Carnapping

June 21, 2017

G.R. No. 226846

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JEFFREY MACARANAS y FERNANDEZ, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For consideration of this Court is the appeal of the Decision   dated October 29, 2015 of the Court of
1

Appeals (CA) dismissing appellant Jeffrey Macaranas y Fernandez's appeal and affirming with

modification the Judgment  dated August 22, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 79,
2

Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 38-M-2008, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.

The facts follow.

Frank Karim Langaman and his girlfriend Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes were at Meyland Village,
Meycauayan, Bulacan, in the evening of February 18, 2007, aboard Frank's motorcycle, a green
Honda Wave 125 with Plate No. NQ 8724, registered under the name of Jacqueline Corpuz
Langaman. When they were about to leave the place, two (2) men, both wearing jackets and
bonnets suddenly approached them, followed by a third man who was earlier standing at a post.
One of the three men held Frank by the neck and shot Frank causing the latter to fall down. The
same man pointed his gun at Kathlyn and demanded that she give him her cellphone. After Kathlyn
gave her cellphone, the same man hit her on the back. Thereafter, Kathlyn pretended to be
unconscious and saw that the men searched the body of Frank for any valuables. While the incident
was taking place, the second man took Frank's motorcycle, while the third man, herein appellant,
just stood to guard them and acted as the look-out. Afterwards, the three men left together riding
Frank's motorcycle. It was then that Kathlyn was able to seek help and Frank was taken to the
hospital.

According to Dr. Gene Patrick De Leon, Frank sustained a gunshot injury traversing the neck area
which necessitated surgery. Eventually, Frank died on the 27th post-operative day or on March 30,
2007. The cause of Frank's death was "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to the spinal cord injury
with retained metallic foreign body secondary conjunction injury status post the surgery done which
is laminectomy infusion with rods and screws," as shown in the Post-Mortem Certificate.

Thus, an Information was filed against appellant, Richard Lalata and a certain John Doe charging
them of violation of R.A. No. 6539, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of February, 2007, in the City of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with gun, by means of violence and intimidation, with intent of gain and without the consent of the
owner, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away with them one Honda Wave 125 motorcycle
with Plate No. NQ 8724 valued at ₱59,000.00 belonging to Jacqueline Corpuz [Langaman], to her
damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount of ₱59,000.00, and by reason or on the occasion of
the commission of the said carnapping act, the said accused in furtherance of their conspiracy and
with intent to kill did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
Frank Karim Langaman with the gun they were then provided, hitting the latter on his neck which
caused his death.

Appellant pleaded "not guilty" during his arraignment and after the pre-trial ended, the trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jacqueline Langaman, Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes,
Dr. Gene Patrick De Leon and SPO 1 Hernan Roble Berciles, Jr.

Appellant, on the other hand, testified in his defense and denied the charges against him claiming
that on February 18, 2007, he fetched his cousin Richard Lalata before proceeding to his father
Eming Macaranas' house at Brgy. Lawa, where they usually eat and sleep. According to him, they
left early in the morning of the following day' and just slept the whole day at their house in Brgy.
Daungan. Thereafter, sometime in June, 2007, barangay officials arrested him and claimed that they
beat and mauled him in order to admit that he killed Frank, and under coercion, he pointed to his
cousin Richard Lalata as the perpetrator.

The RTC, in its decision, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and
disposed the case, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused Jeffrey Macaranas, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of Carnapping.

Accordingly, accused Jeffrey Macaranas is hereby SENTENCED:

(a) To suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;

(b) To indemnify the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman Corpuz the amount of Php
50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Frank Karim Corpuz Langaman;

(c) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of PhpS0,000.00 as temperate
damages;

(d) To restore to the offended party, Jacqueline Langaman, the subject motorcycle or in default
thereof, to indemnify said offended party in the sum of Php25,000.00; and

(e) To pay the costs of the suit.

The case against accused Richard Lalata who remained at large since the filing of the Information is
ordered ARCHIVED to be revived upon his apprehension. Issue an alias warrant of arrest for the
arrest of accused Lalata.

SO ORDERED. 3

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Judgment of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch79, Malolos, Bulacan, dated 22 August 2012 is
hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:
 xxxx

Accordingly, accused Jeffrey Macaranas is hereby SENTENCED:

(a) To suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;

(b) To indemnify the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman [y] Corpuz the amount of seventy-
five thousand (Php75,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity forthe death of Frank Karim Corpuz
Langaman;

(c) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of fifty thousand
(Php50,000.00)pesos as moral damages;

(d) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of thirty thousand
(Php30,000.00)pesos as exemplary damages;

(e) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of twenty-five
thousand(Php25,000.00) pesos as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages;

(f) To restore to the offended party, Jacqueline Langaman, the subject motorcycle or in default
thereof, to indemnify said offended party in the sum of Php25,000.00; and

(g) To pay the costs of the suit.

The damages awarded shall earn interest at six percent (6%) per annum from finality of
judgment until fully satisfied.

The case against accused Richard Lalata who remained at large since the filing of the Information is
ordered ARCHIVED to be revived upon his apprehension. Issue an alias warrant of arrest for the
arrest of accused Lalata.

