Recollection and the Argument 'From a Hypothesis' in Plato's Meno

Author(s): J. T. Bedu-Addo
Source: The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 104 (1984), pp. 1-14
Published by: The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies
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Journalof HellenicStudiesciv (1984) 1-14

RECOLLECTIONAND THE ARGUMENT 'FROM

A HYPOTHESIS'IN PLATO'S MENO
INTRODUCTION

THEdialoguebeginswith Meno'speremptoryrequest:'Canyou tell me, Socrates,whether

virtuecanbe taught,or is it acquiredby practice,not teaching.. .?'(7oa).Socratesproteststhat
he does not know what virtue is, and hence cannotknow whetherit is teachableor not,
explainingthatin generalif onedoesnotknowwhata thingis,T LErTL,one cannotknowwhatit
is like, 67roiov(7Ib).He insiststhatthe priorquestionof whatvirtueis mustbe settledbefore
consideration of the subsequentquestionof whetherit is teachableor not.
In accordancewith thisprinciple,Socratesgets Menoto makeattemptsto offera general
definitionof virtue.As in earlierdialogues,Socratesquicklyreduceshis interlocutorto aporia,
andMenorefusesto makefurtherattemptsat definingvirtueon thegroundthatno criterionof
truthexists.Socratessumsup hisargumentthus:'Itis impossiblefora manto enquireintowhat
he knowsor intowhathe doesnot know.Forhe cannotenquireintowhathe knows,becausehe
knowsit, andthereis no needforenquiry;noragaincanhe enquireintowhathe doesnotknow,
sincehe doesnot knowaboutwhathe is to enquireinto'(8oe).Socratesdescribes thisparadoxas
apieceof eristic,buthe doesnotdismissit. To resolveit, heintroducesthetheoryof recollection,
dvdalivc4~s (8Ia-e).
To demonstrate the truthof thistheory,Socratesproceedsto teach,or ratherhelpone of
Meno'silliterateslaveswho speaksGreekto recollect,how to constructa squaretwicethesizeof
a givensquare.Thishe doeswith the aidof diagramsdrawnin thesandandskilfulquestioning.
Theupshotis thattheslavegetsto understand thatthesquareof thediagonalis twicethesizeof
thegivensquare.Socratesclaimsthattheslavehasalwayspossessed thispieceofknowledge--he
hasnot reallytaught him anything;he hasonly helpedhim to recollectwhathe alreadyknew.
Socrates,however,doesnot say thatat " thisstagethe slavehasknowledgeproperlyso called;
what he has is true opinion, 86da. He does claim,however,that this true opinion,
that the of the ,A'r50is
namely square diagonal twicethesizeof thegivensquare,canbe convertedinto
knowledgeby further questioning(85c).Thisprocessis laterdescribedas tyingdown the true
opinion'by reasoningout the cause',al'rca AtoycL/u, andthisis saidto be recollection(98a).
Having thus justifiedenquiry, SocratesinvitesMenooncemoreto proceedwith theirjoint
enquiry into the nature of virtue.Meno,however,is not at all enthusiastic;
he ratherwantsto
find out firsthow virtueis acquired.Then followsthiscrucialpassage:
I will yieldto you-what elseam I to do?It seemsthenthatwe areto considerof whatsorta thingis
when we do not know what it is. But perhapsyou would relaxyour authorityjustslightly, and allow
the question whether virtue comes by teaching or some other means to be examined 'from a
hypothesis' (1( brioOE~oEws)
(86d-e).
On the strength of this passage scholars have sometimes all too readily assumed that the
following argument'from a hypothesis'marksthe abandonmentof the enquiryinto the nature
of virtue, and that it has nothing whatever to do: with recollection and the search for the
definition of virtue in the dialogue. As Bluck' puts it: 'The real oiola of virtue could only be
discoveredby recollection, and the attempt to define it has been abandoned.The resultis that
throughout this discussion,since the introductionof the hypotheticalmethod, virtuehasstrictly
speaking been an unknown quantity....' That is to say, having taken the trouble to
demonstrateto the satisfactionof Meno in that long 'Slavepassage'(82b-85c) that all learning is
recollection,and having carefullypointed out a correspondencebetween the stagesin the slave's
1R. S. Bluck, Plato'sMeno (Cambridge 1964) 23.

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2 J. T. BEDU-ADDO
progressat recollectionandthe stagesin thatof Meno(84a-c),Socratesis heretellingus quite
unambiguously thathe actuallyintendsto humourMeno,andabandonthispromisingenquiry
into the natureof virtue,againsthis betterjudgement.
This view is the fundamentalpresuppositionof the currentinterpretationsof the argument
'froma hypothesis';2and I thinkthat it is a mistakenpresupposition: it reckonscompletely
withoutPlatonicartistry.In thispaper,I proposeto showthatdespiteMeno'sunwillingness to
continuewiththeenquiryintothenatureof virtue,Socratesartfullyintroducesthehypothetical
methodto ensurethe continuityof Meno'srecollectionof the natureof virtue.I shallargue(i)
thatMenodoesattaintrueopinionaboutthenatureof virtue,namelythatit isknowledge,atthe
end of the argument'froma hypothesis'(89c),andthatthis is a stagein Meno'srecollection
corresponding with thatattainedby his slaveat the endof the slave-boyexperiment;3 and(ii)
thatthe subsequent to
argumenttending prove thatvirtueis not knowledge is not meantto be
takenat its face value,but that it is a piece of Platonicartistryillustratingthe unstableand
transitorynatureof Meno'strueopinionandallothertrueopinionsunfettered'byreasoningout
the cause',at'rl AoyLc/UCO (97e-98a).

A carefulexaminationof the passage86d-e, quotedabove,revealsthatSocratesdoesnot

havetheslightestintentionof yieldingto Meno'srequestto leavethepriorquestionunanswered
so thatthe subsequent questionmaybe takenup, whenhe says:'Butperhaps,you wouldrelax
yourauthorityjust slightly,andallowthe questionwhethervirtuecomesby teachingor some
othermeansto be examined"froma hypothesis"(i (86e).Two featuresin the
Greekprecludethe interpretation V`roOE••aow)'
whichassumesthatSocrates is yieldingto Menoandthat,as
MalcolmBrownputsit, 'hereconcileshimselfto the factthatit is Menowho, unableto control
himself,is nevertheless controllingthe courseof the discussion,so thatSocrateswill be forcibly
led away from the fundamental ti estiquestionin the directionof thepoion ti'.4
First,asBrownhimselfnotes,5whendAAdis usedto introducetheapodosisof a conditional
sentencein whicha commandis expressed, andwhentheprotasisis negative,it impliesa breakin
thought between and
protasis apodosis: it means'theapodosiscontainsa moreor lessinadequate
substitutefor whatis left unrealizedin the protasis:"atall events",with a notionof pis aller'.6
Thusas Bluckrightlypointsout, 'evenif Meno will not allow an inquiryinto the natureof
adpErTq,he is askedto allowa hypothesisto be made,in verygeneralterms,aboutitsnature,if any
sortof answeris to be reachedto the questionwhetheror not it is StSaKTdv'.7 As we shallsee,
thisis preciselyhow Platothinksthe mindshouldproceedin forminga trueopinionaboutthe
natureof a thing.Bluck,however,doesnot seemto suspectthatmakinga hypothesis,in very
general terms, about the nature of virtue is at once an attempt to define virtue and an aid at
recollecting the nature of virtue.8
Secondly, in the phrase it 1rToOEoaWs a3ir- cL,the object of is a 7d
UcKorELU•r
(it, i.e. virtue). Thus Socratesis sayingin effect, 'let us examine virtue "from acKoWrrctuLt
hypothesis"to see
2 See
esp. R. Robinson, Plato's EarlierDialectic and his dialogue with Meno, and says that the slave-boy
(Oxford1953)114-22; I. M. Crombie,An Examinationexperiment 'is a model of the dialogue as a whole' (65).
ofPlato'sDoctrines
(London1963)ii 529-48;Bluck(n. I) However, as I shall argue, the slave-boy experiment is a
8-17; M. S. Brown, 'Platodisapprovesof the slave- model of Socrates'dialogue with Meno, but only up to
boy's answer',RMetaphysxxi (1967)63-5; Lynn E. the end of the argument 'from a hypothesis', i.e. 89c.
Rose,'Plato'sMeno86-89',JHistPhilosviii (1970)1-8; 4 Ibid. 64.
R. E. Allen,Plato'sEuthyphroandtheEarlierTheoryof s Ibid. 63.
Forms(London 1970) 96; Harold Zyskind and R. 6 J. D. Denniston, The GreekParticles2(Oxford 1954)
Sternfeld,'Plato'sMeno89c:"Virtueis Knowledge"a 12.
hypothesis?',Phronesis
xxi (1976)130-4. 7 Bluck
(n. 1) 322.
3 Brown (n. 2) 57-93 rightlypointsout the precise 8
Cf. ibid.92.
parallelismbetweenSocrates'dialoguewith the slave

