National department of Civil protection - Technological risk

Major industrial accident

Scenarios and evaluation of the effects of
explosive mixtures.
Prevention and protection methods

Ing. F. GERI

Ing. F. GERI 1

vapor cloud explosion

A vapor cloud explosion (VCE) results from
the ignition of a flammable mixture of vapor,
gas, aerosol, or mist, in which flame speeds
accelerate to sufficiently high velocities to
produce significant overpressure.

VCEs are generally associated with the

release of a sufficient quantity of flammable
gas or vaporizing (flashing) liquid from a:
 storage tank
 process or transport vessel
 piping system

Ing. F. GERI 2
 vapor cloud explosion
Buildings may be damaged and people may be injured by:
 the blast wave
additional indirect effects from missile generation, crater
formation, ground shock, and fire.
Generally:
 as the blast wave travels farther away from the center of
the explosion it loses energy
 the magnitude of overpressure and other effects decreases
as the distance increases from the explosion source.

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Five conditions for Vapor Cloud Explosions

1. The released material must
be flammable and at suitable
conditions to form a vapor
cloud (the reactivity of the
unburned material is
important )

2. An ignition source is needed

to initiate the explosion.
Higher energy ignition
sources can lead to a more
severe explosion than do
lower energy sources.

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 Reactivity of unburned material

 Highly unsaturated molecules

(es.acetylene, hydrogen)

 High flammable range

 Low ignition energy

 High flame speeds

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Five conditions for Vapor Cloud Explosions

3. Ignition of the flammable vapor cloud

must be delayed until a cloud of
sufficient size has formed.
If ignition occurs as the flammable
material is escaping, a large fire, jet flame,
or fireball might occur, but a VCE is
unlikely.

The probability of explosion rather than
fire increases with the size of the cloud,
since the quantity of the mixture within
the flammable range increases.
Lenoir and Davenport (1992) analyzed historical data on
ignition delays and found delay times from 6s to as long
as 60 min.
The most probable for generating Vapour Cloud
Explosion: ignition delays of from 1 to 5 min

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 Factors Favoring High Over Pressures

Vapor Cloud Size impacts on:

– probability of finding ignition
source
– likelihood of generating any
overpressure
– magnitude of overpressure

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Five conditions for Vapor Cloud Explosions

4. Turbulence is required for the
flame front to accelerate to the
speeds required for a VCE;
otherwise, a flash fire will result.

This turbulence is typically formed

by the interaction between the
flame front and obstacles such as
process structures or equipment.

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 Five conditions for Vapor Cloud Explosions

The blast effects produced by

VCEs can vary greatly and are
strongly dependent on flame
speed.

In the absence of turbulence,

under laminar or near-laminar
conditions, flame speeds are
too low to produce significant
blast overpressure.

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Five conditions for Vapor Cloud Explosions

5. Confinement of the cloud by obstacles can

result in rapid increases in pressure during
combustion.
Absence of confining obstacles limiting the
pressure increases.

The degree of confinement in process plants,

with their congested equipment layout and
built-up structures, is generally high

simulation of the blast wave

reflection by a complex of two
buildings

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 Effects of obstacles
• Dense concentrations of
process equipment in
chemical plants or refineries
have been contributing causes
of heavy blast in vapor cloud
explosions in the past.
• Local partial confinement or
obstruction in a vapor cloud
may easily act as an initiator
for detonation, which may
propagate into the cloud as
well

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Typical overpressure profiles

For a given explosion energy, deflagrations

are generally characterized by a gradual
increase to peak overpressure with long
durations, followed by a gradual decrease
in overpressure.

Detonations are characterized by a very

rapid rise to peak overpressure followed by
a steady decrease of overpressure to form
the more idealized shock front.

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 Pressure vs Time Characteristics

In summary an explosion causes

overpressure and drag
pressures on buildings and other
strucures: DETONATION

a) The overpressure produces

the largest loads on the side VAPOR CLOUD DEFLAGRATION

of buildings facing the

explosion because of
reflection and lesser loads on When the blast wave strikes the front of the structure (Figure a),
the roof and other sides the overpressure rises to a value in excess of the peak
TIME
overpressure

b) Drag pressure produces The blast wave then bends around the structure, exerting
pressures on the sides and roof and finally on the back face
(Figures b and c)
negative pressure on slender Then, drag pressure, has a negative value for the back

strucures such as stacks and surfacaces (figure d)

towers
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Factors Favoring High Over Pressures

