Prog. Energl Comb Set., Vol. 6, pp, 121 126
00/0
Pergamon Press Ltd, [980. Printed m Great Brttain.
U N C O N F I N E D VAPOUR-CLOUD EXPLOSIONS:
DEFINITION OF SOURCE OF FUEL
DAVID J. LEWIS
ICI Mond Division, Northwich, Cheshire
Summary-- In this paper, the effects of a release of fuel are shown to vary considerably-,ranging from a non-
ignition to a violent aerial explosion or "'quasi-detonation". The differences in behaviour are described in
terms of fuel properties, the way it is released, how it is ignited and the surrounding location.
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
In this paper, the spectrum of consequences which
can arise from an escape of a fuel to atmosphere will be
described and also how an incident can be charac-
terized by the use of suitable definitions.
The various types of fuels that can be involved as
fuel sources will have an important influence on the
behaviour that results. This is linked to the different
combustion behaviour of the fuels, relative density of
vapourized or gaseous fuel with respect to air and the
discharge conditions of temperature, physical state of
the fuel and velocity and position relative to surround-
ings of the escaping material. The problem of
identifying those sources of fuel (in terms of postulated
escapes) which are most important in the consider-
ation of aerial explosions is then shown to be
influenced by the degree of fuel mixing with the air that
occurs as well as by the nature of the fuel and its initial
state at release.
Finally, this paper will consider what can be stated
regarding the effects of atmospheric conditions on the
type and size of incident likely to result and also
concerning the influence of the topography of the
surroundings, both in the immediate locality of the
fuel source (buildings etc) and further afield in the case
ofa vapour cloud not finding an ignition source locally
to the release position.
2. T Y P E S O F I N C I D E N T A R I S I N G F R O M F U E L R E L E A S E S
The consequences of a release of fuel must first be
classified according to whether or not ignition occurs.
If ignition occurs, we then proceed to consider what is
the combustion/decomposition behaviour. Any com-
prehensive study of the subject of fuel releases to
atmosphere must also cover the case of non-ignition
when toxicity problems and the possible ignition of
small parts of the released fuel needs to be considered.
2.1. Non-Ignited Fuel Releases
In this category are those events where a fuel-air
cloud is formed which is not ignited as a large incident.
Ignition may however take place in localized areas
where (a) some of the escaped fuel enters drainage
121
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systems and explodes or burns at various points and
(b) some fuel is drawn into buildings, furnaces etc and
explodes or burns therein without the main quantity of
escaped fuel becoming ignited etc.
Escaping materials cannot easily be classed as either
flammable materials or toxic materials as many
flammable materials which would lead to fires and
explosions have specified Threshold Limit Values for
toxicity considerations. Others such as acetylene,
butane, ethane, ethylene, methane, propane etc are
defined as Simple Asphyxiants where they can
introduce an asphyxiating effect if their concentration
in the air is sufficient to reduce the oxygen concen-
tration to 18~o v/v or less.
Other materials (notably ammonia) are generally
classified as toxic hazards but they are capable of
burning in air under suitable conditions. A long
history of ammonia refrigeration plant explosions
illustrates this point.
With non-ignition fuel releases, it is necessary to
consider whether any toxicity problems will arise or
whether localized fires and/or explosions should be
expected. Toxic effects can be of a long or short term
type or more simple such as irritation or discomfort
which can lead to panic and effects due to a cloud of
material in the form of a fog which obscures normal
visibility. Other effects of non-ignited fuel releases are
the corrosion of equipment and other structures and
effects on plant life.
In the case of hydrogen, many low velocity escapes
are well recorded as not leading to any hazard from
flammable cloud formation as the considerable
buoyancy of hydrogen takes the escape well up into
the atmosphere before a mixed cloud is set up.
2.2. Ignited Fuel Releases
In this category are included a wide range of
incidents ranging from a normal liquid pool fire
through more vigorous combustion such as flange (or
liquid jet) fires, firestorms and BLEVE (boiling liquid
expanding vapour explosion) fireballs to aerial or
semi-confined explosions and "quasi-detonations".
