A Flare Deflagration Incident at Rohm and Haas

Vipul M. Desai
Rohm and Haas Company, Ag Chem Process Research, 727 Norristown Road, Spring House, PA 19477

One of the flares at Rohm & Haas plant eqwrienced a
series of three consecutive deflagrations resulting in se-
vere damage to the flare water seal flame arrestor. The
deflagrations occurred during process start up after a
complete unit shutdown. This incident caused no per-
sonal injuries or off-site impact. 7;he incident was inves-
tigated using MCSOII (Multiple Cause System Oriented
Incident Investigation)process.
The root causefor the event was inadvertent addition
of hot air to theflare. The hot airflow was such that the
methane-air mixture in the flare was combustible
(about 1% methane). In addition, hot air raised the
combustible methane-air mixture temperature to about
300°C. me flashback velocity from the flare tip is a
strong function of process gas temperature and is much
higher at elevated temperatures. Thus, the downward
flame front velocity was greater than the upward
methane-airmixture velocity and causedflashback. 7;he
firstflashback possibly damaged the water seal such that
the water seal flame arrestor lost its functionality and
the connector pipe, which brings gases from knockout
drum through the water seal, was open (See Figure I ) .
The next twoflashbacks resulted in deflagrations in the
knockout drum through the open connectorpipe. Thus,
the key recommendation to avoid a similar incident is
to eliminate hot airflow to theflare.
The key learning from the above incident is that
flashbacks are possible when process gas is hot. We
would like to extend this learning to other flares and
ulge a further study of all flares for possibleflashback
(about 11%methane) and hot (about 300°C). The flashback
velocity calculated (using conservative methods) at this
condition was about 40 fps versus process gas velocity of
about 32 fps in tip and 17 fps in stack. This means that
flashback was possible and flame travelled down the flare
stack. The flame front travelling down the pipe and was felt
by operators as a “rumble.” This first deflagration is be-
lieved to have tilted the water seal such that it lost its effec-
tiveness. The deflagration pressure wave raised the flare
pressure and activated the natural gas safety interlock to
stop natural gas flow. In addition, high water seal tempera-
tures activated the snuffing steam interlock which added
snuffing steam to the flare stack. This quenched the defla-
gration and put the flare in a fail safe mode.
Production reset both the natural gas and steam inter-
locks (the conditions that activated these interlocks were
quickly eliminated when the deflagration was quenched).
Thus, the methane flow was reestablished to the flare and
steam flow was stopped. This resulted in a second flash-
back which was also felt as “rumble” by operators. How-
ever, at this point, the water seal flame arrestor was not
functional (as evident by low pressure drop) and the flash-
e FLAME AT TOP

scenarios. A key action point from this incident is to

Several Feet of Stack
peqorm a HAZOP on other possibilities of FLASHBACK
in the flare. This will be done by peqormingflashback
calculations on allpossibleflaring scenarios in theflare.

INTRODUCTION
The following sections provide a brief description of the
event. root causes and results of this incident.

Event
The flare deflagrations were caused by ignition of
methane and hot air inside the flare (Figure 1). The flare
was started with an incorrect amount of enrichment gas Y M E
flow (NOTE: Enrichment gas is added to the flare to satisfy
a permit requirement of at least 200 BTU/SCF). The
process start-up led to inadvertent addition of hot air to the
flare from a blown rupture disc and through misaligned
valves. This made the methane-air mixture flammable FIGURE 1 Flare internal details.

Process Safety Progress (V01.15, N0.3)

166 Fall, 1996
back traveled into the knockout drum causing an explo-
sion. The deflagration was heard as a “boom”. This proba-
bly caused additional damage to the water seal. Again, the
pressure wave generated in the flare stack activated the
natural gas and snuffing steam interlocks.
Production once again reset both interlocks and the same
flashback scenario was repeated for a third time, except the
boom was much louder. This deflagration probably caused
additional internal damage. Note: No external flare dam-
age occurred fi-om any of the flashback because the shell
is desigried ,for a 150 p i g deflagrations. Both interlocks
were once again activaed tripping the flare to a fail safe
position. Production did not reset these interlocks this time
and they took an orderly unit shutdown.
R o o t Causes
Fuel Source and Hot Air Source
For pr0ces.s confidentiality purposes, the details of “how”
these streams were introduced to the flare can not be dis-
closed. This limitation should not affect the discussion be-
cause the key to this event is the ignition source.
Natural Gas was the fuel source and was added because
of instrument problems. However, natural gas is added to
our flare on a regular basis to increase heating value of the
streams (per permit requirements).
Hot air was added to the flare while attempting to start
the process through blown rupture disc and misaligned
valves
Ignition Source
The key unknown in the flare defagration event was the
ignition source. This was because the flare tip was de-
signed to force the proces:: gas velocity above normal flame
speeds. Conventional wisdom insisted that this design pre-
Process Safety Progress (Vol. 15, No.3)
cluded a flashback scenario. However, analysis showed
that the preheated air significantly increased the flashback
velocity. The investigation team performed a detailed tech-
nical analysis of all postulated ignition sources to deter-
mine the responsible ignition source. In this analysis, first
all postulated ignition sources were identified.Then, all the
known established facts around the event were listed. Fol-
lowing that, each postulated ignition source was examined
against the known facts in a grid format. The analysis clearly
showed that only one ignition source; “flashback from the
tip of the flare which damaged the top hat in the first rum-
ble such that succeeding deflagrations passed through the
water seal to the open gas inlet pipe”; supported all known
facts.
RESULT OF THE EVENT
Several action points and recommendations have been
generated through this MCSOII. The short term action
points were completed prior to restart of the flare. Several
projects have been assigned to complete the long term ac-
tion points. The key recommendation was to institute ad-
ministrative controls and engineering controls to mini-
mize/eliminate hot air flow to the flare. The key modifica-
tion to the flare design since the incident is repiping the
natural gas line to above the water seal to prevent the pos-
sibility of an explosive mixture underneath the water seal,
based on a recommendation from the flare vendor. In ad-
dition, the unit has implemented interlock resetting proce-
dures and a routine checking of all flare instruments.
This paper (Gel waspresented at the AICbE Summer National Meeting
in Boston, M A on August 2, 1995.
Fall, 1996 167