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 RECOLLECTION IN PLATO'SMENO 3
whetherit comesby teachingor someothermeans'.9Thatis to say,he meansto examinethe
priorquestionof what virtueis beforeconsideringthe subsequentquestionof whetherit is
teachableor not. Similarly,havinggiven the geometricalillustrationof the argument'froma
hypothesis'Socratessays:
Inthesamewayconcerning virtue,sinceweknowneither
whatit isnorwhatsortof thingit is,letus
make a hypothesis and consider whether it is teachableor not ('r7ro0E'•1EvoL UKo7TWCLEv
ELTE
0) 8L8&KTVETrLy) (87b).
ELTE at•'i
8LSaKTOV
Bluck criticizesFriedlander's translation,namely, 'hypothesizingit let us inquire...', and
suggests that
`r2oT`OELEvot
is usedabsolutely,asin vrTroeq
E v ovv E'Aw uoc. . . (87a).'0
EL'rELV
Thiscriticism,however,is not as decisiveas Zyskindand Sternfeldsuggest," for Bluckalso
suggeststhata3'rTois likelyto be the objectof UKOTrcwjy~ .12 Thusin eithercase(i.e. whether
aT•d is the of
object rro0/-evot or UKo0rrc1LEv) questionof whethervirtueis teachable
the ornot
is stillmade to depend on an examination of virtue;and,aswe shallseein sectionII,Socratesdoes
preciselythatin the argument'froma hypothesis'.
Now, it is generallyrecognized that in this dialogue, Plato, by pointing out a
correspondence betweenthestagesin theslave'sprogressat recollectionandthestagesin thatof
Meno, makes it clearthatthetheoryof recollectionis introducedasa foundationfortheSocratic
searchfor definitions.What does not seem to be clearlyrecognizedis that until complete
recollectionof the essentialnature 72b) or 'form' (EIS'Os,72c) is achieved,general
definitionsare in fact opinions (however (otder'a,
true they may be) which should be treatedas
hypothesesor assumptions involvingnotionsof the 'forms'involvedin the enquiry.As I have
arguedelsewhere,13 in the Phaedowe are meantto understand that the Ao"yoc
referredto in
Socrates'description of thehypotheticalmethodareopinionsin theformofgeneralexplanations
or definitionsandthattheybecomevrroOE'ELs whenthey areprovisionally assumedto be true.
It is significantthatin theMenothehypotheticalmethodis introducedimmediatelyafterthe
demonstration of thetruthof thetheoryof recollection,andthoughSocratesdoesnot explicitly
sayso, andMenohimselfis quiteunawareof it, it wouldseemthatwe aremeantto seethatthe
generaldefinitionsof virtueofferedby Meno,andtestedby meansof the Socraticelenchus,are
treatedby Socratesashypothesesor assumptions aboutthenatureof virtue.The introductionof
the argument'froma hypothesis'is reallya subterfugeon the partof Socratesto ensurethe
continuityof Meno'srecollectionof thenatureof virtue;andat theendof theargument'froma
hypothesis'(89c), Meno attainstrue opinion about the natureof virtue, namely 'virtueis
knowledge'which,in effect,is a satisfactory definitionof virtue.Indeed,asCornford'4rightly
observes:'The Socraticdefinitionof virtueas knowledgeis actuallyreachedabouthalf-way
through(89a),andyet the conversation endswith the remarkthatwe shallneverbe surehow

9 On thecaseof ar6d,Bluck(n. 1) 322rightlypoints this'--Kdv o (75b), it seems that he would accept

out thatby theregularGreekidiomthe subject(virtue)
of the indirectquestion(E'E8LsaK-rd05V KTIA.) is
CL
broughtforwardandassociatedwith the introductory
verb aKorre~ItOaL. Bluck, however,does not seem to
suspect that this fact may have influencedPlato's
thinking in the argument'froma hypothesis'.
10 Ibid.
"
325.
Zyskind-Sternfeld(n. 2) 131-2.
12 Bluck (n. I) 325.
'3 'The role of the hypotheticalmethod in the
Phaedo',Phronesis xxiv (1979)113-14.
14 F. Cornford, Platoand Parmenides(London
M.
1939)245. Admittedly,it is not definitionpergenuset
differentiam (see Allen [n. 2] 94). However, since
Socrates,having definedfigure as 'that which alone
alwaysfollowsuponcolour',sayshe wouldbe satisfied
if Meno would define virtue for him 'even like
swgS
'virtue is knowledge' as a satisfactory definition of
virtue; though, clearly, in the context of the discussion,
'virtue is knowledge of what is good' would be a more
satisfactorydefinition. Indeed, if, as I shallargue, we are
meant to see the deduction of the proposition 'virtue is
knowledge' from the proposition 'virtue is good' as an
exemplificationof the 'upwardpath' of the hypothetical
method as describedin the Phaedo,then it seems likely
that Plato is hinting at 'virtue is knowledge of the Good'
as the definition of virtue required here. Significantly,
the hypothesis 'virtue is good' is said to stand (pE'VEL,
89d), which presumably means it cannot be refuted.
Thus, since virtue and knowledge are not really Forms,
but ratherpsychical endowments (87d), it would seem
that Plato has in mind even here in the Meno the view
implicit in the Republic,namely that virtue is the effect
of knowledge of the Good on the soul. See n. 54.

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4 J. T. BEDU-ADDO
virtue is acquireduntil we have found out what virtue is. The concealment is so cunningly
effectedthatmanyreadersof theMenodo not realizethatwe havefoundout whatvirtueis. .. '
It would seemthat manyreadersof the Menoare misledby the contrastwhich Socrates
drawsbetweenknowingwhata thingis (T71 torL) andknowingwhatit is like (7roidyv TL)at the
beginning of the dialogue into thinking that in the argument 'from a hypothesis'Socrates 'is
operating in flat contradiction to the rulewhich he himselfhad enunciated
in 7Ib', as Brown
putsit,15andthatPlatomeansusto seethattheentireenquiryrightfromtheintroduction of the
argument'froma hypothesis'to the end of the dialogueis improperlyconducted.I shallnow
showthatthisview derivesfroma fundamental misunderstandingof thebasisof thatcontrast.
Socratesexplainsthatin generalif onedoesnotknowwhata thingis,onecannotknowwhat
it islike:0 8E' olTa TaErTL,
i rias d•rotov
V YL Etl'lv; (7Ib).Thus,if, for example,one
EY
doesnot know Menoat all,one cannotknow whatsortof personMenois:-r'SOKEL GOL OLoV 7TE
t /C,
EtLVaL, ouTt ME'vwva
t
) )'YLYVVWKEL To Trapa7ravoaTL~EUTLV, TUTowV ELTE KaAOS'ELTE
ELEovaty
7rAo1UtosEL'TEKat yEvvatodSEUTLV,ELTEKat 7avavrta ToVr0v; (71b). Admittedly, the statement
thatif one doesnot know what a thingis, one cannotknow anythingaboutit soundsrather
paradoxical.Clearly,however,the use of the verb to know--ytyvd0UKELV, the
E•rEvaL-and
fact that throughoutthe dialoguePlatois operatingwith a conceptionof knowledge which
distinguishesit sharplyfrom trueopinion16 would seemto indicatethatPlatodoesnot really
mean to suggest that if one does not know what a thing is, one cannotsay, or entertaina true
opinion about, what sort of thing it is. However, it is not uncommonly supposedthat Socratesis
in factsayingsomethingof thissort.Thuscommentingon thiscontrastbetweenknowingwhat
a thing is and knowing what it is like, Crombiesays:'It is defendedin this place by an
unfortunate,not to say sophistical,analogy-namely that I cannotsay what sortof personMeno
is if I do not know who he is.'"7
It is, of course,quite possiblefor one who does not know (y-yvdUKEL)Meno in the senseof
being acquaintedwith him, to say, quite truly what sort of personMeno is from hearsay;but this
to Plato is something quite differentfrom knowing (E'E'vat) what sort of personMeno is-it is
only an opinion which, however true it may be, does not constitute knowledge. One may be
said to knowwhat sort of person Meno is only when one gets to knowhim personally.Thus the
boy who at the end of the geometry lesson is said not to know the answer to the problem of
doubling the squarewhose side is two feet, can say, or entertaina trueopinion about, whatsortof
line is the requiredlength (85b).18 Significantly Socratesexplainshere that one can have true
opinions about mattersof which one hasno knowledge, when at the end of the geometry lesson,
he observes:'Do you see then that he who does not have knowledge has true opinions about the
things of which he has no knowledge?' (85c).19

