Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 32 (2014) 5e17

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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

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Quantitative risk assessment of the Italian gas distribution network

Chiara Vianello, Giuseppe Maschio*
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Industriale, University of Padova, Via F. Marzolo, 35131 Padova, Italy

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: European Critical Infrastructures include physical resources, services, information technology facilities,
Received 23 December 2013 networks and infrastructure assets, which, if disrupted or destroyed would have a serious impact on the
Received in revised form health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of the Member States.
11 June 2014
The gas distribution network is a critical infrastructure and its failure can cause damage to structures
Accepted 12 July 2014
and injury to people.
Available online 25 July 2014
The aim of this paper is to analyze and then assess the risk of the Italian high pressure natural gas
distribution network.
Keywords:
Natural gas
The paper describes an application of a methodology for quantitative risk assessment.
Safety Failure frequencies considered in risk calculation were found in the European Gas pipeline Incident
Risk analysis data Group (EGIG) database, whereas consequences were computed as a function of pipe diameter and
Hazmat operating pressure for each section of the network. The results of this quantitative risk assessment is the
Land-use planning determination of local and social risks for the Italian North East Area.
© 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

1. Introduction pipeline in Ghislenghien industrial park, near Ath, about 50 km (30

European Critical Infrastructures include those physical re-
sources, services, information technology facilities, networks and
infrastructure assets, which, if disrupted or destroyed would have a
serious impact on the health, safety, security, economic or social
well-being of the Member States.
The gas distribution network is a critical infrastructure and its
failure can cause damage to structures and injury to people.
The quantity of natural gas transported in the European Union
and in the industrialized Countries is progressively increasing. As
the volumes of gas transported from one site to another is
increasing, also the awareness of the risk posed by these activities
has grown within the operators and the population potentially
exposed (Erkut & Alp 2007; HSE 1991, p. 68; Kara & Verter, 2004).
Therefore, the problem of the safety and security of the natural
gas distribution infrastructure must be adequately investigated.
Despite the low number of accidents that occurred in the
transportation of natural gas (CCPS 1995, p. 382; TNO, 1999), some
serious incidents have confirmed that the transportation of haz-
ardous materials has the potential to pose a high risk to the
population.
Two particularly relevant pipeline incidents occurred in 2004:
the explosion of a major underground high pressure natural gas
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ39 0498275835; fax: þ39 0498275461.
E-mail address: giuseppe.maschio@unipd.it (G. Maschio).
miles) south-west of Brussels, Belgium (HInt Dossier, 2005) and a
pipeline rupture (ammonia) near Kingman, Kansas (http://www.
ntsb.gov/investigations/fulltext/PAB0702.htm).
Other incidents involved road and rail transportation of fuels,
such as in Viareggio (Italy) (Landucci et al., 2011) and Lac Me gantic
(Canada, 2014).
The safety aspects of pipelines conveying dangerous substances
are not covered in specific EU regulations. It must be highlighted
that the Seveso III Directive (DIRECTIVE 2012/18/EU) aims to pre-
vent major accidents at industrial facilities, whereas transport by
pipeline is not included. Pipeline safety is else not included in other
EU regulations such as the Pressure Equipment Directive (PED).
Already during the discussion on the Seveso II Directive, the
European Parliament was keen to have pipelines included and the
Commission was asked to look into the subject. At that time, the
conclusion that emerged from the studies pointed out certain gaps
in national legislation. These considerations, coupled with histori-
cal data, have led researchers of many countries to explore and
evaluate transfers of hazardous materials by different transport
modes (road, rail, waterway, pipeline, sea and air) with quantitative
risk analysis (QRA) methodologies.
In fact, the same kind of accidental scenarios, in terms of fre-
quency and severity, may occur both in fixed plants and in trans-
portation systems. Additionally transport accidents may occur close
to, and sometimes within, densely populated areas (Fabiano, Curro ,
Palazzi, & Pastorino, 2002).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2014.07.004
0950-4230/© 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
6 C. Vianello, G. Maschio / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 32 (2014) 5e17
The development of tools both for the risk assessment and the
performance evaluation of preventive and protective measures in
the transportation of hazardous materials is thus an issue of pri-
mary concern. The results of several comprehensive quantitative
risk assessments in areas where a high concentration of sites
handling and storing hazardous substances is present, confirm the
significant contribution of transportation hazards on the definition
of the overall risk profile (Bubbico, Maschio, Mazzarotta, Milazzo, &
Parisi, 2006; Egidi, Foraboschi, Spadoni, & Amendola, 1995;
Milazzo, Lisi, Maschio, Antonioni, & Spadoni, 2010). In particular
for the transport of substances via pipeline, these data are
confirmed through accidental historical analysis (Brito &
Dealmeida, 2009; CONCAWE, 2011; Dziubinski, Fratczak, &
Markowski, 2006; EGIG, 2011; Montiel, Vílchez, Arnaldos, &
Casal, 1996; OGP, 2010).
Risk-based optimization of the design of on-shore pipeline
shutdown systems is described in Medina, Arnaldos, Casal,
Bonvicini, & Cozzani (2012).
Several of such studies pointed out that the risk due to trans-
portation activities is comparable or even more critical than the risk
