POSADAS VS.
CA only after they shall have obtained a search
On October 16, 1986 at about 10am Pat. Ursicio
Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar were conducting a
surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City.
While they were within the premises of the Rizal
Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be
acting suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified
themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was
thwarted by the two notwithstanding his
resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner
where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith &
Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2)
rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a
smoke (tear gas) grenade,3 and two (2) live
ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun.  abdomen. They approached these persons and
They brought the petitioner to the police station
for further investigation.
In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked
to show the necessary license or authority to
possess firearms and ammunitions found in his
possession but he failed to do so.
He was prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City.
Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals but still affirmed
the decision of the RTC.
Hence, the herein petition for review.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the arrest was lawful.
Whether or not the seizure, the items which were
confiscated from the possession of the petitioner
are inadmissible in evidence against him.
RULING:
YES. Thus, as between a warrantless search and
seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints
and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no
question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was
effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was
the right and duty of the police officers to inspect
the same.
ISSUES:
It is too much indeed to require the police officers
to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner
warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may
prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be
sustained under the exceptions heretofore
discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures has not
been violated.
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE
 Western Police District received a telephone
call from an informer that there were three
suspicious-looking persons at the corner of
Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo,
Manila
 A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was
forthwith dispatched to the place.
 Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan
narrated that they saw two men "looking from
side to side," one of whom was holding his
identified themselves as policemen, whereupon
the two tried to run away but were unable to
escape because the other lawmen had
surrounded them.
 The suspects were then searched. One of them,
who turned out to be the accused-appellant,
was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber.
 His companion, later identified as Nicanor
Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front
right pants pocket. The weapons were taken
from them.
 Mengote and Morellos were then turned over
to police headquarters for investigation by the
Intelligence Division.
 One other witness presented by the prosecution
was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the
subject weapon as among the articles stolen
from him during the robbery in his house in
Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to
Mengote as one of the robbers.
 He had duly reported the robbery to the police,
indicating the articles stolen from him,
including the revolver.
  Mengote made no effort to prove that he
owned the firearm or that he was licensed to
possess it and claimed instead that the weapon
had been "Planted" on him at the time of his
arrest.
 It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the
revolver should not have been admitted in
evidence because of its illegal seizure. no
warrant therefor having been previously
obtained. Neither could it have been seized as
an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest
of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been
also effected without a warrant.
 The defense also contends that the testimony
regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's
house was irrelevant and should also have been
disregarded by the trial court.
 WON the arrest was lawful.
WON the revolver should not have been admitted
in evidence because of its illegal seizure.
RULING:
NO. 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading
as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A
peace officer or private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b)
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as
Mengote was not an escapee from a penal
institution when he was arrested. We therefore
confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of
his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this
section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1)
after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in
the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused-appellant was merely
"looking from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen," according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that
had just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempted by Mengote
in their presence.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less
stringent requirements have also not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at
the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact
just been committed and that the arresting officers
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
Mengote had committed it. All they had was
hearsay information from the telephone caller, and
about a crime that had yet to be committed
MALACAT VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
 Police officer Rodolfu Yu, in response to bomb
threats reported seven days earlier, was on foot
patrol with three other police officers (all of
them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store
at Plaza Miranda.
 They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-
looking men, with each group, comprised of
three to four men, posted on opposite sides of
the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the
Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with [t]heir eyes moving very fast.
 Yu and his companions positioned themselves
at strategic points and observed both groups for
about thirty minutes.
 The police officers then approached one group
of men, who then fled in different directions.
 As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up
with and apprehended petitioner.
 Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a
fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioners
front waistline.
 Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio
Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from
whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered.
 Petitioner and Casan were then brought to
Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an X
mark at the bottom of the grenade and
thereafter gave it to his commander.
 On cross-examination, Yu declared that:
1. they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a
group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade
somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda.
2. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday,
25 August 1990, likewise, at Plaza Miranda, Yu
saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a
grenade.
3. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other
policemen chased petitioner and his companions;
however, the former was unable to catch any of
the latter.
4. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were
merely standing on the corner of Quezon
Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990.
5. Although they were not creating a commotion, since
they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and
his companions approached them.
6. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he
allegedly recovered from petitioner.
7. Also, officer Serapio, took petitioner’s confession
without a counsel during the inquest.
 Petitioner as the lone witness denied all the
allegations against him and asserted that he
was just strolling in Plaza Miranda to catch a
breath of fresh air and that he was surprisingly
apprehended by the police with the allegation
that he shoots him and he saw the grenade only
in court when it was presented.
 The trial court ruled that the warrantless search
and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and
frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by
an arrest and whose object is either to maintain
the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information.
