BAR OPS 1

SUBMISSION No. 3
CASE NO. 31-45

Submitted by:
JAN VEAH P. CAABAY
LLB-IV

Submitted to:
ATTY. ALLAN B. CARLOS
Professorial Lecturer

Date Submitted: 10/09/2020

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Lydia Balma Ceda-Tugano Vs. Jerry R. Marcelino, Sheriff III,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71,...
A.M. No. P-14-3233. October 14, 2019
2. Rowena Padas y Garcia @ “Weng”
G.R. No. 244327. October 14, 2019
3. People of the Philippines Vs. Eduardo Lacdan y Perez @ “Edwin”
and Romualdo Vierneza...
G.R. No. 208472. October 14, 2019
4. Efren J. Julleza Vs. Orient Line Philippines, Inc. Orient Navigation
Corporation and Macario Dela...
G.R. No. 225190. July 29, 2019
5. The People of the Philippines Vs. Dante Cubay y Ugsalan
G.R. No. 224597. July 29, 2019
6. Hayden Kho, Sr. Vs. Dolores G. Magbanua, et al.
G.R. No. 237246. July 29, 2019
7. Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines Vs. Ricardo S. Macapagal, et al.
G.R. No. 232669. July 29, 2019
8. People of the Philippines Vs. Albert Perez Flores
G.R. No. 241261. July 29, 2019
9. Gregorio Telen y Ichon Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 228107. October 9, 2019
10. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company Vs. Citi
Appliance M.C. Corporation
G.R. No. 214546. October 9, 2019
11. Danilo S. Ibañez Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 198932. October 9, 2019
12. Department of Justice Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano, et
al. Vs. Magtanggol B. Gatdula
G.R. No. 212215. October 9, 2019 [Date Uploaded: 03/10/2020]
13. People of the Philippines Vs. Jenny Tecson y Avecilla
G.R. No. 243786. October 9, 2019
14. Mark Eliseus M. Villola Vs. United Philippine Lines, Inc. and
Fernandino T. Lising
G.R. No. 230047. October 9, 2019
15. The People of the Philippines Vs. Noli Villegas, Jr., Lacrete
G.R. No. 218210. October 9, 2019

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 31. Lydia Balma Ceda-Tugano Vs. Jerry R. Marcelino, Sheriff III,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Quezonc City
A.M. No. P-14-3233. October 14, 2019
FACTS:
In a Decision the MeTC, Branch 71, Pasig City, ordered complainant to
vacate the subject premises and peacefully surrender possession to the plaintiffs
therein. Complainant appealed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 161, however, the appeal was likewise dismissed. Consequently, the
court a quo issued a Writ of Execution. Aware of her impending eviction upon
finality of the decision, complainant tried to gather good lumber, galvanized iron
and other materials from her house to be able to build another home in another
place. However, she was prevented from taking away the said 'materials by the
barangay officials of Barangay Oranbo, Pasig City, despite her explanation that
the decision of the court covered only the lot and not the house which she built
using her own resources.
In her complaint, complainant assailed the manner by which Marcelino
enforced the writ of execution. She claimed that all the defendants in the case
were neither notified nor furnished with a copy of the writ of execution and were
not given sufficient time of at least five (5) days to vacate the premises. She also
averred at the time Marcelino enforced the writ, she was not at home because
she was looking for a new place where they could move in. She lamented that
Marcelino hastily took over the possession and occupancy of their house and
turned it over to the plaintiffs without even giving them a chance to remove their
house so that they could rebuild in another place.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Marcelino to submit
his comment on the charge against him. In his Comment, Marcelino explained
that contrary to complainant's claim, he issued a Notice to Vacate which he
posted on the front door of complainant's house because the latter was not
around. He admitted that he opened the house and enforced the writ albeit in the
presence of two (2) barangay peace officers and one (1) barangay councilor.
In her Reply, complainant maintained that she never received personally
from Marcelino the copy of the Writ of Execution. She pointed out that Marcelino
essentially admitted that he indeed violated the procedures when he served the
writ of execution by merely posting it on the door of the subject premises, and
forcibly opened the locked door of the house to remove and bring out all her
belongings. She asserted that because Marcelino unlawfully and whimsically
evicted her, she had no place to even put her personal belongings which resulted
to its loss and damage.
ISSUE: Whether the sheriff Marcelino properly executed the order of the court
HELD:
No. Well settled is that the sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ is purely
ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no
discretion whether to execute the judgment or not. When the writ is placed in his
hands, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed
with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its
mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure that the order is executed without
undue delay. This holds especially true herein where the nature of the case
requires immediate execution. However, immediacy of the execution does not
mean instant execution. The sheriff must comply with the Rules of Court in
executing a writ. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down in the Rules of
Court is a misconduct and warrants disciplinary action. Marcelino's duties as a
sheriff in implementing a writ of execution for the delivery and restitution of real
property are outlined in Rule 39, Section lO(c) and (d), and Section 14 of the
Rules of Court.
