GR.
No/Article
Sections 2 and 3, Article III
of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication
and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Facts Issue
Marti and his common law wife went
to Manila export and package
forwarders to send 4 packaged
wrapped as a gift to a friend in Zurich
Switzerland.
During the transaction, Anita Reyes, the
person in charged in the receiving
section asked to open the packaged but
Marti justified that what’s inside are
some gifts for a friend in Zurich like
tobacco, gloves, etc. So Anita Reyes
process it without further inspection.
When it passed by the custody of
Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Post,
the proprietor Anita and her husband
undergo the usual process where they
opened the packaged for inspection.
To their surprise, the packaged
contained dried leaves which turned
out to be marijuana. The also check the
rest of the boxes, and the said cigar
also contained marijuana as well as the
other boxes. (the opening of boxes was
done in the presence of NBI Agents)
They try to locate the suspect, which
they eventually found after series of
investigation.
After the result of the Forensic
Chemsitry Section which confirmed the
Ruling
SC hold in the negative. In the absence of
WON an act of a private governmental interference, the liberties
Individual guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.
In the case of Villanueva V. Quirubin
(since the one who “ This constitutional right (against unreasonable
discovered it first is the search and seizure) refers to the immunity of
proprietor), allegedly in one's person,whether citizen or alien, from
violation of appellant's interference by government”
constitutional rights, be
invoked against the There the state, however powerful, does not as
State? such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted,
Reason behind the decision:
1. It was Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) who opened
the box as part of the standard procedure before
delivering the package to Bureau of Customs.
That he is the one who conducted the search
and infection.
Mr. Reyes is the one who took the sample and
sent it to NBI for checking
Clearly, the NBI agents made no search
and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to
the postulate of accused/appellant.
2 the mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes
into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed
by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look
at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
identification of the substance as
marijuana, Marti was an Information
was filed against appellant for violation
of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous -Drugs Act.
the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is
not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission.
(mine:whatever searches done by a private
person against another who discovered the
crimes of others is admissible as evidence and
could not question the constitutionality of such
act/ But if it is an act by the government, then it
is a violation to your constitutional rights and
would turn the evidence invalid.)
__
To Whom this protection is given
Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual
and the state. Its concern is not the relation
between individuals, between a private
individual and other individuals. What the Bill of
Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in
the private sphere inaccessible to any power
holder. (Bernas)
Thus, The constitutional proscription against
unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies
as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
power is imposed.

G.R. No. 188920 February 16, 2010
Atienza V Comelec
This case is an offshoot of former 2
cases resolved already regarding the
election dispute occurred in the Liberal
Party.
On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza
hosted a party conference to
supposedly discuss local autonomy and
party matters but, when convened, the
assembly proceeded to declare all
positions in the LP’s ruling body vacant
and
elected new officers, with Atienza as LP
president. This was questioned by
Franklin Drilon who raised the invalidity
of the said election since the NECO and
NAPOLCO did not convene.
Since COMELEC has jurisdiction on this
matter, it granted the petition of
Drilon. Then NECO and NAPOLCO
convened in a meeting to elect new
leaders before Drilon’s expired term.
Thus, Manuel Roxas was installed as
the new LP President.
It follows from this that with the
national and local elections taking place
in May 2007, the number and
composition of the NECO would have
to yield to changes brought about by
If request for search and seizures are done by
enforcer of law, it should have warrant first that
will pass the test of constitutionality/.
Whether or not No. The requirements of administrative due
respondents Roxas, et process do not apply to the internal affairs of
al. violated petitioners political parties.
Atienza, et al.’s
constitutional right to Administrative agency or instrumentality
due process by the "contemplates an "authority to which the state
latter’s expulsion from delegates governmental power for the
the party. performance of a state function.
(They claim that the The constitutional limitations that generally
NAPOLCO and the NECO apply to the exercise of the state’s powers thus,
should have first apply too, to administrative bodies.
summoned them to a
hearing before The constitutional limitations on the exercise of
summarily expelling the state’s powers are found in Article III of the
them from the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of
party. According to Rights, which guarantees against the taking of
Atienza, et al., life, property, or liberty without due process
proceedings on party under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the
discipline are the state’s powers in relation to the rights of its
equivalent of citizens.
administrative
proceedings) The right to due process is meant to protect
ordinary citizens against arbitrary government
action, but not from acts committed by
private individuals or entities.
In the latter case, the specific statutes that
provide reliefs from such private acts apply.
The right to due process guards against
 the unwarranted encroachment by the state into the
elections. fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be
invoked in private controversies involving
private parties.23
Although political parties play an important role
in our democratic set-up as an intermediary
between the state and its citizens, it is still a
private organization, not a state instrument. The
discipline of members by a political party does
not involve the right to life, liberty or property
within the meaning of the due process clause.
An individual has no
vested right, as against the state, to be accepted
or to prevent his removal by a political party.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the

Resolution of the Commission on Elections
dated June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001. Therefore,
election of ROxas as LP president remains valid

The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party

disputes is limited. It does not have blanket
authority to resolve any and all controversies
involving political parties. Political parties are
generally free to conduct their activities without
interference from the state. The COMELEC may
intervene in disputes internal to a party only
when necessary to the discharge of its
constitutional functions.
Valid Exercise of Police Power

[G.R. NO. 157036. June 9, This is in line with President Gloria Whether or not the Yes. The SC held that indeed it is a valid exercise
2004] MAcapagal Arroyo’s mandate to issuance of the assailed of police power.
prohibit the carrying of firearms in Guidelines is a valid
public places outside their residency exercise of police The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the
provided with some exemptions such power? petition pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of
as those in imminent danger, those courts.
who are in line with their duties need WON THE PRESIDENTS
to carry such firearms, etc. as provided VERBAL DECLARATION Nonetheless, in refutation of petitioners
in the guidelines prepared by PNP Chief ON GUN BAN VIOLATED arguments, he contends that: (1) the PNP Chief
Ebdane based on President Arroyo’s THE PEOPLES RIGHT TO is authorized to
directive PROTECT LIFE AND issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does
THEIR PROPERTY RIGHT not have a constitutional right to own and carry
TO CARRY firearms; (3) the assailed Guidelines do not
FIREARMS. violate the due process clause of the
Constitution; and (4)
the assailed Guidelines do not constitute an ex
post facto law.

Despite the changes in the law or in the position

like Chief of the Constabulary to PNP Chief by
virtue of Republic Act No. 6975,21 the Philippine
National Police (PNP) absorbed the Philippine
Constabulary (PC).

Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the

Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore,
assumed the latters licensing authority. Section
24 thereof specifies, as one of PNPs powers, the
issuance of licenses for the possession of
firearms and explosives in accordance with
law.22

This is in conjunction with the PNP Chiefs power

to issue detailed implementing policies and
instructions on such matters as may be
necessary to effectively carry out the functions,
powers and duties of the PNP.

