Supreme Court: The Solicitor General For Plaintiff-Appellee. Sanvicene, de Leon & Associates For Accused-Appellant

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 95029 March 24, 1993
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ADOLFO NARVAS PASCUAL, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Sanvicene, De Leon & Associates for accused-appellant.
NOCON, J.:
Accused-appellant Adolfo Pascual disclaims knowledge of raping Virginia de Guzman on the feastday of the Sto.
Niño (January 17, 1982) in Tondo because he was, according to him, insane at that time. Virginia claims she was
raped five (5) times in as many hours.
As summarized by the trial court, the facts of the case are as follows:
[S]ometime in November, 1981, or roughly two (2) months before January 17, 1982, the Accused
began courting Virginia de Guzman in earnest. . . . . His persistency and tenacity and avowals of
love bore fruit because after a month of unrelenting courtship, Virginia de Guzman finally succumbed
and she accepted him as her boyfriend and agreed to be his girlfriend. . . . .
However, the feast of the Sto. Niño, the patron saint of the locality, which was third Sunday of
January of every year, was fast approaching. On January 15, 1982, . . . he invited Virginia de
Guzman to attend and spend the day of the feast on January 17, 1982, and have dinner in the house
of his uncle "Tonying" and his auntie at No. 1602 Velasquez Street, Tondo, Manila. She saw nothing
wrong with the invitation of the Accused and accepted the invitation readily.
. . . (they) started the day of January 17, 1982, by meeting in the house of Virginia de Guzman at
about 3:00 o'clock in the morning and attended mass together.
xxx xxx xxx
When . . . (they) arrived (at the house of his uncle and auntie), . . . the Accused told Virginia de
Guzman that they will go to the old house (which was at the back of the house) to have their dinner
there because there were plenty of people inside the house of his aunt. The Accused then took
some food for him(self) and Virginia de Guzman . . . (he) assured the latter that they will just stay
there for a while and get back to the house after their dinner. On that note, Virginia de Guzman
agreed.
They left the house of the aunt of the Accused, passing through the door near the toilet (Exhibit "I-E")
and proceeded to the old house nearby. Upon reaching the old house, they passed through the door
thereto. The old house is also a two-storey edifice. There were no occupants at the time the
Accused and Virginia de Guzman entered the house. The lights were on.
The two proceeded to the second floor of the house. Virginia de Guzman was then preparing the
food brought for their dinner when the Accused suddenly kissed her and tried to remove her blouse.
She was caught off-guard and, taken aback, instinctively she shouted. She resisted the advances of
the Accused. However, the accused persisted, assuring her that he will answer and take full
responsibility for what will happen. She refused. However, the Accused, took out a "balisong" or
single bladed knife from his waistline pointed it to her neck, at the same time unzipping his pants.
Virginia de Guzman, thereupon managed to run to the ground floor of the house to seek help. The
door was closed, however. She pounded on the door, shouting: "Diyos ko, tulungan po ninyo ako."
However, the accused followed Virginia de Guzman to the ground floor and prevented her from
pounding on the door some more. Nevertheless, the aunt of the Accused heard the noise and
inquired: "Ano iyon, Dolphy?" However, the Accused replied: "Wala iyon, Tiyang." Forthwith, the
Accused boxed Virginia de Guzman on the stomach and tried to stab her with his balisong.
Instinctively, Virginia de Guzman tried to wrest the knife from the Accused and got hold of the knife.
She, however, failed to wrest the knife from the Accused. In the process, her palms and fingers were
injured. The Accused then held Virginia de Guzman by putting his right hand around her neck, with
the knife, held by the Accused with his right hand, pointed and pressed to her neck. The Accused
uttered invectives at Virginia de Guzman, saying "Putang Ina mo, dito ka pa gagawa ng gulo." and
warning her that something might happen to both of them. The Accused then pulled her (kinaladkad)
towards the second floor as she continued to resist. Thereupon, the Accused, with the knife still held
by him, removed her blouse, cut off the front portion of her brassiere with the tip of his knife and
removed the strap of her brassiere with his left hand. She did not know where the Accused put her
brassiere after removing it from her. She continued pleading with the Accused, at the same time
kicking him. Instead of relenting, the Accused pointed the knife at her and warned her that if any
vehicle was parked nearby, it might be a vehicle of a policeman and he would have to cut her neck
with the knife. The Accused then removed his pants and clothes. Thereafter, he kicked the lower
portion of her left leg and this forced her to fall down on the floor, on a sitting position. The Accused
then removed her pants with his two hands, the knife still on his hand. The Accused then ordered
her to lie down on the floor and, when she did, the Accused removed her panties with his left hand,
while poking the knife at her neck. Thereupon, the Accused went on top of her and inserted his
private part into her private parts and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. The
Accused, in the process, moved his buttock in an "up and down" direction. She cried as she felt
pains in her private parts. She had not experienced sexual congress before. Her love for him
completely evanesced because of what he did.
The Accused was on top of her, having sexual intercourse with her for about one-half hour. During
that period of time, the Accused had his knife pointed at her neck. After about half an hour, she felt
something coming out of the private part of the Accused and thereafter, he dismounted from her.
Both of them sat on the floor, naked, leaning against the wall. The knife, in the meanwhile, was
being held by the Accused. The Accused, assured her that he would take full responsibility for what
happened. It was then about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January 17, 1982. After an interval of ten
(10) minutes, the Accused succeeded in having a second sexual intercourse with her. Like during
the first intercourse, the Accused had with Virginia de Guzman, the knife was pointed at her. Again,
she felt something was coming out of his private parts. They sat down again, on the floor, still naked
for about thirty (30) minutes. Virginia de Guzman then told the Accused that she wanted to go home
already. However, the Accused refused and merely kept silent. The Accused had sexual congress
with her for three (3) more times. It was then about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 18,
1982. By then she was extremely exhausted and dizzy. She wanted to put on her clothes back but
the Accused did not want her to. As they laid down on the floor, Virginia de Guzman tried her best to
keep awake. However, the Accused was alert and was able to keep awake too. Unable to keep
herself from sleeping, Virginia de Guzman slept ahead of the Accused. The Accused took a blanket
from inside the aparador and used the said blanket for both of them.1 (Sic not used to avoid cluttering
of testimony).
Accused-appellant was thus charged in court with the rape of Virginia de Guzman in an Information filed on
February 3, 1982.2
In defense, accused-appellant pleads insanity and denial of the crime charged.

According to the trial court:
The Accused pleaded ignorance of the charge against him. The accused denied recollection of his
whereabouts on January 17, 1982. Although he admitted knowing the Private Complainant as his
neighbor, he alleged ignorance of any relationship he had with her or having met her on January 17,
1982, or his whereabouts on January 29, 1982 or why he was brought to the hospital although his
mother, Felicitas Pascual used to visit him there. He recalled his father's name, Elpidio Pascual, and
his brothers' and sisters' names, as Ernesto Pascual, Hermina Pascual, Arsenia Pascual and Jonel
Pascual. He studied with the Arellano University High School but finished only the second year. He
finished his elementary education at the Yangco Elementary School.
The Accused adduced evidence, through the testimony of Dr. Eduardo Maaba of the National Center
for Mental Health, to prove that, at the time of the commission of the crime charged, the Accused
was insane within the context of Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. It appears that
the Accused was first admitted to the National Mental Hospital (now the National Center for Mental
Health) on May 7, 1980 for "schizoprenia, undifferentiated type" when the Accused was barely
eighteen (18) years of age. Eventually, the Accused was discharged from the hospital, on January 5,
1982 on an overdue pass. The hospital found
that there was no more need for the further confinement of the Accused although he had to go back
to the hospital for periodic examination and treatment. . . .3
On March 5, 1982, the trial court ordered the confinement of the accused at the National Mental Hospital for
examination and treatment.
It was only on July 3, 1987 that the accused was certified by the mental health authorities to be fit to stand the rigors
of a court trial.
Consequently, after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment against accused-appellant, on August 1,
1988, finding him guilty of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused ADOLFO PASCUAL Y NARVAS
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape defined in and penalized by Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code and, conformably with said provision, hereby sentences the said Accused, to
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties of the law and the costs of
suit.
The Accused is hereby ordered to pay to the Private Complainant, Virginia de Guzman, the sum of
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, as moral damages.
The period during which the Accused has been confined at the City Jail after his arrest in this case
and the National Center for Mental Health from March 5, 1982 in connection with this case shall be
credited to him in full provided that he agreed, in writing, to abide by and comply strictly with the
rules and regulations of the City Jail.
SO ORDERED.4
Hence, this appeal, with accused-appellant raising as errors of the trial court:
I. In not finding that the accused was insane at the time of the commission of rape;
II. In proceeding with the trial without first securing the conformity or approval of the Director of Health as mandated
by law that accused was already cured of his mental illness and can stand trial, and
III. On the assumption that the accused was sane, in not acquitting him on ground of reasonable doubt on the face
of the inconsistent, contradictory and incredible testimonies of prosecution witnesses.5
The principal submission of accused-appellant is that he was suffering from "schizoprenia, undifferentiated type" on
January 17, 1982 that is why he does not remember having raped Virginia five (5) times.
Schizoprenia, as a defense, was discussed extensively in People vs. Rafanan, Jr.,6 as follows:
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only in People
vs. Formigones that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity, quoting
extensively from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, . . :
xxx xxx xxx
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. A linguistic or
grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2)
distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the [criminal act]," and (b) the test of volition — "or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the
will." But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating
to "freedom of the will;" examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court
has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of "freedom and will," i.e.,
without an accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This is "perhaps to be expected
since a person's volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is presented as desirable by
his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused
failed to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has recognized at most a
mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code:"
Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without
however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.
Schizoprenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized
by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis
and usually develops between the ages 15 and 30. A standard textbook in psychiatry describes
some of the symptoms of schizoprenia in the following manner:
Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizoprenia: a

