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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

JEFFREY MACARANAS y FERNANDEZ


G.R. No. 226846 June 21, 2017
(Anti-Carnapping Law)

FACTS:

Frank Karim Langaman and his girlfriend Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes were at Meyland
Village, Meycauayan, Bulacan, in the evening of February 18, 2007, aboard Frank's
motorcycle. When they were about to leave the place, two (2) men, both wearing
jackets and bonnets suddenly approached them, followed by a third man who was
earlier standing at a post. One of the three men held Frank by the neck and shot Frank
who later died. The same man pointed his gun at Kathlyn and demanded that she give
him her cellphone. After Kathlyn gave her cellphone, the same man hit her on the back.
Thereafter, Kathlyn pretended to be unconscious and saw that the men searched the
body of Frank for any valuables. While the incident was taking place, the second man
took Frank's motorcycle, while the third man, herein appellant, just stood to guard them
and acted as the look-out. Afterwards, the three men left together riding Frank's
motorcycle. It was then that Kathlyn was able to seek help and Frank was taken to the
hospital.

Thus, an Information for carnapping was filed against him, and a certain Richard Lalata
and a John Doe, who both remain at large, charging them of violation of R.A. No. 6539.

In his defense, he claimed that on the day of the incident, he fetched his cousin Richard
Lalata before proceeding to his father Erning Macaranas' house at Brgy. Lawa, where
they usually eat and sleep. According to him, they left early in the morning of the
following day and just slept the whole day at their house in Brgy. Daungan. Thereafter,
sometime in June, 2007, barangay officials arrested him and claimed that they beat and
mauled him in order to admit that he killed Frank, and under coercion, he pointed to his
cousin Richard Lalata as the perpetrator.

The RTC nonetheless found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of violation of R.A. No. 6539 or the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972;

HELD:

R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as
the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by
using force upon things. 

It is different from the crime of robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It
particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law with
the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and
characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property
belonging to another is taken without the latter's consent. However, the anti-
carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a
motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to
gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the
use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a
motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was
certainly the case before the enactment of said statute.

Further, among of the three amendments made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-
Carnapping Act clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special complex crime,
by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section
14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution must show that the original criminal
design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated " in the course
of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof ."

So, essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle and it becomes
qualified or aggravated when, in the course of the commission or on the occasion of the
carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant is killed or raped. 

In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of evidence presented
by the prosecution show that there were two (2) men both wearing jackets and
bonnets, together with the appellant who approached the victim and the witness
Kathlyn and employed force and intimidation upon them and thereafter forcibly took the
victim's motorcycle and then shot the victim on the neck causing his death.

As to the imposable penalty, Section 14 of RA No. 6539, as amended, provides that the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
IRENEO CAHULOGAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 225695 March 21, 2018
(Anti-Fencing Law)

FACTS:

An Information was filed before the RTC charging petitioner with the crime of Fencing.

The prosecution alleged that private complainant Johnson Tan, a businessman engaged
in transporting Coca-Cola products, instructed his truck driver and helper, Braulio Lopez
and Loreto Lariosa to deliver 210 cases of Coca-Cola products worth P52,476.00 to
Demins Store. The next day, Tan discovered that contrary to his instructions, Lopez and
Lariosa delivered the subject items to petitioner's store. Tan then went to petitioner and
informed him that the delivery to his store was a mistake and that he was pulling out
the subject items. However, petitioner refused, claiming that he bought the same from
Lariosa for P50,000.00, but could not present any receipt evidencing such transaction.
Tan insisted that he had the right to pull out the subject items as Lariosa had no
authority to sell the same to petitioner, but the latter was adamant in retaining such
items. Fearing that his contract with Coca-Cola will be terminated as a result of the
wrongful delivery, and in order to minimize losses, Tan negotiated with petitioner to
instead deliver to him P20,000.00 worth of empty bottles with cases. Nonetheless, Tan
felt aggrieved over the foregoing events, thus, prompting him to secure an
authorization to file cases from Coca-Cola and charge petitioner with the crime of
Fencing. He also claimed to have charged Lariosa with the crime of Theft but he had no
update as to the status thereof.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty, but chose not to present any evidence
in his defense. Rather, he merely submitted his memorandum, maintaining that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and the CA
affirmed petitioner's conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for the crime of Fencing;

HELD:

Yes.
Section 2 of PD 1612 defines Fencing as "the act of any person who, with intent to gain
for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object
or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." The same Section also states that a
Fence "includes any person, firm, association, corporation or partnership or other
organization who/which commits the act of fencing."24

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (a) a crime of robbery or
theft has been committed; (b) the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in
the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft; (c) the accused knew or should have known that the said
article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and (d) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for
oneself or for another. 

