Ocean Engineering 201 (2020) 107146

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Ocean Engineering
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/oceaneng

Modeling and analysis of flammable gas dispersion and deflagration from

offshore platform blowout
Xinhong Li a, *, Rouzbeh Abbassi c, Guoming Chen b, Qingsheng Wang d
a
School of Resource Engineering, Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology, No.13 Yanta Road, Xi’an, 710055, China
b
Centre for Offshore Engineering and Safety Technology (COEST), China University of Petroleum (East China), No.66, Changjiang West Road, Qingdao, China
c
School of Engineering, Faculty of Science and Engineering, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
d
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, 77843, USA

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Blowout is a catastrophic accident in offshore drilling operations, and it poses a serious threat to the operational
Offshore platform safety of an offshore platform. This paper uses a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model to simulate an
Blowout accident offshore platform blowout accident and to assess its impact on the assets and personnel. It integrates the
Gas dispersion
dispersion of flammable gas with the subsequent deflagration due to the accidental ignition. The dispersion
Deflagration
Safety assessment
behavior of blowout gas with wind is predicted and the hazardous area generated on an offshore platform is
assessed. Also, the effect of well productivity on the blowout gas dispersion is examined. Subsequently, the
deflagration scenario due to ignition of flammable gas is simulated to predict the deflagration loads including
overpressure, high temperature and heat radiation. Eventually, the impact of blowout gas deflagration on
offshore platform and personnel is assessed. The hazardous area generated by blowout gas dispersion is mainly
distributed on the drill floor. The increase of well productivity can cause an increase of the hazardous area. The
minimum radius to ensure the safety under deflagration overpressure is 30.63 m. The present work could help in
conducting a prior risk assessment and tomake an emergency response plan.

1. Introduction
Blowout is one type of major accident that may occur in offshore
drilling operations in which a volume of flammable gas is discharged
from the wellhead and disperses on an offshore platform. A deflagration
accident may be induced when flammable gas cloud is ignited by the
potential ignition sources existing on the offshore platform (Yang et al.,
2019; Shi et al., 2017). As per the historical statistics, the main risk
associated with offshore platforms is oil and gas release incident arising
from human error, equipment failure, and management flaws. About
70% of offshore platform accidents are caused by highly destructive oil
and gas fire and explosion, which have a catastrophic impact on
humans, equipment and the environment (Paik et al., 2011). Deepwater
Horizon accident was a graphic case (Dadashzadeh et al., 2013; Skog­
dalen and Vinnem, 2012).
Nowadays, many studies have been conducted to model the disper­
sion and explosion of flammable gas in blowout accident or other
scanrios (Zhang and Chen, 2010; Joshi et al., 2016). The CFD based
approaches were widely adopted because of the advantages of low cost
and risk compared to field experiments (Tauseef et al., 2011; Tan et al.,
2018; Jiao et al., 2019; Yi et al., 2019). Li et al. (2018) carried out a
systematic simulation of gas dispersion and deflagration above sea from
a subsea release. Yang et al. (2018) built a CFD based procedure to study
potential accident scenarios in an offshore facility with the different
ignition source locations. Dadashzadeh et al. (2016) proposed a CFD
based model to evaluate the dispersion behavior of hydrogen gas after a
release from a hydrogen fuel cell car in an enclosed area. The
above-mentioned studies illustrated the CFD approach to be a useful tool
to reproduce an accident triggered by flammable gas release, and to
obtain the detailed information relating to the accidents. A blowout
accident during drilling operations has a large influencing range, and it
is difficult to assess the accident hazards using a field experiment due to
the high risk and cost. The CFD approach is an alternative method in
modeling and assessment of such an accident. Zhu and Chen (2010) built
an integrated model in the hills to simulate the blowout accident and to
assess the consequences of SO2 poisoning. Ma and Zhang (2011)
employed the CFD approach to model the sour gas dispersion in the
atmosphere after blowout. These studies focused on an onshore blowout

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: safety_lxh@163.com, lixinhong@xauat.edu.cn (X. Li).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oceaneng.2020.107146
Received 7 October 2019; Received in revised form 17 December 2019; Accepted 17 February 2020
Available online 5 March 2020
0029-8018/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
X. Li et al. Ocean Engineering 201 (2020) 107146

