POLITICAL LAW

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ASSET

PRIVATIZATION TRUST, NOW PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
OFFICE (PMO), Petitioner, v. VIRGILIO M. TATLONGHARI, DOMINGO
P. UY, GUILLERMO P. UY, HINOSAN MOTORS CORPORATION, AND
WESTERN GUARANTY CORPORATION, Respondents.

G.R. No. 170458, November 23, 2015

SUMMARY: The notation "in trust for" or "for escrow" that comes with
deposited funds indicates that the deposit is for the benefit of a third party.
In this case, Asset Privatization Trust deposited funds "in trust for"
Pantranco North Express, Inc., (Pantranco) a corporation under the
management of Asset Privatization Trust. These funds belong to Pantranco.
Further, in the absence of evidence that Asset Privatization Trust is
authorized to collect Pantranco's indebtedness to Philippine National Bank,
the subject funds can be garnished to satisfy the claims of Pantranco's
creditors. When Pantranco was under sequestration, it remained to be a
private corporation, and its funds also remained to be private. Although the
Presidential Commission on Good Government is a government agency, it
does not follow that Pantranco's funds were converted into public funds by
the mere fact that its conservator was a government agency.

FACTS: Pantranco was formerly a government-owned and controlled

corporation without original charter. Sometime in 1972, Pantranco suffered
financial losses. One of Pantranco's creditors was Philippine National Bank.
Pantranco's assets was foreclosed by Philippine National Bank, and in 1978,
the ownership of Pantranco was transferred to the National Investment
Development Corporation, a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank.

In 1985, National Investment Development Corporation sold Pantranco to

North Express Transport, Inc., which was owned by Gregorio Araneta
III, while Pantranco's assets were sold to Max B. Potenciano, Max Joseph A.
Potenciano, and Dolores A. Potenciano. The Potencianos thereafter
incorporated Pantranco as a private corporation.

After the 1986 People Power Revolution, Pantranco was sequestered by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government. Pantranco was allegedly part
of Ferdinand Marcos' ill-gotten wealth and was acquired by using Gregorio
Araneta III and the Potencianos as dummies.

The sequestration was lifted in 1988 "to give way to the sale of Pantranco
North Express Inc." At that time, Asset Privatization Trust took over
Pantranco's management.

On May 26, 1988, a Complaint was filed against Pantranco. In the Imexco
case, the trial court allowed the sale of Pantranco's assets, "on the condition
that the buyer shall comply with the contractual commitments of PNEI-PNB-
NIDC, wherein all receipts up to the extent of P25 Million plus the accrued
interest thereon shall be deposited with the Security Bank and disbursement
for operation to be taken therefrom." Pantranco prayed for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, which the trial court granted. A P1 million
bond was required for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction

In view of the trial court Order, Pantranco's Board of Directors passed a

Resolution authorizing the transfer of P20 million to Asset Privatization Trust
as the manager of Pantranco. Pantranco interpreted the trial court's Order to
mean that it was required "to deposit the amount of [P20] million pesos." A
check amounting to P20 million was issued in favor of Asset Privatization
Trust.

Pantranco subsequently realized that what was required was not the
payment of P20 million, but only the posting of the P1 million bond for the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to be issued. Pantranco requested
Asset Privatization Trust to return the funds. However, Asset Privatization
Trust did not do so. The Imexco case was dismissed in 1992, due to "failure
to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time."

In a Memorandum, Special Investigator Calimag stated that the money

amounting to P29,816,225.91 belongs to Pantranco and could be released to
Domingo P. Uy, Guillermo P. Uy, and Hinosan Motors. Atty. Espinosa
concurred with Special Investigator Calimag's recommendation and informed
Tatlonghari. Tatlonghari then informed Asset Privatization Trust that notices
of garnishment were issued, and that Atty. Espinosa recommended the
release of the funds to Domingo P. Uy, Guillermo P. Uy, and Hinosan Motors.

