Case Study: Large industrial ball valve fire

wha-international.com/case-study-large-industrial-ball-valve-fire

​January​ ​25​, ​2019

In 2001, WHA International, Inc. investigated a major industrial oxygen fire that
resulted in significant damage as well as personnel injury and one death. The fire was
initiated in a 6 in. (150 mm) ball valve while it was being opened under a low pressure
differential, which caused extensive burnout. The results of this incident emphasize the
extreme nature of fires in oxygen pipeline systems and underscore several important
considerations in the design and operation of these systems.

A tragic oxygen fire occurs

During July of 2001 a fire occurred in a 6 in. (150 mm) ball valve being used as an
oxygen pipeline isolation valve (shown here).

Just prior to the fire, the valve had been closed and a leak check was performed on the
valve by bleeding off pressure downstream and monitoring the pressure differential
across the valve. During this leak check, system data indicated that the upstream
pressure was approximately 550 psig (3.8 MPa) and the downstream pressure was
approximately 510 psig (3.5 MPa), or roughly a 40-psig (0.28 MPa) differential
pressure.

At this point, the valve was to be re-opened to establish flow and provide full system
pressure. As the valve was being opened manually by the hand wheel, ignition and fire
developed within the valve that consumed most of the valve internals and surrounding
valve body, as well as downstream piping and flanges. Tragically, the operator was
killed in the incident.

Looking to WHA for answers

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WHA International, Inc was contacted to provide forensic investigation and failure
analysis of the incident. WHA’s unique industry experience and expertise were exactly
what the client needed to determine the origin and cause of the fire. Thorough
understanding of the accident was critical to preventing such a tragic incident from
occurring again.

WHA’s approach to investigating oxygen fires is detailed and thorough. Our engineers
apply the concepts from international standards that they themselves helped develop,
including ASTM G 88 (Standard Guide for Designing Systems for Oxygen Service), G
63 (Standard Guide for Evaluating Nonmetallic Materials for Oxygen Service), G94
(Standard Guide for Evaluating Metals for Oxygen Service) and G-145 (Standard Guide
for Studying Fire Incidents in Oxygen System).

Evidence reconstruction
WHA’s forensic engineers first began by documenting and reconstructing the available
evidence and examining a similar “exemplar” valve that was also installed in the same
oxygen system. This undamaged exemplar valve proved useful to the investigation in
many ways, providing a reference for the valve’s actuator positioning and samples of
materials, especially lubricants, which had largely been consumed in the incident valve.
The exemplar valve was referenced, along with the use of other analytical tools, to
reconstruct the burned fragments into their approximate original positions and to
create a three dimensional model of the valve’s internal flow passages.

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The incident reconstruction provided three major insights:

1. No burning or melt patterns were observed upstream of the main seat

assembly, compared to significant burning and evidence of melt-flow extending
downstream from this location. These burn patterns suggested an early local
origin in the proximity of the upstream seat. This observation is consistent with
previous experience indicating that for flowing oxygen systems of primarily
metallic components, burn patterns usually do not extend upstream of the local
origin of the fire. Propagation typically progresses in a “fire follows flow” pattern
and generally begins to quench once the pressure containment is breached and
pressure is lost.
2. Burning on the valve body was heaviest on the back and downstream
side of the valve. The front side of the body also sustained significant damage
as only discontinuous segments remained, mostly under the ball and associated
with the lower shaft housing. The upper shaft and top of the ball were completely
consumed. Only the upper bonnet flange remained intact (connected to the
actuator, as shown in Figure 3 below), but it was heavily lanced during the event.
3. The recovered ball fragment shows a strong preference for burning
from upstream to downstream. Because of the significant burning upstream
of the ball element and on the upstream face of the ball, the evidence indicated
that the fire’s local origin was upstream of the ball element.

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Ignition Mechanisms and Flow Analysis
The fire damage and melt/flow patterns discussed above suggested that ignition took
place within the upstream seat retainer, which contained a wave spring packed with a
lubricating grease as supplied through two grease-injection ports in the valve body.
Samples of this lubricating grease were taken from the exemplar valve and analyzed to
be consistent with a heavy hydrocarbon grease, which is highly flammable and easy to
ignite in oxygen. This same lubricant is believed to have also been within the incident
valve at the time of the fire. This evidence suggested that contaminant promoted
ignition could have occurred while the valve was opening due to the mechanical energy
created by the pressure differential causing high-frequency movement of the
contaminated wave springs and the re-establishment of flow through the valve.

