G-one T.

Paisones

FATHER SATURNINO URIOS UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW
AY 2023-2024
Political Law Class Readings
4th Batch for Class Reading

1. Parens Patriae

 The government, or any other authority, regarded as the legal protector of citizens unable to protect
themselves.
 means parent of his or her country, and refers to the State in its role as "sovereign", or the State in its
capacity as a provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves [Southern Luzon Drug Corp., vs.
DSWD; 2017]

a. Government of the Philippine Islands v El Monte de Piedad

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
Inhabitants
Facts:
About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of
the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands
on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto and on October 6 of that year, a central relief board was appointed, by
authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed. After a thorough investigation
and consideration, the relief board allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution, dated
September 22, 1866, and, by order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments,
together with the names of those entitled thereto
There was later distributed, in accordance with the above-mentioned allotments, the sum of $30,299.65,
leaving a balance of S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad,
dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated the 1st of that month, directed its treasurer to
turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each.
These amounts were received on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883,
and are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons, and heirs of
others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made by the central relief board for the payment of those
amounts, the Philippine Islands to bring suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover, "through the Attorney-General
and in representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together with interest, for the
benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette instituted on
May 3, 1912, by the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial,
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency,
together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.
In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was directed to inform
the home Government in what manner the indemnity might be paid to which, by virtue of the resolutions of the
relief board, the persons who suffered damage by the earthquake might be entitled, in order to perform the sacred
obligation which the Government of Spain had assumed toward the donors.
The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the transactions which took place between the
Government of Spain and the Philippine Government on the one side and the Monte de Piedad on the other,
concerning the $80,000. The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its
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financial condition and its absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held
in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to it the sum
of $80,000 to be held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of the relief board." The Monte de Piedad
agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be
returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a donation. The Governor-General, after reciting
the substance of the petition, stated that "this general Government has submitted for the determination of H. M.
Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to,
may remain as a surplus, should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the
security of the credit of the institution," and "considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the
request herein contained," directed the transfer of the $80,000 to be made with the understanding that "the Board of
Directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may
have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution."

Issue:
Whether or not the transaction between the Government of Spain and Monte Piedad is a donation and that
the Government of the Philippines can enforce the said contract.

Held:
Yes; the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of
public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is
entrusted with it.
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes
exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the
contrary, it is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for
the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.
If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being true that the Spanish Government could not, as
counsel say, transfer the ownership of the fund to the Monte de Piedad, the question arises, who may sue to recover
this loan? It needs no argument to show that the Spanish or Philippine Government, as trustee, could maintain an
action for this purpose had there been no change of sovereignty and if the right of action has not prescribed. But
those governments were something more than mere common law trustees of the fund. In order to determine their
exact status with reference to this fund, it is necessary to examine the law in force at the time there transactions
took place, which are the law of June 20, 1894, the royal decree of April 27. 1875, and the instructions
promulgated on the latter date. These legal provisions were applicable to the Philippine Islands.

b. SPARKS VS QC
August 8, 2017 G.R. No. 225442

Facts:
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors,
several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through
police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City,
through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02, (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 8046
(Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP- 2301, (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively,
Curfew Ordinances).
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 Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of
young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void
for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due
process. In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.

Issue 1:
Whether the ordinances subjects in this case is Void for Vagueness.

Held:
No; a statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do
not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails
to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.
The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are absent from this
particular claim.
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the
proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the
subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines.
The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are
best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement
is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived
danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities
to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of
law contravenes due process because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law
permits and/or forbids.

Issue 2:
Whether Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural and primary
right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process.

Held:
No; Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of
parents in the rearing of their children: Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning the
child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [State may act to promote these
legitimate interests." Thus, "in cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety,
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peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to
control the upbringing of their children."
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development
of their children, and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it
was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to
the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful
and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for
example, who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of the laws
designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."

Issue 3:
Whether the assailed ordinances are unconstitutional because the same impaired right to travel by the youth.

Held:
Partly meritorious. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose limitations on the exercise
of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and
(2) are provided by law.
City councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done in this case) and
enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as
required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally
permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights, but the
exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults. They are always subject to the authority or custody
of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State. As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a
certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote, the
right to execute contracts, and the right to engage in gainful employment. With respect to the right to travel, minors
are required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before they can
travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their parents. These limitations demonstrate
that the State has broader authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of adults, and overall,
reflect the State's general interest in the well-being of minors. Thus, the State may impose limitations on the
minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.
In Bellotti, the US Supreme Court identified three justifications for the differential treatment of the minors'
constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child
rearing.
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors
as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens patriae to protect and preserve their well-being with
the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a
suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the
classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.
Compelling State Interest: Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally
declared policies. This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care
for them as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State. It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way. As explained in Nunez, the
Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on
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adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the State to
protect and care for their welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances
is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally
eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which
may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in
imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that: “children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected
of their proper care and guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug
addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses…”
City councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general
welfare clause. In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact,
attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a
compelling State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances. With the first
requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied.
Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn: While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be
minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When
it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional
rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they are
still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic. Thus, in
the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the
minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights.
 The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors
accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands
such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c)
night school students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside
their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.
 Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at
night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office;
(d) those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision
of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (j) those involved in
accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions:
Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day
of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter
Sunday.
o This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the
rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work. However, even with those
safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable
exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression, among others.
o The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The
Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still
provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in
legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their
freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of
organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual
development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

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 Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day,
it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night
without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier. This legitimate activity done pursuant
to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend
city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free
expression.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions, which
are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure
protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are
merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence of any separability
clause.
 The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently
safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions: Section 4. EXEMPTIONS
- Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this
ordinance;
o (a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
o (b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of
their school or organization wherein their attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are
out and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper authorities
concerned; and
o (c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization,
road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
o (d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home from the same place
of employment activity without any detour or stop;
o (e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
o (f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
o (g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious, recreational, educational, social,
community or other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay, school, or other similar private
civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when the minor is
going to or returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and
o (h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the
evening or that he/she is a working student.
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more
narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression. Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions
guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by
enabling minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but
also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are also
covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious
organizations are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free
exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious
masses even during curfew hours. In relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants
to move to and from the places where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the
Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-
being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more
prominent.

2. Renunciation of war and adoption of generally accepted principles of international

law

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 a. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association vs Health Secretary Duque
G.R. No. 173034 October 9, 2007
Facts:
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular
clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and
ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending
and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk
Code but also various international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is respondents'
position that said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may
implement them through the RIRR.

Issue:
Whether respondents’ officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in
promulgating the RIRR.

Held:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of
the Constitution which provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional international
law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can
be applied to domestic conflicts.
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds
of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. However, the
ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through local legislation,
the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the
ICMBS per se.
In Mijares vs. Ranada, he Court held thus: Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result
from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States;
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and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit
in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.
Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of general or customary international
law which are binding on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of
sovereign immunity, a person's right to life, liberty and due process, and pacta sunt servanda, among others. The
concept of "generally accepted principles of law" has also been depicted in this wise: Some legal scholars and
judges look upon certain "general principles of law" as a primary source of international law because they have
the "character of jus rationale" and are "valid through all kinds of human societies." (Judge Tanaka in his
dissenting opinion in the 1966 South West Africa Case, 1966 I.C.J. 296). O'Connell holds that certain priniciples
are part of international law because they are "basic to legal systems generally" and hence part of the jus
gentium. These principles, he believes, are established by a process of reasoning based on the common identity of
all legal systems. If there should be doubt or disagreement, one must look to state practice and determine whether
the municipal law principle provides a just and acceptable solution.
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas defines customary international law as follows: "Custom or customary international
law means "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio
juris]." (Restatement) This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how
states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do." Once the
existence of state practice has been established, it becomes necessary to determine why states behave the way they
do. Do states behave the way they do because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as
a matter of courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes
practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law.
Clearly, customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. WHA Resolutions
have not been embodied in any local legislation. Have they attained the status of customary law and should they
then be deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land?
The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international specialized agencies allied with the
United Nations (UN) by virtue of Article 57, in relation to Article 63 of the UN Charter. Under the 1946 WHO
Constitution, it is the WHA which determines the policies of the WHO, and has the power to adopt regulations
concerning "advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international
commerce," and to "make recommendations to members with respect to any matter within the competence of the
Organization." The legal effect of its regulations, as opposed to recommendations, is quite different.
Regulations, along with conventions and agreements, duly adopted by the WHA bind member states thus:
Article 19. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt conventions or agreements with respect to
any matter within the competence of the Organization. A two-thirds vote of the Health Assembly shall be
required for the adoption of such conventions or agreements, which shall come into force for each Member
when accepted by it in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Article 20. Each Member undertakes that it will, within eighteen months after the adoption by the Health
Assembly of a convention or agreement, take action relative to the acceptance of such convention or
agreement. Each Member shall notify the Director-General of the action taken, and if it does not accept
such convention or agreement within the time limit, it will furnish a statement of the reasons for non-
acceptance. In case of acceptance, each Member agrees to make an annual report to the Director-General in
accordance with Chapter XIV.
On the other hand, under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members, in
the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force.
Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads: Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make
recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization.

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 The former Senior Legal Officer of WHO, Sami Shubber, stated that WHA recommendations are generally
not binding, but they "carry moral and political weight, as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the
collective membership of the highest international body in the field of health." Even the ICMBS itself was adopted
as a mere recommendation.
Apparently, the WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA Resolutions urging member
states to implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. Thus, unlike what has been
done with the ICMBS whereby the legislature enacted most of the provisions into law which is the Milk
Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months,
continued breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting advertisements and promotions of
breastmilk substitutes, have not been adopted as a domestic law.
It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft law" or non-binding norms, principles and
practices that influence state behavior. Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law set
forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice.
It is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior.
Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under this category. The most notable is the
UN Declaration of Human Rights, which this Court has enforced in various cases, specifically, Government of
Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, Mijares v. Rañada and Shangri-la
International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc..
WHO has resorted to soft law. This was most evident at the time of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) and Avian flu outbreaks. Although the IHR Resolution does not create new international law binding on
WHO member states, it provides an excellent example of the power of "soft law" in international relations.
International lawyers typically distinguish binding rules of international law-"hard law"-from non-binding
norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior-"soft law." WHO has during its existence
generated many soft law norms, creating a "soft law regime" in international governance for public health.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic
law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.
In support of its claim that the RIRR is inconsistent with the Milk Code, petitioner alleges the following:
1. The Milk Code limits its coverage to children 0-12 months old, but the RIRR extended its coverage to "young
children" or those from ages two years old and beyond:

9
 WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative
Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of
Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions.

b. Mijares vs Ranada, G.R. 139325

G.R. No. 139325 April 12, 2005
Facts:
The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights violations who, deprived of the
opportunity to directly confront the man who once held absolute rule over this country, have chosen to do battle
instead with the earthly representative, his estate. The clash has been for now interrupted by a trial court ruling,
seemingly comported to legal logic, that required the petitioners to pay a whopping filing fee of over Four Hundred
Seventy-Two Million Pesos in order that they be able to enforce a judgment awarded them by a foreign court.
On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of
Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was
brought forth by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary
detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act
was invoked as basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for
tortious violations of international law. These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their
heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while
in the custody of military or paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of approximately ten
thousand (10,000) members; hence, joinder of all these persons was impracticable.
On 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment
(Final Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five
Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was
eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996.
Petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement
of the Final Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose favor the US District
Court awarded damages. They argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US
Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of the US
District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines,
pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force.
On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment
of the correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and
filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of
over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular
No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and payment of docket fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that
an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of
only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141.
Respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the
complaint without prejudice. Respondent judge opined that contrary to the petitioners' submission, the subject
matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a
foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy determination of the value of the
foreign judgment. On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application,

10
and the RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million
Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.

Issue:
Whether the respondent judge erred in dismissing the case on the ground of the non-payment of the proper
docket fee.

Held:
Yes; obviously, Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the computation of the filing fee of over 472 pesos
Million covers, on one hand, ordinary actions, permissive counterclaims, third-party, etc. complaints and
complaints-in-interventions, and on the other, money claims against estates which are not based on judgment.
Thus, the relevant question for purposes of the present petition is whether the action filed with the lower court is a
"money claim against an estate not based on judgment."
Petitioners' complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment, the
Final Judgment of the US District Court. The provision does not make any distinction between a local judgment
and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish.
A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the filing fee is computed on the
basis of the amount of the relief sought, or on the value of the property in litigation. The filing fee for requests for
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is based on the amount of indebtedness or the mortgagee's claim. In special
proceedings involving properties such as for the allowance of wills, the filing fee is again based on the value of the
property. The aforecited rules evidently have no application to petitioners' complaint.
Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded that the filing fees should be
computed on the basis of the schematic table of Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an
estate based on judgment.
To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a foreign judgment
in this jurisdiction. The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among
civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and
rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an
action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in
personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to
impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the
enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the
foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.
Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US District Court
judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment
against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What provision then governs the
proper computation of the filing fees over the instant complaint? For this case and other similarly situated
instances, we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, "other actions not involving property."
There is another consideration of supreme relevance in this case, one which should disabuse the notion that
the doctrine affirmed in this decision is grounded solely on the letter of the procedural rule. We earlier adverted to
the internationally recognized policy of preclusion, as well as the principles of comity, utility and convenience of
nations as the basis for the evolution of the rule calling for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
The US Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot relied heavily on the concept of comity, as especially derived from the
landmark treatise of Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws of 1834. Yet the notion of "comity"
11
has since been criticized as one "of dim contours" or suffering from a number of fallacies. Other conceptual bases
for the recognition of foreign judgments have evolved such as the vested rights theory or the modern doctrine of
obligation.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize
foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if
they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice
on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.
While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have not
been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among those
generally accepted principles of international law. As earlier demonstrated, there is a widespread practice among
states accepting in principle the need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying
degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread
rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for
recognition and enforcement.
Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition and enforcement is
embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the
Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which has existed in its
current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its
jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the
requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrines. Again, there may be
distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular state, but they all prescind from the premise that there is a
rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of opinio juris in international practice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and a
new order REINSTATING Civil Case No. 97-1052 is hereby issued. No costs.

c. Pimentel vs Ermita
G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005
Facts:
President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments.
Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries.
Pimentel and other senators filed this present petition. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23
September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments
to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries because “in
case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary.”
Petitioners base their argument on Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (“EO 292”), which
enumerates the powers and duties of the undersecretary. Petitioners further assert that “while Congress is in session, there
can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.”
Petitioners and respondents maintain two diametrically opposed lines of thought. Petitioners assert that the President
cannot issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session because the law does

12
not give the President such power. In contrast, respondents insist that the President can issue such appointments because no
law prohibits such appointments.

Issue:
Whether President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is unconstitutional.

Held:
The petition has no merit. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may
not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly
allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature.
The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe
the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular
person to an office.
However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of
its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises
its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. Thus: The Commission on Appointments is a
creature of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is
independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from
the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely
executive in nature.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure
intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of
her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great
trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the
President who her alter ego should be.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I,
Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government
service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the
President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the
President deems that person competent.
In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook writer
on constitutional law has observed: Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting
capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a
recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President
Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before
the lapse of one year.

13
 d. Bayan Muna represented by Ocampo vs Romulo, G.R. 159618, Feb 1, 2011.
Facts:
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement,
hereinafter) between the USA and the RP. Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-03, the RP, represented by then
DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted
to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In essence, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers
to and defines as "persons" of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against
them in international tribunals.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender
agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes
constituted a legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not
require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and
prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect. For their part,
respondents question petitioner’s standing to maintain a suit and counter that the Agreement, being in the nature of
an executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for its efficacy. And for reasons detailed in their
comment, respondents assert the constitutionality of the Agreement. Petitioner’s initial challenge against the
Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for
concluding the Agreement.

Issue:
Whether or not the Agreement, which has not been submitted to the Senate for concurrence, contravenes
and undermines the Rome Statute and other treaties.

