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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 75 (2022) 104718

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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries


journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

A risk assessment framework considering uncertainty for corrosion-induced


natural gas pipeline accidents
Xinhong Li a, *, Jingwen Wang a, Rouzbeh Abbassi b, Guoming Chen c
a
School of Resources Engineering, Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology, No.13 Yanta Road, Xi’an, 710055, China
b
School of Engineering, Faculty of Science and Engineering, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
c
Centre for Offshore Engineering and Safety Technology (COEST), China University of Petroleum (East China), No.66, Changjiang West Road, Qingdao, China

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Corrosion degradation is one of the main causations of natural gas pipeline failure, which poses a severe threat to
Natural gas pipelines human life, assets, and the environment. This paper develops a methodology to assess the risk of corrosion-
Corrosion failure induced natural gas pipeline accidents considering the uncertainties in incident escalations. This approach can
VCE
capture both the uncertainties in corrosion failure likelihood and the impact of pipeline leak accidents. A pair of
Risk assessment
Uncertainty
limit state functions are established to estimate the corrosion failure probability of the pipeline. The pipeline
accident from gas release to vapor cloud explosion (VCE) is modelled using empirical models. Subsequently, the
uncertainties in gas pipeline corrosion failure accidents, reflected by some uncertain parameters, e.g., basic
pipeline parameters, corrosion defect and environmental conditions et al., are identified. These identified pa­
rameters are discretized and described using a set of probability density functions. Eventually, Monte Carlo (MC)
method is utilized to solve the established models. Besides, sensitivity analysis is conducted to study the effect of
uncertain parameters on the likelihood and impact of a pipeline accident. A practical case is used to test the
methodology, proving a valuable tool for risk assessment of corrosion-induced natural gas pipeline accidents.

1. Introduction hazard assessment approach for oil & gas pipelines. Zhou et al. (2016)
established a model for estimating corrosion failure likelihood based on
Corrosion is the main factor affecting pipeline reliability during its the fuzzy logic method. Witek et al. (2018) developed a probabilistic
service life (European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group, 2018). It is method for an onshore gas pipelines maintenance risk estimation, which
different from other factors, e.g., third-party damage, operation error, considers a population of the anomalies detected by an in-line inspec­
corrosion degradation is inevitable during an entire life cycle of a tion. Seghier et al. (2021) developed an intelligent model to predict
pipeline (Halim et al., 2020; Zelmati et al., 2020). The corrosion accu­ maximum pitting corrosion depth in oil and gas pipelines. Djamel et al.
mulation can lead to the release of natural gas transported in the pipe­ (2020) estimated the time-dependent reliability of a pipeline in Algeria
line and trigger a chain of flammable gas dispersion, fire, and explosion. using a probabilistic approach. Valor et al. (2013) assessed the reliability
The corrosion-induced natural gas pipeline accidents can cause a cata­ of buried pipelines based on MC and different corrosion rate models.
strophic impact on human life, assets, and the environment. Risk Witek (2019) used the fracture mechanics approach to evaluate the
assessment can help to understand the likelihood and impact of time-dependent failure probability of an underground pipeline sub­
corrosion-induced natural gas pipeline accidents and develop efficient jected to internal pressure. Wang and Elsayed (2020) developed a sto­
emergency planning. chastic model to characterize both corrosion volume and depth growth.
Recent years have seen lots of efforts made on risk assessment of Most of these studies focused on corrosion growth modelling, corrosion
corroded pipelines. Mahmoodian and Li (2017) established an analytical failure probability and reliability assessment, whereas corrosion failure
reliability-based model for failure assessment of corrosion-affected gas consequence was not included. Risk is comprised of likelihood and
pipelines. Liu et al. (2019) used subset simulation to estimate corrosion consequence, and an integrated risk assessment is better for revealing
failure probability of buried gas pipelines. Shabarchin and Tesfamariam the operational risk of corroded natural gas pipelines comprehensively.
(2016) built a Bayesian belief network-based probabilistic corrosion The available techniques to assess accident consequences of gas

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: safety_lxh@163.com, lixinhong@xauat.edu.cn (X. Li).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2021.104718
Received 10 November 2021; Received in revised form 5 December 2021; Accepted 15 December 2021
Available online 18 December 2021
0950-4230/© 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
X. Li et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 75 (2022) 104718

pipelines, include simulations, experiments, and empirical models (Luo escalation. Modelling a complete process of pipeline accident escalation
et al., 2006; Caroline et al., 2018; Shan et al., 2020; Deng et al., 2017). could assist to better understand the corrosion-induced natural gas
Houssin-Agbomson et al. (2018) used an experimental approach to pipeline accident hazards.
assess the consequences of gas release occurring on the buried The contribution of this study is a new methodology for better
high-pressure pipeline. Wilkening and Baraldi (2007) presented a CFD quantitative risk assessment of corrosion-induced natural gas pipeline
modelling of accidental hydrogen release from pipelines. Froeling et al. accidents. The risk assessment covers pipeline corrosion failure likeli­
(2021) assessed the individual risk associated with a hazardous hood and the impact of cascading accidents. The uncertainties in the
hydrogen jet fire using a detailed flame model and state-of-the-art model are reflected in some uncertain parameters described by a set of
computational software. Ebrahimi-Moghadam et al. (2016) applied a probability density functions. The accident impacts, e.g., gas release
CFD model to estimate leakage from above-ground and buried urban rate, dispersion distance and explosion overpressure range, obtained
natural gas pipelines. Bagheri et al. (2016) conducted a risk assessment from the methodology are the form of probability distributions pre­
of sour gas transport pipeline using a combination of CFD method and senting impact range with a certain frequency, not a crisp value, which
dose-response model. Mishra and Wehrstedt (2015) used semi-empirical may be closer to the practice and could help to better develop contin­
and advanced CFD modelling to foresee underground gas pipeline ac­ gency planning.
cident hazards. Vairo et al. (2021) analyzed the consequences deriving The structure of the remaining sections of this paper is organized as
from accidents on high pressure buried natural gas pipelines and related follows: Section 2 presents the proposed methodology; Section 3 applies
probabilities of the various outcomes by an event tree framework. Liu a case study to illustrate the methodology; Section 4 gives the conclu­
et al. (2021) built two equations to calculate the release rate and gas sions of this paper.
concentration in the soil for background leakages under low pressure.
Although a lot of progress on consequence assessment of pipeline leak 2. Methodology
failure has been made, most previous studies focused on extracting a
specific range of accident impacts. The pipeline and environmental pa­ Fig. 1 presents the procedures of the proposed methodology for risk
rameters usually possess a certain degree of uncertainties, which may assessment of corrosion-induced natural gas pipeline accidents. Firstly,
propagate in pipeline accident escalation from gas release to an explo­ the information of corrosion-induced pipelines is collected to identify
sion. The uncertainty of pipeline accident escalation in risk assessment the potential accident scenarios. Subsequently, a likelihood model of
was not included in previous studies. Besides, the previous studies pipeline corrosion failure is built using limit state function and MC
focused on assessing the consequences at one stage of accident method, and it can be used to assess dynamic failure probability

Fig. 1. The framework of the proposed methodology.

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X. Li et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 75 (2022) 104718

considering pipeline corrosion degradation. Accounting for the concern expresses the difference between critical failure pressure and operating
of cascading disaster from gas release due to pipeline corrosion failure, a pressure. Eq. (1) is used to express the difference between the capacity
consequence model including gas release, dispersion, and explosion are (C) and load (L) of the evaluated system (Mahadevan and Haldar, 1991;
established to assess the impact of a corrosion-induced pipeline acci­ Nowak and Collins, 2012).
dent. The assessed corrosion failure likelihood and accident impact can
Z =C − L (1)
be integrated through the risk matrix method, which can present the
overall risk of a corrosion-induced pipeline accident. Eventually, a where Z is the performance function of structure; C is the loading ca­
sensitivity analysis is conducted to investigate the influence of uncer­ pacity of structure; L is the external load.
tainty parameters. The results can support the efficient risk management Step 3: Corrosion growth model.
strategies to minimize the operational risk of corroded natural gas Corrosion defects will grow with pipeline service time. Two param­
pipelines. eters, i.e., radial depth and axial length, are used to describe the defects
shown in Fig. 2.
2.1. Defining system and collecting information For the quasi-steady state corrosion, corrosion growth can be
considered as a linear function with time, and the corrosion growth
The continuous corrosion degradation can induce a cascading model can be shown as Eqs. (2) and (3) (Valor et al., 2013).
disaster of a natural gas pipeline from the release of flammable gas to the
explosion. This paper focuses on risk assessment of corrosion-induced d(T) = d0 + vd (T − T0 ) (2)
natural gas pipeline accidents. The required information to support
risk assessment should include but not limit environmental conditions, L(T) = L0 + vl (T − T0 ) (3)
service life, pipeline materials, operating pressures, inspection data and
where d(T) represents the measured corrosion depth at time T, d0 is the
accident history, etc. The mentioned information can be obtained from
initial defect depth, mm; vd is the radial corrosion rate, mm/year; L(T)
the reports provided by the industry and available data within the
represents the estimated corrosion length at time T, L0 is the initial
literature.
defect length, mm; vl is the axial corrosion rate, mm/year; T and T0
represent the predicted time and the initial time, respectively, year.
2.2. Likelihood modelling of pipeline corrosion failure
Step 4: Limit state function of corrosion perforation.
The corrosion perforation is the main failure mode of pipelines
The structure reliability theory comprising of limit state functions
subjected to pitting corrosion. The maximum allowed corrosion depth
implemented with MC is used to estimate the corrosion failure proba­
should not exceed 85% of wall thickness (DNV-RP-F101, 2019).
bility of a pipeline. Based on the corrosion failure mechanism, corrosion
DNV-RP-F101 classified corrosion defects into three types, i.e., single
failure modes can be identified. Then, the corrosion growth model is
defect, interacting defect, and complex defect. A single defect does not
introduced to establish the limit state functions of corrosion failure
interact with the adjacent defects while interacting defects and complex
modes. The dynamic failure probability is calculated by defining un­
defects are opposite. This study concentrates on single defects, and the
certain parameters and MC simulation. The specific steps for establish­
maximum defect depth of each pipeline segment is considered. There­
ing the failure likelihood model to calculate corrosion failure probability
fore, based on the theory presented in step 1, the limit state function of
are shown as follows:
pipeline corrosion perforation is expressed by the difference between the
Step 1: Identifying corrosion failure modes.
maximum allowed corrosion depth and the measured corrosion depth at
There are two possible failure modes for a corroded pipeline. The
time T, as shown in Eq. (4).
first failure mode occurred due to the penetration of the entire wall
thickness, which may lead to the release of a small amount of gas. The Z1 = dc − d(T) (4)
other failure mode will occur when the operating pressure exceeds the
maximum allowed pressure or burst pressure, which may result in where Z1 represents the limit state function of corrosion perforation, dc is
piping burst and the release of a large amount of gas (Aljaroudi et al., the maximum allowed corrosion depth of the pipeline, and this study
2015). Therefore, pipeline corrosion failure modes consist of perforation takes 85% pipeline wall thickness, d(T) is the measured corrosion depth
and burst. at time T.
Step 2: Defining limit state functions. Step 5: Limit state function of burst.
The limit state function can be used to estimate pipeline failure According to the failure mechanism of pipeline burst, the limit state
probability. In this paper, the limit state functions of pipeline corrosion equation presented in step 1 can be redefined as the difference between
failure can be defined based on two corrosion failure modes. The first the failure pressure of the pipeline and the actual operating pressure, as
one expresses the difference between critical corrosion depth and the shown in Eq. (5).
measured corrosion depth at time T. The second limit state function

Fig. 2. Pipeline corrosion morphology.

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X. Li et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 75 (2022) 104718

Z 2 = pf − p0 (5)
1 (x− μ)2
f (x) = √̅̅̅̅̅e− 2σ 2 (10)
where Z2 represents the limit state function of burst, pf is the burst failure σ 2π
pressure of the corroded pipeline, MPa; p0 is the actual operating pres­
where σ represents standard deviation, μ is the mean value.
sure of the corroded pipeline. The failure pressure can be calculated
using Eq. (6), which is recommended by DNV part B allowable stress
approach model for single defect (DNV RP-F101, 2019) and (BS-7910, 2.3. Impact modelling of pipeline corrosion failure
2005).
⎡ ⎤ This study considers the impact of cascading disasters of gas release
2tσU ⎢
d(T)
⎥ due to pipeline corrosion failure. To assess the impact, the cascading
⎢1 − t ⎥
(6)
pf =
(D − t) ⎣1 − d(T)⎦ disaster of pipeline leak includes a process of gas release, dispersion and
tM
explosion should be modelled. The gas release rate is modelled by a hole
model to calculate the amount of gas release, and the dispersion range of
where t is the pipe wall thickness, mm; σ U is the ultimate tensile released gas can be calculated based on Gaussian plume model, while
strength, MPa; D is pipeline diameter, mm; M is the Folias factor defined the impact of VCE can be calculated through TNO multi-energy method.
by Eq. (7). Finally, a set of MC simulations are carried out to obtain cascading
√̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ impact with uncertainties. The specific steps are discussed as follows:
( 2)
L Step 1: Modelling gas release rate.
M = 1 + 0.31 (7)
Dt Small hole leaks can be regarded as an adiabatic process, and natural
gas is considered an ideal gas. The gas flow state can be divided into
Step 6: Dynamic corrosion failure probability. subsonic state and sonic flow state. At the gas release location, the in­
The failure probability of a corroded pipeline can be expressed by Eq. ternal energy of the gas is converted to kinetic energy when it flows out
(8). from the hole due to the difference between pipeline pressure and sur­
Pf = P(Z < 0) (8) rounding pressure. It will lead to the variation of gas density, pressure,
and temperature. The discharge coefficient CD is introduced to consider
The counting method is used to calculate pipeline corrosion failure the shape of the hole. It is assumed that gas release reaches a sonic flow
probability, which is through recording the number of Z < 0. Thus, the state. The gas release rate from the hole can be estimated using Eq. (11)
ratio of the number (Z < 0) and total simulation number is regarded as (Jo and Ahn, 2003).
the pipeline failure frequency. Since the simulation times are large √̅̅̅̅̅̅
enough, the failure frequency can approximately be regarded as the M
Q = CD APc σ φ (11)
failure probability of a corroded pipeline, and it can be expressed as Eq. RT
(9) (Li et al., 2017).
where Q is gas mass release rate, kg/s; CD is discharge coefficient; A is
Pf =
Nf
(9) corrosion hole area, m2; M is gas molecular weight, which is 0.017 kg/
N mol; σ is release velocity coefficient.
Step 2: Modelling flammable gas dispersion.
where Nf is the number for Z < 0, N is the total number of simulations.
Step 7: Identifying uncertain parameters. The Gaussian model can be used to predict the concentration dis­
tribution of flammable gas, and it is suitable for the light or neutral gases
The parameters involved in likelihood modeling of pipeline corro­
sion failure have the natural uncertainty, which is mainly reflected as released from point sources in a homogeneous atmosphere. The
Gaussian model is divided into the Gaussian plume model and the
follows:
Gaussian smoke model. The Gaussian plume model is suitable for
continuous release with a long duration and a small gas release.
■ Uncertainty of pipeline material parameters;
■ Uncertainty of load; Gaussian smoke model is suitable for the instantaneous release with a
short duration and a long dispersion time. A neutral buoyancy plume
■ Uncertainty of geometric dimension;
■ Uncertainty of corrosion defects; model can simulate the dispersion process of natural gas under atmo­
spheric conditions. Based on the Gaussian plume model, the concen­
Material parameters include thermal parameters of material (e.g., tration of released gas at any point can be expressed as Eq. (12).
( ){ [ ] [
thermal conductivity, thermal expansion coefficient et al.) and me­ Q y2 (z − H)2
chanical parameters (e.g., yield strength, ultimate tensile strength C(x, y, z, H) = exp − exp − + exp
2πσ y σz u 2σ 2y 2σ 2z
et al.). The operating pressure is regarded as a load in reliability analysis. ]}
A number of statistical data confirm noticeable variability in pipeline (z + H)2
− (12)
material parameters, load, and corrosion defects (including corrosion 2σ 2z
depth and length, radial and axial corrosion rate). Although pipeline
geometric dimensions (e.g., wall thickness, pipeline diameter, etc.) have where C (x, y, z, H) represents the concentration of release gas at a point
insignificant variability, they also need to be considered as uncertain (x, y, z), kg/m3; x and y are the downwind and crosswind distances, m,
parameters (Caleyo et al., 2009; Zhou et al., 2009). The most suitable respectively. u is the average wind speed at discharge height, m; σ y and
probability distribution can be obtained by fitting the data to charac­ σ z are the horizontal and vertical dispersion parameters, respectively, m;
terize the uncertainty of the parameters. H is the effective discharge height, m.
The normal distribution as the most common density function is The environmental condition has a great effect on the dispersion of
characterized by its parameter transferability and universal applica­ natural gas. A gas dispersion coefficient is used to adapt the simulation
bility. It has been proved that normal distribution can be used to accuracy of the Gaussian model. Environmental condition is divided into
describe the mentioned random variables. The probability density six categories according to wind speed, sunshine, overcast, and other
function of a normal distribution is shown in Eq. (10) (Gómez et al., weather conditions: strong unstable, unstable, weak, stable, neutral,
2007). more stable, and stable, which is represented by A, B, C, D, E, F,
respectively. The gas dispersion coefficients corresponding to different
atmospheric stabilities can be found in Wu et al., (2016).

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X. Li et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 75 (2022) 104718

Step 3: Modelling flammable gas explosion. [ ( )]


k(v)k− 1 v k
Flammable gas clouds will be generated in the downwind direction f (v) = exp − (16)
with the coupling effect of gravity, air resistance, and buoyancy. It may c c c
cause a VCE when it encounters an ignition source. The impact of VCE
where c represents the average wind speed, m/s; k is the shape param­
can be evaluated by the TNT equivalent method and TNO multi-energy
eter which is taken as 1.5 in this study; v is the mean wind speed
method. However, TNT equivalent method may overestimate the over­
measured within 10 min, m/s. The corrosion defect shape is reflected by
pressure in the near field. TNO multi-energy method is more suitable for
the discharge coefficient, and it is assumed that the discharge coefficient
evaluating VCE impact since this method comprehensively takes various
follows the normal distribution.
factors, e.g., turbulence acceleration, local restriction, gas activity, etc.,
into consideration.
2.4. Sensitivity analysis of uncertain parameters
The explosion intensity is affected by ignition source energy, space
type around the explosion source (open space or enclosed space), and
Sensitivity analysis is a useful approach to illustrate the robustness of
congestion degree, etc. The TNO method uses some explosion intensity
the established model. It is assumed that the parameters to the model are
curves to determine the impact range of VCE. There are a total of 10
not accurate, which can present the variation of the model outputs,
curves describing different explosion intensities, and the details about
given some variations of the input parameters. The present study uses a
the explosion intensity curve can be found in Xin et al. (2020). The use of
sensitivity index reported in Han and Zhou (2015) to analyze the un­
the TNO method requires the selection of an explosion intensity curve.
certainty of model parameters, as shown in Eq. (17).
The explosion intensity curve 7 is utilized in the present study for
illustrative purposes. Then, the explosive load is calculated to obtain the ΔPf ∕Pf
αi = (17)
impact range of explosion overpressure. It is assumed that vapor cloud is ΔCi ∕Ci
a hemisphere, and the flame spreads at a constant speed when the center
of the vapor cloud is ignited. The volume of vapor cloud VC and the total where Ci represents the basic random variable, ΔCi is the variation of the
energy of the explosion E are expressed using Eqs. (13) and (14), random variable, Pf is the value corresponding to Ci , ΔPf is the variation
respectively (Xin et al., 2020; Alonso et al., 2006). caused by ΔCi , αi is the sensitivity index of random variable Ci.
W/ρ
Vc = (13) 3. Application of the developed methodology
C

where VC represents the volume of vapor cloud, m3; W is the mass of 3.1. Background
combustible gas in vapor cloud, kg; ρ is the density of flammable gas, kg/
m3; C is the volume fraction of flammable gas. Based on the volume of A natural gas pipeline in the northwest of China is used to demon­
gas cloud obtained by Eq. (13), the total explosive energy is estimated by strate the proposed methodology. This pipeline has not been serviced for
Eq. (14). a long time and is subjected to serious corrosion. According to the
collected information, the pipeline has a diameter of 1219 mm and a
E = Vc ⋅Hc (14) wall thickness of 18.4 mm. The length of this pipeline is 10 km, and its
operating pressure is 5 MPa. The yield strength of pipeline material is
where E represents the total explosion energy, KJ; Hc is the combustion
620 MPa. The leak point of the pipeline is 5 km away from compressor
heat of hydrocarbon and air mixture. Based on the obtained explosion
stations. The local annual average wind speed is 6 m/s. As discussed in
energy E, a dimensionless parameter called the scaled distance is defined
the methodology part, likelihood assessment is mainly affected by the
as follows:
uncertainty of pipeline parameters and corrosion parameters, e.g.,
l operating pressure, ultimate stress, yield stress, size of corrosion defects,
(15)

r =( / )1/3
E × 103 Pa pipe diameter, and wall thickness. The corrosion rate is also considered
an uncertain parameter in the corrosion growth model. This study
where r is the scaled distance (dimensionless); l is the distance between

considers the pipe segment with a leak hole exposed in the air. A VCE
the target and explosion center, m; Pa is the atmospheric pressure, Pa. accident happens when the accumulation of corrosion induces a pipeline
Step 4: Assessing the cascading impact with uncertainties. leak. Assessment of accident consequences is affected by the uncertainty
The gas release rate with uncertainty can be calculated by proba­ of environmental conditions and defect shape, e.g., gas emission coef­
bility distribution functions of the identified uncertain parameters. ficient and local wind speed, etc.
Then, the dispersion and VCE ranges with uncertainties can also be
obtained. After obtaining the failure likelihood and accident impacts, a 3.2. Likelihood assessment of pipeline corrosion failure
risk matrix method can integrate the results and assess the risk associ­
ated with a corrosion-induced pipeline accident. The parameters of probability density distributions of main variables
Step 5: Identifying uncertain parameters. in the limit state equations are shown in Table 1. The variable coefficient
The following two types of uncertainty parameters are required to be is regarded as a ratio of standard deviation to mean value, representing
considered in assessing the cascading impact of a corrosion-induced the degree of dispersion of a parameter value. These variable coefficients
natural gas pipeline leak. are taken from actual case data and used to test the proposed method­
ology. In practice, these coefficients can be obtained from the data
■ Uncertainty of environmental conditions; provided by the pipeline company. In this study, a total of 3 × 106
■ Uncertainty of corrosion defect shapes; simulations were carried out for different service times to obtain the
time-dependent failure probability of corroded gas pipelines. The
Environmental parameters, e.g., wind speed, have an apparent effect simulation numbers are determined when the increase in simulation
on the dispersion of flammable gas. A two-parameter Weibull distribu­ numbers does not affect the final results. First, a set of random number
tion function can be used to describe the distribution of wind speed, and generators of probability density functions are used to generate the
its probability density function is shown by adopting Eq. (16) (Wu et al., required values of model parameters. Then, the generated values are
2016). entered into the established model for MC simulation. Eventually, the
multiple-times sampling calculations are performed to obtain the failure
probability of corroded gas pipelines.

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X. Li et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 75 (2022) 104718

Table 1
Basic parameters of corroded gas pipeline.
Parameters Distribution Mean Variable
pattern value coefficient

Pipe diameter/mm Normal 1219 0.01


distribution
Wall thickness/mm Normal 18.4 0.03
distribution
Working pressure/MPa Normal 5 0.10
distribution
Initial defect depth/mm Normal 4.62 0.26
distribution
Initial defect length/mm Normal 33 0.38
distribution
Radical direction corrosion Normal 0.20 0.15
rate/(mm/a) distribution
Axial direction corrosion Normal 5 0.2
rate/(mm/a) distribution
Ultimate tensile strength/ Normal 688 0.03
MPa distribution Fig. 4. Time-dependent failure probability of burst.
Yield strength/MPa Normal 620 0.03
distribution

Table 2
Figs. 3 and 4 give the time-dependent pipeline failure probabilities Constant parameters affecting gas dispersion.
due to corrosion perforation and burst, respectively. The probability of Parameters Value Parameters Value
corrosion perforation gradually increases over time. During the first 20 The lower limit of natural gas 5 The higher limit of natural 15
years of service time, there is basically no change in the probability of explosion in the air/% gas explosion in the air/%
corrosion perforation. It indicates that the pipeline with high structural Combustion heat of mixture 3500 Length of pipeline from 5000
with hydrocarbon and air/ delivery pressure point to
strength will not fail due to slight corrosion. With the accumulation of
(kJ/m3) leak point/m
corrosion, the pipeline appears an apparent structural degeneration due Pressure under the standard 101.325 Density of natural gas at 0.6548
to the reduction of wall thickness. The pipeline failure probability due to atmospheric conditions/ 20 ◦ C/(kg/m3)
corrosion perforation increases over service time, which can reach KPa
0.0986 in the 35th year. Similarly, the failure probability due to burst,
presented in Fig. 4, is basically consistent with the corrosion perforation
probability shown in Fig. 3. Table 3
It can be found that probabilities of corrosion perforation and burst Probability distributions of the parameters affecting gas dispersion.
gradually increase with the service life. The pipeline failure probability Parameters Distribution Mean Variable
suddenly has a significant increase when its service time exceeds 20 value coefficient
years. Thus, effective measures are required to extend pipeline life and
Pressure at the leak source/ Normal 5 0.1
prevent the serious chain accidents due to corrosion failure. MPa distribution
Gas emission coefficient Normal 0.85 0.15
distribution
3.3. Impact assessment of corrosion-induced pipeline accident
Wind speed/(m/s) Weibull 5.4 0.22
distribution
The pipeline parameters in the failure model shown in section 3.2,
are remained to be unchanged. The constant parameters of gas release
are shown in Table 2, and the probability density functions of the pa­ release rate at the pipeline crack. According to the local conditions, the
rameters with uncertainties in the dispersion model are shown in atmospheric stability is D. A histogram for the gas release rate of the
Table 3. corroded pipeline is presented in Fig. 5.
The gas release rate at the surface outlet can be regarded as the

Fig. 3. Time-dependent failure probability of corrosion perforation. Fig. 5. Histogram of gas release rate.

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X. Li et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 75 (2022) 104718

Fig. 6 gives the concentration and dispersion range of the released


natural gas, in which 1.5 m is taken as the height of the human respi­
ratory zone. Due to the uncertainty of pipeline leak pressure and gas
emission coefficient, the estimated gas release rate follows a normal
distribution with a mean of 128.37 kg/s and a standard deviation of
22.73 kg/s. The results indicate that the maximum gas release rate can
reach 239.7 kg/s, and the minimum is 41.8 kg/s. When the gas release
rate is in the range of (95–100 kg/s) to (150–155 kg/s), the corre­
sponding frequencies of each group are all above 0.05, and the total
frequency reaches 0.69.
Fig. 7 presents the distance from the farthest point of the hazardous
area where the downwind direction is at the explosion limit after the
release of natural gas. Due to the uncertainty of gas release rate and wind
speed, the farthest dangerous point in the downwind direction continues
to vary. As shown in Fig. 7, when the flammable gas concentration is 5%,
the x-axis downwind radius of the dangerous explosion zone conforms to
a normal distribution with a mean of 108.25 m and a standard deviation
of 9.82 m. The corresponding minimum and maximum dangerous dis­ Fig. 7. Histogram of downwind explosion dangerous zone radius.
tances in the downward distance are 79.74 m and 159.6 m, respectively.
When the x-axis downwind radius of the dangerous explosion zone is in Suppose TNO multi-energy method is replaced using TNT equivalent
the range of (95–100 m) to (110–115 m), the corresponding frequencies method. In that case, the radius of the death zone follows a normal
of each group are all above 0.05, and the total frequency reaches 0.67. distribution with a mean of 22.22 m and a standard deviation of 1.49 m,
The results show that every point in this zone can be ignited to generate and the radius of the severe injury zone obeys a normal distribution with
the explosion hazard, and the farthest point should also be considered a mean of 63.63 m and a standard deviation of 3.86 m. It means that the
while dividing the hazardous zone. human injured zone obtained by TNT is smaller than the results from
The shock wave generated by the flammable gas explosion can cause TNO. Due to the longtime pressure rise during the gas explosion, the
serious injury to human. It is assumed that an accident occurs when the peak overpressure is relatively low, resulting in a slower overpressure
gas release duration is 60 s. The impact on human, caused by VCE are decay. Thus, TNT equivalent method underestimates the explosion in­
analyzed, and the explosion zone is divided into four types: death zone, tensity in midfield and far-field. The radius of the death zone calculated
severe injury zone, medium injury zone, and slight injury zone. Based on by TNT only depends on the TNT equivalent, which causes that the
overpressure criteria, the critical overpressures corresponding to these explosion intensity at the near distance is overestimated. It shows that
four zones are 98 kPa, 49 kPa, 29.4 kPa and 19.6 kPa, respectively. the dead zone is narrowed. Compared to TNT equivalent method, TNO
Based on the relationship between scaled distance and scaled over­ multi-energy method is more suitable for VCE impact assessment. To
pressure, the radius of injury zones can be calculated (Alonso et al., ensure personal safety and prevent asset damage, it is necessary to
2006). This paper just analyzes the dead zone and the severe injury zone, consider the range with a higher probability, and the farthest point with
as shown in Fig. 8. It is observed from Fig. 8 (a) that the zone radius of an extremely low likelihood cannot be ignored when planning an
death follows a normal distribution with a mean of 33.98 m and a emergency zone. After obtaining the corrosion failure probability and
standard deviation of 2.06 m, and the minimum and maximum radius accident impact, the traditional risk matrix method can be used to assess
are 42.15 m, and 16.39 m, respectively. When the death radius is in the the risk by integrating the likelihood and impact. However, this study
range of (32–33 m) to (35–36 m), the corresponding frequencies of each focuses on a new methodology considering uncertainty which is an
group are above 0.06, and the total frequency reaches 0.686. improvement of conventional empirical models. The parameter uncer­
It can be seen from Fig. 8 (b) that the radius of severe injury zone tainty in model results is considered in the present study. Thus, the
follows a normal distribution with a mean of 71.81 m and a standard integration of likelihood and impact is not discussed here.
deviation of 4.35 m. The minimum radius can reach 38.16 m, and the
maximum radius can reach 88.09 m. When the severe injury zone radius
is in the range of (68–70 m) to (74–76 m), the corresponding frequencies 3.4. Sensitivity analysis
of each group are above 0.06, and the total frequency reaches 0.685.
The variation of the parameters listed in Table 1 will lead to the

Fig. 6. Concentration distribution of flammable gas dispersion.

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X. Li et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 75 (2022) 104718

Fig. 8. Radius of human injury zone.

change of pipeline failure probability. The variations of basic parame­ but the failure probability increases with time accumulation compared
ters are set as follows: wall thickness (t) and ultimate tensile strength with the initial state.
(σ U ) decrease by 20% each time; pipeline diameter (D), operating When t and σU decrease by 20%, D, p0, v, and d0 and L0 increase by
pressure (p0), corrosion rate (v), and initial corrosion depth (d0) and 20%, sensitivity analysis of these parameters is performed. Thus, the
length (L0) increase by 20% each time. maximum sensitivity index αmax of each parameter involved in the
As shown in Fig. 9, when the wall thickness and ultimate tensile pipeline failure probability model can be obtained as shown in Tables 4
strength decrease, the failure probability gradually increases with a and 5. Wall thickness t greatly affects pipeline failure probability, which
pipeline service time. It is indicated that there are negative correlations is far more significant than other indices. In addition to t, vd , and d0 are
between t and pipeline failure probability, as well as and pipeline failure critical for pipeline safety and reliability, considering the correlation
probability. If t decreases, the structural strength of the corroded pipe­ between t and them.
line will decrease, which means that the safety performance and reli­ It is assumed that the parameters listed in Table 3 are changed by
ability of the pipeline will degenerate. At the same time, the time to ±10%, ±20%, and ±30%, respectively. When the flammable gas is
pipeline failure has been shortened by five years. Therefore, the failure released into the air, the variations of gas release rate caused by the
probability of the pipeline presents an ascending trend. It is worth changes of orifice radius r, the pressure at the leak point P0 and tem­
noting that the variation rate of pipeline failure probability due to the perature T, and the change of x-axis downwind radius of the dangerous
variation of t is significantly higher than the results from the variation of explosion zone caused by gas release rate Q and wind speed u, are shown
other parameters. in Fig. 10.
When pipeline diameter D, initial corrosion depth d0 and length L0, The gas release rate presents an ascending trend with the increase of
corrosion rate v, and operating pressure p0 increase, the failure proba­
bility of corroded pipeline also increases over service time. It means that
Table 4
a positive correlation exists between pipeline failure probability and Maximum sensitivity index of corrosion perforation parameters.
these parameters. In the same service time, there is a little difference in
Parameter
pipeline failure probabilities caused by D, L0, p0, and axis direction
αmax

corrosion rate vl , compared with the pipeline failure probability curve Wall thickness/mm 6507.1
that grows slightly with the increase of d0 and radical direction corrosion Rate of radical direction corrosion/(mm/a) 62.4916
Initial corrosion depth/mm 37.5004
rate vd . Besides, the occurrence time of pipeline failure does not vary,

Fig. 9. Parameter sensitivity of pipeline failure probability.

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X. Li et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 75 (2022) 104718

Table 5 corresponding to u, which indicates that Q is regarded as a critical factor


Maximum sensitively index of burst parameters. affecting the downwind dispersion distance.
Parameter αmax As can be seen from Fig. 11, the explosion damage range increases
with the increase of Q, and a positive correlation lies in them. The
Wall thickness/mm 2437.9
variation rate of the death zone radius can be considered to be lesser
Initial corrosion depth/mm 28.3516
Rate of radical direction corrosion/(mm/a) 18.7337
Ultimate tensile strength/MPa 8.7663
Rate of axial direction corrosion/(mm/a) 6.7935 Table 6
Working pressure/MPa 6.6939 Maximum sensitivity index of gas release rate.
Pipeline diameter/mm 5.00
Parameter αmax
Initial corrosion length/mm 5.1868
Orifice radius/mm 2.30
Leakage pressure/MPa 1.00
r and p0, which indicates that r and p0 are positively correlated with the Temperature/◦ C 0.03
gas release rate. Since r is affected by the shape of corrosion orifice, a
significant ascending trend of gas release rate emerges by the increase of
orifice size. When p0 increases to cause a tremendous jet velocity, a Table 7
turbulent free jet will be formed near the orifice, and the increased jet Maximum sensitivity index of x-axis downwind explo­
velocity makes it easier for gas to diffuse into the atmosphere and mix sion dangerous zone radius.
with air. In contrast, a negative correlation lies in T and gas release rate.
Parameter αmax
But it can be seen from Fig. 10 that the variation rate of gas release rate
caused by the change of T is little that it almost approaches a horizontal Gas release rate/(kg/s) 0.50
Wind speed/(m/s) 0.01
line.
Then, X-axis downwind dangerous distance of explosion will be
affected by the variation of gas release rate, which presents a negative
correlation and shows a descending trend with an increase of gas release
rate. The volume of a flammable gas cloud increases with the mass
accumulation of the released gas; although gas dispersion distance de­
creases, the risk of flammable gas explosion increases. As u continues to
increase, transient mass exchange occurs due to the continuous expan­
sion and mixing between air and natural gas. Under the effect of airflow
entrainment and atmospheric turbulence, the gas cloud is diluted by air
to cause a decrease in concentration, resulting in a gradual narrowing of
X-axis downwind explosion dangerous distance. Therefore, there is a
positive correlation lies in u and X-axis downwind explosion dangerous
distance. In addition, it is worth noting that when u is large enough to
make gas cloud leaving the jet core area diluted, the X-axis downwind
explosion dangerous zone disappears.
When r, p0, T, and u each increase by 20%, Q decrease by 20%, the
value of αmax is used to indicate the sensitivity of each parameter is
shown in Tables 6 and 7.
It can be seen from Table 6 that αmax corresponding to r is twice more
than the value corresponding to p0, and is 77 times than αmax corre­
sponding to T. It can be concluded that r has a significant effect on gas
release rate compared with other factors. Similarly, it can be obtained
from Table 7 that αmax corresponding to Q is 50 times the αmax
Fig. 11. Parameter sensitivity of VCE impact range.

Fig. 10. Parameter sensitivity of gas dispersion.

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X. Li et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 75 (2022) 104718

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