due to fixed installations. Several of such studies pointed out that
the risk due to transportation activities is comparable or even more
critical than the risk due to fixed installations. For this reason, some
comprehensive methodological approaches for transportation risk
analysis were proposed (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1995,
p. 382; Han & Weng, 2010; Health and Safety Executive, 1991, p. 68;
TNO, 1999).
A natural gas pipeline is designed to allow gas transport from
locations situated at large distances. The characteristic size of a gas
transmission pipeline can range up to several hundred centimetres
in diameter and several thousand kilometres in length. The pipeline
may cross both rural and heavily population areas. Failure of the
pipeline can lead to various outcomes, some of which can pose a
significant threat to people and buildings in the immediate prox-
imity of the failure location.
This paper presents the risk assessment of the Italian gas dis-
tribution network, specifically focuses on the methodologies and
results of a quantitative risk analysis.
Section 2 describes the properties of natural gas and the char-
acteristics of transportation by pipeline.
Section 3 describes the adopted risk analysis methodologies and
they are been implementation to this case study.
In Section 4 a quantitative risk analysis (QRA) of the Italian NG
distribution network is carried out.
In particular, the study aims to show the results of local risk and
societal risk for the case study, and then the obtained results are
compared with acceptability criteria.
2. Natural gas transport by pipeline
2.1. Natural gas
The natural gas distribution network is considered conventional
in that its presence and use of this substance takes place from 19th
century.
Currently natural gas is transported in gaseous phase by pipe-
lines or in the liquid state by tankers (LNG).
Natural gas exists in nature under pressure in rock reservoirs in
the Earth's crust, either dissolved in heavier hydrocarbons and
water or by itself. Natural gas is colourless, odourless, tasteless,
shapeless, and lighter than air.
The main component principal constituent of natural gas is
methane, about 70e90%. Other components are light paraffinic
hydrocarbons such as ethane, propane, and the butanes. Many
natural gases contain nitrogen as well as carbon dioxide and
hydrogen sulfide (Saeid Mokhatab, Poe, & James, 2006). Natural gas
is treated to remove carbon dioxide, nitrogen and hydrogen sul-
phide, which is a toxic and corrosive gas.
During last decades, in the natural gas supply chain, the
contribution of liquefied gas (LNG) has increased. To produce LNG,
natural gas is piped from the wellhead to a liquefaction plant at a
coastal location and then it is cooled at very low temperatures
(approximately 160  C).
The LNG is then loaded into specialized LNG tankers and ship-
ped. Upon reaching its destination, the LNG is offloaded at a
receiving terminal and re-gasified to be delivered into the local
pipeline and storage network. Within this network, the transported
gas becomes completely integrated with the locally produced or
pipeline-imported natural gas supplies.
The properties of Natural Gas are shown in Table 1.
Since LNG and NG are the same substance, they have the same
properties and the only difference is their relative density.
Mixed with air, methane is flammable in a concentration range
from 5% to 15%. Below 5%, the amount of natural gas is not sufficient
to support combustion, while above 15% there is not enough oxy-
gen. At a temperature of 15  C and atmospheric pressure, 1 cubic
metre of methane generates over 33.5 MJ. Under these conditions, 1
cubic metre of natural gas has an energy content equal to 1.2 kg of
coal and 0.83 kg of oil.
2.2. The Italian national gas pipeline network
The transport of natural gas in Italy is an integrated service
which involves the transport of the gas delivered to Snam Rete Gas
S.p.A. at the entry points of the National Network (connected with
the Import lines from Russia, Northern Europe and North Africa,
with the re-gasification plants and the production and storage
centres located in Italy) up to the redelivery points of the Regional
Network, (connected to local distribution utilities and large in-
dustrial and power plants) where the gas is redelivered to the users
of the service.
The natural gas injected into the National Network originates
from imports and, to a lesser extent, the national production. The
import gas is injected into the National Network via eight entry
points where the network joins up with the import pipelines
(Tarvisio, Gorizia, Passo Gries, Mazara del Vallo, Gela) and the two
LNG regasification terminals (Panigaglia, Cavarzere). Domestically
produced gas is introduced into the Network through 51 entry
points from the production fields or their collection/treatment
plants; natural gas storage fields are also connected to the trans-
mission network.
Legislative Decree no. 164 of 23 May 2000 (the so-called Letta
Decree) divided the Italian pipelines network into a National Gas
Pipeline Network (of approximately 8800 km) and a Regional
Transmission Network (of more than 22,600 km). The National Gas
Table 1
Properties of natural gas.
Properties Value for NG
Relative molar mass 17e20
Relative density NG, 15  C 0.72e0.81
Relative density LNG, 15  C 424.2
Boiling point,  C 162
Vapour flammability limits, volume % 5e15
Flammability limits 0.7e2.1
Lower heating/calorific value, MJ/kg 38e50
Autoignition temperature,  C 540e560
Octane number 120e130
Methane number 69e99
Stoichiometric lower heating value, MJ/kg 2.75
 C. Vianello, G. Maschio / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 32 (2014) 5e17
Pipeline Network, managed by Snam Rete Gas consists mainly of
pipes, which usually have a large diameter (DN 900e1400 mm),
used to transport quantities of gas from the entry points (imports
and main domestic production) to the interconnection points with
the Regional Transmission Network and storage facilities. The main
characteristics of the national network are summarized in Table 2.
The national gas pipeline network is shown in Fig. 1.
In the figure, the solid lines represent the national distribution
