PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
ANDRE MARTI The Court pointed out that: a) It was the proprietor who made a reasonable search of the packages in
FACTS:
Andre Marti and his wife Shirley Reyes, went to the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders
carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages to be sent to WALTER FIERZ,a friend, in Zuroch,
Switzerland.
When asked by the forwarder, Anita Reyes (proprietress), if they could examine and inspect the
packages, Marti refused, assuring that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend. Anita no longer insisted on inspecting the packages.
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (proprietor), opened the boxes for final inspection as part of the SOP. When he opened appellant's
box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. He took several grams of the contents thereof and suspected that
the content were dried leaves.
Job Reyes reported the incident to NBI was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics and informed
that the rest of the shipment was still in his office.
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI
agents, dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the packages.
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after
signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects.
After Marti was traced by NBI, he was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA
No. 6425).
Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against him, which, according to him, is obtained
in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizure has been violated?
Whether or not an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional
rights, be invoked against the State?
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties granted by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government.
Its protection is directed only to governmental action. This right does not require exclusion of evidence
obtained through a search by a private citizen.
In this case, the evidence was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a
private capacity and without the intervention of State authorities. Therefore, there is no reason why it
should not be admitted to prosecute him.
Marti, however, alleged that the NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence.
compliance with SOP AND b) the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected into a warrantless search and seizure. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is
not a search.
Marti further argued that since the Constitution expressly declares as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not
whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals.
The Court answered that the Constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and
fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.
DISCUSSION:
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were
invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized
government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
without the intervention and participation of State authorities.
HARRY S. STONEHILL,et.al vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO
FACTS:
In violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code, 42 warrants were issued against petitioners or the corporation where they are officers
to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and
to seize and take possession of their books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) which are the subject of the offense.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using
the effects seized and declaring the contested search warrants null and void since (1) they do not describe
with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the
warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued
the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners'
consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However, by a
resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the offices of the
corporations but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and
seized in the residences of petitioners.
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrant is valid.
Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation.
RULING:
1. NO. Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection,
the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed  particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the
things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
2. NO. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that
said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality
of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, 9 and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN vs. HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR
FACTS:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them
although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
1. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary
of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of
Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On
appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988.
2. The case at bar is a petition raised by one of the petitioners, Beltran, who wants to call for an
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest.
The petitioner assailed that his constitutional right was violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause. Beltran's interpretation of the words "determined personally" convinced him that the judge
is solely responsible to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
3. Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution,
bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to
possible contempt of court or perjury.
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts.
3. YES. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office
holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so, minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to
the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