G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
Ermita Malate Vs City Mayor
on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, which was
approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-
Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the
acting City Mayor of Manila, in the
absence of the respondent regular City
Mayor, amending sections 661, 662,
668-a, 668-b and 669 of the
compilation of the ordinances of the
City of Manila besides inserting therein
three new sections. This
ordinance is similar to the one vetoed
by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for
the reasons stated in its 4th
Indorsement dated February 15, 1963
(Annex B);
Then petition for prohibition was files
by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc.,
and a certain Go Chiu being beyond the
powers of the Municipal Board of the
Thus, the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to
the Chief of the Constabulary the authority to
issue rules and regulations regarding firearms
remains
effective.
Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 6975
authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed
guidelines.
Petition dismissed.
whether Yes. The statute here questioned deals with a
Ordinance No. 4760 of subject clearly within the scope of the police
the City of Manila is a power. The presumption of constitutionality
valid exercise of police must prevail in the absence of some factual
power. foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute.".
The mantle of protection associated with the
due process guaranty does not cover petitioners.
This particular manifestation of a police power
measure being specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals is immune from such imputation
of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of
substance.
explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio
Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of
facts,
speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of
prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila
traceable in great part to the existence of
motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere
City of Manila to enact insofar as it
would regulate motels, on the ground
that in the revised charter of the City of
Manila or in any other law.
That the challenged ordinance the
challenged ordinance is
unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due
process which require the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or
lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or
customer or letting any room or other
quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed
form in a lobby open
to public view at all times and in his
presence
require the owner, manager, keeper or
duly authorized representative of a
hotel, motel, or lodging house to
refrain from entertaining or accepting
any guest or customer or letting any
room or other quarter to any person or
persons without his filling up the
prescribed form in a lobby open to
public view at all times and in his
presence
challenged ordinance prohibiting a
person less than 18 years old from
for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and
thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes
and thrill-seekers police power is "that inherent
and plenary power in the State which enables it
to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society
Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City
Mayor and chief executive of the City of
Manila charged with the general power and duty
to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and
to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and
enforcement of such ordinances;
Justice Malcolm: "The
presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The
local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has
in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well being of the people x x x .
The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation.2

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 198
City government v ericta
being
accepted in such hotels, motels,
lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a
lawful
guardian and making it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of such
establishments to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every
24 hour
The city government of Quezon City
issued Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118,
S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF
PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY
OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE
VIOLATION THEREOF"
provides:
1. that 6% of the total area of a private
owned memorial park shall be allotted
for charity burial of paupers to be
determined by competent city
authorities
But seven years after its enactment,
they issued this: RESOLVED by the
council of Quezon assembled, to
request, as it does hereby request the
City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any
further selling and/or transaction of
WON taking of the No. Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of
respondent's property is Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but
a valid and reasonable an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of
exercise of police his private property without due process of law,
power? nay, even without compensation.
no reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area
of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually
a taking without compensation of a certain area
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries.
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power
of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and
 memorial park lots in Quezon City
where the owners thereof have failed
to donate the required 6% space
intended for paupers burial.
In response, Himlayang Pilipino reacted
by filing a petition for declaratory relief
as is contrary to the
Constitution, the Quezon City Charter,
the Local Autonomy Act, and the
Revised Administrative Code.
G.R. No. 89572 December The private respondent is a graduate of
21, 1989 the University of the East with a degree
Decs V SB of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The
petitioner claims that he took the
NMAT three times and flunked it as
many times.1 When he applied to take
it
again, the petitioner rejected his
pplication on the basis of the aforesaid
rule. He then went to the Regional Trial
regulating the use of liberty and property
If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not
taken for public use but rather to destroy in
order to promote
the general welfare. owner does not recover
from the government for injury sustained in
consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623).
police power is the most essential of
government powers, at times the most insistent,
and always one of the least limitable of
thepowers of government
Supreme Court has said that police power is so
far-reaching in scope that it has almost become
impossible to limit its sweep. derives its
existence from the very existence of the state
itself, it does not need to be expressed or
defined in its scope. Being coextensive with self-
preservation and survival itself, it is the most
positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential insistent and
illimitable Especially
WON NMAT is a valid he power is validly
exercise of police power exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the
State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
the proper exercise of the police power requires
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to
compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus,
he first invoked his constitutional rights
to academic freedom and quality
education.
he squarely challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12,
Series of 1972, containing the above-
cited rule. The
additional grounds raised were due
process and equal protection.
the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.
subject of the challenged regulation is certainly
within the ambit of the police power. It is the
right and indeed
the responsibility of the State to insure that the
medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives and
health.
The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession
from the intrusion of those not qualified to be
doctors
right to quality education invoked by the private
respondent is not absolute. The Constitution
also provides that
"every citizen has the right to choose a
profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements
medical profession directly affects the very lives
of the
people, unlike other careers which, for this
reason, do not require more vigilant regulation
The private respondent
has failed the NMAT five times. While his
persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is

G.R. No. 105323 July 3, 1992
Chavez V Comelec
Public respondents, on the other hand,
include the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), the
Department of Health (DOH), the
Department of Finance (DOF), the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the
Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) which have been
specifically tasked to monitor the
drugstores’ compliance with the law;
promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations for the effective
implementation of the
law; and prosecute and revoke the
licenses of erring drugstore
stablishments.
delete the name of Melchor Chavez as
printed in the certified list of
candidates tally sheets,
certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich
our system of education by directing the
student to the course for which he is best suited
as determined by initial tests and evaluations
Otherwise, we may
be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of
Justice Holmes
WON Comelec acted No. As aptly observed by the
capriciously and Solicitor General, respondent Comelec can
whimsically and with administratively undo what it has
grave abuse of administratively left undone
discretion
and therefore prays respondent Comelec has in fact, on May 6, 1992
that the Comelec be to be exact, ordered the deletion of
enjoined from Melchor Chavez's name not only on the official
proclaiming the 24th list of candidates, but also on the election
winning senatorial returns, tally sheet and certificate of canvass
candidate until after
his petition before the pre-proclamation cases (are) not allowed in
Commission is resolved. elections for President,Vice-President, Senator
and Member of the House of Representatives.''
What is allowed is the correction of "manifest
errors in the certificate of canvass or election
returns."
petitioner's prayer does not call for the
correction of "manifest errors in the certificates
of canvass or election returns" before the
Comelec but for the re-opening of the ballot
boxes and appreciation of the
ballots contained therein. is therefore crystal
clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate

G.R. No. 166494 June 29, On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257,
2007 amending R.A. No. 7432,3 was signed
Superdrug VS DSWD into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and it became
effective on March 21, 2004.
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens.
– The senior citizens shall be entitled to
the
twenty percent (20%) discount from all
establishments relative to the
utilization of services in hotels
and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and
purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or
enjoyment of senior citizens, including
funeral and burial services for the
Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive
jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner
involving, as it does, contest relating to the
election of a member of the Senate. As
aforesaid, petitioner's proper recourse is to file a
regular election protest before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal
after the winning senatorial candidates have
been proclaimed.
petitioner's allegation that "Chavez" votes were
either invalidated or declared stray has no
relation
to the correctness or authenticity of the election
returns canvasses. Petition dismissed.
WON Section 4(a) of the law is a legitimate exercise of police power
law is unconstitutional which, similar to the power of eminent domain,
because it constitutes has general welfare for its object. Police power is
deprivation of private not capable of an exact definition, but has been
property. / won it is an purposely veiled in general terms to underscore
invalid exercise of rights its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies
and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits.
property rights must bow to the
primacy of police power because property
rights, though sheltered by due process, must
yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the
common good would be diluted considerably if
 death of senior citizens;
Beltran v. Secretary of RA 7719 (National Blood Services Act)
Health was enacted in 1994, seeking to provide an
adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation and by regulating
blood banks in the country. Section 7
thereof provided for the phase-out of all
commercial blood banks within 2 years after
its effectivity.
The Act was passed after studies showed
that blood transfusions could lead to
transmission of diseases, and that blood sold
by persons to commercial blood banks are
three times more likely to have blood
transfusion transmissible diseases than
those donated to the Philippine National
Red Cross.
Prior to the expiration of the commercial
blood banks’ licenses, they filed a petition
assailing the constitutionality and validity of
RA 7719 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, for discriminating against
freestanding blood banks in a manner,
which is not germane to the purpose of the
law.
. W/N RA 7719 violates
the equal protection clause.
2. W/N Section 7 of RA
7719 constitutes unlawful
deprivation of personal
liberty and property.
on the mere plea of
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings
and capital, the questioned provision is
invalidated. Moreover, in the
absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged
confiscatory effect of the provision in question,
there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in
its favor
1. NO. One, RA 7719 is based on substantial
distinctions. Nonprofit blood banks operate for purely
humanitarian reasons and as a medical service, and
encourage voluntary blood donation. On the other
hand, commercial blood banks are motivated by profit
and treat blood as a sale of commodity.
Two, the classification and the consequent phase-out
of blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law,
which is to provide the nation with an adequate supply
of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation
and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or
medical service rather than a commodity. This
necessarily involves the phase-out of commercial
blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a
business enterprise, and they source their blood supply
from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general
application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to
address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor
was it intended to apply only to existing conditions.
Four, the law applies equally to all commercial blood
banks without exception.
2. NO. In serving the interest of the public, and to give
meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature
deemed it necessary to phase-out commercial blood
banks. This action may seriously affect the owners
and operators, as well as the employees, of

SJS v Atienza Social Justice Societ y v. Atienza, Jr
., February 13,2008, Corona, J.
The Supreme Court denied the motions for
reconsideration filed by the Department
of Energy and oil giants Chevron, Petron, and
Shell; and reiterated its March 7, 2007
decisionordering the Manila City mayor to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 directing the
removal of theterminals from Pandacan by the
said oil companies. The said Ordinance
reclassified portionsof the Manila districts of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to
commercial and directedcertain business owners
and operators, including the three oil giants to
cease and desistfrom operating their businesses
there.
Ordinance No. 8027, approved by Manila
City Council on November 28, 2001 and
effective December 28, 2001, reclassifies
portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from
industrial to commercial and directs the
owners and operators of businesses to
cease and desist from operating their
businesses within 6 months from the
ordinance’s effectivity. Among the
businesses in the area are the so-called
Pandacan Terminals of Chevron, Petron,
and Shell.
Chevron, Petron and Shell, questioned
the validity of the said ordinance. They
argued that they are fighting for their
right to property alleging that they stand
to lose billions of pesos if forced [to]
relocate. Are the contentions of the oil
commercial blood banks but their interests must give
way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public.
DOCTRINE: Class legislation, discriminating against
some and favoring others is prohibited; but
classification on a reasonable basis and not made
arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
WON it a valid exercise No. The Court described Ordinance No. 8027 as a
measure enacted pursuant to the delegated police
of police power power of local government units “to promote the
order, safety, and health, morals, and general
welfare of the society.” It explained that “based on
the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the
right to life enjoys precedence over the right to
property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable,
property is not.
When the state or [local government unit] LGU’s
exercise of police power clashes with a few
individuals’ right to property, the former should
prevail.” (GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et
al. v. Atienza, Jr., February 13, 2008)
Ordinance No. 8027 visit fellester.blogspot.com was
enacted right after the Philippines, along with the
rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the
September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the
World Trade Center in New York City.
The objective of the ordinance is to protect the
residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation
that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on
the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a
protective measure should be delayed.
NOTES:
In 2007, the SC ruled that the Local Government Code
imposes upon Mayor Atienza, to “enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city.”
One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
 companies tenable?
ROMEO P. GEROCHI, RA 9136, otherwise known as the
KATULONG NG BAYAN Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
(KB) and 2001 (EPIRA), which sought to impose
ENVIRONMENTALIST a universal charge on all end-users of
CONSUMERS electricity for the purpose of funding
NETWORK, INC. (ECN), NAPOCOR’s projects, was enacted and
Petitioners took effect in 2001.
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF Petitioners contest the constitutionality
ENERGY (DOE) of the EPIRA, stating that the
imposition of the universal charge on all
end-users is oppressive and confiscatory
and amounts to taxation without
representation for not giving the
consumers a chance to be heard and be
represented.
repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the
courts. He has no other choice. (GR No. 156052,
Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., March 7,
2007)
In 2008, The Supreme Court denied the motions for
reconsideration filed by Chevron, Petron, and Shell,
and instead reiterated its March 7, 2007 decision. (GR
No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza,
Jr., February 13, 2008)
In 2009, the SC recently denied with finality the
second motion for reconsideration of the three big oil
players. The Court stressed that the second motion
for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant
to sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court. It said that it
already passed upon the basic issues in its February
13, 2008 resolution and noted that the arguments of
the oil firms were a mere rehash of their arguments
raised in the first motion for reconsideration. (Min.
Res., GR No. 156052, Social Justice Society, et al. v.
Atienza, Jr., April 28, 2009)
W/N the universal NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax,
charge is a tax but an exaction in the exercise of the State’s
police power. That public welfare is promoted
may be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which
enumerates the policies of the State regarding
electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust Fund
feature of the universal charge reasonably serves
and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the
purposes for which the universal charge is
imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the
country’s electric power industry), further
boosting the position that the same is an exaction
primarily in pursuit of the State’s police
objectives.
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose

Invalid exercise of police power
G.R. No. 122846 January
20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT
CORPORATION, TITANIUM
CORPORATION and STA.
MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA,
represented by DE CASTRO,
MAYOR ALFREDO S.
LIM, Respondent.
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor
Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila
City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission
Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses,
Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila”
(the Ordinance).” The ordinance
sanctions any person or corporation
who will allow the admission and
charging of room rates for less than 12
hours or the renting of rooms more
than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light
Corporation (WLC), Titanium
and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that revenue is
incidentally raised does not make the imposition
a tax.
The taxing power may be used as an implement
of police power.
The theory behind the exercise of the power to
tax emanates from necessity; without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its mandate of
promoting the general welfare and well-being of
the people.
Whether Ordinance No. No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as
7774 is a valid exercise a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is
of police power of the unconstitutional.
State. The facts of this case will recall to mind not only
the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but
the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City
Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs
through those decisions and the case at bar goes
beyond the singularity of the localities covered
under the respective ordinances. All three
ordinances were enacted with a view of
regulating public morals including particular
illicit activity in transient lodging establishments.
This could be described as the middle case,
wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels
and hotels but the services offered by these
establishments have been severely restricted. At
Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist
and Development Corporation (STDC),
who own and operate several hotels
and motels in Metro Manila, filed a
motion to intervene and to admit
attached complaint-in-intervention on
the ground that the ordinance will
affect their business interests as
operators. The respondents, in turn,
alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null
and void as it “strikes at the personal
liberty of the individual guaranteed and
jealously guarded by the Constitution.”
Reference was made to the provisions
of the Constitution encouraging private
enterprises and the incentive to
needed investment, as well as the right
to operate economic enterprises.
Finally, from the observation that the
illicit relationships the Ordinance
sought to dissuade could nonetheless
be consummated by simply paying for a
12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents
asserted that the ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code which confers on
cities the power to regulate the
establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
its core, this is another case about the extent to
which the State can intrude into and regulate
the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established.
A long line of decisions including City of Manila
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it
must not only be within the corporate powers of
the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not
be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific
and distinct business practices, namely wash
rate admissions and renting out a room more
than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to
be rooted in the police power as conferred on
local government units by the Local Government
Code through such implements as the general
welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of
necessity of the State and its corresponding right
to protect itself and its people. Police power has
been used as justification for numerous and
varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to
minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug
use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports. Also,
they contended that under Art III Sec
18 of Revised Manila Charter, they
have the power to enact all ordinances
it may deem necessary and proper for
the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience and
general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants and to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is
unconstitutional and void since it
violates the right to privacy and
freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is
unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of
RTC and affirmed the constitutionality
of the ordinance. First, it held that the
ordinance did not violate the right to
privacy or the freedom of movement,
as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit
individuals for short time stays. Second,
the virtually limitless reach of police
power is only constrained by having a
lawful object obtained through a lawful
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and
all means for their achievement. Those means
must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the
myopic view that an ordinance should be
analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the
only restraint imposed by the law that they were
capacitated to act upon is the injury to property
sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also
recognized the capacity of the petitioners to
invoke as well the constitutional rights of their
patrons – those persons who would be deprived
of availing short time access or wash-up rates to
the lodging establishments in question. The
rights at stake herein fell within the same
fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as
guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by
Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and
the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into
mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace
the right of man to enjoy the facilities with
which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraint as are necessary
for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional
right must be recognized and the invasion of it
should be justified by a compelling state
interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to
the right to privacy independently of its
method. The lawful objective of the
ordinance is satisfied since it aims to
curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments
are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is
justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before
the SC
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of
a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and
the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with
another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive of private
rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.
More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the measure and
the means employed for its accomplishment, for
even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the
police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to
curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in
fact be diminished simply by applying existing
laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing
the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers
through active police work would be more
effective in easing the situation. So would the
strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion
on the businesses of the petitioners and other
legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that
the ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any
hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in
fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by
charging their customers a portion of the rent
for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. The State is a
leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may
be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as
well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly
restrains the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners as well as restricting the rights of
their patrons without sufficient justification. The
ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting
out a room more than twice a day with
immorality without accommodating innocuous
intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED,
and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of

REVIEW CENTER On 11 and 12 June 2006, the
ASSOCIATION OF Professional Regulation Commission
PHILIPPINES v. EXECUTIVE (PRC) conducted the Nursing Board
SECRETARY EDUARDO Examinations nationwide. In June 2006,
ERMITA, GR No. 180046, licensure applicants wrote the PRC to
2009-04-02 report that handwritten copies of two
sets of examinations were circulated
during the examination period... among
the examinees reviewing at the R.A.
Gapuz Review Center and Inress
Review Center.
George Cordero, Inress Review Center's
President, was then the incumbent
President of the Philippine Nurses
Association.
On 18 August 2006, the Court of
Appeals restrained the PRC from
proceeding with the oath-taking of the
successful examinees set on 22 August
2006.
Consequently, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo)
replaced all the members of the PRC's
Board of Nursing. President Arroyo also
ordered the examinees to re-take the
Nursing Board Examinations.
On 8 September 2006, President
Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized
the CHED to supervise the
establishment and operation of all
Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No.
7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Whether EO 566 is an The petition has merit.
unconstitutional The propensity of litigants and lawyers to
exercise by the disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial
Executive of legislative system by seeking relief directly from this Court
power as it expands the must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it
CHED's jurisdiction; and would be an imposition upon the precious time
Whether the RIRR is an of this Court; and (2) it would... cause an
invalid exercise of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
Executive's rule-making otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in
power some instances had to be remanded or referred
to the lower court as the proper forum under
the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues because this
Court is not a trier of facts.
The rule, however, is not absolute, as when
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
the exercise of this Court of its primary
jurisdiction
The alleged violation of the Constitution by the
Executive Department when it issued EO 566
justifies the exercise by the Court of its primary
jurisdiction over the case. The Court is not
precluded from brushing aside technicalities and
taking cognizance of an... action due to its
importance to the public and in keeping with its
duty to determine whether the other branches
of the Government have kept themselves within
the limits of the Constitution.
EO 566 Expands the Coverage of RA 7722
The OSG justifies its stand by claiming that the
review centers and similar entities in
the Philippines.
the Review Center Association of the
Philippines (petitioner), an organization
of independent review centers, asked
the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw"
the IRR arguing, among other things,
that giving permits to... operate a
review center to Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs
and professional organizations will
effectively abolish independent review
centers.
EO 566- authorized ched to supervise
the establishment and operation of all
review centers
In a letter dated 3 January 2007,[6]
Chairman Puno wrote petitioner,
through its President Jose Antonio
Fudolig (Fudolig), that to suspend the
implementation of the IRR would be
inconsistent with the mandate of EO
566.
On 7 May 2007, the CHED approved the
RIRR. On 22 August 2007, petitioner
filed before the CHED a Petition to
Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations[8] praying for a
ruling:
Amending the RIRR by excluding
independent review centers from the
coverage of the CHED;
Clarifying the meaning of the
requirement for existing review centers
term "programs x x x of higher learning" is broad
enough to include programs offered by review
centers.
We do not agree.
Section 3 of RA 7722 provides:
Sec. 3. Creation of Commission on Higher
Education. - In pursuance of the
abovementioned policies, the Commission on
Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter
referred to as the Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and
separate from the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), and attached to the
Office of the President for administrative
purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public
and private institutions of higher education as
well... as degree-granting programs in all post-
secondary educational institutions, public and
private. (Emphasis supplied)
Neither RA 7722 nor CHED Order No. 3, series of
1994 (Implementing Rules of RA 7722)[24]
defines an institution of higher learning or a
program of higher learning.
Further, Articles 6 and 7 of the Implementing
Rules provide:
Article 6. Scope of Application. - The coverage of
the Commission shall be both public and private
institutions of higher education as well as degree
granting programs in all post-secondary
educational institutions, public and private.
These Rules shall apply to all public and private
educational institutions offering tertiary degree
programs.
The establishment, conversion, or elevation of
to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs,
consortium or HEIs and PRC-recognized
professional associations with
recognized programs, or in the
alternative, to convert into schools; and
Revising the rules to make it conform
with Republic Act No. 7722 (RA
7722)[9] limiting the CHED's coverage
to public and private institutions of
higher education as well as degree-
granting programs in post-secondary
educational institutions.
CHED was given the authority to
regulate and establish review centers
uner EO 566
While it may be true that regulation of
review centers is not one of the
mandates of CHED under Republic Act
7722, however, on September 8, 2006,
Her Excellency, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, issued Executive
Order No. 566 directing the
Commission on Higher
Education to regulate the
establishment and operation of review
centers and similar entities in the entire
country.
With the issuance of the aforesaid
Executive Order, the CHED now is the
agency that is mandated to regulate
the establishment and operation of all
review centers as provided for under
Section 4 of the Executive Order which
provides that "No review center or
degree-granting institutions shall be within the
responsibility of the Commission.
Clearly, HEIs refer to degree-granting
institutions, or those offering tertiary degree or
post-secondary programs. In fact, Republic Act
No. 8292 or the Higher Education Modernization
Act of 1997 covers chartered state universities
and colleges. State universities and colleges...
primarily offer degree courses and programs.
The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly
expand the CHED's coverage under RA 7722. The
CHED's coverage under RA 7722 is limited to
public and private institutions of higher
education and degree-granting programs in all
public and private post-secondary educational...
institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to
formulate a framework for the regulation of
review centers and similar entities
Usurpation of Legislative Power
The President has no inherent or delegated
legislative power to amend the functions of the
CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the
authority to make laws and to alter or repeal
them,[32] and this power is vested with the
Congress under Section 1,... Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved
to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive
power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the
similar... entities shall be established
and/or operate review classes without
the favorable expressed indorsement
of the CHED and without the issuance
of the necessary permits or
authorizations to conduct review
classes. x x x"
pertinent provision of the IRR
Section 1. Authority to Establish and
Operate - Only CHED recognized,
accredited and reputable HEIs may be
authorized to establish and operate
review center/course by the CHED
upon full compliance with the
conditions and requirements provided
herein and in other pertinent laws,...
rules and regulations. In addition, a
consortium or consortia of qualified
schools and/or entities may establish
and operate review centers or conduct
review classes upon compliance with
the provisions of these Rules.
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws,
and to alter and repeal them."
The Constitution, as the will of the people in
their original, sovereign and... unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress
of the Philippines.
Main issue relating to Art. VII
As head of the Executive Department, the
President is the Chief Executive. He represents
the government as a whole and sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees
of his department. He has control over the
executive department, bureaus and offices.
This... means that he has the authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office, or interfere with
the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the
power of control, the President also has the duty
of supervising the enforcement of laws for the...
maintenance of general peace and public order.
Thus, he is granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable
him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the
work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It
enables the President to fix a uniform standard
of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he... can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the
President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his
duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders."
An administrative order is an ordinance issued
by the President which relates to specific aspects
in the administrative operation of government.
It must be in harmony with the law and should
be for the sole purpose of implementing the law
and carrying out the legislative... policy. x x x.
Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative
power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the
CHED's quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-
legislative or rule-making power through the
promulgation of rules and regulations.[36] The
CHED may only exercise its rule-making power
within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA
7722. The RIRR covers... review centers and
similar entities which are neither institutions of
higher education nor institutions offering
degree-granting programs.
Exercise of Police Power
Police power primarily rests with the legislature
although it may be exercised by the President
and administrative boards by virtue of a valid
delegation
Here, no delegation of police power exists under
RA 7722 authorizing the President... to regulate
the operations of non-degree granting review
centers.
Republic Act No. 8981 is Not the Appropriate
Law
There is no doubt that a principal mandate of
the PRC is to preserve the integrity of licensure
examinations. The PRC has the power to adopt
measures to preserve the integrity and
 inviolability of licensure examinations. However,
this power should properly be interpreted to...
refer to the conduct of the examinations
These powers of the PRC have nothing to do at
all with the regulation of review centers.
However, this power has nothing to do with the
regulation of review centers. The PRC has the
power to bar PRB members from conducting
review classes in review centers. However, to...
interpret this power to extend to the power to
regulate review centers is clearly an
unwarranted interpretation of RA 8981.
Section 7(y) of RA 8981 giving the PRC the power
to perform "such other functions and duties as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions" of
RA 8981 does not extend to the regulation of
review centers. There is absolutely nothing in RA
8981 that mentions regulation by the
PRC of review centers.
Similarly, the PRC has no mandate to regulate
similar entities whose reviewees will not even...
take any licensure examination given by the PRC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and the
petition-in-intervention. We DECLARE Executive
Order No. 566 and Commission on Higher
Education Memorandum Order No. 30, series of
2007 VOID for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
Principles:

Ynot vs Intermediate In 1980 President Marcos amended Whether or not police NO. The protection of the general welfare is
Appellate Court Executive Order No. 626-A which power is properly the particular function of the police power
orders that no carabao and carabeef enforced which both restraints and is restrained by due
GR No. L-74457, March shall be transported from one process. The police power is simply defined
 20, 1987 province to another; such violation as the power inherent in the State to
shall be subject to confiscation and regulate liberty and property for the
forfeiture by the government, to be promotion of the general welfare. As long as
distributed to charitable institutions the activity or the property has some
and other similar institutions as the relevance to the public welfare, its regulation
Chairman of the National Meat under the police power is not only proper but
Inspection Commission may see fit necessary. In the case at bar, E.O. 626-A has
for the carabeef and to deserving the same lawful subject as the original
farmers through dispersal as the executive order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribio
Director of Animal Industry may see case) but NOT the same lawful method. The
fit in the case of the carabaos. reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be
On January 13, 1984, achieved by the questioned measure is
Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were missing. The challenged measure is an
confiscated by the police station invalid exercise of the police power because
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo the method employed to conserve the
for having been transported from carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
626-A. He issued a writ for replevin, oppressive.
challenging the constitutionality of
said EO. The trial court sustained the
confiscation of the animals and
declined to rule on the validity of the
law on the ground that it lacked
authority to do so. Its decision was
affirmed by the IAC. Hence, this
petition for review filed by
Petitioner.

HON. RENATO C. Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA- WON Administrative NO

CORONA VS UNITED AO No. 04-92) provides that all Order No.04-92 is
HARBOR PILOTS appointments to harbor pilot positions constitutional The Court is convinced that PPA No. 04-92 was
ASSOCIATION OF THE in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, issued in stark disregard of respondents’ right
PHILIPPINES be only for a term of one year from
G.R. No. 111953 date of effectivity subject to yearly
December 12, renewal or cancellation by the
1997 Authority after conduct of a rigid
evaluation of performance.
PPA General Manager Rogelio Dayan
issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 whose
avowed policy was to instill effective
discipline and thereby afford better
protection to the port users through
the improvement of pilotage services.
On Aug 12, 1992, respondent, through
Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned
PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Dept of
Transportation and Communication.
On December 23, 1992, the Office of
the President (OP) issued an order
directing the PPA to hold abeyance the
implementation of the said
administrative order. PPA countered
that the said order was issued in the
exercise of its administrative control
and supervision over harbor pilots
under Section 6, Article I of P.D. 857.
On March 17, 1993, the OP, through
Assistant Executive Secretary Renato
Corona, dismissed the appeal and lifted
the restraining order issued. He
concluded that the said order applied
to all harbor pilots and, for all intents
against deprivation of property without due
process law. The Supreme Court said that in
order to fall within the aegis of the provision,
two conditions must concur, namely, that there
is a deprivation and that such deprivation is
done without proper observance of due process.
Neither does that the pilots themselves were not
consulted in any way taint the validity of the
administrative order. As general rule, notice and
hearing, as the fundamental requirement of
procedural due process, are essential only when
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
function. In the performance of its executive or
legislative functions, such as issuing rules and
regulations, an Administrative body needs to
comply with the requirement of notice and
hearing.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken
on the nature of a property right. It is readily apparent that
the said administrative order unduly restricts the right of
harbour pilots to enjoy their profession before their right
of harbor pilots to enjoy their respective profession before
their compulsory retirement.

Balacuit et al., v. Court of
First Instance of Agusan
del Norte and Butuan City
G.R. No. L-38429 (E)
30 June 1988
and purposes, was not an act of Dayan,
but of the PPA, which was merely
implementing P.D. 857, mandating it to
control, regulate and supervise pilotage
and conduct of pilots in any port
district.
Respondents filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and
damages before the Regional Trial
Court.
This involves a Petition for
Review questioning the validity and
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640
passed by the Municipal Board of the
City of Butuan on April 21, 1969,
penalizing any person, group of
persons, entity or corporation engaged
in the business of selling admission
tickets to any movie or other public
exhibitions, games, contests or other
performances to require children
between 7 and 12 years of age to pay
full payment for tickets intended for
adults but should charge only one-half
of the said ticket.
Petitioners who are managers
of theaters, affected by the ordinance,
filed a Complaint before the Court of
First Instance of Agusan del Norte and
Butuan City docketed as Special Civil
Whether
It is already settled that the operation of
Ordinance No. 640
theaters, cinematographs and other places of
passed by the Municipal public exhibition are subject to regulation by the
Board of the City of
municipal council in the exercise of delegated
Butuan is valid and
police power by the local government.
constitutional and was However, to invoke the exercise of police power,
the Ordinance a valid not only must it appear that the interest of the
exercise of police power. public generally requires an interference with
private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The legislature may not, under the
guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily
interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, the determination as
to what is a proper exercise of its police power is
not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the courts.
The Court likewise ruled in the negative
 No. 237 on June 30, 1969, praying that
the subject ordinance be declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, void
and unenforceable. The Court
rendered judgment declaring Ordinance
No. 640 of the City of Butuan
constitutional and valid.
Facts On or about October 6, 1986,
Lupangco V CA herein respondent Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
Resolution No. 105 as parts of its
"Additional Instructions to Examiness,"
to all those applying for admission to
take the licensure examinations in
accountancy
No examinee shall attend any review
as to the question of the subject ordinance being
a valid exercise of police power. While it is true
that a business may be regulated, it is equally
true that such regulation must be within the
bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory
ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions
cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary
interference with the business or calling subject
of regulation. The proprietors of a theater have
a right to manage their property in their own way,
to fix what prices of admission they think most for
their own advantage, and that any person who
did not approve could stay away.
The exercise of police power by the local
government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the
legislature, or unless it is against public policy or
is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common right.
For being unreasonable and an undue restraint
of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising
police power, be upheld as valid.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial
court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void. This decision is
immediately executory.
WON it is constitutional Held: It is not Constitutional.
the questioned resolution was adopted for a
commendable purpose which is "to preserve the
integrity and purity of the licensure
examinations." However, its good aim cannot be
a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that
one who is caught committing the prohibited acts
even without any ill motives will be barred from
class, briefing, conference or the like taking future examinations conducted by the
conducted by, or shall receive any respondent PRC
hand-out, review material, or any tip Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and
from any school, college or university, arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right
or any review center or the like or any to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.
reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on
employee of any of the aforementioned the reviewees as to how they should prepare
or similars institutions during the three themselves for the licensure examinations. They
days immediately proceeding every cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful
examination day including examination steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their
day. ambition to become public accountants. They
Any examinee violating this instruction have every right to make use of their faculties in
shall be subject to the sanctions attaining success in their endeavors. They should
prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire
Rules and Regulations of the useful knowledge that will promote their personal
Commission growth
On October 16, 1986, herein
petitioners, all reviewees preparing to
take the licensure examinations in
accountancy schedule on October 25
and November 2 of the same year, filed
on their own behalf of all others similarly
situated like them, with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila a complaint for
injuction with a prayer with the issuance
of a writ of a preliminary injunction
against respondent PRC to restrain the
latter from enforcing the above-
mentioned resolution and to declare the
same unconstitution.

Respondent PRC filed a motion to

dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the
ground that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the
enforcement of its resolution

In an Order of October 21, 1987, the

lower court declared that it had
jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined
 the respondent commission from
enforcing and giving effect to Resolution
No. 105 which it found to be
unconstitutional
Not satisfied therewith, respondent
PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with
the Court of Appeals
GSIS V Monteclaros
Nicolas filed and was approved an
application for retirement benefits
under PD No. 1146 or the Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of
1977. Milagros, as wife and
designated beneficiary, filed with GSIS
a claim for survivorship pension. GSIS
denied the claim because under
Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving
spouse has no right to survivorship
pension “if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the
pensioner within three years before
the pensioner qualified for the
pension.” According to GSIS, Nicolas
wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than
one year from his date of retirement on
“17 February 1984.”
WON the proviso in
Section 18 of PD 1146 is It is void for being violative of the
valid and constitutional. constitutional guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the law. The GSIS cannot
deny the claim of Milagros for survivorship
benefits based on this invalid proviso.
Denial of Due Process. The proviso is contrary
to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
which provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.” The proviso (Sec. 18, PD
1146) is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a
dependent spouse’s claim for survivorship
pension if the dependent spouse contracted
marriage to the pensioner within the three-year
prohibited period. There is outright confiscation
of benefits due the surviving spouse without
giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to
be heard. The proviso undermines the
purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure
comprehensive and integrated social security
and insurance benefits to government
employees and their dependents in the event
of sickness, disability, death, and retirement
of the government employees. (Karla Deles)
Planters v Fertiphil Petitioner PPI and private respondent (1) Whether LOI 1465 (1) No;
Fertiphil are private corporations constitutes a valid Even if We consider LOI No. 1695 enacted under the police
incorporated under Philippine laws. They legislation pursuant power of the State, it would still be invalid for failing to
are both engaged in the importation and to the exercise of comply with the test of "lawful subjects" and "lawful
distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and police power. means." Jurisprudence states the test as follows: (1) the
agricultural chemicals. interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means
On 3 June 1985, then President Ferdinand employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
issued LOI No. 1465 which provided,
among others, for the imposition of a For the same reasons as discussed, LOI No. 1695 is invalid
capital recovery component (CRC) on the because it did not promote public interest. The law was
domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in enacted to give undue advantage to a private corporation.
the Philippines. The LOI provides:
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 28, 2003 is
Pesticide Authority to include in its AFFIRMED.
fertilizer pricing formula
a capital contribution component
of not less than P10 per bag. This
capital contribution shall be collected
until adequate capital is raised to
make PPI viable. Such capital
contribution shall be applied by FPA
to all domestic sales of fertilizers
in the Philippines. (Underscoring
supplied)

Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for

every bag of fertilizer it sold in the
domestic market to the Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then
remitted the amount collected to the Far
East Bank and Trust Company, the
depositary bank of PPI.Fertiphil
paid P6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985 to
January 24, 1986

After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA

voluntarily stopped the imposition of
the P10 levy. With the return of democracy,
Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of
the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465,
but PPI refused to accede to the demand.

Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection

and damagesagainst FPA and PPI with the
RTC in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality
of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable,
oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition
that amounted to a denial of due process of
law.Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely
favored PPI, a privately owned
corporation, which used the proceeds to
maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer
industry.

In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor

General, countered that the issuance of
LOI No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the
police power of the State in ensuring the
stability of the fertilizer industry in the
country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not
sustain any damage from the LOI because the
burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate
consumer, not the seller.

RTC: the imposition of the P10 CRC was an

exercise of the State’s inherent power of
taxation; invalidated the levy for violating
the basic principle that taxes can only be
levied for public purpose. (PPI filed a M.R. ->
denied; In a separate but related proceeding, SC
allowed appeal but remanded to CA)

CA: affirmed with modification; even on the

assumption that LOI No. 1465 was issued
under the police power of the state, it is
still unconstitutional because it did not
promote public welfare; the levy was NOT
for the benefit, as alleged, of Planters
Foundation, Inc. (on the strength of the
Letter of Understanding (LOU) issued by
then Prime Minister Cesar Virata on 18
April 1985 and affirmed by the Secretary of
 Justice in an Opinion dated 12 October
1987.(PPI filed a M.R. -> denied)
City of manila v laguio The City Council of Manila encated on 9
March 1993 and approved on 30 March
1993 an ordinance entitled: AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN
FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
It prohibited establishments such as bars,
karaoke bars, motels and hotels from
operating in the Malate District which was
notoriously viewed as a red light district
harboring thrill seekers. This was expressly
provided under Section 1 of the ordinance:
Private respondent Malate Tourist
Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of
operating hotels, motels, hostels and
lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria
Court in Malate which was licensed as a
motel although duly accredited with the
Department of Tourism as a hotel. MTDC
prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it
includes motels and inns as among its
Whether or not Ordinance
7783 is valid on the ground
that it is violates the equal
protection clause
The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee
means that no person or class of persons shall be
denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed
by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances. ]The “equal protection of the laws is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws. It limits
governmental discrimination. The equal protection
clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as
their property is concerned.
To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure
Administration: “The ideal situation is for the law’s
benefits to be available to all, that none be placed
outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could
chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men
governed by that serene and impartial uniformity,
which is of the very essence of the idea of law.” There
is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact
exists “cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law
susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into
account the realities of the situation. The constitutional
guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that
disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure
that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end
of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights
to liberty and property. Those adversely affected
prohibited establishments, be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.
One of the reasons raised by MTDC
on why the ordinance was invalid and
unconstitutional is that the
Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal
protection under the law as no reasonable
basis exists for prohibiting the operation of
motels and inns, but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments, and for prohibiting said
business in the Ermita-Malate area but not
outside of this area.
Petitioners asserted that
the Ordinance is valid because it was
enacted in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community in
conjunction with its police power. Petitioners
also maintained that the Ordinance is not
unconstitutional because it did not infringe
the equal protection clause and cannot be
denounced as class legislation as there
existed substantial and real differences
between the Ermita-Malate area and other
places in the City of Manila.
On 28 June 1993, Judge Laguio
issued an ex-parte temporary restraining
order against the enforcement of
the Ordinance. And on 16 July 1993, he
granted the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for by MTDC. The ordinance was
declared null and void.
Petitioners made an appeal on the
grounds that it It erred in concluding that
may under such circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired
by the attainment of the common weal was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very
least, discrimination that finds no support in
reason.” Classification is thus not ruled out, it being
sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew
“that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons must be treated in the same manner, the
conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed.
For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under
circumstances which, if not identical, are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest.[102]
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the
subjects of legislation. If the classification is
reasonable, the law may operate only on some and
not all of the people without violating the equal
protection clause.[103] The classification must, as an
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it
must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial
distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of
the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing
the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or
otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and
oppressive exercise of police power and that
it erred in declaring the Ordinance void and
unconstitutional.
However, respondents reiterate that
the questioned Ordinance is not a valid
exercise of police power; that it is violative of
due process and is violative of the equal
protection clause.
conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of
the class.]
In the Court’s view, there are no substantial
distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments.
By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services
for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels
and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar
subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it
does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just
and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for
prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A
noxious establishment does not become any less
noxious if located outside the area.
The standard “where women are used as tools for
entertainment” is also discriminatory as prostitution
one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is
not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and
women have an equal propensity to engage in
prostitution. This discrimination based on gender
violates equal protection as it is not substantially
related to important government objectives. Thus, the
discrimination is invalid.
Note: Other reason why the ordinance is invalid
and unconstitutional (not related to the current topic)-
Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are
not met.

In the exercise of police power, a reasonable

relation must exist between the purposes of the police
measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded.
The Ordinance was enacted to address and
arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are
allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of
legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars,
karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels
and motels. Petitioners insist that even the Court in
the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila[63] had already
taken judicial notice of the “alarming increase in the
rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila
traceable in great part to existence of motels, which
provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry,
presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven
for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.”[64]

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly,

the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of
argument that the objectives of theOrdinance are
within the scope of the City Council’s police powers,
the means employed for the accomplishment thereof
were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

The closing down and transfer of businesses or

their conversion into businesses “allowed” under
 the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the
prohibition of the enumerated establishments will
not per se protect and promote the social and moral
welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate
the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual
disease in Manila
Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate
area teems with houses of ill-repute and
establishments of the like which the City Council may
lawfully prohibit,[65] it is baseless and insupportable to
bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage
parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super
clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and
inns. This is not warranted under the accepted
definitions of these terms. The enumerated
establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per
se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
The City Council instead should regulate human
conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not
to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are
covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.

In the instant case, there is a clear invasion of

personal or property rights, personal in the case of
those individuals desirous of owning, operating and
patronizing those motels and property in terms of the
investments made and the salaries to be paid to those
therein employed

MMDA V Viron  The present petition for 1) the MMDA’s The MMDA cannot order the closure
transportation review on certiorari, rooted power to regulate of respondents’ terminals not only because
in the traffic congestion traffic in Metro no authority to implement the Project has
problem, questions the Manila included the been granted nor legislative or police power
 authority of the Metropolitan
Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) to order
the closure of provincial bus
terminals along Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue (EDSA)
and major thoroughfares of
Metro Manila.
 Challenged are two Orders
issued by Judge Silvino T.
Pampilo, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
The first assailed Order of
September 8, 2005,
Executive Order (E.O.) No.
179, hereafter referred to as
the E.O., "unconstitutional as
it constitutes an unreasonable
exercise of police power."
The second assailed Order of
November 23, 20053 denied
petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
 President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo issued the E.O. on
February 10, 2003,
"Providing for the
Establishment of Greater
Manila Mass Transport
power to direct been delegated to it, but also because the
provincial bus elimination of the terminals does not satisfy
operators to abandon the standards of a valid police power
and close their duly measure.
established and It is the DOTC ─ as the primary
existing bus terminals policy, planning, programming, coordinating,
in order to conduct implementing, regulating and administrative
business in a common entity to promote, develop and regulate
terminal; networks of transportation and
(2) the E.O. is communications ─ which has the power to
consistent with the establish and administer a transportation
Public Service Act project like the Project subject of the case at
and the Constitution; bar.
(3) the provincial bus The trial court sustained the
operators would be constitutionality and legality of the E.O.
deprived of their real pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which
properties without due empowered the MMDA to administer Metro
process of law should Manila’s basic services including those of
they be required to use transport and traffic management. The E.O.
the common bus was a valid exercise of the police power of
terminals; and the State as it satisfied the two tests of lawful
(4) the President has subject matter and lawful means, hence,
the authority to Viron’s and Mencorp’s property rights must
undertake or to cause yield to police power.
the implementation of
the Project. The President’s authority to order the
implementation of the Project in the exercise
of the police power of the State have been so
delegated for the good and welfare of the
people. Hence, these powers partake of the
nature of police power.
ANNOTATIONS:
 System."  Police power is the plenary power
vested in the legislature to make,
 The MMDA has ordain, and establish wholesome and
recommended a plan to reasonable laws, statutes and
decongest traffic by ordinances, not repugnant to the
eliminating the bus terminals Constitution, for the good and welfare
now located along major of the people.
Metro Manila thoroughfares. This power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals,
 The Metropolitan Manila education, good order or safety, and
Development Authority general welfare of the people flows
(MMDA), is hereby from the recognition that salus populi
designated as the est suprema lex ─ the welfare of the
implementing Agency for the people is the supreme law.
project.  Police power rests primarily with the
legislature, such power may be
 The E.O. noted the primary delegated, as it is in fact increasingly
cause of traffic congestion in being delegated.
Metro Manila has been the
numerous buses plying the  The power may be exercised by the
streets and the inefficient President and administrative boards
connectivity of the different as well as by the lawmaking bodies of
transport modes. municipal corporations or local
governments under an express
 Viron Transport Co., Inc. delegation by the Local Government
(Viron), a domestic Code of 1991.
corporation engaged in the
business of public  Two tests of a valid police power
transportation with a measure:
provincial bus operation, (1) the interest of the public
filed a petition for generally, as distinguished from that
declaratory relief10 before of a particular class, requires its
the RTC11 of Manila. exercise; and
 (2) the means employed are
 Mencorp Transportation reasonably necessary for the
System, Inc. (Mencorp), accomplishment of the purpose and
another provincial bus not unduly oppressive upon
operator, asked the court to individuals.
declare the E.O.  The police power legislation must be
unconstitutional and illegal firmly grounded on public interest
for transgressing the and welfare and a reasonable relation
possessory rights of owners must exist between the purposes and
and operators of public land the means.
transportation units over
their respective terminals.  In Luque v. Villegas, public welfare
lies at the bottom of any regulatory
measure designed "to relieve
congestion of traffic, which is, to say
the least, a menace to public safety."
As such, measures calculated to
promote the safety and convenience
of the people using the thoroughfares
by the regulation of vehicular traffic
present a proper subject for the
exercise of police power.

 The true role of Constitutional Law is

to effect an equilibrium between
authority and liberty so that rights are
exercised within the framework of the
law and the laws are enacted with due
deference to rights.