network, the dashed lines indicate the pipelines under construc-
tion. The network also includes interregional pipelines used to
reach key consumer areas.
The regional transportation network, consisting of the other
parts of its pipelines, allows the transportation of natural gas in
specific areas to supply industrial consumers, power plants and
urban distribution networks.
3. Quantitative risk assessment
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is a formalized specialist
method for calculating individual, environmental, employee and
public risk levels for comparison with regulatory risk criteria. QRA
can be defined as the formal and systematic approach of identifying
potentially hazardous events, estimating the likelihood and con-
sequences of those events, and expressing the results as risk to
people, the environment or the infrastructures. A general classifi-
cation of methodologies used for risk assessment is described by
Dziubin ski et al., 2006.
The risk analysis for gaseous substances transported by pipeline
(INTeg-Risk, 2012) can be summarized as follows:
 description of the system;
 risk identification;
 estimation of failure frequency;
 estimation of consequences.
In the following paragraphs, the quantitative risk assessment is
applied to the case study of a gas pipeline network.
3.1. Risk identification: event tree analysis
The first step of QRA is the risk identification. One of the most
frequently used methods in this stage is the historical analysis of
accidents (Markowski, 2000; Sklavounos & Rigas, 2006). The his-
torical analysis of accidents was performed using a conformance
test of the technical documentation with legal requirements (API,
2008; http://www.asme.org, n.d.) and ‘‘scoring’’ methodology for
relative risk assessment (Borysiewicz & Potempski, 2001;
Muhlbauer, 1996).
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) used in this work is a formal technique
and one of the standard approaches used when performing in-
dustrial incidents investigation as well as pipeline risk assessment
(Borysiewicz and Potempski, 2001; Muhlbauer, 1996). ETA is a logic
sequence that graphically portrays the combination of events and
circumstances in an accident sequence. It is an inductive method,
which begins with an initial undesirable event and works towards a
Table 2
Operating conditions and diameters of natural gas pipeline network.
Pipeline system Pressure (bar) Diameter (cm)
Nominal Operating
National Network 70 50 90e140
Regional Network 25 20 25e20
Local distribution 5 4 8e15
7
result (outcome); each branch of the Event Tree represents a
separate accident sequence (CCPS, 1995, Vianello and Maschio,
2011). Fig. 2 shows a simplified event tree for a release from a
natural gas pipeline, as proposed by Mathurkar and Gupta (2006).
More detailed event trees are described in literature (Shahriar
et al., 2012). Generally the possibility to get a fire or a vapour ex-
plosion depends on the level of congestion/confinement in the
surroundings of the release. Additionally, it is expected that a jet
fire can develop following a VCE. However, the most of the pipe-
lines are typically located in areas with low density of congestion,
thus the case can be treated in a simplified way for the evaluation of
the risk area.
Immediate ignition of a release can result in a jet fire or fireball,
and, in this case, thermal radiation can affect people and buildings
in the vicinity of the release.
Delayed ignition can occur when the released gas finds an
ignition source after being dispersed in the atmosphere for several
minutes. As methane is lighter than air, delayed ignition is expected
to produce a flash fire 90% of the time, and a vapour cloud explosion
(VCE) only 10% of the time.
3.2. Estimation of failure frequency
An important step for risk assessment, in particular to calculate
the local risk, is the failure frequency of the equipment.
The commonly used techniques are based on generic data
available in literature (HSE & Contract Research Report 210, 1999),
specific studies (Jo & Ahn, 2005; Jo & Crowl, 2008; Sklavounos &
Rigas, 2006; Slater, Cox, Comer, & Pyman, 1979), reliability
models using fault and event tree analysis (Metropolo & Brown,
2004; Yuhua & Datao, 2005) and technique based on inspection
activity (API, 2008).
The data used in this study were derived from the 8th EGIG
reports (EGIG, 2011) and the OGP reports (OGP, 2010), that contain
information on pipelines and incidents.
Table 3 shows the single causes of failure that may lead to the
rupture of a pipeline and the relative probabilities of occurrence.
The calculation of the safety indicators, namely the primary
failure frequency, refers to two notions: the total system exposure
and the number of incidents.
The primary failure frequency is the result of the number of
incidents within a period divided by the corresponding total
exposure.
Table 4 shows the primary failure frequency of different periods
as reported in the 8th EGIG report (2011).
Over the years, the frequencies of occurrence have been reduced
following the introduction of stringent measures for risk
prevention.
As proposed by Mathurkar and Gupta (2006) the catastrophic
rupture accounts for 13% of the cases and the remaining 87% of
cases occur through the release from crack or hole in pipelines.
Ruptures with ignition can cause severe social damages. This is
especially the case of pipelines with large diameters. In this case gas
releases are more likely to ignite than releases from small diameter
pipeline. It can be noticed that higher pressure are typically used in
larger pipelines.
In the risk estimation of the network, it is considered that the
full bore rupture has an ignition probability of 33%, generally the
complete rupture of a pipeline is considered when the hole is larger
than 460 mm. For release from a hole, an ignition probability equal
to 10% (EGIG, 2011) is assumed .
With data of ignition probability and likelihood from the event
tree reported in Fig. 2, it is possible to calculate the frequency of
each scenario, taking into account the frequency of breakage of the
last period reported in Table 4 (2006e2010). The frequency of
8 C. Vianello, G. Maschio / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 32 (2014) 5e17

