MINORU FUJIKI VS MARINAY

FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents.
Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.

Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started
to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code
of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National
Statistics Office (NSO).

ISSUE:  Whether the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

HELD: YES. The Philippine court can recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Philippine courts already have jurisdiction
to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment
does not contravene domestic public policy. However, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal
prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment
on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on
the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under
the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
REPUBLIC VS OLAYBAR

FACTS: Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt
thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on
June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied
having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not
appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is
not hers.  She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the
4

entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well
as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before
Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly
celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She
completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the
named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel
agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. Respondent
also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed
that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife
who appeared was definitely not respondent. Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was forged.

ISSUE: May the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage,
be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding?

HELD: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then
the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.

Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 225 Phil. 408 the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the
true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate
adversarial proceeding. “An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest
which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any
person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil
register.
ONDE VS CR OF LAS PINAS

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the R TC
and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole respondent. Petitioner
alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but
his birth certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his
mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on
his birth certificate be corrected as follows:

ENTRIES FROM TO
1) Date and place of marriage of December 23, 1983 - Bicol Not Married
his parents
2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde
3) His first name Franc Ler Francler

Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents but his birth certificate stated that his
parents were married. The trial court dismissed the petition as it should have been an adversarial
proceeding. Correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were “not married” is a
substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings.

ISSUE: Is the trial court correct in dismissing the case?

HELD: Yes, the trial court is correct in dismissing the case. When a petition for cancellation or correction
of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. Since the petitioner did not implead his father
and mother as parties because the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them, there was
no compliance with the strict requirements of the Rules. Hence, the petition was correctly dismissed by
the trial court.
ALMOJUELA VS REPUBLIC

FACTS: For almost sixty (60) years, petitioner has been using the surname "Almojuela." However, when
he requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the National Statistics Office (NSO), he was surprised
to discover that he was registered as "Felipe Condeno," instead of "Felipe Almojuela."

Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 and is the acknowledged natural child of Jorge
V. Almojuela (Jorge), former governor of the said province, and Francisca B. Condeno (Francisca), both
deceased. He averred that while his parents did not marry each other, he has been known to his family
and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has been using the said surname in all of his official and legal
documents. In support of his petition, he also presented a copy of his birth certificate issued by the Local
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pandan, Catanduanes showing that "Felipe Almojuela" appears as
his registered full name.

In a Decision, CA held that Petitioner’s failure to implead and notify the Local Civil Registrar and his half-
siblings as mandated by the rules precluded the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the case, thereby,
reversing the RTC’s Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in nullifying the correction of entry on petitioner's birth certificate
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

HELD: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of substantial changes in
the civil registry through an appropriate adversary proceeding.

A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices to potential
oppositors: one given to persons named in the petition, and another given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Consequently,
the petition for a substantial correction of an entry in the civil registry should implead as respondents
the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be
affected thereby.

In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, the Court emphasized that in a petition for a substantial correction or
change of entry in the civil registry under Rule 108, it is mandatory that the civil registrar, as well as all
other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby be made
respondents for the reason that they are indispensable parties.
Similarly, in Republic v. Uy, the Court nullified the trial court's order to correct respondent's entry for the
latter's failure to implead and notify not only the Local Civil Registrar, but also her parents and siblings as
the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections sought.

In this case, the CA correctly found that petitioner failed to implead both the Local Civil Registrar and his
half-siblings.  Although he claims that his half-siblings have acknowledged and accepted him, the
procedural rules nonetheless mandate compliance with the requirements in the interest of fair play and
due process and to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
Moreover, although it is true that in certain instances, the Court has allowed the subsequent publication
of a notice of hearing to cure the petition's lack/failure to implead and notify the affected or interested
parties, such as when: (a) earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible
interested parties; (b) the parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; (c) there is no actual
or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or, (d) when a party is
inadvertently left out, these exceptions are, unfortunately, unavailing in this case.

In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court for correction of an entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and controversial alterations
renders the entire proceedings therein null and void.