accident during drilling operations. The exploration and development of

oil and gas resources is moving into the deep oceans where drilling
operations are challenged by higher risk due to the harsh environmental
conditions. The offshore drilling platform is the main tool used to extract
oil and gas resources from the ocean. Since it is far from land, there is
difficulty in rescuing workers and evacuating the platform in the case of
a blowout accident. Consequently, understanding the risk of offshore
platform blowout accident is in high demand.
Recently, some studies have been carried out on the risk assessment
of different aspects of offshore blowout accident. The data-driven model
was developed to predict the dimension of flammable cloud in the
congested offshore platform and to predict the explosion consequence
(Shi et al., 2018, 2019). An integral model to track the fate and transport
of underwater oil and gas plume from the subsea blowout (Yapa and
Chen, 2004; Wang et al., 2018). Meng et al. (2018) identified the sys­
tematic hazards and restrictions of the Deepwater well control system.
Khakzad et al. (2014) integrated the event tree and hierarchical
Bayesian analysis to assess the risk of offshore blowouts using precursor Fig. 1. Diagram of blowout gas jet.
data. A series of quantitative risk analysis methodologies were devel­
oped to identity the hazards in drilling operations and to prevent and rapidly to the atmospheric level. Internal energy of blowout gas at high
control the blowout accidents (Abimbola and Khan, 2016; Khakzad pressure is considered to completely transform into kinetic energy. The
et al., 2013; Chang et al., 2018). Dadashzadeh et al. (2013) reproduced exchange of momentum, heat, and mass of blowout gas with the sur­
the Deepwater Horizon blowout accident and assessed the consequences rounding air occurs in the drag zone. The motion direction and velocity
such as flammable gas cloud explosion. Nevertheless, offshore blowout of blowout gas is changed before moving into the dispersion zone, due to
accident is a systematic cascading evolution process including several the effect of wind or ground structures, which may cause a certain
stages. The researchers above studied offshore blowout accident from momentum loss (Zhu and Chen, 2009).
several different aspects, e.g. modeling of underwater fate and transport The modeling of blowout gas dispersion is subject to the following
of contaminants, explosion consequences and probabilistic risk assess­ assumptions:
ment, etc. The fire and explosion incidents may appear in a rapid
sequence when a blowout accident occurs. The accurate assessment of ● The densities of gases in the computational domain have very little
an offshore blowout accident needs to consider blowout gas release, changes in the dispersion;
dispersion and deflagration scenarios as a whole. However, most pre­ ● The movement of gas belongs to the transient turbulence;
viously developed models only focused on one of the stages of blowout ● The dispersion process of blowout gas is an incompressible flow with
accident evolution, and the systematic studies integrating the entire low speed.
blowout accident process are sporadic. Therefore, a comprehensive
simulation to reveal the detailed process of blowout accident and to
assess its impact is required. The considerable previous studies have 2.2. Basic governing equations
illustrated that the application of a validated CFD code Fluent can give a
convincing result in the field of simulation of gas release, dispersion, fire The dispersion of blowout gas involves turbulence motion, substance
and explosion. Thus, this paper uses the Fluent based CFD code to model dispersion and thermal transmission, and is assumed to be a steady jet
and assess the dispersion and deflagration of blowout gas. process. It follows the mass, energy and momentum conservations. The
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the dispersion and defla­ blowout gas dispersion includes the following control equations (Zhu
gration behavior of flammable gas from an offshore platform blowout. and Chen, 2010; Li et al., 2019):
The novelty of this paper is an integration of blowout gas dispersion with ∂ρ ∂
the subsequent deflagration consequence. For this purpose, an inte­ þ ðρui Þ ¼ 0 (1)
∂t ∂xi
grated CFD model is built. Blowout gas dispersion with wind is simu­
lated to predict the spatial distribution of flammable gas cloud and � �
∂ ∂ � ∂p ∂ ∂ui ∂τij
assess the hazardous area distributed on an offshore platform. Consid­ ðρu Þ þ ρui uj ¼ þ v (2)
∂t i ∂xj ∂xi ∂xj ∂xj ∂xj
ering the accidental ignition, the deflagration scenario is considered to
!
predict the distribution of overpressure, high temperature and heat ∂ðρhÞ ∂P ∂ ρuj h
�
∂ ∂T XN
∂Y μ ∂h
radiation. þ ¼ λ þ ρDi hi i þ t i þ SE (3)
∂t ∂t ∂xj ∂xj ∂xj ∂xj Prt ∂xj
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the i