Fig. 1. Italian National gas pipeline e Import points : 1 Tarvisio, 2 Gorizia, 3 Passo Gries, 4 Mazzara del Vallo, 5 Gela; LNG regasification terminals : 6 Panigaglia, 7 Cavarzere.

prior periods were not chosen because in recent years older
pipelines have been replaced with new pipeline of different
material.
In Table 5, for each event considered in the event tree, the values
of frequency for each scenario are reported.
Considering the aforementioned frequencies of occurrence and
calculating the probability of harm or death, it is possible to esti-
mate the local risk as a function of the distance from the release
point.
3.3. Estimation of consequences: modelling releases from buried
pipeline
Release modelling e also called discharge or source term
modelling e is mainly used to determine the rate at which a fluid is
released to the environment due to a loss of containment, together
with the associated physical properties (e.g. temperature,
momentum).
According to the Decree of 17 April 2008 (Ministero dello
sviluppo economico, 2008), in Italy the pipelines must be buried
to a depth normally not less than 0.90 m. For high-pressure pipe-
lines an average depth of 1.5 m is assumed. This condition must be

Table 3
Primary failure frequency per causes in different periods.

Cause/Period Primary failure frequency per 1000 km year

1970e2010 2006e2010

External interference 0.170 0.057

Corrosion 0.057 0.040
Construction defect 0.059 0.031
Hot tap made by error 0.017 0.011
Ground movement 0.026 0.015
Fig. 2. Natural gas pipeline event tree.
 C. Vianello, G. Maschio / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 32 (2014) 5e17 9

Table 4
Primary failure frequency of different period.