Held:
No; Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines,
practices, and jargons––is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and
amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls "into the category of inter-governmental agreements," which is
an internationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty
Reference Guide) defines the term as follows: An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine agreement that has
many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of
the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure,
the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be
government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted
to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms "exchange of notes" and "executive agreements" have been used
interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through
executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President "sometimes take the form of
exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’" As
former US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of
Trade Agreement Acts: The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
14
agreements – whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise – begin, may
sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment.
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03––be it viewed as the Non-Surrender
Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound––is a recognized
mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.
Senate Concurrence Not Required: Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a
treaty as "an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation." International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after
executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require
legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.
Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their
binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within
their powers. Neither, on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution. Authorities are,
however, agreed that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-requirement
aspect. As has been observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater "dignity" than an executive
agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the
President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any
prior statutory enactment.
The categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in
Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given
subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary
consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft an international
agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. Verily, the matter of form takes a back seat
when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the
parties in either international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle.
As may be noted, almost half a century has elapsed since the Court rendered its decision in Eastern Sea
Trading. Since then, the conduct of foreign affairs has become more complex and the domain of international law
wider, as to include such subjects as human rights, the environment, and the sea. In fact, in the US alone, the
executive agreements executed by its President from 1980 to 2000 covered subjects such as defense, trade,
scientific cooperation, aviation, atomic energy, environmental cooperation, peace corps, arms limitation, and
nuclear safety, among others. Surely, the enumeration in Eastern Sea Trading cannot circumscribe the option of
each state on the matter of which the international agreement format would be convenient to serve its best interest.
The Agreement Not in Contravention of the Rome Statute: As a result, petitioner’s argument that State-
Parties with non-surrender agreements are prevented from meeting their obligations under the Rome Statute,
specifically Arts. 27, 86, 89 and 90, must fail. These articles are only legally binding upon State-Parties, not
signatories. Furthermore, a careful reading of said Art. 90 would show that the Agreement is not incompatible with
the Rome Statute. Specifically, Art. 90(4) provides that "[i]f the requesting State is a State not Party to this Statute
the requested State, if it is not under an international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State, shall
give priority to the request for surrender from the Court. x x x" In applying the provision, certain undisputed facts
should be pointed out: first, the US is neither a State-Party nor a signatory to the Rome Statute; and second, there is
an international agreement between the US and the Philippines regarding extradition or surrender of persons, i.e.,
the Agreement. Clearly, even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the
primacy of international agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to
the Rome Statute.

15
 e. Pangilinan vs Cayetano, G.R. 238875, March 16, 2021.
Facts:
On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. On
March 16, 2018, it formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations
Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet. The Secretary General received this communication the following day, March
17, 2018.
Through these actions, the Philippines completed the requisite acts of withdrawal. This was all consistent
and in compliance with what the Rome Statute plainly requires. By this point, all that were needed to enable
withdrawal have been consummated. Further, the International Criminal Court acknowledged the Philippines'
action soon after it had withdrawn.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a Note Verbale delivered to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations is valid, binding, and effectual.

Held:

President's discretion on unilaterally withdrawing from any treaty or international agreement is not
absolute. As primary architect of foreign policy, the president enjoys a degree of leeway to withdraw from treaties.
However, this leeway cannot go beyond the president's authority under the Constitution and the laws. In
appropriate cases, legislative involvement is imperative. The president cannot unilaterally withdraw from a treaty if
there is subsequent legislation which affirms and implements it.
Conversely, a treaty cannot amend a statute. When the president enters into a treaty that is inconsistent with
a prior statute, the president may unilaterally withdraw from it, unless the prior statute is amended to be consistent
with the treaty. A statute enjoys primacy over a treaty. It is passed by both the House of Representatives and the
Senate, and is ultimately signed into law by the president. In contrast, a treaty is negotiated by the president, and
legislative participation is limited to Senate concurrence. Thus, there is greater participation by the sovereign's
democratically elected representatives in the enactment of statutes.
The extent of legislative involvement in withdrawing from treaties is further determined by circumstances
attendant to how the treaty was entered into or came into effect. Where legislative imprimatur impelled the
president's action to enter into a treaty, a withdrawal cannot be effected without concomitant legislative sanction.
Similarly, where the Senate's concurrence imposes as a condition the same concurrence for withdrawal, the
president enjoys no unilateral authority to withdraw, and must then secure Senate concurrence.
However, the President's discretion to withdraw is qualified by the extent of legislative involvement on the
manner by which a treaty was entered into or came into effect. The President cannot unilaterally withdraw from
treaties that were entered into pursuant to the legislative intent manifested in prior laws, or subsequently affirmed
by succeeding laws. Treaties where Senate concurrence for accession is expressly premised on the same
concurrence for withdrawal likewise cannot be the subject of unilateral withdrawal. The imposition of Senate
concurrence as a condition may be made piecemeal, through individual. Senate resolutions pertaining to specific
treaties, or through encompassing legislative action, such as a law, a joint resolution by Congress, or a
comprehensive Senate resolution.
Ultimately, the exercise of discretion to withdraw from treaties and international agreements is susceptible
to judicial review in cases attended by grave abuse of discretion, as when there is no clear, definite, or reliable
showing of repugnance to the Constitution or our statutes, or in cases of inordinate unilateral withdrawal violating
requisite legislative involvement. Nevertheless, any attempt to invoke the power of judicial review must conform

16
to the basic requisites of justiciability. Such attempt can only proceed when attended by incidents demonstrating a
properly justiciable controversy.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated Petitions in G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483, and 240954 are DISMISSED for
being moot.

f. Llamanzares vs Comelec G.R.221697

Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016
Facts:
Petitioner was five years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed
from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary
notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, the
petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled
petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's
new name and the name of her adoptive parents. Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting
to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new
Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local
COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification
Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Petitioner claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225
or the right to reacquire her natural-born status. Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the
presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born
citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC. She
believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. citizenship

Issue:
Whether foundlings (in the Philippines) are natural born Filipino citizens.

Held:
Yes; as a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings
either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine
the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, this Court held that: "The ascertainment
of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers."
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not
provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place
to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws relating to
family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even
17
though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the
adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis vs. Republic, a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be
adopted by aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain unless
it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is
the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the
theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this
theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the
status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the
Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this
Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a
foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2
"Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act
must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the
child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the
parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings
to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino
mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced
by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved
petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife,
Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. International
customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in
question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. "General principles of law recognized
by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles
which are "basic to legal systems generally," such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and

18
Occupation." These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). In 1986, the
country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof
provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social
origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the
part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted
principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of
birth," to wit:
Article 14:
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage
is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it
was found.
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found,
contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2:
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer
to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise,
it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This
shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

g. Ang Ladlad vs Comelec [G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010]

Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration
with the COMELEC in 2006.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that: This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner
defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community.

Issue:
19
 Whether Comelec erred in denying the registration of Ladlad as party for lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-
gendered individuals (LGBTs).

Held:
Yes; Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause
calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead,
on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to
religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily
secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily
secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate
may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in
secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals,
the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or
agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a
religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its
actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove
contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not
provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved
are second-class citizens.
Freedom of Expression and Association: Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its
agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the
public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any
restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state
interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the
COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message
or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country.
It follows that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association
that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Non-Discrimination and International Law: In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically
in scope and promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring
about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and
governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively
enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human
rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows: All persons are equal
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination

20
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to
elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not
specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human
Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual
orientation." Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.
The UDHR provides; Article 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives. Likewise, the ICCPR states: Article 25 - Every citizen shall have
the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to
the Philippines’ international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all
social ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International
Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), which petitioner declares to reflect
binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not
reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken
any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

h. Ichong vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
Facts:
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the
retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the
Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by
citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade.
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration
that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of
the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty
and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 1180 is unconstitutional.

Held:
21
 No; it has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to
limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be
expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the
most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it
so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of
public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight.
Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly
changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which
and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define
the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most
important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our
Constitution: SECTION 1 (1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution).
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret
manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the
ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and
disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in
the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the
alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for
a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. — The above objectionable
characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds
for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the
legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court
finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it
cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the
legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limit of equal
protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not
curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of
discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without
reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs.
Natural Carbonic Fas Co: “The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state
the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in
that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made
22
with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a
law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of
that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. One who assails the classification in such a
law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."”
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do not
naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in daily
contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor
the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens
have been shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago
recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation
and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and
reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged
in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner,
without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare.
But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused
by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control
of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in
times of crisis and emergency.
Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations: Another subordinate argument against the
validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of
the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter
imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of
the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the
import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members
of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail
trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is
also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the
Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not
discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the
law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law
(U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power
of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

i. Secretary of Justice vs Lantion

G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
Facts:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the
doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state
where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped.

23
 On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US
Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said
treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on
the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States.
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069.
Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the
documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish
were not attached to the request and that there are some other matters that needed to be addressed".
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a
letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S.
Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also
requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Petitioner denied the request. Private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the
extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the
extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside
herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the
extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United
States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
Honorable Ralph C. Lantion ordered that “the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by
refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the
request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition
with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United
States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of
the 1997 Rules of Court.”

Issue:
Whether private respondent is entitled to the copies of the official extradition request from the U.S.
Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith.

Held:
Yes. Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with
and shelved aside. Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes
Section 7 of Article III which reads: Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,

24
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely:
(1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records
documents. The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern.
In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights
are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer,
1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone
can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from the
U.S. Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation
to matters of foreign relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional
provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public concern since they may result in the extradition
of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary
for the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of
our own government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast,
records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by
then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow
Filipino would be forthcoming.
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a
special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition
petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature
of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having
charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the
reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.).
Said decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory
(Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals
shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui
generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial
functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the
completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the
face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination
whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-
US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in
contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts
prove. Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the determinative
powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and
premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to
require disclosure of information by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of
documents, or otherwise.

25
 Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal
since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty
of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement. In
essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases,
we had occasion to make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional
rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza
during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an
earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination.
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-
incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal
prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an
administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in his loss
of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty.
Due process is comprised of two components — substantive due process which requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due
process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an
impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
 In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing
administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of
filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate
threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for
criminal prosecution;
 Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded
from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected,
such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement
of a temporary appointee; and
 Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been
claimed.

Issue 2:
Whether private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty.

Held:
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law,
requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal
duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of
the law of the and land no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to
26
both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict
is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such
courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p.
13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the
primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation,
as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a
treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the
land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict
with the constitution (Ibid.).
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic
twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the
Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as
explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the
governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35
C.J.S. 410).
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or
employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The
convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's
liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice
outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside
legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are
protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict
construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of
democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and government
authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers,
and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in
Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered
dismissed.

3. Separation of Powers

a. Angara vs Electoral Commission

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
27
Facts:
That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having
received the most number of votes. November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office.
That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after
the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared
elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be
nullified.
That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid
protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8
of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its
members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for,
the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period.
Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to
Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly and that the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to
regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of
the Government or the National Assembly.

Issue:
Whether Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts.

Held:
Yes. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow
from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent
is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may
be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever
he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its
consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to
appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The
Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme

28
Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law,
and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly
is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is
in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives
in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not
the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of
constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must
be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last
and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the
crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature
of the republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon
the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and
defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the
reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions.
The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims
of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.

b. Estipona vs Lobrigo
29
 August 15, 2017 G.R. No. 226679
Facts:
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia
for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal
quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1)
the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme
Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers
among the three equal branches of the government.
prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is
said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a
Comment or Opposition it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to
give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the
express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to
reject the proposal of the accused."
Respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the RTC Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's
motion.

Issue:
Whether Section 23 of R.A. 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules of procedure.

Held:
YES; Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: Promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now SC’s exclusive domain and no
longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray),
the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been
priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually
altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying
in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "stronger
and more independent judiciary."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure. The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within
the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders
that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court. Viewed from this
perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power,
to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

30
  Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative
disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules
instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
 Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. - The Cooperative Code
provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
 Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) - The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770,
which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it
contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure: The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal
procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or
modify the latter. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established
to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain
redress for their invasions." Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
substantive or procedural in nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower
courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure,
that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is
not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but
if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval." There is give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense
make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the
chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor
take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present
Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is
necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the
prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one,
based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to plead
guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of
discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep
in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a
matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of
discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical
31
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of
passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.

c. Republic vs Gingoyon, G.R. 16429

G.R. No. 166429 December 19, 2005
Facts:
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in Agan v. PIATCO,
promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified the "Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-
and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III" entered into between
the Philippine Government (Government) and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as
well as the amendments and supplements thereto. The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new
international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the
concession period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor
of PIATCO, did not possess the requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the
agreement was contrary to public policy.
At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by
PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3
facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for
its expenses in the construction of the facilities. Still, in his Separate Opinion, Justice Panganiban, joined by Justice
Callejo, declared as follows: Should government pay at all for reasonable expenses incurred in the
construction of the Terminal? Indeed it should, otherwise it will be unjustly enriching itself at the expense of
Piatco and, in particular, its funders, contractors and investors — both local and foreign. After all, there is no
question that the State needs and will make use of Terminal III, it being part and parcel of the critical infrastructure
and transportation-related programs of government.
Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City RTC.
The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take
immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited
the amount of ₱3,002,125,000.00 in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3
terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes.
The case was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by respondent judge Hon. Henrick F.
Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day that the Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the
issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to "take or enter upon the possession" of the
NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of Manila v. Serrano, the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to
issue the writ of possession upon the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and
upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to
expropriation. The RTC found these requisites present, particularly noting that "[t]he case record shows that [the
Government has] deposited the assessed value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in the Land Bank of the Philippines, an
authorized depositary, as shown by the certification attached to their complaint." Also on the same day, the RTC
issued a Writ of Possession. According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take possession over the NAIA 3
facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession was issued.
However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its 21 December 2004
Order and the Writ of Possession. In the 4 January 2005 Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted
that its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as "An
32
Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects
and For Other Purposes" and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67
in many respects.
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and
Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the
filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only
to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial
deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974
which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the
tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is
higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8974 and Section 10 of the Implementing
Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its earlier issuances. First, it directed the Land Bank of the Philippines,
Baclaran Branch (LBP-Baclaran), to immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO, an amount
which the RTC characterized as that which the Government "specifically made available for the purpose of this
expropriation;" and such amount to be deducted from the amount of just compensation due PIATCO as eventually
determined by the RTC. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of
Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was
directed "to maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform such as acts or activities in
preparation for their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment
of just compensation. However, the Government was prohibited "from performing acts of ownership like awarding
concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties."

Issue:
Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this
case.

Held:
Application of Rule 67 Violates the 2004 Agan Resolution. The Government insists that Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court governs the expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the other
hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does apply. Earlier, we had adverted to the basic
differences between the statute and the procedural rule. Further elaboration is in order.
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by
no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private
property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government
units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which
covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects.
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than
Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property "for national
government infrastructure projects." Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes
other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67
continues to apply.
Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an authorized government depositary the assessed
value of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No.
8974 requires that the Government make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ may issue.
Moreover, such payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value of the

33
improvements or structures under the replacement cost method, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of
utmost urgency, the proffered value of the property to be seized.
It is quite apparent why the Government would prefer to apply Rule 67 in lieu of Rep. Act No. 8974. Under
Rule 67, it would not be obliged to immediately pay any amount to PIATCO before it can obtain the writ of
possession since all it need do is deposit the amount equivalent to the assessed value with an authorized
government depositary. Hence, it devotes considerable effort to point out that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not apply in
this case, notwithstanding the undeniable reality that NAIA 3 is a national government project. Yet, these efforts
fail, especially considering the controlling effect of the 2004 Resolution in Agan on the adjudication of this case.
It is the finding of this Court that the staging of expropriation proceedings in this case with the exclusive
use of Rule 67 would allow for the Government to take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes
our 2004 Resolution in Agan. This Court cannot sanction deviation from its own final and executory orders.
Would the deposit under Section 2 of Rule 67 satisfy the requirement laid down in the 2004 Resolution that
"for the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said
structures"? Evidently not.
Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even
assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should
then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court’s requirement in
the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government may
take over the property.
Rep. Act No. 8974 Fits to the Situation at Bar and Complements the 2004 Agan Resolution.

d. Pimetel vs Executive Secretary , GR 158088

G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the
Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which "shall have the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to
the national criminal jurisdictions." Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute. The Statute was opened for signature by all states in
Rome on July 17, 1998 and had remained open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the United Nations
Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 through Charge d’ Affairs
Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions, however, require that it be
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the respondents, questioned the standing of the
petitioners to file the instant suit. It also contended that the petition at bar violates the rule on hierarchy of courts.
On the substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to
transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.

