AN OVERVIEW OF THE NATURE OF

HYDROCARBON JET FIRE HAZARDS IN THE

OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY AND A SIMPLIFIED
APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE HAZARDS

B. J. Lowesmith1,
, G. Hankinson1, M. R. Acton2 and G. Chamberlain3

1
Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK.
2
Advantica Limited (formerly British Gas Research and Development), Loughborough, UK.
3
Shell Global Solutions, Chester, UK.

Abstract: High pressure jet fires pose a serious hazard to offshore installations operated by the
oil and gas industry as demonstrated by the Piper Alpha incident. Following the Piper Alpha inci-
dent a major initiative by the offshore oil and gas industry operators led to the production of
Interim Guidance Notes which provided guidance to operators on how to assess jet fire hazards.
However, many areas of uncertainty were identified where no data was available. Areas of par-
ticular concern identified in the Interim Guidance Notes were two-phase jet fires, the effect of
confinement on jet fires and their behaviour with water deluge. Since that time a considerable
body of experimental research has been undertaken. Based on this recent data, this paper reas-
sesses jet fire hazards in an offshore environment and provides updated guidance on the
hazards they pose, including tabulated data and simple calculation techniques for predicting
jet fire hazards.

Keywords: jet fires; two-phase jet fires; offshore fire hazards; water deluge; thermal load.

BACKGROUND Prior to the Piper Alpha incident, there was

The oil and gas industry produces, processes


Correspondence to:
and conveys a wide range of hydrocarbon
Dr B.J. Lowesmith, fuels from natural gas to heavy crude oil in
Department of Chemical large quantities and often at high pressures.
Engineering, Loughborough An ignited accidental release of pressurized
University, Loughborough,
fuel can present a serious jet fire hazard to
Leicestershine, LE11 3TU,
UK. industry personnel and to the installation
E-mail: b.j.lowesmith@ itself potentially leading to escalation of the
lboro.ac.uk incident due to further inventory loss or struc-
tural collapse. For example, the riser failure
DOI: 10.1205/psep06038
which occurred during the Piper Alpha Incident
0957–5820/07/ in 1988 (Cullen, 1990), contributed to the col-
$30.00 þ 0.00 lapse of the platform and a major loss of life.
Offshore installations present particular
Process Safety and problems in relation to the protection of
Environmental Protection
personnel from hazardous events. Space
Trans IChemE, restrictions lead to closely packed process
Part B, May 2007 pipework and hence the likelihood of escala-
tion following a relatively small fire is
# 2007 Institution
of Chemical Engineers
increased compared to an onshore facility.
The close proximity of personnel and the diffi-
culties of escape are an important consider-
ation. Hence it is important for operators to
have a good understanding of the fire hazards
posed by their installation and to be able to
demonstrate that the risk is managed effec-
tively as part of their Safety Case.
little public domain information concerning the
quantification of fire hazards which could be
accessed by operators and the incident led
to the initiation of a major Joint Industry Pro-
ject (JIP) coordinated by the Steel Construc-
tion Institute (SCI) entitled ‘Blast and Fire
Engineering Project for Topside Structures’
(BFETS) in 1990. Phase 1 reviewed the cur-
rent understanding of fire and explosion
hazards offshore, identified areas requiring
further research and provided Interim Gui-
dance Notes (IGNs) for use by the offshore
industry (Cowley and Johnson, 1992; SCI,
1992). In particular, the IGNs included gui-
dance on the kinds of fires likely to occur off-
shore and, where possible, guidance on their
quantification, for example, in terms of fire
size and thermal loading. However, the gui-
dance recognized many areas of uncertainty
where no reliable data could be provided.
This led directly to the initiation of Phase 2
of the project where major research projects
were undertaken to obtain full scale data on
the hazards presented by offshore fires and
explosions to address the gaps in under-
standing identified during Phase 1. As part
of Phase 2, jet fires involving oil and gas mix-
tures were undertaken by Advantica Limited

207 Vol 85 (B3) 207–220

208 LOWESMITH et al.
(formerly British Gas Research and Development) and con-
fined condensate jet fires were studied by SINTEF in
Norway (SCI, 1998; Advantica, 1997a).
Advantica were well qualified to undertake this work since
from the early 1980s Advantica had been studying jet fire
hazards associated with natural gas, principally related to
gas transmission pipelines. Recognizing the importance of
studying these hazards at a representative scale, large and
full scale experiments were undertaken at their Spadeadam
Test Site in Cumbria to determine the fire characteristics
(Wickens and Lowesmith, 1993; Cook et al., 1987;
Hankinson et al., 2000), although much remains unpublished.
Other studies of jet fires (conducted jointly with Shell Global
Solutions) included other fuels such as propane and butane
of particular relevance to onshore storage facilities (Bennett
et al., 1991; Shell, 1992; Davenport, 1994a; Sekulin and
Acton, 1995).
After Phase 2, Advantica continued work on gas jet fire
hazards (Gosse and Pritchard, 1995; Advantica, 1997b)
and Shell undertook large scale experiments studying gas/
kerosene jet fires (Davenport, 1994b). Attention was also
focused on fire mitigation using active water deluge. Advan-
tica initiated two JIPs to study the effectiveness of water
deluge to mitigate jet and pool fire hazards (Advantica,
1997c, 2000a), whilst Advantica and Shell jointly conducted
a JIP to study jet fires involving oil/gas/water mixtures
(Advantica, 2000b). Only limited information from these
JIPs has been published thus far (Gosse and Hankinson,
2001; Hankinson and Lowesmith, 2004; Hankinson et al.,
forthcoming). Experiments studying dedicated vessel
deluge with jet fires have also been conducted at Spadea-
dam and elsewhere (Shirvill and White, 1994; Shirvill, 2004;
Roberts, 2004).
The effect of confinement (with and without deluge) on fire
behaviour was studied during the BFETS JIP experiments
conducted at SINTEF and subsequently in further studies
by Shell (Chamberlain, 1994; Chamberlain and Brightwell,
1994).
It was always the intention of the BFETS JIP that the
IGNs would be updated after Phase 2 and this was
completed initially in relation to explosion hazards. After
some delay, the updating of the IGNs for fire hazards is
now in progress with the support of the UK Offshore
Operators Association (UKOOA, 2006).
SCOPE OF PAPER
As part of the updating of the IGNs for fire hazards, infor-
mation on the nature of fire hazards likely to be experienced
offshore and guidance on their quantification is being
reviewed taking into account the wealth of large scale exper-
imental data that has been generated during and since
Phase 2 of the BFETS JIP, as described above. This paper
presents the results of this review in relation to jet fire
hazards which forms the basis of the guidance relating to
jet fires which is to be included within the updated industry
guidance notes (UKOOA, 2006).
Based on data from the large scale experiments outlined
above including much data which has not been previously
published, the nature and characteristics of hydrocarbon jet
fires, especially in relation to offshore oil and gas installa-
tions, are described. The effects of confinement and active
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2007, 85(B3): 207– 220
water deluge systems on fire behaviour and consequences
are also summarized.
Guidance is then presented for a simplified approach to
quantifying jet fire hazards (in terms of values for flame
size, temperature, heat loads, and so on) for the range of
fire sizes likely to be considered in a quantified risk assess-
ment (QRA). These typical values for jet fire hazards are
based on the experimental data reviewed here sup-
plemented with predictions by validated models (developed
by Shell and Advantica) and can be used to assess the
potential hazard to personnel and the likely affect to fire
impacted obstacles. The approach taken in defining jet fire
hazards is similar to, but more detailed than, that presented
within the Energy Institute guidance on severe fires (Energy
Institute, 2003).
As the focus is offshore operations, the fuels for which gui-
dance is required are principally pressurized gas, oil fractions
and their mixtures, sometimes including water. The guidance
does not extend to activities involving liquefied natural gas
(LNG). Experimental studies generally used processed oil
fractions such as diesel or kerosene and these are con-
sidered to be representative of the behaviour of light crude
oils. Some experimental studies related to LPG (propane
and butane) and, although not generally experienced off-
shore except as part of the composition, where appropriate
the results of these studies have been included.
NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF JET FIRES
Jet fires can be produced following the pressurized
release of a variety of fuel types. The simplest being a
pressurized gas giving rise to a gas jet fire. A pressurized
liquid/gas mixture (such as ‘live crude’ or gas dissolved in
a liquid) will give rise to a two-phase jet fire. The gas
stream atomizes the liquid into droplets which are then
evaporated by radiation from the flame. However, a pressur-
ized release of a liquid can also give rise to a jet fire in
which two-phase behaviour is observed if the liquid is able
to vaporize quickly. This is most likely to occur when a
liquid is released from containment at a temperature
above its boiling point at ambient conditions whereupon
flash evaporation occurs (e.g., propane, butane) and a
flashing liquid jet fire results. Non-volatile liquids (e.g., kero-
sene, diesel, or stabilized crude) are unlikely to be able to
sustain a two-phase jet fire, unless permanently piloted by
an adjacent fire; even so, some liquid drop-out is likely
and hence the formation of a pool.
Flame Stability
Whether or not a stable jet fire will arise following the
releases of a pressurized hydrocarbon will depend principally
upon the nature of the fuel, the size of the hole from which the
release occurs and the geometry of the surroundings. In the
case of natural gas, it has been found that for free jets (not
impacting) some combinations of hole size and pressure
cannot produce stable flames (Birch et al., 1988). Figure 1
shows that for hole sizes under 30 mm diameter, there is a
lower bound pressure which vertical high pressure releases
must exceed to produce stable jet fires. In practice this
means that most small leaks will be inherently unstable and
will not support a flame without some form of flame stabiliz-
ation, such as the presence of another fire in the vicinity to
 HYDROCARBON JET FIRE HAZARDS IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
Figure 1. Stability of free (non-impacting) natural gas jet fires.
provide a permanent pilot or stabilization as a result of impact
onto an object such as pipework, vessels or the surrounding
structure.
Figure 1 also includes data from horizontal free jet fires
with and without general area deluge at two different flow-
rates (Advantica, 2000a) from which it can be seen that the
unstable region is larger for horizontal jets and that deluge
further increases flame instability. However, in the highly con-
gested environment offshore, impact within a short distance
is very likely, and hence small leaks are most likely to stabil-
ize on the nearest point of impact.
Flame Shape and Appearance
A jet fire is a turbulent diffusion flame produced by the com-
bustion of a continuous release of fuel. Except in the case of
extreme confinement, which might give rise to extinguish-
ment of gas jet fires or liquid drop-out with two-phase jet
fires, the combustion rate will be directly related to the
mass release rate of the fuel.
In the offshore context, operating pressures are high so the
flow of an accidental pressurized gas release into the atmos-
phere will be choked having a velocity on release equal to the
local speed of sound in the fluid (called sonic releases).
A factor which is often overlooked is the noise produced
by sonic gaseous releases. This is usually high pitched and
so loud that it may prevent effective radio communication
between personnel. As a result emergency actions could
be hampered.
For pressurized gaseous releases, following an expansion
region downstream of the release point, the flame itself com-
mences in a region of sub-sonic velocities as a blue relatively
non-luminous flame. Further air entrainment and expansion
of the jet then occurs producing the main body of the gas
jet fire as turbulent and yellow. In the absence of impact
onto an object, these fires are characteristically long and
thin and highly directional. The high velocities within the
released gas mean that they are relatively unaffected by
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2007, 85(B3): 207 –220
209
the prevailing wind conditions except towards the tail of the
fire. By contrast, the generally lower exit velocities from flash-
ing liquid releases lead to flashing liquid jet fires with shorter
flame lift-offs and proportionately shorter and more buoyant
flames overall. These lower velocities also result in fires
that are more wind affected whilst the higher hydrocarbon
content of these fuels increases the flame luminosity. How-
ever, releases involving gas dissolved in, or mixed with, a
liquid can result in a two-phase jet fire which combines the
worst aspects of both the gas jet fire and the flashing liquid
jet fire, that is, high velocities and high flame luminosity.
Apart from providing flame stabilization, impact onto an
obstacle may modify the shape of a jet fire. Objects which
are smaller than the flame half-width at the point of impact
are unlikely to modify the shape or length of the flame to
any great extent. However, impact onto a large vessel may
significantly shorten the jet fire, and impact onto a wall or
roof could transform the jet into a radial wall jet where the
location and direction of the fire is determined by the
surface onto which it impacts and its distance from the
release point.
Combustion Characteristics and Smoke
In the case of high pressure releases of natural gas, the
mixing and combustion is relatively efficient resulting in little
soot (carbon) formation except for extremely large release
rates. Hence little or no smoke is produced by natural gas
jet fires (typically ,0.01 g m23). CO concentrations in the
region of 5– 7% v/v have been measured within a jet fire
itself but this is expected to drop to less than 0.1% v/v by
the end of the flame. Considerably more soot is produced
in jet fires involving higher hydrocarbons, although there is
no available experimental data quantifying the difference.
Limited measurements in the smoke one flame length down-
stream of the end of a ‘live crude’ jet fire determined a per-
centage obscuration of typically 10% over a 200 mm path
length (Advantica, 2000a). This corresponds to a visibility
distance of about 5 m (Drysdale, 1985).
Jet Fire Length
Jet fire size is primarily related to the mass release rate.
For gaseous releases this, in turn, is related to the size of
the leak (hole diameter) and the pressure (which may vary
with time as a result of emergency blowdown). For non-
gaseous fuels, the liquid content results in relatively higher
release rates for a given aperture and pressure compared
to gaseous releases and, when the release is two-phase
(such as may arise from a relatively long pipe connected to
a storage vessel containing a liquid above its boiling point),
estimating the release rate is non-trivial. This is because it
is necessary to know what proportion of the fluid is in each
phase and this proportion may be changing along the
length of the pipe due to heat transfer through the pipe wall
and pressure changes.
Figure 2 shows jet fire lengths for a range of fuels plotted
against the power of the flame in megawatts, Q ( ¼ mass
release rate x net calorific value). The figure includes a corre-
lation for jet fire length, L, based on the majority of the natural
gas data and all the higher hydrocarbon data, which is
L ¼ 2:8893Q0:3728 (1)
210
Figure 2. Jet flame length.
For high pressure gaseous releases, the mass release rate
through an orifice, Ṁ, can be related to the area of the hole,
Ad, and pressure, P, using
vffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
u   ggþ1 ! radiative emissions from soot within the higher hydrocarbon
u g m 2 1
_ ¼ Cd Ad P10
M 6 t
RTg Z g þ 1
For natural gas, this can be approximated for circular holes
of diameter, d (mm), by
_ ¼ d 2 P  103
M (3)
Substituting into equation (1), the jet fire length for natural
gas can be approximated by
L ¼ 0:933d 0:746 P0:373
Flame Radiative Emissions
As noted above, the combustion process within a natural
gas jet fire is relatively efficient and produces little soot
(carbon). Consequently, these flames are not as luminous
as higher hydrocarbon flames. Radiation emissions from
natural gas jet fires arise mostly from water vapour and
carbon dioxide, except for very large releases where soot
production starts to enhance the process. The long thin
shape may also result in a flame path which may not be opti-
cally thick. The net result is that the radiative heat transfer to
the surroundings is lower than for comparable higher hydro-
carbon jet fires. This is reflected in the fraction of heat
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2007, 85(B3): 207– 220
LOWESMITH et al.
radiated, F, for such fires as can be seen in Figure 3. (F is
defined as ‘(energy released as radiation from the flame
surface/net energy of combustion)’). As can be seen,
F increases with carbon number, reflecting the increased
(2) jet fires.
For gas– liquid fuel mixtures, interpolation based on the
percentage liquid within the mixture provides a reasonable
estimate of F as can be seen in Figure 4 for butane/natural
gas mixtures.
A special case of interest at some installations is ‘live’
crude that includes a significant quantity of water. Experi-
ments (Hankinson et al., 2007) have shown that mixtures
with a ‘water cut’ [defined as (mass of water/mass of
fuel)  100%) of up to 125% remain flammable, although
not necessarily capable of supporting a stable flame in the
(4)
absence of some other supporting mechanism. The inclusion
of water also slightly increases flame length and flame
buoyancy, and significantly reduces the amount of smoke
produced. For water cuts less than 50% there is little
impact on the fraction of heat radiated but for higher water
cuts the fraction of heat radiated is reduced (Figure 5).
Heat Loads and Flame Temperatures
The thermal load to an engulfed object in a jet fire will be a
combination of radiative load and convective load from the
hot combustion products passing over the surface. Clearly
the total heat flux which is imparted to an engulfed object
will vary over the surface of the object. In addition, the relative
proportions of convective and radiative heat flux will vary over
 HYDROCARBON JET FIRE HAZARDS IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 211