RULING:
1. NO. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the
administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process
of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a
criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. NICOMEDES SILVA vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC OF NEGROS
All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so ORIENTAL
minded.
FACTS:
2. NO. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
RTC judge Nickarter Ontal issued a search warrant filed by M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, chief of the
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
PC NARCOM Detachment in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, to be served against Petitioner
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
Nicomedes Silva whose application was accompanied by “deposition of witness” executed by Arthur
Alcoran and Pat. Leon Quindo.
Judge Ontal issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing the aforesaid police officers to search the
room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. as amended. The search warrant stated that “You
are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the day (night) of the room of Tama
Silva residence of his father Comedes Silva to open  aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartoons, containers,
forthwith seize and take possession of the following property Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and
bring the said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.”
During the raid, the officers seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of
P1,231.40. Petitioners alleged that the enforcement of the search warrant was illegal because it was issued
on the sole basis of mimeographed and the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witness
by searching questions and answers.
 Antoinette Silva also filed a motion the return of the said amount because her name is not
included in the search warrant. Thus, her belongings shouldn’t be subject of the warrant. Acting on the said
motion to return the money, Judge Ontal issued an order stating that the court “holds in abeyance the
disposition of the said amount pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection with the search
warrant.
Trial Court’s Judge Cruz replacing judge Ontal, ruled against petitioners. Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrant is validly issued by Judge Ontal.
WON the officers abused their authority in implementing the search warrant.
RULING:
1. NO. Section 2, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to personal
liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. This section provides:L
"SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatevernature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by
officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such
usurpations when attempted.
Thus, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant, to wit:
"SECTION 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
"SECTION 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted."
Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the judge must, before issuing a
search warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses
through searching questions and answers.
In the case of Prudente vs. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, this Court defined "probable cause" as
follows:
"The 'probable cause' for a valid search warrant, has been defined 'as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched'. This
probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay."
In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as well as the
"Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed to
comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause. The joint
"Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was submitted together with the
"Application for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part, suggestive questions answerable by merely
placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided thereon.
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and
statutory requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this
requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
2. YES. The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the
money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named as
one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves,
cigarettes and joints, and that the search warrant was issued for the seizure of personal property (a) subject
of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense and NOT for
personal property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus, the then presiding
Judge Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he rejected the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva
seeking the return of her seized money.
ESTEBAN MORANO, CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN vs. HON. MARTINIANO VIVO
FACTS:
Chan Sau Wah with her minor child, Fu Yan Fun were granted a temporary visitor’s visa as for two
months upon posting P4k cash bond to visit a cousin in the Philippines. She soon married to Esteban
Morano, a Filipino Citizen and gave birth to a child, Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the
Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on
Sept. 10, 1962 and were ordered by Commissioner of Immigration (COI) thru a letter, to leave the country
on or before Sept. 10, 1962 with warning of issuance of warrant of arrest for failure to leave and
confiscation of bond.
Instead of leaving the country, petitioners then filed with the CFI of Manila for Mandamus to compel COI
to cancel their Alien Certificate Registrations, to stop issuing arrest warrant, and preliminary injunction
from confiscating their bond. They argue that Chan Sau Wah became a Filipino Citizen upon marriage to
Esteban Morano by virtue of Revised Naturalization Act. Likewise, it argues that Section 37 of the
Immigration Act of 1940 is unconstitutional for allowing the COI to issue warrant of arrest which trenches
upon the constitutional mandate of the Bills of Right and effecting deportation without judicial
intervention enshrined in the Constitution.
CFI decided partly against petitioners, thus, COI and petitioners both appealed to SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Chan Sau Wah to Esteban Morano makes her a Filipino citizen.
Whether or not Section 37 of the Immigration Act of 1940 empowering the COI to issue a warrant of
arrest, and deport upon a warrant on deportation cases is unconstitutional for it trenches the Constitutional
mandate on searches and seizures without judicial intervention required under the Constitution.
1. NO. In a series of cases, this court has declared that the marriage of an alien woman to a
Filipino citizen does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen. She must satisfactorily show that
she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by the Naturalization Law.
'Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who
is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines."
To apply this provision, two requisites must concur: (a) a valid marriage of an alien woman to a
citizen of the Philippines; and (b) the alien woman herself might be lawfully naturalized.
We may concede that the first requisite has been properly met but not the second one.
2. NO. Squarely put in issue by petitioners is the constitutionality of Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act
of 1940, which reads:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under
which he was admitted as a nonimmigrant.
Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in
the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation
contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power 4 as a step preliminary or incidental to
prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to
carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.
In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3), Article III of the
Constitution aforesaid, requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend
to deportation proceedings.
Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such power is planted
on the "accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions."8 So it is, that this Court once aptly remarked that there can be no controversy on the fact that
where aliens are admitted as temporary visitors, "the law is to the effect that temporary visitors who do not
depart upon the expiration of the period of stay granted them are subject to deportation by the
Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated the limitation or condition under which they were
admitted as non-immigrants.
ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT vs. HONORABLE
COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO , COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION
AND DEPORTATION
FACTS:
Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, are both American, while Adriaan Van Elshout is
a Dutch citizen.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended
after three months of close surveillance by CID agents. Two (2) days after apprehension seventeen (17) of
the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country. One was released
for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid
working visa. Thus, of the original twenty-two (22), only the three petitioners have chosen to face
deportation.
 Seized during petitioners’ apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected
child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also
posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes.
Deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens in that:
they, being pedophiles, are inimical to public morals, public health and public safety.
Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45
and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release and Petition for Bail however denied by the CID.
Petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a
self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the
custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country.
Board of Special Inquiry — III allowed provisional release of five (5) days only under certain
conditions. However, it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed,
Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of
existence of probable cause.
Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.
WON Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of
petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not
valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They further allege that
being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.
RULING:
1.Yes, the warrant of arrest is valid. The Supreme Court decided in the case of Vivo vs. Montesa that "the
issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation
and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section I of Article III of the
Constitution" (referring to the 1935 Constitution) is not inviolable herein. Respondent Commissioner's
Warrant of Arrest issued did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be
deported. They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act
and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code." Before that, deportation proceedings had been
commenced against them as undesirable aliens and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible
deportation.
Also, the requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings."  There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a
single deportation proceeding. The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs.
Deportation Board reiterated in Vivo vs. Montesa, that "under the express terms of our Constitution (the
1935 Constitution), it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any
authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading
to an administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated, probable cause had already been shown to
exist before the warrants of arrest were issued.
2.NO There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused
of crime or not. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that
it must be based upon probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a
cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof."
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest with a warrant may be effected by a
peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113,
Section 5).
3. NO. In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close
surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of
probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without
warrant.
Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.
The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Section 37(a) provides in part:
(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation or any other officer designated by him for the purpose and
deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien;
SORIANO MATA v. v. HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA
The contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on application for
Search Warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully allegedly subscribed,
and sworn to before the Clerk of Court. Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of the
respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinently under PD 810, as amended by PD1306, the
information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took, and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game
by “selling illegal tickets knows as Masiao tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai and
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the
said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the
same.
This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles
seized, citing and invoking, among others but was denied by respondent Judge stating that the court has
made a thorough investigation and examination under oath.
Hence this petition praying that the search warrant to be invalid and all the articles confiscated under such
warrant as inadmissible as evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Search Warrant is valid?
RULING:
NO. The SC hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court.
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge
must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition
to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform
with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering
the search warrant invalid.
UMIL v. RAMOS
 Various petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus by accused suspected to be NPA members
 Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie Javellon, believed to
be one of the five NPA sparrows who recently murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being
treated in St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds.
 Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that his real name is
Rolando Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the NPA).
 Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security
reasons. 
 Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who recently murdered
the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
 In this 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military
on the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army
member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest and subsequent detention of accused is in accordance with law.
Whether or not issuance of Writ should be granted.
RULING:
Warrantless arrest of Dural in the hospital is within the contemplation of Section 5(b) of Rule 113,
RCP
 Dural arrested for being an NPA member
 NPA is an outlawed organization
 Rebellion is a continuing offense
Based on probable cause
 Confidential information received by arresting officers is deemed reasonable, with probable
cause and in good faith as officers are not ill-motivated in arresting Dural.
 Mere suspicion of being a communist party member is absolutely not a ground for arrest
without warrant
PEOPLE v. SUCRO
 PO Fulgencio monitored activities of Sucro suspected of selling marijuana
 Sucro was seen entering a chapel, taking something (which turned out later to be marijuana)
from the compartment of a cart inside the chapel, getting out of the chapel, and handing it to
a first buyer, then to second buyers, and to a third person named Macabante
 Police pursued Macabante who threw the thing on the ground and admitted buying it from
Sucro
 Police overtook and arrested Sucro and recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from
the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante
 Sucro alleges sufficient time for police to secure SWWA considering that Fulgencio
informed his superior about the activities of the accused 2 days before the arrest
ISSUE: ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest is lawful Whether or not the warrantless arrest and search are valid
Whether or not marijuana seized are admissible in evidence Whether or not the evidence seized is admissible

