eld liable for acts of lasciviousness because the latter constitute an offense included or subsumed in the charge of

attempted rape.21

We now come to the propriety of the penalties imposed on appellant. Section 11 of Republic Act 7659,22 which
amended Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua when rape is committed by
using force or intimidation. But the imposable penalty becomes reclusion perpetua to death whenever the rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon. Such is the situation in Criminal Case Nos. 98-551 and 98-552 because
the use of a knife or bladed weapon by appellant in the consummation of the two rapes has been alleged and
proved.

However, we are unable now to sustain the death penalty imposed on appellant in both cases. As provided in
Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective December 1, 2000, but applicable to
these cases now, the complaint or information must not only state the designation of the offense given by statute
and aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, but also "specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances." But here the informations against appellant in both cases show no specification of circumstances
that aggravate the offenses charged. Note that the close relationship between the victim and the offender (mother
and son) is alleged, but nothing is stated in the informations specifically concerning pertinent circumstances (such
as disregard of the filial respect due the victim by reason of her age, sex, and rank) that could aggravate the
crimes23 and justify imposing the death sentence. Thus, absent any aggravating circumstance specifically alleged
and proved in the two rape cases, the penalty imposable on appellant for each offense is not death but only the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

For the acts of lasciviousness committed on February 14, 1998, Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides the
penalty of prision correccional,24 which shall be from six months and one day to six years imprisonment. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty for the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed by
appellant should be an indeterminate imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as
minimum25 to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum.

The Court notes that the trial court awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to private complainant in
each case of consummated rape. In addition, however, the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape must be
awarded to her as civil indemnity in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.26 Lastly, exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 for each rape must likewise be imposed on appellant to serve as a deterrent against bestial
offenses.27

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-551 and
98-552, finding appellant MELECIO SAGARINO, JR., GUlLTY of two counts of rape is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that for each count appellant's sentence is reduced to reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to
pay to private complainant for each count of rape the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. 1âwphi1. nêt

In Criminal Case No. 98-553, appellant MELECIO SAGARINO, JR., is found GUlLTY of one count of acts of
lasciviousness and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as
minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum, and to indemnify private
complainant in the amount of P10,000.0028 as moral damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ. concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 17-32.

2 Id. at 8.

3 Id. at 9.

4 Id. at 10.

5 TSN, March 24, 1998, pp. 7-8.

6 Id. at 4-12.

7 TSN, March 26, 1998, pp. 1-2.

8 Id. at 7; Rollo, pp. 123-124.

9 Rollo, pp. 31-32.

10 Id, at 51.

11 Id. at 122-123.

12 Id. at 125.

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
13

woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

xxx

14 TSN, March 26, 1998, p. 4.

15 Id. at 5; Rollo, p. 121.

16 TSN, March 24, 1998, p. 11.

17 TSN, March 26, 1998, p. 2.

18People v. Razonable, 330 SCRA 562, 574 (2000); People v. Sevilla, 320 SCRA 107, 120 (1999); People
v. Catoltol, Sr., 265 SCRA 109, 117-118 (1996).

19 People v. Francisco, 258 SCRA 558, 563 (1996).

20 People v. Gianan, G.R. Nos. 135288-93, September 15, 2000, p. 17.

21 Ibid.

22 Art. 335 has been repealed by R.A. No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) effective October 22 1997.
 "SEC. 11. Article 335 of the same Code (Revised Penal Code, as amended) is hereby amended to
read as follows:

"ART. 335. When and how rape is committed, - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

"Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxx.

23 Art. 14, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code.

Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. -The following are aggravating circumstances:

xxx

3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank, age, or sex, or that it be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the
latter has not given provocation.

24Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. - Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other
persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished
by prision correccional.

25This is within the range allowed under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower to prision
correccional being arresto mayor in any of its period (I month and I day to six months, Article 27, Revised
Penal Code).

26 People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 133859, August 24, 2000, p. 13.

27 Id. See also People v. Bonghanoy, 308 SCRA 383, 394 (1999); Article 2230, Civil Code.

28 People vs. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39-46 (1995); People v. Mariña, G.R. No. 132550. February 19, 2001, p. 23.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 191197 June 22, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RODRIGO LAPORE, Accused-Appellant.
 RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

For review is the conviction of accused-appellant RODRIGO LAPORE (Lapore) of rape as defined in Article 266-A
and penalized under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed against AAA.1 The
Decision2 dated 20 March 2007, rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Puerto Princesa City, in
Criminal Case· No. 15286 was affirmed by the Decision3 dated 12 October 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR H.C. No. 02771.

The Information

That sometime in the month of October, (sic) 1998, at Barangay Berong (sic) Municipality of Quezon, Province of
Palawan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with force, threat, violence
and intimidation and with lewd designed, (sic) did and (sic) then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
(sic) carnal knowledge with one AAA, a girl of 13 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.

Contrary to law.4

While a warrant of arrest was issued on 26 January 1999, Lapore remained at large until his arrest on 11 February
2000. During his arraignment, Lapore pleaded not guilty to the crime. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The Prosecution Evidence

The victim, AAA, is thirteen (13) years old and illiterate. She lives with her parents in Baranga y Berong, Municipality
of Quezon, Palawan. On 1 October 1998, when AAA’s parents went to Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, AAA was left
at their house with her older brother, two (2) younger siblings , and accused-appellant Lapore who was staying at
their house as a guest. Lapore was a pastor in their church.5

One evening, AAA’s older brother left the house to go fishing while AAA was asleep. Lapore went inside AAA’s
room and removed AAA’s panty. Lapore then removed his underwear and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA
cried. When she tried to shout, Lapore pointed a knife at her neck and threatened to kill her.

With his penis still insider her vagina, Lapore made push and pull movements and then left.6

On 20 October 1998, when AAA’s parents returned home, AAA reported her ordeal to her parents. When
AAA’s parents confronted Lapore, Lapore admitted to the rape and promised to marry AAA. After the
confrontation, Lapore left. Three (3) months passed. Lapore failed to return. Thus, AAA and her mother
reported the incident to the Barangay Chairman and to the police. AAA was brought to Dr. Josieveline M.
Abiog-Damalerio, the Municipal Health Officer of Quezon, Palawan, for medical examination. On 23
December 1998, AAA filed the instant criminal complaint for the crime of rape against Lapore.7

7 G.R. No. 129875, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 241, 256.

8 People v. Galvez, 424 Phil. 743, 755 (2002).

9 TSN, February 5, 2002, p. 41.

10 People v. Pansensoy, 437 Phil. 499, 518 (2002). See also People v. Atadero, 435 Phil. 888, 904 (2002).

11 People v. Malabago, 333 Phil. 20, 34 (1996).

12 People v. Simon, G.R. No. 56925, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 148, 162.

13 People v. Devaras, G.R. No. 48009, February 3, 1992, 205 SCRA 676, 693-694.
14 People v. Manes, 362 Phil. 569, 579 (1999).

15 People v. Derilo, 338 Phil. 350, 375 (1997).

16 People v. Herida, G.R. No. 127158, March 5, 2001, 353 SCRA 650, 658.

17 383 Phil. 656, 668 (2000).

18 Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sec. 14: Amendment or substitution.

A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be
made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes
any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with
notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion
and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

19 People v. Degamo, 450 Phil. 159, 171 (2003).

20 G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134, 142.

21 People v. Degamo, supra at 172.

22 Id.

23 Records, pp. 225-226.

24 People v. Degamo, supra at 173.

25Revised Penal Code, Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means
involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,

eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing
at his person or corpse.
 An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised
26

Penal Code, as amended, other Special Penal Laws, and for other Purposes.

27 See REVISED PENAL CODE, Arts. 63 and 248.

28 Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it
is otherwise provided. On the other hand, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9346 specifically provides that the Act will
take effect immediately after its publication in two national newspapers of general circulation. R.A. No. 9346
was published in Malaya and Manila Times, two national newspapers of general circulation on June 29,
2006. Accordingly, R.A. No. 9346 took effect on June 30, 2006.

29 Nueva España v. People, G.R. No. 163351, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 547, 555.

30 Villafuerte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134239, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 58, 69.

31
LBC Express, Inc. v. Ado, G.R. No. 161760, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 216, 225.

32The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163 and the Court of Appeals had a total of P298,202.25
as actual damages. This amount is comprised of P25,438.25, representing the hospital bill; and
P272,772.00, representing the price of the casket and funeral services for Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho. The total of
these two amounts is P298,210.25, not P298,202.25.

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 135356-58 September 4, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MELENCIO SAGARINO, JR. y FAMI alias "Kalamansi", accused-appelant.

QUISUMBING, J.:

On automatic review is the joint decision1 dated July 28, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, of Makati City, Branch
138, finding accused-appellant Melencio Sagarino, Jr., guilty of two (2) counts of incestuous rape and one (1) count
of acts of lasciviousness, after trial on the basis of the three separate informations as follows:

Criminal Case No. 98-551:

That on or about the 11th day of October, 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of Aurora Sagarino y Fami who is his (accused) mother, against her will and consent.
 Contrary to Law.2

Criminal Case No. 98-552:

That on or about the 18th day of October, 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of Aurora Sagarino y Fami who is his (accused) mother, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.3

Criminal Case No. 98-553:

That on or about the 14th day of February, 1998, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempted to have
carnal knowledge with Aurora Sagarino y Fami who is his (accused) mother, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance, that is because of his embarrassment when his mother uttered nerve wrecking
words.

Contrary to law.4

During his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits followed.

The prosecution presented as its witnesses private complainant Aurora Sagarino, Rosita Yacap, and Senior
Inspector Angelita Alvarico. Their testimonies established the following facts:

AURORA SAGARINO, who was 57 years old, testified that sometime on October 11, 1997 at about midnight, she
was asleep on the sofa at the first floor of their house. Appellant, her son who lived with her, approached and poked
a knife at her. Thereafter, he removed her duster and underwear. He took off his shorts and brief, and had sexual
intercourse with her from behind while she was lying on her side.5 Dissatisfied that he did not ejaculate, he
masturbated in front of her and after ejaculating, sat in the sofa. The latter, who was not feeling well at that time,
was either too weak to resist or too shocked that her own son violated her.6

According to Aurora, one week later her son again abused her. On October 18, 1997, between 1 o'clock to 2 o'clock
in the morning, she was sleeping in the sofa when appellant while pointing a knife at her, undressed her and had
sexual intercourse with her again. She lost consciousness thereafter.7

Aurora narrated that there was another incident on February 14, 1998. After taking a bath, she went to her room
upstairs. Appellant appeared and poked a knife at her. Then she was only in her bra and panty. Appellant fondled
her breast. He then took off his shorts and brief while stomping his feet on the floor and mouthing scurrilous words
at her. She pleaded, " Bakit ginaganito mo ako, maghanap-hanap ka na ng asawa mo." Appellant, stung by these
words this time, retreated.