Figure 3. Fraction of heat radiated.

the surface, with the highest convective component likely to
be experienced close to the point of impact of a flame
where the highest velocities occur, whereas the highest
radiative heat load will be experienced where the more
radiative part of the flame (usually towards the end of the
flame) is viewed by the object. As the more radiative part of
the flame is closer to the tail, this can result in the highest
overall heat fluxes being experienced on the rear surface of
an engulfed object which may seem counter-intuitive.
Figure 6 shows total heat fluxes experienced by a horizontal
cylinder (pipe) impacted by a horizontal high pressure gas
jet fire (Pritchard and Cowley, 1991). The cylindrical surface
is presented flat by cutting along the rear. When the pipe
was located at 21 m (towards the end of the flame) the
maximum heat fluxes were experienced at the point of
impact on the front of the pipe [Figure 6(a)]. At 15 m
[Figure 6(b)] the heat loads were relatively uniform around
the pipe, but at 9 m [Figure 6(c)] the heat loads were greatest
to the rear of the pipe due to radiation from the tail of
the flame.

Figure 4. Fraction of heat radiated for fuel mixtures. Figure 5. Effect of water cut on fraction of heat radiated.

Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2007, 85(B3): 207 –220
212 LOWESMITH et al.

Figure 6. Variation of total heat flux over the surface: (a) pipe at 21 m; (b) pipe at 15 m; (c) pipe at 9 m.

Due to the radiant soot emissions, the radiative heat trans-
fer from higher hydrocarbon jet fires is generally greater than
that from natural gas flames and the generally lower vel-
ocities arising from flashing liquid releases (such as propane
or butane) result in a lower convective flux to engulfed
objects.
For the rear surface of an engulfed object, Figure 7 shows
that the fraction of the heat flux which is radiative increases
from about 0.5 for natural gas to about 0.8 for fuels containing
a large proportion of higher hydrocarbons (data from Bennett
et al., 1991; Davenport, 1994a, b; Advantica, 1997a).
In the case of a pressurized gas–liquid mixture (such as
‘live’ crude), the high gas velocities may still occur and
result in a high convective contribution, whilst the higher
hydrocarbon content maintains a high radiative contribution;
making these type of jet fires a ‘worst case’ in terms of total
heat flux to engulfed obstacles. Experimental work
(Davenport, 1994a, b; Advantica, 1997a) suggests that the
maximum combined fluxes occur for gas –liquid mixtures
which are about 60 –80% by mass of liquid (Figure 8). This
phenomenon can be explained by considering the maximum
time averaged flame temperatures measured in over 180
large scale gas jet and flashing liquid jet fires (Bennett
et al., 1991; Sekulin and Acton, 1995; Advantica, 1997b) pre-
sented in Figure 9. As can be seen, the maximum flame
temperatures are higher for the gas jet fire (on average
12808C and up to 15008C), compared to a flashing liquid
fire which has a lower flame temperature (typically 10508C).
In the case of two-phase jet fires, the flame temperature is
dominated by the gas content but the flame emissivity will
also be enhanced by the higher hydrocarbon content leading
to overall higher radiative fluxes for such mixtures.
Figure 8 includes data with mass flowrate between 2.5 and
5 kg s21 and shows that for a flashing liquid fuel the maxi-
mum heat flux is generally around 200 kW m22 whereas for
gas only (0% liquid), the maximum heat flux is typically
250 –275 kW m22. In experiments involving natural gas at
higher flowrates (up to 10 kg s21) maximum heat fluxes up