Weather

– Stable atmospheres
lead to large clouds
(see table 1)

– Low wind speed

encourages large
clouds (see table 2)

most unfavorable weather condition F2 (F stable, 2m/sec windspeed)

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 Important
Experieces demonstrated the following points:
 Low-energy ignition of unobstructed propane-air and natural
gas-air clouds does not produce damaging overpressures
 Combustion of a natural gas-air cloud in a highly congested
obstacle array leads to flame speeds in excess of 100 m/s
(pressure in excess of 200 mbar)
 There seems to be a minimum threshold below which a UVCE
is unlikely to occur: according to some authors the threshold
value is in the range of 500-1000 kg to fall to around 100 kg
for highly reactive materials (eg. Acetylene, hydrogen)
 Historical analysis shows that almost all of the VCE happened
in the first 10 minutes following the release

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Human injury and property damage criteria under peak blast ovepressure

peak peak overpressure Property damage Human injury

overpressure (psi) (bar)

0,42 0,03 REVERSIBLE INJURY (italian decree)

0,5 -1 0,34 – 0,068 Glass windows break Knock personnel down
1 0,07 IRREVERSIBLE INJURIES (italian decree)
1 -2 0,07 – 1,36 Common siding types fail (corrugated asbestos,
shatters corrugated steel, panel joints fail, wood
siding, blows in

2 -3 0,14 – 0,2 Unreinforced concrete or cinder block walls fail

3–4 0,2 – 0,27 Self-framed steel panel buildings collapse

Oil storage tanks rupture
4,2 0,3 DESTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT HIGH LETHALITY (italian decree)
6 0,4 probably of eardrum rupture
10 0,68 Probable total destruction of buildings lung hemorrhage threshold
17 1,15 10% probably of fatality from direct blast effect
50 3,4 50% fatalities
65 4,4 99% fatalities

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 Evaluating Characteristics of Vapour cloud explosions

A TNT equivalence method for predicting VCE

overpressures and duration is often used.
In the TNT equivalence approach, the blast
effects from VCEs are correlated with those from
equivalent explosive charges of TNT as a means
of quantifying the intensity of explosions.

It is assumed that only a certain proportion

(usually 1%-10% based upon energy) of the fuel
released contributes to the explosion.

This mass of fuel is converted to an equivalent

mass of TNT, taking into account the combustion
energy of the fuel and the detonation energy of
TNT.
Overpressures are determined from
TNT blast curves, which have been
well established from experimental
data.

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limitations and deficiencies of TNT equivalence method

The method does have serious limitations and deficiencies, including:
1. TNT equivalency is not clearly defined,
2. blast wave characteristics from TNT are very different from those for
a VCE (TNT produces a shorter-duration and higher overpressure
blast wave than does a VCE for the same energy)
3. blast attenuation differs between TNT and a VCE
The Multi-Energy method for VCE blast modeling is an alternative for
conventional TNT-equivalency method.

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 VCE and «DOMINO EFFECT» in current national decree

D.Lgs 26 june 2015, n. 105 «Attuazione

della direttiva 2012/18/UE relativa al
controllo del pericolo di incidenti rilevanti
connessi con sostanze pericolose. (G.U. 14
luglio 2015, n. 161 - S.O. n. 38)» is the
implementation of SEVESO III EU
Directive

ANNEX E (art. 19) – «Criteri per

l'individuazione degli stabilimenti tra i quali
esiste la possibilità di effetto domino…»
deals with «DOMINO EFFECT»

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Prevention and protection in seveso III directive

Seveso III Directive aims at:

1) prevention of major
accidents involving dangerous
substances
2) limitation of the
consequences of accidents on
man and the environment

For this purpose, the Directive

brings the instruments for the
management of major
accidents and ensures that
safety procedures for
prevention and mitigation the
effects of major accidents are
put into practice.

Seveso III Directive has been in

force since 1 June 2015 in EU.
From this date, Seveso III
Directive has been
implemented.
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 Explosion Protection Systems

Methods Based on the Prevention of Explosion protection system, can be

Combustion. chosen and dimensioned based on the
analysis of scenarios related to
(1) Oxidant concentration reduction
hazardous substances
(2) Combustible concentration reduction
The following is an analysis of some
reference scenarios as a tool for decision
Methods Based on the Prevention or
support for prevention and protection
Limitation of Damage. methods.
(1) Spark extinguishing systems
(2) Deflagration suppression
(3) Isolation methods
(4) Deflagration pressure containment

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Impact scenarios: case studies

Substances: Hydrogen, Ammonia, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)

Accident conditions IMPORTANT!!!