Aurora also testified that on several occasions prior to the above incidents she saw the appellant taking shabu.8 She
reported this matter to the barangay captain who did not act on her report. She admitted she was at first hesitant to
reveal her ordeal publicly.

Complainant's aunt, witness ROSITA Y ACAP, who lived two doors away from Aurora's house, testified that in the
evening of February 14, 1998, she noticed Aurora coming in and out of her house crying. She observed that Aurora
was not her usual self. She approached Aurora, and asked her what happened. It was then Aurora divulged that she
was raped by her son. Rosita was speechless for a while. Then, she went to the house of Aurora's sister, Melinda
Fami, who summoned her other siblings named Thelma and Teofilo. Aurora was brought to her daughter's house in
Quezon City. Although Aurora and her relatives did not immediately report the incidents to the police because they
thought of the humilation it would cause their family, after two days, they eventually did.
INSPECTOR ALVARICO testified she conducted the investigation and took Aurora's statement. This was forwarded
to the City Prosecutor.

Defense evidence consisted of the lone testimony of appellant MELECIO SAGARINO, JR., who denied the offenses
imputed to him. He also interposed an alibi as a defense. He alleged that at about midnight of October 11, 1997 he
was playing cards and drinking beer up to four or five o'clock the following morning in the house of his friend, Leo
Camu, at Almanza Street, Tejeros, Makati. From there he went home and slept. He explained that his mother was
no longer home when he arrived because she went to her work at her auntie's house at Alejandrino corner
Apolinario Street in Makati. He woke up at 1 or 2 P.M.. At that time mother had not yet returned home because she
usually arrived between 6 to 7 P.M.. He denied sexually assaulting his mother on October 11, 1997.

Appellant said he could not recall where he was at the time the alleged October 18, 1997, incident happened. He
denied sexually abusing his mother on said date. Appellant likewise could not remember where he was at 7 A.M. on
February 14, 1998, when the attempted rape was allegedly committed and he denied knowing anything about his
mother's story that he attempted to rape her then.

Asked what could have motivated his mother to charge him with rape, Melecio unperturbly answered that it was her
way of getting back at him for not having a stable job.

Republic of the Philippines

with the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances above mentioned and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of death in the manner provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of deceased
Vicente Bayona in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) and to pay the costs.

The Amended Information charged accused-appellant Florencio Ordiales of the crime of murder committed as
follows:

I.

The court a quo erred in holding that there was conspiracy among the appellants in the case at bar.

II.

Assuming arguendo that conspiracy exists, the court a quo gravely erred in convicting them of the crime of
murder and frustrated murder instead of homicide and frustrated homicide only, the qualifying circumstance
of treachery not having been duly proven to have attended the commission of the crimes charged.30

The trial court had ruled that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted in conspiracy in the commission of the crimes
charged. Thus, despite the established fact that it was Carandang who fired the gun which hit SPO2 Red, PO2
Alonzo and SPO1 Montecalvo, all three accused were held equally criminally responsible therefor. The trial court
explained that Carandang, Milan and Chua’s actuations showed that they acted in concert against the police
officers. The pertinent portion of the RTC Decision reads:

Milan, Carandang and Chua were all inside the room of Milan. Upon

occasions when the mayor was slandered. Defense witness Pedrito Caballes impliedly so admitted by quoting
Vicente Bayona as saying to accused-appellant before he was shot "huwag mo akong pakialaman." Finally,
prosecution witnesses Daniel Brown, Jr., and Rolando Cruz corroborated each other in quoting accused-appellant
as having said "Sino ba ang minumura mo?" as against the lone denial of accused-appellant.

It is true that the deceased had two companions while accused-appellant was alone, but superiority in number do
not necessarily mean superiority in strength.4 These three men were all seated and unarmed, and their movement
was impeded by the table at which they sat. Their positions even gave accused-appellant more advantage
especially since he carried two firearms, a carbine and a revolver. However, as correctly held by the lower court,
abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery and is inherent in the same.5
It is accused-appellant's contention, and error was assigned in this regard, that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses should not be given full credence because of alleged serious and material contradictions, inconsistencies
and manifestly false assertions. Our review of the evidence demonstrates that the contractions were not on material
points. The rule is settled in this

That on or about the 4th day of November, 1968, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, Florencio Ordiales y Abaro, being
then a Confidential Agent of the City Mayor, Pasay City, duly appointed and qualified as such, taking
advantage of his public position, with deliberate intent to kill, and with evident premeditation, and
treachery aforethought suddenly and unexpectedly, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot for several times on the vital parts of the body, unarmed,
Vicente Bayona, with a carbine the herein accused was then provided with, which treacherous acts,
tended to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to himself, from the defense that
Vicente Bayona may make, thereby inflicting upon the latter several mortal wounds, which caused
his instantaneous death.