15isBrown (n. 2) 64. see Bluck (n. I) 213.

16 SeeMeno98b 19 This should mean that when Socratessays that if
ff.
17 Crombie(n. 2) 532. CfalsoRobinson(n.2) 51-2. one does not know X, one cannot know what sort of
18 Socratesdescribesthis as a true
opinionand not thing X is, he is conscious of the fact that he is
knowledge(85b);for ashe hasalreadyexplained,if one enunciating a paradox which requiresfor its solution a
does not know what a thing is, one cannot know clear distinction between knowledge and true
opinion.
anythingaboutit. We aremeantto understand thatthe It is, however, not to be supposed that at the time of
boy does not knowthat the squareof the diagonalis writing the Meno, Plato considered 'knowing Meno'
twice the sizeof the givensquare,preciselybecausehe and 'knowledge of the road to Larisa'as instances of
does not know whatthesquareis, i.e. the Form).Once knowledge properly so called. Plato is only
making use
we recognizethis, we shallbe much less inclinedto of acquaintance with sensible particularsto illustrate
supposethatwhenPlatomakesuseof acquaintance with what he means by knowledge that is the result of
objects to illustratewhat he means by knowledge recollection. I have argued in a forthcoming article,
properlyso calledheisignoring'knowledgethat.. .' or 'Sense-experienceand recollectionin Plato'sMeno',that
propositional knowledge.He meansthatpropositional at the time of writing the Meno Plato had already
knowledgepresupposes knowledgeby acquaintance of formulated his metaphysicaltheory of Forms, and that
objectsdesignated by thetermsof theproposition.Note he was consciously aware of the importance of sense-
that ytyvWLVKELVis used of 'knowingMeno' whereas experience in the slave-boy experiment.
EL8EvaL is usedof knowingfactsabouthim (7Ib). But

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 RECOLLECTION IN PLATO'SMENO 5
Any readerwho afterthe demonstration of the theoryof recollectionandthe discussionof
theimmortalityof thesouldoesnot recognizethatPlatomeansus to seethatin spiteof thefact
thatonecannotknowwhatvirtueis like(7ro-ov TL)who doesnotknowwhatvirtueis (TrEUrt),the
actualprocessof acquiringknowledge(i.e. recollection)of what virtue is beginswith the
'stirringup' of innatetrue opinionsabout whatvirtueis like,is bound to be deceivedwhen
Socratespretendsto yieldto Meno'srequestto settlethesubsequent questionof whethervirtueis
teachableor not, leavingunsettledthepriorquestionof whatvirtueis, andthussupposethatit is
Menowho is controllingthe courseof the discussion.Surely,Socratesis moreresourceful than
that.Menois beingdifficult;butin relaxinghis'authority' and
justslightly, allowing Socratesto
considerhisquestion'froma hypothesis',Menounwittinglyallowshimto havehisown way.It
wouldseemthatwe aremeantto see (evenif Menodoesnot seeit) thatthehypothesis'virtueis
knowledge'is a trueopinionanda satisfactory definitionof virtuereachedby the consideration
of whatsortof thingvirtueis. We do not know whatvirtueis, nor do we know whatsortof
thingit is, butwe do haveopinionsaboutwhatsortof thingit is, by theconsideration of which
opinionswe mayattaintrueopinionaboutwhatvirtueis;andthis will enableus to answerthe
subsequent questionof whethervirtueis teachableor not. However,untilwe areableto convert
thistrueopinionintoknowledgeouranswerto thesubsequent questionwill be a trueopinion(a
very unstable thing)and not knowledge.
This,indeed,is preciselytheroleassignedto TO rov (rELpt
rL EKaTov)or 'whatthenature
of eachthingis like'in theprocessof acquiringknowledgeof 'therealnatureof eachthing'----r
Ev KGaUTovU or To 71 at Epistle7 342e and 343b. This meansthat the processof acquiring
knowledge Formsmustbe indirect.I submit,then,thatPlato'sconspicuoususe of sensible
of
diagramsin the Meno,andhis recommendation of the use of sensibleparticularsas imagesof
Formsin the Phaedo,the Symposium andthe Republic, andof the hypotheticalmethodin the
Meno,the Phaedoandthe Republic derivefrom thisview of the natureof knowledgeandthe
mannerwherebywe mayacquireit expressedin Epistle7, butneverexplicitlystatedin anyof his
dialogues.20
I shallnow show, by a detailedexaminationof the argument'froma hypothesis',that
SocratesandMeno areindeedstillengagedin ajoint enquiryinto the natureof virtue.

II
Socratesbeginsthe argument'froma hypothesis'with an explanationof the procedure:
I meanthus,asthegeometers
By 'froma hypothesis', oftenenquire, whensomeoneasksthemfor
exampleabout an area,whetherit is possible forthisareato be inscribed in thiscircle,
asa triangle
theymightreply:'Ido notknow yet if thisis so;butI thinkI have a sort
of hypothesis willbeof
that
help in the matter,and it is as follows: if the areais (suchand such)21 one thing seemsto me to follow,
20 The genuinenessof this letter is disputed by some 21 Plato'spoint in using this geometricalexample
scholars;however, whoever wrote it must have consi- seemsclearenough,but theexampleitselfaswell asthe
deredthat, accordingto Plato, situatedas we are,we can statementof the determinative criterionaremattersof
only approach T' 8v EKdaTrovor To Tt through the scholarlydispute. Many differentinterpretations of
considerationof i- Irroidv r L (7rEpL E"Kaarov).The thesehavebeenoffered;of thesethemostimportantare
nearest Plato comes to stating explicitly that the discussedby Bluck, (n. I) 441-61. See also Robert
approachto knowledgeof Formsmust be indirect, SternfeldandH. Zyskind,'Plato'sMeno86e-87a:The
startingwith sensibleimagesthroughverbalimages,is geometricalillustration of theargumentby hypothesis',
Socrates'account of his 'secondvoyage' (SErEpoS Phronesisxxii (1977) 2o6-II. They use W. H. D.
in the Phaedo.See Bedu-Addo,'On the alleged Rouse'stranslation(GreatDialoguesof Plato[Mentor
lrrotig)
abandonmentof the Good in the Phaedo',Apeironxiii 1965] 52) of the statement of the determinative
(1979) Io4-II; art. cit. (n. 13) I12 ff.; 'Mathematics, criterion:'If the spaceis suchthatwhen you applyit to
dialecticand the Good in the Republic VI-VII',Platon thegivenlineof thecircle,it is deficientby a spaceof the
xxx (1978) 112
ff.,
and 'IAtLvoLa and the images of same size as that which has been applied,one thing
Forms in Plato's RepublicVI-VII', Platon xxxi if
(I979) follows,and thisis impossible,another'(87a3-6).
93-10o3