disturbance of association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity.
Bleuler also stressed the dereistic attitude of the schizoprenic — that is, his
detachment from reality and his consequent autism and the ambivalence that
expresses itself in his uncertain effectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of
schizoprenia is often referred to as the four A's: association, affect, autism, and
ambivalence.
xxx xxx xxx
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizoprenia that he considered in no

way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a diagnosis. Schneider's first-
rank symptoms include the hearing of one's thoughts spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations that
comment on the patient's behavior, somatic hallucinations, the experience of having one's thoughts
controlled, the spreading of one's thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of having one's
actions controlled or influenced from the outside.
Schizoprenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis of second-rank
symptoms, along with an otherwise typical appearances. Second-rank symptoms include other
forms of hallucination, perplexity, depressive and euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional
blunting.
xxx xxx xxx

In previous cases where schizoprenia was interposed as an exempting circumstance, it has mostly
been rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if
there was impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the
accused of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.7
The following actions on the part of the accused-appellant, which are findings of fact of the trial court, negate
complete destruction of intelligence at the time the rape was committed:
1. the fact that he pointed a "balisong" at the neck of Virginia when she initially resisted his
advances;8
2. the fact that he told his Auntie that Virginia's pounding at the door of the house, where accused
brought her to be raped, was nothing to worry about;9
3. the fact that he threatened her with death if any police vehicle will park near that home; 10
4. the fact that when complainant first resisted accused's advances and after he had consummated
the sexual assault, he assured Virginia that he would answer and take full responsibility for what will
happen; 11
5. the fact that he raped her five (5) times in as many hours; 12
6. the fact that accused took a blanket from the aparador and used it to cover both himself and the
complainant, who having been raped five times, eventually fell asleep as she was tired, exhausted
and emotionally drained; 13
7. the fact that the accused insisted on going with Virginia when her mother rescued her from
accused's auntie's old house. 14
All these indicate to the court that accused-appellant was very much aware of what he had done, contrary to the
requirement of complete deprivation of intelligence for the exempting circumstance of insanity to be appreciated in
accused-appellant's favor. 15
We find, therefore, no exempting circumstance of insanity in accused-appellant's case. With this finding, the
resolution of appellant's second assignment of error would be irrelevant and immaterial.
II
However, appellant contends that, on the assumption that he was sane, he could not be convicted on the basis of
the inconsistent, contradictory and incredible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as follows:
1. Accused-appellant threatened Virginia with a knife either when she was boxed by the accused at
the first floor of the house where she was raped16 or when he kissed her while they were eating; 17
2. Either Virginia told her mother she was raped when she and her mother were going home from
accused's auntie's house on the morning of January 18, 198218 or she never informed her mother of
the rape committed on her19; and that
3. Virginia just slept the whole day of the 18th of January when she arrived at her house.20
These alleged inconsistencies represent minor lapses on the complaining witness' part and are to be expected
when a person is recounting details of a humiliating experience, which are painful to recall, in open court and in the
presence of strangers on an extremely intimate matter not normally talked about in public, and do not detract from
the credibility of the complaining witness.21 What is sufficient is that Virginia's parents did talk things over between
themselves lest the entire family be involved in any untoward incident. 22 After the decision to seek vindication on the
wrong done to her was reached, the family lost no time in reporting the incident to the police and having Virginia
medically examined. 23
The fact that Virginia slept the whole day of January 18, 1981 in the safety of her own house has no effect on the
credibility of her testimony that she was raped the previous night by the accused and up to the early morning of
January 18th. Tired and exhausted from her harrowing experience, it is but natural for her to fall asleep.
III
A rule deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is that when a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is to be said to constitute the commission of said crime.24 No young Filipina of decent repute would
publicly admit that she has been ravished and abused unless it is the truth.25
The law presumes every person to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative
allegations of insanity.26 This appellant has failed to prove — that he was insane at the time he raped Virginia — and
offered no evidence of his total deprivation of intelligence while he was raping Virginia five (5) times. On the
contrary, accused-appellant's own witness testified as follows:
FISCAL CADELINA:
When you were examining him on March 9, 1982, he was relating to you the incident
of intercourse, did the Accused show any sign of remorse about the intercourse or
rape?
WITNESS:
The most important thing that I do here is to jot down the acts of the patient, but there
were times when the patient described emotional tunes. In this particular case I failed
to reflect it in the chart of the patient, sir.
FISCAL CADELINA:
But when the patient was answering your questions he answered them responsively
and coherently, is that right?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.27
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the indemnity is hereby INCREASED to P40,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.28
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 119-124; Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-10.
2 Ibid., p. 4.
3 Ibid., pp. 128-129.
4 Decision, People vs. Pascual, penned August 1, 1988, by Judge Romeo J. Callejo, in Criminal
Case No. 82-3145-SCC, Manila RTC, Branch 49; Rollo, p. 148.
5 Ibid., p. 100.
6 204 SCRA 75 (1991).
7 Ibid., pp. 74-77.
8 Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 19.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 7; Ibid., 20.
11 Ibid., p. 7-8; Ibid., pp. 20-21.
12 Op. cit.
13 Ibid., p. 8; Ibid., p. 21.
14 Ibid., p. 9; Ibid., p. 22.
15 People vs. Dungo, 199 SCRA 860, 871 (1991).
16 TSN, December 3, 1987, p. 8.
17 Ibid., January 5, 1988, p. 31.
18 Ibid., December 3, 1987, p. 27.
19 Ibid., February 4, 1988, p. 6.
20 Appellant's Brief, p. 14; Rollo, p. 113.
21 People vs. Olivar, G.R. No. 10151, November 13, 1992, at p. 9.
22 Ibid., February 9, 1988, p. 18.
23 Ibid., p. 20.
24 People vs. Matrimonio, G.R. Nos. 82223-24, November 13, 1992; pp. 20-21 citing United States
vs. Ramos, 1 Phil. 81, 82.
25 Ibid., p. 22.
26 People vs. Dungo, supra.
27 TSN, June 28, 1988, Dr. Eduardo Maaba, Physician-In-Charge, Forensic Psychiatrical Pavilion,
National Mental Hospital, under cross-examination, pp. 15-16.
28 People vs. Casinilo, G.R. No. 97441, September 11, 1992.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172697 September 25, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
REYNALDO VILLANUEVA y MARQUEZ Appellant.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This is an appeal from the 21 February 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00539. The
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court finding appellant Reynaldo Villanueva y
Marquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder.
In the afternoon of 21 January 2000, appellant, then 31 years old, killed his niece Angelica Villanueva (Angelica),
aged 8, by boxing her on the head and kicking her several times on the different parts of her body.2 Appellant also
mauled his nephews Rexie Villanueva (Rexie) and Enrique, Villanueva, Jr. (Enrique, Jr.), aged 5 and 2, respectively.
Angelica died of massive brain edema, cerebral contusion, subdural hemorrhage due to mauling. Rexie sustained
injuries, which could have resulted to massive brain edema and his subsequent death, were it not for the medical
intervention. Enrique, Jr. suffered a broken mouth and was confined at the Baguio General Hospital (BGH) for four
days.
Consequently, appellant was charged with murder for the death of Angelica, frustrated murder for the serious
injuries suffered by Rexie, and attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on Enrique, Jr. The corresponding
Informations3 were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, for murder,4 frustrated murder, and
attempted murder. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case No. 17427-R for murder, Criminal Case No. 17429-R
for frustrated murder, and Criminal Case No. 17428-R for attempted murder.
Appellant pleaded insanity. He claimed that he did not know that he killed his niece Angelica and that he mauled his
nephews Rexie and Enrique, Jr.
However, appellant was able to narrate vividly the events prior to the commission of the brutal crimes. In the
morning of 21 January 2000, appellant consulted Dr. Clarette Rosario P. Dy (Dr. Dy) of the Psychiatric Department
of BGH for a follow-up check-up. Dr. Dy prescribed medicines; then, she allowed appellant to go home. From BGH,
appellant went to 456 Restaurant along Session Road, where he ordered several bottles of Red Horse beer. After
leaving the restaurant, he strolled along Session Road, Maharlika Livelihood Center, and Burnham Park. On his way
home, he passed by a videoke bar along Magsaysay Avenue, where he ordered more Red Horse beer. A lady
joined him in his table so he ordered drinks for her. He took turns in passing the microphone and singing. He paid a
total of ₱650 for their drinks. He only had enough fare when he left the videoke bar past 4:00 p.m. Upon reaching
home, he went to buy some hot dogs which he cooked since he was hungry. When his mother asked if she could
have some, appellant got irked because he did not have breakfast and lunch. He told her that she must have eaten
already as it was late in the afternoon. His mother got scared of him and ran away. Appellant was so peeved that he
wanted to give vent to his anger. After finishing his food, he went to his mother’s room. It was at this point that
appellant committed the crimes.
Dr. Dy testified that she had been attending to appellant for about four years already at the Psychiatric Department
of BGH. She opined that appellant is suffering from a mental disorder classified as schizophrenia, paranoid, episodic
with interepisode residual symptoms characterized by intermittent episodes of psychotic signs and symptoms. Dr.
Dy said that this type of illness is recurrent and not permanent.
Appellant’s mother testified that appellant had a tendency to have violent fits when angry and under the influence of
liquor or drugs.
In its Decision of 11 March 2002,5 the trial court found appellant guilty of murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, frustrated murder, and attempted murder. The trial
court held that appellant failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The defense evidence even showed that
appellant was sane at the time the crimes were committed. There was sufficient evidence that immediately prior to
the commission of the crimes, appellant was not completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will.
The trial court found it strange that appellant’s memory was sharp as to the incidents prior to the commission of the
crimes but "stood still at that very crucial moment when he mortally injured his victims." Thereafter, appellant’s
memory returned when he was already at the hospital.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 17427-R, the Court finds the accused Reynaldo Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Murder defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Sec. 6 of Republic Act 7659 as charged in the Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Angelica Villanueva the sum of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and ₱200,000.00 as Moral Damages for the pain and anguish
suffered by the heirs as a result of her death, all indemnifications are without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs of suit.
The accused Reynaldo Villanueva being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
doubt of the offense of Frustrated Murder defined and penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 50 and Art.
6 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in the Information, for the injuries suffered by Rexie Villanueva and