Issue:
Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit
to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations
even without the signature of the President.
34
Held:
No; in our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of
foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the
President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the
realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution
provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the
validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty
or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate."
In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that
the power to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate. We disagree.
Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this wise: The
usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of
ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this
step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.
Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his
authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers, which they
exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to
submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the
subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may
even "collapse" in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under consideration.
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This
step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good
faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where
ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is,
each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of
a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to
examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find
it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and
consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated them.
The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually
also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where
ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective
upon its signature.
Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It
should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the
treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the
instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the state’s authorized
representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms
and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act,
undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel
V. Ramos on November 25, 1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and its
35
ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the Philippine representative, the same shall be
transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the
ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President for ratification. After the President has
ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon
receipt of the concurrence of the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provisions of the
treaty to render it effective.
Petitioners’ submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the
treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty.
It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the
signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory
states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State.
By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such
treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state’s representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is
burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are
not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing
of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the
requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even
moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to
the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent,
or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to
the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to
ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is
within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus.
This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction
to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.

e. Pangilinan vs Cayetano
Facts:
On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. On
March 16, 2018, it formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations
Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet. The Secretary General received this communication the following day, March
17, 2018.
Through these actions, the Philippines completed the requisite acts of withdrawal. This was all consistent
and in compliance with what the Rome Statute plainly requires. By this point, all that were needed to enable
withdrawal have been consummated. Further, the International Criminal Court acknowledged the Philippines'
action soon after it had withdrawn.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a Note Verbale delivered to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations is valid, binding, and effectual.

Held:
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 Yes; President's discretion on unilaterally withdrawing from any treaty or international agreement is not
absolute. As primary architect of foreign policy, the president enjoys a degree of leeway to withdraw from treaties.
However, this leeway cannot go beyond the president's authority under the Constitution and the laws. In
appropriate cases, legislative involvement is imperative. The president cannot unilaterally withdraw from a treaty if
there is subsequent legislation which affirms and implements it.
Conversely, a treaty cannot amend a statute. When the president enters into a treaty that is inconsistent with
a prior statute, the president may unilaterally withdraw from it, unless the prior statute is amended to be consistent
with the treaty. A statute enjoys primacy over a treaty. It is passed by both the House of Representatives and the
Senate, and is ultimately signed into law by the president. In contrast, a treaty is negotiated by the president, and
legislative participation is limited to Senate concurrence. Thus, there is greater participation by the sovereign's
democratically elected representatives in the enactment of statutes.
The extent of legislative involvement in withdrawing from treaties is further determined by circumstances
attendant to how the treaty was entered into or came into effect. Where legislative imprimatur impelled the
president's action to enter into a treaty, a withdrawal cannot be effected without concomitant legislative sanction.
Similarly, where the Senate's concurrence imposes as a condition the same concurrence for withdrawal, the
president enjoys no unilateral authority to withdraw, and must then secure Senate concurrence.
However, the President's discretion to withdraw is qualified by the extent of legislative involvement on the
manner by which a treaty was entered into or came into effect. The President cannot unilaterally withdraw from
treaties that were entered into pursuant to the legislative intent manifested in prior laws, or subsequently affirmed
by succeeding laws. Treaties where Senate concurrence for accession is expressly premised on the same
concurrence for withdrawal likewise cannot be the subject of unilateral withdrawal. The imposition of Senate
concurrence as a condition may be made piecemeal, through individual. Senate resolutions pertaining to specific
treaties, or through encompassing legislative action, such as a law, a joint resolution by Congress, or a
comprehensive Senate resolution.
Ultimately, the exercise of discretion to withdraw from treaties and international agreements is susceptible
to judicial review in cases attended by grave abuse of discretion, as when there is no clear, definite, or reliable
showing of repugnance to the Constitution or our statutes, or in cases of inordinate unilateral withdrawal violating
requisite legislative involvement. Nevertheless, any attempt to invoke the power of judicial review must conform
to the basic requisites of justiciability. Such attempt can only proceed when attended by incidents demonstrating a
properly justiciable controversy.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated Petitions in G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483, and 240954 are DISMISSED for
being moot.

f. ABS-CBN vs NTC
G.R. No. 252119, August 25, 2020
Facts:
On March 30, 1995, petitioner ABS-CBN was granted a legislative franchise to "construct, operate and
maintain, for commercial purposes and in the public interest, television and radio broadcasting stations in and
throughout the Philippines" under RA 7966. The franchise was valid for a term of twenty-five (25) years from the
law's effectivity on May 4, 1995, or until May 4, 2020.
In 2014 and 2018, bills6 for the renewal of ABS-CBN's franchise were filed in the 16th and
17th Congress. In the current (or 18th) Congress, eleven (11) bills for the renewal of ABS-CBN's franchise were
submitted before the House Committee on Legislative Franchises, while two (2) bills were filed before the Senate
Commitee on Rules.10 On February 26, 2020, another bill was filed seeking the amendment of Section 1 of RA
7966 to extend the term of ABS-CBN's franchise while Congress is still deliberating on the issue of franchise
renewal.
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 On February 24, 2020, the Senate Committee on Public Services called a hearing to "look into, in aid of
legislation, the operations of [ABS-CBN] to determine compliance with the terms and conditions of its franchise
under [RA] 7966." During the hearing, respondent NTC's Commissioner, Gamaliel A. Cordoba (Commissioner
Cordoba), stated that the NTC has not withdrawn any Provisional Authority to operate under similar circumstances
and has not closed any broadcast company in the past due to an expired franchise, pending its renewal.
Commissioner Cordoba also declared that in the case of ABS-CBN, it will issue a Provisional Authority if so
advised by the Department of Justice (DOJ).
House Committee on Legislative Franchises sent a letter to the NTC enjoining it to grant ABS-CBN a
provisional authority to operate "effective May 4, 2020 until such time that the House of Representatives/Congress
has made a decision on its application." The letter was signed by the Committee's Chairperson, Franz E. Alvarez
(Chairperson Alvarez) with the concurrence of Speaker Alan Peter S. Cayetano.
Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, through a press release, "warned the [NTC] against granting ABS-CBN
provisional authority to operate while the approval of its franchise is pending in Congress." He further declared
that "the NTC Commissioners could risk subjecting themselves to prosecution under the country's anti-graft and
corruption laws should they issue the 'unlawful' [provisional authorities] to ABS-CBN in the absence of a
franchise."
On May 4, 2020, ABS-CBN's franchise expired. Hence, on May 5, 2020, the NTC issued the CDO
directing ABS-CBN to "immediately CEASE and DESIST from operating radio and television stations." The CDO
was based solely on the "expiration of RA 7966." Consequently, on even date, ABS-CBN complied with the CDO
and went off-air.
On May 7, 2020, ABS-CBN filed the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Urgent
Applications for the Issuance of a [TRO] and/or a [WPI]) before the Court, claiming that the NTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the CDO.
In its petition, ABS-CBN mainly argues that instead of issuing the CDO, the NTC should have allowed
ABS-CBN to continue its operations pending Congress' determination of whether or not to renew its legislative
franchise based on the bills already filed therefor. In this regard, ABS-CBN posits that "the plenary power of
Congress to grant or renew a franchise necessarily includes the corollary power to define and preserve rights and
obligations pending its final determination of the matter." Therefore, by disregarding the pending bills for the
renewal of ABS-CBN's franchise, the NTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed CDO.
NTC explained that in view of the wording of the Constitution and related laws, as well as prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter, it could not issue a provisional authority in favor of ABS-CBN pending the
deliberations of the Congress on its franchise, as to do so would amount to an encroachment into the exclusive
power of Congress to grant legislative franchises to broadcasting companies. Expressing regret over its failure to
notify the House of Representatives of its decision to issue the assailed CDO, the NTC assured that it will abide by
any law passed by Congress regarding the matter.
House of Representatives filed its Comment Ad Cautelam, similarly seeking to be discharged as a party to
the case since there is no cause of action or any relief sought by ABS-CBN as against it in the petition. Moreover,
the House of Representatives asserted that any inquiry into its actions at this stage in the deliberations on ABS-
CBN's franchise will be premature and offensive to the doctrine of separation of powers.

Issue:
whether or not the NTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed CDO against ABS-CBN.

Held:
In light of the supervening denial of the pending House bills for the renewal of ABS-CBN's legislative
franchise, the Court finds it appropriate to dismiss this case on the ground of mootness.

38
 Broadly speaking, "a franchise is defined to be a special privilege to, do certain things conferred by
government on an individual or corporation, and which does not belong to citizens generally of common
right." Insofar as the great powers of government are concerned, "[a] franchise is basically a legislative grant of
a special privilege to a person." In Associated Communications & Wireless Services v. NTC (Associated
Communications), the Court defined a "franchise [as] the privilege granted by the State through its legislative
body x x x subject to regulation by the State itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative
agencies." On this score, Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution further states that "for the operation of a
public utility," no "such franchise or right [shall] be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."
In closing, while the Court understands the plight and concerns of ABS-CBN, its employees, and its
supporters in general, it wishes to emphasize that the act of granting or renewing legislative franchises is beyond
the Court's power. Congress has the sole authority to grant and renew legislative franchises for broadcasting
entities, such as ABS-CBN, to legally broadcast their programs through allocated frequencies for the purpose. As it
presently stands, the legislative branch of our government has yet to grant or renew ABS-CBN's legislative
franchise, which decision - whether fortunate or unfortunate - this Court must impartially respect, else it violates
the fundamental principle of separation of powers.

g. Araullo vs Aquino
Araullo vs Aquino III
July 1, 2014
Facts:
On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the
Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional ₱50 Million each as
"incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public statement
entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program, explaining that the funds released to
the Senators had been part of the [Disbursement Acceleration Program] DAP, a program designed by the DBM to
ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion.
At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the
fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges posed by the petitioners against the DAP
indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public money pooled from
programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his
constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to augment
the appropriations of offices within the Executive Branch of the Government. But the challenges are further
complicated by the interjection of allegations of transfer of funds to agencies or offices outside of the Executive.
The respondents submit that there is no actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication in the absence of
adverse claims between the parties; that the petitioners lacked legal standing to sue because no allegations were
made to the effect that they had suffered any injury as a result of the adoption of the DAP and issuance of NBC No.
541. The respondents aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition are not proper actions for
directly assailing the constitutionality and validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541.
The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual situations that the petitioners can
question either in the trial courts or in the COA; that if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either of the
trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial courts by petition for review on certiorari, or

39
assail the decision or final order of the COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Issue:
Whether Disbursement Acceleration Program violates the separation of power.

Held:
Yes; unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments under the DAP were not savings, and
the use of such appropriations contravened Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), must be made upon a concurrence of
the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are
savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to
augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.
First Requisite–GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize transfers of funds under the
DAP; hence, transfers under the DAP were unconstitutional. A reading shows, however, that the aforequoted
provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying the phrase
"for their respective offices" contained in Section 25(5), supra. The impact of the phrase "for their respective
offices" was to authorize only transfers of funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer
was to an item of appropriation within the Executive). The provisions carried a different phrase ("to augment any
item in this Act"), and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds
from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive. To
that extent did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the Constitution. At the very least, the aforequoted provisions
cannot be used to claim authority to transfer appropriations from the Executive to another branch, or to a
constitutional commission.
Even had a valid law authorizing the transfer of funds pursuant to Section 25(5), supra, existed, there still
remained two other requisites to be met, namely: that the source of funds to be transferred were savings from
appropriations within the respective offices; and that the transfer must be for the purpose of augmenting an item of
appropriation within the respective offices.
In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles should be borne in mind. The first principle is that
Congress wields the power of the purse. Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPs to fund; and
the amounts of money to be spent for each PAP. The second principle is that the Executive, as the department of
the Government tasked to enforce the laws, is expected to faithfully execute the GAA and to spend the budget in
accordance with the provisions of the GAA. The Executive is expected to faithfully implement the PAPs for
which Congress allocated funds, and to limit the expenditures within the allocations, unless exigencies result
to deficiencies for which augmentation is authorized, subject to the conditions provided by law. The third
principle is that in making the President’s power to augment operative under the GAA, Congress recognizes
the need for flexibility in budget execution. In so doing, Congress diminishes its own power of the purse, for
it delegates a fraction of its power to the Executive. But Congress does not thereby allow the Executive to
override its authority over the purse as to let the Executive exceed its delegated authority. And the fourth
principle is that savings should be actual. "Actual" denotes something that is real or substantial, or
something that exists presently in fact, as opposed to something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential
or hypothetical.
40
 Although the OSG rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to
faithfully execute the laws (which included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that
allowed the President to substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the
provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from
Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth resided in Congress, not in the Executive. Moreover,
leaving the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would threaten to undo the principle of separation of
powers.
Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse whenever
it deliberates and acts on the budget proposal submitted by the Executive. Its power of the purse is touted as the
very foundation of its institutional strength, and underpins "all other legislative decisions and regulating the
balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches of government." Such enormous power
encompasses the capacity to generate money for the Government, to appropriate public funds, and to spend the
money. Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse, Congress wields control by specifying the PAPs [or
program, activity or project] for which public money should be spent.
Third Requisite – Cross-border augmentations from savings were prohibited by the Constitution. By
providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment any
item in the GAA "for their respective offices," Section 25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their offices,
such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the guise of
augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-
border augmentations.

h. Belgica vs Ochoa
Belgica vs Ochoa
November 19, 2013
Facts:
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members
of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term‘s
usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund.
NBI began its probe into allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the
past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for
scores of ghost projects." The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles– had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs
were supposedly the ultimate recipients of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), the whistle-blowers
declared that the money was diverted into Napoles’ private accounts."
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Pork Barrel funds.

Issue 5:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

41
Held:
It violates separation of powers:
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government
unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation
of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s
performance of its constitutionally assigned function"; and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one
branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another." n other words, there is a violation of the
principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s
functions.
The Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of
implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive.
Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the
Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress’ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any
post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and
hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.
It violates non-delegability of legislative power;
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the
body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the
process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise
embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would
be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on
purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law,
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making
authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent
rule-making). The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of
People v. Maceren as follows: The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative
regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law."
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged
in Congress.
It violates checks and balances
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not
mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government.
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 In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson
relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently
auditing the utilization of said Funds." Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or
amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides
for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the
Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify
even commendable ends.

4. Separation of the church and state

a. Estrada vs Escritor
Estrada vs Escritor
A.M. No. P-02-1651
Facts:
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253,
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor,
court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to
twenty years old. Estrada filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that
the court condones her act.
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her
husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit
of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness." At the time Escritor executed her pledge, her husband was still alive but living with another woman.
Quilapio was likewise married at that time, but had been separated in fact from his wife.
Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock recommended that the case be referred to Executive
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas City for investigation, report and recommendation. In
the course of Judge Maceda's investigation, Escritor again testified that her congregation allows her conjugal
arrangement with Quilapio and it does not consider it immoral. She offered to supply the investigating judge some
clippings which explain the basis of her congregation's belief and practice regarding her conjugal arrangement.
The declaration requires the approval of the elders of the Jehovah's Witnesses congregation and is binding
within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. The Jehovah's
congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the couple cannot secure the civil authorities'
approval of the marital relationship because of legal impediments.
DCA Lock stressed that although Escritor had become capacitated to marry by the time she joined the
judiciary as her husband had died a year before, "it is due to her relationship with a married man, voluntarily
carried on, that respondent may still be subject to disciplinary action."

Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral
conduct."

Held:
43
 No; courts must define religion for constitutional and other legal purposes. It was in the 1890 case of Davis
v. Beason that the United States Supreme Court first had occasion to define religion, viz:

The term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of
reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will. It is often confounded with the cultus or form of
worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter. The First Amendment to the Constitution, in
declaring that Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or forbidding the free exercise
thereof, was intended to allow everyone under the jurisdiction of the United States to entertain such notions
respecting his relations to his Maker and the duties they impose as may be approved by his judgment and
conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments in such form of worship as he may think proper, not injurious to the equal
rights of others, and to prohibit legislation for the support of any religious tenets, or the modes of worship of any
sect.