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6 J. T. BEDU-ADDO
andanotherthingif it is not such.Accordingly,I shouldliketo makea hypothesisandtell you the
resultregardingthe possibilityof inscribingit in the circle'(86e-87b).
The first thing to note here is that what the geometer says he has is 'a sort of
' 7wtdaOWEaLVw. The geometer says:if the areais such and such, one thing
hypothesis'-c•irrrp
follows, and another thing if it is not such. Clearly, he is prescribingthe conditions which any
given areashould satisfyif it is to be inscribabletriangularlyin a given circle;and in doing so, he
is not really assuminganything about the given area;he is making use of geometricaltheorems
which he knows, and for which he is not requiredto offer any proofs. Secondly, it is important
to recognize that unlike the geometricalproblem in the slave-boy experiment, this geometrical
problem cannotbe solved without taking the necessarymeasurements.Whereasin the slave-boy
experiment the length of the side of the given square is explicitly stated, in the geometrical
illustration of the argument 'from a hypothesis' we are given no clues whatever for the
determinationof the sizes of the given circle and the given space (Xowplov). Thus we are to
imagine the questionersimply drawing a circleand a rectangle(or, indeed, any other rectilinear
figure) in the sand, and in the manner of Meno at the beginning of the dialogue, asking the
geometer: 'Can this space be inscribedas a triangle in this circle?'To determine whether the
given space satisfies his conditions or not, the geometer will have to take the necessary
measurements.Having done that, he will be in a position to saywith certaintywhether the space
is inscribabletriangularlyin the circleor not. In fact, he does not even have to tacklethe problem
of construction.22
What then does the geometer mean by the statement:'accordingly,I should like to make a
hypothesisandtell you the result...' oiv ElOTELv GOtrL TOva43aitvov)(87a)?
Presumablyhe cannot really mean to suggest (lzroO4LEvos~
that~EAwo
he wants to make the hypotheticalstatement,
namely that 'if the areais such and such, one thing follows, and anotherthing if it is not such',
and then state the conclusion, for he hasjust made preciselythat statement.What he is likely to
mean is that, making use of his theoremshe will take the necessarymeasurements,and make the
hypothesisthat 'thisareais suchand such'or thatit is not such, from which he will be able to state
the conclusion.23 We thus have two types of hypothesis in the geometer's statement of his
procedure:(i) the hypotheticalstatementwhich is describedas 'a sort of hypothesis',and which
is, in effect, the statementof the determinativecriterionfor the solubilityof the problem;and (ii)
the statementthat 'thisareais such and such',which must be the hypothesisthe geometer sayshe
wishes to make, and from which he will be able to state the conclusion.

22
On the 'operationalism' of our geometer, see
Sternfeld-Zyskind (n. 21) 210. What is describedhere as
'a sort of hypothesis'or 'a hypothesis,as it were' (carrrEp
rva rdOwOEalv) is the hypothetical statement, i.e. the
statementof the determinativecriterionwhich is not an
assumption, but rather something that the geometer
knows for certain. See n. 21 above. It is sometimes
suggested that Plato is using this example to introduce
the reader to the notion of 6rr'dOE'e,and that he is
apologizing for the use, in a semi-technicalsense, of an
unfamiliarword. Cf Bluck (n. I) 92-3. This would be a
rather misleading way of introducing an unfamiliar
notion, precisely because when the geometer, having
made this hypothetical statement, proceeds to say
vrrofE/levOS o~v EOEAw co 7Tao Crvpatov, it
ELrTELV
seems clear that his hypothesis is going to be the minor
premise (i.e. 'this area is such and such') of the
hypothetical syllogism, from which, if proved, the
conclusion may be drawn. Similarly, when at the
beginning of the Line passage in the RepublicSocrates
says oiTrrp . . ypaLppl7v ... Aafcov... (5o9d), he is
not really introducing the reader to the notion of
ypapptj; he means that the intelligible and the visible do
not really form a straight line. See Bedu-Addo, Platon
xxxi (n. 20) esp. 90-2 and Io6-8. I submit that Plato was
not really writing for people unfamiliarwith elemen-
tary geometry. Presumably the word 5rrdOertswas
currently used indifferently to refer to both types of
proposition, and Plato means that a hypothesis in the
strict sense of the word is a proposition that is not
known for certain.
23 The geometrical example given is of a
condition or conditions for the
8topt•rdt's--limiting
solubility of a geometrical problem. Cf Euclid i 22, vi
28. These StoptaClot,it is important to note, always
depended on some theorem already known. For good
discussionsof Greek geometricalanalysisto which Plato
seems to be indebted for his own practice and
development of a 'hypothetical method', see N. Gulley,
'Greek geometrical analysis', Phronesisiii (1958)
I-14;
and Bluck (n. I) 76-85.

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 RECOLLECTION IN PLATO'SMENO 7
Let us now considerhow Socratesand Menoproceed.Socratessays:
Inthesameway,concerning virtue,sinceweknowneither whatit isnorwhatsortof thingit is,letus
makea hypothesis andexamineit (virtue)to seewhetherit is teachable ornot,sayingasfollows:'If
virtuewerewhatsortof thingconcerning thesoulwouldit beteachable ornotteachable? Inthefirst
place,if it is otherthan knowledge, is it teachableor not-or ...
recollectable ? Is it not plainto
everyone that theonlything a man is is
taught knowledge? (87b-c).
SocratesandMenoproceed,likethegeometer,to prescribewhattheythinkis theconditionthat
anythingshouldsatisfyif it is to be teachable.Theydecidethatin factit isplainto everyonethat
the one and only thing taughtto men is knowledge,and hence that if virtue is a kind of
knowledge(7TLaT'rP r)TLS) it clearlymustbe teachable.Thatis to say,virtueis teachableifand
only if it is To
knowledge. arriveat this decisionSocratesand Meno makeuse of the fact,
described asobviousto anyone,thattheoneandonlythingtaughtto menisknowledge:7 ro0rTd
ye TravTr8Aov, Ot oT~t8v AAo&SLdaKETaa L vOpWTroS 71ELUTaTr41jv; (87c). Thus this
proposition,namely that 'the one and only thingtaught to men is knowledge',functionsas a
truth
self-evident corresponding to the theorem or theorems on the of whichthe geometer
basis
decidesthatthe areais suchandsuchor thatit is not such.24
Socratesnow says: 'The next thing, it would seem, is to considerwhethervirtue is
knowledge or other than knowledge' (87c). Socratesand Meno then proceed to prove
dialectically thatvirtueis knowledge(87c-89a),andMeno drawsthe conclusionthatvirtueis
teachable(89c).ThusSocratesis treatingthe proposition'virtueis knowledge'asan assumption
whichhasto be established or refuted.However,as in the geometricalexample,we havehere
two typesof hypothesis:(i)thehypotheticalstatement'ifvirtueisknowledgeit is teachable'; and
(ii) the assumption that virtue is knowledge.
Now since the propositions'virtueis knowledge'and 'virtueis teachable'are mutually
deducible,it is sometimesmaintainedthatthe importantthingto note hereis the equivalence
relationbetween'virtueis knowledge'and'virtueis teachable'.25 However,fromthemannerin
whichSocratesandMenoproceedto obtaintheproposition'virtueis teachableif andonly if it is
knowledge',and subsequentlyto deduce the proposition'virtue is knowledge'from the
proposition'virtueis good',whichis significantly describedasa hypothesis(87d),it wouldseem
thatBluckis quiterightin considering thatSocratesis lookingat eachstageforlimiting conditions
ratherthanfor an equivalencerelationin one caseandfor a limitingconditionin the other.26
24
Zyskindand Sternfeld(n. 2) say that the basic tions, Plato is primarilyinterestednot in the mutual
hypothesisis 'knowledgealoneis teachable'(87c),and deducibilityor convertibilityof the two propositions,
that 'textuallyit is this statementor the statement but rather in the causalpriorityof the 'limiting
validlyderivablefromit which functionsas the major condition'.Thus we are here dealing with a causal
premissof the hypotheticalsyllogism:"if virtue is relation-a relation that is asymmetrical:it is not
knowledge, clearly it could be taught" ' (p. 132). becausea given spaceis inscribabletriangularlyin a
Similarlyat Sternfeld-Zyskind (n. 21) 20o6,they argue given circle that it has a certaincharacteristic; it is
asfollows:'Theobjectiveis to stateanhypothesiswhich becauseit has that characteristic that it is inscribable
will determinewhether or not a given propertyis triangularlyin the circle. Similarly,it is not because
ascribableto a givenobject;thatiswhethertheproperty virtueis teachablethatit is knowledge;it is becauseit is
inscribabletriangularly,is ascribableto thejoint object, knowledgethatit is teachable.This,aswe shallsee,has
a givenareaanda givencircle,or whethertheproperty animportantbearingon theproprietyof thearguments
teachable,is ascribableto the objectvirtue.'It seemsto purportingto prove,on the groundthat thereareno
me that they are mistakingthe geometer'stheorem or successfulteachersof virtue,that virtueis not know-
theorems,and Socrates'self-evident truth(knowledge ledge. Again, since the 'method of hypothesis'is a
aloneis teachable),on thebasisof whichtheymaketheir meansof establishing necessary andsufficientconditions
respectivehypotheses,for the hypothesesthemselves. for the truthof a hypothesis-in the presentexample,
25
Cf. Robinson(n. 2) 116;H. P. Stahl,'Beginnings 'virtueis knowledge'-we shouldexpectthe dialecti-
of propositionallogic in Plato', trans.by G. Weiler cian,attheendof theenquiry,to be ableto formulatean
from Hermes,in M. Brown,Plato'sMeno(Indianapolis 'adequateproposition'that will includethe necessary
1971)180-97;andZyskind-Sternfeld (n. 2) 132. andsufficientconditionsfor thetruthof thehypothesis.
26 Bluck(n. 1)87-8. Seealsonn. 23 and40. Itwould As in the caseof his descriptionof the methodin the
seemthatin Plato's'methodof hypothesis',evenwhen Phaedo,Platodoesnot do thisforhisreaders.But seen.
we havean equivalencerelationbetweentwo proposi- 14for my view that(i)thedeductionof theproposition

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8 J. T. BEDU-ADDO
ThusSocratesandMenomakethe hypothesis'virtueis knowledge',whichis the limiting
conditionthat will allow virtue to be teachable,on the basisof the self-evidenttruththat
knowledgealoneis teachable, just asthe geometer,makinguseof therelevanttheorems,makes
thehypothesisthatthisareais suchandsuchor thatit is not such.However,apartfromtheiruse
of the sametypesof hypothesisnotedabove,it wouldseemthattheprocedureof Socratesand
Meno is, totomundo,differentfrom thatof the geometer;for unlikeSocratesand Meno, the
geometerdoesnot tryto deducehishypothesisfroma 'higher'hypothesis.27 SocratesandMeno
proceeddialectically to demonstrate the truthor falsehood of theirhypothesis,andthisinvolves
gradual recollection
of the natureof virtue.In the caseof the geometer'sexample,the question
of recollectingthenatureof theareadoesnot arise,sincehe is not reallyassuming anything,noris
he learningany new a prioritruth.
It is sometimessuggestedthatby proceedingastheydo to provethehypothesisthatvirtueis
knowledgeinsteadof pursuingthe consequences to see whetherthey areconsistentlytenable,
SocratesandMenoarecontraveningthe instructionat Phaedoioid-e accordingto whichwe
should not mix things up if we want to discover any of the realities:28
(la S oVK av qUpoLO
oaTEpO 7VTLAOyKOL... ELTEp ovo TL V VTWVEVpEL (IoIe). However,as we have
T" "
seen, before proceedingto find argumentsin supportof the hypothesis,Socratessays
'The
significantly: nextthing,it wouldseem,is to considerwhethervirtueis knowledgeorother
thanknowledge.' (To 8' %LECr roTiro,WS 8E UaKE'aacUL TOTEpdV UTLV EUTLT
And •oLKE,
thiswould seem to that Plato in
dpLET7r1dAAogov ) (87c).
rITL(T77jrS suggest has mindsome
of
body teaching on this of
technique employinglogoiupon which he is consciouslydrawing.29I
suspectthatthe strictprocedureoutlinedin the Phaedois meantto be theproperprocedurefor
philosophical enquiriesundertaken by two or more'philosophers', butthatin itspedagogicalor
maieuticuse, as in this dialogue,thisdeparturemay be justifiedon othergrounds.30
Inthisparticular instance,if, asI haveargued,theintroduction of thehypotheticalmethodis
not intendedto disruptthe enquiryinto the essentialnatureof virtue,Socrateshasa verygood
reasonfor makingthis departure;for, indeed,the properconsequences of the hypothesis-
whichmustincludetheapplication of thehypothesis'virtueis knowledge'to particularinstances
of virtue,i.e. actsofjustice,courage,temperance, etc.,to ensurethateveryvirtuousactinvolves
knowledge,specifically, knowledgeof whatis good andwhatis bad-have alreadyemergedin
the courseof Socrates'examinationof Meno'sdefinitions.31 Besides,Socratesmakesuseof this

'virtue is knowledge' from the proposition 'virtue is
good' is to be seen as an instance of 'reasoning out the
cause'(al?ras and that (ii) what Plato has in
,oyato'sg),
mind here as the 'adequateproposition' is 'virtue is the
effectof knowledge of goodness on the soul'. See also
Bedu-Addo (n. 13) 122-4, and 130 n. 23.
27 In effect, the difference is precisely that which
exists between the dianoieticmathematician'streatment
of his hypothesis and the dialectician'streatment of his
hypothesisdescribedat Repub.5iob ff. For the view that
the hypothetical treatment of the propositions of
dianoietic mathematicsbelongs to philosophicaldialec-
tic, see Bedu-Addo, Platonxxx (n. 20), esp. 120 ff.
28 Cf. K. M. Sayre, Plato's Analytic Method
(Chicago/London 1969) 29-30 n. 40, and 57-8 n. I.
29 Cf. Crombie (n. 2) 528 where, commenting on
hypothesesin Meno,Phaedoand the Republic,he says:'It
seems that there is some technical doctrine connected
with this word that Plato is anxious to communicate to
us ... and that he failed to notice that he had not given
us enough clues to enable us to follow him with
confidence. .. .' However, on Plato's conception of the
natureof philosophicalwriting,see Phdr.276c-d, and
Epist.7 343 ff.
30 See Bedu-Addo(n. 13) 117-18, where I have
argued that far from being a digression,Phaedo
Iooc-Ioic is anillustration of thispartof thehypotheti-
calmethod.Herein theMenoSocratesobviouslyhasin
mind the hypothesisthat virtue is knowledgein his
examinationof Meno'sdefinitions,sincehe makeshim
admitat eachstagethatallactsor casesof virtueinvolve
knowledgeof what is good andwhat is bad.
31 See n. 30. It is not to be supposedthatin the first
part of the dialoguewith Meno, Socratesand Meno
dispensewith what each of them supposesto be
instancesor casesof whatvirtueis like,forif asI believe
(see n. 3) the slave-boy experimentis a model of
Socrates'dialoguewith Meno, then we are meantto
understandthat Meno, in his attemptsat defining
virtue, and Socrates,in his examinationof Meno's
definitions,aredrawingupontheirprevious of
experience
what eachof them supposesto be instancesor casesof
what virtueis like.

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 RECOLLECTION IN PLATO'SMENO 9
fact,namelythateveryvirtuousactinvolvesknowledge,in hisdemonstration of thetruthof the
hypothesis, which may be outlined as follows:
i. Virtueis good (87d)
2. All good is beneficial(87e-88a)
3. Thus,virtueis beneficial(87e)
4. If somethingpertainingto the soul is beneficial,it is knowledge(88a-89a)
5. Thus,virtueis knowledge(89a)
Now, it seemsclearthatin all thisSocratesis not reallysettlingthesubsequent questionof
whethervirtueis teachableor not;he is rathersettlingthepriorquestionof whatvirtueis.Thatis
to say, Socratesis not in fact yieldingto Meno. This fact constitutesa realdifficultyfor the
interpretations which assumethat the introductionof the hypotheticalmethod marksthe
abandonmentof the enquiryinto the natureof virtue. Crombie'scriticismof his own
reconstruction of the argument'from a hypothesis'on the assumption(whichhe does not
accept) that the hypothesisis 'virtueis knowledge'ratherthan 'if virtueis knowledge,it is
teachable'is particularlynoteworthy.He observes:
Thetroublewiththisreconstruction is thatit overlooksthe factthatSocratesagreesto consider
Meno'squestion, whethervirtueis teachable froma hypothesis, whereasonthisreconstructionheis
allthetimeinterestedinhisownquestion, whatisvirtue.Thequestion whether it isteachable
isnot
considered'fromahypothesis'; it issimplyconsidered byaskingwhether infactpeopledosucceed in
teachingit.32
It seemsclear,however,that Socratesand Meno actuallyprovethe propositionthatvirtueis
knowledge,from whichMeno drawsthe conclusionthatvirtueis teachable:'Andit is plain,
Socrates,accordingto the hypothesis,sincevirtueis knowledge,that it is teachable'33(KaL
87Ajov,U)Zo'KpaTES, KaaTlTT/V1TOOEULV, ELITE7p " UTLVa
'E7LTLT7/ cvpETT,OTL &LSaKTOV EaTLV)
(89c). Crombieseemsto ignore this conclusionwhen he says that Meno'squestionis not
considered'from a hypothesis',and that 'this fact constitutesan obstacleto any reasonable
interpretationof thispartof the dialogue'.34
Thefundamental presupposition of theview thatit is theproposition'ifvirtueis knowledge,
it is teachable',ratherthanthe proposition'virtueis knowledge',whichfunctionsas the most
importantor decisivehypothesisin the argument'froma hypothesis'is thatthe hypothetical
method is essentiallya method of proof, ratherthan a method of invention,employed
'wheneveronewantsto discoveranyof therealities'-Et"'rEp 'y
fl3ovAotL
rOL
OOTvroJv EpEv (Phd.
Tole).35 Failureto appreciatethatthe Platonichypotheticalmethodinvolvesrecollectionleads
to Aristotelianinterpretationsof it. It is truethatAristotleregardedthe majorpremissof the
'syllogism from a hypothesis'as thehypothesisin the argument,36presumablybecauseit is
hypothetical. Thus the proposition'if virtueis knowledge,it is teachable'is hypothetical,and
like Aristotle, Plato, as we have seen, regarded it as 'a sort of hypothesis'. Indeed at 89d Socrates
says that he does not 'take back' (dcvaTrlEat) the proposition 'if virtue is knowledge, it is
teachable'; and this would seem to mean that he is letting it stand as a hypothesis. But the
proposition 'virtue is knowledge' which is the minor premiss of the hypothetical syllogism also
functions as a hypothesis in the argument,37 and is, in fact, more important in the argument
'from a hypothesis' than the hypothetical statement itself, in as much as it is the assumptionabout
the nature of virtue which has to be proved or refuted to justify any modusponens inference.38
32 Crombie(n. 536.
2) 34Crombie(n. 2) 536.
33 I think Zyskindand Sternfeld(n. 2) 131-2 are 31 See Bedu-Addo(n. 13) 117 f.
right in maintainingthat Lamb's translation,'and 36 See AnalyticaPriora5oaI6-28.
plainly, Socrates,on our hypothesisthat virtue is 37 Cf. Crombie(n. 2) 544-5.
knowledge,it mustbe taught',is mistaken,andthatthe 38 ZyskindandSternfeld(n. 2) do not explainwhy,
hypothesisreferredto hereis 'ifvirtueis knowledge,it is in spite of the fact that the minor premissof the
teachable'. hypotheticalsyllogism'hasbeen proved',thusjustify-

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10 J. T. BEDU-ADDO
Indeed,as Cherniss39haspointedout, in callingthe proposition'virtueis good' a hypothesis,
Socrates is exemplifying the 'upward path' of the hypothetical method as described in the
Phaedo:'And when you should have to give account of the hypothesisitself,you would do so in
the same mannerhypothesizinganotherhypothesiswhich seemedbest of those above, until you
came to something adequate (T L'Kavov)' (Phd. IoId). Thus the proposition 'virtue is good'
functionsas the 'something adequate'in the argument 'from a hypothesis';and the entire proof
which gives the 'account' of the hypothesis 'virtue is knowledge' as recommended at Phaedo
IoId is to be seen as an instanceof 'reasoningout the cause',clrlets Aoytao'ds,which we aretold
has to be done if a true opinion is to be converted into knowledge, and which is said to be
recollection (98a).40It is, however, not to be supposedthat Meno attainsknowledge in respect
of the propositions'virtueis good' and 'virtueis knowledge'; for neitherMeno nor his slavehas
attainedthe state of mind or level of thought of the 'true philosopher'at which alone the mind
can completely recollect the Forms necessaryto guaranteethe truth of propositions.41
Now, to appreciatewhat Socratesproceedsto do from 89c to the end of the dialogue, it is
absolutelynecessaryto see that Socratesand Meno have indeedansweredMeno's question'from
a hypothesis'.I shall now show that in the subsequentargumenttending to prove that virtue is
not teachable,and hence that it is not knowledge, Socratesis all along speakingtongue in cheek.
For the sakeof brevity, I shallconfine myself to the main argumentswhich have been offeredin
support of the view that the argumentsare meant to be taken at their face value.

III

Bluck brings forward a number of arguments in support of the view that the aporetic
conclusionof the dialogue is to be taken at its face value.42He disagreeswith scholarswho see a
deliberateflaw in the argumentwhen Socratessuggeststhat if thereare no teachersor learnersof
a thing it will not be teachable(89e).43Bluck agreesthat the absenceof teachersof a thing does
not entail that it is not teachable.However, he thinksthat Socratesdoes not say thatit does: 'and
it is perfectly legitimate to use the absenceof teachersof virtue both now and in the past as a
reasonable groundforassumingthat it is not teachable,and this is what Socratesis doing ... andif it
is only meantthatvirtue cannotbe taught now,this seemsreasonableenough'.44Plato, however,
clearly indicates right at the beginning of the enquiry that he does not really think that the
argumentis sound when he makes Socratespoint out to Meno, who has expressedsurprisethat
the proposition'virtueis teachable'seemed correcta moment ago, that 'it must seem correctnot
only a moment ago, but now also and hereafterif it is to be at all sound': \AAad
pL7 oOK E'v 7C •7pTL
IIOvov Ui aVTO'S Kac. wouAAl
hiAE'YEmeOL, KsLe EVrTCo VVV B EV
KLt TCsEITELnTio,EttLEcaEL TL
VTro) (89c). Thisstatementwouldseemto ruleout Bluck'scontentionthatSocrates
VYL•~ EL•ctvLt

ing theconclusion'virtueis teachable'

'ina simplemodus i.e. Greekgeometricalanalysis.See n. 23 above.
ponensinference'(132-3), Socratesfindsit necessaryto 41
Similarly,at the end of the 'upwardpath'of the
proceedto argue that since there are no teachersof hypotheticalmethodin thePhaedo,CebesandSimmias
virtue, it is not teachable,and hence that it is not only attain true opinion, whereas Socratesattains
knowledge.Nor indeeddo theyexplainwhy, if'virtue knowledgeof the causeof generation,existenceand
is knowledge'is not a hypothesisin the argument,the destruction. See Bedu-Addo (n. 13) 126-7. also my
proposition'virtueis good' whichis nothypotheticalis 'A theory of mental development:Plato's Cf.
Republic
describedas a hypothesisat 87d. V-VII',pt I, Platonxxviii and
(1976)296ff., pt 2, Platon
39 H. Cherniss,'Some war-timepublicationscon- xxix (1977) 222-4.
cerningPlato',AJPlxviii (1947)140. 42 Bluck (n. I) I9-30.
40 As N. Gulley,Plato's
Theoryof Knowledge (Lon- 43 See Cornford (n. 14) 245, and his Principium
don 1962) 14, rightly says: 'We may give greater Sapientiae(Cambridge1952) 6o n. I; A. Koyre,
precisionto Plato'sphrase"achainof causalreasoning" Plato,trans.L. C. Rosenfield(New York
Discovering
by associatingit witha particular
methodof analysisthe 1945)I7; V. Goldschmidt,Lesdialogues
dePlaton(Paris
aimof whichis to findtheantecedentconditionsforthe 1947) I17 ff.
solutionof a problemor for thetruthof a proposition', 44 Bluck (n. I) 22.