Notably, Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD 1612 creates a prima


facie presumption of Fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good,
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or
theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that the prosecution was able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime of Fencing, as it was shown
that: (a) Lariosa sold to petitioner the subject items without authority and consent from
his employer, Tan, for his own personal gain, and abusing the trust and confidence
reposed upon him as a truck helper; (b) petitioner bought the subject items from
Lariosa and was in possession of the same; (c) under the circumstances, petitioner
should have been forewarned that the subject items came from an illegal source, as his
transaction with Lariosa did not have any accompanying delivery and official receipts,
and that the latter did not demand that such items be replaced with empty bottles,
contrary to common practice among dealers of soft drinks; and (d) petitioner's intent to
gain was made evident by the fact that he bought the subject items for just
P50,000.00, lower than their value in the amount of P52,476.00.

The Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as
affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.
PEOPLE v. HEROFIL OLARTE Y NAMUAG
GR No. 233209, Mar 11, 2019
(Law on Illegal Possession of Firearms)

FACTS:

Police Officer 2 Intud and Police Officer 2 Monilar, Jr. were members of Task Force "Boy
Solo," a team formed in response to reports that a lone gunman was believed to be
responsible for several robbery incidents in Cagayan de Oro City.

When they were conducting discreet monitoring operations, they noticed a man walking
towards a branch of LBC Express, Inc. His features resembled "Boy Solo" whose image
was shown in CCTV  footages of past robberies in the area. As "Boy Solo" was about to
enter the establishment, he pulled out a firearm. This prompted the officers to
immediately run towards the suspect. "Boy Solo," however, noticed the police officers
running towards him so he ran away. 

"Boy Solo's" also had three companions – Randy P. Tandoy, Dexter D. Caracho and
Rodel B. Rubilla, acting as his lookouts, and who also fled from their posts. They all
boarded a public utility jeepney. Eventually, accused-appellant was arrested after a
chase. His three companions were caught in a follow-up operation.

During the arrest, they searched accused-appellant's person and recovered, among
others, a .25 caliber pistol replica, a fragmentation grenade with an M204A2 fuse
assembly. PO2 Intud then wrapped the grenade with masking tape and marked it with
his initials. Thereafter, the police officers brought accused-appellant to police station
where the incident was recorded in the police blotter. The grenade was turned over to
the PNP Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team with whom it was inspected and identified
as an M61 fragmentation hand grenade with an M204A2 fuse assembly. Finally, the
police officers found out that accused-appellant had no license or permit to possess the
M61 hand grenade as well as the .25 caliber pistol, though a replica.

In his defense, he claimed that he merely boarded a passenger jeepney where, upon
stopping, two civilian-dressed persons suddenly approached. They bear-hugged and
handcuffed him, and was brought to the police station where his bag was
confiscated. There, a grenade and a pistol replica was brought to him claiming that the
same were found inside his bag. Accused-appellant was then forced by the police
officers to admit to illegally possessing the grenade and imitation pistol.

RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of a


hand grenade. However, it dismissed the case of illegal possession of a .25 caliber pistol
replica against accused-appellant because the Information in said case was defective. It
only alleged that the pistol replica was merely possessed and not used in the
commission of a crime as contemplated in Section 35, Article V of R.A. No. 10591.

CA rendered a decision affirming it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not he is guilty of violating R.A. No. 10591;

HELD:

Yes.

The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms,
which include explosives, ammunitions or incendiary devices, are: (a) the existence of
subject firearm, and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same
does not have the corresponding license for it. Associated with the essential elements
of the crime, the term "corpus delicti"  means the "body or substance of the crime and,
in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed." Its
elements are: (a) that a certain result has been proved (e.g.,  a man has died); and (b)
that some person is criminally responsible for the act. In the crime of illegal possession
of firearms, the corpus delicti  is the accused's lack  of license  or permit  to possess
or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish
the corpus delicti,  the prosecution has the burden of proving that the firearm
exists and that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same. However, even if the
existence of the firearm must be established, the firearm itself need not be presented
as evidence for it may be established by testimony, even without the presentation of
the said firearm.

As previously stated, the officers involved positively testified as to the integrity and
evidentiary value of the grenade presented in court. PO2 Intud testified that it is the
same grenade confiscated from the accused-appellant at the time of his arrest. SPO2
Radaza testified that it is the same grenade turned over to him by PO2 Intud. SPO2
Tiongson testified that it is the same grenade turned over to him by SPO2 Radaza.
Thus, there is also no break in the chain of custody of the grenade confiscated from the
accused-appellant.

The Court also deems noteworthy that accused-appellant never presented any


evidence which would effectively taint PO2 Intud's or any other prosecution
witnesses' credibility with reasonable doubt. Bare and unsubstantiated allegations of ill
motive or impropriety have no probative value and cannot (and will not) take the place
of evidence. In this instance, the presumption that the prosecution's witnesses have
been regularly performing their official duty should be upheld absent any clear and
convincing evidence of ill motive.

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