1. Maximum impact conditions each hazardous substance
2. the most likely accident conditions should be analyzed with
specific scenarios that are
Critical distances assessed dependent on several
• Maximum distance of source to LEL (m) factors
• Minimum distance of source to LEL (m)
• Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,3 bar (m) (threshold for High lethality and extensive
damage to mechanical and concrete structures)
• Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,07 bar (m) (threshold for irreversible injury and some
damage to concrete structures)
The simulations were performed with sotware Effects (TNO)

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 Hydrogen: the maximum impact conditions

released overall mass release of liquid in tanks by 100, 50

The probability that a cloud of hydrogen
and 30 m3 with respective amounts of
leading to an UVCE instead of a Flash Fire
3000, 1500 and 900 kg at a
is bound to two aspects: temperature T = 15 ° C
1) the mass involved in the release must wind speed at 10 meters 2 m/s for class F
be greater than 100 kg 5 m/s for class D
2) there must be a certain degree of Ignition time after release 60, 120, 240, 400 sec
confinement

F2 Total mass 3000 kg Total mass 1500 kg

Time of ignition after start release (sec) 60 240 400 60 240 400
Maximum distance of source to LEL (m) 163,7 592 935 160 579 892
Minimum distance of source to LEL (m) 76,3 367 664 70 360 707
Maximum distance of source to LEL/2 (m) 182,64 611 954 179 598 911
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,3 bar (m) 159 146 128 129 117 89
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,07 bar (m) 505 463 405 407 370 242
Explosive mass LEL< < UEL (kg) 2853 2233 1369 1401 936 335

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Hydrogen: the most likely impact conditions

is the continuous release of hydrogen due to rupture

Release flow rate (kg / s) Are a function of three historical
of a pipe or to the failure of control valves Loading
analysis diameters (25, 50, 10 mm)
The response times may vary from 1 minute to about 10 and are 0.52, 0.13, and 0.021
minutes: release time for intervention of 120 sec
- Pneumatic actuators: 1-2 minutes security system
- Electric actuators: 2-5 minutes wind speed at 10 meters 2 m/s for class F
- Mechanical and manual actuators: up to 30 minutes 5 m/s for class D
Ignition time after release 60, 120 180 sec
The reference broken from the historical analysis have
diameters of 10, 25 and 50 mm with intervention times of
2 minutes

F2 Mass flow rate 0,52 Kg/s Mass flow rate 0,13 Kg/s
Time after start release (sec) 60 120 180 60 120 180
Maximum distance of source to LEL (m) 125 213 235 92,35 94 94
Minimum distance of source to LEL (m) 0,11 0,11 50 0,11 0,11 61
Maximum distance of source to LEL/2 (m) 144 231 254 111 113 113
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,3 bar (m) 53 55 53 0 0 0
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,07 bar (m) 148 152 149 0 0 0
Explosive mass LEL< < UEL (kg) 19.53 30.56 22.57 3,18 3,37 0,44

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 LNG: maximum impact conditions

Condition of maximum
released overall mass release of liquid in tanks of 3000, 500 and 100 m3
impact: instantaneous with respective amounts of 350.000, 100.00 and
release of fuel as a wind speed at 10 meters
60,000 kg at a temperature T = 15 ° C
2 m/s for class F
result of collapse of a 5 m/s for class D
Ignition time after release 60, 300, 900 e 1200 sec
tank and explosion of
the cloud

F2 Total mass 350.000 kg Total mass 100.000 kg

Time after start release (sec) 60 300 1200 60 300 900
Maximum distance of source to LEL (m) 185 765 2671 172 744 1903
Minimum distance of source to LEL (m) 54 434 2128 67 455 1696
Maximum distance of source to LEL/2 (m) 204 784 2690 191 763 1922
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,3 bar (m) 214 1137 1317 141 628 166
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,07 bar (m) 692 3770 4369 451 2073 534
Explosive mass LEE< < UEL (kg) 9240 70800 82000 4400 36000 6000

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LNG: the most likely impact conditions

continuous release of fuel due to a Release flow rate (kg / s) Sono funzione dei tre diametri da analisi storica
loss or malfunction with spillage (50 25, 10 mm) e sono pari a 1,47 , 0,37 , e 0,06
and ignition of the cloud release time for intervention of security system 120 sec
wind speed at 10 meters 2 m/s per class F
5 m/s per class D
Ignition time after release 60, 120 150 secondi