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 RECOLLECTION IN PLATO'S MENO 11
is only arguing that virtue cannot be taught now. And this applies also to the view that 'if
Socrateshad been deliberatelymaking a falseinference,he would hardlyhave spoilt the trickby
"wateringdown" his conclusionthatvirtue is not teachable,and allowing, at 99e-Iooa, that one
day virtue may prove to be teachable'.45Indeed, it would ratherseem that by thus 'watering
down' his conclusion,Socratesis deliberatelyremindingPlato'sreadersof what he hasjustsaidat
89c, namely that '"virtue is teachable"must seem correctnot only a moment ago, butnowalso
andhereafter if it is to be at all sound', thus hinting that the conclusion is not really sound.
Again, in his discussion of the arguments for the absence of teachers of virtue, Bluck
recognizes that Socratesis engaged in argumentaad homines,and that this is confirmed by his
treatmentof the lines from Theognis (95d-96a). However, though he agreesthat it is not in fact
the case that Theognis contradictshimself on the questionwhether virtue is teachable,and that
'Platocan hardlyhave been unawareof this', Bluck does not seem to suspectthat the argumentis
not meant to be taken at its face value even if Meno acceptsit. As he says:'The Socratesof our
presentdialogue is copying the mannerof the sophistsin his discussionof Theognis. Meno, the
discipleof Gorgias,would not object to the method, andhe acceptsSocrates'conclusion-all the
more readily, perhaps, as Gorgias himself had not claimed to teach virtue (95c).'46 Surely
Socrates'humoroustreatmentof a poem of Simonidesin the Protagoras (342a-347a)in imitation
of the sophistsought to put us on our guardagainsttakinghis argumentshere at theirfacevalue.
Nor, indeed, is it the case that, since in his discussionwith Anytus Socratesconsistentlyuses
teaching in the sophistic sense, he does not really intend to argue that 'virtue is not teachable
simpliciter',as Daniel Devereux47 suggests. For having explained to Anytus (who was not
present during the discussionof the theory of recollection) that what he wants to know is
whether good men know how to transmit (rrapaSo0vat) their virtue to another or whether
virtue is something which cannot be transmittedor taken over from one person to another,
Socratessays significantly:'That is the question Meno and I have been discussingall the time'
(93b). Surelyreadersof the Meno are meant to see that, on the contrary,the introductionof the
theory of recollectionwas meant, among other things, to disabuseMeno's mind of this sophistic
conception of teaching.
Devereux furthersuggeststhat taking the view that the argumentwas not seriouslymeant
lands us in a seriousdifficulty,namely that Socratesis trying to convince Meno of something
which he himself believes to be false; for 'given Socrates'belief that false opinion about an
important question-which this surely is-is an evil to be avoided at all costs, this difficulty
becomes a ratherseriousmatter'.48However, we can think of at least two good reasonswhy
Meno is not very likely to sufferany spiritualdamage: (i) he has had 'stirredup in him like a
dream' a number of true opinions about virtue including a particularlyimportantone, namely
that virtue is good-a hypothesiswhich is significantlysaid to be unassailable,/JVEL (87d); (ii)
when lateron Meno comes to reflecton the theory of recollectionand the natureof teaching,he
is very likely to regainhis lost true opinion, namely that virtue is knowledge, and hence that it is
teachable.
The fact is that it is a misunderstanding to suppose that Socrates is only arguing that virtue is
not teachable in the sophistic sense, but that it is, or may be, teachable in the maieutic sense; for
the arguments clearly purport to establish that virtue is not knowledge, but rather true opinion,
imparted by divine dispensation (OEt's without intelligence--lvEv vo3 (99e). Socrates
for tolpa)
argues, instance, that we were wrong in considering that knowledge was the only guide to
right action, for there is also true opinion (97c); thus true opinion isjust as usefulas knowledge,'at
least as long as one opines rightly' (97c). Nevertheless, instead of concluding merely that some
sort of virtue can also be based on true opinion, Socrates rather concludes that since we have
agreed that virtue is not teachable, we no longer take it to be knowledge, hence 'knowledge
4s Ibid.22-3. Meno', Phronesisxxiii (1978) 122-3.
46 Ibid.29. 48 Ibid. 122.
47 D. T. Devereux, 'Nature and teaching in Plato's

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12 J. T. BEDU-ADDO
cannot be our guide in political conduct' (99a-b). Now, observe how Socrates and Meno arrive
at this conclusion (98e-99b):

.Soc. At the same time we agreedthatit (virtue)is something good, and that to be usefuland good
consists in giving right guidance.
Meno Yes.
Soc. And that these two, true opinion and knowledge, are the only things which direct us
aright ... and we say that where a man is a guide to what is right we find these two things,
true opinion and knowledge.
Meno Yes, I agree.
Soc. Well now, since virtue is not teachable,we no longer take it to be knowledge?
Meno Apparently not.
Soc. So of two good and useful things one has been rejectedand knowledge cannot be our guide
in political conduct.

So we are now to believe that the only thing that is good and useful in directing one's life is that
unstable and transient thing called true opinion (97e ff.), and that this is what virtue is? Plainly,
sophistry can go no further.49
I do not think we need to suppose that between writing the Meno and the RepublicPlato had
changed his mind, nor that it was not until the writing of the Republicthat Plato realized that the
absence of teachers of a thing (e.g. solid geometry) does not entail that it is not teachable. Indeed,
when at the beginning of the argument 'from a hypothesis' Socrates says (87b):
If virtue were what sort of thing concerning the soul would it be teachableor not teachable?In the
firstplace, if it is other than knowledge, is it teachableor not-or recollectable(dvakvrla-rov)?
Let us
not quarrelabout the choice of words-is it teachable?
he seems to be making it quite clear that 'teachable' (8MSaKTdv)in the argument that follows
means 'recollectable'. Thus it would seem that Plato wants his readers to see that Socrates, in the
argument against the proposition that virtue is knowledge, is now talking as if the theory of
recollection has not been mentioned in the dialogue at all. At 8 Ic, however, we are explicitly
told that the soul can recollect all that it knew before about virtue and other things (Ka r7TEpL
'AAwv). And sinceSocrateshasshownin the slave-boyexperimentthattrue
KaL7Tept
dpET•r is a in the
opinion only stage of recollection
process it would seemthatPlatomeanshis
(85c),
readersto seethattheview thatvirtueis trueopinionandnot knowledgedoesnot reallymake
sensein the contextof thisdialogue.50
It wouldseemthenthatPlatoexpectshisreadersto recognizethattheargumentstendingto
provethatvirtueis not knowledge(i.e. the soul cannotrecollectthe natureof virtue)arenot
reallymeant to be takenat their face value. However,it is sometimessuggestedthat the
explanationof the aporeticconclusionof the Menoliesin the distinction,impliedby Plato,but
49 It may be suggested that this argumentis valid and tion of his own position,see RosamondK. Sprague,
that the conclusion does not really contradict the Plato'sUseof Fallacy(London1962)esp. I-33.
premiss that the only guides to right conductare true so Indeed, the view that virtue is true opinion
opinion and knowledge. On this view, Socrates is impartedby divinedispensation (OE'atolpa) without
saying that knowledge is not a useful guide in political understanding or intelligence(avEvvov-)is particularly
conduct (i.e. in social and moral life), but that it may absurdin the context of this dialogue,since we are
well be a good and useful guide in other areas,e.g. in the explicitly told (i) that the natureof virtue can be
applicationof technicalskills. This view, however, is so recollected(8Ic),and(ii)thattrueopinionis onlya stage
patently opposed to the political views both of the in this processof recollection(85c).Bluck recognizes
historicalSocratesand Plato that it is difficultto imagine that Plato is here 'being very ironical' (n. I) 434.
that the irony in the conclusion of this argument was However,he maintainsthat 'we neednot suppose...
lost on contemporaryreadersof the Meno.I suggest that thatthewholeof whatis saidaboutvirtuebasedon true
Plato expects his readers to see that the fault in this belief is not seriouslymeant' (435). The argument,
argument can be traced to the premiss 'virtue is not however,purportsto establish,not thatvirtueor some
knowledge', the arguments in favour of which, I have sort of virtuecanbe basedon trueopinion,but rather
argued,are deliberatelyfallacious.For Plato'sdeliberate thattrueopinionisjust whatvirtueis. See n. 53.
use of sophisticalargumentsas an indirectrecommenda-