Asset Privatization Trust, through Atty. Jose M. Suratos, Jr., notified the
sheriffs and Tatlonghari of a third-party claim over the subject funds, as
shown by the Affidavit of third-party claim of Atty. Jose C. Sison, Associate
Executive Trustee. Tatlonghari was also given a letter informing him "that
the garnished amount should not be released unless a bond be filed by
defendant-appellants [Domingo P. Uy, Guillermo P. Uy, and Hinosan Motors]
in the same amount."

Hence, Domingo P. Uy, Guillermo P. Uy, and Hinosan Motors posted

indemnity bonds under Western Guaranty Corporation for the release of the
garnished funds. The Sheriffs then informed Asset Privatization Trust that
bonds were filed.

Asset Privatization Trust, through Atty. Jose C. Sison, suddenly changed its

position and informed the sheriffs "that the subject funds belong to the
government and not subject to execution notwithstanding the filing of
bonds." Tatlonghari was also informed by Asset Privatization Trust through a
letter that the funds were government funds and should not be released by
the Bureau of Treasury.

Tatlonghari then sought the opinion of the Treasury Miscellaneous

Accounting Division of the Bureau of Treasury. In a Memorandum, the
Treasury Miscellaneous Accounting Division informed Tatlonghari "that the
deposit was recorded as a trust liability account of the Bureau and not as
income of the National Government, and as such, do not form part of the
income in the General Fund of the National Government."

in respect of the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of corporate

subsidiaries of parent government corporations, such proceeds shall accrue
to the parent corporation. The proceeds shall be net of fees, commissions
and other reimbursable expenses of the Trust as approved by the
Committee, where the disposition was undertaken by or through the Trust.

The trial court explained that the assets in this case, which are in cash,
should automatically be considered as part of the general fund.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the trial court and
held that the funds were not public.

ISSUE: whether the funds belong to Pantranco North Express, Inc. and are
in the nature of private funds, or whether they belong to petitioner Asset
Privatization Trust, in which case the subject funds are public funds
HELD: No. The Court ruled that the subject funds belong to Pantranco and
are in the nature of private funds. Hence, the subject funds can be garnished
and be used to satisfy the claims of respondents Tatlonghari, Domingo P.
Uy, Guillermo P. Uy, Hinosan Motors, and Western Guaranty Corporation.

The definition of "government funds" is provided under the Revised

Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 1445:

"Government funds" includes public moneys of every sort and

other resources pertaining to any agency of the Government.

The phrase "pertaining to any agency of the Government"

distinguishes government funds from private funds. The definition of
"government funds" indicates that for funds to be considered
government funds or public funds, it must be shown that the funds
properly belong to a government agency. To determine whether an
entity is a government agency, we are also guided by the definition
provided under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential
Decree No. 1445:

"Government agency" or "agency of the government," or

"agency" refers to any department, bureau or office of the National
Government, or any of its branches and instrumentalities, or any
policitical subdivision, as well as any government-owned or controlled
corporation, including its subsidiaries, or other self-governing board of
commission of the Government.

The determination of the nature of funds is important especially in cases

where there are allegations that the funds involved are government funds.
The general rule is that government funds cannot be garnished. The reason
for this rule is explained in City of Caloocan v. Allarde.City of
Caloocan involved the garnishment of the funds of the City of Caloocan in
order to satisfy the claim for backwages of Delfma Hernandez Santiago. The
City of Caloocan raised the defense that its funds are public funds and
cannot be garnished. 

In this case, petitioner has not shown that Pantranco is a government entity.
As the history of Pantranco shows, it was originally a government
corporation, was foreclosed by Philippine National Bank, and was later sold
and incorporated as a private corporation. Pantranco was sequestered, but
the sequestration did not have the effect of transferring ownership to the
national government.
REMEDIAL LAW
 DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH),
represented by SEC. HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR, and
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, represented by
CHAIRMAN BAYANI F. FERNANDO, Petitioners  vs. CITY ADVERTISING
VENTURES CORPORATION, represented by DEXTER Y. LIM,
Respondent

G.R. No. 182944, November 9, 2016

SUMMARY: For a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the applicant

must show, by prima facie evidence, an existing right before trial, a material
and substantial invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary
injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable injury.