In the instant case, the guilt of Marcelino is undisputed. He admitted that
he merely posted the notice to vacate on the front door of complainant's house
because the latter was nowhere to be found. Likewise, he enforced the writ of
execution on the same day he posted the notice to vacate on the door by forcibly
opening the door, and took out movables from the subject premises, albeit, in the
presence of barangay officials. There was no prior notice given. Complainant
only learned of the issuance of the writ of execution at the time it was being
enforced by Marcelino. Moreover, the latter neither made any effort to ascertain
the whereabouts of complainant nor made any attempt to ensure that
complainant received personally the notice to vacate. Clearly, this arbitrary
manner in which Marcelino acted in delivering possession of the subject
premises to the plaintiff is inexcusable.
 32. Rowena Padas y Garcia @ “Weng”
G.R. No. 244327. October 14, 2019
FACTS:
Police Officer I Acemond Villanueva (PO1 Villanueva) and Senior Police
Officer II Mario Sanchez (SPO2 Sanchez) went to Bohol Street, Balic Balic,
Sampaloc on board a tricycle to conduct a surveillance against one alias
"Manok." The purpose of the surveillance was to familiarize themselves with the
area. After about an hour of not seeing their supposed target, PO1 Villanueva
and SPO2 Sanchez decided to leave. As they were about to leave while still on
board the tricycle, PO1 Villanueva and SPO2 Sanchez allegedly saw a woman
taking out, from her right front pocket, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance. The woman, later identified as
petitioner, was showing the plastic sachet to an unidentified man. Upon seeing
this, PO1 Villanueva and SPO2 Sanchez alighted from the tricycle and arrested
petitioner. The unidentified man, however, escaped. PO1 Villanueva marked the
plastic sachet with "RGP" and the two other sachets found in petitioner's
possession with "RGP-1" and "RGP-2." The physical inventory and taking of
photographs of the seized evidence were conducted at the place of arrest in the
presence of petitioner and Rene Crisostomo (Crisostomo), a media
representative. The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The CA affirmed in toto the conviction of
petitioner for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE: Whether the court of appeals gravely erred in giving full weight and
credence to the prosecution's evidence despite the arresting officer's non-
compliance with the requirements for the proper custody of seized dangerous
drugs under section 21, r.a. no. 9165 and for failure to prove the drugs' integrity
and identity.
HELD:
Yes. In this case, no DOJ representative and elected public official were
present at the time of the physical inventory, marking, and taking of photographs
of the evidence seized from petitioner. Additionally, PO1 Villanueva testified that
Crisostomo, the media representative, was not present when petitioner was
arrested and the seized evidence were marked. Crisostomo merely signed the
inventory after the marking of the evidence.[27] It is therefore unclear whether he
witnessed the actual physical inventory of the seized drugs.
 Nevertheless, there is a saving clause under the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 in
case of non-compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule. This saving clause,
however, applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized the procedural
lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and (2) when the
prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
seized had been preserved. The prosecution, thus, loses the benefit of invoking
the presumption of regularity and bears the burden of proving — with moral
certainty — that the illegal drug presented in court is the same drug that was
confiscated from the accused during his arrest.[28]
In this case, however, the prosecution offered no justification as to the
absence of a representative from the DOJ and the elected public official. The
prosecution did not even recognize their procedural lapses or give any justifiable
explanation on why the apprehending team did not conduct the inventory,
marking, and taking of photographs of the seized evidence in the presence of an
elected public official and a DOJ representative.
 33. People of the Philippines Vs. Eduardo Lacdan y Perez @ “Edwin”
and Romualdo Vierneza Y Bondoc @ "Ulo"
G.R. No. 208472. October 14, 2019
FACTS:
A confidential informant went to Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,
Regional Office, Calabarzon (PDEA), stationed at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba
City, Laguna to relay to Regional Director Sgt. Amado Marquez (Sgt. Marquez)
that he was able to negotiate a drug deal with accused-appellants involving 10.03
grams of shabu worth P18,000.00.
Sgt. Marquez referred the matter to Police Senior Inspector Julius Ceasar
Ablang (S/Insp. Ablang) who verified the information and formed a buy-bust team
to conduct the operation against accused-appellants.
The team proceeded to the San Pedro Town Center in San Pedro, Laguna
and arrived at the parking lot at around 4:00 a.m. The confidential informant,
through cellular phone, was in constant communication with accused-appellants.
After one and a half hours of waiting, PO3 Garcia saw accused-appellants
disembark from a tricycle. The confidential informant introduced PO3 Garcia to
accused-appellants who asked if the former had with him the P18,000.00 agreed
upon. PO3 Garcia pulled out the buy-bust money from his pocket and flashed it
to accused-appellants. Vierneza pulled out from his pocket one big heat-sealed
transparent sachet containing white crystalline substance and handed the same
to PO3 Garcia. When Lacdan demanded payment for the substance, PO3 Garcia
handed him the buy-bust money.
Upon seeing that the sale had been consummated, the rest of the buy-bust
team rushed accused-appellants and introduced themselves as members of the
PDEA. Upon having been apprised of their constitutional rights, accused-
appellants were brought to the PDEA Office in Camp Vicente Lim. At the PDEA
Office, PO3 Garcia placed his initials on the plastic sachet and inventoried the
same in the presence of an elected official and a representative from media.
Thereafter, the plastic sachet was submitted to the crime laboratory for testing.
The forensic examination yielded a positive result that the white crystalline
substance contained in the confiscated plastic sachet was indeed shabu.
ISSUE: Whether there is non-compliance with the requirements for the proper
custody of seized dangerous drugs under section 21, r.a. no. 9165 and for failure
to prove the drugs' integrity and identity.
HELD:
 Yes. Since the buy-bust operation was conducted prior to the amendment
of R.A. 9165, the apprehending team is mandated, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the seized items
in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized,
or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely:
(1) a representative from the media; (2) a representative from the DOJ; and (3)
any elected public official.
In this case, the records provide that the inventory of the illicit drugs was
made in the PDEA Office in Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba City, Laguna when
the buy-bust operation was conducted in San Pedro, Laguna or some 20
kilometers away from the former. Further, the inventory was only witnessed by
the accused, a representative from the media, and an elected public official. The
illicit drug was not even photographed as required by Section 21. There was no
explanation offered as to: (1) why the inventory was made in Calamba City and
not in San Pedro; (2) why there was no photograph of the illicit drug; and (3) why
the inventory was not witnessed by a representative from the DOJ.
These glaring non-compliance with the provisions of Section 21 of R.A.
9165 render the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items to be
highly compromised, consequently warranting accused-appellants' acquittal.
 34. Efren J. Julleza Vs. Orient Line Philippines, Inc. Orient Navigation
Corporation and Macario Dela...
G.R. No. 225190. July 29, 2019
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed by the respondent as a bosun on board MV
Orient Phoenix. After the required Pre-employment medical examination period
of nine months (9 mos) The aforeseaid employment was covered by the IBF-
JSU/PSU-IMMAJJ Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).ON 19th of
December 2012, Petitioner allegedly slipped while cleaning the cargo hold under
bad weather condition. AB Magalona wanted to bring him to the hospital for
medical attention. The Ship master advised petitioner to just wait while until his
extended contract ends on 25th of December 2012. He was given medication to
alleviate the pain on his lower back.
Upon his return to the Philippines, Petitioner went to the company
designated physician on 27th of December 2012, which several test were done,
until 21st of February 2013, when the company physician certified that he was
suffering from bilateral nephrolithiasis and lumbar spondylosis. Such illness is
Grade 8 or loss of 2/3 lifting power of the trunk. After which, he seek the
expertise of his own doctor in the person of Dr. Catapang Jr. which he concluded
that the petitioner is unfit for strenuous duties.
The Private respondent claimed that the bilateral nephrolithiasis is not
work related as certified by the company physician and the lumbar spondylosis
was classified as grade 8 disability, and it did not result from any accident, since
there was no confirmation or validation under the Ship master’s reports but only
based on the written testimony of the petitioner and unnotarized statement of the
accident by AB Magalona.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both agreed on the the ruling that the
petitioner was entitled for the permanent disability benefits under the CBA.
However the Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the NLRC, due to the
contention that the petitioner did not observe the conflict resolution procedure
under the CBA, to which it was stated that in case of accidents, arising on board
of the ship, such entitlement for the permanent disability, must be based on the
determination of the company physician, and if not in agreement with the latter,
one can seek for a third doctor, which should be agreed upon by the employee
and the company, which according to the CA, petitioner did not do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ca erred in reversing the findings of the NLRC
HELD:
No. The court reiterated in the case of Gargallo v Dahle Seafront Crewing
(Manila) Inc. The Court ruled that the seafarer is required to comply with the
conflict resolution procedure, which was the same under the 2010 POEA
Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). The failure of the
Petitioner to observe such protocol, violated the terms of the CBA,which makes
the findings of the company physician more given weight than the Petitioners
own private physician.
Also, the Court reiterated that Petitioner’s injury was not a result of an
accident. As elaborated by Black’s Law Dictionary, accident is defined as ,
unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence, something that does not occur
in the usual course or that could not be reasonably anticipated. The Court finds
no evidence of whatsoever of the said accident except from the statement of AB
Magalona. Hence the Court decided against the petitioner in this case.
 35. The People of the Philippines Vs. Dante Cubay y Ugsalan
G.R. No. 224597. July 29, 2019
FACTS:
Appellant Dante Cubay y Ugsalan was charged with forty-four (44) counts
of rape under separate Informations which, except for the material dates,
uniformly read, thus:
That on or about the 7th day of September, 2007, in the evening, at XXX,
province of Bukidnon, Philippines particularly at the Special Education Dormitory
(SPED) and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with [AAA], (an) 18 year-old (who) suffered (a) physical defect
(hearing impaired) against her will, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA] in such
amount as (may be) allowed by law. CONTRARY to (and) in violation of R.A.
8353.
ISSUE: Did the Information validly charge the crime of rape?