Period Number of Total system Failure

incident exposure [km*years] frequency
[km*years]

1970e2010 1172 3.15$106 3.7$104

2001e2010 207 1.24$106 1.67$104
2006e2010 106 0.65$106 1.61$104

taken into account in modelling release from pipelines (OGP, 2010).
In the OPG report, a detailed description of the release modelling is
presented. In this paper the results of the modelling of the OPG
report were adopted after verifying their reliability using PHAST.
The modelling of releases from underground pipelines has been
carried out for:
 Full bore rupture;
 Large medium hole;
 Small hole.
In the case of full bore rupture and large hole, the consequent
releases have sufficient force to throw out the overburden, as
happened in several incidents investigated by the National Trans-
port Safety major cause of accidents in the pipeline network is due
to external interference of third party activity, such as excavation,
and then the ground above the pipe is removed from this activity.
For small losses horizontal or downward, the force exerted by
the flow is unlikely to throw out the cover layer, then the flow will
be released slowly to the surface. Therefore in the risk assessment
small losses were not considered.
For full bore rupture, the consequences can be modelled as:
1. Initial high flow rate: consider immediate ignition as a fireball,
using mass released given the time as the fireball mass.
2. Ensuing lower flow rate(s): model dispersion and delayed
ignition with low momentum (velocity) as the flows from both
sides of the broken pipe are likely to interact.
The approach to modelling the release from medium or large
hole considers a simplified schematization of the pipeline, Fig. 3,
based on the division into quadrants of release directions.
The consequences can be modelled as follows:
1 Vertical release: Model as vertical release (upwards) without
modification of normal discharge modelling output, i.e. full
discharge velocity.
2, 3 Horizontal release: Model at angle of 45 upwards with ve-
locity of 70 m/s.
4 Downward release: Model as vertical release (upwards) with
low (e.g. 5 m/s) velocity to reflect loss of momentum on
impact with ground beneath.
Considering the pipe divided into four quadrants, the proba-
bility that a release originates has originated from each quadrant is
Fig. 3. Simplified scheme of release directions for a leak from buried pipeline, using
four quadrants.
equal to 25%. Thus for the vertical release (zone 1) the probability is
25%, the horizontal release (zone 2 and 3) is 50% and the downward
release is 25%. These probabilities will be used to calculate the local
risk.
The consequences of the release can be modelled by considering
three different kind of release: horizontal, vertical and downward.
The downward release has not been considered since its rate is very
low and therefore the calculated contribution of the consequences
do not affect the calculation of the local risk.
Other assumptions were used in the consequence calculation
and were discussed in a previous paper of Vianello and Maschio
(2011).
In this work, the software used for the consequence simulation
is PHAST version 6.4 (DNV software).
The scenarios which follow the top event and are obtained from
the event tree, are:
 Jet fire
 VCE
 Flash Fire.
For each event, Table 6 shows the damage thresholds and the
probabilities of fatalities in relation to vulnerability models pro-
posed by Jo and Ahn (2005).
The vulnerability models for fire and explosion scenarios are
published by TNO (1999), where the dose concept and the Probit
functions are used.
Results were inserted in ArcMap (ArcGIS) through the conver-
sion in a database format. These tables were related to the
geographical information about the network and, through the tool
“Buffer Wizard”, it was possible to create the damage zones cor-
responding to the distance calculated with PHAST for each section
of pipeline.
4. Case study: quantitative area risk assessment
In this section, the analysis is focused on the Italian North East
Area (Fig. 4). This is a strategic area in the system of Italian NG supply
Table 6
Damage thresholds.
Physical Thermal radiation/ Probability
phenomena overpressure level of fatalities [%]