 Probable cause was not required as it was not
certain that a crime had been committed,
however, the situation called for an
investigation, hence to require probable cause
would have been premature.
 The RTC emphasized that Yu and his
companions were [c]onfronted with an
emergency, in which the delay necessary to
obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of
evidence and the officers [h]ad to act in haste,
as petitioner and his companions were acting
suspiciously, considering the time, place and
reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners
group suddenly ran away in different directions
as they saw the arresting officers approach,
thus [i]t is reasonable for an officer to conduct
a limited search, the purpose of which is not
necessarily to discover evidence of a crime but
to allow the officer to pursue his investigation
without fear of violence.
 The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the
grenade from petitioner was incidental to a
lawful arrest, and since petitioner [l]ater
voluntarily admitted such fact to the police
investigator for the purpose of bombing the
Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient
evidence existed to establish petitioners guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
 CA affirmed lower court’s decision.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest was valid
HELD:
NO. The warrantless arrest is illegal.
According to the SC, the prosecution failed to
establish petitioners guilt with moral certainty.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and
seizures are that a warrant is needed in order to
validly effect the same. The Constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches
and seizures refer to those effected without a
validly issued warrant, subject to certain
exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests,
these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful --
A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped ***
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while
that under Section 5(b) has been described as a
"hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are
limited to the following:
(1) customs searches;
(2) the search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) (6) a "stop and frisk."
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the
warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the
seizure of the grenade from the accused as an
appropriate incident to his arrest, hence
necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of
these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused
the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly
effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for
conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made -- the process cannot be
reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter may
reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or property found which was
used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of
the crime, or that which may be used as evidence,
or which might furnish the arrestee with the means
of escaping or committing violence.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante
delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in
light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part
of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical
act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a
crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the
warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search
conducted on petitioner could not have been one
incidental to a lawful arrest.
In the case at bar, at least three (3) reasons why
the stop-and-frisk was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that
petitioner was a member of the group which
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier.
This claim is neither supported by any police
report or record nor corroborated by any other
police officer who allegedly chased that group.
Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness,
this likewise diminishes the probability that a
genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search
petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility
of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that
petitioner and his companions had to be chased
before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest
(Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon
arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner,
and his companions were "immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior
or conduct which could have reasonably elicited
even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were
moving very fast an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were
nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30
p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his
companions were merely standing at the corner
and were not creating any commotion or trouble.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or
otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed
with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for
as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered
inside the front waistline of the petitioner, and
from all indications as to the distance between Yu
and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that
petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not
have been visible to Yu.
Hence, petitioner is acquitted of the crime under
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (IPF)
PEOPLE VS. AMINNUDIN
FACTS:
 Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984,
shortly after disembarking from the M/V
Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo
City.
 The PC officers who were in fact waiting for
him simply accosted him, inspected his bag
and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves
took him to their headquarters for
investigation.
 Later on, the information was amended to
include Farida Ali y Hassen and both were
charged for Illegal Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs.
 The fiscal absolved Ali after a thorough
investigation.
 Then trial proceeded only against the accused-
appellant, who was eventually convicted.
 Then in his defense,
o Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana,
averring that all he had in his bag was
his clothing consisting of a jacket, two
shirts and two pairs of pants.
o He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed.
His bag was confiscated without a
search warrant.
o At the PC headquarters, he was
manhandled to force him to admit he
was carrying the marijuana, the
investigator hitting him with a piece of
wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still
handcuffed.  
o He insisted he did not even know what
marijuana looked like and that his
business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes.
o  He also argued that the marijuana he
was alleged to have been carrying was
not properly Identified and could have
been any of several bundles kept in the
stock room of the PC headquarters.
 The trial court was unconvinced, noting from
its own examination of the accused that he
claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell
watches but carried only two watches at the
time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and
spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his
other expenses.
 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two
watches in a secret pocket below his belt but,
strangely, they were not discovered when he
was bodily searched by the arresting officers
nor were they damaged as a result of his
manhandling.
  He also said he sold one of the watches for
P400.00 and gave away the other, although the
watches belonged not to him but to his cousin,
to a friend whose full name he said did not
even know.
 The trial court also rejected his allegations of
maltreatment, observing that he had not
sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by
him.
 On appeal, the Court finds it necessary to
answer the legality of his arrest without
warrant.
ISSUE:
WON The warrantless arrest is valid
HELD:
NO. Aminuddin was arrested illegally.
The mandate of the Constitution is clear that a
valid search or arrest warrant shall be served first
before the authorities can check his personal
properties or deprived him of his liberty.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or
search warrant issued by a judge after a personal
determination by him of the existence of probable
cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught
in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed
or had just been committed to justify the
warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court.