hereby sentences to an imprisonment ranging from 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as Minimum to 14
years and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum; to indemnify Rexie Villanueva the sum of ₱100,000.00
as Moral Damages for his injuries, all indemnification are without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs of suit.
doubt of the offense of Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 51 and Art.
6 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in the Information, for the injuries suffered by Enrique Villanueva,
[Jr.] and hereby sentences him to an imprisonment ranging from 6 months and 1 day of Prision Correccional
as Minimum to 8 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor Maximum; to indemnify Enrique Villanueva, Jr. the sum
of ₱50,000.00 as Moral Damages, all indemnifications are without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
In its Decision of 21 February 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision. The
appellate court found appellant’s schizophrenia a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9)7 of the Revised Penal
Code. The appellate court reduced the award of moral damages and modified the penalty imposed on appellant for
attempted murder.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City (Branch 6) is MODIFIED in that (i) it
is in Crim. Case No. 17429-R where accused-appellant Reynaldo Villanueva y Marquez is adjudged guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder and meted [out] the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; (ii) it is in Crim. Case No. 17428-R where said accused-appellant is adjudged guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of attempted murder, for which he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and
(iii) the award of moral damages is REDUCED to ₱50,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 17427-R (for murder) and
₱25,000.00 each in Crim. Cases Nos. 17429-R (for frustrated murder) and 17428-R (for attempted murder). The
appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, this appeal.
The issue in this case is whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, frustrated murder, and
attempted murder.
The appeal lacks merit.
We affirm the findings of both trial and appellate courts that appellant failed to overcome the presumption of sanity.
Findings of fact of trial courts, specially if affirmed by the appellate courts, are entitled to respect and generally
should not be disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered,
may affect the outcome of the case.9 Such exception is inexistent in this case.
The defense failed to prove that appellant was completely deprived of intelligence in committing the dastardly
acts.10 Proof of the existence of some abnormalities in the mental faculties will not exempt the accused from
culpability, if it was shown that he was not completely deprived of freedom and intelligence.11
Appellant’s recollection of the events prior to the crimes and his emotions afterwards indicate that he was sane
before, during, and after the commission of the crimes. Dr. Dy’s psychiatric report states that appellant felt guilty
about Angelica’s death and apprehensive for being in jail for a longer time.12 A feeling of remorse is inconsistent with
insanity, as it is a clear indication that he was conscious of his acts. He acknowledged his guilt and was sorry for his
acts.13
We agree with the Court of Appeals in appreciating appellant’s mental disorder as a mitigating circumstance under
Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no dispute that appellant has a history of mental illness. He was
diagnosed to be suffering from "Schizophrenia, Paranoid, Episodic with Interepisode Residual Symptoms" which
began in 1985 and was characterized by intermittent episodes of psychotic signs and symptoms since then until
appellant’s examination on 21 June 2000.14 We find that such illness diminished the exercise of appellant’s will
power without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. In fact, appellant was aware that he hurt his
niece "for he perceived her as a big man with a horrifying appearance."15 1âwphi1
However, the Court of Appeals erred in the computation of the maximum of the indeterminate penalty for frustrated
murder in Criminal Case No. 17429-R. The Court of Appeals merely sustained the trial court’s imposition of the
penalty. Accordingly, we modify the penalty for frustrated murder and impose the indeterminate sentence of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 21 February 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00539
finding appellant Reynaldo Villanueva y Marquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, frustrated murder, and
attempted murder with the MODIFICATION that the indeterminate penalty for frustrated murder should be six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1Rollo, pp. 3-16. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices
Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Sesinando E. Villon.
2 CA rollo, p. 13.
3 Id. at 13-18.
4 As defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
5 CA rollo, pp. 32-54. Penned by Judge Ruben C. Ayson.
6 Id. at 53-54.
7 Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances. -- The following are mitigating circumstances:
xxxx
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender
without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts.
8 Rollo, p. 15.
9 See People v. Villa, Jr., 387 Phil. 155 (2000).
10 See People v. Belonio, G.R. No. 148695, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 579.
11 Id.
12 Records, Vol. 1, p. 46.
13 See People v. Villa, Jr., supra note 9.
14 Records, Vol. 1, p. 48.
15 Id. at 46.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Causapin, Millar & Tutana Law Office for defendant-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan convicting him of
the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount
of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:
The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then
only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines Rafanan alias "Baket
Ines" with a salary of P30.00 a month.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house at Barangay San
Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused to
help in their store which was located in front of their house about six (6) meters away. Attending to the store
at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help him
close the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the
complainant inside the store and said, "Come, let us have sexual intercourse," to which Estelita replied, "I do
not like," and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the
handle which he pointed to the throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist.
Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his
own pants, went on top of complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her
resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report
the matter to her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her.
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not leave the house of the
accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of the accused that evening and the following
morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine work in the house. She only left the house in the
evening of March 17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what happened the night
before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel ensued among them prompting Estelita
Ronaya to go back to her house. When Estelita's mother confronted her and asked her why she went home
that evening, the complainant could not answer but cried and cried. It was only the following morning on
March 18, 1976 that the complainant told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing
what happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to the house
of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis,
Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a cousin of the father of the complainant. He advised them to proceed to
the municipal building while he went to fetch the accused. The accused was later brought to the police
headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit "E", which the accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant. 1
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and in due course of time, the trial court, as
already noted, convicted the appellant.
The instant appeal is anchored on the following:
Assignment of Errors
1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on the testimony of the complainant and her
mother.
2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution, "Exhibits B and C".
3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the mental condition of the accused-
appellant at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape.
4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was suffering from insanity. 2
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose testimonies he contends are contradictory. It is
claimed by appellant that the testimony of complainant on direct examination that she immediately went home after the rape incident, is
at variance with her testimony on cross examination to the effect that she had stayed in the house of appellant until the following day.
Complainant, in saying that she left the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have contradicted her mother who stated that
she (the mother) went to the store in the evening of 17 March 1979 and brought Estelita home.
The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on cross examination. In any case, the
inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential details which do not touch upon the manner in which the crime had been
committed and therefore did not in any way impair the credibility of the complainant. 3
The commission of the came was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of complainant in this respect is clear and
convincing:
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside the store
after you helped him closed the store. Now, after the accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside the store what
happened then?
A "You come and we will have sexual intercourse," he said.
Q And what did you say?
A "I do not like," I said.
Q And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual intercourse with him?
A I struggled and cried.
Q What did the accused do after that?
A He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do what he wanted to do. He was able to do what
he wanted to do.
Q This "kutsilyo" you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please demonstrate, if any?
A This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet long.)
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after he placed the bolo or that knife [at] your
throat. Now, will you please tell the court what did the accused do immediately after placing that bolo your throat and before
having sexual intercourse you?
A He had sexual intercourse with me.
Q What was your wearing apparel that evening?
A I was wearing pants, sir.
Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear?
A Yes, sir, I have a panty.
Q Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do with respect to your pants and your
panty?
A He removed them, sir.
Q Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do?
A I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger that's why he succeeded.
Q Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else happened?
A He went on top of me, sir.
Q At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel?
A He was wearing pants.
Q When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your panty, was he still wearing his pants?
A He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants.
Q And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he opened?
A I saw his penis.
Q Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his penis which you saw, he went on top of
you. When he was already on top of you what did you do, if any?
A I struggled.
Q Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled against the accused when he was on top of
you?
A Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get.
xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in what he wanted to get?
Fiscal Guillermo:
Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be allowed to ask a leading question which is a
follow-up question?
Witness:
A He inserted his private part inside my vagina.
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, when he inserted his private part inside your vagina what did you feel, if any?
A I felt something that came out from his inside.
Q Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your vagina:?
A Around five minutes maybe, sir.
Q After that what happened then?
A He removed it.
Q After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?
A No more, sir, he sat down.
Q What, if any, did he tell you?
A There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my
mother and to anybody in their house.
Q What else did he tell you?
A He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.
Q After that where did you go?