FACTS: On December 28, 2005, City Advertising Ventures Corporation

entered into a lease agreement with the MERALCO Financing Services
Corporation for the use of 5,000 of Manila Electric Company's (MERALCO)
lampposts to display advertising banners. Under this contract, City
Advertising Ventures Corporation obtained sign permits from Quezon City's
Department of Engineering, Office of the Building Official, Signboard Permit
Section. It obtained similar permits for the cities of Pasay and Makati. City
Advertising Ventures Corporation likewise obtained permits for setting up
pedestrian overpass banners in Quezon City.

When Typhoon Milenyo hit in September 2006, several billboards in Metro

Manila were blown by strong winds and fell. In its wake, Former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,
issued Administrative Order No. 160 dated October 4, 2006 "[d]irecting the
Department of Public Works and Highways to conduct field investigations,
evaluations and assessments of all billboards and determine those that are
hazardous and pose imminent danger to life, health, safety and property of
the general public and to abate and dismantle the same." Six (6) days later,
on October 10, 2006, Administrative Order No. 160-A was issued,
supplementing Administrative Order No. 160 and "[s]pecifying the legal
grounds and procedures for the prohibition and abatement of billboards and
signboards constituting public nuisance or other violations of law."

On October 6, 2006, the Department of Public Works and Highways

announced that they would start dismantling billboards. During its
operations, it was able to remove 250 of City Advertising Ventures
Corporation's lamppost banners and frames, 12 pedestrian overpass
banners, 17 pedestrian overpass frames, and 36 halogen lamps.

City Advertising Ventures Corporation then filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City its Complaint for "Violation of [Administrative Order
No.] 160, Tort, [and] Injunction with Prayer for [Temporary Restraining
Order], Preliminary Injunction, and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" dated
October 18, 2006.

Asserting that Administrative Order No. 160 pertained specifically to

"billboards" (i.e., "large panel[s] that carr[y] outdoor advertising") and not
to small advertising fixtures such as its signages and banners, City
Advertising Ventures Corporation claimed that the Department of Public
Works and Highways exceeded its authority when it dismantled its banners
and other fixtures.31 It also claimed that the Department of Public Works
and Highways "seriously impeded the pursuit of [its] legitimate business and
... unlawfully deprived [it] of property, income and income opportunities ...
without due process of law,"32 violated Articles 19,33 20,34 2135 and
32(2), (6), and (8) of the Civil Code, and impaired contractual obligations.

After conducting summary hearings, Branch 66 of the Regional Trial Court of

Makati City issued the Order granting City Advertising Ventures
Corporation's prayer for a temporary restraining order. In another Order, the
Regional Trial Court granted City Advertising Ventures Corporation's prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction

In response, the Department of Public Works and Highways and the

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification of the November 21, 2006 Order and for
the Dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They asserted that City
Advertising Ventures Corporation failed to show a clear legal right worthy of
protection and that it did not stand to suffer grave and irreparable injury.43
They likewise asserted that the Regional Trial Court exceeded its authority in
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.44

In the Order dated April 11, 2007, the Regional Trial Court denied the
Omnibus Motion.
Thereafter, the Department of Public Works and Highways and the
Metropolitan Manila Department Authority filed before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. In its assailed Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the Petition. In its assailed May 14, 2008 Resolution the
Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition
was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court gravely abused its discretion
in issuing its November 21, 2006 and April 11, 2007 Orders.

HELD: No. The orders issued are valid. Turning to the other requisites for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, The COurt find that
respondent adequately averred and showed a material and substantial
invasion of its ostensible right, for which the writ or preliminary injunction
was necessary lest that invasion persist and it be made to suffer irreparable
injury.