Explosion 0.3 bar 100

Table 5
0.16 bar 1
Frequency of top events.
0.07 bar 0
Consequence Probability Frequency [event/km*year]
of event [%] Jet fire 38.5 kW/m2 99
Release Catastrophic
19.5 kW/m2 50
from hole rupture
12.5 kW/m2 6.5
Fireball e Jet fire 30.00% 2.87$106 1.42$106 9.8 kW/m2 1
VCE 5.60% 5.36$107 2.64$107 5 kW/m2 0
Flash Fire 50.40% 4.82$106 2.38$106 Flash Fire LFL 100
No hazard 14.00% 1.34$106 6.61$107 ½ LFL 0
10 C. Vianello, G. Maschio / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 32 (2014) 5e17
Fig. 4. Italian Northern Eastern Area pipeline network.
because of the presence of two import points (Tarvisio and Gorizia)
and of one re-gasification terminal (Porto Viro e Adriatic LNG).
In this area the national grid passes close to towns and terri-
tories with different population densities and it is therefore
possible to study different scenarios related to the leakage of
pipeline network transporting natural gas.
In addition the Region Friuli-Venezia Giulia is an area subjected
to earthquakes.
The network, located in the Northern Eastern part of Italy, is also
vulnerable to other risks of disruption because of the occurrence of
a lack of gas supply due to social and political problems, such as the
UkraineeRussia crisis occurred in past years (Vianello & Maschio,
2011) and returned to these days of great actuality. For this
reason an LNG terminal was located in this area.
For the risk assessment of the national network, the seasonal
average weather conditions of each region were considered. The
data were found in the report prepared by ISPRA (2008).
In this study the annual average temperature and annual
average humidity of the Northern Eastern Italian regions were
taken into account.
The roughness of the terrain was assumed constant and equal to
180 mm, which corresponds to rural land with poor edification.
For the release of natural gas, wind direction and speed do not
affect the calculation of consequences, characterized manly by ef-
fects of thermal radiation and explosion. However, in case a
dispersion occurs, these parameters would be important for the
calculation and the development of a cloud.
Therefore the simulations were conducted with a mean wind
speed of 1.5 m/s and Pasquill stability class F.
The results, reported in the following sections, refer to a portion
of the Italian network, Fig. 5, crossed from several parts of pipelines
having different size.
4.1. Analysis of the consequences of release
The following figures highlight that for each section the con-
sequences results are different because the release calculation is a
function of diameter, pressure, length of each pipeline (Figs. 6
and 7).
Vertical release consequences, related to thermal radiation of
the jet fire, are lower than those of horizontal releases since the
direction of the jet is different. For vertical jet fires, there are no
consequences for a higher thermal strength up to 12.5 kWm2
(Figs. 8 and 9).
The model used for the calculation of the explosions is the Baker
e Strehlow model which takes account of the confinement and of
the underground pipeline. The volume is then calculated with the
following formula:


  
V ¼ p*L* dpipe 2 þ ddept
where L is the length of the pipe, dpipe is the internal diameter of the
pipe and ddepth is the average depth of 1.5 m.
Vapour Cloud Explosions generated by vertical releases produce
consequences comparable to those of horizontal releases, because
the explosive mass spilled from the pipeline is equivalent (Figs. 10
and 11).
The consequences of the flash fires from vertical releases are
similar to those of horizontal releases.
From the analysis of the results of the simulations, the conse-
quences of the explosions are lower compared to those of flash fires
because the area involved by this scenario is lower than in the case
of the flash fire.
In conclusions the flash fire represents the most severe acci-
dental scenario produced by a release of natural gas.
4.2. Risk evaluation
The risk assessment includes the identification and evaluation
of the likely accidental scenarios (releases, fire and explosion
events, their probabilities and consequences) for each fixed
installation and each type of transport.
The quantitative area risk evaluation is necessary to identify the
measures of local (LR), individual risk (IR) and the F/N curves
relevant to the societal risk, that are used as indicators of the area
 C. Vianello, G. Maschio / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 32 (2014) 5e17 11

Fig. 5. Case study: portion of the Italian network.

risk resulting from the merging of point risk sources (plants) and
linear risk sources (different ways of transportation). The following
section describes the methodology to determinate the local risk,
societal risk and the results obtained. In this study only the linear
sources are accounted for.
4.2.1. Local risk
Local risk is defined as the likelihood per year that a person who
is continuously and without protection at that location, is fatally
injured as a consequence of an event at the transportation route
leading to the release of a dangerous material.

Fig. 6. Jet fire from horizontal release.

12 C. Vianello, G. Maschio / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 32 (2014) 5e17

Fig. 7. Jet fire from vertical release.

The outdoor LR in a generic point P of a territory is the sum of The procedure for determining the local risk is described in the
the risks into it generated by each source present in the area. It is Purple Book by TNO (TNO, 1999).
calculated through two steps: By identifying the areas indicated in Table 7 for the release from
the hole and release from full bore rupture and then the type of
 LR assessment induced by a single branch and a specific type of event, the local risk was calculated by using the equation.
substances carried; X
n
 Extension of the evaluation to all branches and all types of LRx ¼ fi $Pi (1)
substances transported. i¼1

Fig. 8. Vapour cloud explosion from horizontal release.

 C. Vianello, G. Maschio / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 32 (2014) 5e17 13

Fig. 9. Vapour Cloud Explosion from vertical release.