HELD:
No. The appellant was charged with forty-four (44) counts of rape. The
elements of rape are as follows: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (2) the offender accomplished such act through force or intimidation,
or when the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when
she was under twelve (12) years of age or was demented.
The Informations conspicuously lack the second element of rape, i.e. the
accused employed force or intimidation, or that the victim was deprived of
reason, unconscious, under twelve (12) years of age, or was demented.
Surely, being a deaf-mute does not necessarily take the place of the
element of force or intimidation or having been deprived of reason, unconscious,
or demented. The allegation that "the accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with AAA, an 18 year-old
(who) suffered a physical defect (hearing impaired) against her will, xxx" does not
equate to force or intimidation either.
In fine, the Informations do not validly charge the crime of rape or any
offense at all. The same, for sure, cannot be the basis of a valid judgment of
conviction.
 36. Hayden Kho, Sr. Vs. Dolores G. Magbanua, et al.
G.R. No. 237246. July 29, 2019
FACTS:
A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by respondents before the Labor
Arbiter (LA) against Holy Face Cell Corporation (Corporation), Tres Pares Fast
Food (Tres Pares) and the Corporation’s stockholders including its alleged
President, Hayden Kho Sr and the latter’s wife, Irene Kho. The Respondents
claimed that they were employed by the Corporation as cooks, cashiers or
dishwashers, respectively. They received information, through the daughter of
petitioners, MS. Sheryl Kho,by posting a notice in the company premises posited
that on 14 of January, 2011, the said restaurant would close down on 19th of
January 2011. Due to the fear of losing their jobs, they requested an audience
with MR. Kho, thru the daughter, but to no avail. The restaurant closed on
schedule, thus the respondents filed the complaint for illegal dismissal with
payment of separation pay, salary differentials, nominal damages, differentials on
overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, and holiday pay, including damages
and attorney’s fees as well.
The LA ruled in favour of the Respondents that the Corporation failed to
prove that it closed down its business due to financial distress as it did not offer
financial documents to corroborate its claim. It also failed to comply with the
notice requirement prior to such closure as laid down under Article 298 of the
Labor Code.
The NLRC reversed the findings of the LA, and dismissed the case, on the
contention that Petitioenrs cannot be held solidarily liable with the Corporation,
absent the acts that would justify piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
In the Decision of the CA, it held Petitioners solidary liable, on the account
of the admission of Kho, that he managed the corporation, that his daughter
posted the notice of closure and lastly; the respondent sought audience to
discuss the closure. It found out that Kho, Acted in bad faith despite the absence
of a board resolution authorizing the closure as such.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are solidarily liable
HELD:
No. In cases of Corporations, They are juridical entities which have a
separate and distinct personality with their stockholders. Hence, The Board of
Directors cannot be held liable for the liabilities incurred by the Corporation, since
it has a separate, independent personality of its own. In order to pierce the veil of
Corporate fiction, The court reiterated three instances, a.) when an act is
intended to defeat public convenience or as a vehicle for the evasion of an
existing obligation. B.) to justify wrong, protect or perpetuate fraude, defend
crime, or as a shield to confuse legitimate issues and c. as mere alter ego or
business conduit of a person so organized and controlled and its affairs are so
conducted as to make it merely as an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct
of another corporation.
Also, the evidence on record does not support the findings of both LA and
CA that Kho was indeed the President, or made the corporation as his alter ego.
Also, the respondents did not alleged any fraud or bad faith on the part of Kho.
As the court reiterated in this case, Failure of the Corporation notices, does not
mean that the Corporation are engaged in unlawful business, because the law
does not define it as unlawful, such is only a procedural defect. The court did not
find any reason to pierce the veil of Corporate fiction in this case. Hence the
Court reinstated the decision of the NLRC.
 37. Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines Vs. Ricardo S. Macapagal, et al.
G.R. No. 232669. July 29, 2019
FACTS:
Respondents Ricardo S. Macapagal and 12 others were employed by
petitioner Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines Inc. (Company) at its manufacturing
plant in San Fernando City, Pampanga, as part of the Product Availability Group
(PAG). In January 2011, the Company announced its plan to abolish PAG,
together with all of its warehouses and the positions under it, including those held
by respondents and outsource its remaining functions to The Redsystem
Company Inc. (TRCI).
Thereafter, respondents received letters terminating their employment due
to redundancy effective March 1, 2011. Thus, they filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, arguing that the redundancy program was done in bad faith to
undermine their security of tenure. They also alleged that TRCI is not an
independent contractor as it is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company.
For its part, the Company denied respondents’ claims. It averred that it is
engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling carbonated drinks and
other beverage items nationwide while PAG’s work involved coordination with the
external distribution channels. To improve operation efficiency and effectiveness,
the Company resolved to outsource all of its distribution and coordination efforts
under PAG to an independent contractor, TRCI. Proper notices were given to
respondents and to the Department of Labor and Employment. It gave more than
the required separation pay and other benefits to respondents who in turn
voluntarily executed their respective notarized waiver and quitclaim.