SO ORDERED.

SO ORDERED. 4

Hence, the present appeal.

Appellant insists that the trial court and the CA committed an error in giving full credence to the
testimony of the lone witness and in rejecting his defense of denial and alibi.

R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as the taking,
with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means
of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using force upon things.   By the
5

amendment in Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:

SEC. 14. Penally for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be
punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation
of persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four
months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof (Emphasis supplied)

Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act: (1) the
penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the
change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of thecommissionof the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof" This thirdamendment clarifies the law's intent to make the
offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal
Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of
Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of
carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the
original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on theoccasion thereof" Consequently, where the
elements of carnapping are notproved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be
applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal
Code. 6

"There is no arguing that the anti-camapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery
and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law
with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit:
unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the
latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of
motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with
intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of
force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall
within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of
said statute."
7

So, essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle and it becomes qualified or
aggravated when, in the course of the commission or on the occasion of the carnapping, the owner,
driver or occupant is killed or raped.   As we have ruled in People v. Mejia: 
8 9

The killing or the rape merely qualifies the crime of carnapping x x x and no distinction must be
made between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other which is committed "in the
course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof' makes no difference insofar as the penalty is
concerned.

It is similar to the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and in People v. Bariquit,   it was
10

ruled that:

In the present case, the accused-appellants were charged with, tried, and convicted for the crime of
robbery with homicide. In our jurisdiction, this special complex crime is primarily classified as a crime
against property and not against persons, homicide being a mere incident of the robbery with the
latter being the main purpose and object of the criminal.

Under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons.
Accordingly, inasmuch as robbery with homicide is a crime against property and not against
persons, cannot treachery be validly considered in the present case.
Thus, the elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under R.A. No. 6539, as amended are
the following:

1) That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2) That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;

3) That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and

4) That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. 
11

Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. No. 6539, as amended, the prosecution has to prove
the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more
importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the
killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof."   In other words, to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there
12

must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.  13

In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution show that there were two (2) men both wearing jackets and bonnets, together with the
appellant who approached the victim and the witness Kathlyn and employed force and intimidation
upon them and thereafter forcibly took the victim's motorcycle and then shot the victim on the neck
causing his death.

Appellant argues that the RTC, as well as the CA, erred in appreciating the testimony of the lone
witness of the prosecution because of its inconsistencies and the improbability of her imputations.

This Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witness[es],
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand.   From
14

its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of
witness[es].   The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even
15

more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the
findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion.  16

The CA, therefore, did not err when it concurred with the RTC on the following:

The testimony of Kathlyn satisfies the aforementioned test of credibility. More importantly, during her
time at the witness stand, Kathlyn positively and categorically identified accused-appellant as one of
the three (3) men who committed the crime. We agree with the court aquo's observation on this, thus
-

xxx

The testimony of the Prosecution witness Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes reveals that she came face to
face with accused Jeffrey Macaranas. Though the other two (2) accused wore bonnet at the time of
the shooting incident, she was able to identify accused Jeffrey Macaranas and narrate to the court
his specific participation in the carnapping incident. She testified that before the two (2) male
persons approached her and Frank Karim, she saw accused Jeffrey Macaranas who was then
standing beside a post, staring at them while they were moving slowly on board the motorcycle.
Again, she saw Jeffrey following the two male persons who approached her and Frank Karim.
Jeffrey Macaranas was just a meter away from her because he was near the person holding the
motorcycle. Jeffrey Macaranas boarded the motorcycle together with his two (2) male companions
immediately after the incident.

xxx

There was indeed a positive and unequivocal identification of the accused. It has long been settled
that where the witnesses of the prosecution were not actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they
were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Herein, no imputation of
improper motive on the part of Kathlyn was ever made by the accused-appellant, as the latter even
testified he was without knowledge of any grudge Kathlyn might have against him. Further,
relationship per se of Kathlyn with the victim does not necessarily mean that her testimony is biased
and/or fabricated.

xxxx

Moreover, as correctly held by the People, through the OSG, any inconsistency, if at all, was already
superseded by Kathlyn's positive identification of the accused-appellant in court. x x x

xxx 17

Conspiracy was also proven in this case. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be
proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime,   which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and
18

concurrence of sentiments.   In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present
19

when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act
leading to the crime committed. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated.   As the CA correctly ruled:
20

In the present case, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of the three accused.
Accused-appellant was seen standing by the post looking at Kathlyn and the victim aboard the
motorcycle. When his co-accused approached the former, accused-appellant followed suit and was
standing guard nearby, while his companions committed their criminal acts. After the victim fell
down, and apparently thinking Kathlyn to be unconscious, the trio left together taking with them the
victim's motorcycle. Clearly, the accused-appellant and company all acted in confabulation in
furtherance of their common design and purpose, i.e., to carnal the motorcycle. As aptly held by the
court a quo thus -

xxx

From the acts of accused Jeffrey Macaranas, there was unity in his action with his co-accused and a
concerted effort to commit the crime charged. The simultaneous acts of Macaranas and his two (2)
companions indicate a joint purpose and concurrence of intentions on their part. x x x

xxx 21
Anent appellant's defense of denial and alibi, this Court has consistently ruled that denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence, which
deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimonies of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters  and that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
22

accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime  during its
23

commission.  In correctly ruling that the defense of denial and alibi of appellant is inconsequential,
24

the CA stated the following:

In the face of the serious accusation, accused-appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and
alibi to prove his innocence.  Time and again, this Court held that denial is an inherently weak
1âwphi1

defense and has always been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it
can be concocted. Inherently weak, denial as a defense crumbles in the in the light of positive
identification of the accused-appellant, as in this case. The defense of denial assumes significance
only when the prosecution's evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
which is not the case here. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony
of the prosecution witness who testified on affirmative matters. The Court finds inadequate the
accused-appellant's defense of alibi absent any credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses,
to exculpate him of the crime charged.  25

As to the imposable penalty under Section 14 of RA No. 6539, as amended, it is provided that:

Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be
punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation
of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four
months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed
or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

Thus, the RTC did not commit an error in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua considering
that there was no alleged and provenaggravating circumstance. In line, however, with the recent
jurisprudence,  in cases of special complex crimes like carnapping with homicide, among others,
26

where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages,
and exemplary damages are pegged at ₱75,000.00 each. The appellant is also ordered to pay
₱50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the award of ₱25,000.00 as actual damages to the
private complainant.  All the other dispositions of the CA stays.
27

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Jeffrey Macaranas y Fernandez is DISMISSED. Consequently, the

Decision dated October 29, 2015 of theCourt of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the appellant is ordered to indemnify the private complainant Jacqueline
Langaman the amount of ₱75,000.00 instead of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱75,000.00 instead
of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages and the amount of ₱50,000.00 instead of ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.

SO ORDERED.
Anti-fencing law

G.R. No. 190475               April 10, 2013

JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37,
Manila. The RTC had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of
Presidential Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.

Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:

That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with intent
of gain for himself or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and
acquire from unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth ₱65, 975.00, belonging to
FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have
been derived from the crime of robbery.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the RTC found
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of its Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the guilt
of the accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1612 also known as Anti-Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of 10 years and 1 day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.

SO ORDERED.4

Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the RTC’s
finding of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August 2009.

Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.

The Facts

The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:

Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100
by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount of ₱223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and
Rubber Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of
Firestone tires. Private complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated
November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by
their serial numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them
inside the warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1,
Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the
warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995,
thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.

On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight
(38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private
complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at
Fort Bonifacio.

Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business
establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant
chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by
appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply
Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the
description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse,
based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if
he had any more of such tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private
complainant then left the store and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the
Southern Police District.

On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation
on appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3
Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito
Atienza was appointed as the poseur-buyer.

On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western Police
District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in
the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted
themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14
Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his display, which
Atienza bought for ₱5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.

Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which
was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in, private complainant
entered the store, inspected them and found that they were the same tires which were stolen from
him, based on their serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the
buy-bust team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the
warehouse.

After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside
appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of the stolen truck
tires be witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was
already past 10:00 in the evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police
station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate thirteen
(13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed
by private complainant as stolen from his warehouse.5
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the
business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any
knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February
1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from
Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for ₱3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for ₱45,500, for which he
was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware &
General Merchandise (Gold Link).6

Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega. The
poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes
later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those
items were stolen tires.7

The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in
the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the
presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D.
1612.8

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty
from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.9

OUR RULING

The Petition has no merit.

Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has
been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should
have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain
for oneself or for another.10

We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence
in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this case.

First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was
corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were
stolen – testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was
able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 456511 dated 10 November 1994 and
an Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as
evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay13 taken at the Southern Police District at Fort
Bonifacio.14 The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila
on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never
denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not
establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13)
out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial
numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong’s possession.15 Ong likewise admitted
that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ₱45,500 where he was
issued Sales Invoice No. 980.16

Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know"
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists.17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24)
years,18 ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller.
Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for
proof of ownership of the tires.19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of
tires happened in just one day.20 His experience from the business should have given him doubt as
to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and
the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.

In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:

Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of
the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include
the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of
commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly
engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and
therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No.
1612 that "mere possession of any goods, . . ., object or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" — a presumption that is,
according to the Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the
established fact of . . . possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." xxx.22

Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires.  Section 6 of P.D. 1612
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requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item,
object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the
necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the
town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the
public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for
some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a
diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.

In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go.  Logically, and for all
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practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and
may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable.23 In this
case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove
that Gold Link and its address were fictitious.24 Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by
the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the
prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation,
Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of
the 25 property.

The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on ₱5,075 for each tire
recovered, or in the total amount of ₱65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased forty-four
(44) tires from Philtread in the total amount of ₱223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides a disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair
and regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of business is not overturned
in the absence of the evidence challenging the regularity of the transaction between Azajar ,and Phil
tread.

In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not find
sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong for violation
of P.D. 1612 and modifying the minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision
correccional.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.