A I went home already, sir. 4
The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted
his violent intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel, the trial court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the
National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was
admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.
During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and physical condition of the appellant, all signed
by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-in-charge and chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively.
In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning appellant's mental condition were set forth:
On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just look up whenever questioned but refused to
answer.
On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with dishevelled hair, would stare vacuously through
the window, or look at people around him. He was indifferent and when questioned, he would just smile inappropriately. He
refused to verbalize, even when persuaded, and was emotionally dull and mentally inaccessible. He is generally seclusive, at
times would pace the floor, seemingly in deep thought. Later on when questioned his frequent answers are "Aywan ko, hindi
ko alam." His affect is dull, he claimed to hear strange voices "parang ibon, tinig ng ibon," but cannot elaborate. He is
disoriented to 3 spheres and has no idea why he was brought here.
The report then concluded:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is found suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by
carelessness in grooming, sluggishness in movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce], smiling inappropriately, refusal to verbalize, emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility,
seclusiveness, preoccupation, disorientation, and perceptual aberrations of hearing strange sounds. He is psychotic or insane, hence cannot stand court trial. He needs further
hospitalization and treatment. 5
The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of appellant's mental condition:
At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his reponses. There is dullness of his affect and he appeared
preoccupied. He is observed to mumble alone by himself and would show periods of being irritable saying — "oki naman" with
nobody in particular. He claim he does not know whether or not he was placed in jail and does not know if he has a case in
court. Said he does not remember having committed any wrong act
and the following conclusions:

In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is at present time still psychotic or
insane, manifested by periods of irritability — cursing nobody in particular, seclusive, underactive, undertalkative, retarded in
his response, dullness of his affect, mumbles alone by himself, preoccupied and lack of insight.
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment. 6
In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become "better behaved, responsive" and "neat in person," and "adequate in his emotional tone, in touch with
his surroundings and . . . free from hallucinatory experiences." During the preceding period, appellant had been allowed to leave the hospital temporarily; he stayed with a relative in Manila
while coming periodically to the hospital for check-ups. During this period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household chores, conversed and as freely with other members
of the household and slept well, although, occasionally, appellant smiled while alone. Appellant complained that at times he heard voices of small children, talking in a language he could
not understand. The report concluded by saying that while appellant had improved in his mental condition, he was not yet in a position to stand trial since he needed further treatment,
medication and check-ups. 7
In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented"
and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial." 8
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying
that appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when he raped complainant. 9
The defense next presented Raquel Jovellano, a psychiatrist
engaged in private practice, who testified that she had examined and treated the appellant.
Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. —
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the
court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted,
which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only in People vs.
Formigones 10 that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity, quoting extensively from the
Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account,
it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that
the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the
least discernment; (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that
there be a complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 29,
1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at
the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will,
because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated with] imbecility or
insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant
had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the
crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be
voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from
liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. 11 A linguistic or grammatical
analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests: (a) the test of
cognition — "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the test of volition — "or
that there be a total deprivation freedom of the will." But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of
cognition, rather than on a test relating to "freedom of the will;" examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any
case where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of "freedom of the
will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This is perhaps to be expected since a
person's volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether
that intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused failed to show complete impairment or loss
of intelligence, the Court has recognized at most a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article
13(9) of the Revised Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of
the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." 12
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis an usually develops between the ages 15 and 30. 13
A
standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the symptoms of schizophrenia in the following manner:
Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a disturbance of
association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler also stressed the dereistic attitude
of the schizophrenic — that is, his detachment from reality and consequent autism and the ambivalence that
expresses itself in his uncertain affectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of schizophrenia is often
referred to as the four A's: association, affect, autism, and ambivalence.
xxx xxx xxx
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he considered in no way
specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank symptoms
include the hearing of one's thoughts spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on the patient's
behavior, somatic hallucinations, the experience of having one's thoughts controlled, the spreading of one's
thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of having one's actions controlled or influenced from the
outside.
Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis of second-rank
symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical appearances. Second-rank symptoms include other forms
of hallucination, perplexity, depressive and euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional blunting.
Perceptual Disorders
Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . .
Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external stimuli are common
symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory hallucinations, or the hearing of voices. Most
characteristically, two or more voices talk about the patient, discussing him in the third person. Frequently,
the voices address the patient, comment on what he is doing and what is going on around him, or are
threatening or obscene and very disturbing to the patient. Many schizophrenic patients experience the
hearing of their own thoughts. When they are reading silently, for example, they may be quite disturbed by
hearing every word they are reading clearly spoken to them.
Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in schizophrenic patients, but they are
not rare. Patients suffering from organic of affective psychoses experience visual hallucinations primarily at
night or during limited periods of the day, but schizophrenic patients hallucinate as much during the day as
they do during the night, sometimes almost continuously. They get relief only in sleep. When visual occur in
schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in color, life size, in three dimensions, and
moving. Visual hallucinations almost never in one of the other sensory modalities.
xxx xxx xxx
Cognitive Disorders
Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by reasoning, and that are
idiosyncratic for the patient — that is, not part of his cultural environment. They are among the common
symptoms of schizophrenia.
Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the paranoid type of
schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious power that exercises its
influence from a distance is almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all,
schizophrenics at one time or another, and for many it is a daily experience. The modern schizophrenic
whose delusions have kept up with the scientific times may be preoccupied with atomic power, X-rays, or
spaceships that take control over his mind and body. Also typical for
many schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the world. 14
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumtance, 15

it has mostly been rejected by the Court. In each of these
cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if there was impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment
was not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.
The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as follows:
(Fiscal Guillermo:)
Q Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you say doctor that he was
completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did in connection with the incident in this case?
A He is not completely devoid of consciousness.
Q Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the victim at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape?
A Yes, he was conscious.
Q And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he will place his penis?
A Yeah.
Q And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection?
A Yes.
Q Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is schizophrenic which you said, it deals
(sic) some kind of intelligence and consciousness of some acts that is committed?
A Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to the act is what we call
primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act of an insane and a normal individual, a normal
individual will use the power of reasoning and consciousness within the standard of society while an insane
causes (sic) already devoid of the fact that he could no longer withstand himself in the ordinary environment,
yet his acts are within the bound of insanity or psychosis.
Q Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the accused here is suffering is
capable of planning the commission of a rape?
A Yes, they are also capable.
Q He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault?
A Yes.
Q And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to perform all the acts
preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an insane person?
A Yes, it could be done.
Q Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong?
A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is wrong but yet there is no
inhibition on the individual.
Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are going to commit is
wrong?
A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the inhibition. The reasoning
is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there, the drive is [not]
there. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is
critical if the defense of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had been sexually
assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense sought to suggest, through Dr.
Jovellano's last two (2) answers above, that person suffering from schizophrenia sustains not only impairment of the mental faculties but also deprivation of there power self-
control. We do not believe that Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by itself, sufficiently demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss
of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. 17
Here, appellant failed to
present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault
on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately
before or at the very moment the act is committed. 18 Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2)
physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition during
that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumtances occurring on or immediately before the
day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people
afflicted with schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and examined appellant
during his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense chose to present Dr. Nerit.
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.
In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting because it does not
completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a mitigating circumstance
under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-
power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. Appellant should have been credited with
this mitigating circumstance, although it would not have affected the penalty imposable upon him under Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code: "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua in
this case), it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount of moral damages is
increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Decision, pp. 2-4.
2 Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 12.
3 People vs. Veloso, 148 SCRA 60 (1987); People vs. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500 (1987); People vs. Polo, 147
SCRA 551 (1987).
4 TSN, 5 September 1978, pp. 10-15.
5 Record, pp. 69-70.
6 Id., p. 83,
7 Id., pp. 93-94.
8 Id., pp. 90-91.
9 TSN, 27 February 1979, pp. 21-23.
10 87 Phil. 658 (1950).
11 See, e.g., People v. Cruz, 177 SCRA 451 (1989); People vs. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451 (1986); People vs.
Ambal, 100 SCRA 325 (1980); People vs. Magallano, 100 SCRA 570 (1980); People vs. Renegado, 57
SCRA 275 (1976).
12 E.g., People v. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 (1949); People v. Balneg, 79 Phil. 805 (1948); People v. Bonoan, 64
Phil. 95 (1937).
13 Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, Miller-Keane, p. 860 (1972).
14 Modern Synopsis of Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiarty/III, Kaplan and Sadock, M.D. (3rd ed.,
1981), pp. 309-311.
15 See People vs. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451 (1986); People vs. Puno, 105 SCRA 151 (1981); People vs.
Fausto, 113 Phil. 841 (1961).
16 TSN, 28 March 1979, pp. 74-77.
17 People vs. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991; People vs. Morales, 121 SCRA 426 (1983).
18 People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851 (1990); People vs. Aldemita, 45 SCRA 451 (1986).
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 144933 July 3, 2002