Where x is distance from pipeline (zone 1,2…), fi is the frequency of
the event and Pi is the probability of fatalities or damages.
Fig. 12 shows the results of the total local risk for a section of the
network due to the release from hole.
The previous figure highlights that the values for LR are different
for each section, since the consequences of releases depend on the
diameter, length, pressure and pumped flow.
Higher values of LR, ranging from 5  106 to 1  106, are
associated to the tract of pipeline of larger diameter and higher
operative pressures (Pipe 55, 57, 126, 128).
In European Countries the value of the individual risk consid-
ered to be acceptable in regulating industrial risk is different for
each Country (Hill & Catmur, 1994).
In the Netherlands, local risk of 106 per year is considered
the limit value for vulnerable buildings (houses, hospitals,
schools etc.), while for less vulnerable buildings like offices,
recreation activities and stores, the local risk level of 106 is the
limit value.
In UK, the HSE quotes 1  106 per year as the risk of fatality that
is regarded broadly as acceptable, and 1  105 per year as that

Fig. 10. Flash fire from horizontal release.

14 C. Vianello, G. Maschio / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 32 (2014) 5e17

Fig. 11. Flash fire from vertical release.

representing the boundary between tolerable and unacceptable for Societal risk refers to the cumulative probability per kilometre
the public. of pipeline that a group of at least N persons is fatally injured as a
The distance from the pipeline, at which the individual risk is direct consequence of their presence within the impact area of the
1  105 per year, is directly proportional to the square root of the pipeline during a failure. In contrast to the local risk, which as-
operating pressure. This is because the fatal length is approximately sumes a hypothetical person which is present all the time, the so-
proportional to the square root of the effective release rate which is cietal risk takes into account the actual presence of persons.
proportional to the operating pressure. The acceptability of the societal risk depends not only on the
The results proposed here refers to the total LR. When consid- probability but also on the number of fatalities.
ering the single causes that may cause the rupture of a pipeline, the Also the acceptability criterion for societal risk is not stan-
local risk is lower. Fig. 13 shows an example of LR based on the dardized among the EU countries. The acceptable level of societal
cause of failure. The percentage of single causes were taken from risk has been set down generally as the cumulative frequency
the works of EGIG (2011) and Brito and Dealmeida (2009). multiplied by the square of the number of fatalities lower than a
The calculated values of local risk are between tolerable and certain value.
unacceptable for the public. Various governments have established “tolerable risk” limits
It is evident that the external interference, such as excavation based on these analysis methods. Many corporations have also
work, represents the initiation cause that mainly contribute to the adopted these methods for internal evaluation of the relative risk of
values of the local risk. For this reason it is necessary an improve- projects, plants and businesses, presumably setting their own
ment in the identification of the path of the pipelines and the criteria. FeN and individual risk analyses have also been applied to
adoption of accurate preventive measures in case of excavation in pipelines, generally with F calculated on a per-length-of-pipeline
areas crossed by pipes. basis. Such an analysis is useful for comparing the risk.
Furthermore, the criteria vary between different countries. In the
4.2.2. Societal risk Netherlands, the societal risk criterion of F$N2 > 102 is an orien-
The societal risk takes into account the population distributed tation value, where F is the frequency and N the number of fatalities.
around the area involved in the consequences of an accident. Hence, societal risk exceeding the criterion may be allowed if all
risk mitigation measures are applied which are not unreasonable
Table 7 with respect to costs or other aspects, i.e., the “as low as reasonably
Distance from release. achievable” principle.
Zone Release from hole [m] The criteria for “tolerable risk” adopted by the Dutch govern-
Zone 1 50
ment in 1996 sets a guide value for hazmat transport goods. Ac-
Zone 2 100 cording to these criteria, the societal risk line is one order of
Zone 3 200 magnitude higher in frequency and is applied to a kilometre of the
Zone 4 300 transport route (Boot, 2013; Schork, Lutostansky, & Auvil, 2012).
Zone 5 450
In UK, the HSE quotes a guide value for the societal risk of
Zone 6 600
Zone 7 800 F$N > 102 as the value of societal risk that is regarded as
Zone 8 1000 acceptable.
Zone 9 1200 As previously described the distribution network may pass
Zone 10 1400 through populated areas and thus can cause injury to the
Zone 11 1600
population.
 C. Vianello, G. Maschio / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 32 (2014) 5e17 15

Fig. 12. Local risk for release from hole.