In United States v. Ballard that the free exercise of religion "embraces the right to maintain theories
of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths."
In 1961, the Court, in Torcaso v. Watkins, expanded the term "religion" to non-theistic beliefs such as
Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular Humanism. Four years later, the Court faced a definitional
problem in United States v. Seeger which involved four men who claimed "conscientious objector" status in
refusing to serve in the Vietnam War. One of the four, Seeger, was not a member of any organized religion opposed
to war, but when specifically asked about his belief in a Supreme Being, Seeger stated that "you could call (it) a
belief in a Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words that I use." Forest Peter, another one of
the four claimed that after considerable meditation and reflection "on values derived from the Western religious
and philosophical tradition," he determined that it would be "a violation of his moral code to take human life and
that he considered this belief superior to any obligation to the state." The Court avoided a constitutional question
by broadly interpreting not the Free Exercise Clause, but the statutory definition of religion in the Universal
Military Training and Service Act of 1940 which exempt from combat anyone "who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Speaking for the Court, Justice Clark
ruled, viz: Congress, in using the expression 'Supreme Being' rather than the designation 'God,' was merely
clarifying the meaning of religious tradition and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views (and) the test of belief 'in relation to a Supreme Being' is whether a
given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to the orthodox
belief in God.
Federal and state courts have expanded the definition of religion in Seeger to include even non-theistic
beliefs such as Taoism or Zen Buddhism. It has been proposed that basically, a creed must meet four criteria to
qualify as religion under the First Amendment. First, there must be belief in God or some parallel belief that
occupies a central place in the believer's life. Second, the religion must involve a moral code transcending
individual belief, i.e., it cannot be purely subjective. Third, a demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary, but the
court must not inquire into the truth or reasonableness of the belief. Fourth, there must be some associational ties,
although there is also a view that religious beliefs held by a single person rather than being part of the teachings of
any kind of group or sect are entitled to the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.
The Establishment Clause mandates separation of church and state to protect each from the other, in service
of the larger goal of preserving religious liberty. The effect of the separation is to limit the opportunities for any
religious group to capture the state apparatus to the disadvantage of those of other faiths, or of no faith at all
because history has shown that religious fervor conjoined with state power is likely to tolerate far less religious
disagreement and disobedience from those who hold different beliefs than an enlightened secular state. In the
words of the U.S. Supreme Court, the two clauses are interrelated, viz: "(the structure of our government has, for

44
the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it
has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority."
Consequently, U.S. jurisprudence has produced two identifiably different, even opposing, strains of
jurisprudence on the religion clauses: separation (in the form of strict separation or the tamer version of strict
neutrality or separation) and benevolent neutrality or accommodation. A view of the landscape of U.S. religion
clause cases would be useful in understanding these two strains, the scope of protection of each clause, and the
tests used in religious clause cases. Most of these cases are cited as authorities in Philippine religion clause cases.
The Court first interpreted the Free Exercise Clause in the 1878 case of Reynolds v. United States. This
landmark case involved Reynolds, a Mormon who proved that it was his religious duty to have several wives and
that the failure to practice polygamy by male members of his religion when circumstances would permit would be
punished with damnation in the life to come. Reynolds' act of contracting a second marriage violated Section 5352,
Revised Statutes prohibiting and penalizing bigamy, for which he was convicted. The Court affirmed Reynolds'
conviction, using what in jurisprudence would be called the belief-action test which allows absolute protection to
belief but not to action. It cited Jefferson's Bill Establishing Religious Freedom which, according to the Court,
declares "the true distinction between what properly belongs to the Church and what to the State."
 But while the belief-action test has been abandoned, the rulings in the earlier Free Exercise cases have
gone unchallenged. The belief-action distinction is still of some importance though as there remains an absolute
prohibition of governmental proscription of beliefs.
The Free Exercise Clause accords absolute protection to individual religious convictions and beliefs and
proscribes government from questioning a person's beliefs or imposing penalties or disabilities based solely on
those beliefs. The Clause extends protection to both beliefs and unbelief.
Thus, in Torcaso v. Watkins, a unanimous Court struck down a state law requiring as a qualification for
public office an oath declaring belief in the existence of God. The protection also allows courts to look into the
good faith of a person in his belief, but prohibits inquiry into the truth of a person's religious beliefs. As held in
United States v. Ballard, "(h)eresy trials are foreign to the Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot prove.
They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs."
Next to belief which enjoys virtually absolute protection, religious speech and expressive religious conduct
are accorded the highest degree of protection. Thus, in the 1940 case of Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court struck
down a state law prohibiting door-to-door solicitation for any religious or charitable cause without prior approval
of a state agency. The law was challenged by Cantwell, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses which is committed
to active proselytizing. The Court invalidated the state statute as the prior approval necessary was held to be a
censorship of religion prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause.
Compared this in Philippine jurisprudence:

Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute
but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society. . . In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to
infringe the protected freedom.
The Court stated, however, that government had the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of
solicitation on the streets and assure the peace and safety of the community.
The least protected under the Free Exercise Clause is religious conduct, usually in the form of
unconventional religious practices. Protection in this realm depends on the character of the action and the
government rationale for regulating the action. The Mormons' religious conduct of polygamy is an example of
unconventional religious practice. As discussed in the Reynolds case above, the Court did not afford protection to
the practice. Reynolds was reiterated in the 1890 case of Davis again involving Mormons, where the Court held,
viz: "(c)rime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion."

45
 The Court abandoned the simplistic belief-action distinction and instead recognized the deliberate-
inadvertent distinction, i.e., the distinction between deliberate state interference of religious exercise for
religious reasons which was plainly unconstitutional and government's inadvertent interference with
religion in pursuing some secular objective.
In the 1940 case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the Court upheld a local school board
requirement that all public school students participate in a daily flag salute program, including the Jehovah's
Witnesses who were forced to salute the American flag in violation of their religious training, which considered
flag salute to be worship of a "graven image." The Court recognized that the general requirement of compulsory
flag salute inadvertently burdened the Jehovah Witnesses' practice of their religion, but justified the government
regulation as an appropriate means of attaining national unity, which was the "basis of national security." Thus,
although the Court was already aware of the deliberate-inadvertent distinction in government interference with
religion, it continued to hold that the Free Exercise Clause presented no problem to interference with religion that
was inadvertent no matter how serious the interference, no matter how trivial the state's non-religious objectives,
and no matter how many alternative approaches were available to the state to pursue its objectives with less impact
on religion, so long as government was acting in pursuit of a secular objective.
Three years later, the Gobitis decision was overturned in West Virginia v. Barnette which involved a similar
set of facts and issue. The Court recognized that saluting the flag, in connection with the pledges, was a form of
utterance and the flag salute program was a compulsion of students to declare a belief. The Court ruled that
"compulsory unification of opinions leads only to the unanimity of the graveyard" and exempt the students who
were members of the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag. A close scrutiny of the case, however, would
show that it was decided not on the issue of religious conduct as the Court said, "(n)or does the issue as we see it
turn on one's possession of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are held. While religion
supplies appellees' motive for enduring the discomforts of making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not
share these religious views hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual."
Nearly a century after Reynolds employed the belief-action test, the Warren Court began the modern free
exercise jurisprudence. A two-part balancing test was established in Braunfeld v. Brown169 where the Court
considered the constitutionality of applying Sunday closing laws to Orthodox Jews whose beliefs required them to
observe another day as the Sabbath and abstain from commercial activity on Saturday. Chief Justice Warren,
writing for the Court, found that the law placed a severe burden on Sabattarian retailers. He noted, however, that
since the burden was the indirect effect of a law with a secular purpose, it would violate the Free Exercise Clause
only if there were alternative ways of achieving the state's interest. He employed a two-part balancing test of
validity where the first step was for plaintiff to show that the regulation placed a real burden on his religious
exercise. Next, the burden would be upheld only if the state showed that it was pursuing an overriding secular goal
by the means which imposed the least burden on religious practices

Two years after came the stricter compelling state interest test in the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner. This
test was similar to the two-part balancing test in Braunfeld,172 but this latter test stressed that the state interest was
not merely any colorable state interest, but must be paramount and compelling to override the free exercise claim.
In this case, Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, claimed unemployment compensation under the law as her
employment was terminated for refusal to work on Saturdays on religious grounds. Her claim was denied. She
sought recourse in the Supreme Court. In laying down the standard for determining whether the denial of benefits
could withstand constitutional scrutiny, the Court ruled, viz:
Plainly enough, appellee's conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no conduct prompted by
religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation. If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina
Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as
a beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any

46
incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest in the
regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate.
This germinal case of Sherbert firmly established the exemption doctrine: "It is certain that not every
conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some 'compelling state interest' intervenes."
In Thomas v. Review Board and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Division, for example, the Court
reiterated the exemption doctrine and held that in the absence of a compelling justification, a state could not
withhold unemployment compensation from an employee who resigned or was discharged due to unwillingness to
depart from religious practices and beliefs that conflicted with job requirements. But not every governmental
refusal to allow an exemption from a regulation which burdens a sincerely held religious belief has been
invalidated, even though strict or heightened scrutiny is applied.
The strict scrutiny and compelling state interest test significantly increased the degree of protection
afforded to religiously motivated conduct. While not affording absolute immunity to religious activity, a
compelling secular justification was necessary to uphold public policies that collided with religious practices.
Although the members of the Court often disagreed over which governmental interests should be considered
compelling, thereby producing dissenting and separate opinions in religious conduct cases, this general test
established a strong presumption in favor of the free exercise of religion.
The Court's first encounter with the Establishment Clause was in the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of
Education. It was in the Everson case that the U.S. Supreme Court adopted Jefferson's metaphor of "a wall of
separation between church and state" as encapsulating the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
In Everson v. Board of Education, for example, the issue was whether a New Jersey local school board
could reimburse parents for expenses incurred in transporting their children to and from Catholic schools. The
reimbursement was part of a general program under which all parents of children in public schools and nonprofit
private schools, regardless of religion, were entitled to reimbursement for transportation costs. Justice Hugo Black,
writing for a sharply divided Court, justified the reimbursements on the child benefit theory, i.e., that the school
board was merely furthering the state's legitimate interest in getting children "regardless of their religion, safely
and expeditiously to and from accredited schools."
By 1971, the Court integrated the different elements of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence that
evolved in the 1950s and 1960s and laid down a three-pronged test in Lemon v. Kurtzman in determining the
constitutionality of policies challenged under the Establishment Clause. This case involved a Pennsylvania
statutory program providing publicly funded reimbursement for the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials in secular subjects and a Rhode Island statute providing salary supplements to teachers in
parochial schools. The Lemon test requires a challenged policy to meet the following criteria to pass scrutiny under
the Establishment Clause. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its primary or
principal effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion (Board of Education v. Allen, 392 US
236, 243, 20 L Ed 2d 1060, 1065, 88 S Ct 1923 [1968]); finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
entanglement with religion.' (Walz v.Tax Commission, 397 US 664, 668, 25 L Ed 2d 697, 701, 90 S Ct 1409
[1970])" Using this test, the Court held that the Pennsylvania statutory program and Rhode Island statute were
unconstitutional as fostering excessive entanglement between government and religion.

Strict Neutrality v. Benevolent Neutrality

To be sure, the cases discussed above, while citing many landmark decisions in the religious clauses area, are but a
small fraction of the hundreds of religion clauses cases that the U.S. Supreme Court has passed upon. Court rulings
contrary to or making nuances of the above cases may be cited. Professor McConnell poignantly recognizes this,
viz: Thus, as of today, it is constitutional for a state to hire a Presbyterian minister to lead the legislature in daily
prayers (Marsh v. Chambers, 463 US783, 792-93[1983]), but unconstitutional for a state to set aside a moment of
47
silence in the schools for children to pray if they want to (Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 US 38, 56 [1985]). It is
unconstitutional for a state to require employers to accommodate their employees' work schedules to their sabbath
observances (Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 US 703, 709-10 [1985]) but constitutionally mandatory for a
state to require employers to pay workers compensation when the resulting inconsistency between work and
sabbath leads to discharge (. . .Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US 398, 403-4 [1963]). It is constitutional for the
government to give money to religiously-affiliated organizations to teach adolescents about proper sexual behavior
(Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 US 589, 611 [1988]), but not to teach them science or history (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
US 602, 618-619 [1971]). It is constitutional for the government to provide religious school pupils with books
(Board of Education v. Allen, 392 US 236, 238 [1968]), but not with maps (Wolman v. Walter, 433 US 229, 249-
51 [1977]); with bus rides to religious schools (Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1, 17 [1947]), but not from
school to a museum on a field trip (Wolman v. Walter, 433 US 229, 252-55 [1977]); with cash to pay for state-
mandated standardized tests (Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 US 646, 653-54
[1980]), but not to pay for safety-related maintenance (Committee for Pub. Educ v. Nyquist, 413 US 756, 774-80
[1973]). It is a mess.

The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are anchored on a different reading of the
"wall of separation." The strict separationist view holds that Jefferson meant the "wall of separation" to protect the
state from the church.
A tamer version of the strict separationist view, the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by
the Court, showing the Court's tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular society. It finds basis in the
Everson case where the Court declared that Jefferson's "wall of separation" encapsulated the meaning of the First
Amendment but at the same time held that the First Amendment "requires the state to be neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power
is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." While the strict neutrality approach is not
hostile to religion, it is strict in holding that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of
governmental action, whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or obligations. Only secular
criteria may be the basis of government action. It does not permit, much less require, accommodation of secular
programs to religious belief.
However, if the strict neutrality standard is applied in interpreting the Establishment Clause, it could de
facto void religious expression in the Free Exercise Clause. As pointed out by Justice Goldberg in his concurring
opinion in Schempp, strict neutrality could lead to "a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a
passive, or even active, hostility to the religious" which is prohibited by the Constitution.
The separationist approach, whether strict or tame, is caught in a dilemma because while the Jeffersonian
wall of separation "captures the spirit of the American ideal of church-state separation", in real life church and state
are not and cannot be totally separate.
Consequently, the Court has also decided cases employing benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality
which gives room for accommodation is buttressed by a different view of the "wall of separation" associated with
Williams, founder of the Rhode Island colony. In Mark DeWolfe Howe's classic, The Garden and the Wilderness,
he asserts that to the extent the Founders had a wall of separation in mind, it was unlike the Jeffersonian wall that is
meant to protect the state from the church; instead, the wall is meant to protect the church from the state, i.e., the
"garden" of the church must be walled in for its own protection from the "wilderness" of the world with its
potential for corrupting those values so necessary to religious commitment.
The Williams wall is, however, breached for the church is in the state and so the remaining purpose of the
wall is to safeguard religious liberty. Williams' view would therefore allow for interaction between church and
state, but is strict with regard to state action which would threaten the integrity of religious commitment. His
conception of separation is not total such that it provides basis for certain interactions between church and state
dictated by apparent necessity or practicality.
48
 Benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government's favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect
therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. As Justice
Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into account…to exempt, when possible, from generally
applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish."

Strict neutrality holds that government should base public policy solely on secular considerations, without
regard to the religious consequences of its actions.
An accommodationist holds that it is good public policy, and sometimes constitutionally required, for the
state to make conscious and deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. On the other hand, the
strict neutrality adherent believes that it is good public policy, and also constitutionally required, for the
government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of inhibiting religious exercise. Second, the
accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the First Amendment. The principle underlying the First
Amendment is that freedom to carry out one's duties to a Supreme Being is an inalienable right, not one dependent
on the grace of legislature. Third, the accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to protect
adherents of minority religions from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which include ignorance and
indifference and overt hostility to the minority. Fourth, the accommodationist position is practical as it is a
commonsensical way to deal with the various needs and beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic nation. Without
accommodation, many otherwise beneficial laws would interfere severely with religious freedom.
Benevolent neutrality gives room for different kinds of accommodation: those which are constitutionally
compelled, i.e., required by the Free Exercise Clause; and those which are discretionary or legislative, i.e., and
those not required by the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by the Establishment Clause.

Using benevolent neutrality as a standard could result to three situations

of accommodation: those where accommodation is required, those where it is permissible, and those
where it is prohibited. In the first situation, accommodation is required to preserve free exercise protections and not
unconstitutionally infringe on religious liberty or create penalties for religious freedom. Contrary to the Smith
declaration that free exercise exemptions are "intentional government advancement", these exemptions merely
relieve the prohibition on the free exercise thus allowing the burdened religious adherent to be left alone. The state
must create exceptions to laws of general applicability when these laws threaten religious convictions or practices
in the absence of a compelling state interest.

Number 24 of Code: Freedom of Religion_Extended

In other words, a three-step process (also referred to as the "two-step balancing process" supra when the
second and third steps are combined) as in Sherbert is followed in weighing the state's interest and religious
freedom when these collide. Three questions are answered in this process. First, "(h)as the statute or government
action created a burden on the free exercise of religion?" The courts often look into the sincerity of the
religious belief, but without inquiring into the truth of the belief because the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth as held in Ballard and Cantwell. The sincerity of the claimant's
belief is ascertained to avoid the mere claim of religious beliefs to escape a mandatory regulation. Second, the
court asks: "(i)s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of religious liberty?" In
this step, the government has to establish that its purposes are legitimate for the
49
state and that they are compelling. Government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if
exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if
exemptions are granted. Third, the court asks: "(h)as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate
goal of the state?" The analysis requires the state to show that the means in which it is achieving its
legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means , i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate
state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties.
Thus, the "grave and imminent danger" test laid down in a dissenting opinion in German which involved
prior restraint of religious worship with overtones of the right to free speech and assembly, was transported to
Ebralinag which did not involve prior restraint of religious worship, speech or assembly. Although, it might be
observed that the Court faintly implied that Ebralinag also involved the right to free speech when in its preliminary
remarks, the Court stated that compelling petitioners to participate in the flag ceremony "is alien to the conscience
of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free
speech and the free exercise of religious profession and worship;" the Court then stated in a footnote that the "flag
salute, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge are all forms of utterances."
The "compelling state interest" test was not fully applied by the Court in Ebralinag. In the Solicitor
General's consolidated comment, one of the grounds cited to defend the expulsion orders issued by the public
respondents was that "the State's compelling interests being pursued by the DEC's lawful regulations in question do
not warrant exemption of the school children of the Jehovah's Witnesses from the flag salute ceremonies on the
basis of their own self-perceived religious convictions." The Court, however, referred to the test only towards the
end of the decision and did not even mention what the Solicitor General argued as the compelling state interest,
much less did the Court explain why the interest was not sufficiently compelling to override petitioners' religious
freedom.
Three years after Ebralinag, the Court decided the 1996 case of Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, et
al.
Although there was a dissent with respect to the applicability of the "clear and present danger" test in this
case, the majority opinion in unequivocal terms applied the "clear and present danger" test to religious speech. This
case involved the television program, "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," regularly aired over the television. Upon petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo's submission of the VTR tapes of some of its episodes, respondent Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television classified these as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and
constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."
The Court then called to mind the "clear and present danger" test first laid down in the American Bible
Society case and the test of "immediate and grave danger" with "infringement only to the smallest extent necessary
to avoid danger" in Victoriano and pointed out that the reviewing board failed to apply the "clear and present
danger" test. Applying the test, the Court noted, viz:

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is
completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the
tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

Replying to the challenge on the applicability of the "clear and present danger" test to the case, the Court
acknowledged the permutations that the test has undergone, but stressed that the test is still applied to four types of

50
speech: "speech that advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction, out of court
contempt and release of information that endangers a fair trial" and ruled, viz:

. . . even allowing the drift of American jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear and present danger
test to the case at bar which concerns speech that attacks other religions and could readily provoke hostile
audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb and disturb terribly.

In Philippine jurisdiction, there is substantial agreement on the values sought to be protected by the Establishment
Clause, namely, voluntarism and insulation of the political process from interfaith dissension.

How the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause will be resolved is a
question for determination in the actual cases that come to the Court. In cases involving both the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, the two clauses should be balanced against each other. The courts must
review all the relevant facts and determine whether there is a sufficiently strong free exercise right that should
prevail over the Establishment Clause problem.
In our jurisdiction, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. asserts that a literal interpretation of the religion clauses
does not suffice. Modern society is characterized by the expanding regulatory arm of government that
reaches a variety of areas of human conduct and an expanding concept of religion. To adequately meet the
demands of this modern society, the societal values the religion clauses are intended to protect must be
considered in their interpretation and resolution of the tension. This, in fact, has been the approach followed
by the Philippine Court.
As a result, in a case where the party claims religious liberty in the face of a general law that inadvertently
burdens his religious exercise, he faces an almost insurmountable wall in convincing the Court that the wall of
separation would not be breached if the Court grants him an exemption. These conclusions, however, are not and
were never warranted by the 1987, 1973 and 1935 Constitutions as shown by other provisions on religion in all
three constitutions. It is a cardinal rule in constitutional construction that the constitution must be interpreted as a
whole and apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that will give to all
of them full force and effect. From this construction, it will be ascertained that the intent of the framers was to
adopt a benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religious clauses in the Philippine constitutions, and
the enforcement of this intent is the goal of construing the constitution.
Although our constitutional history and interpretation mandate benevolent neutrality, benevolent neutrality
does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. But it
does mean that the Court will not look with hostility or act indifferently towards religious beliefs and practices and
that it will strive to accommodate them when it can within flexible constitutional limits; it does mean that the Court
will not simply dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in question offends a law or
the orthodox view for this precisely is the protection afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution, i.e., that in
the absence of legislation granting exemption from a law of general applicability, the Court can carve out an
exception when the religion clauses justify it. While the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can
eliminate the difficult questions of judgment in determining the degree of burden on religious practice or
importance of the state interest or the sufficiency of the means adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court
can set a doctrine on the ideal towards which religious clause jurisprudence should be directed.
We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent
neutrality approach not only because of its merits as discussed above, but more importantly, because our
constitutional history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from
which the Court should take off in interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal towards which this approach is
directed is the protection of religious liberty "not only for a minority, however small- not only for a majority,
however large- but for each of us" to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.
51
 But while history, constitutional construction, and earlier jurisprudence unmistakably show that benevolent
neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view religion clause cases, it must be stressed that the interest
of the state should also be afforded utmost protection. To do this, a test must be applied to draw the line between
permissible and forbidden religious exercise. It is quite paradoxical that in order for the members of a society to
exercise their freedoms, including their religious liberty, the law must set a limit when their exercise offends the
higher interest of the state. To do otherwise is self-defeating for unlimited freedom would erode order in the state
and foment anarchy, eventually destroying the very state its members established to protect their freedoms. The
very purpose of the social contract by which people establish the state is for the state to protect their liberties; for
this purpose, they give up a portion of these freedoms - including the natural right to free exercise - to the state. It
was certainly not the intention of the authors of the constitution that free exercise could be used to countenance
actions that would undo the constitutional order that guarantees free exercise.
The all important question then is the test that should be used in ascertaining the limits of the exercise of
religious freedom. Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the
first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger"
test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The
Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the
established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as
well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least
restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state
interest" test. After Victoriano, German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and
immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the
"clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of American Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which
employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another,
religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and
German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law.
Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test. Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test,
but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human
conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others
delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, NOT any
interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this
is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the
most inalienable and sacred of all human rights".
As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental
right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not
appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious
liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the
state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall
prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state
interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on
Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks
to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved.

52
 Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies -- including
protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small- not only for a majority, however large- but
for each of us" -- the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise
could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities. In the realm of religious exercise, benevolent neutrality
that gives room for accommodation carries out this promise, provided the compelling interests of the state are not
eroded for the preservation of the state is necessary to the preservation of religious liberty. That is why benevolent
neutrality is necessary in a pluralistic society such as the United States and the Philippines to accommodate those
minority religions which are politically powerless.
The distinction between public and secular morality as expressed - albeit not exclusively - in the law, on the
one hand, and religious morality, on the other, is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bar should be understood
only in this realm where it has authority. More concretely, should the Court declare respondent's conduct as
immoral and hold her administratively liable, the Court will be holding that in the realm of public morality, her
conduct is reprehensible or there are state interests overriding her religious freedom. For as long as her conduct is
being judged within this realm, she will be accountable to the state. But in so ruling, the Court does not and cannot
say that her conduct should be made reprehensible in the realm of her church where it is presently sanctioned and
that she is answerable for her immorality to her Jehovah God nor that other religions prohibiting her conduct are
correct. On the other hand, should the Court declare her conduct permissible, the Court will be holding that under
her unique circumstances, public morality is not offended or that upholding her religious freedom is an interest
higher than upholding public morality thus her conduct should not be penalized.
Having distinguished between public and secular morality and religious morality, the more difficult task is
determining which immoral acts under this public and secular morality fall under the phrase "disgraceful and
immoral conduct" for which a government employee may be held administratively liable. The line is not easy to
draw for it is like "a line that divides land and sea, a coastline of irregularities and indentations."
But the case at bar does not require us to comprehensively delineate between those immoral acts for which
one may be held administratively liable and those to which administrative liability does not attach. We need not
concern ourselves in this case therefore whether "laziness, gluttony, vanity, selfishness, avarice and cowardice" are
immoral acts which constitute grounds for administrative liability. Nor need we expend too much energy grappling
with the propositions that not all immoral acts are illegal or not all illegal acts are immoral, or different
jurisdictions have different standards of morality as discussed by the dissents and separate opinions, although these
observations and propositions are true and correct. It is certainly a fallacious argument that because there are
exceptions to the general rule that the "law is the witness and deposit of our moral life," then the rule is not true; in
fact, that there are exceptions only affirms the truth of the rule. Likewise, the observation that morality is relative in
different jurisdictions only affirms the truth that there is morality in a particular jurisdiction; without, however,
discounting the truth that underneath the moral relativism are certain moral absolutes such as respect for life and
truth-telling, without which no society will survive. Only one conduct is in question before this Court, i.e., the
conjugal arrangement of a government employee whose partner is legally married to another which Philippine law
and jurisprudence consider both immoral and illegal. Lest the Court inappropriately engage in the impossible task
of prescribing comprehensively how one ought to live, the Court must focus its attention upon the sole conduct in
question before us.
The case at bar being one of first impression, we now subject the respondent's claim of religious freedom to
the "compelling state interest" test from a benevolent neutrality stance - i.e. entertaining the possibility that
respondent's claim to religious freedom would warrant carving out an exception from the Civil Service Law;
necessarily, her defense of religious freedom will be unavailing should the government succeed in demonstrating a
more compelling state interest.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent's right to religious freedom has been burdened.
There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice
53
and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the
other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion. In Sherbert, the Court found that Sherbert's religious
exercise was burdened as the denial of unemployment benefits "forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion
in order to accept work, on the other hand." The burden on respondent in the case at bar is even greater as the price
she has to pay for her employment is not only her religious precept but also her family which, by the Declaration
Pledging Faithfulness, stands "honorable before God and men."
The second step is to ascertain respondent's sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in
her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid
punishment for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral
standards are strict and defined, much less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against her.
To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent's stance that her conjugal
arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the
Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court's action would
be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom.
We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent's claim of religious freedom, but must instead
apply the "compelling state interest" test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an
opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state's compelling interest which can override respondent's
religious belief and practice. To repeat, this is a case of first impression where we are applying the "compelling
state interest" test in a case involving purely religious conduct. The careful application of the
test is indispensable as how we will decide the case will make a decisive difference in the life of the respondent
who stands not only before the Court but before her Jehovah God.

b. Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of

Justice Building in QC
March 7, 2017 A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC
Facts:
This controversy originated from a series of letters, written by Tony Q. Valenciano and addressed to then
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. Valenciano reported that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City (QC)
had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory table, images of Catholic religious
icons, a canopy, an electric organ, and a projector. He believed that such practice violated the constitutional
provision on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of
public money or property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion.
Valenciano further averred that the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice showed that
it tended to favor Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals of the choir caused great disturbance to other employees;
that the public could no longer use the basement as resting place; that the employees and litigants of the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO), Branches 82 and 83 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Legal Library, Philippine
Mediation Center, and Records Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) could not attend to their personal
necessities such as going to the lavatories because they could not traverse the basement between 12:00 o'clock
noontime and 1: 15 o'clock in the afternoon; that the court employees became hostile toward each other as they
vied for the right to read the epistle; and that the water supply in the entire building was cut off during the mass
because the generator was turned off to ensure silence.

54
 Judge Maceren clarified that the basement of the QC Hall of Justice was known as the prayer corner. He
opined that the use of the said area for holding masses did not violate the constitutional prohibition against the use
of public property for religious purposes because the religious character of such use was merely incidental to a
temporary use. Judge Bay recommended that, pending the final resolution of the case, daily masses be permitted to
continue, provided that: (1) the mass be limited to thirty (30) minutes; (2) no loud singing be allowed so as not to
disturb others; and (3) the inconveniences caused by the mass be addressed.
Judge Lutero reported that Catholic masses were being held only during lunch breaks and did not disturb
court proceedings; that the basement of the QC Hall of Justice could still be used as waiting area for the public;
that court personnel and the public were never physically prevented from reaching the lavatories during mass as
there was a clear path from the public offices leading to the comfort rooms; that water service interruptions were
caused by maintenance problems and not because the water pump was being shut off during mass; and that the
elevators could not be used during mass because elevator attendants took their lunch break from twelve (12)
o'clock to one (1) o'clock in the afternoon.
OCA believed that the practical inconveniences cited by Valenciano were unfounded. It, thus,
recommended that his letter-complaints, dated January 6, 2009, May 13, 2009 and March 23, 2010, be dismissed
for lack of merit and that the RTC and MeTC Executive Judges of QC be directed to closely regulate and monitor
the holding of masses and other religious practices within the premises of the QC Hall of Justice.

Issue:
Whether the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the
Constitutional Principle of Separation of Church and State.

Held:
No; the Holding of Religious Rituals in the Halls of Justice does not Amount to a Union of Church and
State.
The rationale of the rule is summed up in the familiar saying, "Strong fences make good neighbors." The
idea is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and, thus, avoid encroachments by one against the
other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. The demarcation line
calls on the entities to "render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are
God's."
This, notwithstanding, the State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have some form of belief
system, whether such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even an outright rejection of
religion. Our very own Constitution recognizes the heterogeneity and religiosity of our people as reflected in
lmbong v. Ochoa.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality innate in our nature
and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble,
it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the
purest principles of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption
of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in
public schools.
"The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect - freedom to believe and freedom to act
on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."
As pointed out by Judge Lutero, "the Roman Catholics express their worship through the holy mass and to
stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of their religion. Our Muslim brethren,
who are government employees, are allowed to worship their Allah even during office hours inside their own
55
offices. The Seventh Day Adventists are exempted from rendering Saturday duty because their religion prohibits
them from working on a Saturday. Even Christians have been allowed to conduct their own bible studies in their
own offices. All these have been allowed in respect of the workers' right to the free exercise of their religion.
Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state interest. To
successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in the QC Hall of Justice
unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and employees in the performance of their
official functions.
As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the masses were being conducted only during noon
breaks and were not disruptive of public services. The court proceedings were not being distracted or interrupted
and that the performance of the judiciary employees were not being adversely affected. Moreover, no Civil Service
rules were being violated. As there has been no detrimental effect on the public service or prejudice to the State,
there is simply no state interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom in the halls of
justice.
In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of
accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures may not be
imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious
beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of
the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.
The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. It simply means
that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion
over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they
may adopt or teach or practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any
religious organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor an
official religion.
Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice
is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation. First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive
authorities expressly mandating that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary employees
attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there on their own free will and volition, without any
coercion from the judges or administrative officers. Third, no government funds are being spent because the lightings and airconditioning
continue to be operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has neither been converted into a Roman
Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not
prejudiced other religions.
In Manosca v. CA, a parcel of land located in Taguig was determined by the National Historical Institute to be the birthsite of
Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic then sought to expropriate the said property. The exercise of the power of
eminent domain was questioned on the ground that it would only benefit members of Iglesia ni Cristo.

c. Islamic Da’Wah Concil of PH vs. Office of the Exec.

G.R. No. 153888
Facts:
Petitioner is a non-governmental organization internationally accredited to issue halal certifications
in the Philippines. To carry out its functions, it formulated internal rules and procedures based on the
Qur’an and Sunnah for food analysis and inspection, and began to issue certifications to qualified products
and food manufacturers for a fee.

56
 Respondent Office issued Executive Order 46 which created the Philippine Halal Certification
Scheme. Such order vested exclusive authority on the Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to issue halal
certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. OMA then warned Muslim consumers to buy
only products with its official halal certification since those without said certification had not been
subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork.
Petitioner filed a petition to nullify EO 46, contending that it is unconstitutional for the government
to formulate policies & guidelines on the halal certification scheme because it is a function that only
religious organizations can lawfully & validly perform for the Muslims.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 46 is unconstitutional for violating the non-establishment and free exercise
clauses guaranteed under Art. III, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:
Yes. Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are
drawn from the Qur’an & Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products
as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations to interpret for Filipino
Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption; by arrogating to itself the task of issuing
halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur’an &
Sunnah on halal food.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the
premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos right
to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with
ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and
safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.

d. Peralta vs Philpost (G.R. No. 223395, December 4, 2018),

G.R. No. 223395, December 04, 2018
Facts:
On May 10, 2014, respondent Philippine Postal Corporation (PhilPost) issued a stamp commemorating
Iglesia ni Cristo's (INC's) Centennial Celebration. The design of the stamp showed a photo of INC founder, the late
Felix Y. Manalo (Manalo) with the designation on the left side containing the words "Felix Y. Manalo, 1886-1963
First Executive Minister of Iglesia ni Cristo", with the Central Temple of the religious group at the background.
Petitioner Renato V. Peralta (petitioner) filed a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Br. 33 of Manila, assailing the constitutionality of the printing, issuance and distribution of the INC
commemorative centennial stamps, allegedly paid for by respondent PhilPost using public funds.
Petitioner reiterates his argument that the CA failed to judiciously analyze the design of the INC
commemorative stamp as to conclude that the same is "more historical than religious". He argues that the INC
stamp, which commemorates the 100th year founding of INC, particularly the INC Central Temple and centennial
logo, is purely religious. He explains that in Aglipay vs. Ruiz, the stamp deleted the grapevine with stalks of wheat
in its design, and merely contained the Philippine map and the location of the City of Manila, with
57
inscription,"Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, February 3-7, 1937". For petitioner, what was
emphasized in the stamp subject of the case of Aglipay vs. Ruiz was Manila, and not the Eucharistic Congress.
Meanwhile, in this case, the INC stamp purportedly emphasized the INC as a religious institution.

Issue:
Whether respondents' act in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorating the INC's centennial
celebration is unconstitutional.

Held:
No; the non-establishment of religion clause is not equivalent to indifference to religion. The
Constitutional "wall" between the Church and the State, has been jurisprudentially recognized to stem from the
country's unfortunate collective experience when the two institutions are commingled into one entity, exercising
both power and influence, oftentimes to the detriment of the populace.
However, as apparent from the Constitution, the "wall" between the Church and the State exists along with
the recognition of freedom of religion. In fact, review of jurisprudence would reveal that this Court has carefully
weighed this principles as to allow the broadest exercise of religious freedom without infringing the non-
establishment clause.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power
that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble
of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody
their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,"
they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious
purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended
thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher,
minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious
instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the
Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas
Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is
conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain
crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and
133, Revised Penal Code).
In Estrada vs. Escritor, this Court encapsulated its policy towards these kinds of disputes as "benevolent
neutrality": By adopting the above constitutional provisions on religion, the Filipinos manifested their adherence to
the benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religion clauses, an approach that looks further than the
secular purposes of government action and examines the effect of these actions on religious exercise. Benevolent
neutrality recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating influence of religion in
society; at the same time, it acknowledges that government must pursue its secular goals. In pursuing these
goals, however, government might adopt laws or actions of general applicability which inadvertently burden
religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality gives room for accommodation of these religious exercises as required
by the Free Exercise Clause. It allows these breaches in the wall of separation to uphold religious liberty, which
58
after all is the integral purpose of the religion clauses. The case at bar involves this first type of accommodation
where an exemption is sought from a law of general applicability that inadvertently burdens religious exercise.
Verily, where the Court has been asked to determine whether there has been an undue enchroachment of
this Constitutionally forged "wall", this Court has adopted a stance of "benevolent neutrality". Rightfully so, for
this incorporates the Constitutional principle of separation of the Church and the State while recognizing the
people's right to express their belief or non� belief of a Supreme Being. This Court, applying the view of
benevolent neutrality, declared that there was no violation of the non-establishment of religion clause in the recent
case of Re: Letter Of Tony Q. Valenciano.
The "Lemon test", which has been extensively applied by the U. S. Supreme Court in issues involving the
determination of non-establishment of religion clause originated from the case of Lemon vs. Kurtzman. In that
case, the Court used a three-pronged test to adjudge whether the assailed governmental act violated the First
Amendment, as follows:
 The statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
 Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and,
 The statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."
The printing of the INC commemorative stamp did not amount to a violation of the non-establishment of
religion clause. It is plain, that the costs for the printing and issuance of the aforesaid 50,000 stamps were all paid
for by INC. Any perceived use of government property, machines or otherwise, is de minimis and certainly do not
amount to a sponsorship of a specific religion.
There is no law mandating anyone to avail of the INC commemorative stamps, nor is there any law
purporting to require anyone to adopt the INC's teachings. Arguably, while then President Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 815, s. 2014, authorizing the issuance of the INC commemorative stamp, the same did not
contain any legal mandate endorsing or requiring people to conform to the INC's teachings.
The printing of the INC commemorative stamp is no different. It is simply an acknowledgment of INC's
existence for a hundred years. It does not necessarily equate to the State sponsoring the INC.
The design of the INC commemorative stamp is merely an acknowledgment of the historical and
cultural contribution of INC to the Philippine society. All told, therefore, the Court finds no reason or basis to
grant the petition. In refusing to declare unconstitutional the INC's commemorative stamp, this Court is merely
applying jurisprudentially sanctioned policy of benevolent neutrality. To end, it bears to emphasize that the
Constitution establishes separation of the Church and the State, and not separation of religion and state.

5. Civil Supremacy over Military

a. People vs Lagman, GR L-45893
G.R. No. L-45892 July 13, 1938
Facts:
In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa are
charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is
alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and
unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding
the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by
the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in
accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the
filing of the information.

59
 The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the
military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support,
and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be
killed.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of
imprisonment, with the costs. In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused
were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Issue:
Whether the National Defense Law is unconstitutional.

Held:
No; the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against
this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government
to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of
the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein.
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military service
adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate the Constitution, because the power to
establish it is derived from that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This is so
because the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend
the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the
Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and
even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk
the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said
that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of
property to an office or employment.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the actual existence of war does
not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the
defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The
circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to
present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in
complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these
family responsibilities.

6. Independent Foreign Policy

a. Bayan vs Zamora
October 10, 2000
Facts:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement
which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military
personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United States
entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951.
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and
the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the
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Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect,
would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. With the expiration of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted between the two countries were held in
abeyance. Notwithstanding, the defense and security relationship between the Philippines and the United States of
America continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.
On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia
Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino
Jr., to exchange notes on "the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the
Asia-Pacific region." Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified
the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and
the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred
the VFA to its Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F. Ople, and its Committee on National
Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for their joint consideration and recommendation.
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3)
vote of its members. Via these consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners - as legislators, non-
governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers - assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein
respondent’s grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.

Issue:
Whether the VFA is subject to concurrence of the Senate pursuant to Section 21 of Article VII.

Held:
Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which case, the
concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or
international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule
on treatise or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such
as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treatise or those economic in nature. All treaties or international agreements
entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation,
requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the
presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of
the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider
the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that "foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress,
and recognized as such by the other contracting state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel
visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further
defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the
provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of

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determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed
hereunder.
It is a rudiment in legal hermenuetics that when no distinction is made by law, the Court should not
distinguish- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. In like manner, we do not subscribe to the
argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops
and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a perusal of said constitutional provision reveals that the
proscription covers "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities." Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to
the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to " foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities" collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects. The use of
comma and the disjunctive word "or" clearly signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from the
others included in the enumeration, such that, the provision contemplates three different situations - a military
treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities - any of the
three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.

Issue 2:
Whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were complied with when the Senate gave its concurrence to
the VFA.

Held:
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred
in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate is
clearly required so that the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed present. While it
is true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty-the VFA, in the instant case-be
"duly concurred in by the Senate," it is very true however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of
the clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms, requires that the concurrence
of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by a two -thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed,
Section 25, Article XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section 21, Article, VII.
Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed in Section 25, Article XVIII are present, we shall
now pass upon and delve on the requirement that the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the United States of
America. Respondents argue that the letter of United States Ambassador Hubbard stating that the VFA is binding
on the United States Government is conclusive, on the point that the VFA is recognized as a treaty by the United
States of America. According to respondents, the VFA, to be binding, must only be accepted as a treaty by the
United States.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of
America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is
to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is "an international instrument
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation." There are many other
terms used for a treaty or international agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d’
arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All
writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that the names or titles of international agreements included

62
under the general term treaty have little or no legal significance. Certain terms are useful, but they furnish little
more than mere description.
Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding
effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.
International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are equally
binding obligations upon nations.
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even without the
concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, we had occasion to
pronounce: “the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered
into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights,
patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims.
The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.”
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated
that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the
United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its
obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the Senate
should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our nation’s consent to be bound by said treaty, with the
concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may
provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a
treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established
that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be required, (c) the representative of the State has signed
the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears
from the full powers of its representative, or was expressed during the negotiation.
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the
legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes
between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part,
under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution, declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity with all nations.
As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the
conduct of its international relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and not upon any
particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government, the Philippines is nonetheless responsible
for violations committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any official thereof. As an integral part
of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our government, Constitution and laws will carry out
our international obligation. Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-
compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under international law.
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in
the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this
light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain
solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than
63
by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it.
Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of
ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts -
squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less
calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.
It is the Court’s considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to the
Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. It is
of no moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and in the honest belief that the
VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for
concurrence under the aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave, patent and
whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the President in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the
same to the Senate for the purpose of complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental
law. In doing so, the President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly
pertains to the functions of his office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under
the provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the
President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some
patent, gross, and capricious manner.

7. Social Justice and Human Rights

a. Calalang vs Williams
GR No. 47800, December 2, 1940
Facts:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court
this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works
and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief
of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved
to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca
to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed
in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes
said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2,
1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles
be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on
August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the
Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be

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closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period
of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

Issue:
Whether the closing of roads violates the social justice principle enshrine in the constitution.

Held:
No; social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization
of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of
the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number.”
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins v.
Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a
business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other causes,
become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good." And in People v.
Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state
today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the
rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and
of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the
police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered.

8. Sanctity of Family Life

a. Spouses Imbong vs Ochoa
April 8, 2014
Facts:
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on
December 21, 2012.
Petitioners ask the court to review the legality of the RH Law. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding
its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an
65
abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary
to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

Issue:
Whether the RH Law violates the Sanctity of Human Life.

Held:
Yes; life begins at fertilization. Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception.
This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise
that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen
because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is
reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life
begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the
female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to
the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female
ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal
conditions.
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano, it was written: Life is not synonymous with
civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the
child being delivered, qualifies as death.
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the
State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life,
that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the
Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it
determine when life begins.
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an
abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the
female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and
Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a
spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."

9. Natural Duty of Parents in Rearing for their Children

a. Nery vs. Lorenzo,
G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972

Facts:
The point to be resolved in these two petitions for the review of a decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated April 30, 1964 is the extent of the rights acquired by the vendees, the spouses Martin Nery and
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Leoncia L. de Leon arising from a sale of a parcel of land, four (4) hectares more or less, situated in Malaking
Kahoy, Parañaque, Rizal. The vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, was the widow of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and
guardian of their children, Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebeeca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, who thereafter
challenged the validity of such a transaction. It was their contention that notwithstanding an order authorizing the
sale from the probate court on June 2, 1953, it could be, impugned as they were not informed of such a move.
Moreover, the guardianship proceeding, instituted on December 7, 1950, was heard without the two elder children,
Dionisio and Perfecto Lorenzo being notified although they were then more than 14 years of age. The heirs of
Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of the property in question, intervened in such action. In the
lower court decision, they were adjudged co-owners of the aforesaid one-fourth portion of the property, the sale by
the widow being considered null and void insofar as they were concerned. The rights of the Children of Leoncio
Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla to one-half of the three-fourths appertaining to such spouses were likewise
accorded recognition.
The matter was then elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals by the spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia
L. de Leon. Respondent Court in its decision, now subject of this review, declared valid the deed of sale executed
by the mother Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the spouses Nery and de Leon as to the whole three-fourths, without
prejudice however to the children demanding from their mother their participation in the amount paid for the sale
of such property.
The antecedents of the case were set forth in the appealed decision thus: "After hearing the evidence, the
lower court handed down decision on June 24, 1961, finding that in the guardianship proceedings, the court
acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the minors who were not notified of the petition, at least 2 of them
being over 14 years of age; that as the inventory submitted by the guardian stated that the minors had no real estate,
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the real property of the minors and could not have validly authorized its
sale, and the total absence of the requisite notice necessarily rendered the order of sale, ... null and void, and the
defendant, Martin S. Nery, a lawyer, could not be considered a purchaser in good faith of the one-half portion of
the land belonging to the minors; ... that as Silvestra Ferrer, one of the sisters of Florentino Ferrer, did not sign the
deed of sale ... upon her death in 1952, her 1/4 portion of the land passed to her nearest relatives, the third-party
plaintiffs who are children of her sister, Tomasa Ferrer, whose action had not prescribed 'because from the death of
Silvestra Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party complaint on September 3, 1958, barely six yeaxs had
elapsed'; and that the remaining 3/4 of the land in question was the conjugal property of Leoncio Lorenzo and his
wife, Bienvenida de la Isla, 1/2 of which, upon the demise of Leoncio, corresponding to Bienvenida and the other
half to their children, the herein plaintiffs, in equal shares."

Issue:
Whether Court of Appeals erred in holding that the probate court could have authorized the sale in question.

Held:
Yes; the jurisdictional infirmity was too patent to be overcome. It was the lower court that acted correctly.
There is the more reason for deciding as we do considering that the rights of minors are involved. It is a distinctive
feature of our law, one that is quite commendable, that whenever their welfare may be affected, its solicitude is
made manifest. The rights of young are not to be ignored. Precisely their stage of immaturity calls for every
procedural principle being observed before their interest in property to which they have a claim could be adversely
affected. It does not matter that their guardian is their mother. As far back as 1811, in Salunga v. Evangelista, Chief
Justice Arellano took note that even a mother could have an "interest opposed to that of her children." That may not
have been the precise situation in this case, but certainly from the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, the
Lorenzo children would have been better protected if they were notified as is required by law. If there is any
occasion then why there should be a strict insistence on rule having the impress of a jurisdictional requirement, this
is it.
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 Moreover, where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the
rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other
parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to look after
their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an
opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power
of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those
arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and
the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to be
exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves."
WHEREFORE, premises considered with the modification as above set forth that Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria
Rebecca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, all surnamed Lorenzo, children of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and
Bienvenida de la Isla are adjudged co-owners to the extent of one-half of the three-fourths of the property in
question, as was decreed by the lower court, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. With costs
against Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon.

b. SPARKS vs QC
August 8, 2017 G.R. No. 225442
Facts:
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors,
several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through
police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City,
through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02, (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 8046
(Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP- 2301, (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively,
Curfew Ordinances).
Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of
young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void
for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due
process. In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.

Issue 1:
Whether the ordinances subjects in this case is Void for Vagueness.

Held:
No; a statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do
not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails
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to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.
The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are absent from this
particular claim.
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the
proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the
subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines.
The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are
best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement
is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived
danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities
to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of
law contravenes due process because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law
permits and/or forbids.

Issue 2:
Whether Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural and primary
right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process.

Held:
No; Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of
parents in the rearing of their children: Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning the
child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [State may act to promote these
legitimate interests." Thus, "in cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety,
peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to
control the upbringing of their children."
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development
of their children, and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it
was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to
the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful
and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for
example, who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of the laws
designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."

Issue 3:
Whether the assailed ordinances are unconstitutional because the same impaired right to travel by the youth.

Held:
Partly meritorious. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose limitations on the exercise
of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and
(2) are provided by law.
City councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done in this case) and
enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as
required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.
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 The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally
permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights, but the
exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults. They are always subject to the authority or custody
of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State. As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a
certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote, the
right to execute contracts, and the right to engage in gainful employment. With respect to the right to travel, minors
are required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before they can
travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their parents. These limitations demonstrate
that the State has broader authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of adults, and overall,
reflect the State's general interest in the well-being of minors. Thus, the State may impose limitations on the
minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.
In Bellotti, the US Supreme Court identified three justifications for the differential treatment of the minors'
constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child
rearing.
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors
as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens patriae to protect and preserve their well-being with
the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a
suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the
classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.
Compelling State Interest: Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally
declared policies. This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care
for them as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State. It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way. As explained in Nunez, the
Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on
adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the State to
protect and care for their welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances
is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally
eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which
may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in
imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that: “children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected
of their proper care and guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug
addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses…”
City councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general
welfare clause. In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact,
attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a
compelling State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances. With the first
requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied.
Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn: While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be
minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When
it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional
rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they are
still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic. Thus, in
70
the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the
minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights.
 The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors
accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands
such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c)
night school students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside
their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.
 Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at
night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office;
(d) those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision
of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (j) those involved in
accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions:
Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day
of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter
Sunday.
o This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the
rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work. However, even with those
safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable
exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression, among others.
o The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The
Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still
provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in
legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their
freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of
organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual
development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day,
it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night
without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier. This legitimate activity done pursuant
to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend
city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free
expression.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions, which
are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure
protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are
merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence of any separability
clause.
 The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently
safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions: Section 4. EXEMPTIONS
- Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this
ordinance;
o (a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
o (b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of
their school or organization wherein their attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are
out and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper authorities
concerned; and
o (c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization,
road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]

71
 o (d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home from the same place
of employment activity without any detour or stop;
o (e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
o (f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
o (g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious, recreational, educational, social,
community or other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay, school, or other similar private
civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when the minor is
going to or returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and
o (h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the
evening or that he/she is a working student.
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more
narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression. Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions
guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by
enabling minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but
also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are also
covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious
organizations are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free
exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious
masses even during curfew hours. In relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants
to move to and from the places where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the
Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-
being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more
prominent.

10. Civic Efficiency

11. Right to balanced and healthful ecology
a. Opposa vs Factoran
GR No. 101083
Facts:
Petitioners filed an action before the court to annul the Timber Licence Agreement by the Secretary of
DENR. The respondent Secretary averts that the petitioner did not able to alleged the specific legal right or a
specific legal wrong committed by him.
Petitioners maintained that their causes of action is that the TLA encroaches the Constitutional provisions of
Balance and Healthful Ecology [Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution].

Issue:
Whether or not plaintiffs have cause of action.

Held:
YES. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners
— the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of

72
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear
of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies
by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and
the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect
the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

b. Mosqueda v PBEA Davao and City Government of Davao v CA, PBEA

Davao
August 16, 2016
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, after a
committee hearing and consultations with various stakeholders, on imposing a ban against aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City. Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the said
ordinance and took effect on March 23, 2007 after its publication in the newspaper Mindanao Pioneer.
Pursuant to Section 5 of the ordinance, the ban against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced three
months thereafter. Then the Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its
members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et
al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, and sought for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The residents living within and adjacent to banana
plantations in Davao City led by Wilfredo Mosqueda, joined by other residents of Davao City, (Mosqueda, et al.)
submitted their Motion for Leave to Intervene and Opposition to the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction.
The RTC granted and issued the TRO and writ. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance
valid and constitutional. PBGEA, et al. appealed, and applied for injunctive relief from the CA, which granted the
application and consequently issued a TRO to meanwhile enjoin the effectivity of the ordinance.
The CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC. The City of Davao and the
intervenors filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motions. Hence, the
separate, but now consolidated, appeals by petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on
aerials praying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-
period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of
the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.

Held:

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 Ordinance 0309-07 is unconstitutional. Precautionary principle should be backed with scientific basis.
The precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence of three elements;
 uncertainty
 threat of environmental damage and
 serious or irreversible harm.

In situations where the threat is relatively certain, or that the causal link between an action and
environmental damage can be established, or the probability of occurrence can be calculated, only preventive,
not precautionary measures, may be taken. Neither will the precautionary principle apply if there is no indication
of a threat of environmental harm; or if the threatened harm is trivial or easily reversible.
Initially, there has been no scientific study. Although the precautionary principle allows lack of full
scientific certainty in establishing a connection between serious or irreversible harm and human activity, its
application is still premised on empirical studies. Scientific analysis is still a necessary basis for effective policy
choices under the precautionary principle.
The only study conducted to validate the effects of aerial spraying appears to be the Summary Report on
the Assessment and Fact-Finding Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations. Yet, the fact-
finding team that generated the report was not a scientific study that could justify the resort to the precautionary
principle.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause. The respondents posit that the requirement of
maintaining a 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory
and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their
property that amounts to taking without just compensation. The contention is devoid of any merit. The
establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the effects of aerial spraying within and
near the plantations. Although Section 3(e) of the ordinance requires the planting of diversified trees within the
identified buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as confiscatory requiring payment of
just compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to compensation if the taking amounts to a permanent
denial of all economically beneficial or productive uses of the land. The respondents cannot be said to be
permanently and completely deprived of their landholdings because they can still cultivate or make other
productive uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer zones.
Nonetheless, the Ordinance violates the Due Process Clause for being unreasonable and oppressive. In
order to declare one as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive
requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not
oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.
Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unreasonable and oppressive in that it sets the effectiveness of the
ban at three months after publication of the ordinance. The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode
of
pesticide application within three months can readily be appreciated given the vast area of the affected
plantations and the corresponding resources required therefor.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the plantations. As
such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the
respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month

74
period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would definitely
be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause. Equal protection neither requires universal
application of laws to all persons or things without distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the
object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection
envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized
by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. In other words, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the
class. The total ban on aerial spraying runs afoul with the equal protection clause because it does not classify
which substances are prohibited from being applied aerially even as reasonable distinctions should be made in
terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of liquid substances to the public health, livelihood and the
environment.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 is ultra vires. The Local Government Code vests the municipal corporations with
sufficient power to govern themselves and manage their affairs and activities, however they definitely have no
right to enact ordinances dissonant with the State’s laws and policy. The Local Government Code is not intended
to vest in the local government unit the blanket authority to legislate upon any subject that it finds proper to
legislate upon in the guise of serving the common good. The function of pesticides control, regulation and
development is within the jurisdiction of the FPA under Presidential Decree No. 1144. The FPA was established in
recognition of the need for a technically oriented government entity that will protect the public from the risks
inherent in the use of pesticides. Evidently, the FPA was responsible for ensuring the compatibility between the
usage and the application of pesticides in agricultural activities and the demands for human health and
environmental safety.
In enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 without the inherent and explicit authority to do so, the City of Davao
performed an ultra vires act. As a local government unit, the City of Davao could act only as an agent of Congress,
and its every act should always conform to and reflect the will of its principal. Every local government unit only
derives its legislative authority from Congress. In no instance can the local government unit rise above its source
of authority.
Atty. Reserva’s Notes”
In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
(A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect. In such an event, the courts may
construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving and protecting the
environment.
It is notable, therefore, that the precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence of three
elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm. In situations
where the threat is relatively certain, or that the causal link between an action and environmental damage can be
established, or the probability of occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not precautionary measures, may
be taken. Neither will the precautionary principle apply if there is no indication of a threat of environmental harm,
or if the threatened harm is trivial or easily reversible.
We cannot see the presence of all the elements. To begin with, there has been no scientific study. Although
the precautionary principle allows lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a connection between the serious
or irreversible harm and the human activity, its application is still premised on empirical studies. Scientific analysis
is still a necessary basis for effective policy choices under the precautionary principle.

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 Precaution is a risk management principle invoked after scientific inquiry takes place. This scientific stage
is often considered synonymous with risk assessment. As such, resort to the principle shall not be based on anxiety
or emotion, but from a rational decision rule, based in ethics. As much as possible, a complete and objective
scientific evaluation of the risk to the environment or health should be conducted and made available to decision-
makers for them to choose the most appropriate course of action. Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of
an activity is also important in the application of the principle. The potential harm resulting from certain activities
should always be judged in view of the potential benefits they offer, while the positive and negative effects of
potential precautionary measures should be considered.

c. AGHAM vs. Japan Tobacco International GR 235771, June 15, 2021

Facts:
In a joint operation on March 6, 2017, the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) successfully seized 4.7 Million packs of cigarettes with counterfeit tax stamps from Mighty Corporation
(MC). The cigarettes were under the brand names "Mighty Mentol 100s," "Marvels FK," and "Marvels King Full"
(Mighty/subject cigarettes). Eventually, the government filed a case against the officers of MC for tax law
violations. It nonetheless withdrew the complaint after MC offered to settle its tax liabilities in the amount of P25
Billion and shut down its operations.
Japan Tobacco International (Philippines), Inc. (JTI-Phil.), which is part of Japan Tobacco International,
acquired MC. In November 2017, the Department of Finance (DOF) and the BIR officials caused the burning and
destruction of batches of Mighty cigarettes to prevent pilferage. The procedure was undertaken inside the
compound of respondent Holcim Philippines, Inc. (Holcim) in Bunawan, Davao City.
JTI-Phil., Holcim, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), DOF and BIR (collectively,
respondents) violated the right of the people to a balanced and healthy ecology.

Issue:
Whether a writ of kalikasan must be issued in the case.

Held:
No; a writ of kalikasan is aimed to provide a stronger protection of environmental rights in order to accord
an effective and speedy remedy where the constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology is violated, and
address any possible large-scale ecological threats. Necessarily, the party seeking the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan must demonstrate that a particular law, rule or regulation was or would be violated by the respondent.
It has the burden to prove: (1) the environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be
transgressed; (2) respondent's act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of such
magnitude as would impair the life, property, or health of the inhabitants of two or more provinces or cities.
Considering all the foregoing, the petition is not sufficient in form and substance as AGHAM failed to
discharge the burden to prove the requirements for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan. In sum, there is no clear
showing that respondents committed an act or omission violative of any environmental law which resulted or will
result in an environmental damage of such magnitude that would infringe the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology.

d. International Service for The Acquisition Of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. vs.

Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Phils.) GR 209271 etc, December 8, 2015

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Facts:
The instant case arose from the conduct of field trials for "bioengineered eggplants," known as Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt talong), administered pursuant to the Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU)
entered into by herein petitioners University of the Philippines Los Baños Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), and the University of the
Philippines Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), among others. Bt talong contains the crystal toxin genes from the
soil bacterium Bt, which produces the CrylAc protein that is toxic to target insect pests. The Cry1Ac protein is said
to be highly specific to lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer, the most destructive insect pest to
eggplants.
On March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI) issued two (2)-year Biosafety
Permits for field testing of Bt talong after UPLB's field test proposal satisfactorily completed biosafety risk
assessment for field testing pursuant to the Department of Agriculture's (DA) Administrative Order No. 8, series of
2002 (DAO 08-2002), which provides for the rules and regulations for the importation and release into the
environment of plants and plant products derived from the use of modern biotechnology.
Respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines) (Greenpeace), Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa
Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura (MASIPAG), and others (respondents) filed before the Court a Petition for Writ of
Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) against herein petitioners the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the BPI and the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority
(FPA) of the DA, UPLBFI, and ISAAA, and UPMFI, alleging that the Bt talong field trials violated their constitutional
right to health and a balanced ecology considering, among others, that: (a) the Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC), as required by Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151, as not secured prior to the field trials (b) the
required public consultations under the Local Government Code (LGC) were not complied with; and (c) as a
regulated article under DAO 08-2002, Bt talong is presumed harmful to human health and the environment, and
that there is no independent, peer-reviewed study showing its safety for human consumption and the
environment.
CA ruled in favor of respondents and directed petitioners to pemanently cease and desist from conducting
the Bt talong field trials.

Issue:
Whether or not Writ of Kalikasan should be issued in this case despite of its mootness.

Held:
Yes. In a Decision dated December 8, 2015, the Court denied the petitions and accordingly, affinned with
modification the ruling of the CA. Agreeing with the CA, the Court held that the precautionary principle applies in
this case since the risk of harm from the field trials of Bt talong remains uncertain and there exists a possibility of
serious and irreversible harm. The Court observed that eggplants are a staple vegetable in the country that is
mostly grown by small-scale farmers who are poor and marginalized; thus, given the country's rich biodiversity,
the consequences of contamination and genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.
The Court likewise agreed with the CA in not dismissing the case for being moot and academic despite the
completion and termination of the Bt talong field trials, on account of the following exceptions to the mootness
principle: (a) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; and (b) the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Further, the Court noted that while the provisions of DAO 08-2002 were observed, the National Biosafety
Framework (NBF) established under EO 514, series of 2006 which requires public participation in all stages of
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biosafety decision-making, pursuant to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety which was acceded to by the
Philippines in 2000 and became effective locally in 2003, was not complied with. Moreover, the field testing
should have been subjected to Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), considering that it involved new
technologies with uncertain results.
Thus, the Court permanently enjoined the field testing of Bt talong. In addition, it declared DAO 08-2002
null and void for failure to consider the provisions of the NBF. The Court also temporarily enjoined any application
for contained use, field testing, propagation, commercialization, and importation of genetically modified
organisms until a new administrative order is promulgated in accordance with law.

International Service for The Acquisition Of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. vs. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
July 26, 2016 [Motion for Reconsideration]
 To recount, these cases, which stemmed from herein respondents petition for Writ of Kalikasan, were
mooted by the undisputed expiration of the Biosafety Permits issued by the BPI and the completion and
termination of the Bt talong field trials subject of the same. These incidents effectively negated the
necessity for the reliefs sought by respondents in their petition for Writ of Kalikasan as there was no
longer any field test to enjoin. Hence, at the time the CA rendered its Decision dated May 17, 2013, the
reliefs petitioner sought and granted by the CA were no longer capable of execution.
 At this juncture, it is important to understand that the completion and termination of the field tests do not
mean that herein petitioners may inevitably proceed to commercially propagate Bt talong. There are three
(3) stages before genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) may become commercially available under DAO
08-2002 and each stage is distinct, such that "[subsequent stages can only proceed if the prior stage/s
[is/]are completed and clearance is given to engage in the next regulatory stage." Specifically, before a
genetically modified organism is allowed to be propagated under DAO 08-2002: (a) a permit for
propagation must be secured from the BPI; (b) it can be shown that based on the field testing conducted in
the Philippines, the regulated article will not pose any significant risks to the environment; (c) food and/or
feed safety studies show that the regulated article will not pose any significant risks to human and animal
health; and (d) if the regulated article is a pest-protected plant, its transformation event has been duly
registered with the FPA.
 The Court notes that the petition for Writ of Kalikasan specifically raised issues only against the field
testing of Bt talong under the premises 'of DAO 08,..2002, i.e., that herein petitioners failed to: (a) fully
inform the people regarding the health, environment, and other hazards involved; and (b) conduct any
valid risk assessment before conducting the field trial. As further pointed out by Justice Leonen, the reliefs
sought did not extend far enough to enjoin the use of the results of the field trials that have been
completed. Hence, the petition's specificity prevented it from falling under the above exception to the
mootness rule.
 More obviously, the supersession of DAO 08-2002 by JDC 01-2016 clearly prevents this case from being
one capable of repetition so as to warrant review despite its mootness. To contextualize, JDC 01-2016.
 Notably, the new framework under JDC 01-2016 is substantially different from that under DAO 08-2002. In
fact, the new parameters in JDC 01-2016 pertain to provisions which prompted the Court to invalidate
D'AO 08-2002. In the December 8, 2015 Decision of the Court, it was observed that: (a) DAO 08-2002 has
no mechanism to mandate compliance with inten1ational biosafety protocols; (b) DAO 08-2002 does not
comply with the transparency and public participation requirements under the NBF; and (c) risk
assessment is conducted by an informal group, called the Biosafety Advisory Team of the DA, composed of
representatives from the BPI, Bureau of Animal Industry, FPA, DENR, DOH, and DOST.
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  JDC 01-2016 also provides for a more comprehensive avenue for public participation in cases involving
field trials and requires applications for permits and permits already issued to be made public by posting
them online in the websites of the NCBP and the BPI. The composition of the Institutional Biosafety
Committee (IBC) has also been modified to include an elected local official in the locality where the field
testing will be conducted as one of the community representatives. Previously, under DAO 08-2002, the
only requirement for the community representatives is that they shall not be affiliated with the applicant
and shall be in a position to represent the interests of the communities where the field testing is to be
conducted.
 It is apparent that the regulatory framework now applicable in conducting risk assessment in matters
involving the research, development, handling, movement, and release into the environment of
genetically modified plant and plant products derived from the use of modem biotechnology is
substantially different from that which was applied to the subject field trials. In this regard, it cannot be
said that the present case is one capable of repetition yet evading review.

e. Resident Marine Mammals Of The Protected Seascape Tañon Strait vs. Reyes GR
180771 etc, April 21, 2015
Resident Marine Mammals vs Secretary of Dept of Energy
April 21, 2015
Facts:
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition,
are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the
Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as
their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and
seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species.
Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract-I 02 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of
the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic
data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in
Tañon Strait.
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well
was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a
protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586.
Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition; that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and
the various laws cited in the petitions; that the ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations.
Public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons.

Issue:
Whether the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 have locus standi.

Held:
No; the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which
allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth

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noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named
cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to
possess the legal standing to file this petition.
As to substantive issue:
Agreements Involving Technical Or Financial Assistance Are Service Contracts with Safeguards.
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety,
the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the
government as principal or "owner" of the works. In the new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide
capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale
mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control
and supervision over the entire operation.
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform
terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible
insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that
it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that
branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.

12. Right to full public disclosure

a. Valmonte vs Belmonte
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989

Facts:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to
information and pray that respondent be directed to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately
before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or to
furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or to allow
petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct
interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the
GSIS.
Respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that
petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General
Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the
GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then
petitioners have no cause of action.
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Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.

