceptable basis. Measures under- blamed the United States for blocking proposals to cre-
ate a “single, genuinely democratic government.” The
Source: Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 3 headquarters of U.N. Command was relocated from
(Fall 1993), p. 17. Seoul to Tokyo in 1955 where it remains to this day. JFQ

Spring/Summer 2001 / JFQ 85