ISSUE: Whether the defense find merit
HELD:
Yes. Redundancy is an authorized cause for termination of employment
under Article 29832 (formerly, Article 283) of the Labor Code. It exists when “the
services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the
actual requirements of the enterprise.” It can be due to “a number of factors, such
as the overhiring of workers, a decrease in the volume of business or the
dropping of a particular line or service previously manufactured or undertaken by
the enterprise.” The determination of whether the employees’ services are no
longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore, properly terminable for
redundancy, is an exercise of business judgment. In making such decision,
however, management must not violate the law nor declare redundancy without
sufficient basis.
To ensure that the dismissal is not implemented arbitrarily, jurisprudence
requires the employer to prove, among others, its good faith in abolishing the
redundant positions as well as the existence of fair and reasonable criteria in the
selection of employees who will be dismissed from employment due to
redundancy. Such fair and reasonable criteria may include, but are not limited to:
(a) less preferred status, i.e., temporary employee; (b) efficiency; and (c)
seniority.
Since the market execution partners or dealership system incurs the
lowest cost-to-serve, the other distribution systems had to be phased out,
resulting in the termination of the employees, as what happened in this case. The
Court ruled that the phasing out of distribution systems was an exercise of
management prerogative and there was no proof that it was exercised in a
malicious or arbitrary manner.
 38. People of the Philippines Vs. Albert Perez Flores
G.R. No. 241261. July 29, 2019
FACTS:
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed before the RTC
charging Flores of the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs. The prosecution alleged that on the evening of March 7, 2015, police
officers from the Ginatilan Police Station, Cebu, successfully implemented a buy-
bust operation against Flores, during which two (2) sachets weighing a total of
0.12 gram of white crystalline substance were recovered from him. As there were
many people gathered due to a motocross contest at the area where the buy-
bust operation was conducted, the police officers took Flores and the seized
items to the police station where he was body searched in the presence of two
(2) barangay councilors, during which eight (8) more sachets weighing a total of
0.43 gram were recovered from him. The markings, inventory, and photography
of the seized items were then conducted in the presence of Flores, as well as the
aforesaid barangay councilors. Thereafter, the seized items were brought to the
crime laboratory where, upon examination, the contents thereof yielded positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
ISSUE: Whether there is non-compliance with the procedure of RA 9165
amended by RA 10640
HELD:
Yes. The law requires that the said inventory and photography be done in
the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or
his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if
prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official; or (b)
if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media. The law
requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment
of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence."
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions,
strict compliance with the chain of custody procedure may not always be
possible. As such, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
same would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void
and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved. The foregoing is based on the saving
clause found in Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, which was later adopted into the text of RA
10640. It should, however, be emphasized that for the saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must duly explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that
the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the
Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
In this case, the Court finds that the police officers were justified in
conducting the markings, inventory, and photography of the seized items at the
police station instead of the place of arrest, considering that there were a lot of
people at the latter area in view of the ongoing town fiesta activities in Ginatilan,
Cebu. Nonetheless, it appears that the inventory and photography of the seized
items were not conducted in the presence of representatives either from the DOJ
or the media, contrary to the express mandate of RA 9165, as amended by RA
10640. This fact may not only be gleaned from the Certificate of Inventory which
was only signed by two (2) elected public officials, but also from the testimony of
the poseur-buyer himself, Police Officer 2 Ruben Catubig (PO2 Catubig).
 39. Gregorio Telen y Ichon Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 228107. October 9, 2019
FACTS:
About 2:30 p.m. on October 7, 2012, PO3 Mazo was at Petron Gasoline
Station, Guadalupe, Makati City, waiting for his turn to gas up his motorcycle. He
was in line behind another rider—later identified to be, Telen—who was then
putting gasoline in his own motorcycle. After filling up his motorcycle's gas tank,
Telen drew out his wallet from his right back pocket. This caused his shirt to be
pulled up, revealing a part of his waist. PO3 Mazo saw a metal part of what
appeared to be a hand grenade tucked in Telen's right waistband. This prompted
the officer to call his superior to report what he observed and ask for back-up. As
instructed by his superior, PO3 Mazo tailed Telen on the road up to Robinsons
Galleria, where Telen left his motorcycle at the parking area along Ortigas
Avenue. The officer continued tailing Telen while he walked around the area, by
the mall's entrance. At around 5:00 p.m., PO3 Mazo received a call informing him
that his back-up was already positioned in the area. PO3 Mazo then saw Senior
Inspector Payumo at a distance. When Telen returned to his motorcycle about 30
minutes later, PO3 Mazo approached him. The officer placed his arm around
Telen's shoulder and patted his right waist. He introduced himself as a police
officer and warned Telen not to make any untoward movement. He then pulled
out the metal object from Telen's waist and confirmed that it was indeed a hand
grenade. PO3 Mazo arrested Telen and apprised him of his constitutional rights.
He then frisked Telen and recovered three (3) small plastic sachets of white
crystalline substance from him. He placed the seized items in the compartment of
his motorcycle.