The difference in behaviour represented by these terms
will be explained in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
122 D.J. LEWIS
It is frequently observed that fire and explosion
effects occur in the same incident; but an explosion can
initiate a fire or can occur during the duration of a fire.
This is the area with which a number of subsequent
papers will be dealing as it is the area which produces a
significant scale of damage. As regards fatalities, a
recent paper by Marshall 1 draws the conclusion that
the mortality to be expected from a release of a given
quantity of fuel of about 10 ton.nes which is then
ignited is of the same order as would be expected from
the same quantity of a toxic material. The data on
which this conclusion was based is recognized to be
incomplete, and it is dangerous to draw comparisons
at other scales of escape as the relationship to release
size is likely to be different for the two situations of fuel
and toxic material escapes.
2.2.1. Behaviour when fuel is ignited immediately
Many fuel releases are effectively ignited after a
short delay during which time no appreciable mixing
of the fuel with air to give a flammable fuel-air cloud of
significant size takes place. The result on ignition is a
minor bang followed by a fire of one or more types
depending on the mechanism of the escape of fuel. The
material will burn as a pool fire, a flange fire etc
according to the method of fuel escape, and the
combustion process is essentially that of diffusion
burning. The minor bang is noticeable as a sound
iather than as an explosion type event.
This combustion process (i.e. the fire) is ac-
companied by a release of energy. If this energy release
rate is low and dispersed over a reasonable volume, no
noticeable pressure effect due to the expansion of
combustion products is experienced. This is the case of
a steady fire situation. However, if a large quantity
burns rapidly as a one-off event such as a fire-ball, the
release of energy is such that some pressure effects
akin to a mild explosion can be detected. Very often in
such situations, the fire damage grossly exceeds any
blast damage and may (but not always) be in the same
locality. This type of behaviour is typical of a fuel-
container pressure burst during a fire followed by a
BLEVE incident. A normal fire, if it covers a large
enough area, will induce high wind el/'ects as air enters
the combustion zone due to the thermal upwards
movement of combustion products. These high winds
produce a forced draught effect on the fire which
becomes more intense and is described as a
"firestorm".
2.2.2. Behaviour when fuel is not immediately ignited
In this case, the continued escape of fuel leads to the
fuel cloud or liquid pool progressively extending in
size. The usual result is that the fuel cloud or liquid
pool contacts an effective ignition source at some
position and then the combustion process starts.
Typical ignition sources are: furnaces, sparking
electrical equipment, flare stacks, operating diesel or
petrol driven equipment or vehicles, use of smoking
materials, welding or flame cutting operations etc.
Ignition sources of these types are normally separated
from processing units on an operating site so that the
travel of the fuel prior to ignition can be quite
extensive (up to many hundreds of metres have been
reported in incidents).
When a fuel escape occurs from a transportation
situation (cross-country pipeline, road or rail tank
vehicle etc), the location of the above types of ignition
sources can either be very much closer--perhaps a few
metres away--or they may not exist within distances
of the order of kilometres.
Whilst the escape of fuel is not burning, various
influences will produce a variable amount of mixing of
the fuel with air. There are three situations which lead
to different behaviour:
(1) The fuel is mixed with only a small amount of air
so that we have either liquid pools with a small
amount of flammable fuel-air mixture above them
or a fuel-air cloud which has more fuel present
than the appropriate upper flammability limit
concentration (note that there is a different
concentration value at the flammability limit for a
mist compared to a uniform vapour mixture).
(2) The fuel and air are reasonably mixed and a
considerable cloud volume is formed which is
within the appropriate flammability range.
(3) The fuel is highly diluted with air so that the
fuel content is below the appropriate lower flam-
mability limit (note again that this value is differ-
ent for a mist to a uniform vapour mixture).
It is frequently the case that different parts of a given
cloud will fall into both categories 1 and 2.