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 RECOLLECTION IN PLATO'S MENO 13
not explicitly stated in the dialogue, between virtue as popularly conceived and virtue as properly
conceived, the former being 'at best' true opinion and hence unteachable, the latter knowledge
and hence teachable. This view is almost certainly a misunderstanding if only because it assumes
(i) that there are a number of popular opinions about what virtue is that are true, but are,
nevertheless, different from virtue as properly conceived, and that these true opinions cannot be
taught;"' (ii) that the arguments against the conclusion that virtue is teachable are not really
directed against virtue as properly conceived, but rather against virtue as popularly conceived;52
and (iii) that there is no irony in Socrates' references to Themistocles, Pericles and Thucydides as
virtuous Athenian citizens whose inability to pass on their good qualities to their children
indicates that virtue is not teachable.53
I submit that the explanation of the aporetic conclusion of the dialogue is to be sought in
Socrates' use of eristic arguments against the conclusion that virtue is knowledge and hence that
it is teachable at this stage in the dialogue. Though some scholars have recognized that these
arguments are not meant to be taken at their face value, they do not seem to see clearly that Plato
has a serious purpose here, and that he is not just being playful for its own sake. Now, in the
course of the arguments purporting to prove that virtue is not knowledge but true opinion,
Socrates avails himself of the opportunity to contrast knowledge with true opinion. He explains
that true opinions, like the statues of Daedalus, are indeed unstable and transitory, unless they are
fastened up, and that this is how true opinions are converted into pieces of knowledge (97e-98a):
For these, so long as they stay with us, are fine possessions,and effect all that is good; but they do not
care to stay for long, and run away out of the human soul, and thus are of no great value until one
tethers them by reasoning out the cause. And this process, my dear Meno, is recollection, as we
agreed earlieron.54
Thus if, as I have argued,Meno attainstrue opinion about the natureof virtue at the end of
the argument 'from a hypothesis', we can see that the entire argument which completely
changesMeno's opinion about the natureof virtue is a piece of Platonicartistry-an admirable
illustrationof the unstableand transitorynatureof all true opinions unfettered'by reasoningout
the cause',alrt'asAoytatotw.
Theconclusionof thedialogue,then,that'theresultof ourpresent
reasoning (cKTOVTOV TOt3 oy attuoi)is that virtue comes by divine dispensation,but we shall

51 It seems clearfrom what Plato saysin this dialoguerather true opinion! See n. 26.
about knowing what a thing is (T71•an't) and knowing 53 Immediately after rejecting knowledge as a good
what it is like (7oEdov that there can be only one true and useful guide in political conduct, Socrates says
"r),
opinion about whatvirtueis, namely that it is knowledge (99b): 'So it is not by the possessionof any wisdom that
(of what is good and what is bad), whereastheremay be such men as Themistocles, and others whom Anytus
many true opinions about what virtueis like, i.e. about mentioned just now, became leaders in their cities. This
particularinstancesof virtue. Again, the view that true fact .. will explain why they are unableto make others
opinion is not teachablereckons without the demonst- like themselves.' Note that it is not really Anytus who
ration of recollection in this dialogue. Perhaps this mentions the names of these highly respected and
misunderstandingis due to the fact that at Tim. 51e2-3 renowned statesmen;it is Socrates himself! Indeed, as
Plato suggests that true opinion is not teachable;but it is
far as Anytus himself is concerned, it is quite unnecess-
important to note that there Plato is adverting not to ary to mention the name of any individual-any
true opinions about what things are, but rather true Athenian gentleman (KaA&~ Kyado') is quite capable
opinions about what thingsare like, i.e. particulars.On of making Meno a good man (92c). The whole of this
levels or gradesof opinion, see my articlecited in n. 41,
section (i.e. 99b ff. ) up to the end of the dialogue is shot
pt 2, 223-4. through and through with subtle sarcasm.See also n. 50.
52 As I have
suggested, in this argument Socrates is 54 As Bluck (n. I) 31 rightly says, 'in view of the
talking as if the theory of recollection has not been suggestion that a-lt'as Aoyto(3wds is recollection "as we
mentioned at all in the dialogue, and he deliberately agreed before", we may assume that although the
talks as if knowledge can be handed over from one expressionatrlas was not used earlieron, we
AoytorLo's
personto another.Thus it is clearthat he hasin mind not may gloss with these words what was said at 85c about
only virtue as popularlyconceived, but also teaching as the possibility of converting true opinions into know-
popularly conceived. Nevertheless, he concludes that ledge by further questioning'.
virtue (as properlyconceived) is not knowledge, but

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14 J. T. BEDU-ADDO
never know the certaintyof this until, before askinghow virtue comes to mankind,we set about
enquiringwhat virtue is, in and by itself' (ioob), need not be construedto mean that Socrates
and Meno have not reallymade the enquiryinto the natureof virtue, which, as I have argued,is
precisely what the argument 'from a hypothesis' is designed to accomplish. Socratesis still
pretending that he has indeed yielded to Meno.55

CONCLUSION

It would seem, then, that the Menois primarilyan enquiryinto the natureof knowledge and
the mannerwhereby it may be acquired,and that the natureof virtue and how we acquireit are
discussed only for the sake of example. I have also tried to show (i) that despite Meno's
unwillingnessto continuewith the enquiryinto the natureof virtue, Socratesartfullyintroduces
the hypothetical method to facilitate his recollection of the nature of virtue; (ii) that the
proposition'virtueis knowledge' ratherthan 'if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable'functionsas
the importanthypothesisin the argument'from a hypothesis';(iii) that Plato wantshis readersto
see this hypothesisas a satisfactorydefinitionofvirtue--a 'trueopinion' attainedby Meno at the
end of the argument'from a hypothesis'(89c), and a stagein Meno's recollectioncorresponding
with that of his slave at the end of the slave-boy experiment (85b); and finally (iv) that the
subsequentargument tending to prove that virtue is not teachable, and hence that it is not
knowledge, is a piece of Platonic artistryillustratingthe unstableand transitorynatureof 'true
opinions' unfettered'by reasoningout the cause', atitas Aoytatou (97e-98a).
These resultssuggest that the aporeticconclusionof the dialogue is not genuine, and that in
it, Plato is making use of the maieuticart of Socratesto preparehis readers'minds for the major
themesin his metaphysics,epistemology and methodology which he laterdevelopsin the Phaedo
and in the Republic.56

J.T. BEDU-ADDO
Universityof Ife,
Ile-Ife, Nigeria
ss It would seem then, that TIrTOU roV , 21-40, where he arguesconvincingly that Plato was not
rK AoytlLoo,
(Ioob) refers to 'our present' discussionof the question merely experimenting in the aporeticdialogues,but was
whether there are successful teachers of virtue, rather rather producing artistically framed teaching works
than to the entire discussionright from the introduction designed to preparehis readersstep by step towards his
of the argument 'from a hypothesis'. main philosophical doctrines which he had already
56 H. Erbse, 'Ober Platons Methode in den developed to a considerabledegree.
Cf.
sogenannten Jugenddialogen', Hermes xcvi (1968)

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