In the many cases where this Court has sustained
the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown
that they were caught red-handed, as a result of
what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of
the narcotics agents. Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the
accused was in the act of selling the prohibited
drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not,
at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that
he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9
and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of
the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that
he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by
the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them
to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest
him.
As to the Court’s exclusion of the illegally seized
marijuana as evidence against the accused-
appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt and he must, therefore, be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT
FACTS:
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of
the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed
at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking
all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted
by persistent reports that vehicles coming from
Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs. And an information also was
received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had in his possession prohibited drugs.
            In the afternoon the bus where accused was
riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were
members of the NARCOM and that they would
conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC
Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun,
the officer asked for accused’s passport and other
identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out
whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And
it turned out to be a pouched bag and when
accused opened the same bag the officer noticed
four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
            Thereafter, the accused was invited outside
the bus for questioning. But before he alighted
from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling
bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only
after the officers had opened the bags that the
accused finally presented his passport. The two
bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection
the stuff toy contained also hashish.
ISSUES:
WON the search of his personal effects was illegal
because it was made without a search warrant.
WON the prohibited drugs which were discovered
are inadmissible.
RULING:
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.5 However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to
obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a
private person under the following circumstances. 6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. –– A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
and
© When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and
(b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with
Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while
transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime
was actually being committed by the accused and
he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest.7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were
not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal effects of accused,
however, under the circumstances of the case,
there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an
accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the
smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused,10 or where the accused was
acting suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee.
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure
of the accused to produce his passport, taken
together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to
hide something illegal from the authorities. From
these circumstances arose a probable cause which
justified the warrantless search that was made on
the personal effects of the accused. In other words,
the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the
accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one
of the wrapped objects found inside said bag
(which was discovered to contain hashish) as well
as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2)
teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were
prompted by accused’s own attempt to hide his
identity by refusing to present his passport, and by
the information received by the NARCOM that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM
agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly,
including, to search even without warrant, in the
light of such circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement,
to the detriment of society.
ESPANO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
 The accused was caught in flagrante by herein
police officers selling Marijuana near Zamora
and Pandacan Streets, where they are
conducting an investigation in the area reported
being rampant of drug pushing. The agents
frisked the accused after he completed his
transaction to a buyer and there found with him
2 tea bags of Marijuana.
 Accused was asked by the police officers
whether he has some more of the marijuana
and told them he got more at his house. They
went to the accused house and found 10 more
teabags of Marijuana.
 During the trial, accused denied all the
allegations against him and made an alibi that
he was in his house sleeping when the police
officer went to his house looking for his
brother in law and instead handcuffed him to
take his part for allegedly having in his
possession 10 teabags of Marijuana.
 The trial court did not believe his alibi and
found him guilty of violation of Article II,
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
 Accused appealed and said that the arrest was
illegally done and the search of his house is
deemed a violation of his constitutional right.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest is valid.
HELD:
YES. Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the
aforecited rule (Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules
of Court ). He was caught in flagranti as a result
of a buy-bust operation conducted by police
officers on the basis of information received
regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area
of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The
police officer saw petitioner handing over
something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer
left, they searched him and discovered two pieces
of cellophane of marijuana. His arrest was,
therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of
marijuana seized were admissible in evidence,
being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found
at petitioners residence, however, the same are
inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against
unreasonable searches and seizures under Article
III, Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense. It may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include
the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana seized at petitioners house after his
arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall
under the said exceptions.
Petition denied with a modification that the 10
bags of marijuana seized from his house is
inadmissible in evidence since no search warrant
was served to him.
PAPA VS. MAGO
FACTS:
 Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-
intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, acting upon a reliable information
that a certain shipment of personal effects,
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would
be released the following day from the customs
 zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two
trucks.
 Upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief
of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent
of the Bureau of Customs, Petitioner Alagao
conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the
customs zone.
 When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in
the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements
of the counter-intelligence unit went after the
trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina
Circle, Ermita, Manila.
 The load of the two trucks consisting of nine
bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized
on instructions of the Chief of Police.
 Upon investigation, a person claimed
ownership of the goods and showed to the
policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties
Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501",
issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name
of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
 Remedios Mago, herein respondent, said that
she owns the goods seized.
Ø That she purchased them from the Sta. Monica
Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga;
Ø that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa
to transport, the goods from said place to her
residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc,
Manila;
Ø  that the goods were seized by members of the
Manila Police Department without search warrant
issued by a competent court;
Ø that Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the
request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the
bales be not opened and the goods contained
therein be not examined;
Ø that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had
illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods
because the goods were no longer under the
control and supervision of the Commissioner of
Customs;
Ø that the goods, even assuming them to have been
misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to
seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and
Customs Code because Remedios Mago had
bought them from another person without
knowledge that they were imported illegally.