vs.
JERRY ANTONIO Y DIOLATA, accused-appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case No.
DU-6619 convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder; sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; and ordering him to pay the heirs of the deceased the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P20,000.00 as moral damages, plus the costs of suit.
The information against accused-appellant reads:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1998, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, with deliberate intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
one Jomar Cardosa Ephan with a sharp bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound at
his vital portion namely:
"Stab wound (L) Lumbar Level of L1 & L2 with grade IV Spleenic injury & grade II Renal (L) injury."
Which caused his death soon thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment on November 16, 1998, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.3 Trial thereafter ensued.
The facts as presented by the prosecution show that at 1:00 in the early morning of October 11, 1998, the victim,
Jomar Ephan, was engaged in a drinking session with Reynaldo Ephan and Roselito Dacillo in front of a store in
Barangay Pakna-an, Mandaue City. Accused-appellant arrived and bought cigarettes. Then, he ordered Jomar,
Reynaldo and Roselito to count the cigarettes he bought, but the three told accused-appellant to let the storekeeper
do the counting. Rebuked, accused-appellant left the store. He returned minutes later and suddenly stabbed the
victim at the back, after which he immediately fled. The victim was rushed by his companions to the hospital but died
the following day.4
Meanwhile, Eduardo Juban, a Barangay Tanod, was awakened by one of his neighbors and was told that there was
trouble at a nearby store. When Eduardo went out, he saw accused-appellant being chased by a crowd who were
shouting, "thief." The group mauled accused-appellant when they caught up with him. Eduardo, however, pacified
the mob and brought accused-appellant to the barangay hall. Eduardo later learned from the group that accused-
appellant had stabbed somebody.5
The examination conducted by Dr. Reynaldo Baclig revealed that the victim sustained a stab wound near the spinal
column, three inches above the waist line, and died from spleen and renal injury and massive blood loss.6
On the other hand, the defense tried to prove that: at around 1:00 a.m. of October 11, 1998, accused-appellant was
in the house of his friend, Fernando Gelig, at Pakna-an, Mandaue City. While they were drinking liquor, accused-
appellant went out and bought cigarettes from a store across the street. As a token of friendship, accused-appellant
offered the cigarettes to the people in front of the store, but nobody accepted his offer. Accused-appellant went back
to the house of his friend. After a short while, he went back to the same store to buy "pulutan." For no reason at all,
somebody struck him with a stool hitting him on the left eyebrow. Accused-appellant fell on the ground but the group
of the deceased, who were then in front of the store, ganged up on him. The deceased attempted to hit accused-
appellant but because the former was very drunk, he missed and fell on his belly. It was at this point when accused-
appellant got hold of a knife he saw under the table and stabbed the deceased at the back. Thereafter, accused-
appellant immediately fled but the crowd chased and mauled him. Fortunately, a Barangay Tanod came and
stopped the mob.7
On July 12, 2000, the trial court promulgated the assailed judgment of conviction. The dispositive portion thereof
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, the Court hereby finds the accused Jerry Antonio y
Diolata GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for by law. Let him be given full credit for the preventive
imprisonment he has served. Likewise, the accused is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jomar Ephan the
sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and the sum of P20,000.00 as moral damages. The Court
hereby orders too that the accused should pay the cost of this suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
Hence, this appeal based on the following grounds:
I.
FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE THAT THE ACCUSED WAS THE
UNLAWFUL AGGRESSOR, HE SHOULD BE CONVICTED FOR A LESSER OFFENSE AS
CHARGED (sic).
II.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

ILLNESS OF THE OFFENDER AS WOULD DIMINISH THE EXERCISE OF THE WILL-POWER OF THE
OFFENDER WITHOUT HOWEVER DEPRIVING HIM OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF HIS ACTS.9
Faced with the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court’s choice of which version to
believe is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to conclude
so, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness stand, and the
manner in which they gave their testimonies, and therefore could better discern if such witnesses were telling the
truth. The trial court is thus in the best position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Therefore, unless the trial judge
plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his
assessment on credibility must be respected.10
A thorough review of the records of the case at bar shows that the trial court did not miss any such material
circumstance nor did it commit any palpable error in upholding the facts as established by the prosecution. The
positive and direct narration of the prosecution witnesses that accused-appellant suddenly stabbed the victim at the
back, and that no altercation preceded the attack, deserves full faith and credence. These witnesses were not
shown to have been impelled by ill-motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant.11 Moreover, being friends and
relatives of the deceased, they would naturally be interested in having the real culprit punished.12
The trial court did not likewise err in rejecting accused-appellant’s self-defense theory. Where an accused invokes
self-defense, he thereby admits authorship of the crime. The burden of proof is thus shifted on him to prove all the
elements of self-defense, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.13
In the case at bar, even if we sustain the version of accused-appellant that the initial act of aggression came from
the group of the deceased, still we cannot uphold his plea of self-defense. As testified by accused-appellant himself,
the deceased who was at that time very drunk tried to hit him but missed and fell on the ground. At that point,
unlawful aggression ceased and it was no longer necessary for him to stab the deceased. It was accused-appellant,
therefore, who became the aggressor when he, despite the condition of the deceased, proceeded to stab the latter
at the back. His act can no longer be interpreted as an act of self-preservation but a perverse desire to kill.14 Hence,
he cannot successfully claim the benefit of self-defense. Furthermore, if it were true that the companions of the
deceased ganged up on him, his attack should have been directed against them and not against the deceased who
was already defenseless and lying on the ground. Pertinent portion of accused-appellant’s testimony reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened when you bought "pulutan" in the same store where you bought the cigarettes?
A: I was struck by a person on the head. (Witness indicating left eyebrow.)
Q: Were you bloodied when you were hit?
A: Yes. I fell down.
Q: When you fell down, what happened next?
A: I stood up.
Q: Could you recognize the person who hit you with a chair on your left eyebrow?
A: No.
Q: When you stood up after you were hit, what happened next?
A: I saw a kitchen knife under the table upon standing up and they were ganging up on me by striking
me. So, I happened to have stab (sic) him.
Q: What was the position of the person that you stabbed?
A: He was very drank (sic) and he fell down.
Q: Could you show to the Honorable Court the position? Could you demonstrate the position of the
alleged victim that was hit by the knife?
A: When he struck me, I was able to evade the blow and by his force and momentum, he fell towards
the ground on all force (sic) and so, I stabbed him this way (witness demonstrating by delivering a blow
downwards) and I happen to hit him maybe at the back.
Q: After hitting him with the knife what happened?
A: I ran.15
The qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated by the trial court. Accused-appellant’s attack on
the deceased from behind completely caught the latter by surprise. Accused-appellant therefore effectively executed
the assault without any risk to himself arising from the defense which the deceased might make.16
The injury sustained by accused-appellant after he was allegedly struck by a stool on the head will not entitle him to
a mitigating circumstance. The alleged injury hardly qualifies as mitigating circumstance analogous to illness or
defect that would diminish the exercise of will-power. More importantly, accused-appellant failed to prove that he
was assaulted by the deceased and the latter’s companions.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since no modifying circumstance was established by the prosecution, the trial court correctly
imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant.
As to accused-appellant’s civil liability, the amount of P50,000.00, as indemnity ex delicto is affirmed. The moral
damages awarded by the trial court in the amount of P20,000.00 should, however, be increased to P50,000.00 in
line with current jurisprudence.17
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in
Criminal Case No. DU-6619, finding accused-appellant Jerry Antonio y Diolata guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs
of the deceased Jomar C. Ephan the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the moral damages to be paid by accused-appellant is increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Isaias P. Dicdican.
2 Rollo, p. 7.
3 Records, p. 12.
4
TSN, January 18, 1999, pp. 4-8.
5 TSN, January 25, 1999, pp. 2-5.
6 TSN, January 14, 1999, pp. 5-7.
7 TSN, April 19, 1999, pp. 4-12.
8 Rollo, p. 22.
9 Rollo, p. 49.
People v. Alimon, 257 SCRA 658, 669 [1996], citing People v. Vallena, 244 SCRA 685, 691 [1995];
10
People v. Jaca, 229 SCRA 332 [1994]; People v. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 [1991]; People v. Uycoque, 246
SCRA 769 [1995].
11 People v. Javier, 229 SCRA 638, 645 [1994], citing People v. Pomentel, 216 SCRA 375 [1992].
12 People v. Galas, 262 SCRA 381, 391 [1996], citing People v. Viente, 225 SCRA 361 [1993].
13 People v. Obzunar, 265 SCRA 547, 566 [1996].
14People v. Tampon, 258 SCRA 115, 124-125 [1996], citing People v. So, 247 SCRA 708 [1995]; People v.
Ganzagan, Jr., 247 SCRA 220 [1995]; People v. Jotoy, 222 SCRA 801 [1993]; People v. Gomez, 235 SCRA
444 [1994].
15 TSN, April 19, 1999, pp. 7-8.
16 People v. Aliviado, 247 SCRA 300, 310 [1995], citing People v. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653 [1993].
17People v. Ronquillo, G.R. No. 126136, April 5, 2002, citing People v. Clarino, G.R. No. 134634, July 31,
2001; People v. Cortez, 348 SCRA 663 [2000].

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 113691 February 6, 1998

vs.
ALBERTO MEDINA y CATUD, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The law presumes that an offender possesses full control of his mental faculties. Thus, the exempting circumstance
of insanity or imbecility under Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, must be established by clear and
competent evidence showing that the accused completely lost his reason, or was demented immediately prior to or
at the very moment the crime was committed.
The Case
This is the legal precept relied upon by this Court in denying this appeal from the Decision1 dated November 17,
1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 7, in Criminal Case No. 5787 convicting Alberto
Medina y Catud of murder.
In an Information dated June 10, 1992, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benito E. Lat charged
appellant with murder allegedly committed as follows:2
That on or about the 20th day of May, 1992, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, in Barangay
Kaingin, Municipality of San Pascual, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a balisong knife, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said balisong knife one Andres M.
Dalisay, suddenly and without warning, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds on the
different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
On arraignment, appellant, assisted by Counsel Jose Contreras, pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.3 After
trial in due course, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:4
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, ALBERTO MEDINA y CATUD, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder as defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal [Code]
and there being no mitigating circumstance to offset the qualifying circumstance of treachery
generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased Andres M. Dalisay the sum of
P50,000.00. Costs against the deceased.
Hence, this appeal.5
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution's version of the facts, as recounted by the solicitor general in the appellee's brief, is as
follows: 6
At around 11 pm on May 20, 1991, a party was held in the house of Sebastian and Delia Aguila in
Barangay Caingin, Balite, Batangas, to celebrate the awarding of a championship trophy to the
basketball team of Larry Andal. Among those present during the celebration were Andres Dalisay,
Edgardo Silang, Larry Andal, Norberto Biscocho, Bayani Dorado, Salustiano Aguila and appellant
Alberto Medina (pp. 3-5, tsn, September 9, 1992, testimony of Larry Andal). During the celebration,
appellant and Dalisay danced the "cha-cha" in the shade (sulambi) near the terrace of the house of
Delia and Sebastian Aguila. While the two were dancing, the group watched and clapped their hands.
When the dance was finished, appellant left the house of the Aguilas. After a while, Dalisay invited
Andal to go home (pp. 8-11, tsn, September 11, 1992). The two left the house of the Aguilas, with
Dalisay walking ahead of Andal. While they were walking, Andal saw appellant, who was waiting
along the way, stab Dalisay with a "balisong" in the abdominal region. Dalisay held the hand of
appellant. While they were grappling, Dalisay was able to extricate himself and started to run away.
Appellant chased him. When appellant caught up with Dalisay, appellant stabbed Dalisay once more
at the back. Dalisay fell to the ground. He tried to get up and run, but he again fell down. Appellant
stabbed him [once more] on the chest. Then [a]ppellant fled from the scene.
Andal, who was about one meter away, was so stunned and shocked by what he saw that he did not
do anything to help Dalisay. Andal and his relatives brought Dalisay to the Batangas Hospital, but
Dalisay was pronounced dead on arrival (pp. 2-6, tsn, Sept. 11, 1992).
At that time of the incident, prosecution witness Edgardo Silang was urinating twenty paces away.
He heard Delia Aguila, the sister of appellant, shouting, "Husay ka Alberto pihadong makukulong ka,
sinaksak mo si Andres." When he turned to where the shout came from, he saw Dalisay running
towards him, pursued by appellant. He saw blood in front of the body of Dalisay. He held the arm of
Dalisay and tried to hug him but Dalisay fell to the ground. At that point, he saw appellant flee (pp. 5-
18, tsn, Sept. 9, 1992, testimony of Edgardo Silang).
Dr. Benjamin M. Aguado, the Municipal Health Officer of San Pascual Rural Health Unit, conducted
post-mortem examination of the body of the deceased. He issued a Post-Examination Report
(Exhibit "C") containing the Mortem following findings:
1. Stab Wound between the 3rd & 4th interspace at the lateral side of the body of the sternum
measuring 1/2 inch in length x 2 cm in wid[th] x 3 cm in depth.
2. Stab Wound at the left Hypochondriac region measuring 1/2 inch in length x 2 cm in wid[th]
exposing the omentum.
3. Stab Wound thigh left just below the Inguinal Hernia measuring 1 inch in length 3 cm in wid[th] x
4cm in depth.
4. Stab Wound of the thigh left mid portion anterior surface measuring 1 inch in length x 3 cm in
wid[th] x 4 cm depth.
5. Stab Wound at the scapular region mid portion measuring 1/2 inch in length x 2 cm in wid[th] x 3
cm in depth.
6. Stab Wound at the back left between the 7th and 8th interspace measuring 1/2 inch in length x 2
cm in wid[th] x 3 cm in depth.
7. Stab Wound at lower portion of the scapular region left measuring 1/2 inch in length x 2 cm in
wid[th] x 3 cm in depth.
8. Stab Wound at the back right at the level of the kidney measuring 1/2 inch in length x 2 cm in
wid[th] x 4 cm in depth.
(Exhibit "C").
Version of the Defense
In his brief, appellant sets up insanity as his defense. His version of the facts is as follows:7
1. Accused-appellant Alberto Medina testified that on the evening of May 20, 1992, he went to the
house of his sister, Delia Aguila, purposely to watch t.v. (TSN, September 9, 1993, p. 5). Upon his
arrival, he saw the group of the deceased Andres Dalisay, Larry Andal and Edgardo Silang who were
then engaged in a drinking spree at the balcony of the Aguila residence (Ibid, p. 6).
2. Accused-appellant refused the group's invitation to join them in their drinking; however, he
accepted their invitation to dance with Andres Dalisay (Ibid.). In fact, accused-appellant danced with
him for about six (6) or seven (7) times (Ibid, p. 7).
3. As the dance and the party ended, the guests started to leave. Accused-appellant left his sister's
house to head for his home at Barangay Balete, which was more or less 200 meters away. Among
the persons left behind was Andres Dalisay.
4. While walking along the path, accused-appellant heard Andres Dalisay say, "Bert, sandali lang",
(TSN, September 9, 1993, p. 10) prompting the former to stop.
5. Thereupon, Andres Dalisay, who appeared to be drunk, approached accused-appellant and

uttered: "Bakit mo ako hiniya?" and hit him (accused-appellant) on the chest (Ibid). Enraged,
accused-appellant prepared to fight back when Andres Dalisay threatened to kill him (Ibid., p. 11). At
this point, accused-appellant further testified, it looked as if Andres Dalisay was taking something
out [of] his pocket.
6. Upon seeing this, accused-appellant beat him to the draw, took out his "balisong" and stabbed
Andres Dalisay, who then looked like a devil with "horns" (Ibid., p. 11 and 19). It was only when
Andres Dalisay uttered "May tama ako" did accused-appellant stop . . . stabbing his victim (Ibid., p.
16).
7. Upon realizing that he has stabbed a person, accused-appellant surrendered himself and the
weapon on the same evening to the authorities (TSN, September 9, 1993, p. 20).
8. On several occasions before, specifically during the latter part of 1981, accused-appellant had
exhibited unusual behaviors. His sister Lorna Medina testified that on June 22, 1982, she brought
her brother to the National Mental Hospital after the latter had shown unusual conduct, such as
looking blankly at a distance, hitting his wife or banging her head on the wall for no reason and
having sleepless nights (TSN, August 11, 1993, pp. 13-15).
9. From June to October of 1982, accused-appellant was confined at the National Mental
Hospital. Ms. Lourdes Palapal, the Records Officer of the National Center for Mental Health (formerly,
the National Mental Hospital) testified on the documents issued by their office relative to the
confinement of accused-appellant for "schizophreniform disorder" during that period (Exhibits 3 to
11).
10. After his release from the hospital, accused-appellant lived with his mother and his two children
at Brgy. Balete, San Pascual, Batangas. His condition did not seem to improve, though. Lorna
Medina further testified that in January of 1992, accused-appellant again exhibited the same unusual
behavior which she had observed from him in 1982 (TSN, August 11, 1993, p. 17).
11. This prompted Lorna to refer her brother's case to Dr. Teresita Adigue, a psychologist-friend who
conducted a psychological examination on accused-appellant (TSN, August 11, 1993, p. 17).
12. Dr. Teresita Adigue, a Doctor of Psychology and a holder of a Master's Degree in Clinical and
Industrial Psychology and another Master's Degree in Guidance and Counselling, and an accredited
psychologist of the Philippine National Police testified that on January 20, 1992, she administered a
psychological evaluation on accused-appellant (TSN, May 24, 1993, p. 5).
13. Dr. Adigue testified that based on the evaluation of accused-appellant, the latter has been shown
to be suffering from depression and was exhibiting homicidal tendencies, and that he did not know
the difference between right and wrong (TSN, May 24, 1993, p. 10 and TSN, July 20, 1993, p. 16). On
cross-examination, the witness affirmed that a person suffering from depression may be insane
(TSN, July 20, 1993, p. 10).
14. Dr. Adigue stated that the psychological evaluation made on accused-appellant was based on
the behavioral history of the latter furnished to her by Lorna Medina and Leticia Regalado, (TSN, July
20, 1993, p. 11) a case study based on the family background of accused-appellant (Ibid., p. 12), and
on a series of psychological tests ("draw a person" test, the "card" test wherein the emotions of the
subject are represented by the cards, and the thematic perception test) (TSN, May 24, 1993, p. 7).
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court rejected the appellant's defense of insanity. It ruled that Dr. Adigue was not properly qualified
as an expert witness because: (1) she did not have the appellant's complete behavioral history; (2) she
failed to demonstrate satisfactorily how she arrived at her conclusions; (3) her method of testing was
incomplete and inconclusive; (4) her examination lasted for only a few hours without any follow-up
evaluation; (5) the university from where she allegedly obtained her doctoral degree is not known to
specialize in psychology or psychiatry; (6) she is not known as a psychiatrist; and (7) she reported that 'the
mental activity [of the accused was] functioning on the normal level' at the time of the evaluation, that he
comprehended instructions fast, and that he was suffering only from mild depression.
The testimony of appellant's sister that she had observed unusual behavior on the part of appellant did not
constitute sufficient proof of his insanity, "because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency
constitute[s] insanity." That the accused was released from confinement at the National Center for Mental
Health on October 4, 1982 and was not readmitted for any mental disorder for about ten years militated
against his alleged lunacy. Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, appellant was
attentive, well-behaved and responsive to the questions propounded to him in English even without
translation.
On the other hand, appellant's mental agility was shown when he admitted seeing the deceased take
something our of his pocket, for which reason he decided to beat him to the draw ("Inunahan ko na"). With
his balisong, he repeatedly stabbed the deceased. The trial court appreciated treachery based on Andal's
narration of the stabbing incident.
Assignment of Errors
The defense assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court in convicting appellant:
The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting accused-appellant or mitigating his criminal liability on
the ground of insanity.
Assuming, arguendo, that accused-appellant is criminally liable for the death of Andres Dalisay, the
trial court nevertheless erred in convicting him of the crime of murder by appreciating the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation despite doubt tending to show
the existence of such circumstances.
Assuming, arguendo, that accused-appellant is criminally liable, the trial court likewise erred in not
appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor.
In short, appellant puts in issue (1) his insanity and (2) the presence and the effect of the following
circumstances: (a) treachery, (b) evident premeditation, and (c) voluntary surrender. We shall deal with each
of these issues.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. We reject appellant's plea for acquittal but accept his claim of voluntary
surrender.
First Issue: Appellant's Insanity Not Proven
Appellant insists that the trial court gravely erred in refusing to consider Dr. Adigue as an expert witness.
He argues that Dr. Adigue, being an accredited psychologist of the Philippine National Police since 1979
and a holder of a doctorate in psychology from the University of Calcutta, India, and a master's degree in
clinical and industrial psychology, deserves credence.
Appellant misses the point. More than her academic qualifications as a psychologist, what really matters is
the failure of Dr. Adigue's testimony to establish legal insanity on the part of the appellant. After examining
the appellant on January 20, 1992, or four months prior to the incident, and after conducting the "Draw-a-
Person" Test, the Thematic Apperception Test and the Hand Test, she reported the results of her
examination as follows:
VII. TEST RESULTS/EVALUATIONS
Psychological test results revealed that subject's mental activity is functioning on the normal level at
the time of evaluation. He can comprehend instructions fast and [was] never hesitant to take the said
examinations.
With regards to some dominant personality factors, test results revealed also the fact that subject is
suffering only from mild depression because of problems he had encountered in life and in things
around him. He had also developed negative reactions and outlook in life, therefore he undersigned
concluded that he has some emotional disturbances.
Verily, such results do not prove the alleged insanity of the appellant. Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, requires a complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act; i.e., that the accused be deprived
of reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete absence
of the power to discern.8 More relevantly, said report does not support the claim that appellant could not
distinguish right from wrong.
Thus, the trial court properly rejected appellant's defense of insanity. The presumption of law, per Art. 800
of the Civil Code, always lies in favor of sanity, and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every person is
presumed to be of sound mind.9
The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved,10 for there is a presumption that acts penalized
by law are voluntarily.11 Hence, in the absence of positive evidence that the accused had previously lost his
reason or was demented moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, the courts will always
presume that he was in a normal state of mind. In Bascos,12 the accused was exempted from criminal
liability because he was a violent maniac as confirmed by the acting district health officer who examined
him. In Bonoan,13 the Court reversed the conviction of the accused, holding that a person afflicted
with dementia praecox and manic depressive psychosis has "no control whatever of his acts. . . . There is in
this disorder a pathologic lessening [of] normal inhibitions and the case [in] which impulses may lead to
actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor impulses (Peterson, Haines and
Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxicology [2d, ed., 1926], vol. I, p. 617." There, the accused was treated at the
psychiatric department of San Lazaro Hospital and was released long before the commission of the crime,
but the reports of the alienists14 who examined the accused after the crime confirmed his mental disorders.
The Court held that the evidence that the accused appeared lucid when he stabbed the victim did not
necessarily prove his sanity, because it was "clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of
Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburgh, said in his work on Forensic Medicine, (3d. ed. [London], p.
382), that in the type of dementia praecox, 'the crime is usually preceded by much complaining and
planning. In these people, homicidal attacks are common, because of delusions that they are being
interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken.'"15
However, care must be taken to distinguish between lack of reason (insanity) and failure to use reason or
good judgment due to extreme anger (passion). ". . . [I]t is now well settled that mere mental depravity, or
moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the
moral system, where the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes
committed under its influence."16
Thus, before the defense of insanity may be accepted as an exempting circumstance, Philippine case law
shows a common reliance on the test of cognition, which requires a complete deprivation of intelligence —
not only of the will — in committing the criminal act.17 In the cited case of Rafanan, the fact that appellant
threatened the victim with death in case she reported her ravishment indicated that he was aware of the
reprehensible moral depravity of that assault and that he was not deprived of intelligence. In Dungo, that
the accused knew the nature of what he had done negated his claim that he was insane when he fatally
stabbed his victim.18 In Aquino19, appellant, who took 120 cc of cough syrup and consumed three sticks of
marijuana before raping his victim and hitting her head with a stone, had some form of mental illness which
did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, enabling him to exercise
sound judgment and to satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounted any intimation
of insanity when he committed the felony. It has been held that mere abnormality of the mental faculties
does not exclude criminal culpability.
In the present case, Dr. Adigue's testimony did not establish complete deprivation of appellant's reason.
Consequently, appellant cannot claim exemption from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Alternatively, appellant argues that his condition should merit, at the very least, the appreciation of a
mitigating circumstance under Art. 13, par. 9 of the Code.20 In Formigones, the Court found the
feeblemindedness of the accused to be a mitigating circumstance, noting that his faculties were not fully
developed. After stabbing his wife, the accused in said case took her dead body up their house, put her on
the floor and lay beside her for hours, showing remorse at having killed her. The accused was "suffering
[from] some physical defect which thus restrict[ed] his means of action, defense or communication with his
fellow beings,' or such illness 'as would diminish the exercise of his will power.'"21 In Rafanan,
schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting because it does not completely deprive the offender of the
consciousness of his acts, was considered a mitigating circumstance which diminished the exercise of the
offender's will power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.22
In the instant case, however, the defense miserably failed to establish the deprivation of the appellant's will
when he stabbed his victim. Appellant testified that he thought the victim was going to pull out a weapon,
thus he beat him to the draw and stabbed him with his balisong.23 This statement shows that he did not suffer
any deprivation of reason or discernment. While the victim appeared to him as a "devil with horns," such
perceptual distortion occurred only after he had dealt the fatal blows on the victim. The Court cannot, therefore,
appreciate this mitigating circumstance in his favor.
Second Issue: Proof of Treachery
The treacherous nature of appellant's attack on the victim was established by Andal who witnessed the
incident. Testified the witness:24
FISCAL CARAAN:
Q What about you, where [were] you on that occasion?
A I was with Andres in going home sir..
Q Can you tell the court [if you were] walking together at that time?
A Yes sir.
Q Who was ahead?
A Andres was ahead of me, sir.
Q And you [were] following?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While walking together, can you tell the court what actually happened?
A Alberto waited for us on the way that were going pass, sir.
Q Why do you say that Alberto [was] waiting for you and Andres during that time?
A Perhaps he has a bad intentioned, (sic) sir.
Q While walking on that path Andres was ahead of you what did you see if you had
see[n] anything?
A Alberto stabbed Andres Dalisay, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happen[ed] after Alberto had [stabbed] Andres Dalisay?