Figure 7. Radiative heat flux as a fraction of total heat flux to rear of Figure 8. Maximum heat fluxes to an engulfed object for gas– liquid
engulfed object. mixtures.

Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2007, 85(B3): 207– 220
 HYDROCARBON JET FIRE HAZARDS IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
Figure 9. Maximum flame temperatures.
to 320 kW m22 were measured. This was due to a higher
radiative component arising from increased flame thickness
and soot production within the flame. Broadly speaking,
neglecting spatial variations, for a given location of an
object within a flame (as a proportion of flame length), the
convective component for a gas jet fire is more or less con-
stant with increasing size of release, whereas the radiative
component increases with release rate as the flame becomes
optically thick and more smoky. Hence the relative proportion
of convective to radiative flux varies with fire size.
For fuels containing water, water cuts under 50% result in
no significant reduction in heat fluxes to engulfed objects
(,10%). However, over 50% the flames are significantly
less radiative, and the overall heat flux to an obstacle can
be reduced by 40% or more (Advantica, 2000b; Hankinson
et al., 2007) (Figure 10).
Water Deluge of Jet Fires
The most usual forms of active water deluge are water
curtains (used to protect an escape corridor), general area
deluge and dedicated vessel deluge. The success or other-
wise of active water deluge in mitigating the effect of jet
fires depends upon the nature of the jet fire (gas, liquid or
two-phase) and objective to be achieved (reduction of inci-
dent thermal radiation or protection of engulfed objects).
As noted above, the activation of general area deluge can
adversely affect the stability of high pressure gas jet fires,
Figure 10. Effect of water cut in the fuel on maximum heat fluxes to
an engulfed object.
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2007, 85(B3): 207 –220
213
particularly if the fire is not impacting onto an obstacle
(Figure 1). However, in most practical cases at the industry
standard deluge rate of 12 l m22 min21, this undesirable
effect is unlikely to occur due to impact onto obstacles provid-
ing adequate flame stabilization.
Although there is some evidence that the deluge increases
combustion efficiency resulting in lower CO and increased
CO2 levels within the flame (Advantica, 2000a), in most
other respects deluge has little effect on the size, shape
and thermal characteristics of a high pressure gas jet fire.
Therefore, the heat loading to engulfed obstacles is not
diminished. The same is true for dedicated vessel deluge
systems; the water being unable to form a film over the
vessel in the presence of the high velocity jet, and so dry
patches form where the temperature rise is undiminished
by the action of deluge (Shirvill and White, 1994).
Compared to the situation with a gas jet fire, the use of
dedicated vessel deluge to protect a vessel against a flashing
liquid jet fire (e.g., propane, butane) can be more effective.
The water interacts with the flame to some extent; reducing
the flame luminosity and the amount of smoke produced.
Nevertheless, at typical application rates (10 –15 l m22
min21) it cannot be relied upon to maintain a water film
over the vessel and hence to prevent vessel temperature
rise in areas where dry patches form, although the rate of
rise may be expected to reduce to 20 –70% of the rate with-
out deluge for a propane jet fire (Shirvill, 2004). However, in
tests with an increased water application of 40 l m22 min21,
a 2 tonne LPG tank was effectively protected when subjected
to a 2 kg s21 flashing propane jet fire (Roberts, 2004).
For two-phase jet fires of ‘live’ crude, dedicated deluge (at
10 l m22 min21) offered limited protection and no reduction in
the rate of temperature rise in the area where the fire
impacted the obstacle (Advantica, 2000a; Hankinson and
Lowesmith, 2004). This work also showed that using area
deluge alone at the ‘standard’ rate of 12 l m22 min21 is unli-
kely to modify the flame behaviour although there is some
evidence that a higher deluge rate (24 l m22 min21) can
result in water interaction with the flame, resulting in a shorter
flame and some reduction in heat fluxes to certain areas of an
engulfed object, notably the front (where flame impact
occurs) and top areas. Since dedicated vessel deluge is
more effective at reducing the radiative heat fluxes in the
region to the rear of the vessel, the combination of area
deluge (at the higher rate) and dedicated vessel deluge can
be effective in reducing overall heat fluxes to a vessel such
that the temperature rise is halted or at least the rate of temp-
erature rise is reduced. This may prevent vessel failure,
especially if combined with a blowdown strategy. The relative
performance of these deluge strategies for a two-phase ‘live’
crude jet fire impacting onto a vessel (Hankinson and
Lowesmith, 2004) are shown in Figure 11. Measurements in
the combustion products downstream of these ‘live crude’ jet
fires determined an obscuration factor due to smoke of typi-
cally 10% over a 200 mm path length without deluge (visibility
distance of about 5 m) and no significant change was noted in
the presence of area deluge at 12 l m22 min21. At 24 l m22
min21 the smoke changed from black to grey due to the
increased water vapour and this had the effect of increasing
the obscuration factor to about 20%, corresponding to a visi-
bility distance of between 1 m and 2 m.
The major benefit of area deluge with all kinds of jet fires
arises from the suppression of incident thermal radiation to
214 LOWESMITH et al.
Figure 11. Performance of different deluge strategies with a two-phase jet fire. (a) Top of vessel; (b) front; (c) rear; (d) bottom.
the surroundings, which protects adjacent plant and in par-
ticular, aids escape by personnel. Similarly water curtains
can be used to protect escape corridors. Figure 12 presents
large scale data (Advantica, 1997c; Advantica, 2000a) on the
reduction of incident radiation due to water deluge by MV57
type nozzles spaced 2.84 m apart. For this arrangement,
operating at 12 l m22 min21, incident radiation levels can
be reduced by about 20% for a single row of nozzles,
30–40% for two rows and 40–60% for more than two rows
(general area deluge).
Figure 12. Reduction in incident radiation by water curtains of MV57
nozzles.
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2007, 85(B3): 207– 220
Increased deluge rates can further reduce incident radi-
ation levels: 60 –70% at 18 l m22 min21; 80– 90% at 24 l
m22 min21 for general area deluge. Nozzles producing smal-
ler droplet sizes can have an enhanced mitigation effect, but
there is an increased risk that the droplets will be blown away
by the wind (Advantica, 2000a).
The mitigation of incident radiation is due to attenuation of
radiation by the water droplets in the atmosphere, that is,
effectively reducing the atmospheric transmissivity, t. The
reduction in incident radiation, Is, with distance, s, due to
this attenuation is characteristically expressed by an equation
of the form
Is ¼ I0 eats (5)
When using deluge, additional water is present in the
atmosphere. For a deluge system with N nozzles over an
area Aw, each supplied with V̇w litres per minute and produ-
cing droplets with a velocity Uw, the water volume fraction,
Wf, is given by
N:V_ W 1
Wf ¼  (6)
AW :UW 60 000
From which it can be seen that as smaller droplets will
have a lower terminal velocity, the water volume fraction
will be comparatively higher. Multiplying Wf by the pathlength
through the deluged area (that is, the ‘thickness’ of the water
curtain) gives a measure of the average water pathlength.
Figure 13 presents data on the reduction in incident radi-
ation as a function of average water pathlength for a range
of nozzle types being: TF12-170 producing low velocity
 HYDROCARBON JET FIRE HAZARDS IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
Figure 13. Effectiveness of water deluge in reducing incident
radiation.
droplets with a Sauter mean diameter of 300 micron; HV60
producing droplets in the range 670 –750 micron depending
on the operating pressure; MV57 producing droplets
640–870 micron; and a prototype Large Droplet Nozzle
(LDN) producing droplets about 1890 micron. The best-fit
equation of the appropriate form fitted to the data is
y ¼ 100
(1 2 e 21005x). Therefore, the reduction in incident
radiation, RI (%), for a curtain of thickness Cw is
RI ¼ 100
(1  e1005Wf Cw )
Confined Jet Fires
The behaviour of a jet fire within a confined or partially con-
fined area will depend upon the degree of confinement and
the direction of the jet relative to the ventilation opening. It
should be noted that certain ventilation patterns could lead
to flame instability and extinguishment.
The amount of air required for complete stoichiometric
combustion of methane is about 17.2 times the fuel flowrate
on a mass basis. For higher hydrocarbons this figure is about
15. The equivalence ratio, f, for a confined fire in terms of the
mass burning rate of the fuel and the mass flowrate of air
entrained (Ṁ and Ḃ) is defined as
M_
f¼r
B_
where r is the mass ratio of air to fuel required for stoichio-
metric burning (that is r  15). If f , 1 then the fire is well
ventilated (also termed ‘fuel controlled’) and if f . 1 the fire
is under-ventilated (or ‘ventilation controlled’).
If ventilation is plentiful (f , 1) or the jet is directed out of a
confined region through a vent then there may be little differ-
ence in jet fire characteristics compared to an unconfined fire.
However, if the release rate is large relative to the size of the
confinement or the ventilation openings are small then the fire