 Hence, respondent Mago filed for prohibition
and certiorari.
 Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 67496
(regarding restraining respondents from
opening 9 bales), Judge Hilarion Jarencio
issued an order ex parte restraining the
petitioners. However, when the restraining
order was received by herein respondent, some
bales had already been opened by the
examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the
presence of officials of the Manila Police
Department, an assistant city fiscal and a
representative of herein respondent Remedios
Mago.
 Also, Remedios Mago filed an ex parte motion
to release the goods which the court granted.
 Petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf,
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
of the court releasing the goods under bond,
upon the ground that the Manila Police
Department had been directed by the Collector
of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the
goods pending termination of the seizure
proceedings.
 Without waiting for the court's action on the
MR, and alleging that they had no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, herein petitioners filed the
present action for prohibition and certiorari
with a preliminary injunction before this Court.
ISSUE:
WON the seizure of the imported goods is validly
done by herein petitioners
WON an automobile truck or an automobile could
be searched without search warrant
HELD:
1. YES. The seizure is valid.
The goods in question are imported articles
entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found
to have been released irregularly from Customs
custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure
and forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes
within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs
pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of
Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement
of the customs laws, from the moment the goods
are actually in its possession or control, even if no
warrant of seizure or detention had previously
been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture
proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of
Customs actually seized the goods in question on
November 4, 1966, and so from that date the
Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the
goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the
tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the
regular courts. Much less then would the Court of
First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the
goods in question after the Collector of Customs
had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on
January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as
respondents contend, that the issuance of the said
warrant was only an attempt to divest the
respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. The court presided by
respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over
the goods in question when the petition for
mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no
need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having
acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that
the Court of First Instance of Manila had no
jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March
7, 1967releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin
Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police
Department, could not seize the goods in question
without a search warrant. This contention cannot
be sustained.

The Chief of the Manila Police Department,
Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing
by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the
purposes of the enforcement of the customs and
tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests,
and it was his duty to make seizure, among others,
of any cargo, articles or other movable property
when the same may be subject to forfeiture or
liable for any fine imposed under customs and
tariff laws.
He could lawfully open and examine any box,
trunk, envelope or other containers wherever
found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the
presence therein of dutiable articles introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise
to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such article as aforesaid.   commission of a crime of all degrees, from those
It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner
Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could
lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods
in question. The Tariff and Customs Code
authorizes him to demand the assistance of any
police officer to effect said search and seizure, and
the latter has the legal duty to render said
assistance. This was what happened precisely in
the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit,
made the search and seizure of the two trucks
loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at
the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the
Chief of Police to make the interception of the
cargo.
2. YES. Petitioner Martin Alagao and his
companion policemen had authority to effect the
seizure without any search warrant issued by a
competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code
does not require said warrant in the instant case.
The Code authorizes persons having police
authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any
land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not
being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search
and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, or envelope or any person on board, or to
stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning
the need of a search warrant in said cases.  But in
the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides
that said: "dwelling house may be entered and
searched only upon a warrant issued by a judge or
justice of the peace. . . ."  It is our considered
view, therefore, that except in the case of the
search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may effect
search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws.
An automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of
recent development, which has multiplied by
quantity production and taken possession of our
highways in battalions until the slower, animal-
drawn vehicles, with their easily noted
individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered
vehicles to standard form in immense quantities,
and with a capacity for speed rivaling express
trains, they furnish for a successful commission of
a crime a disguising means of silent approach and
swift escape unknown in the history of the world
before their advent. The question of their police
control and reasonable search on highways or
other public places is a serious question far deeper
and broader than their use in so-called
"bootlegging" or "rum running," which is itself is
no small matter. While a possession in the sense of
private ownership, they are but a vehicle
constructed for travel and transportation on
highways. Their active use is not in homes or on
private premises, the privacy of which the law
especially guards against search and seizure
without process. The baffling extent to which they
are successfully utilized to facilitate the
against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery,
rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common
knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition, and
not a theory, confronts proper administration of
our criminal laws. Whether the search of and
seizure from an automobile upon a highway or
other public place without a search warrant is
unreasonable is in its final analysis to be
determined as a judicial question in view of all the
circumstances under which it is made.
Therefore, the seizure by the members of the
Manila Police Department of the goods in question
was in accordance with law and by that seizure,
the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction
over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement
of the customs and tariff laws.