That at the time of the commission of this offense the accused-Florencio Ordiales y Abaro was
provided with a motor vehicle, while he took advantage of, to facilitate his escape from the scene of
the crime.

All contrary to law, with qualifying circumstance of alevosia, and the aggravating circumstances of (1) his public
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30956 November 23, 1971

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORENCIO ORDIALES, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

N. Cruz Jr. for defendant-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal to this Court in view of the capital punishment imposed against accused-appellant, Florencio Ordiales,
by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VII Pasay City, in its Criminal Case No. 8114-P. The dispositive
position of the said court's decision follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court after having thus consider very carefully the evidence of the prosecution
and the defense, both testimonial and documentary, and the exhaustive Memorandum of the
Defense, finds accused FLORENCIO ORDIALES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder, punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed have, his carbin M-1
converted to an automatic one or M-2. Since the accused-appellant did not have the carbine with
him at the time, they agreed to meet at Nad's restaurant at 5:30 that afternoon so he could deliver
the carbine.

At past five of the said afternoon, accused-appellant went to the Nad's restaurant to keep the appointment. While
shots. He was in Milan’s house during the incident in order to ask Milan to accompany him to convert his cellular
phone’s SIM card. When he arrived at Milan’s place, he found Milan and Chua playing a card game. A short time
later, there was banging on the door. The door of the house was destroyed and gunfire suddenly erupted, prompting
him to take cover under a bed. Chua cried out to him that he was hit and that he might lose blood. Milan ran outside
and sustained injuries as well. There was an explosion near the door, causing burns on Carandang’s left arm.
Gunfire continued coming from different directions for two to three minutes. Suddenly, the place became dark as the
lights went out.16

Since gunshots were still heard every now and then, Carandang stayed in the house and did not come out. Col. Tor,
the new Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Sikatuna, negotiated for Carandang to come out.
Carandang requested for the presence of his wife, Col. Doroteo Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo. He went out of
the house at around midnight when the three arrived.17

Milan testified that he was at home in Calavite St. at the time of the incident. He knew Carandang for seven months.
Chua was their neighbor. While playing a card game inside his room, they heard someone pounding at the door. He
stood and approached the door to check. The door was destroyed, and two unidentified men barged in. Gunshots
erupted. He was hit on the left side of his body. He ran out of the room, leaving Chua and Carandang behind. As he
was doing so, he saw his mother lying down and shouting "Itigil niyo ang putukan; maraming matatanda dito!" Milan
was then hit on his left leg by another gunshot.18

Chua testified that he went to the house of Milan at around noontime of April 4, 2001 to play a card game. They
played inside Milan’s ground floor room. Five to ten minutes later, Carandang arrived and laid down on the bed.
Chua did not pay much attention as Milan and Carandang discussed about cellular phones. Later, they heard a loud
banging in the door as if it was being forced open. Milan stood up to see what was happening. Chua remained
seated and Carandang was still on the bed. The door was forcibly opened. Chua heard successive gunshots and
was hit on his left big toe. He ducked on the floor near the bed to avoid being hit further. He remained in that
position for several hours until he lost consciousness. He was already being treated at the Chinese General Hospital
when he regained consciousness. In said hospital, a paraffin test was conducted upon him.19

P/Sr. Insp. Grace Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, later testified that the paraffin test on
Chua yielded a negative result for gunpowder nitrates, but that performed on Carandang produced a positive result.
She was not able to conduct a paraffin test on Milan, who just came from the operating room when she saw him.
Milan seemed to be in pain and refused to be examined.20

On April 22, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision21 finding Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty of two counts of
murder and one count of frustrated murder:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN CHUA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder described and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Article 63 of the same Code, for the killing of SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and PO2 Dionisio Alonzo
qualified by treachery and acting in conspiracy with each other, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of murder and to indemnify the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, as
follows:

To the heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red:

1. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

3. ₱149,734.00 as actual damages; and

4. ₱752,580.00 as compensatory damages

To the heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo:

1. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

 3. ₱139,910.00 as actual damages; and

4. ₱522,960.00 as compensatory damages.

Likewise, finding the accused Restituto Carandang, Henry Milan and Jackman Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of frustrated murder, described and penalized under Article 249 in relation to Article 6, paragraph 2,
having acted in conspiracy with each other and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years of prision mayor to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, and to indemnify the victim Wilfredo Montecalvo as follows:

1. ₱14,000.00 as actual damages;

2. ₱20,000.00 as moral damages;

3. ₱20,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees; and

4. To pay the costs.22

Carandang, Milan and Chua appealed to this Court.23 The appeals were separately docketed as G.R. Nos. 160510-
12.24 Pursuant, however, to the decision of this Court in People v. Mateo,25 the appeals were transferred26 to the
Court of Appeals, where they were assigned a single docket number, CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934.

On May 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision modifying the Decision of the trial court:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061-63 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
Murder and one (1) count of Frustrated Murder is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:

1) In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay the
heirs of PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and SPO2 Wilfredo P. Red an indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the
amount of ₱2,140,980.69 and ₱2,269,243.62, respectively; and

2) In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, accused-appellants are hereby instead sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

With costs against the accused-appellants.27

Milan and Chua appealed to this Court anew.28 Carandang did not appeal, and instead presented a letter informing
this Court that he is no longer interested in pursuing an appeal.29 On April 9, 2008, Milan and Chua filed a
Supplemental Appellant’s Brief to further discuss the Assignment of Errors they presented in their September 28,
2004 Appellant’s Brief:

Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.45 It was the trial court
that was able to observe the demeanors of the witnesses, and is consequently in a better position to determine
which of the witnesses are telling the truth. Thus, this Court, as a general rule, would not review the factual findings
of the courts a quo, except in certain instances such as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there
is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the
findings of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the
issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.46

Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of conspiracy. Unlike evident premeditation,
there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period of time to elapse to afford full
opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree,
expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony.47

As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milan’s act of closing the door facilitated the commission of the
crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed the door open
illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to prevent any chance for the police officers to defend
themselves. Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that
the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.48

The trial court correctly sentenced appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-
100061 and Q-01-100062. The penalty for murder under Article 24849 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Applying Article 6350 of the same Code, since there was no other modifying circumstance other
than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the penalty that should be imposed is reclusion perpetua.

In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the penalty for the frustrated murder of
SPO1 Montecalvo. Under Article 5051 in connection with Article 61, paragraph 252 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for frustrated murder is one degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal.
Reclusion temporal has a range of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Its medium period, which should be applied in
this case considering that there is no modifying circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, is
14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months – the range of the maximum term of the indeterminate
penalty under Section 153 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The minimum term of the indeterminate penalty
should then be within the range of the penalty next lower to reclusion temporal, and thus may be any term within
prision mayor, the range of which is 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. The modified term of 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, is within these
ranges.

The civil liabilities of appellants should, however, be modified in accordance with current jurisprudence. Thus, in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, the award of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each victim must
be increased to ₱75,000.00.54 In cases of murder and homicide, civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 and moral damages
of ₱50,000.00 are awarded automatically, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the
victim.55 Appellants are furthermore solidarily liable to each victim for ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, which is
awarded when the crime was committed with an aggravating circumstance, be it generic or qualifying.56 However,
since Carandang did not appeal, he is only solidarily liable with Milan and Chua with respect to the amounts
awarded by the Court of Appeals, since the Court of Appeals’ Decision has become final and executory with respect
to him. The additional amounts (₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages) shall be
borne only by Milan and Chua, who are hereby held liable therefor solidarily.

In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the solidary liability of Milan and Chua for moral damages to SPO1 Wilfredo
Montecalvo is likewise increased to ₱40,000.00, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.57 An award of
₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages is also warranted.58 The additional amounts (₱20,000.00 as moral damages and
₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages) are likewise to be solidarily borne only by Milan and Chua.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934 dated May 10, 2006 is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, appellants Henry Milan and Jackman Chua are
held solidarily liable for the amount of ₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages
to the heirs of each of the victims, PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and SPO2 Wilfredo P. Red, in addition to the
amounts to which they are solidarily liable with Restituto Carandang as held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01934. Thus, to summarize the rulings of the lower courts and this Court:

a. The heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red are entitled to the following amounts:

i. ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 of which shall be solidarily borne by Carandang,

Milan and Chua, while ₱25,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan and Chua only;

ii. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
 iii. ₱149,734.00 as actual damages to be soldarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;

iv. ₱2,140,980.00 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity to be solidarily borne by

Carandang, Milan and Chua; and

v. ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua only;

b. The heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo are entitled to the following amounts:

i. ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 of which shall be solidarily borne by Carandang,

Milan and Chua, while ₱25,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan and Chua only;

ii. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;

iii. ₱139,910.00 as actual damages to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;

iv. ₱2,269,243.62 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity to be solidarily borne by

Carandang, Milan and Chua;

v. ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua only;

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, appellants Henry Milan and Jackman Chua are held solidarily liable
for the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages to SPO1 Wilfredo
Montecalvo, in addition to the amounts to which they are solidarily liable with Restituto Carandang as held in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934. Thus, to summarize the rulings of the lower courts and this Court, SPO1
Wilfredo Montecalvo is entitled to the following amounts:

i. ₱14,000.00 as actual damages to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;

ii. ₱40,000.00 as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 of which shall be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan
and Chua, while ₱20,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan and Chua only;

iii. ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua only; and

iv. ₱20,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees, to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua.

3. Appellants are further ordered to pay interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of Six Percent
(6%) per annum from date of finality of this judgment.1avv phi 1

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*

Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Raffle dated June 27, 2011.

1Rollo, pp. 3-22; penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) with
Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring.