Category 3 is clearly non-ignitable as the fuel-air
cloud is non-flammable at all times. This corresponds
to the situation of sate dispersion of a fuel such as is
obtained with vent discharges at low total rate at high
level.
The behaviour in category 1 depends on the degree
of mixing of the fuel with air. If only small volumes of
mixed fuel plus air exist, these will ignite and the cloud
will relatively slowly burn back with a diffusion type
flame front until the flame reaches a pool or the source
of escape, If some degree of air mixing has occured
(but not enough to bring the mixture down to the
upper flammability limit and so into category 2),
ignition can then give rise to a ~flash fire'. This is a
situation where a fire zone rapidly traverses the partly
premixed fuel-air cloud volume until it reaches a fuel
dominated zone when it will revert to a diffusion flame
situation as a pool or flange fire somewhere in the
neighbourhood of the source of the fuel. The speed of
propagation in a flash fire is determined by the amount
of premixing as less air has to be added to the diffusion
flame (the rate determining step in a pool or flange
fire). These flash fires are not normally accompanied
by any noticeable pressure effects although this might
 Unconfined vapour-cloud explosions
not be true of a flash fire involving a large fuel plus air
cloud.
The most interesting behaviour is that of category 2.
These fuel-air clouds on ignition behave as an
explosion which can vary widely in its brissance or
explosive damaging potential. These variations arise
from:
(1) the characteristics of the fuel,
(2) the relative proportions of fuel and air in the
cloud,
(3) the degree of turbulence present in the cloud at the
time of ignition,
(4) the place (or places) of ignition, the initial flame
area and the pattern of flame propagation,
(5) the presence or otherwise of any walls, obstacles,
ground surfaces etc in contact with the fuel-air
cloud.
The results observed are described as aerial
explosions or aerial "quasi-detonations". These two
categories have considerable differences as regards
flame propagation rates and damage potential. It is a
hotly debated point as to whether a true steady state
unconfined detonation can be the result of a fuel
escape and an accidental ignition. Probably the
differences between the effects from a true steady state
unconfined detonation and the observed "quasi-
detonation" effects are not too important from a
practical point of view. The difference between a
normal aerial cloud explosion (or deflagration) and a
"quasi-detonation" is best expressed in the time taken
for the explosion to proceed through a volume
containing 1 tonne of fuel. I would class a deflagration
as requiring a time of 1.0 sec down to 0.04 sec with a
"quasi-detonation" giving a time of 0.02 sec or less.
The more rapid the release of energy, the more
damaging the explosion will be from a blast stand-
point, and this latter effect is what is used to "label" an
incident as an aerial explosion (deflagration) or an
aerial "quasi-detonation".
3. SOURCES OF FUEL LEAKAGES A N D THEIR TYPES
Fuel sources can be of a number of types and they
can discharge fuel to atmosphere in a variety of
different directions, velocities etc. These variations will
be shown in subsequent papers to have an important
bearing on the formation of fuel-air clouds, how they
disperse and move under the influence of buoyancy,
atmospheric conditions etc. They also have some effect
on the ignition process which as described previously
can materially affect the resultant behaviour.
Fuel variations divide into two categories:
(1) The combustion or decomposition properties of
the fuel when mixed with air or in a cloud of fuel
unmixed with air.
(2) The state in which the fuel is normally present in
the process, transport container, pipeline etc.,
prior to the release to atmosphere.
123
Discharges of material to atmosphere can be due to
foreseeable situations (discharge from vent pipes,
relief devices, overfilling of process or storage vessels
or transport containers) or can be caused by some
equipment malfunction such as vessel rupture or
leakage, pipeline failure, unexpected reaction in a
vessel (run-away reaction or polymerization, stock
tank slop-over), etc.
The first group of foreseeable situations offers the
opportunity of analysing in advance the probable
behaviour of the fuel leakage because the fault tree
leading to the leakage can be described and the leakage
rate and other conditions can be reliably estimated.
When equipment malfunction incidents arise, they
are often as a result of corrosion, erosion, vibration
fatigue, creep effects etc. and are frequently combined
with deviations from the normal system temperature
and pressure conditions. Others are due to process
control failures (operator or instrument initiated)
where unusual chemical or physical changes take place
and lead to conditions inside equipment which they
were not designed to deal with. The prediction of the
location of, rate of and other behaviour of this second
group of situations is much more difficult unless a
system has a high standard of design such that a few
well identified weak points are all that have to be
studied. A number of fuel and toxic releases to
atmosphere have occurred due to Domino effects
which have broken or punctured part of a fuel or toxic
system as a result of incidents inside other process
equipment and fragmentation impact effects.
The variations in fuels and discharge mechanism
will now be described in more detail.
3.1. Variations In Fuel Properties
Fuels that are likely to be discharged to atmosphere
and give fire or explosion effects can vary from
marginally flammable materials such as methylene
chloride, ammonia etc through a wide range of
saturated hydrocarbons and solvents (which are
frequently carbon-hydrogen-oxygen compounds) to
fuels which are unsaturated compounds containing
double or triple bonds. The normal combustion
behaviour of this range of fuels is well known to vary
over a wide range. The values of the lower and upper
flammability limits in air, the heats of combustion and
the relative speeds of flame propagation all vary and
the combustion hazard of a given fuel is a complex
function of all these.
It is somewhat fortunate that a large number of
hydrocarbons and solvents from a group having
flammability limit characteristics and relative speeds
of flame propagation which are similar. In this group
are the range of paraffin hydrocarbons excluding
methane, aromatic hydrocarbons, alicyclie hydro-
carbons, plus most alcohols, aldehydes, ketones, and
esters not containing double bonds or oxygen bonds
such as are in ethers and peroxides. There are however
considerable variations in the heat of combustion
values, which are generally considerably lower for
124 D.J. LEwis
carbon-hydrogen-oxygen compounds than for
hydrocarbons. This group can be termed the normal
or average combustion potential fuel class. In general,
the upper flammability limit in air is between four
times and nine times the lower flammability limit value
and the upper flammability limit is considerably less
than 50~o v/v in air. There are a number of exceptions
to this, as the main feature which distinguishes
behaviour on release is the flammability charac-
teristics on the rich side. These limit values apply to
these materials when present as vapours (in the form of
mists of an optimum size, the flammability zone can be
widened considerably).
A number of other fuels have markedly different
properties in that the 100~o fuel will propagate a
decomposition flame at atmospheric pressure and
temperatures of 200°C or lower. The commonest
examples of this group are acetylene and ethylene
oxide. With these materials, we do not have the
situation of a cloud of pure fuel only being able to
support a diffusion flame (i.e. fire), but an explosive
type flame propagation can arise from the heat of
decomposition of the fuel. Clearly in any consider-
ation of sources of fuel which can set up a hazard in the
atmosphere, these autodecomposible fuels present a
hazard of quite a different nature.
There are a number of fuels which come in between
the normal or average combustion potential fuel class
and the autodecomposible fuel class. The most
important fuel in this class is ethylene and others are
propylene oxide, diethyl ether, di-vinyl ether, acrolein,
methyl vinyl ether. This group has a reasonably wide
flammability range and a faster speed of flame
propagation than the normal or average combustion
potential fuel class. This class can be conveniently
termed the ethylene class.
There are a number of fuels which are used in
considerable quantities which can be classified as
having a lower combustion potential than the average
class. They cover a wide range of properties from fuels
such as methane and coal gas which are not far away
from the average class to fuels such as acetic acid,
ammonia and methylene chloride which can be truly
considered as marginally flammable fuels. This class is
termed the sub-normal class.
The relevance of these classifications of fuels will be
shown in a later paper when a review of known aerial
explosions and related events will be made. The
classification of other fuels such as halogenated and
sulphur compounds, hydrogen etc can be made by
approprite detailed analysis of the flammability
characteristics. The principle is somewhat similar to
that adopted for electrical flameproofing and intrinsic
safety circuit design, but there are differences in that
we are concerned with potential fuel autodecomposi-
tion effects. These "other fuels" plus the ethylene and
the "lower than average hazard" class have wide
variations in heats ofcombustion and these have to be
taken into account in overall assessments of the fuel
source characteristics which are normally made on the
basis of potential final escape quantities.