A They chased one another, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happen[ed] after that?
A When the first stubbed (sic) hit Dalisay, Dalisay tried to hold the hand of Alberto and
when they were struggling Andres was able to push Alberto and they both fell down
and with Alberto on top of Andres, Andres was able to push Alberto and he was able
to get up and Andres ran away and Alberto chased him sir.
FISCAL CARAAN:
Q Did Alberto [catch] up with Andres . . .?
A Yes sir, Andres Dalisay toppled down and Alberto stabbed him at the back, sir.
Q What happen[ed] next?
A After the stabbing of Andres at the back by Alberto, Andres was able to get up and
ran and while running he fell for the second time and Alberto stabbed [him] again on
the chest, sir.
Treachery can be gleaned from the fact that appellant waited behind a chico tree and then, all of a sudden,
jumped on the victim. Appellant's attack was not only sudden and unexpected; it was also vicious and
relentless. After delivering the first stab, appellant chased his victim and stabbed him seven more times.
These seven additional stabs were inflicted when the victim was helpless, as he fell down several times
during the pursuit. Counterattack and escape proved futile because of the injuries that the victim sustained.
The medico-legal officer reported that of the eight stab wounds on the victim, six were fatal.25 Clearly, in
killing his victim, appellant employed means which ensured its execution without risk to himself arising
from any defense which the victim might make.26 Treachery which qualified the killing as murder was properly
appreciated by the trial court.
Third Issue: Absence of Evident Premeditation
The Court concurs with appellant and the solicitor general that the trial court erred in appreciating evident
premeditation. The solicitor general explains that "only a few minutes had passed" from the time appellant
left his sister's house to the time he stabbed his victim. Thus, no sufficient lapse of time is appreciable from
the determination to commit the crime until its execution to allow appellant to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.27 Under such circumstances, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated.
Fourth Issue: Voluntary Surrender
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been credited in favor of the
appellant.28 The solicitor general concurs and notes that appellant, after having earlier given himself up to a
certain Col. Faltado, surrendered at midnight on May 20, 1992, or about an hour after the stabbing incident,
to Wilfredo Sevillano, former desk officer of the Batangas City Police Station.29 Hence, the evidence
sufficiently established the elements of voluntary surrender, namely: (1) the offender has not been actually
arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his
surrender was voluntary.30
The Proper Penalty
Voluntary surrender diminishes appellant's penalty. Since the crime committed prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act 7659, the imposable penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
The proscription of the death penalty by the 1987 Constitution did not amend the imposable penalty under
said article.31 Thus, Art. 64, which provides the rules for the application of penalties containing three
periods, governs the determination of the proper penalty in this particular case.32 Contrary to the contention
of the solicitor general, Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply.33
Following Art. 64 (2) of the Code, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender entitles appellant to
the imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act
No. 4103, as amended), appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of prison mayor in its
maximum period, as minimum, and reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is IMPOSED an

indeterminate sentence of ten years and one day of prison mayor maximum, as minimum, and seventeen
years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Artermio S. Tipon; rollo, pp. 21-24.
2 Records, p. 1.
3 Ibid., p. 77.
4 Rollo, p. 24.
5 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on July 10, 1996 when the Court noted
receipt of the appellee's brief. Filing of appellant's Reply Brief was deemed waived.
6 Rollo, pp. 140-144. The 25-page appellee's brief was signed by Solicitor General Raul I.
Goco, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. dela Cruz and Associate Solicitor Roselyn O.
Balanquit.
7 Rollo, pp. 67-73. Appellant's 42-page brief was prepared by Counsel de Oficio Constantino
B. de Jesus.
8 People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660-663, November 29, 1950; People vs. Rafanan, Jr.,
204 SCRA 65, 74, November 21, 1991; People vs. Dungo, 199 SCRA 860, 866, July 31, 1991;
and People vs. Puno, 105 SCRA 151, 158-159, June 29, 1981.
9 People vs. Rafanan, supra, p. 79; People vs. Morales, 121 SCRA 426, 436, April 20, 1983;
and People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851, 858, June 27, 1990.
10 People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87 [1937], per Laurel, J.
11 People vs. Formigones, supra, p. 661; and People vs. Aquino, supra, p. 861.
12 People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204, 206-207 [1922].
13 Supra.
14 Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines an alienist as one who treats the
diseases of the mind, a physician who specializes in psychiatry.
15 People vs. Bonoan, supra, pp. 99. Emphases found in the original.
16 United States vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88, 92, March 13, 1914, per Trent, J.
17 People vs. Rafanan, supra; People vs. Dungo, supra, p. 871.
18 Supra.
19 People vs. Aquino, supra, p. 862-863.
20 Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power
of the offender without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts.
xxx xxx xxx
21 Supra.
22 Supra, p. 80.
23 TSN, September 9, 1993, p. 11.
24 TSN, September 11, 1992, pp. 3-5.
25 TSN, November 24, 1992, p. 6.
26 People vs. Marolano, G.R. No. 105004, July 24, 1997, p. 37; People vs. Sol, G.R. No. 118504,
May 7, 1997, pp. 12-13; and People vs. Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, June 20, 1997, pp. 20-22.
27 The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) the accused determined to commit the
crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient
lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. People vs. Estrellanes, 239 SCRA 235, 250, December 15, 1994;
People vs. Layno, G.R. No. 110833, November 21, 1996, pp. 20-21; People vs. Deopante, G.R.
No. 102772, October 30, 1996, pp. 8-9; People vs. Sol, supra, pp. 14-15; and People vs. Nell,
G.R. 109660, July 1, 1997, pp. 16-17.
28 People vs. Rivero, 242 SCRA 354.
29 TSN, December 11, 1992, pp. 3-4.
30 People vs. Isleta, G.R. No. 114971, November 19, 1996, p. 19; and People vs. Castillo, 261
SCRA 493, 503, September 6, 1996.
31 People vs. Muñoz, 170 SCRA 107, 122-124, Feb. 9, 1989.
32 People vs. Sol, supra, 16-18.
33 Appellee's Brief, pp. 23-24; rollo, pp. 160-161. The solicitor general misinterpreted People
vs. Buenaflor (211 SCRA 492, 501, July 15, 1992), which applied the rules for the application
of indivisible penalties in Article 63, because said case dealt with rape which was punishable
with reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty.

Supreme Court: The Solicitor General For Plaintiff-Appellee. Sanvicene, de Leon & Associates For Accused-Appellant

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Supreme Court: The Solicitor General For Plaintiff-Appellee. Sanvicene, de Leon & Associates For Accused-Appellant

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 95029 March 24, 1993

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Sanvicene, De Leon & Associates for accused-appellant.

xxx xxx xxx

In defense, accused-appellant pleads insanity and denial of the crime charged.

xxx xxx xxx

Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizoprenia: a

xxx xxx xxx

Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizoprenia that he considered in no

xxx xxx xxx

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

1 Rollo, pp. 119-124; Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-10.

3 Ibid., pp. 128-129.

6 204 SCRA 75 (1991).

7 Ibid., pp. 74-77.

8 Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 19.

10 Ibid., p. 7; Ibid., 20.

11 Ibid., p. 7-8; Ibid., pp. 20-21.

13 Ibid., p. 8; Ibid., p. 21.

14 Ibid., p. 9; Ibid., p. 22.

15 People vs. Dungo, 199 SCRA 860, 871 (1991).

16 TSN, December 3, 1987, p. 8.

17 Ibid., January 5, 1988, p. 31.

18 Ibid., December 3, 1987, p. 27.

19 Ibid., February 4, 1988, p. 6.

20 Appellant's Brief, p. 14; Rollo, p. 113.

21 People vs. Olivar, G.R. No. 10151, November 13, 1992, at p. 9.

22 Ibid., February 9, 1988, p. 18.

26 People vs. Dungo, supra.

28 People vs. Casinilo, G.R. No. 97441, September 11, 1992.

Republic of the Philippines

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

Hence, this appeal.

The appeal lacks merit.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

4 As defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

5 CA rollo, pp. 32-54. Penned by Judge Ruben C. Ayson.

7 Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances. -- The following are mitigating circumstances:

9 See People v. Villa, Jr., 387 Phil. 155 (2000).

12 Records, Vol. 1, p. 46.

13 See People v. Villa, Jr., supra note 9.

14 Records, Vol. 1, p. 48.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

The instant appeal is anchored on the following:

A "You come and we will have sexual intercourse," he said.

Q And what did you say?

A "I do not like," I said.

A I struggled and cried.

Q What did the accused do after that?

xxx xxx xxx

Q What was your wearing apparel that evening?

A I was wearing pants, sir.

Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear?

A Yes, sir, I have a panty.