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Guilals, Christian James S.

JD-4B

Anti Carnapping Law

G.R. No. 226846

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. JEFFREY MACARANAS y


FERNANDEZ, Accused-Appellant

Facts: Frank Karim Langaman and his girlfriend Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes were at
Meyland Village, Meycauayan, Bulacan, in the evening of February 18, 2007, aboard
Frank's motorcycle, a green Honda Wave 125 with Plate No. NQ 8724, registered under
the name of Jacqueline Corpuz Langaman. When they were about to leave the place,
two (2) men, both wearing jackets and bonnets suddenly approached them, followed by
a third man who was earlier standing at a post. One of the three men held Frank by the
neck and shot Frank causing the latter to fall down. The same man pointed his gun at
Kathlyn and demanded that she give him her cellphone. After Kathlyn gave her
cellphone, the same man hit her on the back. Thereafter, Kathlyn pretended to be
unconscious and saw that the men searched the body of Frank for any valuables. While
the incident was taking place, the second man took Frank's motorcycle, while the third
man, herein appellant, just stood to guard them and acted as the look-out. Afterwards,
the three men left together riding Frank's motorcycle. It was then that Kathlyn was able
to seek help and Frank was taken to the hospital.

Appellant pleaded "not guilty" during his arraignment and after the pre-trial ended, the
trial ensued.

Appellant, on the other hand, testified in his defense and denied the charges against
him claiming that on February 18, 2007, he fetched his cousin Richard Lalata before
proceeding to his father Eming Macaranas' house at Brgy. Lawa, where they usually eat
and sleep. According to him, they left early in the morning of the following day' and just
slept the whole day at their house in Brgy. Daungan. Thereafter, sometime in June,
2007, barangay officials arrested him and claimed that they beat and mauled him in
order to admit that he killed Frank, and under coercion, he pointed to his cousin
Richard Lalata as the perpetrator.

The RTC, in its decision, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged and disposed the case

Issue: Whether or not the Jeffrey Macaranas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Carnapping.
Ruling: Yes. Jeffrey Macaranas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
carnapping.

The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under R.A. No. 6539, as amended
are the following:

1) That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2) That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;

3) That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things; and

4) That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. 

Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. No. 6539, as amended, the prosecution
has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the
victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the
culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."  In other words, to prove
the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of
the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of
the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 

In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of evidence presented
by the prosecution show that there were two (2) men both wearing jackets and
bonnets, together with the appellant who approached the victim and the witness
Kathlyn and employed force and intimidation upon them and thereafter forcibly took the
victim's motorcycle and then shot the victim on the neck causing his death.
PD 1612- Anti Fencing Law

G.R. No. 111426 July 11, 1994

NORMA DIZON-PAMINTUAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts: Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, Department of Public Works and


Highways testified that he has just arrived at his residence at around 9:45 p.m. of
February 12, 1988 coming from the Airport and immediately proceeded inside the
house, leaving behind his driver and two housemaids outside to pick-up his personal
belongings from his case. It was at this point that five unidentified masked armed
persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside the house and poked their
guns to his driver and two helpers and dragged them inside his house. That the men
pointed a gun at him and was made to lie face down on the floor. The other occupants,
namely his wife, the maids and his driver were likewise made to lie on the floor.
Thereafter, the robbers ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other
personal properties including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the
matter immediately to the police.

He likewise reported the matter to the Western Police District (WPD) .Two days later, a
group of WPD operatives came over to his house and he was asked to prepare a list of
items of jewelry and other valuables that were lost including a sketch of distinctive
items. He was later told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped
by the informer the police had dispatched. That an entrapment would be made with
their participation, on February 14, 1988. As such, they went to the vicinity of 733
Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at about 10:00 a.m.; that he is with his wife
posed as a buyer and were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at
the stall being tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan; the pieces were: 1 earring and ring
studded with diamonds worth P75,000 bought from estimator Nancy Bacud , 1 set of
earring diamond worth P15,000 and 1 gold chain with crucifix worth P3,000

The recovery of the pieces of jewelry, on the basis of which the trial court ruled that no
civil liability should be adjudged against the petitioner, took place when, as testified to
by Teodoro Encarnacion, the petitioner "admitted that she got the items but she did not
know they were stolen [and that] she surrendered the items and gave them to [his]
wife."

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of anti fencing law in this case.

Ruling: Yes. There is violation of anti fencing law in this case.

The elements of the crime of fencing are:


1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes,
or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
and

4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were
duly established. The more crucial issue to be resolved is whether the prosecution
proved the existence of the third element: that the accused knew or should have known
that the items recovered from her were the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any
good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery
or thievery shall be  prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is
presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were
the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or
logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft.