PEOPLE VS. MUSA
FACTS:
On 14 December 1989, the accused sold 2
wrappers containing marijuana leaves to Sgt.
Amado Ani in a buy-bust operation in Zamboanga
City.
The said buy-bust operation was planned since a
civilian informer told that Mari Musa was engaged
in selling marijuana and therefore, a test-buy was
conducted the day prior to the said buy-bust
operation. During the buy-bust operation, after
Sgt. Ani handed the money to Musa, Musa entered
his house to get the wrappings. Upon his return
and with the inspection of the wrappings, Musa
was arrested, but the marked money used as
payment cannot be found with him, prompting the
NARCOM agents to go inside his house. There,
they could not find the marked money, but they
found more marijuana leaves hidden in a plastic
bag inside the kitchen.
The leaves were confirmed as marijuana by the
forensic chemist of the PC crime laboratory, who
later on served as a witness, along with T/Sgt.
Jesus Belarga, the team leader of the buy-bust
operation and Sgt. Ani.
The defense gave a different version of what
happened on 14 December 1989 wherein he and
his wife, Ahara Musa, served as witnesses. They
said that the NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian
clothes, got inside their house since the door was
open, and upon entering, declared that they were
NARCOM agents and searched the house, despite
demands of the couple for a search warrant. The
agents found a red bag whose contents were
unknown to the Musas.
Musa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
by the trial court.
On appeal, Musa contests that his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. He also
questioned the credibility of the witnesses, as well
as the admissibility of the seized plastic bag as
evidence since it violates his constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures
provided in Art. III, Sec. 2.
ISSUES:
1. WON Musa is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt
2.     WON the seized plastic bag containing
marijuana is admissible as evidence.
RULING:
1. YES. The corroborative testimony of
T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct
evidence given by Sgt. Ani. Additionally,
the Court has ruled that the fact that the
police officers who accompanied the
poseur-buyer were unable to see exactly
what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer
because of their distance or position will
not be fatal to the prosecution's
case30 provided there exists other
evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the
testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is
sufficient to prove the consummation of
the sale of the prohibited drug.
NO. In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents
searched the person of the appellant after arresting
him in his house but found nothing. They then
searched the entire house and, in the kitchen,
found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the
arresting officer to make a search upon the person
of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court
has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest may
take from the person arrested any money or
property found upon his person which was used in
the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the
crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the
means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as
evidence in the trial of the cause . . . "38 Hence, in a
buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-
pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the
marked money found on the person of the pusher
immediately after the arrest even without arrest
and search warrants
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident
to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises
or surroundings under his immediate
control.40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence.
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be
used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and
his person searched in the living room. Failing to
retrieve the marked money which they hoped to
find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole
house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The
plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain
view" when they arrested the appellant as to
justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to
move from one portion of the house to another
before they sighted the plastic bag. 
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances
of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not
apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic
bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in
evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of
the Constitution.
VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA
FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region
District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within
its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the
National Capital Region.1 As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of
said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are
worried of being harassed and of their safety being
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches
and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
without the benefit of a search warrant and/or
court order. Their alleged fear for their safety Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of interest of public security. In this connection, the
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway movement, so clearly reflected in the increased
at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or killings in cities of police and military men by
refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the
for continuing to speed off inspire of warning abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming
shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban
claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru centers, not all of which are reported in media,
these checkpoints where he was stopped and his most likely brought about by deteriorating
car subjected to search/check-up without a court economic conditions — which all sum up to what
order or search warrant. one can rightly consider, at the very least, as
abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the
Petitioners further contend that the said state to protect its existence and promote public
checkpoints give the respondents a blanket welfare and an individual's right against a
authority to make searches and/or seizures without warrantless search which is
search warrant or court order in violation of the however reasonably conducted, the former should
Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where prevail.
a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military
Petitioners' concern for their safety and is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in
apprehension at being harassed by the military the same manner that all governmental power is
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to
illegal. No proof has been presented before the the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
Court to show that, in the course of their routine times, when conducted within reasonable limits,
checks, the military indeed committed specific are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
violations of petitioners' right against unlawful and a peaceful community.
search and seizure or other rights.
ISSUE:
WON  the installations of the checkpoints violated
their constitutional right against illegal search and
seizures.
RULING:
NO. The constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
only by those whose rights have been
infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search
and seizure in any particular case is purely a
judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the
effect that he had been stopped and searched
without a search warrant by the military manning
the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating
the details of the incidents which amount to a
violation of his right against unlawful search and
seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation of
Valmonte's right against unlawful search and
seizure. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in

Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the
NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public.