F2 Mass flow rate 1,47 Kg/s Mass flow rate 0,37 Kg/s
Time after start release (sec) 60 120 150 60 120 150
Maximum distance of source to LEL (m) 98,02 102 102 41 41 0
Minimum distance of source to LEL (m) 0,11 0,11 60 0,11 0,11 0
Maximum distance of source to LEL/2 (m) 117 121 121 60 60 0
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,3 bar (m) 41 41 40 0 0 0
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,07 bar (m) 125 139 135 0 0 0
Explosive mass LEE< < UEL (kg) 24,56 24,28 8,86 2,07 2,11 0

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 Ammonia: the maximum impact conditions

released overall mass release of liquid in tanks of 3000, 500

Substance that has a high and 100 m3 with respective amounts
chemical reactivity in respect of of 500,000, 90,000 and 19,000 kg at a
the metals and air, has a temperature T = 15 ° C
wind speed at 10 meters 2 m/s for class F
flammability range from 16% to 5 m/s for class D
25%. Ignition time after release 60, 480, 720 sec
Instantaneous release of tanks
for liquid flash

F2 Total mass 500.000 kg Total mass 90.000 kg

Time after start release (sec) 60 360 720 60 360 720
Maximum distance of source to LEL (m) 129,7 1093 1524 160 784 0
Minimum distance of source to LEL (m) 60 829 1366 79 665 0
Maximum distance of source to LEL/2 (m) 197 1100 1542 178 802 0
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,3 bar (m) 205 / 444 100 226 /
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,07 bar (m) 619 / 1309 314 679 /
Explosive mass LEE< < UEL (kg) 13.900 173.400 36.120 4572 16750 0

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Ammonia: the most likely impact conditions

Release flow rate (kg / s) They are a function of the three

Continuous release into the diameters from historical analysis
atmosphere as a result of loss (25, 50, 10 mm) and are equal to
from the reservoir due to 33,87; 8.47 and 1.35
release time for intervention of 720 sec hypothesis of reservoir
rupture of pipe or a valve. security system depletion
wind speed at 10 meters 2 m/s for class F
5 m/s for class D
Ignition time after release 60, 600, 1800 secondi

F2 Mass flow rate 33,87 Kg/s Mass flow rate 8,47 Kg/s
Time after start release (sec) 60 600 1800 60 600 1800
Maximum distance of source to LEL (m) 133 368 366 113 145 146
Minimum distance of source to LEL (m) / /
Maximum distance of source to LEL/2 (m) 160 395 384 131 162 164
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,3 bar (m) 39 63 63 35 36 36
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,07 bar (m) 116 208 209 109 110 111
Explosive mass LEE< < UEL (kg) 160 1246 1274 59 72 85

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 LPG: maximum impact conditions

instantaneous release of LPG released overall mass release of liquid in tanks of 3000, 500
and 100 m3 with respective amounts
as a result of tank rupture of 978,000, 163,000 and 32,600 kg at a
accident temperature T = 15 ° C
wind speed at 10 meters 2 m/s for class F
5 m/s for class D
Ignition time after release 1, 60 300 sec

F2 Total mass 978.000 kg Total mass 163.000 kg

Time after start release (sec) 1 60 300 1 60 300
Maximum distance of source to LEL (m) 36 209 0 25 132 0
Minimum distance of source to LEL (m) 0 0
Maximum distance of source to LEL/2 (m) 58 329 0 39 208 0
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,3 bar (m)
/ 134 0 / 88 0
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,07 bar (m) / 399 0 / 282 0
Explosive mass LEE< < UEL (kg) 9,2 4660 0 2,1 1600 0

Ing. F. GERI 29

LPG: the most likely impact conditions

Hypothesis based on Release flow rate (kg / s) They are a function of three
historical analysis diameters
breakage of a horizontal (25, 50, 10 mm) and are
equal to 30; 7.67 and 0.01
pipe or the small rupture of release time for intervention of 3600 sec hypothesis of
a tank with horizontal gas security system reservoir depletion
wind speed at 10 meters 2 m/s for class F
jet. 5 m/s for class D
Ignition time after release 60, 600, 1800 sec

F2 Mass flow rate 30 Kg/s Mass flow rate 7,67 Kg/s

Time after start release (sec) 60 600 1800 60 600 1800
Maximum distance of source to LEL (m) 178 218 218 97 100 100
Minimum distance of source to LEL (m)
Maximum distance of source to LEL/2 (m) 280 344 344 153 157 157
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,3 bar (m) 76 83 83 55 55 55
Distance for UVCE Pressure at 0,07 bar (m) 251 269 269 194 195 195
Explosive mass LEE< < UEL (kg) 891 1122 1122 181 189 189