2 Records, p. 2.

3 Id. at 6.

4 Id. at 10.

5 TSN, August 8, 2001, pp. 6-13.

6 TSN, November 12, 2001, p. 5.

7 TSN, August 8, 2001, pp. 14-18.

8 TSN, October 16, 2001, pp. 5-9.

9 TSN, September 10, 2001, pp. 5-7.

10 TSN, September 17, 2001, pp. 6-7.

11 Id. at 10-14.

12 TSN, September 10, 2001, p. 7.

13 TSN, September 17, 2001, pp. 15-16.

14 Records, pp. 91-92.

15 TSN, August 15, 2001, pp. 7-19.

16 TSN, December 10, 2001, pp. 4-11.

17 Id. at 7-9.

18 TSN, April 1, 2002, pp. 3-9.

19 TSN, April 22, 2002, pp. 4-15.

20TSN, September 9, 2002, pp. 3-13. arrival of police officers Red, Alonzo and the others and having identified
themselves as police officers, the door was closed and after Alonzo and Red pushed it open and as Alonzo shouted,
"walang gagalaw," immediately shots rang out from inside the room, felling Alonzo, then Red, then Montecalvo.
Chua was heard by Estores to shout to Milan: "Sugurin mo na" (tsn, October 16, 2001, page 8). And as Milan
lunged at Montecalvo, the latter shot him.

That the three acted in concert can be gleaned from their actuations. First, when they learned of the presence of the
police officers, they closed the door. Not one of them came out to talk peacefully with the police officers. Instead,
Carandang opened fire, Alonzo and Red did not even have the chance to touch their firearms at that instant.31

In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals further expounded on the acts of Milan and Chua showing that they
acted in concert with Carandang, to wit:

In the present case, when appellants were alerted of the presence of the police officers, Milan immediately closed
the door. Thereafter, when the police officers were finally able to break open said door, Carandang peppered them
with bullets. PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red died instantly as a result while SPO1 Montecalvo was mortally wounded.
Then, upon seeing their victims helplessly lying on the floor and seriously wounded, Chua ordered Milan to attack
the police officers. Following the order, Milan rushed towards Montecalvo but the latter, however, was able to shoot
him.

At first glance, Milan’s act of closing the door may seem a trivial contribution in the furtherance of the crime. On
second look, however, that act actually facilitated the commission of the crime. The brief moment during which the
police officers were trying to open the door paved the way for the appellants to take strategic positions which gave
them a vantage point in staging their assault. Thus, when SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were finally able to get inside,
they were instantly killed by the sudden barrage of gunfire. In fact, because of the suddenness of the attack, said
police officers were not able to return fire.

Insofar as Chua is concerned, his participation in the conspiracy consisted of lending encouragement and moral
ascendancy to his co-conspirators as evidenced by the fact that he ordered Milan to attack the already fallen police
officers with the obvious intention to finish them off. Moreover, he did not immediately surrender even when he had
the opportunity to do so but instead chose to stay with Carandang inside the room until their arrest.32

Milan and Chua object to the conclusion that they were in conspiracy with Carandang due to their acts of closing the
door and not peaceably talking to the police officers. According to them, those acts were caused by their being
frightened by the police officers who were allegedly in full battle gear.33 Milan and Chua further assert that the
fortuitous and unexpected character of the encounter and the rapid turn of events should have ruled out a finding of
conspiracy.34 They claim that the incident happened so fast, giving them no opportunity to stop Carandang.35

Appellants contest the factual finding that Chua directed Milan to go after SPO1 Montecalvo, alleging that they were
both unarmed and that there was no way for Milan to attack an armed person. What really happened, according to
them, was that Milan ran out of the room for safety and not to attack SPO1 Montecalvo.36 Milan claims that he was
already injured in the stomach when he ran out, and it was natural for him to seek safety.

Assuming arguendo that Chua uttered "Sugurin mo na!" to Milan, appellants argue that no crime was committed due
to the same as all the victims had already been shot when said words were shouted.37 Furthermore, it appears to
have been uttered as a result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and did not inherently carry with it inducement or
temptation.38

In the Supplemental Brief, Milan and Chua point out that the assault on the victims was the result of the impulsive
act of Carandang and was not a result of any agreement or a concerted action of all the accused.39 They claim that
when the shootout ensued, Chua immediately dove down near the bed while Milan ran out of the room out of
fear.40 It is allegedly hard to imagine that SPO1 Montecalvo with certainty heard Chua utter the phrase "Sugurin mo
na," considering that the incident happened so fast, there were lots of gunshots.41

To summarize, Milan’s and Chua’s arguments focus on the lack of direct evidence showing that they conspired with
Carandang during the latter’s act of shooting the three victims. However, as we have held in People v.
Sumalpong, 42 conspiracy may also be proven by other means:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the conspirators showing a
preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the
crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act
of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each.43

In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established by their acts (1)
before Carandang shot the victims (Milan’s closing the door when the police officers introduced themselves,
allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chua’s directive to Milan to attack SPO1
Montecalvo and Milan’s following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these facts are not
meant to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milan’s act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what
made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity
of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct participation.

Appellants’ attempt to instill doubts in our minds that Chua shouted "sugurin mo na" to Milan, who then ran towards
SPO1 Montecalvo, must fail. SPO1 Estores’s positive testimony44 on this matter prevails over the plain denials of
Milan and Chua. SPO1 Estores has no reason to lie about the events he witnessed on April 5, 2001. As part of the
team that was attacked on that day, it could even be expected that he is interested in having only the real
perpetrators punished.

Furthermore, we have time and again ruled that factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the

accused-appellant was looking for a place to sit in the air-conditioned room, Vicente Bayona whistled at him,
motioning him to come near. As soon as accused-appellant approached Bayona, the latter said, "Tell the mayor the
next year he will lose." Accused-appellant answered, "Huwag naman ganon. Bakit hindi kayo magkasundo. Dati
kayo magkasama." Vicente Bayona, however, shouted "Bastat sabihin mo talo na siya sa isang taon!" Accused-
appellant shouted back, saying, "Why don't you tell him? You are sending me to tell him!"

Vicente Bayona suddenly stood up with hands on waist and was able to approach accused-appellant, holding the
barrel of the latter's carbine. The victim's two companion also rushed at accused-appellant whereupon, the latter
stepped backward and fired at Bayona. The said companion ran away after Bayona was fired upon.

Accused-appellant left the restaurant after Bayona fell and took a taxi at Taft Avenue near Pasay Commercial
Center with the intention of surrendering to the mayor. In the corner of Malibay, accused appellant met Francisco
Villa (who was going to be appointed Chief of Police Pasay City later), so he stopped and told him that he shoot
somebody and that he was going to surrender. Villa, however, advised him to surrender instead to the NBI.
Accused-appellant, accompanied by Mr. Villa, then proceeded to Bankal to see NBI agent Mr. Aragon. Mr. Aragon,
who arrived in his house later was told what happened. He, in turn, accompanied accused-appellant to the NBI
where the latter surrendered to one Mr. Bayani with the carbine used in the shooting.

The Court a quo found the aggravating circumstances of (a) abuse of official position, (b) evident premeditation, and
(c) use of superior force. However, it considered the use of superior force as absorbed by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. The said court also found the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, offsetting
one of the two remaining aggravating circumstances. Hence, the death penalty was imposed. The use of motor
vehicle which was likewise alleged in the Amended Information was not appreciated by the court a quo for the
reason that the jeep was not used as a means to commit the murder.

The following are assigned as errors in accused-appellant's brief: The lower court erred in —

1. Convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder qualified by treachery;

2. Giving full credence to the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution which are full of
serious and material contradictions, inconsistencies and manifestly false assertions;

3. Sentencing accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of death;

 4. Finding that the aggravating circumstances of (1) abuse of official position and (2) evident
premeditation are present in the commission of the offense;

5. Not acquitting accused-appellant of the crime charged on the ground of self-defense; and

6. Not acquitting accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt.

There is nothing on record to warrant a reversal of the court a quo's finding that treachery attended the
killing of the deceased. The sudden and unexpected shooting of the victim with a carbine constituted
treachery. Authorities are clear that even when an attack or aggression is made face to face, treachery
or alevosia is nevertheless present when the attack is sudden and unexpected to the point of incapacitating
the victim to repel or escape it.3 Accused-appellant's account as to what precipitated the shooting could not
be believed. The statement, "Tell the mayor that next year he will lose," or "Basta sabihin mo talo siya sa
isang taon", could not be attributed to the deceased who, being an avid campaigner of local mayoralty
candidates, at least from Mayor Cuneta's time up to the election of Mayor Jovito Claudio, certainly could not
have ignored that 1969 was not a mayoralty election year. On the other hand, it is admitted by the
prosecution that the deceased and his twin brother, Reynaldo, had repeatedly slandered the incumbent
mayor, since the latter disregarded the promise to make Reynaldo the chief of his confidential agent stating
that the promise was merely a joke. In fact, on the afternoon before the shooting and when the brother met
at Shanghai restaurant, Pasay City, the victim told Reynaldo that he slandered the mayor again because the
mayor refused to sign something which the victim asked him to sign. The version of the prosecution that it
was accused-appellant who first confronted the victim with, " Sino ba ang minumura mo?" becomes more
believable in the light of what happened, and specially since it is not disputed that accused-appellant was
present at least in one of those The Court of Appeals correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 in view of the violent death of the victim and the resultant grief of her family.

Article 2230 of the Civil Code specifically states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as in this case. Moreover, as an example and deterrent to
future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of P25,000.00 for exemplary damages is proper.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01366, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified
by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength
and dwelling, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without
possibility of parole. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho, the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P298,210.25 as actual damages; 50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; all with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from this date until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO, LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, ANTONIO T. CARPIO

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA, DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Records, pp. 230-231.

2 CA rollo, pp. 91-92.

3 Records, p. 283. Penned by Judge Leili Suarez Acebo.

4 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

5 CA rollo, p. 87.

6Id. at 99-100. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and concurred in by Associate Justices
Regalado E. Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.10

The issues for resolution are (1) whether the prosecution has presented credible witnesses and evidence sufficient
to prove appellant guilty of the offenses charged beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) whether the death sentence has
been properly imposed on him.
Appellant laments that the trial court gave undue weight to what he described as incredible, unreliable and
inconsistent testimony of complainant on material points. Appellant avers that the testimony of his mother was
replete with inconsistencies, which is why the charge against him could only be pure fabrication. He claims that the
lower court erred in finding him guilty of the crimes charged with the use of a deadly weapon, and in rendering a
verdict of conviction despite the fact that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that findings of the trial court especially on the credibility
of witnesses are entitled to great weight and respect.11 The OSG also advances the view that the damages awarded
must be increased in tune with prevailing jurisprudence.12

Doctrinally, it is settled that the issue of credibility of witnesses is to be resolved primarily by the trial court because it
is in the better position to assess the credibility of witnesses having heard the testimonies, observed the deportment
and manner of testifying of the witnesses. Accordingly, its findings are entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result of the case.