ISSUE: Whether the “stop and frisk” made by the police officers are valid
HELD:
No. For a "stop and frisk" search to be valid, it must be supported by
evidence such that the totality of the suspicious circumstances observed by the
arresting officer led him or her to believe that an accused was committing an illicit
act. A warrantless arrest not based on this is a violation of the accused's basic
right to privacy.
For a valid stop and frisk search, this Court instructed in Manibog v.
People that the arresting officer should have personally observed at least two (2)
or more suspicious circumstances. A reasonable inference must be deduced
from the totality of circumstances to justify further investigation by the arresting
officer.
 Here, however, the prosecution failed to prove the legality of the
warrantless arrest. Its bare assertion that the police officers apprehended
petitioner after having been caught in flagrante of illegal possession of a hand
grenade is insufficient to cloth the police officers with the authority to restrain
petitioner's liberty.
PO3 Mazo's testimony demonstrates his lack of personal knowledge of
suspicious circumstances that would have created the suspicion of a crime being
committed or about to be committed-the necessary impetus for him to "stop and
frisk" petitioner.
 40. Gregorio Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company Vs. Citi
Appliance M.C. Corporation
G.R. No. 214546. October 9, 2019
FACTS:
Citi filed a complaint for forcible entry against PLDT, alleging that the
latter’s underground telephone lines, cables, and manholes encroached on its
property. PLDT argued that Citi’s action had already prescribed, since the 1-year
prescriptive period within which to file an action for forcible entry through steal
this counted from the discovery of the alleged unlawful entry (which PLDT
alleged to be sometime in April-May 2003), not the last demand to vacate. The
MTCC, RTC, and CA ruled in favor of Citi, holding that its complaint was timely
filed since the 1-year prescriptive period should be counted from the last demand
to vacate (Citi made a final demand on May 28, 2004 then filed its complaint on
October 1, 2004), based on jurisprudence. The SC reversed the CA, holding that
the 1-year time bar (for an action for forcible entry through stealth) is reckoned
from the date of discovery of the encroachment. Citi’s own complaint shows that
it discovered the underground cable sand lines in April 2003. Hence, its action
had already prescribed and the MTCC no longer had jurisdiction over its forcible
entry complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue of lack of jurisdiction was deemed waived by
PLDT
HELD:
No. In this case of Amoguis v. Ballado (G.R. No. 189626, 20 August 2018),
the Court pronounced the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is based on the doctrine
of equity, which applies only in cases “where jurisdiction was raised at the very
last minute when the parties have already gone through years of litigation”. The
Tijam doctrine will apply only when circumstances of a case, allowing the belated
objection to the jurisdiction of the court will additionally cause irreparable
damages, and therefore, injustice to the other party that relied on the forum and
the implicit waiver.
In this case, PLDT raised the issue of jurisdiction when it filed with the
MCTCC its Amended Answer with leave of court. Further, even if the Court
disregards PLDT’s Amended Answer, PLDT is not deemed barred by laches
since it immediately questioned the MCTCC’s jurisdiction without allowing trial to
stretch into years. The unique circumstances in Tijam are absent here. As the
Court noted in Amoguis, raising the lack of jurisdiction a little under a year, or
even after the lapse of four (4) years, will not operate as estoppel against a party.
Thus, as PLDT seasonable raised the lack of jurisdiction, there is neither waiver
of the jurisdictional issue nor estoppel against it.
 41. Danilo S. Ibañez Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 198932. October 9, 2019
FACTS:
In 2002, accused and private complainant entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA). Under such MOA the accused is a purchaser of the property
of the complainant of which heh undertakes to sell the same subsequently. To
add, to make this possible, they agreed that the accused shall execute a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) for the sale of such property payable for a period of 24
months. The accused failed to deliver the amount, thus this case. The
complainant argues that there was mere agency, on the other hand, the accused
argues that there was a contract to sell.
ISSUE: Whether the MOA is a contract to sell
HELD:
Yes. There was no crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.
While the transaction entered into by the parties being a sale, the petitioner as
the vendee did not receive the property subject of the sale in trust or under an
obligation to return: The parties' agreement to transfer the title upon payment of
the purchase price rather placed the petitioner in the position of an owner and
made him liable to the transferor as a debtor for the agreed price; he was not
merely an agent who must account for the proceeds of a resale. The failure on
the part of the petitioner to pay the consideration in full only resulted to the
complainants being unpaid vendors. The former did not thereby incur criminal
liability for estafa, for, as earlier explained, the right of the complainants as
unpaid vendors was only to demand the fulfilment or the cancellation of the
obligation.
 42. Department of Justice Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano, et al. Vs.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula
G.R. No. 212215. October 9, 2019
FACTS:
Secretary De Lima released Department Order (D.O.) No. 1007 creating a
fact-finding panel to investigate the matters raised in Tulfo's column about the
alleged kidnapping and extortion of Noriyo Ohara (Ohara), a Japanese national.
It was purportedly committed by several agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). In discharge of its mandate, the fact-finding panel invited
resource persons to shed light on the circumstances involving the alleged
kidnapping and extortion of Ohara. Respondent Magtanggol Gatdula (Gatdula),
who was then the NBI Director, appeared before the fact-finding panel as one of
the resource persons invited.