may not be able to entrain enough air for complete combus-
tion inside the compartment (f . 1). This is likely to result in
increased levels of incomplete combustion products such as
CO, increased levels of smoke (soot) and increased flame
temperatures, particularly in regions close to the ceiling of
a compartment where hot combustion products may be
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2007, 85(B3): 207 –220
215
trapped and recirculate. This leads to increased heat fluxes
to objects and surfaces compared to an unconfined fire
(SCI, 1998; Chamberlain, 1994).
The location where combustion occurs and the hottest
parts of the flame may also shift due to the confinement. In
tests (Chamberlain, 1994) involving horizontal jet fires in a
compartment incorporating a single wall vent, where the jet
was directed away from the vent, increased temperatures
were seen at the interface between the smoke layer leaving
the compartment and the air layer entering the compartment,
most particularly in the area furthest from the vent.
Unlike unconfined fires, the behaviour of under-ventilated
confined fires changes with time as the air initially available
within the compartment is consumed, and this may lead to
‘external flaming’ after a period of time when the body of
flame moves through the vent in order to find the oxygen
required for combustion. For gas jet fires, CO levels of up
to 5% v/v at the vent may occur but after the onset of external
combustion the CO levels drop to typically less than 0.5% v/v
by the end of the flame (Chamberlain, 1994). Soot production
is related to the equivalence ratio f and hence the degree of
ventilation and may range from about 0.1 g m23 at f ¼ 1.3 to
up to 2.5 g m23 at f ¼ 2 (Chamberlain and Brightwell, 1994).
The worst case condition in terms of fire severity is likely to
occur if the jet fire is slightly under-ventilated as this leads to
high heat release rates and enhanced soot production.
Deluge of a confined gas jet fire may lead to flame extin-
guishment and hence a serious explosion hazard from the
continuing release. In the case of a two-phase jet fire, extin-
(7)
guishment may result in a mist-air explosion hazard and/or
the formation of a liquid pool. The likelihood of flame extin-
guishment is significantly increased if the surroundings are
already hot at the time the deluge is activated as the main
mechanism which results in extinguishment of the jet fire is
‘inerting’, that is evaporation of the water droplets leading to
a mixture of gas/air/steam within the compartment which is
outside the flammable limits. The water vapour may also con-
tribute to flame instability by reducing the burning velocity.
However, if the deluge is activated at an early stage, prior
to the compartment walls becoming hot, then the fire may
not be extinguished and some benefit in terms of reduced
flame temperatures and wall temperatures may accrue
(SCI, 1998; Chamberlain, 1994).
In tests (Advantica, 2000a) involving only partial confine-
ment around the upper area of a module, during which
‘dead spaces’ occurred close to the ceiling, area deluge
(8) was found to be beneficial in reducing heat fluxes to the ceil-
ing surface, reducing the flame extent and the amount of
smoke produced.
A SIMPLIFIED APPROACH TO ASSESSING JET FIRE
HAZARDS
It is normal practice for a QRA of an oil and gas installation
to consider a range of sizes of event. The critical parameter in
determining fire size is the mass release rate, which in turn is
related to the leak size and pressure. A leak classification
system which is often used, considers holes of 3, 10, 30
and 100 mm diameter which, for an operating pressure of
about 100 bar, correspond to gaseous release rates of
about 0.1, 1, 10 and 100 kg s21.
Ideally, during a QRA, the fire size and thermal loading
from fires should be assessed using mathematical models
216 LOWESMITH et al.
which have been extensively validated against large scale
data. A range of such models are available on a licence or
consultancy basis. However, a simplified approach was pro-
posed in the Interim Guidance Notes (SCI, 1992), whereby
correlations for flame dimensions were suggested for jet
and pool fires together with guidance on typical heat loadings
to engulfed objects. Similarly, guidance on typical heat load-
ings from fires was provided in the Energy Institute document
for severe jet and pool fires (Energy Institute, 2003).
In this paper, a similar approach is taken in order to provide
tabulated guidance on assessing jet fire hazards, based on
recent knowledge and large scale experimental work. The
guidance values (which are conservative) can then be used
to undertake an initial simplified QRA. If necessary, problem
areas can then be identified for more rigorous assessment.
Guidance values for jet fire hazards are provided for the fol-
lowing range of sizes of leak:
. Small—typically 0.03 –0.3 kg s21, represented by
0.1 kg s21;
. Medium—typically 0.3–3 kg s21, represented by 1 kg s21;
. Large—typically 3–30 kg s21, represented by 10 kg s21;
. Major failure—over 30 kg s21.
For each size category, the information is provided to allow
assessment of the fire size, the incident radiation field to per-
sons and objects outside the fire, the thermal loading to
objects engulfed by the fire, the smoke hazard presented
by the fire, the likely effects of active water deluge and the
effects of confinement. (It should be noted that for leak
sizes of 10 kg s21 and above, the fire is large compared
with the average offshore module and it may be necessary
to consider the fire to be ‘confined’.)
Incident Radiation to the Surroundings
An obvious hazard presented by a fire is the thermal radi-
ation to the surroundings, in particular to personnel during
escape and evacuation. The incident thermal radiation, I, to
a person or object from a fire can be described in terms of
the flame emissive power, E, and the view factor, V, of the
flame from the position of the receiver as
I ¼ VE t (kW m2 ) (9)
The view factor is a function of the flame shape. Conse-
quently, most integral or empirical mathematical models of
fires will assume some kind of simplified flame shape which
is then used to calculate the view factor. The flame average
surface emissive power is also a function of the flame
shape. Therefore, average surface emissive powers used
by the model will not necessarily be the same as those
measured during an actual fire.
In the far field, (typically more than two flame lengths away)
the flame shape is not critical, so a simplified approach can
be taken using the ‘point source’ model, whereby the difficul-
ties of defining a flame shape and associated average sur-
face emissive power can be avoided. In this approach, the
fraction of the heat of combustion of the fuel radiated to the
surroundings, F, is defined in terms of the flame area, Af,
the flame surface emissive power, E, and the net rate of
Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2007, 85(B3): 207– 220
heat released by combustion as
EAf
F¼
1000 Q
The incident radiation received in the far field at a distance,
s (m), from the fire, Is, is then expressed as
_
1000 tF MH
Is ¼ 2
(10)
4 ps
The atmospheric transmissivity will depend upon the pre-
vailing atmospheric conditions (absolute humidity) and the
path length, but might typically be 0.8 on a dry day for dis-
tances likely to considered. However, fog would significantly
reduce this value.
The activation of water deluge on an offshore installation,
producing water droplets in the air, effectively reduces the
transmissivity by absorbing radiation. However, for the pur-
poses of this paper, a revised ‘effective’ fraction of heat
radiated is defined as F0, accounting for the reduced trans-
missivity in the area being deluged, (but not including the
transmissivity of the atmosphere between the fire and the
receiver which is outside the deluged area). The incident radi-
ation at a distance, s (m), from the fire can be estimated using
_
1000 tF 0 MH
Is ¼ (11)
4 ps2
This ‘point source’ model can be useful for estimating the
distance to a given radiation level. In the case of personnel,
it is important to consider both the level of radiation and the
duration of exposure. The thermal dose is often defined
as the product of the incident radiation and the duration
(kJ m22). However, the effect on people correlates better
with a ‘thermal load’, J defined by
ð
J ¼ Is(4=3) dt (12)
Threshold values of dosage associated with serious injury
or death can be found in the literature (Lees, 2005; UKOOA,
2006). However, as a guide, a radiation level of about 5 kW
m22 can be tolerated for about one minute and consequently
represents a level from which it is reasonable to assume that
escape, without significant injury, would usually be possible
for an average employee wearing typical protective clothing.
However, the point source model is not suitable for estimat-
ing incident radiation to locations close to (certainly within
one flame length) of the flame, where it may be significantly
in error. In the near field, a mathematical model which defines
a realistic flame shape (and ideally a variation of surface
emissive power over the flame to allow for smoke obscura-
tion) should be used. Typical values of F and F0 are provided
in the tabulated guidance for the different sizes and types of
jet fire so that estimates of the far field incident radiation
hazard can be made using the point source model equations
(10) and (11) given above.
Thermal Loading to Engulfed Objects
The thermal load per unit area, ql, to an object engulfed by
fire will be a combination of radiation from the flame (qrl) and
convection from the hot combustion products (qcl) passing
 HYDROCARBON JET FIRE HAZARDS IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 217

over the object surface. Hence the thermal load can be writ-
ten as
ql ¼ qrl þ qcl ¼ 1f sTf4 þ tf sTa4 þ h(Tf  Ts )
However, not all the thermal loading is necessarily
absorbed by the surface, some may be reflected back and
the surface will also lose heat by radiation. Hence the total
absorbed load per unit area (qa) is given by
qa ¼ 1f as sTf4  1s af sTs4 þ as tf sTa4
 1s tf sTs4 þ h(Tf  Ts )
Assuming that both the flame and surface can be con-
sidered as diffuse grey bodies, then as ¼ 1s, af ¼ 1f and
tf ¼ 1 2 1f. Furthermore, the term involving Ta is small and
can be neglected, giving
qa (kW m2 ) ¼ qra þ qca
¼ 1s s(1f Tf4  Ts4 ) þ h(Tf  Ts )
When considering an actual object engulfed by a fire, the
flame temperature exposed to different parts of the object
surface may vary; similarly the velocities in the flame (and
hence convective heat transfer coefficient) may vary.
Hence, to determine the total load absorbed by an object
the above equation should be summed over the area of the
object.
Also, as the object engulfed in the flame heats up, the
absorbed load will reduce. This is particularly the case with
the convective load which reduces linearly with increasing
object temperature. Therefore, for an accurate transient cal-
culation of the temperature rise of an object, the parameters
Tf, 1f and h are required, together with the emissivity of the
surface (which itself may change as the surface heats up).
Where possible, typical values of these parameters are
provided in the tabulated guidance for the jet fire types and
sizes.
However, researchers often quote heat fluxes measured
during experiments using calorimeters (for total heat flux)
and radiometers (for radiative flux). These instruments are
designed to have a surface emissivity close to 1 and are
maintained at a low temperature throughout the experiments.
Hence the fluxes measured and reported for calorimeters are
given by equation (13) with 1s ¼ 1 and Ts  333 K and can be
regarded as a conservative estimate of the total heat flux
initially absorbed by an engulfed object. Radiometers are
designed and calibrated to measure 1f sTf4 . At an early
stage, whilst Ts is low, the flux measured by a radiometer is
approximately (qra =1s ) and so, if 1s is taken as 1, it provides
a conservative estimate of the radiative flux absorbed by an
object. Subtracting the measured radiative flux from the
measured total heat flux enables the initial convective flux
absorbed by the object to be determined. Using an estimated
or measured value for Tf enables h to be determined at the
measurement location. In this way, experimentally measured
(13) flux levels can be used to derive input data for transient heat-
up calculations. Consequently, typical values of the total,
radiative and convective fluxes (as defined in the above
with 1s ¼ 1 and Ts  333 K) are also provided in the tabulated
guidance for the range of fire types and sizes. These rep-
resent initial heat fluxes to the fire engulfed object (that is,
when the object surface is still cold and the temperature
difference is greatest). A simplified method for heat-up calcu-
lations can then be used (such as that given in UKOOA,
2006; Energy Institute, 2003) to determine the temperature
of the engulfed object with time.
Tabulated Guidance
Table 1 provides guidance values for gas jet fires and
Table 2 for two-phase jet fires. As noted above, the maximum
heat fluxes to engulfed objects have been found to occur

Table 1. Guidance values for gas jet fires.

21
Size (kg s ) 0.1 1.0 10 .30 Effect of confinement

Flame length (m) 5 15 40 65 Affected by enclosure shape

Fraction of heat radiated, F 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.13 and openings
CO level (% v/v) and smoke CO , 0.1 CO , 0.1 CO , 0.1 CO , 0.1 Increased CO up to about 5%
concentration (g m23) Soot 0.01 Soot 0.01 Soot 0.01 Soot 0.01 v/v at a vent prior to external
flaming, but after external
flaming ,0.5% v/v exiting
the flame. Soot levels
depend on equivalence ratio
from about 0.1 g m23 at
f ¼ 1.3 to 2.5 g m3 at f ¼ 2
Initial total heat flux (kW m22) 180 250 300 350 Increased heat loadings up to
Initial radiative flux (kW m22) 80 130 180 230 400 kW m22 (280 kW m22
Initial convective flux (kW m22) 100 120 120 120 radiative, 120 kW m22
Flame temperature, Tf (K) 1560 1560 1560 1560 convective, Tf ¼ 1600 K,
Flame emissivity, 1f 0.25 0.4 0.55 0.7 1f ¼ 0.75, h ¼ 0.09 kW m22
Convective heat transfer 0.08 0.095 0.095 0.095 K21)
coefficient, h (kW m22 K21)
Effect of deluge No effect on heat loadings to engulfed objects. Risk of extinguishment and
In far field, take F0 ¼ 0.8 F for one row of water sprays, F0 ¼ 0.7 F explosion hazard if deluge
for two rows and F0 ¼ 0.5 F for .2 rows at 12 l m22 min21. activated when enclosure is
May improve combustion efficiency and reduce CO levels already hot and fire is well
within flame established

Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2007, 85(B3): 207 –220
218 LOWESMITH et al.

Table 2. Guidance values for two-phase jet fires.

Size (kg s21) 0.1 1.0 10 .30 Effect of confinement

Flame length (m) 5 13 35 60 Affected by enclosure shape

Fraction of heat radiated, F See note below table and openings
CO level (% v/v) and smoke CO , 0.1 CO , 0.1 CO , 0.1 CO , 0.1 Increased CO up to about 5%
concentration (g m23) Soot 0.01 Soot 0.01 Soot 0.01 Soot 0.01 v/v at a vent prior to external
flaming, but after external
flaming ,0.5% v/v exiting
the flame. Soot levels
depend on equivalence ratio
from about 0.1 g m23 at
f ¼ 1.3 to 2.5 g m23 at
f¼2
Initial total heat flux (kW m22) 200 300 350 400 Increased heat fluxes, take
Initial radiative flux (kW m22) 100 180 230 280 values as per 30 kg s21
Initial convective flux (kW m22) 100 120 120 120 two-phase jet fire
Flame temperature (K) 1560 1560 1560 1560
Flame emissivity, 1f 0.3 0.55 0.7 0.85
Convective heat transfer 0.08 0.095 0.095 0.095
coefficient, h (kW m22 K21)
Effect of deluge Some benefit to engulfed objects but temperature may still rise Risk of extinguishment and
although at a slower rate. Combined area and dedicated deluge potential formation of pool
may prevent temperature rise if effectively applied.
Take F 0 as per Table 1.

Note: For fraction of heat radiated, Fm, of mixture involving x% liquid by mass: use Fm ¼ (x=100):(FL  FG ) þ FG where FG is the fraction of heat
radiated for natural gas as given in Table 1 and FL is the fraction of heat radiated for the liquid fuel involved. Take FL ¼ 0.24 for C3; 0.32 for C4,
0.45 for C6– C25 (including condensate and diesel); and 0.5 for crude oil.