3.2. The Effect Of The Physical State of The Fuel In
The Containment System
Fuels are likely to be present in storage, transpor-
tation and process systems under a wide range of
conditions which are determined by the vapour
pressure characteristics of the fuel and the require-
ments for economic storage, transport or processing.
These differences in the physical state of a given fuel
between different containment systems can materially
alter the behaviour when the fuel escapes to
atmosphere.
Different situations which are relevant to this
problem are :
(1) A liquid fuel at a temperature above its closed cup
flash point.
(2) A liquid fuel under elevated pressure at a
temperature above its 760 mm-Hg normal boiling
point.
(3) A fuel which is solid at room temperature but is a
liquid under elevated temperature in the system.
(4) Any fuel which is in a system at a temperature
above its autoignition temperature in air.
(5) A liquefied flammable gas (defined as a fuel having
a critical temperature above - i 0°C and a normal
boiling point below 30°C).
(6) A cryogenic flammable fuel (defined as a fuel
stored at atmospheric pressure and at tempera-
tures of - 100°C or below).
(7) A gaseous fuel which is buoyant relative to air.
(8) A gaseous fuel which is dense relative to air.
(9) A viscous liquid fuel.
Consideration of the above different situations will
show that the behaviour of a fuel when it leaves a
source and enters the atmosphere can be markedly
affected by different behaviour such as vapourization,
positive or negative buoyancy, mist or dust formation,
pool or cloud development and in the setting up of
flammability or autoignition conditions,
3.3 Foreseeable Discharge Conditions
The main feature of fuel sources of this type is that
the location of the fuel source is predictable. It is also
possible for a range of discharge rates and fuel states to
be estimated. Because these fuel sources can be
foreseen, the location of the fuel source, the direction
of discharge and the discharge rate and fuel form can
be defined. This enables the maximum use to be made
of dispersion calculation techniques with the result
that many of these discharges are likely to result in
either a non-ignition or satisfactorily dispersed
conditions.
The more regularly used fuel discharges will be
found to be low in fuel content and the main concern is
the toxicity and nuisance problems associated with
them. Emergency vent pipe discharges are likely to be
different in that a high fuel content is estimated.
Mixtures of fuels frequently occur and their properties
 Uncontined vapour-cloud explosions
for aerial cloud explosion and fire potential require the
use of flammability assessments to calculate into
which class of fuels they should be assigned.
Discharges from relief devices are more difficult to
predict as the flow and nature of the discharge material
is heavily dependent on the abnormal condition
leading to the operation of the relief device. These
discharges can be as liquid streams, a mechanically
atomized fuel mist or spray, a flashing liquid, hot
burning combustion products, fuel vapours or gases
etc, Some of these categories of material discharges
also arise from process malfunctions when adequately
designed relief devices are provided.
3.4. Discharge Due to Equipment Failure
Two different types of equipment failure need to be
considered here. One is the case of vessel leakage or
major failure (plus local flange or pipe failures) and the
other is where the failure occurs in a pipeline. In the
first case, the discharge of the vessel contents (or a
large part thereof) takes place which can be relatively
easily assessed as regards total fuel quantity. The
estimation of likely escape rates, behaviour of the
escaping material as regards flow direction and
method of mixing with the environment can present
considerable difficulties due to a wide range of possible
failure conditions. Because the failure is associated
with a given vessel or other process item, the general
location of the source is defined although the precise
location and flow direction of the leakage may be
unknown.
The second case relating to pipeline failures presents
more difficulty in defining a fuel source position and
character. With pipelines which are above ground
level, many potential fuel sources can be postulated
such as flange leakages, valve leakages, weld leakages
or leakages arising from positions known to ex-
perience a high level of corrosion/erosion. External
corrosion problems are in the general case not a major
cause of pipeline rupture although small leakages may
be caused this way.