The fact-finding panel recommended that Gatdula be included in those to
be indicted for the alleged kidnapping of Ohara. It noted that based on the
evidence gathered, Gatdula had knowledge and participation in the criminal
operation against Ohara and was involved in its cover-up. President Aquino
relieved Gatdula as NBI Director.
Secretary De Lima issued D.O. No. 047 reconstituting the fact-finding
panel created pursuant to D.O. No. 1007. The fact-finding panel was tasked to
reassess and to reevaluate its findings and recommendation to charge Gatdula
with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
Ohara filed a Letter-Complaint before the National Prosecution Service
(NPS) of the DOJ charging Gatdula, among other individuals, with the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The following day, Secretary De Lima
issued D.O. No. 132 revoking D.O. No. 047 and declaring the reconstituted fact-
finding panel to be functus officio after it was prevented from making a
supplemental report in view of the TRO issued against it.
Petitioner Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano (Arellano) issued Office
Order No. 106 establishing a Panel of Prosecutors to handle the preliminary
investigation of Ohara's complaint. Meanwhile, in its Order, the RTC granted
Gatdula's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The Panel of Prosecutors subpoenaed Gatdula to attend the preliminary
investigation and to submit countervailing evidence. He filed a Petition to
Suspend Proceedings Ex Abundanti Ad Cautela to the DOJ. Gatdula prayed that
the preliminary investigation be suspended pending the resolution of his petition
for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC assailing D.O. Nos. 1007 and 407. He
failed to appear on the scheduled preliminary investigation.
In its Omnibus Order, the Panel of Prosecutors denied Gatdula's petition to
suspend the preliminary investigation. It ruled that while his petition for certiorari
and prohibition pending before the RTC was filed before Ohara's complaint with
the DOJ, it did not involve issues similar or intimately related to the preliminary
investigation. The Panel of Prosecutors highlighted that Gatdula's petition with
the RTC assails the constitutionality of D.O. Nos. 1007 and 407 and the validity
of the proceedings of the fact-finding panel while the preliminary investigation on
Ohara's complaint only seeks to determine whether there is probable cause to
charge Gatdula of the crimes alleged in the complaint.
Aggrieved, Gatdula filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. While his
petition for certiorari before the CA was pending, the RTC partially granted
Gatdula's petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing D.O. Nos. 1007 and 407.
The trial court upheld D.O. Nos. 1007 and 407. However, it ruled that the
investigation conducted by the fact-finding panel was null and void for being
violative of Gatdula's rights, and that his testimony, as well as evidence obtained
therein, were inadmissible in evidence in any other proceeding.
The CA partially granted Gatdula's petition for certiorari. The appellate
court ruled that the case lodged with the RTC assailing D.O. Nos. 1007 and 407
is not a prejudicial question with regard to the preliminary investigation the panel
of prosecutors were conducting. It explained that while they may be closely
related, the resolution of the case before the RTC did not pose a prejudicial
question to the conduct of a preliminary investigation. The CA highlighted that the
case before the RTC concerned the validity of D.O. Nos. 1007 and 407 and the
proceedings conducted by the panel of investigators, which did not concern the
determination of whether there exists a probable cause to indict Gatdula of the
charges leveled against him.
Nevertheless, the appellate court found that petitioners still acted with
grave abuse of discretion when they issued the assailed orders and denied
Gatdula's request to suspend the conduct of preliminary investigation. It pointed
out that the RTC had ruled favorably for Gatdula when it found that his
constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent were violated when he
attended the investigation conducted by the fact-finding panel.

ISSUE: Whether the assailed orders of the panel of prosecutors were issued with
grave abuse of discretion
HELD:
A careful review of the records, the Court finds that the Panel of
Prosecutors did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed
orders.
The process of preliminary investigation is essentially one (1)-sided, as it
serves only to assist the prosecution to summarily decide whether there was
sufficient basis to: (1) charge a person with an offense; and (2) prevent a
harassment suit that both prejudices a respondent and wastes government
resources. During the preliminary investigation, the prosecution only needs to
determine whether it has prima facie evidence to sustain the filing of the
information.
The conduct of the preliminary investigation by the Panel of Prosecutors
was prompted by the filing of Ohara's complaint before the NBI. As such, the
validity of the creation of the fact-finding panel finds no relevance to the
proceedings before the Panel of Prosecutors as the latter was prompted to
determine whether Gatdula should be indicted for kidnapping by the filing of the
complaint by the complainant and not by the results of the investigation of the
fact-finding panel.
 43. People of the Philippines Vs. Jenny Tecson y Avecilla
G.R. No. 243786. October 9, 2019
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that at around 5:00 in the afternoon, a team of
operatives from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) conducted a
buy-bust operation against Tecson. After the conduct of the buy-bust operation,
bystanders had already started to crowd the place of arrest, prompting the PDEA
operatives to immediately bring Tecson to their office in Quezon City, where IO1
Allosada conducted the requisite marking, inventory, and photography of the
seized drugs in the presence of Tecson herself, as well as an elected public
official, i.e., Kgd. Palma, and a media representative, i.e., Mendoza.
