The Changing Nature of War?

Dr Huw Bennett
Defence Studies Department
King’s College London
 Lecture outline
 Understanding change and continuity
 The world since 1990 – “New wars”
 Clausewitz fights back – his big ideas
 Nature vs. character
 The Trinity as the essential concept
 Application – the War on Terror
 Policy implications
 Why does this matter?

 Identifying continuity and change.

 Change between wars vs. during wars
 The international system now.
 A great deal suddenly seems new – but is it?
Brave New War?...
 “New wars”: the main claims
 Keegan – war as cultural rather than political
 Van Creveld – interstate war is over
 Kaldor – identity not territory, unconventional, the
criminal dimension
 Ethnic wars
 Obsolescence of major war and virtual war
 Since 9/11: focus on “new terrorism”
 Since Iraq and Afghanistan: “globalised insurgency”
 The historian’s response
 Clausewitz also dealt with irregular war
 Non-state actors, criminals, cultural influences
etc are not actually new at all
 Clausewitz deliberately misinterpreted as
rationalist, conventional and destructive
 Inter-state war is alive and kicking
 Insurgents are strategic too
 What seems new vs what is new
 Non-state actors were as much a feature of warfare in
the 15th and 16th centuries as they are of our own.
 Non-combatants were as likely to become victims of
war in previous generations as in ours
 Many civilians took up arms
 Private market/economy of war: crime, mercenaries
 Globalisation only in latest phase: circulation of ideas
and things accelerated by telegraph, cheap press,
mass literacy
 Despite intense scrutiny (law & media), still high
levels of immunity
 Using military power - strategy
 Strategy uses force and exploits its potential use
 Its first task is to understand the nature of the war
 Strategy is about a cause and effect relationship, and
sometimes these are unclear in war
 Limits to rationality: complexity, contingency,
chance
 Two basic forms: offence or defence
 Context informs which strategic principles matter
“Strategic calculations can be logical within
their own cultural context, but founder on the
difference in the opponent’s mind-set. Thus
even if both parties are rational in their own
terms, strategic interaction becomes a dialogue
of the deaf.” – Betts (2000), p28.
 The classical strategy response
Clausewitz’s philosophy is still relevant, e.g.
 Real and absolute war
 The dual
 Defence as the stronger form
 Centres of gravity
 The Trinity

Need to distinguish between nature and character

 War: nature vs. character
 Outward form/context vs. inner essence
 Clausewitz: war as a chameleon
 Chameleons change their colour according to
the contexts in which they find themselves, but
their basic nature remains constant.
 What is its nature?
 Clausewitz: ‘an act of force to compel our
enemy to do our will’
 Mao: ‘politics with bloodshed’
 Organised violence threatened or waged for
political purposes
 Nature = the universal that unites all wars
 Nature vs. Character
 ‘After allowances have been made for historical
differences, wars still resemble each other more
than they resemble any other human activity.
All are fought…in a special element of danger
and fear and confusion. In all, large bodies of
men are trying to impose their will on one
another by violence; and in all, events occur
which are inconceivable in any other field of
experience.’
(Michael Howard)
 Past changes in the character
 French and Industrial Revolutions
 Railway
 Telegraph
 Canning – rationing
 New range/lethality for weapons in WW1
 Demographics

Each period has its own conditions

 Clausewitz: the Trinity
 War shaped by three interacting forces:

1. Reason: instrumentality, purpose (government)

2. Passion: primordial hatred, violence (people)
3. Chance: friction, fortune, creativity (army)

These constituent parts always apply in some

combination
 War on Terror
 Apply the trinity:
 Reason:
purpose of Al Qaeda to use spectacular violence to
inspire Muslim uprising, global jihad, Caliphate
purpose of USA: to defeat AQ/terrorism
 Passion: zealous religion and nationalism,
occupation and resistance, torture and atrocities
 Friction: unintended consequences (insurgency in
Iraq, blowback against AQ, GWOT generates
other crises in Iran, Pakistan)
 What is new
 Context rather than essence
 New tools and tactics
 Nuclear weapons: a challenge to Clausewitz?
 New theatres: virtual and cyber space
 Intensity of scrutiny: legal and media influence
on operations may be increasing
 Why this matters
 Policy implications are far-reaching
 Visions of future shape defence policy, acquisition,
doctrine, training: funding, resources, time, manpower
 Irregular war transformation? A radically changed
nature of war calls for radically new approaches, but
continuities or non-linearity calls for greater balance
 Spectrum of capabilities: Imperial constabulary
through to conventional force – fine balance or
prioritise?
Questions, please!