RULING: RULING:

 Sec. 5(a), Rule 113  A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a o Suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana
distance o Taduran immediately released Don instead of arresting and taking him into
Fulgencio saw Sucro three times dealing drugs inside the chapel where he is 2 meters away custody
monitoring his nefarious activities o Inconsistent with the purpose of buy-bust operation
 Sec. 5(b), Rule 113
After the 3rd deal, the police intercepted the buyer Macabante and when confronted by the police,
Macabante readily admitted that he bought the marijuana from Sucro GO v. COURT OF APPEALS
Sucro had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge,
being members of the team which monitored his nefarious activity
 Sec. 13, Rule 126  Go entered a one-way street and travelled the wrong direction, and nearly bumped with
General rule – search and seizure to be valid must be supported by SWWA victim Maguan
Exception – search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest  Go got out of his car, shot Maguan, and fled
ERGO, Sucro’s warrantless arrest and search is valid and the evidence is thus admissible  A security guard was able to take note of Go’s plate number
 Police arrived and recovered an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for 9 mm,
and traced car registration to one Elsa Go
 Next day, police went back to crime scene, got credit card impression from bakeshop
where Go came from shortly before the shooting incident
 SG was shown Go’s picture and positively identified Go
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZA  Police then started manhunt for Go
 6 days later, Go went police station with 2 lawyers to clear his name
 Police officers conducted buy-bust operation upon receipt of confidential information
 Go was identified by an eyewitness at the police station
 PO Taduran acted as poseur buyer, told to look for Don Rodrigueza the alleged seller of
 Police immediately detained him and a charge for Frustrated Homicide was filed before
prohibited drug
the OPP of Rizal which was later changed to Murder
 Along the road, Taduran met Segovia who introduced him to Don
 RTC Judge cancelled bail bond posted by Go, issued order for his immediate surrender
 After agreeing on the price, Don haulted tricycle driven by Lonceras and upon return, handed and bail hearing
to Taduran a ”certain object wrapped in plastic” (turned out later to be marijuana) and got
 Go petitioned for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against RTC Judge before the
payment
CA
 Taduran returned to the HQ and made a report
 CA ruled that warrantless arrest was valid
 In the evening of same day, team apprehended 3 accused without WA.
 Hence, this Petition for Review before the SC
 Team also raided the house of Don’s father, without SW, and confiscated dried marijuana
leaves and a plastic syringe ISSUE:
 The next day, all 3 accused were examined and positive for ultraviolet powder
 whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner
 Trial court acquitted Segovia and Lonceras but convicted Don Rodrigueza
Go
whether or not petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation

RULING:

 Reliance in the case of Umil v. Ramos is misplaced

o In Umil, warrantless arrest was effected 14 days after the killing while in Go, 6 days
after the shooting incident
o In Umil, the crime committed is a continuing offense while in Go, offense was
commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space
 Arrest not within the ambit of Sec. 5 Rule 113
o Arrest took place after the shooting of Maguan
o “Arresting” officers were not present at the shooting incident within the contemplation
of Sec. 5(a)
o "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting cannot be reasonably regarded as effected
"when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section
5(b)
o none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan