ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
municipalities, and cities authorizing their legislative bodies,
Sec 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble & petition the government for redress
of grievances.
CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS vs. VALERIANO E.
FUGOSO
FACTS:
This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner,
Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager of the Coalesced
Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the
City of Manila, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the
holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose
of petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the
ground that the respondent refused to grant such permit.
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for
refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to
believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that
passions, especially on the part of the losing groups, remains
bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending
to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which
might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public
order."
Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local
government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927
prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes
as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or
procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or
collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful
purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in
any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use
of Public Place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue
permit hence violating freedom of
assembly
Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue
permit hence violating freedom of
assembly
WON the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence
violating the freedom of assembly.
RULING:
NO. The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the Constitutions of democratic
countries. But it a casettled principle growing out of the nature
of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights
is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights,
not injurious to the rights of the community or society. The
power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional
rights is termed the sovereign "police power" which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of
the people.
This sovereign police power is exercised by the government
through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws
regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it
may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns,
called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the
purpose.
The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec.
1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with
unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for
the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public places of the City of
Manila ;and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places
to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping,
to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by
others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risk of disorder.
The court favored the second construction since the first
construction is tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to
prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of
government, no such unlimited power may be validly granted
to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of
national emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be
issued is for the use of public places and not for the assembly
itself.
The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be
struck down. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of
speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious
one . . .
There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact
that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression.
There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.
Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to
prevent crimes are education and punishment for violations of
the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and
assembly.
MALABANAN VS, RAMENTO
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of
respondent University. They sought and were granted by tile
school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M.
to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit,
along with other students, they held a general assembly at the
Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court
(VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the
basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby.
At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous
language their opposition to the proposed merger of the
Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture.
At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life
Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the
area covered by their permit. They continued their
demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical
of the University authorities and using megaphones in the
process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes
being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing
distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. 
They were asked to explain on the same day why they should
not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on
September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under
preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding
of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by
petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
against private respondents and before the Ministry of
Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found
petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which was
characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting
in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty
was suspension for one academic year.
Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the petition "for lack
of factual and legal basis and likewise [prayed] for the lifting
of the temporary restraining order.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary
action and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of
the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free
speech.
RULING:
YES. This Court accordingly rules that respect for the
constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech
calls for the setting aside of the decision of respondent
Ramento, the penalty imposed being unduly severe. It is true
that petitioners held the rally at a place other than that
specified in the permit and continued it longer than the time
allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and
caused the work of the non-academic personnel to be left
undone. Such undesirable consequence could have been
avoided by their holding the assembly in the basketball court
as indicated in the permit. Nonetheless, suspending them for
one year is out of proportion to their misdeed. The petition
must be granted and the decision of respondent Ramento
nullified, a much lesser penalty being appropriate.
As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, 6 the
invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly
carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has
likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept
of freedom of expression which is Identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest
without censorship or punishment and which "is not to be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing ... of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
right to prevent." 7
The situation here is different. The assembly was to be held
not in a public place but in private premises, property of
respondent University. There is in the Reyes opinion as part of
the summary this relevant excerpt: "The applicants for a
permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place where and the
time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession
is required." 9 Petitioners did seek such consent. It was
granted. According to the petition: "On August 27, 1982, by
virtue of a permit granted to them by the school
administration, the Supreme Student Council where your
petitioners are among the officers, held a General Assembly at
the VMAS basketball court of the respondent university."
 It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally
absolved for the events that transpired. Admittedly, there was
a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a
place other than that specified, in the second floor lobby,
rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS building of the
University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period
allowed. According to the decision of respondent Ramento,
the "concerted activity [referring to such assembly] went on
until 5:30 p. m. 20 Private respondents could thus, take
disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an admonition,
even a censure-certainly not a suspension-could be the
appropriate penalty. Private respondents could and did take
umbrage at the fact that in view of such infraction considering
the places where and the time when the demonstration took
place-there was a disruption of the classes and stoppage of
work of the non-academic personnel. They would not be
unjustified then if they did take a much more serious view of
the matter. Even then a one-year period of suspension is much
too severe. While the discretion of both respondent University
and respondent Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the
dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the
concept of proportionality between the offense connoted and
the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of
arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process
question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it is the
holding of this Court that a one-week suspension would be
punishment enough.
DE LA CRUZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS
These consolidated petitions are among several petitions filed
with this Court arising from the much-publicized public school
teachers' mass actions of September/October 1990.
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in
Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged, preventively
suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by then
Secretary Isidro D. Cariño of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS).
Teachers failed to explain to the DECS despite the 5-day
period given. Hence, they were found guilty as charged, and
subsequently dismissed from office by Sec. Carino of the
DECS. 
Petitioners appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) and then to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In
1993 the CSC found petitioners guilty of "conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service" for having participated in the
mass actions and imposed upon them the reduced penalty of
six (6) months' suspension. However, in view of the length of
time that petitioners had been out of the service by reason of
the immediate implementation of the dismissal orders of
Secretary Cariño, the CSC likewise ordered petitioners'
automatic reinstatement in the service without back wages.
Petitioners were unhappy with the CSC decision but was still
affirmed by the CA on appeal.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals grievously erred
in affirming the CSC resolutions finding them guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when
their only "offense" was to exercise their constitutional right to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
their grievances. Moreover, petitioners insist that the mass
actions of September/October 1990 were not "strikes" as there
was no actual disruption of classes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioners was invalid as
it is against the right of the said teachers to
peaceably assemble.
RULING:
NO. As early as 18 December 1990 we have categorically
ruled in the consolidated cases of Manila Public School
Teachers Association v.
Laguio Jr., 16 and Alliance of Concerned Teachers
v. Hon. Isidro Cariño 17 that the mass actions of
September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila public
school teachers "amounted to a strike in every sense of the
term, constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized
stoppage of or absence from work which it was said teachers'
sworn duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic
reasons — to protest and pressure the Government to correct
what, among other grievances, the strikers perceived to be the
unjust or prejudicial implementation of the salary
standardization law insofar as they were concerned, the non-
payment or delay in payment of various fringe benefits and
allowances to which they were entitled, and the imposition of
additional teaching loads and longer teaching hours."
In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission, 18 we denied
the claim that the teachers were thereby denied their rights to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be
upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised within
reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. But
the public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions
did not exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable
limits. On the contrary, they committed acts prejudicial to the
best interest of the service by staging the mass protests on
regular school days, abandoning their classes and refusing to
go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had the
teachers availed of their free time — recess, after classes,
weekends or holidays — to dramatize their grievances and to
dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law,
no one — not the DECS, the CSC or even the Supreme Court
— could have held them liable for their participation in the
mass actions.19
With respect to our ruling in PBM Employees Organization
v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 20 invoked by
petitioners, we have likewise already ruled in the Rolando Gan
case 21 that the PBM ruling — that the rights of free
expression and assembly could not be lightly disregarded as
they occupy a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil
liberties — was not applicable to defend the validity of the
1990 mass actions because what were pitted therein against
the rights of free expression and of assembly were inferior
property rights while the higher consideration involved in the
case of the striking teachers was the education of the youth
which must, at the very least, be equated with the freedom of
assembly and to petition the government for redress of
grievances.
PBM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. PBM
Facts:  families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed
of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills
Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo
Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage
a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO
thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated
that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it
has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained
further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed
by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation
of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of
absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall
fail to report for work the following morning shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing
CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike.
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about
400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be
required to participate in the demonstration and that the
workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for
the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969,
filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No.
875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No
Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR
for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.
Issue: 
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and
to peaceable assemble violated.
RULING:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights
requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a
grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It
was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to
the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so
that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or
peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.
Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for
its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary
behind their freedom of expression well as their right of
assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local
officialdom, theemployees and laborers of herein private
respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing
only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The
pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or
damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6
o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea
for the preservation merely of their property rights. The
employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused,
harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by
thepeace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis
the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected
their right to individual existence as well as that of their
compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in
morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human
rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has
been sustained. To regard the demonstration against
policeofficers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal
from employment of the demonstratingemployees, stretches
unduly the compass of the collective bargainingagreement, is
"a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a
moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by
that much the circulation of the Issue raised by the
demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the
more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally.
Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be
regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity,
which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
police persecution. unprotected.

BAYAN VS. ERMITA
FACTS:
Petitioners come in three groups.
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No.
169838,1 allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their rights as organizations and
individuals were violated when the rally they participated in
on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen
implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess
del Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848,2 who allege that they
were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass
action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and
violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that on
October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to
Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they
claim, put the country under an "undeclared" martial rule, and
the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among
them were arrested and suffered injuries.
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al.,
petitioners in G.R. No. 169881,3 allege that they conduct
peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and
those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the
right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa
No. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response"
(CPR) being followed to implement it.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while
sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.
The power to regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,”
which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of
the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers
to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-
based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to
protection. Neither the words “opinion,” “protesting,” and
“influencing” in of grievances come from the wording of the
Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is
independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-

sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but
police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets
and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their
members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-
sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to
proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of
Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police
officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented
them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly
dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.4 Three other
rallyists were arrested.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of

them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and
14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent
dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and
the CPR policy recently announced.

ISSUE:

Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas

Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and
14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as
it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of
the right to peaceably assemble.

RULING:

NO. Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution

provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance
in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights