Republic of the Philippines vs Luzon Stevedoring Corp

Discussion:
In this case Luzon Stevedoring Corporation is liable. The collision of the barge with the
Nagtahan bridge was not caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.
The Court ruled that considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary
object and uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft,
including barges like of appellant's, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge,
exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of
negligence on the part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it.
For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper care is used.
For caso fortuito or force majeure by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or
avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art.
1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have
been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee
or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
The very measures adopted by appellant prove that the possibility of danger was not only
foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.
As to the argument that the dolphins, like the bridge, were improperly located. The Court ruled
that it required a higher degree of care on the part of the appellant since these constructions
have already been placed for years.
Threfore, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the
swollen stream and its swift current, voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious
danger. It therefore assured the risk, and cannot shed responsibility merely because the
precautions it adopted turned out to be insufficient. Hence, the lower Court committed no error
in holding it negligent in not suspending operations and in holding it liable for the damages
caused.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs IAC

Discussion:
Eastern Shipping Lines is liable in this case. The heavy seas and rains were not caso
fortuito because these are normal occurrences that vessel, would encounter as a matter of
routine, particularly in the month of September which, in our area, is a month of rains and heavy
seas. They are not unforeseen nor unforeseeable. These are conditions that ocean-going
vessels would encounter and provide for, in the ordinary course of voyage. The rain water (not
sea water) found its way into Japri Venture is a clear indication that care and foresight did not
attend the closing of the ship’s hatches so that rain water would not find its way into the cargo.
Since Eastern Shipping Lines has failed to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption of fault
or negligence on the part of the carrier applies; and the carrier must present evidence that it has
observed the extraordinary diligence required in Art. 1733 to escape liability.
Moreover, under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are bound to observe "extra-
ordinary vigilance over goods . . . .according to all circumstances of each case," and Article
1735 of the same Code states “In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.”
Since the carrier has failed to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption by law of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier applies and the carrier must present evidence that it has
observed the extraordinary diligence required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code in order
to escape liability for damage or destruction to the goods that it had admittedly carried in this
case. No such evidence was presented. Thus, the carrier is liable and cannot escape liability.

La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. vs De Jesus

Discussion:
La Mallorca-Pambusco is liable in this case. The Court found out that the cause of the
blow-out was that the inner tube of the left front tire was pressed between the inner circle of the
left wheel and the rim which had slipped out of the wheel. It was a mechanical defect of the
conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been
subjected to a more thorough, or rigid check-up before it took to the road that morning. A tire
blow-out in this case was not considered a fortuitous event. It was also found out that the bus
was running quite fast immediately before the accident thus they cannot invoke the incident as
caso fortuito. Therefore, La Mallorca-Pambusco is liable in this case.

Ramos vs C.O.L. Realty Corp

Discussion:
Ramos, the employer of Rodel Ilustrisimo cannot be held liable in this case since the
proximate cause of the accident is Aquilino’s negligence. Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA
prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate
cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.  And more comprehensively, the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom. If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition
against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have
happened.  This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended
for.  Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident
occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and
probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous
on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the
Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass.  
Ramos is not liable here since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness
which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence
has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever
damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result, it will have the effect of mitigating the
award of damages in his favor.
Furthermore, Article 2179 of the Civil Code proved that that when the plaintiff’s own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.  

Maranan vs Perez
Discussion:
The carrier is liable in this case. The basis of the carrier’s liability for assaults on
passengers committed by its drivers’ rests on the principle that it is the carrier’s implied duty to
transport the passenger safely. As between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear
the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier’s employees against passengers, since it,
and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them. Under Article 1759 of the Civil
Code, “Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.” The
liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
The Supreme Court ruled that the attendant facts and controlling law of the case of Gillaco v.
Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, and the one at bar were very different. In the Gillaco case, the
passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. The
Gillaco case was decided under the provision of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the
present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of
passengers against willful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death
of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier
from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous event has been
substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly
remove from their exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides for liability in
spite of the occurrence of force majeure. The Civil Code provisions on the subject common
carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-American law. The basis of the carrier’s liability for
assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rested either on the doctrine or respondent
superior or the principle that it was the carrier’s implied duty to transport the passenger safely.
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it was enough that
the assault happens within the course of the employee’s duty. It was no defense for the carrier
that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier’s orders. The
carrier’s liability here was absolute in the sense that it practically secured the passengers from
assaults committed by its own employees.
Furthermore, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with
due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less
important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social
attitude.
Therefore, the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. 
Light Rail Transit Authority vs Navidad
Discussion:
A contract of carriage was created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT
station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection
under a contractual relation. LRTA and Roman are liable for the death of Navidad in failing to
exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier. The law requires common
carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due
regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers
obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its
premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.
A common carrier is liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or
wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or
of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed
to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved
of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the
burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force
majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred,
the presumption would be that it has been at fault. The foundation of LRTAs liability is the
contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that
contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In
the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to
hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to
undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under
the contract of carriage.

Del Prado vs Manila Electric Co.

Discussion:
Del Prado’s negligence in attempting to board the moving car was not the proximate
cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act of Meralco’s
motorman in putting on the power prematurely. A person boarding a moving car must be taken
to assume the risk of injury from boarding the car under the conditions open to his view, but he
cannot fairly be held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view, will
increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car before he is planted safely on the
platform. Again, the situation is one where the negligent act of the company’s servant
succeeded the negligent act of the passenger, and the negligence of the company must be
considered the proximate cause of the injury.
The rule applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which is sometimes
referred to as the doctrine of “the last clear chance.” In accordance with this doctrine, the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party.
The premature acceleration of the car was a breach of the motorman’s duty to do an act that
would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car.
The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature;
and in failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a
breach of duty under Articles 1101, 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the duty that
the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to
those alighting therefrom. The case of Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. supplies an instance of
the violation of this duty with respect to a passenger who was getting off of a train. In that case
the plaintiff stepped off of a moving train, while it was slowing down in a station, and at the time
when it was too dark for him to see clearly where he was putting his feet. The employees of the
company had carelessly left watermelons on the platform at the place where the plaintiff
alighted, with the result that his feet slipped and he fell under the car, where his right arm badly
injured. The Supreme Court held that the railroad company was liable for breach positive duty
and the plaintiff was awarded damages for the loss of his arm. In the opinion in that case the
distinction is clearly drawn between a liability for negligence arising from breach of contractual
duty and that arising articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
The distinction between the two sorts of negligence is important in this jurisdiction, for the
reason that where liability arises from a mere tort not involving a breach of positive obligation,
an employer, or master, may exculpate himself, under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the
Civil Code, by proving that he had exercised due diligence to prevent the damage; whereas this
defense is not available if the liability of the master arises from a breach of contractual duty.
Herein, the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by del Prado and to establish this contention
the company introduced testimony showing that due care had been used in training and
instructing the motorman in charge of this car in his art. This proof is irrelevant in view of the fact
that the liability involved was derived from a breach of obligation under article 1101 of the Civil
Code and related provisions.

Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. vs CA

Discussion:
Petitioners are liable for damages in this case. It is the duty of common carriers of
passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their
conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board
and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the
sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of their passengers according to all the
circumstances of each case. As such, in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court
need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold
it responsible for any damages. Any injury that might be suffered by a passenger is right away
attributable to its fault or negligence. It is incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has
exercised extraordinary diligence. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must
be proved. In the case at bar, Pedrito, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is
already considered a passenger and is thus entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to
their contractual relation. The duty which the carrier owes to its patrons extends to persons
boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. The testimonies of the witnesses show
that the bus was at full stop when Pedrito boarded the same. They further confirm the
conclusion that the he fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and
was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said
that the he was guilty of negligence. The contention of Dangwa Transportation that the driver
and the conductor had no knowledge that he would ride on the bus since the latter had not
manifested his intention to board the same does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in
motion, there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to
board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders.
Hence, it is the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that
would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board
the same.

La Mallorca vs CA
Discussion:
La Mallorca is liable in this case. The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at
the moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at
the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises.
In the present case, it cannot be concluded that the carrier exercised the utmost diligence of a
very cautious person required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code. The driver, although stopping
the bus, did not put off the engine. He also started to run the bus even before the conductor
gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading some of the baggages of the
passengers. It must be noted that the presence of Mariano and Raquel near the bus was not
unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers who entitled to the
protection under their contract of carriage. Considering the foregoing, La Mallorca should be
held liable for breach of contract of carriage.
Furthermore, even assuming that the contract of carriage has already terminated, La Mallorca
can be held liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The
inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict while incompatible with the other claim under the
contract of carriage is permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
Mirasol vs The Robert Dollar Co.
Discussion:
The Robert Dollar Co is liable in this case. The defendant having received the two boxes
in good condition, its legal duty was to deliver them to the plaintiff in the same condition in which
it received them. From the time of their delivery to the defendant in New York until they are
delivered to the plaintiff in Manila, the boxes were under the control and supervision of the
defendant and beyond the control of the plaintiff. The defendant having admitted that the boxes
were damaged while in transit and in its possession, the burden of proof then shifted, and it
devolved upon the defendant to both allege and prove that the damage was caused by reason
of some fact which exempted it from liability. As to how the boxes were damaged, when or
where, was a matter peculiarly and exclusively within the knowledge of the defendant and in the
very nature of things could not be in the knowledge of the plaintiff. To require the plaintiff to
prove as to when and how the damage was caused would force him to call and rely upon the
employees of the defendant’s ship, which in legal effect would be to say that he could not
recover any damage for any reason. That is not the law.
Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal
rights, and when goods are delivered on board ship in good order and condition, and the
shipowner delivers them to the shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the
shipowner to both allege and prove that the goods were damaged by the reason of some fact
which legally exempts him from liability; otherwise, the shipper would be left without any
redress, no matter what may have caused the damage.

The defendant has not even attempted to prove that the two cases were wet with sea water by
fictitious event, force majeure or nature and defect of the things themselves. Consequently, it
must be presumed that it was by causes entirely distinct and in no manner imputable to the
plaintiff, and of which the steamer President Garfield or any of its crew could not have been
entirely unaware. The fact that the cases were damaged by “sea water,” standing alone and
within itself, is not evidence that they were damaged by force majeure or for a cause beyond the
defendant’s control. The words “perils of the sea,” as stated in defendant’s brief apply to “all
kinds of marine casualties, such as shipwreck, foundering, stranding,” and among other things,
it is said: “Tempest, rocks, shoals, icebergs and other obstacles are within the expression,” and
“where the peril is the proximate cause of the loss, the shipowner is excused.” “Something
fortuitous and out of the ordinary course is involved in both words ‘peril’ or ‘accident’.”