The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied
solely on the testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the
presumption, and, on the contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in
the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo.

Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established that he was a licensed
dealer or supplier of jewelry. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 provides that "all stores,
establishments or entitles dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article, item, object
or anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before
offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from
the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such
store, establishment or entity is located." Under the Rules and Regulationspromulgated
to carry out the provisions of Section 6, an unlicensed dealer/supplier refers to any
person, partnership, firm, corporation, association or any other entity or establishment
not licensed by the government to engage in the business of dealing in or supplying
"used secondhand articles," which refers to any good, article, item, object or anything
of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless of whether the same
has actually or in fact been used.
Republic Act 10591

G.R. No. 239957, February 18, 2019

JESUS TRINIDAD Y BERSAMIN, PETITIONER, v. THE PEOPLE OF


PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Facts: The prosecution alleged that at around 8:30 in the evening of November 14,
2014, members from the Philippine National Police (PNP)-Pasig Police Station conducted
a buy-bust operation to apprehend a certain "Jessie" who, purportedly, was involved in
illegal drug activities at Aurelia St., Barangay Bagong Hog, Pasig City. After the alleged
sale had been consummated, PO1 Nidoy arrested Trinidad, frisked him, and recovered
from the latter a 0.38 caliber revolver loaded with six (6) live ammunitions tucked at his
back, as well as a 0.22 caliber rifle loaded with seven (7) live ammunitions and two (2)
magazines (subject firearms and ammunition) which were found beside the gate of his
house. When asked if he has any documentation for the same, Trinidad claimed that
they were merely pawned to him. After marking the seized items, they proceeded to
the nearby barangay hall and conducted inventory and photography thereof, and then
went to the police station where the request for ballistic examination was made. Finally,
the seized items were brought to the crime laboratory, where, after examination, it was
revealed that "the firearms are serviceable and the ammunitions are live and
serviceable." During trial, Trinidad's counsel agreed to the stipulation that Trinidad has
no license to possess or carry firearms of any caliber at the time of his arrest.

For his part, Trinidad denied the accusations against him, claiming, among others, that
aside from the present case, he was also charged with the crime of Illegal Sale and
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, which arose from the same incident, but was,
however, acquitted therein for, inter alia, failure of the prosecution to prove that
Trinidad was validly arrested thru a legitimate buy-bust operation. He then
formally offered in evidence the said acquittal ruling, which was objected by the public
prosecutor for being immaterial and irrelevant to the present case. The RTC admitted
said evidence only as part of Trinidad's testimony.

In a Decision dated November 7, 2016, the RTC found Trinidad guilty beyond


reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of violation of RA 10591,

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, considering that: ( a) PO1 Nidoy
positively identified the firearms presented before the court as the same firearms seized
and recovered from Trinidad's possession; and ( b) Trinidad admitted that he is not a
holder of any license or permit from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit. It gave
credence to the positive, clear, and categorical testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses rather than Trinidad's defenses of denial and alibi. It likewise held that
Trinidad's acquittal in the drugs charges is immaterial to this case, opining that the
ground for his acquittal is neither unlawful arrest nor unlawful search and seizure, but
the procedural flaw in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs.

Issue: Whether or not of herein petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of


violation of RA 10591.

Ruling: No. Petitioner is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of RA 10591.

"One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be
affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires
that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process
cannot be reversed."

In this case, Trinidad essentially anchors his defense on the following contentions: (a)
his arrest stemmed from a purported buy-bust operation where the illegal
drugs and the subject firearms and ammunition were allegedly recovered
from him; (b) this resulted in the filing of three (3) Informations against him, two (2)
of which are for violations of RA 9165 (which were tried jointly), while the other
pertains to the instant case; and (c) his acquittal in the drugs cases should necessarily
result in his acquittal in this case as well. In finding these contentions untenable, the
courts a quo opined that the resolution in the drugs cases is immaterial in this case as
they involve different crimes and that "the ground for the acquittal x x x is neither
unlawful arrest nor unlawful search or seizure, but the procedural flaw in the chain of
custody of the dangerous drugs."

However, a more circumspect review of the decision absolving Trinidad of criminal


liability in the drugs cases reveals that he was acquitted therein not only due to
unjustified deviations from the chain of custody rule, but also on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove the existence of a valid buy-bust operation,
thereby rendering Trinidad's in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest illegal and
the subsequent search on him unreasonable. Thus, contrary to the courts a quo's
opinions, Trinidad's acquittal in the drugs cases, more particularly on the latter ground,
is material to this case because the subject firearms and ammunition were
simultaneously recovered from him when he was searched subsequent to his arrest on
account of the buy-bust operation.

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