In Republic v. CA, the Court held that the proceedings of the trial court were null and void for lack of
jurisdiction as the petitioners therein failed to implead the civil registrar, an indispensable party, in the
petition for correction of entry, viz.: 

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable
party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not imp leaded in this
case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the
prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders
ineffectual all proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.
xxxx
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to
give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial
court, so far as the corrction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to
party and as to the subject matter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

GAN VS REPUBLIC

FACTS: The petitioner filed with the RTC an Amended Petition dated August 3, 2010 for change of name.
The amended petition contained substantially the same allegations as in the petition for correction of
entry in the birth certificate. On August 10, 2010, the RTC set the initial hearing of the petition in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel of the Republic of
the Philippines (respondent), filed its notice of appearance. The OSG authorized the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Libmanan, Camarines Sur to appear and assist the OSG in the proceedings
before the RTC.

On July 19, 2011, after due proceedings; the RTC of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Branch 29, issued an
Order granting the petition for change of name. The RTC, thus, directed the LCR of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur to change the petitioner's name in her birth certificate from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio
Gan." The RTC opined that, from the evidence presented, the said petition was filed solely to put into
order the records of the petitioner and that changing her name in her birth certificate into Emelita
Basilio Gan would avoid confusion in her personal records.

The respondent sought a reconsideration of the RTC Order dated July 19, 2011, alleging that the
petitioner, who is an illegitimate child, failed to adduce evidence that she was duly recognized by her
father, which would have allowed her to use the surname of her father. On October 17, 2011, the RTC
issued an Order[14] denying the respondent's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC correctly granted her petition since she only sought to have her name indicated
in her birth certificate changed to avoid confusion as regards to her personal records.

HELD: The petition is denied. A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and
reasonable cause must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name. [21] "In granting or
denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound
discretion of the court. x x x What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the
request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in
support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative
for making such determination being lodged in the courts." [22]

After a judicious review of the records of this case, the Court agrees with the CA that the reason cited by
the petitioner in support of her petition for change of name, i.e. that she has been using the name
"Emelita Basilio Gan" in all of her records, is not a sufficient or proper justification to allow her petition.
When the petitioner was born in 1956, prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code, the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code then regarding the petitioner's use of surname provide:

Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the
father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the
recognizing parent.

Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother.
In her amended petition for change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she was born out of
wedlock;[23] she did not state whether her parents, at the time of her birth, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, which would make her a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the
Civil Code. If, at the time of the petitioner's·birth, either of her parents had an impediment to marry the
other, she may only bear the surname of her mother pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, she may use the surname of her father provided that she was acknowledged by her father.

However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she indeed was duly
acknowledged by his father. The petitioner's evidence consisted only of her birth certificate signed by
her mother, school records, employment records, marriage contract, certificate of baptism, and other
government records. Thus, assuming that she is a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code,
she could still not insist on using her father's surname. It was, thus, a blatant error on the part of the RTC
to have allowed the petitioner to change her name from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan."

The petitioner's reliance on the cases of Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines,[24] Republic of the Philippines
v. Coseteng-Magpayo,[25] and Republic of the Philippines v. Lim [26] to support her position is misplaced.

In Alfon, the name of the petitioner therein which appeared in her birth certificate was Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte; she was a legitimate child of her father and mother. She filed a petition for
change of name, seeking that she be allowed to use the surname "Alfon," her mother's surname, instead
of "Duterte." The trial court denied the petition, ratiocinating that under Article 364 of the Civil Code,
legitimate children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Court allowed the petitioner
therein to use the surname of her mother since Article 364 of the Civil Code used the word "principally"
and not "exclusively" and, hence, there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate child should choose to use the
mother's surname to which he or she is legally entitled. [27]

In contrast, Articles 366 and 368 of the Civil Code do not give to an illegitimate child or a natural child
not acknowledged by the father the option to use the surname of the father. Thus, the petitioner cannot
insist that she is allowed to use the surname of her father.

In Coseteng-Magpayo, the issue was the proper procedure to be followed when the change sought to be
effected in the birth certificate affects the civil status of the respondent therein from legitimate to
illegitimate. The respondent therein claimed that his parents were never legally married; he filed a
petition to change his name from "Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing in
his birth certificate, to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez-Lim Coseteng." The notice setting the petition
for hearing was published and, since there was no opposition thereto, the trial court; issued an order of
general default and eventually granted the petition of the respondent therein by, inter alia, deleting the
entry on the date and place of marriage of his parents and correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to
"Coseteng."[28] The Court reversed the trial court's decision since the proper remedy would have been to
file a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled that the change sought by the
respondent therein involves his civil status as a legitimate child; it may only be given due course through
an adversarial proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Court's pronouncement
in Coseteng-Magpayo finds no application in this case.