However, conditions at the time of the fire gave credibility to another potential ignition
source as well. Though the valve was being opened with a low differential pressure,
initial calculations using standard isentropic flow equations for compressible fluids
estimated the gas velocities through the valve to be sufficient to potentially ignite
particles. Because of this, WHA engineers also considered particle impact ignition
as a possible ignition source.

“It’s important to remember that just because a component has been in operation
in oxygen for a long time, it does not guarantee that it’s safe. This valve had been
in operation for several years before the conditions were met to cause an
incident.”
– Elliot Forsyth, WHA International, Inc.
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To further evaluate the most probable ignition scenario and associate the observed
melt/flow patterns, a 3D model of the valve was developed to approximate the
geometric relationships of the valve internals and perform computational fluid
dynamics (CFD) modeling of the flow conditions believed to be present in the valve at
the time of the fire. Of specific interest were gas velocities and vector streamlines, as
well as pressure and temperature conditions throughout the valve. The WHA CFD
analysis predicted that the gas velocity would have exceeded 300 ft/s (90 m/s)
immediately downstream of the valve’s seat, both where the flow entered the ball’s
interstage (upstream) and where flow exited the interstage (downstream). The CFD
analysis also predicted very turbulent flow downstream of the valve.

The characteristic elements for particle impact ignition include the presence of
particles, high gas velocities, impingement locations, and flammable materials. Test
data has shown that gas velocities greater than approximately 150 ft/s (45 m/s) are
capable of supporting particle ignition in oxygen. Further, design guides for oxygen
systems recommend limiting gas velocities to below 100 ft/s (30 m/s) to minimize
particle impact ignition. The CFD analysis predicted that flow velocities in excess of
these thresholds were developed as the flow was sweeping past the upstream seat
retainer and leading edge of the ball element.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

Despite the fact that the CFD model predicted that all characteristic elements for
particle impact ignition could have been present at the time of the fire, WHA’s analysis
of the burn patterns and post-fire evidence indicated that the most probable cause of

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this fire was contaminant promoted ignition. The CFD analysis provided key insight
into each of these ignition mechanisms and also confirmed the relevant probable gas
pressures and velocities inside the valve.

The first take away from this investigation is the importance of minimizing
hydrocarbon-based contaminants in oxygen systems. Hydrocarbon
contaminants require relatively little energy to ignite yet burn vigorously in oxygen with
energies capable of propagating a fire to other materials (especially if gross quantities
are present, as was the case in this valve).

REMEMBER: Always use approved lubricants in oxygen systems. All

oxygen components should undergo thorough oxygen cleaning, and
personnel should be properly training in maintaining cleanliness through
proper installation and maintenance practices.
A second lesson learned in this analysis is the importance of proper
operation of isolation valves in oxygen. These valves are typically purposed only
for isolating pressure and flow, not for throttling or controlling flow. As such they are
generally to be operated fully open or fully closed, and not operated under pressure
differentials which can produce very high gas velocity through the valve. A “zero
pressure, zero flow” operating philosophy often applies to isolation valves in oxygen,
where the valve is pre-positioned open before pressurized (zero pressure) or where
pressure is equalized across the valve before opening (zero flow). If an isolation valve in
an industrial oxygen system is not designed to be operated under pressure differentials
(during system start-up or re-start for example), often a small-diameter bypass valve is
used to slowly equalize pressure across that valve and enable safe operation.

“In some circumstances it is not well appreciated that even a 7% pressure

differential (93% equalized), as was the case in this fire, can produce gas
velocities that are significantly greater than the preferred maximum velocities to
avoid particle impact ignition.”
Dr. Barry Newton, WHA International, Inc.
REMEMBER: Safe operating procedures and best practices should be
clearly outlined. All personnel involved in the operation of an oxygen
system should receive proper technical training. All oxygen systems
should be thoroughly analyzed for oxygen hazards, including the
potential for mis-operation or failures that could lead to fires.

Are your oxygen systems safe?

WHA can address hazards in your systems before they develop into an incident. Contact
us today to learn more about oxygen hazard analysis and technical training options
available to optimize your systems and processes. We simplify oxygen safety so you
can better protect your equipment, and most importantly, protect your personnel.

Contact Us

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Website by Forsythe Creative.

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