when the fuel mixture is about 30% gas and 70% liquid by these guidance values with the data measured during the
mass. Consequently, the values shown in Table 2 correspond tests for maximum total heat flux and the proportion of radia-
to this worst case condition. tive and convective fluxes measured at locations on the front,
For flashing liquid fires (such as propane or butane) a top and rear surface of the fire engulfed pipe. Clearly, the
lower flame temperature of about 1300 K is likely with an simplified guidance values take no account of the spatial vari-
emissivity of 1, giving a radiative flux of about 160 kW m22. ation of heat loading over the surface of a fire engulfed object.
A convective heat transfer coefficient of about 0.08 kW m22 For a conservative assessment of the response of the pipe
K21 is suggested giving a convective flux of about 80 kW to the heat loading, the temperature of the engulfed pipe with
m22 and a total flux of about 240 kW m22. time can be calculated for a series of time steps (Dt) as
follows:
At time ti ¼ ti1 þ Dt(i  1) the thermal load absorbed by
Validation Exercise the object, qi , is given by
Consider a ‘live’ crude jet fire at 5 kg s21, which is 20%
gas, 80% oil, released at 20 bar. Three experiments with qi ¼ 1s s(1f Tf4  Ti4 ) þ h(Tf  Ti ) (i  0) (14)
these test conditions were conducted during the BFETS
Phase 2 project (SCI, 1998; Advantica, 1997a), two of
which impacted onto a pipe (Tests 9 and 11) and the third
being a free flame (Test 3).
Using Table 2, this would fall into the ‘large’ release cat-
egory of 10 kg s21 giving a flame length of 35 m which
gives a conservative assessment compared to the measured
length of 29 m for the free flame and 21 m and 27 m for the
impacting flames.
Using the formula for fraction of heat radiated below Table 2,
with FG ¼ 0.13 and FL ¼ 0.5, Fm ¼ (80=100):(0:5  0:13)
þ0:13 ¼ 0:426, Figure 14 presents incident radiation
measured during the jet fires with calculations made using
the point source model Is ¼ (1000tF MH _ m )=(4ps2 ), taking
t ¼ 0.8 and Hm ¼ 42 MJ kg21.
Table 2 suggests a maximum total heat flux of 350 kW m22
whereas during the two experiments where the flame
impacted a steel pipe, the maximum heat fluxes measured
were 348 and 370 kW m22 . Table 2 suggests that the radia-
tive flux accounted for 65% of the total flux (230 kW m22) with
34% being convective (120 kW m22). Table 3 compares Figure 14. Incident radiation from ‘live’ crude oil jet fire.

Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2007, 85(B3): 207– 220
 HYDROCARBON JET FIRE HAZARDS IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 219

Table 3. Comparison of guidance values for heat flux with large scale data.

Percentage radiative Percentage convective

Maximum
heat flux Front Top Rear Avg Front Top Rear Avg

Guidance values 350 66% 34%

Data Test 9a 370 41% 61% 68% 57% 59% 39% 32% 43%
Data Test 11a 348 43% 86% 100% 76% 57% 14% 0% 24%
a
Test 9 impacted the pipe at 9 m and Test 11 at 15 m from the release point.

on this recent large scale experimental data, this paper has

reviewed jet fire hazards in relation to offshore situations
and provided updated guidance on the hazards they pose.
Tabulated data are provided which can be used as input for
mathematical models. Additionally, simple calculation
methods are given whereby an initial conservative assess-
ment of jet fire hazards can be readily undertaken.

NOMENCLATURE
a constant
Figure 15. Heat up of engulfed object in ‘live’ crude jet fire. Ad area of release hole, m2
Af area of flame, m2
Aw deluged area, m2
Ḃ flowrate of air entrained for combustion, kg s21
and the temperature of the object increases to Tiþ1 ¼ C specific heat capacity of steel, kJ kg21 K21
Cd coefficient of discharge of orifice
Ti þ DTi (i  0) where
Cw water curtain thickness, m
d diameter of release hole, mm
Dtqi E flame emissive power, kW m22
DTi ¼ (15)
Crx F fraction of heat radiated by a flame
H net calorific value, MJ kg21
Figure 15 shows a comparison of the calculated tempera- h convective heat transfer coefficient, kW m22 K21
I incident radiation, kW m22
ture rise of the pipe with data measured by thermocouples
J thermal load to personnel, (kW m22)4/3 s
embedded within the pipe wall at three locations during the Is incident radiation at a distance s, kW m22
two impacting fire experiments. The three locations were: L jet fire length, m
close to the point of impact of the fire (front of pipe); 908 Ṁ mass flow rate, kg s21
from this location on top of the pipe; and 1808 from the m molecular weight, kg
N number of nozzles over a deluged area
point of impact on the rear of the pipe. The data used for P absolute pressure, MPa
the calculations was: C ¼ 520 J kg21 K21, r ¼ 7850 kg Q net rate of heat released by combustion (Q ¼ MH),_ MW
m23, s ¼ 5.6697 W m22 K24, x ¼ 0.0125 m, 1s ¼ 0.7, qa total thermal load absorbed by an engulfed object, kW m22
Dt ¼ 1 s, together with Tf ¼ 1560 K, 1f ¼ 0.7 and h ¼ 95 W qi total thermal load absorbed by an engulfed object at time ti ,
kW m22
m22 K21 from Table 2.
ql total thermal load to an engulfed object, kW m22
qra radiative load absorbed by an engulfed object, kW m22
qca convective load absorbed by an engulfed object, kW m22
qrl radiative load to an engulfed object, kW m22
CONCLUSIONS qcl convective load to an engulfed object, kW m22
Jet fires pose a serious hazard to oil and gas installations R Universal gas constant, J mol21 K21
r mass ratio of air to fuel for stoichiometric combustion
with the potential for escalation to a major incident. Hence it is RI reduction in incident radiation,%
important for operators to have a good understanding of fire s distance, m
hazards posed by their installation and to be able to quantify Ta ambient temperature, K
them as part of their Safety Case. Following the Piper Alpha Tf flame temperature, K
disaster, the Interim Guidance Notes provided guidance on Tg temperature of gas release, K
Ti surface temperature at time ti , K
how to assess fire hazards based on the information avail- Ts surface temperature, K
able at that time. However, many areas of uncertainty were ti time at step i of iterative calculation, s
identified where no data was available, especially in relation Uw water droplet velocity, m s21
to two-phase fires, confinement and deluge. V view factor of flame from position of receiver
V̇w water flowrate per nozzle, l min21
Since that time a considerable body of experimental Wf water volume fraction
research of large scale jet fires has been undertaken provid- x thickness of steel, m
ing an increased understanding of jet fire behaviour. Based Z compressibility factor

Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2007, 85(B3): 207 –220
220 LOWESMITH et al.
Greek Symbols
af flame absorptivity
as surface absorptivity
1f flame emissivity
1s surface emissivity
g ratio of specific heats
f equivalence ratio
r density of steel, kg m23
s Stefan–Boltzmann constant, kW m22 K24
t atmospheric transmissivity
tf flame transmissivity
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The manuscript was received 29 June 2006 and accepted for
publication after revision 6 October 2006. The paper was published
online ahead of print 20 March 2007.