As respondent pointed out, the filing of its Complaint was precipitated by the
removal of no less than 250 of its lamppost banners and frames, as well as
12 of its pedestrian overpass banners, 17 pedestrian overpass frames, and
36 halogen lamps. All these were done in the span of less than two (2)
weeks.81 Petitioners do not dispute this. Moreover, nowhere does it appear
that petitioners intended to restrict themselves to these 250 lamppost
banners and frames, 12 pedestrian overpass banners, 17 pedestrian
overpass frames, and 36 halogen lamps. On the contrary, their incessant
attempts at having the Regional Trial Court's writ of preliminary injunction
lifted—first, on reconsideration at the Regional Trial Court itself; next, on
certiorari and prohibition, and later, on reconsideration at the Court of
Appeals; then, on appeal before this Court; and still later, on their June 15,
2010 Motion before this Court—are indicative of their sheer resolve to
dismantle more. Respondent was left with no justifiable recourse but to seek
relief from our courts.

Petitioners' admitted and pronounced course of action directly obstructed

respondent's ability to avail itself of its rights under its lease agreement and
the permits it secured from local government units. What petitioners sought
to restrict was the very essence of respondent's activity as a business
engaged in advertising via banners and signages. As the Regional Trial Court
explained in its April 11, 2007 Order:
 It bears stressing that the lifeblood of a business rests on
effective advertising strategies. One of which is the posting of
billboards and signages at strategic places. The manner of posting may
be regulated by the government but must comply with certain
requirements, and should not result in taking of property without due
process or in wanton disregard of existing laws. It stands to reason
that [petitioners] are not vested with blanket authority to confiscate
billboards without warning and in violation of existing laws.

LABOR LAW
 VICTOR S. LIMLINGAN AND EMMANUEL A.
LEYCO, Petitioners, v. ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT,
INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 220481, February 17, 2016

SUMMARY: The award of attorney's fee is warranted pursuant to Article 111

of the Labor Code. Ten (10%) percent of the total award is usually the
reasonable amount of attorney's fees awarded. It is settled that where an
employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his
rights and interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally and morally
justifiable.

FACTS: Two senior professors of the Asian Institute of Management (AIM)

called on school officials to respect and immediately implement a ruling of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) lifting the one-year
suspension meted on them.

Victor Limlingan and Emmanuel Leyco, chairman and president of the AIM
Faculty Association (AFA) respectively, said a recent press statement by AIM
officials claiming that the NLRC decision was not final and executory was
“inaccurate and even misleading.”

In a joint statement, the two professors said the AIM’s claim “is in direct
conflict” with a Feb. 27 notice of judgment issued by the NLRC, which states
that the decision shall be “immediately executory even pending appeal.”

The NLRC, through labor arbiter Napoleon Menese, had decided in favor of
the labor complaint filed by Limlingan and Leyco against the suspension
imposed on them by AIM for alleged “dysfunctional behavior” and “willful
breach of trust and confidence.”

While the one-year suspension was lifted and their withheld salary was
ordered paid, the professors’ claim for damages was dismissed.

The two men were suspended after the AFA’s lawyers sent a demand letter
to the AIM board of governors, asking for the rightful share of AIM
professors and workers of the tuition increases imposed by the institute.

AIM management said Limlingan and Leyco reportedly disrupted the

institution’s Leadership Week festivities in February 2007.
In his ruling, Menese ruled that the reason cited by AIM is no basis for
suspending the two professors, who have a right to be heard. He noted that
sending a demand letter is far from being a dysfunctional behavior.

Limlingan and Leyco urged AIM officials to consider the NLRC’s

recommendation of holding dialogues with AFA, which said AIM should give
their members a share of the tuition increases. The AFA cited Republic Act
6728, which provides that teachers should be given a 70 percent share of
tuition increases imposed by an educational institution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Victor S. Limlingan and Emmanuel A. Leyco are

entitled to attorney's fees.

HELD: Yes. The National Labor Relations Commission pointed out that the
Labor Arbiter's February 26, 2008 Decision awarded 10% attorney's fees to
Limlingan and Leyco. The Court affirmed the National Labor Relations
Commission, the Court of Appeals held that:

To be sure, since the attorney's fees matter was not raised as an

issue during the appeal, it follows that the aggrieved party had agreed
to the same. Time and again, the doctrine of finality of judgment,
which is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice, dictates that at the risk of occasional error, the
judgments of the courts must become final and executory at some
definite date set by law.

The issue as to Limlingan and Leyco's entitlement to attorney's fees already

attained finality.

It is settled in different cases raised to The Court that in actions for recovery
of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur
expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney's fees is
legally and morally justifiable.

However, the award of attorney's fee is warranted pursuant to Article 111 of

the Labor Code. Ten (10%) percent of the total award is usually the
reasonable amount of attorney's fees awarded. It is settled that where an
employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his
rights and interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally and morally
justifiable. 
 POLITICAL LAW

FAROUK B. ABUBAKAR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 202408, June 27, 2018

SUMMARY: The rules on competitive public bidding and those concerning

the disbursement of public funds are imbued with public interest.
Government officials whose work relates to these matters are expected to
exercise greater responsibility in ensuring compliance with the pertinent
rules and regulations. The doctrine allowing heads of offices to rely in good
faith on the acts of their subordinates is inapplicable in a situation where
there are circumstances that should have prompted the government officials
to make further inquiries.

FACTS: Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani were public officials of the

Department of Public Works and Highways in ARMM (DPWH-ARMM) when
the offenses were allegedly committed. Abubakar held the position of
Director III, Administrative, Finance Management Service. Baraguir was the
Director of the Bureau of Construction, Materials and Equipment, and a
member of the Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee, while Guiani
was the DPWH-ARMM Regional Secretary.

After the creation of ARMM, the national government earmarked

P615,000,000.00 for the implementation of regional and provincial
infrastructure projects. In 1991, the funds were transferred to the Office of
the ARMM Regional Governor. Later, a portion of the funds was then
transferred to DPWH-ARMM.

During the incumbency of then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos),

the Office of the President received reports of irregularities attending the
implementation of the DPWH-ARMM infrastructure projects. The Commission
on Audit was directed to conduct an investigation.

Acting upon then President Ramos' instruction, the Commission on Audit

created a special audit team headed by Heidi L. Mendoza (Mendoza) to look
into the implementation of four (4) road concreting projects, Physical
inspections were conducted to validate the existence of the projects and the
extent of their development.
The audit team made the following findings:

First, an overpayment amounting to P17,684,000.00 was incurred on nine

(9) road sections. The audit team discovered the existence of bloated
accomplishment reports that allowed contractors to prematurely claim on
their progress billings.

Second, advance payments totaling P14,400,000.00 were given to nine (9)

contractors for the procurement of aggregate sub-base course in violation of
Section 88(l) of Presidential Decree No. 1445.

Third, public bidding for the Cotabato-Lanao Road Project was done without
a detailed engineering survey. The bidding was reportedly conducted on
January 14, 1992. However, the engineering survey was only completed
sometime in August 1992. The audit team also observed bidding
irregularities in the Awang-Nuro Road Project and in six (6) road sections of
the Cotabato-Lanao Road Project. Public bidding for the two (2) projects was
reportedly conducted on January 14, 1992 but records disclose that the
contractors already mobilized their equipment as early as January 4 to 7,
1992.

Lastly, the engineering survey for the centerline relocation and profiling of
the Cotabato-Lanao Road, which cost P200,000.00, appeared to be
unnecessary due to the existence of a previous engineering survey.
Furthermore, advance payment was given to the contractor in excess of the
limit provided under the implementing rules and regulations of Presidential
Decree No. 1594.

Based on the report submitted by the Commission on Audit, the Office of the
Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause
to indict the regional officials of DPWH-ARMM for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On July
31, 1998, 21 separate Informations were filed against Abubakar, Baraguir,
Guiani, and other officials of DPWH-ARMM.

After the prosecution rested its case, several of the accused filed their
respective Motions for Leave to file Demurrer to Evidence. These Motions
were denied by the Sandiganbayan. Defense presented their witnesses. After
such, the Sandiganbayan found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
doubt of seven (7) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 in Criminal Case Nos. 24963 to 24969. The Sandiganbayan held that
Guiani, Baraguir, and Masandag conspired with each other and gave
unwarranted benefits, preference, and advantage to seven (7) contractors
by allowing them to deploy their equipment before the scheduled public
bidding. 