In its decision, the trial court observed that the testimony of private complainant with respect to the sexual assaults
on October 11 and 18, 1997 as well as the attempted rape on February 14, 1998 committed by appellant are clear
and categorical. She answered the questions on both direct and cross-examination spontaneously. For failure of
appellant to point to any fact or circumstance overlooked or ignored by the trial court to cast doubt on her credibility,
we are in full agreement with the trial court's finding that the private complainant's testimony is worthy of credence.

Appellant protests that even the stenographic notes of private complainant's testimony showed no indication that
she resisted nor struggled. This line of reasoning is disingenuous to say the least. Resistance or struggle is not an
element of the crime of rape. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the
circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.13 Besides, private complainant was
straightforward in her testimony that appellant, her very own son, ravished her through force and intimidation with
the use of a bladed weapon, producing fear that if she does not yield to the bestial demands of the appellant,
something dreadful would happen to her. This threat with the use of a bladed weapon is explanation enough to
convince this Court on why there was no struggle, and that on this matter she was telling the truth.

Additionally, complainant satisfactorily explained the delay in reporting the rape incidents to the police. She stated
that she suffered a stroke on account of the sexual abuses of her son (Dahil inabuso po niya ako).14 Also, she was
constrained by shame (Nahihiya po ako) to bare her son's sexual abuses on her publicly.15

In his attempt to discredit his mother, appellant claims that on the first charge of rape, private complainant testified
that appellant poked a knife at her and threatened to kill her but later on she admitted that after awhile, appellant
kept the knife in the bathroom. On the second charge of rape, appellant points to private complainant's testimony
that while the alleged rape was going on, she felt so afraid because appellant was poking a knife at her16 only to
declare later on that he poked the knife at her after the alleged rape.17

We find these alleged inconsistencies insufficient to destroy complainant's credibility. These alleged lapses in her
memory regarding chronology on when appellant poked a knife at his mother are but minor inconsistencies which
could be attributed to her shocking and debasing experience. We have ruled that inconsistencies on matters of
minor details do not detract from the actual fact of rape. When a crime is perpetrated by a son against his mother, it
is understandable if the abhorrent mind is desensitized to mere details. Moreover, slight inconsistencies are
earmarks showing her testimony was not rehearsed but spontaneous.

But on material points her testimony was coherent and straightforward. Though her highest educational attainment
was only Grade VI, she answered questions on both direct and cross-examination spontaneously. Thus, we see no
reason to disturb the findings of the trial court, which accorded full credit to the testimony of private complainant,
while disbelieving the acrimonious but self-serving assertions of appellant.

Note that appellant's defense hinges primarily on denial and alibi. Denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses,
for which reason they are generally rejected especially when the complaining witness has sufficiently and positively
established the identity of the accused. The positive and candid testimony in these cases of the mother against her
own son, in our view, certainly far outweighs his mere disavowals.
Equally important, a rape victim's testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close relative of
rape.18 For there can be ascribed no greater motivation for a woman abused by her own kin than the innate longing
of the human spirit for truth and justice to prevail.19 That the armed abuser was also a user of a prohibited and
dangerous drug, shabu, did not deter complainant from exposing appellant's dastardly conduct. In sum, we find no
reason to deviate from the finding of the trial court that appellant committed incestuous rape by threatening the
complainant with the use of a knife twice, on October 11 and 18, 1997.

With respect to the occurrence during the early morning of February 14, 1998, the lower court found appellant guilty
of acts of lasciviousness only. The elements of the offense encompassed by the term acts of lasciviousness are: (1)
that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force or intimidation
or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is
under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.20 In the case at bar, the
complainant testified that appellant was stomping his feet and mouthing invectives as he poked a knife at her. This
was patent intimidation. Likewise, the element of lewd designs was apparent when appellant removed his shorts
and brief, then fondled complainant's breast. Although the information was for attempted rape, appellant could be h

On July 28, 1998, the trial court handed down its verdict of conviction. The fallo reads:

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN the Court renders judgment as follows:

a) In Criminal Case No. 98-551 the Court finds accused Melecio Sagarino, Jr. y Fami guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of having committed the crime of rape as the same is defined and punished by Republic
Act No. 7659 and he is sentenced to suffer the capital punishment of death. He is further ordered to
indemnify the complainant of the amount of Fifty Thousand P50,000.00 as and for moral damages;

b) In Criminal Case No. 98-552 the Court finds accused Melecio Sagarino, Jr. y Fami guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of having committed the crime of rape as the case is defined and punished by Republic
Act No. 7659 and he is sentenced to suffer the capital punishment of death. He is ordered to indemnify the
complainant the amount of Fifty thousand P50,000.00 pesos as moral damages;

c) In Criminal Case No. 98-553 the Court finds accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having committed
the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness and he is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) months and One
(1) day of arresto mayor to Six (6) years of prision correccional. Accused is ordered to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand P25,000.00 as moral damages.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.9

In his brief, appellant ascribes to the lower court the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT COMMITTED
THE CRIMES CHARGED WITH THE USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON.

III