The calculation of societal risk were performed for the regions of
Veneto, Friuli e Venezia Giulia and Trentino e Alto Adige, as there
were available data of population density of these regions from
previous work. The population density data was derived from
CENSIS 2001 (ISTAT, 2001).
It is possible to calculate the societal risk for each consequence
or the total damage on population. Fig. 14 shows the results of one
segment of network. In this figure two lines, representing the
acceptability criteria in use in NL and UK, were added to the guide
value for hazmat transport goods (Boot, 2013).
With reference to the NL guide value, the results of societal risk
for each scenario, excluded that due to VCE, are above of upper
limits of acceptability, meaning that the societal risk is not
acceptable. Instead, referring to the UK guide value the societal risk
is almost in the acceptability area.
Fig. 15 shows other results of societal risk for different pipeline.
The figure highlights that the results are different because the
distribution of population density changes along the route of dis-
tribution network. In fact, the network crosses different typology of
territory, town or countryside.

Fig. 13. Local risk based on failure causes.

16 C. Vianello, G. Maschio / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 32 (2014) 5e17
Fig. 14. Societal risk of a pipeline in function of consequences type .
In addition, in this case the societal risk, for every tract of
pipeline, is above the upper limits of acceptability with reference to
the NL guide value. Instead, referring to the UK guide value the
societal risk is acceptable.
Taking into account the characteristics of the average population
density of the investigated area, the criterion of UK can be
considered the most suitable for this area. Therefore, the societal
risk may be considered acceptable.
Finally, among the accidental scenarios that most contribute to
the societal risk the formation of flash fires should be considered,
while a significant contribution is given of course by the charac-
teristics of vulnerability of the territory crossed by the pipeline.
5. Conclusions
In conclusions, the consequences that can occur during the
transport of natural gas are due to fire and explosions.
The failure frequencies considered in the calculation of local
risk, were found in the EGIG report for distribution network. The
consequences, due to releases from pipeline are function of the pipe
diameter pressure and flow of each section of the network.
It is evident that the external interference, such as excavation
work, represents the initial cause that mainly contributes to the
final values of the local risk.
The flash fire and the VCE produce the most significant impact in
terms of consequences both from a release caused by a hole or a full
bore rupture of pipelines. Additionally the highest contribution to
the societal risk should be considered the occurrence of flash fires.
Fig. 15. Societal risk of the pipeline tracts considered in the case study.
Consequently, the flash fire scenario should be considered the
most severe and as the limiter for safety distance determination for
natural gas pipelines. The thermal effect of a flash fire, as well as the
distance that the fuel gas travels from the source to its lower
flammable limit position, strongly depend on atmospheric
conditions.
The determination of local risk highlights that the highest
calculated values, ranging from 5$106 to 1$106, are between
tolerable and unacceptable for the public, but the reduction of the
frequencies of external interferences can reduce the values of local
risk under the acceptability values. For this reason it is necessary an
improvement of the identification of the path of the pipelines and
the adoption of accurate preventive measures in case of excavation
in areas crossed by pipes.
In the distribution network, the analysis of the societal risk has
shown that there are pipelines that pass close to zones with me-
dium population density and thus a release could give negative
effects on the population. The results of the quantitative area risk
assessment demonstrate that in some cases the societal risk
exceeded the NL guide values for acceptability, whereas referring to
the UK guide value the societal risk is acceptable.
In conclusions, the high-pressure distribution network is a
defined infrastructure that cannot be changed by the structural
point of view, for example by shifting pipeline sections. Therefore
mitigation and prevention actions that may be adopted are: more
information about where the pipelines are located in case of out-
door interventions (excavations), and communication among
different institutions or facilities.
With current acceptable criteria for local risk, the minimum
proximity of the pipeline for residential buildings is approximately
proportional to the square root of the operating pressure of the
pipeline. The value decreases with the pipeline length due the
resistance of gas flowing through the pipeline.
Safety distances in the proximity of pipelines may be plotted in
diagrams against independent variables. These diagrams could be
used in loss prevention applications as well as in safer land-use
planning.
In addition, the following risk mitigation measures are sug-
gested to mitigate the risk in more critical areas :
 Marker tape can warn an excavator driver that there is a pipeline
under the ground.
 Protective concrete slabs reduce the possibility of external
interference by warning an excavator driver that there is
something below the concrete slab.
 Burying the pipeline deeper at 2.0 m reduces the chance that an
excavator hits the pipeline.
 Installation of additional automatic block valves to isolate a
pipeline section if a leakage occurs and limits the amount of
released NG.
The proposed methodology for risk assessment may be useful
for risk management during the planning and building stages of a
new pipeline, and in very critical conditions the modification of a
buried pipeline could also be suggested.
An analysis was conducted on the entire national network and
similar results are observed in other areas that have population
densities similar to those analyzed. Thus the same conclusions may
be extended to these areas.
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