theoretical model of blowout gas dispersion and deflagration, whereas

where ρ is the density; ui is a velocity component; t is the time; p is the
simulation model and calculation method are provided in Section 3.
pressure; μ is the molecular viscosity; μt is turbulence viscosity; g is
Blowout gas dispersion is analyzed in Section 4 and the subsequent
gravity; h is the average enthalpy of density; λ is laminar thermal con­
deflagration consequence is assessed in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes
ductivity; T is temperature; Prt is turbulence Prandtl number; Di is the
the conclusions of this paper.
dispersion coefficient of component i; hi is the enthalpy of component i;
SE is the energy source;
2. Theoretical model
Blowout gas is a multi-component substance, and the dispersion
process also follows the mass conservation of each component. The
2.1. Blowout gas jet
corresponding governing equation is shown by Eq. (4) (Fluent, 2011).
� �� � �
The blowout gas jet is a complex process involving material transport ∂ðρYi Þ ∂ ρuj Yi ∂ μ ∂Yi
þ ¼ ρDi þ t þ Si (4)
and turbulence motion. Blowout gas jet process can be simplified as ∂t ∂xj ∂xj Sct ∂xj
shown in Fig. 1, in which the wind direction is from the left to the right.
Blowout gas is released from the wellhead, and the pressure reduces where Yi is the mass fraction of component i; Sct is the turbulent Schmidt

2
X. Li et al.
Fig. 2. Semi-submersible drill platform model.
number; Si is the source item of component i; The dispersion of blowout
gas is an unsteady turbulence motion, and the turbulent characteristics
of blowout gas in the dispersion process are considered by the realizable
κ-ε model.
2.3. Deflagration model
A deflagration accident occurs when blowout gas encounters ignition
sources such as high temperature or open flame. The overpressure and
heat radiation generated during deflagration may cause severe damage
to an offshore platform and personnel. Mixture fraction combustion
model is widely used in simulation of a large-scale deflagration accident
and is also employed in the present paper. The basic assumption of
mixture fraction combustion model is that the transient thermochemical
status of fluid only depends on a single conserved scalar, i.e. mixture
fraction f. The component concentration of combustion product is
calculated by solving the transport equations of mixture fraction dis­
tribution. The mixture fraction f is defined by applying Equation (5)
(Fluent, 2011).
f¼
Zi Zi;ox
(5)
Zi;fuel Zi;ox
where Zi is the mass fraction of component i; Zi,ox is the mass fraction at
the oxidant’s entry while Zi,fuel is the mass fraction at fuel entry.
The chemical reaction of combustion is calculated by chemical
equilibrium hypothesis or non-chemical equilibrium hypothesis. The
substantial heat is released during blowout gas combustion. The heat
radiation is obtained by solving transfer equations of heat radiation
energy. The available radiation model includes P-1 model, DO model
and surface radiation model. P-1 radiation model is capable of ac­
counting for the scattering effect of radiation. In addition, it can solve
transfer equations with less computational complexity. Therefore, this
paper adopted P-1 model to calculate the heat radiation flux of defla­
gration. The control equation is as following:
1 and then the grid size is reduced to check the effect of grid size change on
qr ¼ rG (6)
3ðα þ σ s Þ Cσs
where qr is radiation heat; α is absorption coefficient; σ s is scattering
coefficient; C is the linear diverse phase coefficient; G is incident
radiation.
The simulation of blowout gas deflagration is subject to the following
assumptions:
3
Ocean Engineering 201 (2020) 107146
Fig. 3. Mesh generation.
● Both blowout gas and air are incompressible;
● The diffusion flux of all variables at the boundaries of the compu­
tational domain is zero;
● Ignoring the loss of radiative heat;
● The combustion reaction between blowout gas and air is the com­
plete reaction of one-step;
● Blowout gas was released from the wellhead during deflagration.
3. Modeling blowout gas dispersion and deflagration: Case
study
A semi-submersible drill platform is utilized for illustrative purposes.
Based on the size of this offshore platform, CAD is used to establish the
three-dimensional geometric shape model of the offshore platform, as
shown in Fig. 2. An actual offshore platform has a complex appearance
structure, which may increase the difficulty of mesh generation and
calculation cost. As a result, a certain simplification is carried out during
the geometric model establishment of the offshore platform. The main
structures on an offshore platform are considered, including the main
deck, drill floor, living area, helicopter deck, crane, etc. At the same
time, the structures and equipment with less influence on blowout gas
dispersion are simplified, e.g. internal structure of retreat, air-vent,
personnel passage and guardrail, etc.
The size of the computational domain is 5 times the size of an
offshore platform. The dividing blocks method is used to generate the
required mesh model. The whole computational domain is divided into a
central domain containing the offshore platform, and five rectangular
regions around the center region. The pressure gradient at the wellhead
obviously varies and a relatively dense grid density is adopted for the
area around the wellhead, which is achieved by a size function. Blowout
gas gradually evolves into the steady flow state during dispersion from
wellhead to outward area. Thus, the grids with the larger size are used
for the areas away from the wellhead to reduce calculation nodes and
improve the calculation speed. The central area of computational
domain is affected by the irregular shape of the offshore platform. The
triangular tetrahedral grids are utilized in this region to adapt the
complex shapes of the offshore platform. The regular hexahedral grids
are used for the external regions of the central computational region.
Fig. 3 presents the established mesh model used for the simulation.
A grid independence test is carried out to find the suitable grid
density required by simulation, which can ensure the simulation results
independent from grid size. The simulations with a set of grids with the
different numbers are performed. The grids with the larger size are used
simulations. This paper uses three grids with the different sizes (3.6 �
106, 4.8 � 106 and 6.2 � 106). The spatial distribution of blowout gas
cloud and overpressure at the rig are predicted using these grids. The
comparisons reflect that the difference between the simulations with the
grid numbers of 3.6 � 106 and 4.8 � 106 is about 1.8%, whereas the
difference between the simulations with grid numbers 3.6 � 106 and 6.2
� 106 is about 2.1%. Overall, the simulations with different grid
numbers are consistent. Thus, the grid number used in this article is
X. Li et al.
(a) vertical direction
Fig. 4. Offshore wind field.
3643520 considering the computational cost.
Boundary condition definition is a critical step for numerical
modeling. For the whole computational domain, the symmetrical
boundary is set for the top plane, the front plane and the back plane of
computational domain. The wellhead is set as the velocity inlet
boundary where the jet velocity of blowout gas is given. The surface of
the offshore platform is set as the no-slip boundary. The left side of the
computational domain is set as the velocity inlet boundary to consider
the effect of wind. It is assumed that the atmospheric stability is at the
level of A, and a wind speed profile function shown in Eq. (7) is used to
define the wind velocity inlet (Li et al., 2019). The temperature gradient
is 0.018 K/m, and it is defined along with velocity inlet. Fig. 4 depicts
the steady wind speed field in the computation domain. It is observed
that an apparent wind speed gradient is presented in the vertical di­
rection, and wind speed increases with height. An offshore platform has
a great effect on the wind speed distribution. Because of the obstruction
and reflection of topsides and other modules of an offshore platform, the
velocity and direction of airflow varies noticeably. Some areas with low
airflow speed are generated on the offshore platform, which may cause
the accumulation of flammable gas.
The right side of the computational domain is set as the outflow
boundary which is the outlet of wind.
� z �0:091
uz ¼ u10 (7)
10
(a) t=5s
(c) t=60s
Fig. 5. Development process of blowout gas cloud with 2% volume fraction.
4
Ocean Engineering 201 (2020) 107146
(b) horizontal direction
where uz is the wind speed at height of z m above sea surface, u10 is the
wind speed at height of 10 m above sea.
The simulation of gas dispersion and deflagration from offshore
platform blowout is divided into three steps. Firstly, the wind field is
calculated to generate steady wind speed distribution in the computa­
tional domain, and the time step is 1 s. Subsequently, the gas dispersion
with the wind is simulated to predict the impact range of flammable gas,
and the time step is 0.1 s. Finally, the deflagration of flammable gas after
ignition is analyzed to assess the impact on the offshore platform and
personnel. The explosion is a very quick phenomena, and it is generally
measured in milliseconds. Thus, the time step is 0.001 s. The transient
solution algorithm is utilized to solve the simulation.
4. Dispersion of blowout gas
4.1. Blowout gas dispersion behavior
The release rate of blowout gas depends on the well productivity. The
well in the South China Sea is used to illustrate blowout gas dispersion
behavior. The well productivity is about 36.2 � 108 m3/yr, which is used
to assess the blowout gas flowrate. Blowout gas mainly consists of
methane, and the volume fraction is about 87.9%. The maximum wind
speed is 21 m/s and the air temperature is 301 K. Flammable gas is
released from the wellhead at a very high speed when the blowout oc­
curs and is gradually blended with the ambient air. The surrounding air
(b) t=15s
(d) t=120s
X. Li et al. Ocean Engineering 201 (2020) 107146

domain decreases and the action of wind increases. The dispersion dis­
tance of blowout gas in the horizontal direction of the computational
domain increases continuously. The blowout gas, under wind, disperses
towards the stern. From the simulation results, it can be found that the
gas cloud mainly distributes in the upper space of the drill floor, and this
has little effect on most topsides of the offshore platform.
Fig. 6 depicts the variation process of blowout gas dispersion range.
Overall, the geometric size of the gas cloud increases over time and then
reaches the steady values. The geometric size of the blowout gas cloud
increases rapidly within 0–10 s after the blowout accident occurs. Due to
the high pressure of the well, gas mainly moves in a vertical direction. At
about 20 s, the height of the blowout gas cloud is approximately 60 m.
Due to the action of the wind from the bow, the dispersion distance in
the longitudinal direction of the platform is about 25 m. However, the
dispersion distance in a lateral direction is about 10 m. The geometric
size of the blowout gas cloud drops a little after 30 s. With the increase in
time, the blowout gas cloud eventually reaches the steady state.

Fig. 6. Variation process of blowout gas dispersion range.

4.2. Assessment of hazardous area

is entrained into natural gas and disperses with the blowout gas. Even­
The deflagration limit (volume fraction) of natural gas ranges from
tually, the steady flow state of gas is formed. The isosurface of 2%
0.05 to 0.15, and the area described within this concentration range is
methane volume fraction is defined as the spatial range of blowout gas.
defined as the hazardous area. Fig. 7 gives the hazardous area distri­
Fig. 5 presents the dispersion process of blowout gas.
bution in the vertical plane of an offshore platform at different times, in
Blowout gas enters the wellhead plane and expands rapidly due to
which the concentration of natural gas in the area coloured red exceeds
the rapid decrease of surrounding pressure. Due to the action of the high
0.05 vol fraction. After the blowout accident occurrence, the high-
pressure of the well, blowout gas moves in an upward direction. In the
pressure gas in the well moves into the drill floor area. At 2 s, the
initial stage of blowout, the flow of blowout gas is mainly driven by the
height of the hazardous area is 6 m measured from wellhead to the upper
high pressure of the well. During this stage, blowout gas is less affected
border, and the width is 1.38 m. At 10 s, the height of the hazardous area
by wind and the offset to the stern is also small. With the increase in
is 21 m and the width is 2.81 m. The influencing area of blowout gas
time, blowout gas gradually moves away from the wellhead region. The
increases with the increase in time The height of the hazardous area is
dispersion velocity along the vertical direction of the computation
29.21 m and the weight is 4.85 m at 80 s. The height of hazardous area

(a) t=2 s (b) t=10 s

(c) t=80 s (d) t=300 s

Fig. 7. Distribution of hazardous areas at different times.

5
X. Li et al. Ocean Engineering 201 (2020) 107146

(a) Coverage area (b) Volume

Fig. 8. Blowout gas dispersion range under different well productivities.

(a) 11.5×108 m3/yr (b) 23.1×108 m3/yr (c) 36.2×108 m3/yr

Fig. 9. Blowout gas clouds with 2% volume fraction under different well productivities.

reaches 29.99 m while the weight is 4.7 m at 300 s. It is observed that the
Table 1
size of the hazardous area increases with the continuous gas release in
Influencing range of Blowout gas under different well productivities.
the initial stage of blowout accident. After 80 s, the influencing range of
blowout gas becomes a steady state. Blowout gas plume under wind Well X Y Z Coverage Volume
productivity direction direction direction area (m2) (m3)
shifts in a downwind direction, and the cross section of blowout gas (m3/yr) (m) (m) (m)
plume appears nearly elliptical. The volume of the flammable gas cloud
11.5 � 108 17.31 62.32 30.13 1244.17 1998.79
in the steady state is 517.81 m3 and the coverage reaches 61.57 m2. The
23.1 � 108 14.39 70.78 29.51 1759.68 3643.39
steady sizes of the flammable gas cloud are 4.31 m (weight), 4.42 m 36.2 � 108 12.01 102.84 23.58 1954.75 4418.75
(length) and 29.65 m (height). Overall, the hazardous area is mainly
distributed on the drill floor of the offshore platform.
and 30.13 m (height). The coverage area and volume are 1144.17 m2
and 1998.79 m3, respectively. For the blowout accidents under well
4.3. Effect of well productivity productivities of 23.1 � 108 m3/yr and 36.2 � 108 m3/yr, the times for
the blowout gas clouds to reach the steady state are 90 s and 100 s. The
Time duration and flowrate are the critical factors influencing spatial distribution and shape of the blowout gas cloud changes
blowout gas dispersion behavior. The present work accounts for three dynamically under wind. Table 1 provides the dispersion range of
well productivities, i.e. 36.2 � 108 m3/yr, 23.1 � 108 m3/yr and 11.5 � blowout gas cloud under different release rates.
108 m3/yr, to illustrate the effect of well productivity. Fig. 8 presents the Fig. 9 presents the hazardous area distribution under different well
time history of the coverage area and the volume of blowout gas cloud, productivities where the hazardous area is the area coloured red. It can
while Fig. 9 gives the spatial distribution of the steady blowout gas be found that the size of the hazardous area increases with well pro­
cloud. The coverage area of the gas cloud is the projected area of iso- ductivity. The hazardous area is relatively small in the scenario with
surface to offshore platform. The volume is the volume of gas cloud
iso-surface.
The dispersion range of blowout gas under a given release rate in­ Table 2
creases with time, and becomes the steady state when it reaches the Hazardous area distribution of blowout gas cloud under different well
maximum values. For example, the dispersion range of blowout gas productivities.
under the well productivity of 11.5 � 108 m3/yr, increases obviously in Well X Y Z Coverage Volume
the initial stage of the blowout accident. The coverage area and volume productivity direction direction direction area (m2) (m3)
(m3/yr) (m) (m) (m)
reach the maximum value at 70 s. More time is required to reach the
steady state for the blowout with the larger well productivity. Addi­ 11.5 � 108 7.31 62.32 8.76 283.09 262.03
tionally, the coverage area and volume gradually increase. The disper­ 23.1 � 108 4.12 68.98 6.84 340.77 355.38
36.2 � 108 3.48 71.48 4.70 361.94 370.86
sion distances in three directions are 17.31 m (width), 62.32 m (length)

6
X. Li et al.
(a) 11.5×108 m3/yr
Fig. 10. Distribution of hazardous area under different well productivities.
Fig. 11. Time-dependent profile of deflagration overpressure.
well productivity of 11.5 � 108 m3/yr, the maximum height is 13.17 m,
and the coverage area and volume are 283.09 m2 and 262.03 m3,
respectively. In the scenario with well productivity of 11.5 � 108 m3/yr,
the size of the hazardous area increases in the vertical direction while it
decreases in the transverse and longitudinal directions of the offshore
platform. The coverage and volume are 340.77 m2 and 355.38 m3,
respectively. Table 2 summaries the hazardous area range under
different well productivities. Overall, the hazardous area increases in the
vertical direction and decreases in the transverse and the longitudinal
directions for the scenario with the larger well productivity.
Consequently, well productivity has a direct effect on blowout gas
dispersion range. Blowout gas dispersion range and hazardous area
continuously increase during the initial stage of blowout accident, and
maintain a steady state when they reach the maximum values. When the
well productivity increases, more time is required for the blowout gas
dispersion range to reach the steady state. In addition, the hazardous
area also increases, which increases the possibility of a fire and explo­
sion accident.
5. Blowout gas deflagration
5.1. Overpressure assessment
Considering the appearance of a potential ignition source in the
offshore platform, a deflagration accident may be induced by the
possible ignition of flammable gas cloud. It is assumed that a
Ocean Engineering 201 (2020) 107146
(b) 23.1×108 m3/yr (c) 36.2×108 m3/yr
Fig. 12. Maximum overpressure distribution on offshore platform.
deflagration accident is caused by the ignition source in the drill floor
area. The drilling floor is located at the center of an offshore platform
and is a three-dimensional open unconstrained space. The explosion of a
flammable gas cloud in this scenario usually belongs to the deflagration
phenomenon, which is an explosion field generated by the non-ideal
explosion source. The flammable gas cloud expands in a very short
period and generates the damage by causing the surrounding air pres­
sure to increase rapidly.Fig. 10.
Fig. 11 depicts the time-dependent profile of overpressure at defla­
gration source. Flammable gas around the deflagration source involves
chemical reactions which release tremendous amounts of energy. The
products with high temperature, high pressure and high energy expand
at extremely high speed, which generates the undulant air pressure. The
overpressure appears at around 60 ms and fluctuates with a large
amplitude during 60–80 ms. The positive and negative pressures alter­
nately fluctuate. Once the overpressure reaches the maximum, the
products are discharged rapidly because of the rapid expansion of gas
volume due to the high temperature. The deflagration reaction gradually
reaches a steady state, which can be seen in the overpressure profile
during 80 ms–120 ms. Note that the steady state means that the over­
pressure intensity noticeably fades and flucturates with small amplitude.
Due to continuous release, the gas is rapidly added to the reaction. This
contributes to a second rise of deflagration overpressure. However, the
fluctuation amplitude of overpressure is less than the previous period,
and the maximum overpressure decreases to about 1.6 � 104 Pa. Note
that the overpressure fluctuation trend basically disappears after 170
ms, and the overpressure at the explosion source tends to zero. Conse­
quently, the general trend of overpressure development at the explosion
source is summarized as follows: intense fluctuation of high pressure →
steady stage → rapid fluctuation of low overpressure → steady stage. The
maximum overpressures at each stage are 28 KPa, 15 KPa and 10 KPa,
7
X. Li et al.
(a) Positive-pressure
Fig. 13. Maximum overpressure distribution in vertical section of offshore platform.
(a) 15 KPa
(c) 4 KPa
Fig. 14. Spatial distribution of deflagration wave.
respectively.
Deflagration generates a particular pressure load on the offshore
platform. Fig. 12 depicts the overpressure distribution on the offshore
platform. The maximum overpressure distributes in the center of the
drill floor, and the overpressure gradually decreases in a radial direc­
tion. The maximum overpressure at the drill floor is 20 KPa, and the
overpressure at the rig is about 4 KPa. Fig. 13 represents the maximum
overpressure field in the vertical section of the offshore platform. The
overpressure varies in the radial direction. The maximum negative
pressure is about 6.8 KPa. The areas with the positive and negative
pressure are in dynamic change during the whole deflagration process.
To assess the influence area of overpressure, isosurfaces with the
critical overpressure are established. Fig. 14 depicts the spatial distri­
bution of the overpressure at 61 ms. A hemispherical overpressure wave
centered on the deflagration source is generated. The overpressure de­
creases in the radial direction. The influencing range of the overpressure
isosurface of 15 KPa is small, and the maximum radius of the influencing
range is 4.05 m. Based on the deflagration damage criteria (Liu, 2012),
the steel structure within this range will be seriously damaged and op­
erators will be fatally injured. The influencing area of overpressure
isosurace of 6 KPa increases noticeably, and the radius is about 12.59 m.
The overpressure cannot cause obvious damage on the structure of the
8
Ocean Engineering 201 (2020) 107146
(b) Negative pressure
(b) 6 KPa
(d) 2 KPa
offshore platform, but can lead to slight injury to personnel. The over­
pressure isosurface of 4 KPa covers the drill floor completely and the
influencing radius is about 17.53 m. The overpressure cannot form
obvious impact on the offshore platform. The overpressure isosurface of
2 KPa covers the most area of the offshore platform, and the influencing
radius reaches 30.63 m. Based on the deflagration damage criteria, the
overpressure has virtually no effect on the offshore platform structure
nor the personnel. Thus, the radius of 30.63 m is defined as the mini­
mum safety radius where a deflagration accident cannot impose nor
impact on personnel.
5.2. High temperature assessment
The deflagration reaction gradually develops into jet fire. The flame
migrates from the ignition source in radial directions with subsonic
speed. The surrounding premixed flammable gas virtually deflagrates at
the same time, causing the rapid rise of the ambient temperature. The
steady jet fire is formed on the drill floor at 8 s. Fig. 15 presents the
development of jet fire over time on the drill floor. Deflagration makes
the surrounding involved gas combust rapidly. Flame spreads from ex­
plosion source to the outer space, and the outer shape of the flame ap­
pears elliptical. With the increase in flame height, the flowing air
X. Li et al. Ocean Engineering 201 (2020) 107146