Subsequently, the seized drugs were delivered by IO1 Allosada to the
PDEA crime laboratory, where they were received and examined by Ronald
Jefferson A. Narceda, then turned over to evidence custodian Jag Soliven, who
took custody of the same until it was brought to court for presentation as
evidence.
The RTC found Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. The CA affirmed Tecson's conviction.
Tecson appealed, arguing that she should be acquitted since the requisite
marking, inventory, and photography of the purported drugs were not conducted
at the place of arrest, nor were the same witnessed by a representative of the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
ISSUE: Whether Tecson is correct
HELD:
No. The failure to immediately conduct the marking, inventory, and
photography at the place of arrest does not impair the integrity of the confiscated
drugs, as their accomplishment at the office of the apprehending team, whenever
practicable is deemed sufficient compliance with the chain of custody rule.
Moreover, the absence of a DOJ representative as a witness is not fatal since the
crime took place on September 9, 2014, after the effectivity of 10640, which
merely requires that the inventory and photography of the seized drugs be
witnessed by an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media, which was complied with in this case.
 44. Mark Eliseus M. Villola Vs. United Philippine Lines, Inc. and Fernandino T.
Lising
G.R. No. 230047. October 9, 2019
FACTS:
Villola was hired as UPL’s IT and Communications Manager, but he was
unable to implement a project entrusted to him. As a result, UPL was forced to
outsource Villola’s supposed responsibility to another company. In lieu of said
responsibility, Villola spent his time participating in UPL affiliate’s Anti-Piracy
Awareness Program. Later, Villola and Consunji, the UPL”s General Manager,
had a meeting where the latter informed Villola of the possibility of declaring his
position as redundant, to which Villola agreed. The two also agreed that instead
of terminating Villola’s employment, he would simply voluntarily cease his
employment with the company. In return, Consunji promised Villola that he would
hire him as a consultant for the company’s scanning project.
Villola stopped reporting for work at the beginning of June 2013 – a day
after he was asked by Consunji to render a resignation letter, but he was still
allowed within the premises of UPL due to his involvement in the Anti-Piracy
Awareness Program. The scanning project, on the other hand, did not
materialize. Villola never tendered his resignation letter despite the follow-up by
Consunji. Fifteen (15) months after, Villola filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against UPL.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Villola’s complaint, saying that Villola’s acts
indicated that he voluntarily resigned: he was no longer receiving salary since
June 2013 but he was still communicating with Consunji regarding his
consultancy service. The records also showed that Villola did not object to his
supposed termination. The LA concluded, therefore, that Villola deliberately failed
to furnish his resignation letter to later substantiate his claim that he was illegally
dismissed.
LA’s decision, however, was reversed by the NLRC, saying that VIllola’s
resignation was not supported by records as there was no resignation letter to
speak of and Villola’s presence within UPL’s premises after he had supposedly
resigned showed that he did not intend to part ways with the company. The CA,
on the other hand, ruled in favor of UPL, saying that there was in fact a prior
agreement between Consunji and Villola, that Villola did not raise objections to
Consunji’s requests for submission of a resignation letter, and that it took Villola
fifteen (15) months after his separation to file a complaint.
ISSUE: Whether Villola was illegally dismissed
HELD:
 No, Villola voluntarily resigned instead. When an employer uses
resignation as a defense in an illegal dismissal case, it is incumbent upon him to
prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. To prove that an employee did
resign, it must be supported by the concurrence of (1) his intent to relinquish his
office and (2) his overt act of relinquishment.
That Villola voluntarily relinquished his position was proven by the
evidence presented by UPL, and despite the absence of Villola’s resignation
letter, his contemporaneous and subsequent acts showed that he did resign from
UPL. First, Villola did not object to Consunji’s request from him to submit his
resignation letter. Consunji’s letters were ignored by Villola, and the latter only
responded to the former regarding his scanning consultancy service. Next, UPL
ceased paying Villola’s salary right after the latter stopped reporting for work at
his own initiative. Third, Villola still communicated with UPL regarding the
scanning project even after his supposed resignation.
 45. The People of the Philippines Vs. Noli Villegas, Jr., Lacrete
G.R. No. 218210. October 9, 2019
FACTS:
Accused was charged with the crime of rape with homicide for the rape
and death of AAA. Various circumstantial evidence and two witnesses were
presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. The accused
denied the commission of the crime and posited alibi as part of his defense
despite his house being only 10 to 15 minutes away from the place where the
crime was committed. He further argued that when the circumstances shown to
exist yield at least two inferences - one of which consistent with the presumption
of innocence and the other with a finding of guilt - the Court must acquit the
accused.
ISSUE: Whether circumstantial pieces of evidence are enough to convict an
accused despite presenting alibi as a defense
HELD:
Yes. Testimonies of the prosecution witnesses corroborate each other on
material points, hence, it shall be given great weight since the trial court found
these testimonies more convincing. Denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a
categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial
and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.