When buried pipelines are considered as a potential
fuel source, the definition of the location of a source is
much more difficult as considerable lengths of pipeline
across urban and rural areas may be involved.
External corrosion and damage due to excavation
activities are well established causes of pipeline
leakages underground. Dependent on the conditions,
the failure can be a slow one contaminating an area of
ground with gas or liquid or can result in a major split
in the pipe resulting in the formation of a ground
crater and direct discharge to atmosphere from the
exposed rupture point.
A general feature of pipeline failure is that the
amount of fuel which escapes is a complex function of
the initial release, the depressurization stage of the
whole pipeline which follows and finally of the flow
conditions from the source position of fuel of the
connected fuel system. With pipelines travelling across
country, the time necessary for a serious fault to be
125
recognized and reported plus that required to close
isolation valves can lead to the source of fuel being
operative for long periods (hr).
The case of unexpected reactions leading to
emergency discharge to atmosphere via relief devices is
a forseeable condition as regards source position but
akin to a failure type condition for the nature of and
rate of discharge of the source of fuel. An extension of
this situation is where a vessel rupture occurs as a
result of the unexpected reactions. This is similar to a
vessel rupture situation due to overpressure or
weakness, but the conditions of the fuel prior to its
discharge to atmosphere will not be the process
condition prior to the unexpected reaction, but will be
those appertaining zo the products of" the unexpected
reuclion.
Sometimes an unexpected reaction can lead to a
violent slop-over of a stock tank due to the sudden
generation of a large vapour volume within the tank.
This is somewhat similar to a vessel failure case as a
source of fuel.
4. I N F L U E N C E S OF T H E S U R R O U N D I N G L O C A T I O N
In dealing with. the consequences of fuel escaping to
atmosphere from different sources, it is vital that the
effects of the surrounding location on the fuel release is
considered from the following view points:
(1) Whether the topography localizes the fuel escape
or assists it to spread. Examples are fuel escapes in
valleys or cuttings where the fuel has been
somewhat retained and the case of escapes on a
hillside where the spread of fuel has been
accentuated.
(2) Whether the topography contains buildings and
structures which will act as a partial confinement
to a fire or aerial explosion.
(3) Whether the topography is such that ignition at
short distances of fuel spread is likely or at the
other extreme no ignition sources are likely to be
present within distances of a few kilometres.
(4) Effects of the prevailing range of wind directions
and speeds with any accompanying eddying,
downdraught or similar effects. This will include
the conditions set up when atmospheric tempera-
ture inversions occur.
(5) Induced air-flow patterns in the surrounding
locations from either mechanical devices such as
cooling towers, building ventilation systems etc. or
from thermal currents associated with equipment
at elevated or sub-normal temperatures.
(6) The ground and air temperature relative to the
temperature at which the fuel escapes or reaches
after initial flash vapourization has occurred.
The behaviour of the fuel from the source is affected
by the above considerations as regards both the
mixing process of the fuel with the air and the
subsequent dispersion of the fuel vapour, liquid, mist,
126 D.J. LEwis

gas etc. The influences of the surrounding location
have to be taken into account alongside the position of
the fuel source relative to ground level and other
structures. Also the direction of the fuel escape
(upwards, sideways or downwards) plus the velocity of
escape and buoyancy effects will result in a momentum
influence on the movement of a fuel-air cloud. These
effects will be discussed in more detail in other papers
in this series on unconfined vapour-cloud explosions.
Acknowledgements--The author is grateful to the Research
Director ofICI Mond Division for permission to publish this
paper and to the many colleagues and friends who have
contributed information on which the viewsexpressed in this
paper have been based.
REFERENCES
1. MARSHALL,V. C. How lethal are explosions and toxic
escapes?, The Chemical Engineer, 323, 573-577, August
(1977).

(Manuscript received 3 December 1979)