(a) 100 ms (b) 500 ms (c) 1 s

(d) 2 s (e) 3 s (f) 4 s

(g) 6 s (h) 8 s (i) 10 s

Fig. 15. Evolution process of deflagration jet fire.

(a) 873 K (b) 673 K (c) 453 K (d) 391 K

Fig. 16. Influencing range of critical damage temperature.

provides enough oxygen gas and contributes to the rapid increase of the
combustion range. The interaction between pressure wave and flame
surface generates high-turbulence flame. The flame expands and ap­
pears as a mushroom shaped cloud. In addition, the released gas
continuously involves combustion, which makes the combustion range
increase further. Due to the effect of wind and gas pulsation, the flowing
flame appears as an irregular shape and inclines along the downwind
direction. Due to the consumption of blowout gas and the surrounding
air, the flame volume gradually decreases and reaches the steady state.
Based on the fire temperature damage criteria (Liu, 2012), the crit­
ical temperatures for damage and serious damage to a human body are
391 K and 453 K, respectively. The critical temperature for the partial

9
X. Li et al. Ocean Engineering 201 (2020) 107146

Fig. 17. Time-dependent profile of heat radiation intensity on drill floor.
failure and the complete failure of a steel structure are 673 K and 873 K,
respectively (Li et al., 2018). Fig. 16 presents the influencing area of
critical damage temperature. The influencing range increases as the
critical temperature decreases. The influencing area of critical temper­
atures of 873 K and 673 K are mainly distributed around the rig over the
drill floor. The continuous fire can cause the rig to lose its designed
strength, and lead to a complete failure, deformation or collapse of the
rig. It seems that the isothermal surfaces of 453 K and 391 K have the
greater coverage range where the personnel working there will experi­
ence severe burns and human life may even be endangered. Based on the
numerical simulation results, it is recommended that high-temperature
alarm devices and water sprinkler systems on the drill floor area be
arranged to ensure that operators know the disaster information and
enter into the safe area in time when an accident occurs. They should
also take measures to reduce the surface temperature of the rig and
prevent the loss of structure strength.