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Substance Conditions for maximum impact and ignition timing critical distances of damage from the release point
HYDROGEN high mass (3000kg) after 5 minutes cause damage to buildings and concrete structures up to 1300 meters from the
release point
LNG for large masses (350,000 kg) after 20 minutes the damages of concrete buildings and structures are felt up to 3000 m

AMMONIA: very high masses releases (500.000 kg) produce critical distances of over 1000 meters

LPG very high mass releases produce critical distances of less than 300 m

CRITICAL DISTANCE FOR THE MAXIMUM IMPACT CONDITIONS - F2

5000
H2 (3000kg) 0,3bar
4500
H2 (3000kg) 0,07bar
4000 H2 (1500kg) 0,3bar
critical distance for UVCE pressure (m)

3500 H2 (1500kg) 0,07bar

GNL (350.000 kg) 0,3bar
3000
GNL (350.000 kg) 0,07bar
2500 GNL (100.000 kg)0,3bar
GNL (100.000 kg)0,07bar
2000
AMM (500.000kg) 0,3bar
1500 AMM (500.000kg) 0,07bar

1000 AMM (90.000kg) 0,3bar

AMM (90.000kg) 0,07bar
500
LPG (978.000kg) 0,3bar
0 LPG (978.000kg) 0,07bar
1 60 120 150 180 240 300 360 400 600 720 900 1200 1800
LPG (163.000kg) 0,3bar
ignition time (sec)

Ing. F. GERI 31

HYDROGEN: releases for 120 seconds produces critical distances of a few hundred meters(less than 150 m)
LNG: releases for 120 seconds produces critical distances of a few hundred meters (less than 150 m)
AMMONIA: releases for 7200 seconds have critical distances of some hundreds of meters (less than 100 m)
LPG: release for 3600 seconds have critical distances less than 200 hundred meters

CRITICAL DISTANCE FOR THE MOST LIKELY IMPACT CONDITIONS – F2

300

250 H2 (0,52 kg/s) 0,3bar

H2 (0,52kg/s) 0,07bar
H2 (0,13kg) 0,3bar
critical distance for UVCE pressure (m)

200 H2 (0,13kg/s) 0,07bar

GNL (1,47kg/s) 0,3bar
GNL (1,47 kg/s) 0,07bar
GNL (0,37kg/s)0,3bar
150
GNL (0,37kg/s)0,07bar
AMM (33,87kg/s) 0,3bar
AMM (33,87kg/s) 0,07bar
100
AMM (8,47kg/s) 0,3bar
AMM (8,47kg/s) 0,07psi
LPG (30kg/s) 0,3bar
50
LPG (30kg/s) 0,07bar
LPG (7,67kg/s) 0,3bar
LPG (7,67kg/s)0,07bar
0
1 60 120 150 180 240 300 360 400 600 720 900 1200 1800
ingition time afetr release (sec)

Ing. F. GERI 32
Use the scenarios in the prevention and protection from UVCE
FLAMMABLE THREAT ZONES OVERPRESSURE (BLAST FORCE) THREAT ZONE
You can use this scenario to look for potential You can use this scenario to test methods of
sources of ignition and optimize methods based on protection and damage limitation of overpressure
the prevention of explosions and to check the damage of structures and
equipment
Software A.L.O.H.A. (Areal Location of Hazardous Atmospheres) by EPA

Ing. F. GERI 33

Damage Estimates Based on Overpressure for Process Equipment

A. Windows and gauges broken L. Power lines are severed
B. Louvres fail at 0.2-0.5 psi M. Controls are damaged
C. Switchgear is damaged from roof collapse N. Block walls fail
D. Roof collapses O. Frame collapses
E. Instruments are damaged P. Frame deforms
F. Inner parts are damaged Q. Case is damaged
G. Brick cracks R. Frame cracks
H. Debris - missile damage occurs S. Piping breaks
I. Unit moves and pipes break T. Unit overturns or is destroyed
J. Bracing fails U. Unit uplifts (0.9 tilted)
K. Unit uplifts (half tilted) V. Unit moves on foundation

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 Thanks for your attention

Ing. Francesco GERI

Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri
Dipartimento della Protezione Civile
Francesco.geri@protezionecivile.it
Mobile phone 3356193957

Ing. F. GERI 35