Salmon has defined defamation as a statement which has a tendency to injure the reputation of a

person to whom it refers and tends to lower him in the estimation of right thinking members of the
society, generally and in particular, to cause him to be regarded with feelings of hater, contempt,
ridicule, fear, dislike or disesteem. It can further take the form of slander or libel. The present case
scenario shall only delve into the “slander” aspect of the same.

Essential ingredients of defamation that have to be proven by the plaintiff against the defendant:-

1. The statement was false;

2. It was defamatory ;
3. That the said statement was with reference to the plaintiff ;
4. The statement was published; and
5. There was no publication or legal justification for the statement.

Sub c—Justification as defence

Where the defendant successfully proved that the statement alleged to be defamatory by the plaintiff,
are in substance true, it will be a complete defence to absolve him from liability.

In Alexander v. Northeast Railway co.1,the defendants published a news item that the plaintiff had been
convicted for travelling in a train without a ticket and was charged with a fine of 1 euro. On plaintiff
suing the railway for defamation, the court held that the statement was substantially true and the
defendant was not liable.

Further, in Dainik Bhaskar v. Madhusudan Bhaskar 2, the hight court of Madhya Pradesh held that where
truth is pleaded in defence by the defendant , it is not necessary to justify every small detail of the
imputation provided the gist is proved to be substantially true.

In Watt v. Longsdone3, the plaintiff was the M.D. of the Morocco branch of Scottish petroleum company,
the manager wrote to the defendant, a director, accusing the defendant of being drunk, dishonest and
immoral. The defendant showed the letter to the chairman if the board, the plaintiff sued the defendant
of publication of the letter. The allegation contained in the letter was untrue so the defendant could not
defeat the plaintiff’s action by raising a defence on justification. However, this publication to the
chairman of the board was held to be privileged.

The sanctity and authenticity of the facts of the case prove in itself that the directors are not liable for
defamation since the above stated information was only discussed between the board of directors and
moreover, all the statements stated therein were protected by Qualified Privlege.

Sub c-- No publication is done

1
(1865) 6B & S340
2
AIR 1991 MP 162
3
(1930) 1KB 130
Publication of defamatory statement is one of the most essential elements to constitute the tort of
defamation. It implies communication of the statements to the third party. In the present scenario the
facts were silent on the question whether the conversation between the Managing Director and the
Board of Directors was communicated to anyone other than the people involved in the rift. The
communication between the members itself does not amount to publication.

In Arumuga v. Annamalai Mudaliar,4 two persons jointly wrote a letter containing defamatory
statements about the plaintiff and sent the same to the plaintiff by post. The court held that there was
no publication by one tort-feasor to another.

In Bals v. Verduzcu5, the Supreme Court of Indiana considered whether an employee evaluation has
been published for purposes of a defamamtion claim, once the evaluation has been communicated to
management by a direct supervisor within the organization. In this case the court held that an intra-
company communication, i.e submitting poor performance appraisals to the management or
misbehavior, may constitute publication because of the potentially damaging effect the intra co.
communication can have on employee’s reputation. However, the court held that a qualified privelge
applies to this type of communication.

In Staples v. Bangor hydroelectric co.6, the plaintiff was a micro- computer specialaist who was on bad
terms with the manager, the manager became convinced that the plaintiff had erased some of the
defendant’s computer files. The manager told the director that he had reason to believe that the
plaintiff had sabotaged the computer and the plaintiff was terminated. The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff on his defamation claim against Bangor Hydroelectric co. and the court affirmed that aspect
of the ward. The co. argued that the statements made among its employees could not be considered
communication to the third parties.

In King v. United Parcel Service7 the court held that an employer and its employees have a common
interest in boosting morale and ensuring business efficiency,. Therefore, an employer’s statement
related to business cannot be considered as defamation of the employees.

Subc---- Qualified privilege

The Board of Directors meetings are legally protected under qualified privilege because organizations,
businesses and groups need to be able to discuss suspicions, rumors and other unpleasantries. Doing so
is part of how healthy establishments maintain good public reputations and keep their respective
management engines chugging along.

Hence, the whether true or not, this case is covered by Qualified privilege, as can also be referred in
Watt v Longsden8, the claimant was the overseas manager of acompany of which the defendant was a
director. When the defendant received a letter about the claimant which claimed, among other things,
4
(1966) 2 MLJ 223
5
(1992) N.E. 2d 1353
6
(1993) 629 A.2d 601
7
Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.app.4th,441
8
[1930] I. K.B. 130
that he ‘lived exclusively to satisfy his own lusts and passions’, he showed the letter to the chairman of
the company. It was held that the communication to the company was privileged, as there was a duty to
inform him, and he the company had an interest in receiving the information.

In P. H. Daniel v. K. N . Krishna Iyer9, the defendants were the President and General Secretary of a
worker’s union and plaintiff was the managing director The defendant made some disparaging
comments against the plaintiff in the anuual meeting of the union which were per se defamatory. The
proceedings of the meeting were published in the journal of the union and distributed among 5000
members of the union. On defendant suing the plaintiff for defamation and damages, the defendant
pleaded qualified privilege in their defence. The court held the defendant not liableas they were
protected by qualified privilege.

In Satish Chandra Mullick v. Jagat Chandra Dutt 10, an employee of the co. reported to his employer that
his colleague employee had recovered Rs. 7,450 from a party but he did not deposit the amt. in the co.’s
a/c. thereupon the co. instituted in inquiry against the alleged defaulting employee and also initiated
police action against him. The employer succeeded in proving himself not guilty and therefore, was
acquitted of all the charges. He countersued the employee who had reported about him to the employer
for defamation. The defendant’s defence of qualified privilege was accepted by the court because he
couldn’t prove that he had not malice against the plaintiff and that the report against the plaintiff was
not vexatious or false, it is a different matter that he was acquitted for the charges against him.

9
AIR 1982 Ker. 95
10
AIR 1971 Cal. 266