ISSUE: whether or not the prosecution was able to establish petitioners

Farouk B. Abubakar, Ulama S. Baraguir, and Datukan M. Guiani 's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019

HELD: Yes. This Court finds that petitioners Baraguir and Guiani gave
unwarranted benefits and advantage to several contractors by allowing them
to deploy their equipment ahead of the scheduled public bidding.

As a matter of policy, public contracts are awarded through competitive

public bidding. The purpose of this process is two (2)-fold.

First, it protects public interest by giving the public the "best possible
advantages thru open competition." Open and fair competition among
bidders is seen as a mechanism by which the public may obtain the best
terms on a given contract. Participating bidders offer competing proposals,
which are evaluated by the appropriate authority "to determine the bid most
favorable to the government."

Second, competitive public bidding avoids "suspicion of favoritism and

anomalies in the execution of public contracts."

These important public policy considerations demand the strict observance of

procedural rules relating to the bidding process.

Under Presidential Decree No. 1594, a public contract shall be awarded to

the lowest prequalified bidder. The bid must comply with the terms and
conditions stated in the call to bid and must be the most advantageous to
the government. After the evaluation of the bids, the winning bidder shall be
given a Notice of Award. The concerned government office or agency and the
successful bidder will then execute the contract, which shall be forwarded to
the head of the concerned government office or agency for approval. The
contract's approval signifies its perfection and it is at this time when the
successful bidder may be allowed to commence work upon receipt of a
Notice to Proceed.

Petitioners Baraguir and Guiani insist that the prosecution failed to establish
their intent to favor some contractors in the bidding process. Petitioner
Guiani claims that the certificates of mobilization, on which the prosecution
heavily relies, prove nothing.

The certificates of mobilization, which were issued at least one (1) week
before the date of public bidding, categorically identified HMB Construction
and Supply, Kutawato Construction, Al Mohandiz Construction, JM
Construction, PMA Construction, Al-Aziz-Engineering, and MGL Construction
as contractors for some portions of the Awang-Nuro Road and Cotabato-
Lanao Road Projects.

The acts of identifying certain contractors ahead of the scheduled public

bidding and of allowing the advanced deployment of their equipment through
the issuance of certificates of mobilization are glaring irregularities in the
bidding procedure that engender suspicion of favoritism and partiality
towards the seven (7) contractors. These irregularities create a reasonable,
if not conclusive, presumption that the concerned public officials had no
intention of complying with the rules on public bidding and that the results
were already predetermined.

Although petitiOner Baraguir concedes that contractors can only commence

work after they receive a notice to proceed, he justifies the irregularity on an
alleged "risk-taking strategy' employed by some contractors.

This appears to be a flimsy excuse. There is no justifiable reason why

contractors should be allowed to deploy their equipment in advance
considering that it would defeat the very purpose of competitive public
bidding. Benefits derived from this practice, if any, would certainly not
redound to the government.

Aside from this, the alleged purpose of the contractors in mobilizing their
equipment ahead of public bidding is speculative. Prospective contractors are
required to possess the technical capability to execute the implementation of
a given project. Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1594 lists as a
condition for all bidders the "[a]vailability and commitment of the
contractor's equipment to be used for the subject project." The Pre-
Qualification Bids and Awards Committee is mandated under the
implementing rules and regulations to look into the "suitability of [the
contractor's] available construction equipment" in assessing technical
capability.

The screening process ensures that bidders have the necessary equipment
and personnel to carry out the implementation of a particular government
project. In this regard, it may not even be possible for a winning bidder to
lease equipment from another contractor after it has won because technical
capability is evaluated before the submission of the bids. Assuming that
prospective bidders would be permitted to sublease their equipment from
other entities, the sublease agreement should already be finalized prior to
the conduct of public bidding.

Clearly, petitioners Baraguir and Guiani gave seven (7) contractors

unwarranted benefits and advantage through manifest partiality. Petitioner
Baraguir also gave unwarranted benefits and advantage to the contractors
through gross inexcusable negligence. Admittedly, he failed to check the
dates on the certificates of mobilization when they were presented to him for
his signature.