IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF LEONARDO PAQUINTO AND JESUS

CABANGUNAY.

The prisoners’plea should be heeded. The government has failed to show that their continued detention is
supported by a valid conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause
whatsoever. If no information can be filed against them because the records have been lost, it is not the
prisoners who should be made to suffer. In the eyes of the law, Paquinto and Cabangunay are not guilty
or appear to be guilty of any crime for which they may be validly held. Hence, they are entitled to be set
free. Liberty is not a gift of the government but the right of the governed. Every person is free, save only
for the fetters of the law that limit but do not bind him unless he affronts the rights of others or offends the
public welfare.

Liberty is not derived from the sufferance of the government or its 2 magnanimity or even from the
Constitution itself, which merely affirms but does not grant it. Liberty is a right that inheres in every one of
us as a member of the human family. When a person is deprived of this right, all of us are diminished and
debased for liberty is total and indivisible.

Albert Wilson v Executive Secretary

WILSON, A BRITISH, WAS TRIED FOR RAPE, CONVICTED AND LATER ACQUITTED. THE UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (UNHRC) EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT INVESTIGATION
BE CONDUCTED, DUE COMPENSATION BE GIVEN AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE BE BROUGHT TO
JUSTICE. WILSON FILED A CASE FOR MANDAMUS TO COMPEL THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
TO ENFORCE THE VIEW OF THE UNHRC. CAN THE GOVERNMENT BE COMPELLED BY
MANDAMUS?
 
NO BECAUSE THERE IS NO LAW COMPELLING THE GOVERNMENT TO DO SO.
 
WHAT IS MANDAMUS?
 
IT IS A WRIT ISSUED TO COMPEL A TRIBUNAL TO PERFORM AN ACT WHICH THE LAW ENJOINS
AS A DUTY RESULTING FROM AN OFFICE, TRUST OR STATION.
 
WHEN IS MANDAMUS APPLICABLE?
 
WHEN A PURELY MINISTERIAL DUTY EXISTS AND A CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT IS ESTABLISHED BY
THE PETITIONER FOR MANDAMUS.
 
IN OTHER WORDS PETITIONER MUST ESTABLISH A CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT TO THE RELIEF
SOUGHT, AND A MANDATORY DUTY ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENT IN RELATION
THERETO.
 
 WHEN IS A DUTY A MINISTERIAL DUTY?
 
THE DUTY MUST BE CLEAR AND SPECIFIC AS TO LEAVE NO ROOM FOR THE EXERCISE OF
DISCRETION IN ITS PERFORMANCE.
 
WHAT IS A PURELY MINISTERIAL ACT OR DUTY?
 
ONE WHICH AN OFFICER OR TRIBUNAL PERFORMS IN A GIVEN STATE OF FACTS, IN A
PRESCRIBED MANNER, IN OBEDIENCE TO THE MANDATE OF A LEGAL AUTHORITY, WITHOUT
REGARD TO OR THE EXERCISE OF HIS OWN JUDGMENT UPON THE PROPRIETY OR
IMPROPRIETY OF THE ACT DONE.
 
COMPARE DISCRETIONARY DUTY AND MINISTERIAL DUTY?
 
IF THE LAW IMPOSES A DUTY UPON A PUBLIC OFFICER AND GIVES HIM THE RIGHT TO DECIDE
HOW OR WHEN THE DUTY SHALL BE PERFORMED, SUCH DUTY IS DISCRETIONARY AND NOT
MINISTERIAL. THE DUTY IS MINISTERIAL ONLY WHEN THE DISCHARGE OF THE SAME
REQUIRES NEITHER THE EXERCISE OF OFFICIAL DISCRETION OR JUDGMENT.
 
THE PHILIPPINES RATIFIED THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE? IS THIS NOT A LAW ENFORCEABLE IN THE PHILIPPINES?
 
NO.
 
IT DID NOT BECOME PART OF THE DOMESTIC LAW?
 
HOW CAN AN INTERNATIONAL LAW BECOME PART OF DOMESTIC LAW?
 
IN TWO WAYS: BY TRANSFORMATION METHOD SUCH AS BY LEGISLATION OR BY
INCORPORATION METHOD SUCH AS BY CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION.
 
UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, INTERNATIONAL LAW CAN BECOME PART OF THE SPHERE
OF DOMESTIC LAW EITHER BY TRANSFORMATION OR INCORPORATION. THE
TRANSFORMATION METHOD REQUIRES THAT AN INTERNATIONAL LAW BE TRANSFORMED
INTO A DOMESTIC LAW THROUGH A CONSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM SUCH AS LOCAL
LEGISLATION. THE INCORPORATION METHOD APPLIES WHEN, BY MERE CONSTITUTIONAL
DECLARATION, INTERNATIONAL LAW IS DEEMED TO HAVE THE FORCE OF DOMESTIC LAW.

Villar v Technological Institute of the Phils

As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of
peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise
been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression, which is identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment
and which `is not limited, much less denied, except on a showing * * * of clear and present danger of
substantive evil that the state has the right to prevent.' They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice
Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, `shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'

Aberca v Ver

The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from claiming damages for the
illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional rights by seeking judicial authority. What the
writ suspends is merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of
obtaining liberty. It cannot suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of
their rights.
Juan Ponce Enrile v Sandiganbayan

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should... be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it
should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose

Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his... provisional liberty
before or during the trial, and the societ... y’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable,
unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is... strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is
detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of
Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or... with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.

The Court is further mindful of... the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide... without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies... include the right to be admitted to bail.

Isidro Hildawa, v Ministry of Defense

The Supreme held that there is nothing wrong in the creation and deployment of special operation teams
to counter the resurgence of criminality, as there is nothing wrong in the formation by the police of special
teams/squads to prevent the proliferation of vices, prostitution, drug addiction, pornography and the like.
That is the basic job of the police. It is the alleged use of violence in the implementation of the objectives
of the special squads that the court is concerned about. It is our way of life that a man is entitled to due
process which simply means that before he can be deprived of his life, liberty or property, he must be
given an opportunity to defend himself. Due process of law requires that the accused must be heard in
court of competent jurisdiction, proceeded against under the orderly process of law, and only punished
after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment
awarded within the authority of a constitutional law.

Chavez v Gonzales

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms
of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a person’s private comfort but does
not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and
without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just
a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of
speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public
interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related
international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and
calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear
and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law.  By
all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil
consequence.  But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of
free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure
of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no
option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared
violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

Lahon vs Sibulo
 The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary
state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate
or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the
state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters
relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any
time before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause
the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime,
and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his
estate.

Allado v Diokno
 For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the State
invokes its inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for
that matter. More importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search the dwellings of
Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and
not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair. While there may be bits of evidence against
petitioners' co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the
least prove petitioners' complicity in the crime charged. Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is
nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand trial and
be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately exacts much more to
sustain a warrant for their arrest — facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the
belief that they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.
Secretary of National Defense v Manalo
In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right
to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public
officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the
Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life,
liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably
support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time,
even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ
of amparo,” the Court explained. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7,
2008)
Chirskoff v Commissioner of Immigrations
It is true that in the cases of Boris Mejoff  (G.R. No. L-4254) and Victor Borovsky (G.R. No. L-4352) both
decided in September, 1951, Chirskoff v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-3802, prom. October
26, 1951) and Andreu v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-4253, prom. October 31, 1951), this
Court, after having denied their petitions for  habeas corpus in 1949, granted their second petition and
ordered their release from custody by the immigration authorities on the ground that petitioner being
stateless and there being no country to which they could legally be deported or willing to receive them,
their indefinite detention would constitute an unwarranted deprivation of their liberty. This Court also took
into account the fact that therein petitioners had been under detention for over 2 years. In the case at bar,
it should be noted, the herein petitioners at the time their release on bail was ordered by the lower court,
had been in detention for only 2 months and while they themselves and the government were about to
terminate negotiations for their departure to Hongkong, from whence they came, or to Taipeh, their own
country. It appears from all indications, that were it not for the order of release obtained from the trial
court, petitioners herein would have already gone out of the Philippines of their own volition as promised
by them when they were first ordered deported. The case of the petitioners, therefore, is different from
those of Borovsky, Mejoff and Andreu who, being stateless, could not, through no fault of their own, be
legally deported from the Philippines. Also in the cases of Borovsky and Mejoff, they did not come to the
Philippines voluntarily, but were brought here by the Japanese Army, in all appearances, against their
own wishes. In the present case, petitioners came to the Philippines on their way from Japan to
Hongkong, their place of residence to where they were returning. They, however, were allowed to
disembark here upon the pretext of changing boat and upon promise of continuing their trip to Hongkong
within a period of 2 weeks. However, when once here, instead of taking advantage of the availability of
both sea and air transportation, petitioners did not depart within the promised period and allowed their
reentry permit to Hongkong to lapse in April, 1953. There is, therefore, absolutely no question that herein
petitioners are here in the Philippines unlawfully and in violation and defiance of our immigration laws,
and continue to stay illegally not because of impossibility of their deportation but of circumstances of their
own making.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v Comelec

Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a
violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution.
The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that
is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than
out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing
registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights
on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal
force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis
as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual
orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we
adhere.

George Tubb v Griess

SSS Employees Assn. v CA
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of
these provisions.
A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to
limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No.
1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November
24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being
the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

Arreza v Gregorio Araneta University Foundation

If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on,
utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid diffident types. They are likely to
be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the
guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic
audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take
into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate,
the exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but
with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear
and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the
taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker, "materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
Herein, the infractions of University rules or regulations by the students justify the filing
of appropriate charges. What cannot be justified is the infliction of the highly-
disproportionate penalty of denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of senior
students to graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and
peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to them.

Resident Narine Mammals v Angelo Reyes

Bayan Karapatan v Ermita

No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right
of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to
“lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
There is, likewise, no priorrestraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.

The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be
struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some
police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum
tolerance, this was declared null and void. 

The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country.
After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior
permitshall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or
plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.

Castillo v Dr. Amanda Cruz

Respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for
criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and
proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or
the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not
before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.

Garcia v Drilon

The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on
equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and
men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and
women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims
of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human
rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special
remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact
essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or
middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal
protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
Guinguiung v CA

Criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead. Two major propositions in the prosecution of defamatory remarks were established: first,
that libel against a public person is a greater offense than one directed against an ordinary man,
and second, that it is immaterial that the libel be true.

This Court has accepted the proposition that the actual malice standard governs the prosecution of
criminal libel cases concerning public figures. As it has been established that complainant was a public
figure, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove actual malice on the part of Lim and petitioner
when the latter published the article subject matter of the complaint. It should thus proceed that if
the statements made against the public figure are essentially true, then no conviction for libel can be
had.

From the foregoing, it is clear that there was nothing untruthful about what was published in
the Sunday Post. The criminal cases listed in the advertisement as pending against the complainant
had indeed been filed. To this end, the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim
cannot be deemed by this Court to have been done with actual malice. Aside from the fact that
the information contained in said publication was true, the intention to let the public know the
character of their radio commentator can at best be subsumed under the mantle of having been done
with good motives and for justifiable ends.

Burgos vs Arroyo

ON PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO

Effect of the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful
investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their
duties – Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present
case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an
exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to
exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot
rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is
undertaken.

Loloy Unduran v Aberrasturi

Yes. It is the court of general jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and decide cases whose
subject matter does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. In contrast, a court of limited jurisdiction, or a court acting
under special powers, has only the jurisdiction expressly delegated.  An administrative agency, acting in
its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are
specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes. Limited or special jurisdiction is that which is confined to
particular causes or which can be exercised only under limitations and circumstances prescribed by the
statute.

         Meanwhile, the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited under customary laws presents two important issues:
first, whether it is legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs with penalties under customary laws; and
second, whether a member of a particular ICC/IP could be punished in accordance with the customary
laws of another ICC/IP.

         Therefore, the Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of a case is not merely based on the allegations of the complaint in certain cases where
the actual issues are evidenced by subsequent pleadings. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court
cannot be made to depend on the defenses raised by the defendant in the answer or a motion to dismiss;
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Suffice it also to
state that the Court is unanimous in denying the petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the CA
correctly ruled that the subject matter of the original and amended complaint based on the allegations
therein is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.