5.3. Thermal radiation assessment

The fire imposes a hazard on the adjacent assets by releasing heat

Fig. 18. Variation of heat radiation intensity in isoheights.
radiation, which leads to the temperature increase in adjacent assets. It
can make for deformation, failure or fatality of equipment and personnel
when enough heat radiation is generated. Fig. 17 depicts the time-
dependent profile of heat radiation intensity on the drill floor. The
deflagration flame is in dynamic change at the initial stage of the acci­
dent due to the effect of wind and air pulsation. The heat radiation in­
tensity at the monitoring points fluctuates more sharply during 0–0.18 s.
The heat radiation flux is in dynamic stability after 0.8 s since the flame
develops into the steady state. Note that the monitored heat radiation

(a) 80 m (b) 85 m (c) 91 m

(d) 93 m (e) 95 m (f) 100 m

Fig. 19. Heat radiation distribution in different isoheights.

10
X. Li et al.
Table 3
Influencing range of heat radiation intensity.
Radiation intensity 35 25 12.5 9.5 4 configured with CPU E5-2650 and 64 G memory running CFD code, i.e.
(KW/m2)
Maximum coverage 11.84 13.91 14.47 26.356 30.22
radius (m)
Coverage area(m2) 371.82 656.12 738.88 1466.56 2312.01
Volume (m3) 1052.45 1897.52 2826.72 4246.62 6733.62
flux just reflects the time-dependent rule.
Fig. 18 depicts the variation of radiation intensity in different iso­
heights. The heat radiation flux decreases in a vertical direction. The
maximum radiation flux is about 27 kW/m2 at the isoheight of 91 m. The
maximum heat radiation flux at the isoheight of 93 m is about 13 kW/
m2. The heat radiation intensity in an isoheight appears as symmetrical
distribution.
Fig. 19 presents the heat radiation of the steady fire in different
isoheights. The height of the drill floor is 41.79 m. The shapes of heat
radiation distribution are similar in different isoheights. The heat radi­
ation intensity decreases with the increase in height. Table 3 provides
the influencing range of radiation intensity. The influencing range in­
creases with the decrease of heat radiation intensity. For instance, the
maximum coverage radius of 35 kW/m2 isosurface is 11.84 m. The
corresponding coverage area and volume is 656.12 m2 and 1897.52 m3,
respectively. The rig structure in this range will experience serious
failure in a short time (Liu, 2012). In the range with a coverage radius of
11.84–13.91 m, the heat radiation intensity ranges from 25 kW/m2 to
35 kW/m2. The rig may develop obvious fade and deformation. The
personnel exposed within 10 s will have serious burns while death will
occur when the exposure time is beyond 1 min. In the range with
coverage radius of 13.91–14.47 m, the heat radiation intensity ranges
from 12.5 kW/m2 to 25 kW/m2, which only has a slight effect on the rig.
The personnel exposed within 10 s have minor burns while there is the
possibility of death when the exposure time is beyond 1 min. The heat
radiation intensity is below 4 kW/m2 within the radius of 30.22 m,
which cannot pose any damage to the rig and the other topsides of the
offshore platform.
6. Conclusions
This paper presents a comprehensive simulation of offshore platform
blowout accident to evaluate the effect of blowout accident on the
assests and personnel. The emphasis of the present work is an integra­
tion of gas dispersion and the subsequent deflagration. The deflagration
process is simulated based on the prediction of blowout gas dispersion.
The effective quantitative results provided by the simulations could help
to realize the risk of offshore platform blowout accident and prepare a
contingency plan.
The blowout gas cloud mainly distributes in the upper space of the
drill floor, and it has little effect on most topsides of the offshore plat­
form, and the hazardous area is mainly distributed on the drill floor.
Well productivity has a direct effect on blowout gas dispersion. With the
larger well productivity more time is required for a blowout gas cloud
reaching the steady-state in the scenario. The hazardous area also in­
creases with the increase of well productivity. The overpressure can
cause serious damage to the drill floor. The minimum safe radius under
overpressure is 30.63 m, and the range outside the radius is defined as
the safe area. The deflagration jet fire poses a threat to the rig and to the
personnel on the drill floor. The flame temperature may cause serious
burns to the operators. To avoid the longtime heat radiation damage, the
personnel should evacuate to the safe area which is about 30.22 m from
the drill floor.
The main contribution of this study is to reveal the comprehensive
process of offshore platform blowout accident by using a CFD model,
including blowout gas dispersion behavior and subsequent deflagration
11
Ocean Engineering 201 (2020) 107146
consequence. The simulation with the established CFD required about
38 h to simulate all stages of offshore blowout accident on a computer
Ansys/Fluent 17.0. This can be further applied in modeling and assess­
ment of other process accidents.
Acknowledgement
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided
by National Key R&D Program of China (No: 2017YFC0804501).
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