Finally, Lim likewise finds no application in this case. In Lim, the petition that was filed was for correction
of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; the petition sought, among others, is the correction of
the surname of the respondent therein from "Yo" to "Yu." Further, the respondent therein, although an
illegitimate child, had long been using the surname of her father. It bears stressing that the birth
certificate of the respondent therein indicated that her surname was the same as her father albeit
misspelled. Thus, a correction of entry in her birth certificate is appropriate. [29]
Here, the petitioner filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 and not a petition for correction
of entries under Rule 108. Unlike in Lim, herein petitioner's birth certificate indicated that she bears the
surname of her mother and not of her father.
CHUA VS REPUBLIC

FACTS: On January 7, 2013, Eric filed a petition for change of surname from "Kiat" to "Chua." In his
petition, Eric alleged that he was born on November 8, 1973 to a Chinese father named "Cheong Kiat"
(Cheong) and a Filipino mother named "Melania Sibayan" (Melania). However, after his birth, his father
Cheong allegedly secured a favorable judgment allowing him (Cheong) to change his surname from
"Kiat" to "Chua." Thus, Eric adopted the new surname of his father, "Chua," and had been using the
name "Eric Sibayan Chua" in all of his credentials. Eric likewise averred in his petition that he is known in
their community as "Eric Chua" instead of "Eric Kiat." The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding
Case No. 907 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union.

After the RTC found that the petition is sufficient in form and substance, and upon establishing the
requisite jurisdictional facts, trial ensued on May 21, 2013. Eric testified that he was not able to secure a
copy of his father's birth certificate since the latter was born in China; that his mother Melania told him
that his father Cheong changed his surname from "Kiat" to "Chua;" and that his Certificate of Live Birth is
the only document where his surname appears as "Kiat." Offered in evidence were his Certificate of
Baptism, Voter Certification, Police Clearance, National Bureau of Investigation Clearance, Passport, High
School Diploma, and the Certificates of Live Birth of his children, which all state Eric's name to be "Eric
Sibayan Chua."

Melania also testified in support of the petition, claiming that Cheong used the surname "Kiat" in China,
but used "Chua" in the Philippines; that "Chua" is the surname Cheong used when they married; that it
was her uncle who erroneously caused the registration of Eric's name as "Eric Kiat;" and that when Eric
was 16, Cheong, who was already weak, returned to China and contacted them no longer.

The asseveration that Eric is known in their community as "Eric Chua" was corroborated by his neighbor,
Avelino Fernandez.

ISSUE: The issue to be resolved herein is simply whether or not the appellate court erred in disallowing
petitioner from officially changing his name.

HELD: The petition is meritorious. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, there is legal and factual basis for
granting Eric's petition for change of name. To recall, his petition is not only anchored on his father's
alleged change of surname from "Kiat" to "Chua," but also on the fact that he (Eric) had been using the
surname "Chua" in all of his credentials. Thus, it may be that Eric and Melania's testimonies are not
preponderant proof of Cheong's change of surname, but this should not foreclose the possibility of
granting the petition on a different ground.

In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,the Court enumerated several recognized grounds that can be invoked
by a person desirous of changing his name, viz:

(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and

(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Avoidance of confusion was invoked in Alfon v. Republic, wherein the Court granted the petition for
change of name of Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. In allowing the change
of name, the Court held that:

In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S.
Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the
schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this
name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma under this
name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample
justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and
reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.

The same circumstances are attendant in the case at bar. As Eric has established, he is known in his
community as "Eric Chua," rather than "Eric Kiat." Moreover, all of his credentials exhibited before the
Court, other than his Certificate of Live Birth, bear the name "Eric Chua." Guilty of reiteration, Eric's
Certificate of Baptism, Voter Certification, Police Clearance, National Bureau of Investigation Clearance,
Passport, and High School Diploma all reflect his surname to be "Chua." Thus, to compel him to use the
name "Eric Kiat" at this point would inevitably lead to confusion. It would result in an alteration of all of
his official documents, save for his Certificate of Live Birth. His children, too, will correspondingly be
compelled to have their records changed. For even their own Certificates of Live Birth state that their
father's surname is "Chua." To deny this petition would then have ramifications not only to Eric's
identity in his community, but also to that of his children.

The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition be granted. Additionally, public
respondent failed to demonstrate that allowing petitioner to change his surname will prejudice the
State, strengthening Our resolve to grant the sought-after relief.