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Virtue and Circumstances: On the City-State Concept of Arete

Article  in  American Journal of Philology · January 2002

DOI: 10.1353/ajp.2002.0004

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Virtue and Circumstances: On the City-State Concept of Arete
Author(s): Margalit Finkelberg
Source: The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 123, No. 1 (Spring, 2002), pp. 35-49
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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 VIRTUE AND CIRCUMSTANCES:
ON THE CITY-STATECONCEPT OF ARETE

MARGALIT FINKELBERG

IN HIS DISCUSSION OF virtue (arete) in books 1 and 10 of the

Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes the famous claim that "it is impos-
sible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment
(a&op'yrrXovovca)" (Eth. Nic. 1.8 1099a32-33). This is why arete would
need what he calls "the external goods" (a ?cKTO;q
aycaa) in order to be
actualized:

The liberalmanwill need money for the doingof his liberaldeeds,and the
just man too will need it for the returningof services(for wishes are hard
to discern,and even people who are not justpretendto wish to act justly);
and the brave man will need power if he is to accomplishany of the acts
that correspondto his arete,and the temperatemanwill need opportunity;
for how else is either he or any of the others to be recognized?It is
debated,too, whetherthe will or the deed is more essentialto arete,which
is assumedto involve both; it is surely clear that its perfectioninvolves
both; but for deeds many things are needed, and more, the greater and
nobler the deeds are.1

Since arete is essential for achieving the state of happiness (eudaimonia),

in the last analysis happiness too would depend on the circumstances of
one's life.
Aristotle's conditioning of arete on external circumstances had been
sharply criticized already in antiquity, mainly by the Stoics. Not a few
present-day historians of philosophy also tend to see his approach as
unsatisfactory, in that it relies on commonsense intuitions that would not
withstand a proper philosophical examination. Compare, for example,
Julia Annas's criticism of Aristotle's conception of happiness (eudai-
monia), which is intimately connected with his conception of arete:

Unreflectively, we associate happiness with success and with actual posses-

sion of affluence, worldly goods and success. But the account of happiness

1Eth. Nic. 10.8 1178a28-b3, trans. David Ross.

American Journal of Philology 123 (2002) 35-49 ? 2002 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
36 MARGALIT
FINKELBERG

which an ethical theory has to produce must satisfy people who have
reflectedon virtue and what its significanceis in our lives.And to those
who do this,it seems clear that worldlysuccessis not the point at all, that
what mattersis being virtuous,being a moralperson as we nowadayssay,
and that if this is what matters,one has all one needs for happinesseven if
one loses all the worldlygoods."2

Accordingly, the Stoic attitude to virtue would contrast favorably with

that of Aristotle.
According to the alternative view, as represented by Martha
Nussbaum and Bernard Williams, Aristotle in his conditioning of both
virtue and happiness on external circumstances does not avoid facing
harsh realities of life-the same realities, it must be added, that later
attitudes to virtue tended to ignore. Thus, according to Nussbaum, "every
Aristotelian philosophical inquiry is conducted within the world of hu-
man experience and belief, limited by the limits of that world" (Nussbaum
1986, 318). Likewise, in commenting on the substantial honesty of the
attitude to slavery displayed by Aristotle and the Greeks in general, as
compared to the view of Seneca and "its various Christian relatives,"
Williams writes: "Seneca and his various associates can let the social
world be unjust, because they can, in accordance with one or another of
their fantasies, suppose that one can get out of it. Aristotle knew that one
could never get out of it" (Williams 1993, 116).
It should not be forgotten, however, that, whatever the universal
applications of Aristotle's discussion of virtue may be, this discussion
originally addressed Greek society of the fourth century B.C. In what
follows, I argue that to understand Aristotle's reasons for treating arete
as conditioned on external circumstances, we have to consider his con-
ception against the concrete historical background of this society.

ARETE IN AND OUT OF USE

The usual rendering of the Greek arete as "virtue" would be misleading

here, in that it would irreparably distort the sense of the original. This
was the opinion of H. D. F. Kitto, for example, who wrote on this "typi-
cally Greek word," as he called it, as follows: "When we meet it in Plato
we translate it 'Virtue' and consequently miss all the flavor of it. 'Virtue,'
at least in modern English, is almost entirely a moral word; arete on the

2 Annas 1993, 424, and passim.

 VIRTUEAND CIRCUMSTANCES 37

other hand is used indifferently in all the categories and means simply
'excellence"' (Kitto 1957,171-72). According to Terence Ball," 'Virtue' is
our modern (and in many respects unsatisfactory) translation of the
Greek apen'r. A better, if rather more awkward, translation of arete
would be 'role-related specific excellence.' Arete is that quality or set of
qualities which enables one to fill a particular role and to discharge its
duties" (Ball 1995, 74).
Arete was indeed conspicuous in that it could be identified in more
than one way. "But there is no difficulty about it," young Meno boasts
when requested by Socrates to explain what arete is:

Firstof all,if it is manlyareteyou are after,it is easy to see that the areteof
a man consists in managingthe city's affairscapably,and so that he will
help his friendsand injurehis foes while takingcare to come to no harm
himself.Or if you want a woman'sarete,that is easily described.She must
be a good housewife,carefulwith her stores and obedientto her husband.
Then there is anotheraretefor a child,male or female,and anotherfor an
old man,free or slave as you like,and a greatmanymore kindsof arete,so
that no one need be at a loss to say whatit is.Forevery act and every time
of life, with referenceto each separatefunction,there is an aretefor each
one of us.3

Everything, even animals and inanimate objects, has its particular arete,
including the "animate instrument," the slave. At the same time, there
can be no doubt that possessing the "slavery arete" does not grant the
slave the kind of arete that was the prerogative of the free citizen.
The Greeks of the archaic and classical ages molded their concep-
tion of a person out of the realities of the city-state, the identity of whose
members was strictly predicated on their social role of free citizens. Once
this condition was removed, the "city-state animal" that the Greek man
above all was,4 would lose his identity and, together with it, his share in
the only kind of arete that really counted. To quote Ball again, "[Ajrete
does not and cannot refer to the excellence (moral or otherwise) of man
qua man but of man qua role-bearer in relation to other role-bearers"
(Ball 1995, 74). The view of the human being underlying this attitude to
arete is the one that Alasdair Maclntyre defined as "the use of 'man' as a
functional concept": "It is rooted in the forms of social life to which the
theorists of the classical tradition give expression. For according to that

3 PI. Meno 71e-72a, trans. W. K. C. Guthrie.

4 For this translation of Aristotle's noXtucKOvlCpov(Pol. 1253a), see Adcock 1957, 2.
38 MARGALITFINKELBERG

tradition to be a man is to fill a set of roles each of which has its own
point and purpose: member of a family, citizen, soldier, philosopher,
servant of God. It is only when man is thought of as an individual prior
to and apart from all roles that 'man' ceases to be a functional concept"
(Maclntyre 1984, 58-59). To be sure, as is amply exemplified by Meno
and other Platonic dialogues, it was exactly such a view of man as "prior
and apart from all roles"-or, to put it in Plato's own words, of "the
single arete, which permeates all of them,"5-that the philosophers strove
to teach at least from the time of Socrates. Yet, as we shall see, the
popular thought and the behavior of ordinary people exhibited quite a
different attitude.
The most illuminating single discussion of the nature of arete as
seen outside the context of philosophy is perhaps the one that took place
in 401 B.C.near Cunaxa, north of Babylon, a day after the decisive battle
that put an end to the attempt of Cyrus, the younger brother of the Great
King, to seize the throne of Persia. Although the army of Greek merce-
naries hired by Cyrus routed the troops that faced them without a single
casualty, Cyrus himself was killed, and his death left the Greeks leader-
less and alone in the heart of the Persian empire. On the next day
messengers from the king arrived in the Greek camp. They demanded
that the Greeks surrender their arms and leave themselves to the mer-
cies of the Persian ruler. There was a fair chance that the king would be
interested in employing the Greek soldiers exactly as his brother had
before, but one could never be sure. After brief negotiations, the terms of
capitulation were rejected.
On the Persian side, the negotiations were led by Phalinus, a Greek
in the Great King's service, who passed there for an expert in Greek
military tactics. When his first entreaty was met with unanimous opposi-
tion on the part of the Greek generals, Phalinus pointed out to his
compatriots, who still considered themselves victorious in the previous
day's action, how desperate their situation in fact was: they were in the
heart of hostile territory, enclosed by impassable rivers, and the king
could at any moment bring against them a military force "so vast that
even if leave were given to rise and slay you could not kill them."

After him Theopompus the Athenian spoke. "Phalinus," he said, "at this
instant, as you yourself can see, the only good things left to us are our arms
and our arete. If we keep our arms, we suppose we can make use of our
arete; but if we deliver up the arms, we shall presently be robbed of our

5 P1.Meno 74.a9 dTv

6iV liav [sc. &peznv],n 6i&a7avTwovTODitov
ECTiv.
 VIRTUEAND CIRCUMSTANCES 39

lives. Do not suppose then that we are going to give up to you the only
good thingsthat we possess.We preferto keep them;and by their help we
will do battlewithyou for the good thingsthatareyours."Phalinuslaughed
when he heardthose words,and said,"Spokenlike a philosopher,my fine
youngman,andveryprettyreasoningtoo; yet, let me tell you, yourwits are
somewhatscatteredif you imaginethatyouraretewill get the betterof the
king'spower."6

As is well known, the subsequenthistory of the Ten Thousandproved

that Theopompuswas in the right and Phalinusin the wrong:thanksto
their keeping both their arms and their militaryand civic organization,
the Greeks fought their way north from Mesopotamia and, after im-
mense hardships,reached the Greek colonies on the southernshore of
the Black Sea.
Xenophon'sphrase"if we keep our arms,we supposewe can make
use of our arete" (Xckat UEV av KOci&x,ape-r Xpio0atc),
ov eXovxT?;oi6Lt0i9a
implyingas it does that under certaincircumstancesaretecan go out of
use and thereforebecome irrelevant,soundspeculiarto the modernear.
We are accustomedto believe that the basic featuresof a person'schar-
acter would persist even when circumstancesprevent the agent from
exercising them. Yet this view is closely paralleled in Thucydides, who
uses the same expressionin the context of a dialoguebetween the Athe-
nians and the Melians.The Meliansclaim that the Spartanswill come to
their aid;the Atheniansreplythat the Spartans"usearetemost"(nCXkiEoxc
apeTTX Xp&vTat) in their dealingswith one anotherand when their ances-
tral customs are concerned, but in their behavior toward others "they are
the most notorious for identifyingwhat is pleasantwith what is honor-
able, and what is expedient with what is just."7The question whether the
Spartanscan be called virtuousin absoluteterms does not suggestitself
at all. It is the same Thucydides,we must recall, who famously argued
that while in peace and prosperityboth states andindividualsare usually
led by higher motives, war "tends to assimilate the dispositions of most
men to their circumstances."8In his comment on the passage in which
this phrase occurs, Colin Macleod wrote: "Thucydides systematically
avoids distinguishing persons from events. This aptly reinforces the no-
tion behind the whole passagethat circumstancestend to shape human
behavior" (Macleod 1983,132), whereas Jonathan Price argues in a recent

6
Xen. Anab. 2.1.11-13, trans. Henry G. Dakyns, with slight changes.
7Thuc. 5.105.4, trans. Benjamin Jowett.
8Thuc. 3.82.2: npo6'a&tapovra xa& opy&a qTvTo3x,v Oxoitoi.
40 MARGALIT FINKELBERG

book that "Thucydides'vision contradictsassumptionsin other ethical

systems prevalent in his own time and our own, based on fixed moral
standardsas well as on a conception of human nature as essentially
'good,' 'bad' or mixed.... Thucydidesassumes that 'humannature'has
no particularmoral characteristicsin itself' (Price 2001,27).
Characteristically, PhalinuscomparesTheopompus'argumentre-
garding arete to that of a philosopher.Nothing is known of this young
Athenian,9 but several other participantsin the Cyrusexpedition were
not foreignto contemporaryphilosophicaleducation:Meno theThessalian
(who figures as Socrates' interlocutorin the Platonic dialogue by the
same name and is representedthere as a formerstudentof Gorgias)and
Proxenusthe Boeotian (who also "paidhis fee to Gorgiasof Leontini"
[Xen. Anab. 2. 6. 16]), and of course Xenophon himself,who spent con-
siderable time in the company of Socrates in his native Athens. Had
Xenophon and his fellow Greeks been in a mood to discusstheir situa-
tion in the vein of the philosophicaltrainingthey had received at home,
the most suitable topic of conversationmight have been "Under what
conditionscan aretebe possible?"No such question,however,was part
of the philosophicalagendain Xenophon'stime.It was not untilAristotle's
discussionof aretein the NicomacheanEthics some seventy years later
that the attitude to arete reflectedin Xenophon'spassage underwenta
thoroughphilosophicalexamination.Characteristically, Aristotle explic-
itly acknowledges that the view of arete he expounds is in agreement
with popularbeliefs (ro Xteyo6eva [Eth.Nic. 1.8.1098b9-12]).

CITIZENSHIPAND ARETE

When Plato's Meno says with all the self-confidenceof youth that "it is
easy to see that arete of a man consists in managingthe city's affairs
capably,"there can be no doubt that he is doing hardly more than
expressingthe communisopinio of his time."Managingthe city'saffairs"
was an indispensablequalificationfor a citizen of the polis,and this was
why in the second half of the fifthcenturyB.C.crowdsof youngmen from
the best familiesrushedto secure at any cost the servicesof the profes-
sional "teachersof arete,"the Sophists.The Sophists' proclaimedgoal
was to assisttheirstudentsin improvingtheirperformancesas successful
members of the community.In Plato's Protagoras Socrates asks the

9 It is not out of the question that Theopompus, who emerges only once in the
Anabasis, is none other than Xenophon in disguise, see Nussbaum 1967,123 n. 6.
 VIRTUE AND CIRCUMSTANCES 41

greatest of the Sophists what qualificationsthe young and enthusiastic

Hippocrateswill acquireif he becomes his student.Protagoras'answeris
as follows:"Theproper care of his personal affairs,so that he may best
managehis own household,and also of the state'saffairs,so as to become
a real power in the city,both as speaker and man of action."10
Small wonder, therefore, that, when understood in this manner,
aretecould only be affordedby those who enjoyedpersonaland political
freedom, social respectability,and sufficient wealth. In the Odyssey
Eumaeussays,"Zeusthe Thunderertakes awaythe half of a man'sarete,
when the day of slavery comes upon him."11This Homeric line both
epitomizesthe view of areteas dependenton externalcircumstancesand
suppliesit with the propersocial context.Slavery,for one, constitutedan
externalfactorthat was universallyrecognizedas automaticallyreducing
the person, whateverrole he or she previouslyfulfilled,to the state in
whichthe higherformsof aretebecome irrelevant.Therecould of course
be other handicapsbesides slavery,for example,impoverishmentor ex-
ile. "WhenZeus gives fromthe jar of miseryonly,"Achilles says to Priam
in Iliad 24, "he brings a man to degradation(XwP,orvL0liKe),and vile
starvationdriveshim over the holy earth,and he wanderswithouthonor
from gods or men."12
Characteristically,the situationof those who sink into utmostpov-
erty stirs neither pity nor compassion in the hearts of others."Work,
foolish Perses,"Hesiod admonisheshis brotherin the Worksand Days,
"do the work that the gods have markedout for men, lest one day with
children and wife, sick at heart, you look for livelihood around the
neighborsand they pay no heed.Twice,three times you may be success-
ful, but if you harass them further,you will achieve nothing, all your
speecheswill be in vain, and howeverwide yourwordsrangeit will be no
use."13 As Theognis,himself an exile from his native Megara,knew only
too well,"[M]ansubduedby povertycan neithersay nor do anything,for
his tongue is tied."14The pauper,by very fact of his social degradation,

"Prot. 318e, trans. W. K. C. Guthrie.

u Od. 17. 322-23
IpItxuyap T' aperfq arnoaivvrat eoOp'zoa Zet) / a&vpo;, e?T' av uIv
coa'c&oXiov goap?X,otv. Trans. S. H. Butcher and Andrew Lang, slightly changed.
12 //. 24. 527-33. Cf. Hes.
Erga 179; Pi. P. 3. 82-83.
13 Hes.
Erga 397-403; trans. M. L. West. Cf. also Tyrt. 10.3-12 West; Mimn. 2.11-12
West.
14Thgn.177-78; cf. 181-82. Cf. Donlan 1999, 82: "nowhere in the literature of this
period can we find even a hint that poverty should be regarded as something else as
catastrophic."
42 MARGALIT FINKELBERG

was deprived of any function worth mentioning in the communityto

which he belonged. Hence, the areteof the free citizen becomes some-
thing that the paupercannot afford.So Theognisagain:"HarshPoverty
... you teach me, againstmy will,manyshamelessthings,thoughI under-
stand what is good and noble among men."15Both the "inferiors"
(tUcogeiove;)of Sparta,who lost their civic rightsbecause they were too
poor to pay their share in the sussitia,the citizens'publicmeals,and the
hektemoroi,indebted farmers in pre-SolonianAthens, who could be
enslavedif unableto pay a proportionof theirproduceto theircreditors,
come to mind in this connection.
Thiscause-effectrelationshipbetweenpropertyand citizenshiphas
been admirablyformulatedby Martin Ostwald in his recent book on
Greek oligarchy:"In the absence of regularpay for publicservicein the
Greek city-states,a minimumof e6?topiawas needed for the full enjoy-
ment of citizenship,since citizenshipinvolvedgivingfreely of one's time
and service to the community.This requiredownershipof propertynot
only in oligarchiesbut also in democracies....The idea of governmentby
'those endowed with the personal resources'-the e7CRopoi-underlies
all constitutions,especially oligarchies,but is a prerequisitefor active
citizenshipalso in other constitutions,even democracies:the differenceis
merely in the amount owned" (Ostwald2000, 44-45). Considerfor ex-
ample the hoplite phalanx.It is generallyrecognizedthat this form of
warfarewas tailoredespeciallyto suit the social realitiesof the polis.To
quote Ian Morris,"The phalanxbecame the standardimage for citizen
solidarity and remained so until the fourth century" (Morris 1996, 35).16
Yet only those who could provide themselveswith the necessaryequip-
ment-shield, cuirass,helmet, spear, and greaves-could be enlisted as
hoplites,and this is why the militarystatusof the hoplite became identi-
cal to the social statusof a memberof the middleclass.Thatis to say,only
someone who could affordthe hoplite equipmentwas entitledto defend
the communityon the battlefield,and only someone who was entitledto
defend the communityon the battlefieldcould be politicallyactivein the
city-state.17

15
Thgn. 651-52; trans. Walter Donlan.
16
Cf. Adcock 1957,4; Hanson 1989, 117-25; Murray 1993,124-36; Bryant 1996,90-93.
17
Considering that the members of the upper classes, although officially qualified as
"knights," were also often enlisted as hoplites, it would be no exaggeration to say that
hoplite warfare was an experience uniting the upper and the middle classes of the Greek
polis, and this meant the majority of its population. Cf. Donlan 1999,179: "The nobleman
may have considered himself to be above and apart from the common people, but never
 VIRTUEAND CIRCUMSTANCES 43

In the fifth century B.C. the Athenians spread the prerogative of

active citizenship to include the poor citizens of the polis, the thetes, who
proved their worth for the community when serving in the navy during
the Persian Wars. In view of this, it comes as no surprise that the issue of
arete became one of the most hotly debated topics in fifth-century Ath-
ens: the discussion, directly stimulated by the squabbles around the broad-
ening social basis of Athenian democracy, was focused on the question
"Can arete be taught?"18The situation is explicitly addressed in two
contemporary sources that are diametrically opposed in their politics.
One is the famous credo of the Athenian democracy put by Thucydides
into the mouth of Pericles in the Funeral Oration: "But while the law
secures equal justice to all alike in their private disputes, the claim of
merit is also recognized; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished,
he is preferred to the public service, not as a matter of privilege, but as
the reward of arete. Neither is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his
country whatever be the obscurity of his condition."19The other is the
Politeia of the Athenians by the so-called Old Oligarch:

In the firstplace,I maintain,it is only just that the poorer classes and the
commonpeople of Athens shouldbe better off than the men of birthand
wealth, seeing that it is the commonpeople who man the fleet and have
broughtthe city her power.The steersman,the boatswain,the lieutenant,
the look-out-manat the prow,the shipwright-these are the people who
supplythe city with power far ratherthan the hoplites and men of birth
and quality.This being the case, it seems only just that offices of state
should be thrown open to every one both in the ballot and the show of
hands,and that the right of speech should belong to any citizen who is
willing,without restriction.20

That the oligarchic view concurs with the democratic one at this specific
point shows clearly enough that it is not so much the property as such,
but rather the ability to contribute to the common good, of which property
used to be one of the main prerequisites, that was universally recognized

apartfromthe polis;aristocratand nonaristocratalike agreedthat a man existedto serve

the community."On the "middling" tendenciesof the polisaristocracysee also Morris1996,
esp.27-28.
18 A standardaccount of the
fifth-centurydiscussionof the natureof areteis still
Guthrie1969,250-60.
19Thuc.2. 37. On the thetes'changingrole in Atheniandemocracysee, e.g., Strauss
1996,313-25.
20
Pseudo-Xenophon1.2-3;trans.Henry G. Dakyns,slightlychanged.
44 MARGALITFINKELBERG

as establishing one's credentials as a full-scale citizen and thereby a

possessor of full-scale arete.2'
This is why under certain circumstances even women could be
envisaged as capable of reaching the standards of behavior beyond the
social expectations arising from their status. In such cases, rare as they
are in our sources, women were regarded as entitled to the same full-
scale arete as that possessed by men. Thus, in Euripides' Iphigenia in
Aulis, where the death of Iphigenia is represented as a conscious self-
sacrifice for the sake of the entire community, the heroine gains equal
status with those fighting at Troy, while the self-sacrifice of Alcestis is
treated in Plato's Symposium as a model example of arete, on a par with
the exemplary cases of Achilles and the Athenian king Codrus.22This
however did not affect the fact that it was first and foremost the free
male citizen, whose level of euporia was such as to enable him to be
politically active in the community, who habitually furnished the stan-
dard model of arete.
In the famous parable adduced by Herodotus, King Croesus of
Lydia asks Solon the Wise to tell him who in his opinion is the happiest
man in the world. Solon's first choice is Tellus, an ordinary Athenian
citizen:

First,because his city was flourishingin his days,and he himselfhad sons

both beautifulandgood, andhe lived to see childrenbornto each of them,
and these childrenall grew up; and furtherbecause,after a life spent in
what our people look upon as comfort,his end was surpassinglyglorious.
In a battle between the Athenians and their neighborsnear Eleusis,he
came to the assistanceof his countrymen,routed the foe, and died upon
the field most gallantly.The Athenians gave him a public funeralon the
spot where he fell, and paid him the highesthonors.23

Tellus is considered the happiest man by Greek standards not only

because he had the personal qualities of a good citizen and a glorious
death, but also because the circumstances of his life allowed him both to
use these qualities and to benefit from them in the best possible way.
These circumstances consisted in the prosperity of his city, the well-being

21
Cf. Bryant 1996, 152-54. As I argued elsewhere, the view that the possession of
arete is associated with one's contribution to the common good can be traced back as far as
Homer; see Finkelberg 1998, 21-24.
22
See Iph. Aul. 1368-401, 1446; Symp. 179b4-180b5, 208d.
23
Hdt. 1. 30. 4-5; trans. George Rawlinson.
 VIRTUEAND CIRCUMSTANCES 45

of his family, and, last but not least, the personal wealth, moderate though
it was, that he enjoyed during his lifetime. Aristotle obviously refers to
this story in book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics: "Solon, too, was perhaps
sketching well the happy man when he described him as moderately
furnished with externals [Toi; KiTo;] but as having done (as Solon thought)
the noblest acts, and having lived temperately; for one can with but
moderate possessions do what one ought."24
It is against this background that Hesiod's verse "wealth is accom-
panied by arete and repute" should be read.25The context makes it clear
that the wealth meant here could hardly be much more than the moder-
ate prosperity enjoyed by a hardworking farmer.26Nevertheless, Hesiod's
words were found inappropriate by Plutarch, who read them from the
standpoint of the second century A.D. In his treatise How the Young Man
Should Study Poetry Plutarch wrote:

Particularattention must be paid to the other words also, when their

significationis shiftedaboutandchangedby the poets accordingto various
circumstances.An example is the word arete.For inasmuchas arete not
only rendersmen sensible,honest, and uprightin actions and words,but
also often enough secures for them repute and influence [860a; . . . KC
8uvaiget;], the poets, following this notion, make good repute and influence
to be arete.... But when ... in his reading, he finds this line, "Zeus
increasesand diminishesman'sarete"or this,"wealthis accompaniedby
arete and repute"... let him considerthat the poet has employed arete
instead of repute,or influence,or good fortune,or the like.27

Note that Plutarch's conception of arete is essentially the same one that
Plato makes Socrates express in the Apology: "For I spend all my time

24Eth. Nic. 10.8.1179a9-13.It would therefore be

wrong to claim, together with
Bryant1996,360, that "byincludingexternalresourcesas necessaryaccoutrementsin the
compositionof the good life,Aristotlein effect restrictscompleteeudaimoniato those of
high social statusand materialaffluence."
25Hes.Erga 313 kouxTp 65'&aperK(aXii)bo; o6its&i.Cf. Pi. 0. 2.53-4 "wealthadorned
with virtues brings opportunity for this and that (ntXoirco;aperai; 8&?atiaXivo; (p?peciT6v
Te Kai TOVKOalpov)." Cf.also Phocylides9D:"Seeka livelihood;andwhenyou have a living,
arete."Trans.Walter Donlan.
26 See Erga302-13.See also Phocylides7D:"Ifyou desirewealththen farma fertile

piece of land;for a farm,they say,is the horn of Amaltheia."That"wealthand luxurious

living,mattersof great importanceto the nobles of the archaicperiod,are reducedto the
simplestlevel"by the likes of Phocylidesis arguedin Donlan 1999,66-67;cf. 81-82.
27 Mor. 24 CE; trans.F C. Babbit.The
quotation"Zeus increasesand diminishes
man'sarete"is from II//.
20.242.
46 MARGALITFINKELBERG

going about trying to persuade you, young and old, to make your first
and chief concern not for your bodies nor for your possessions,but for
the highest welfare of your souls,proclaimingas I go, 'Wealthdoes not
bringarete,but aretebringswealth and every other blessing,both to the
individualand to the state."'28Yet, as his trial and execution in 399 B.C.
demonstrate,Socrates'approachto civic issues was far from welcome in
Athens of his time. It was therefore the popularratherthan the philo-
sophical conception of arete that underwent a radical change in the
course of centuries.
As a resultof new developmentsin the social life of Greece during
the Hellenisticage,aretebecamegenerallyunderstood,in full agreement
with the tenets of the philosophers,as a permanentstate of mind that
shineseven more stronglyin the adversitiesof fortune.Whenseen in this
manner,aretecertainlycould not depend on wealth or be "increased"or
"diminished"accordingto the circumstancesof one's life. Nowhere was
this changeas conspicuousas in the attitudeto slavery."Laterantiquity,"
BernardWilliamswrote when comparingHellenisticethics with that of
Aristotle, "seems rather to have given up the question of slavery as a
problem in political philosophy in favor of edifying attempts to show
that slavery was not really harmfulto the slave;in particular,that real
freedomwas freedomof the spirit,and that this couldbe attainedas well,
perhapsbetter, by slaves"(Williams1993, 115). It is immaterialfor our
purposewhetherthe Hellenisticdoctrinesshouldbe accountedfor strictly
in terms of their relationship to the earlier theories or, rather, as a
reaction to new political and social realities of the Hellenistic age. To
quote Anthony Long, "It would certainlybe wrong to isolate Stoicism
and Epicureanismfrom their milieu. Epicurus'renunciationof civic life
and the Stoics' conception of the world itself as a kind of city may be
viewed as two quite differentattemptsto come to terms with changing
social and political circumstances.But many of the characteristicsof
Hellenistic philosophy were inherited from thinkers who were active
before the death of Alexander"(Long 1986,3).29 We can howeverbe sure
of one thing:in the Hellenistic city-states,as distinctfrom the classical
polis,the theories of a person'splace in the world that the philosophers
offered were met with a sympatheticresponse.30

28PI.
Apol. 30 b; trans. Hugh Tredennick.
29 For a further discussion see
Bryant 1996, 4-7.
30
According to Scholz 1998, 372-75, the antagonism between philosophy and poli-
tics started at the beginning of the fourth century B.C.as a result of Socrates' execution, and
ended in the second half of the third century, when philosophy became the universally
 VIRTUE AND CIRCUMSTANCES 47

The theories of the Hellenistic age no longer addressedthe tradi-

tional city-statesociety.As MalcolmSchofieldput it in The Stoic Idea of
the City,"[Zeno'sRepublic]opened the way for doing politicalphiloso-
phy in a quite different style, no longer tied to preoccupationwith the
polis, but focused instead on the moral potentialitiesof man considered
as man,not as citizen"(Schofield1991,102-3).Accordingto Peter Scholz,
Zeno "gaveup the idea of the polis as both materialand ideal homeland
of man and replacedit with the idea of the cosmopolisas a 'natural'and
'real'homelandof humanity"(Scholz 1998,343). Likewise,in JosephM.
Bryant's opinion, "The retreat from Polis-citizen ideals . . . occurred
along all philosophicalfrontsduringthe Hellenisticperiod,as the Cynics,
Cyrenaics, Skeptics, Epicureans, and Stoics each sought ... to detach
arete,or 'virtue,'fromits formerdependenceon communalservicethrough
performancein the roles of warriorand self-governingcitizen"(Bryant
1996, 461). This is why the old question "Who is a good citizen?"was
transformedby the Stoics and other schools into the question"Whois a
good man?,"whichwent far beyond the narrowboundariesof the Greek
city-state.
Aristotle, unlike the philosophersbefore and after him who at-
tempted to lay the foundationsof an ideal society,focused on the social
and political realities of the society to which he belonged.As I hope to
have shown, in making arete dependent on external circumstanceshe
was doing hardly more than putting into philosophicallanguage some
basic presuppositionsissuingfrom the realitiesof the city-statelife.

ARETE AS FUNCTIONALCONCEPT

One of the most salientfeaturesof Greek civilizationwas that it created

a civic society whose ideal of man was not identicalto that proposedby
religion or philosophy.The popularconcept of humanexcellence,arete,

recognized vehicle of liberal education. Cf. Habicht 1994, 231-47. Yet, Polybius' acknowl-
edging in passing (3.59.4) that the worldwide conquests of Macedon and Rome were
followed by decrease in the political and military ambition among Greek men of action
(aloXEXuEv6ov 8e Kc
alTC V cparTitucv av6p&v tCic 7repi ra; nOXepiKa;
I1K( tCOtalK&O
; iCpa?er;
(piqoTgiaic) and that the situation thus created acted as a powerful stimulus in their
devoting their energies to scholarship and research (?K 8f TOTCV ro7
noX&; XKaI eya,KXa;
&popa&;eiXT(p6Tcorv ei; T6 noXDonpaygoveiv Kal(pXiog0riv
npo pa T&v npo?etp?ig?VoV), is per-
haps even more relevant.
I am grateful to the anonymous referees and the editor of this journal for their
helpful comments.
48 MARGALITFINKELBERG

which was sustained during the archaic and classical ages, flowed directly
from this ideal. According to this concept, arete is only valid when being
proved in action purporting to benefit the common good. Thus under-
stood, arete only applied to those who were able to make themselves
useful to the community in the accepted ways of war and politics, that is,
it addressed the male citizens of the upper and the middle classes and did
not apply to those whose circumstances prevented them from exercising
it, that is, slaves, women, and in most cases also the poor. In the Hellenis-
tic age this concept gave way to another one, according to which arete
resides in a person's character and therefore does not depend on exter-
nal circumstances, including the civic status. Arete thus understood be-
came accessible to both rich and poor, both freeborn and slaves, both
men and women, both Greeks and barbarians.To paraphrase Maclntyre's
words quoted above, it is only then that "man" ceased to be a functional
concept and began to be generally understood as "an individual prior to
and apart from all roles." In other words, the concept of arete from which
Aristotle proceeds is a historically limited one, even when seen in the
perspective of Greek civilization itself. Nevertheless, it was this concept
that underlay much of the thought and behavior of the ancient Greeks at
the summit of their civilization.

TELAviv UNIVERSITY
e-mail:finkelbe@post.tau.ac.il

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