Held:
Yes [but it does not include furnishing petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos]; the information sought by
petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the
opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election
through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of
various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More
particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977),
provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS
by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or
guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost
prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that
prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A. No. 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times
the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System" [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.]
Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the
legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of
maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were
Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore
expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that its
transactions were above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged
borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential
conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of these
rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the
right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like
the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar
College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the
entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would
have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is
claimed to be violated. It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves
may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at
the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate
and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy
a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public
scrutiny.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify
the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. Considering the intent of
the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
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considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the
GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right
to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end
that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the
records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the
second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who
were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of
the then First Lady Imelda Marcos." It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the
applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of
defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must
be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido,
G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there
being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
As to locus Standing and Justiciability of the Case:
The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of
Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the
general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We
now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not mandamus has to compel respondent to perform the acts
sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their right to information.
Atty. Reserva’s Notes:
First of all, the "constituent — ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has long been
repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices (G.R. Nos. L-21484
and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 6441, the Court said that the government, whether carrying out its
sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. Consequently,
that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the
transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.

b. Akbayan vs Aquino
G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
Facts:
JPEPA was the bilateral free trade agreement entered between the Philippine government with Japan,
concerned with trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment,
intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition
policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and
general and final provisions.
Petitioners, non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers requested, via the
petition for mandamus and prohibition, to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The Congress, through the House Committee called for
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an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive refused to give them the said copies until the
negotiation was completed.

Issue 1:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to request for the full text of JPEPA.

Held:
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a
public right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result,
it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the
right. As the present petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity
as citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who additionally
are suing in their capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This,
respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive
privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
“Showing of Need” Test:
In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a “sufficient showing of need”
only means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in degree to
overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a
balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving fundamental rights.
However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the privilege, and it has been established that
the subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the same by
merely asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of public concern, without any further showing
required? Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect
whatsoever as a limitation on the right to information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be
whether an information is a matter of public concern.
Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the
House of Representatives fail to present a “sufficient showing of need” that the information sought is critical to
the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-negotiation.

Issue 2:
Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of inquiry and power to
concur in treaties, from the negotiation process.

Held:
The petition was dismissed. Petitioner’s demand to be furnished with a copy of the full text of the JPEPA
has become moot and academic, it having been made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006. As for
their demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the JPEPA negotiations, the same
must be denied, respondents claim of executive privilege being valid.
Diplomatic negotiations have, since the Court promulgated its Resolution in PMPF v. Manglapus on
September 13, 1988, been recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction and the reasons proffered by petitioners
against the application of the ruling therein to the present case have not persuaded the Court. Moreover,

83
petitioners both private citizens and members of the House of Representatives have failed to present a sufficient
showing of need to overcome the claim of privilege in this case.
That the privilege was asserted for the first time in respondents Comment to the present petition, and not
during the hearings of the House Special Committee on Globalization, is of no moment, since it cannot be
interpreted as a waiver of the privilege on the part of the Executive branch.
For reasons already explained, this Decision shall not be interpreted as departing from the ruling in Senate
v. Ermita that executive privilege should be invoked by the President or through the Executive Secretary by order
of the President.

13. Filipinization of Public Utilities

a. Gamboa vs Teves
Gamboa vs. Teves,
G.R. No 176579 June 28, 2011
Facts:
PTIC [Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation] shares, which represent about 46.125
percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be owned by the Republic of
the Philippines. In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong-based investment firm, acquired the
remaining 54 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On 20 November 2006, the Inter-Agency
Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government announced that it would sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, or
46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, through a public bidding to be conducted on 4 December
2006. Subsequently, the public bidding was reset to 8 December 2006, and only two bidders, Parallax Venture Fund
XXVII (Parallax) and Pan-Asia Presidio Capital, submitted their bids. Parallax won with a bid of ₱25.6 billion or
US$510 million.
Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine Government of 46.125 percent of PTIC
shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 million shares or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of
PLDT. With the sale, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37
percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This
violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of
a public utility to not more than 40 percent.
Respondent Manuel V. Pangilinan admits the following facts: (a) the IPC conducted a public bidding for the
sale of 111,415 PTIC shares or 46 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC (the remaining 54 percent of
PTIC shares was already owned by First Pacific and its affiliates); (b) Parallax offered the highest bid amounting to
₱25,217,556,000; (c) pursuant to the right of first refusal in favor of PTIC and its shareholders granted in PTIC’s
Articles of Incorporation, MPAH, a First Pacific affiliate, exercised its right of first refusal by matching the highest
bid offered for PTIC shares on 13 February 2007; and (d) on 28 February 2007, the sale was consummated when
MPAH paid IPC ₱25,217,556,000 and the government delivered the certificates for the 111,415 PTIC shares.
Respondent Pangilinan denies the other allegations of facts of petitioner.
On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief, and
declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares. Petitioner claims, among others, that the sale of the
111,415 PTIC shares would result in an increase in First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7
percent to 37 percent, and this, combined with Japanese NTT DoCoMo’s common shareholdings in PLDT, would
result to a total foreign common shareholdings in PLDT of 51.56 percent which is over the 40 percent
constitutional limit.
Petitioner submits that the 40 percent foreign equity limitation in domestic public utilities refers only to
common shares because such shares are entitled to vote and it is through voting that control over a corporation is
84
exercised. Petitioner posits that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to "the
ownership of common capital stock subscribed and outstanding, which class of shares alone, under the corporate
set-up of PLDT, can vote and elect members of the board of directors." It is undisputed that PLDT’s non-voting
preferred shares are held mostly by Filipino citizens.
Petitioners-in-intervention basically reiterate petitioner’s arguments and adopt petitioner’s definition of the
term "capital." Petitioners-in-intervention allege that "the approximate foreign ownership of common capital stock
of PLDT: already amounts to at least 63.54% of the total outstanding common stock," which means that foreigners
exercise significant control over PLDT, patently violating the 40 percent foreign equity limitation in public utilities
prescribed by the Constitution.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not offer any definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution. More importantly, private respondents Nazareno and Pangilinan of PLDT do not dispute that
more than 40 percent of the common shares of PLDT are held by foreigners. Similarly, respondent Manuel V.
Pangilinan does not define the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Neither does he refute
petitioner’s claim of foreigners holding more than 40 percent of PLDT’s common shares. Instead, respondent
Pangilinan focuses on the procedural flaws of the petition and the alleged violation of the due process rights of
foreigners.

Issue:
Whether the consummation of the then impending sale of 111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific violates the
constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public utility.

Held:

Issue 2:
Whether the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total common shares
only or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of
PLDT, a public utility.

Held:
The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total
outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.
The interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching
implications to the national economy. In fact, a resolution of this issue will determine whether Filipinos are
masters, or second class citizens, in their own country. What is at stake here is whether Filipinos or foreigners will
have effective control of the national economy. Indeed, if ever there is a legal issue that has far-reaching
implications to the entire nation, and to future generations of Filipinos, it is the threshold legal issue presented in
this case.
Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the
Filipinization of public utilities, to wit: Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization
for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall
be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the
85
governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the
executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines.
The Corporation Code of the Philippines classifies shares as common or preferred, thus: Section 6
Classification of shares. - The shares of stock of stock corporations may be divided into classes or series of shares,
or both, any of which classes or series of shares may have such rights, privileges or restrictions as may be stated in
the articles of incorporation: Provided, That no share may be deprived of voting rights except those classified
and issued as "preferred" or "redeemable" shares, unless otherwise provided in this Code: Provided, further,
That there shall always be a class or series of shares which have complete voting rights. Any or all of the shares or
series of shares may have a par value or have no par value as may be provided for in the articles of incorporation:
Provided, however, That banks, trust companies, insurance companies, public utilities, and building and loan
associations shall not be permitted to issue no-par value shares of stock.
Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or management of the
corporation. This is exercised through his vote in the election of directors because it is the board of directors that
controls or manages the corporation. In the absence of provisions in the articles of incorporation denying voting
rights to preferred shares, preferred shares have the same voting rights as common shares. However, preferred
shareholders are often excluded from any control; that is, deprived of the right to vote in the election of directors
and on other matters, on the theory that the preferred shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for
income in the same manner as bondholders. In fact, under the Corporation Code only preferred or redeemable
shares can be deprived of the right to vote. Common shares cannot be deprived of the right to vote in any corporate
meeting, and any provision in the articles of incorporation restricting the right of common shareholders to vote is
invalid.
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred
shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then
the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management
of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of
directors.
This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the hands of
Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities. As revealed in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, "capital" refers to the voting stock or controlling interest of a corporation.

Thus, 60 percent of the "capital" assumes, or should result in, "controlling interest" in the corporation.
Reinforcing this interpretation of the term "capital," as referring to controlling interest or shares entitled to vote, is
the definition of a "Philippine national" in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, to wit: SEC. 3. Definitions. - As
used in this Act: a. The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic partnership
or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is
owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized abroad and registered as doing
business in the Philippines under the Corporation Code of which one hundred percent (100%) of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee
retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty percent (60%) of the
fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino
stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least sixty
percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of each of both corporations must be owned and
held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of

86
each of both corporations must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that the corporation, shall be considered a
"Philippine national."
Thus, 60 percent of the "capital" assumes, or should result in, "controlling interest" in the corporation.
Reinforcing this interpretation of the term "capital," as referring to controlling interest or shares entitled to vote, is
the definition of a "Philippine national" in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, to wit:
SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act: a. The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the
Philippines; or a domestic partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized
abroad and registered as doing business in the Philippines under the Corporation Code of which one hundred
percent (100%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of
funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and
at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided, That where a
corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
registered enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of each of
both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent (60%) of the
members of the Board of Directors of each of both corporations must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that
the corporation, shall be considered a "Philippine national."
In explaining the definition of a "Philippine national," the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Foreign Investments Act of 1991 provide: b. "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a
domestic partnership or association wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent [60%] of the capital stock outstanding and
entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a trustee of funds for pension or other
employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty percent
[60%] of the fund will accrue to the benefit of the Philippine nationals; Provided, that where a corporation its non-
Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] registered enterprise, at least
sixty percent [60%] of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of both corporations must be owned and
held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent [60%] of the members of the Board of Directors of
each of both corporation must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that the corporation shall be considered a
Philippine national. The control test shall be applied for this purpose.

Compliance with the required Filipino ownership of a corporation shall be determined on the basis of
outstanding capital stock whether fully paid or not, but only such stocks which are generally entitled to vote
are considered.

For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal
title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with
appropriate voting rights is essential. Thus, stocks, the voting rights of which have been assigned or
transferred to aliens cannot be considered held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals.

Individuals or juridical entities not meeting the aforementioned qualifications are considered as non-
Philippine nationals.

Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in the Constitution.
Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting
rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the

87
hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is
"considered as non-Philippine nationals.

Under Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, Congress may "reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments." Thus, in numerous laws Congress has
reserved certain areas of investments to Filipino citizens or to corporations at least sixty percent of the " capital" of
which is owned by Filipino citizens. Some of these laws are: (1) Regulation of Award of Government Contracts or
R.A. No. 5183; (2) Philippine Inventors Incentives Act or R.A. No. 3850; (3) Magna Carta for Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises or R.A. No. 6977; (4) Philippine Overseas Shipping Development Act or R.A. No. 7471; (5)
Domestic Shipping Development Act of 2004 or R.A. No. 9295; (6) Philippine Technology Transfer Act of 2009 or
R.A. No. 10055; and (7) Ship Mortgage Decree or P.D. No. 1521. Hence, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution is also used in the same context in numerous laws reserving certain areas of investments
to Filipino citizens.

To construe broadly the term "capital" as the total outstanding capital stock, including both common and
non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the "State shall
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." A broad definition
unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the public
utility.

We shall illustrate the glaring anomaly in giving a broad definition to the term "capital." Let us assume that a
corporation has 100 common shares owned by foreigners and 1,000,000 non-voting preferred shares owned by
Filipinos, with both classes of share having a par value of one peso (₱1.00) per share. Under the broad definition of
the term "capital," such corporation would be considered compliant with the 40 percent constitutional limit on
foreign equity of public utilities since the overwhelming majority, or more than 99.999 percent, of the total
outstanding capital stock is Filipino owned. This is obviously absurd.
In the example given, only the foreigners holding the common shares have voting rights in the election of
directors, even if they hold only 100 shares. The foreigners, with a minuscule equity of less than 0.001 percent,
exercise control over the public utility. On the other hand, the Filipinos, holding more than 99.999 percent of the
equity, cannot vote in the election of directors and hence, have no control over the public utility. This starkly
circumvents the intent of the framers of the Constitution, as well as the clear language of the Constitution, to place
the control of public utilities in the hands of Filipinos. It also renders illusory the State policy of an independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
The example given is not theoretical but can be found in the real world, and in fact exists in the present
case.

Holders of PLDT preferred shares are explicitly denied of the right to vote in the election of directors.
PLDT’s Articles of Incorporation expressly state that "the holders of Serial Preferred Stock shall not be entitled
to vote at any meeting of the stockholders for the election of directors or for any other purpose or otherwise
participate in any action taken by the corporation or its stockholders, or to receive notice of any meeting of
stockholders."
On the other hand, holders of common shares are granted the exclusive right to vote in the election of
directors. PLDT’s Articles of Incorporation state that "each holder of Common Capital Stock shall have one vote in
respect of each share of such stock held by him on all matters voted upon by the stockholders, and the holders of
Common Capital Stock shall have the exclusive right to vote for the election of directors and for all other
purposes."
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 In short, only holders of common shares can vote in the election of directors, meaning only common
shareholders exercise control over PLDT. Conversely, holders of preferred shares, who have no voting rights in the
election of directors, do not have any control over PLDT. In fact, under PLDT’s Articles of Incorporation, holders
of common shares have voting rights for all purposes, while holders of preferred shares have no voting right for
any purpose whatsoever.
It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute, that foreigners hold a majority of the common shares
of PLDT. In fact, based on PLDT’s 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS), which is a document required to be
submitted annually to the Securities and Exchange Commission; foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares of
PLDT whereas Filipinos hold only 66,750,622 common shares. In other words, foreigners hold 64.27% of the total
number of PLDT’s common shares, while Filipinos hold only 35.73%. Since holding a majority of the common
shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of control
unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership of public utilities expressly mandated in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.

14. Local Autonomy

a. Mandanas vs Ochoa
Mandanas vs Ochoa
G.R. No. 199802 / G.R. No. 208488
Facts:
Congress enacted R.A. 71-60, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC), in order to
guarantee the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs by specifically providing that:
SECTION 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. - Local government units shall have a share in the national
internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows…:
Petitioners averred that the insertion by Congress of the words internal revenue in the phrase national taxes
found in Section 284 of the LGC caused the diminution of the base for determining the just share of the LGUs, and
should be declared unconstitutional.
SC on July 3, 2018 declares that the phrase "internal revenue" appearing in Section 284 of Republic Act
No. 71-60 (Local Government Code) UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and DELETES the phrase from Section 284.
OSG contends that the affected provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) are not contrary to
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, under which the plenary power of Congress extends not only to the
determination of the just share of local government units (LGUs) but also to the determination of which national
taxes serve as base for the computation of such just share.
The OSG premises its contention on the fact that the article "the" immediately precedes the phrase
"national taxes" in Section 6, thereby manifesting the intent to give Congress the discretion to determine which
national taxes the just share will be based on considering that the qualifier "the" signals that the succeeding phrase
"national taxes" is a specific class of taxes; that if it was the intention of the framers to include all national taxes,
the Constitution should have so stated; that the phrase internal revenue should be restored in the affected
provisions of the LGC considering that the deletion of the phrase constitutes an undue encroachment on the power
of Congress to determine the LGUs' just share; that the effect of broadening the base for computing the just share
is to modify Congress' internal revenue allocations (IRA) in favor of the LGUs, which the Court cannot do because
imposing the new base was not intended by Congress.

Issue:
Whether SC should reverse its decision in declaring that the phrase "internal revenue" appearing in Section
284 of R.A. 71-60 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
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Held:
NO. Constitution itself set national taxes as the base amount from which to reckon the just share of the
LGUs; and Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution textually commands the allocation to the LGUs of a just
share in the national taxes.
Section 6, when parsed, embodies three mandates, namely: (1) the LGUs shall have a just share in the
national taxes; (2) the just share shall be determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be automatically released
to the LGUs.
SC's agrees with Garcia contention that Congress has exceeded its constitutional boundary by limiting to
the NIRTs the base from which to compute the just share of the LGUs.
Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature, congressional lawmaking remains
subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution. The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in
Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national taxes written in Section 6. As such, Congress
has actually departed from the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be the base from
which the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible. Verba legis non est recedendum (from
the words of a statute there should be no departure). Equally impermissible is that Congress has also thereby
curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution.

b. Province of Camarines vs COA

G.R. No. 227926, March 10, 2020

Facts:
To accommodate the growing number of enrollees in public schools, petitioner started hiring in 1999
temporary teaching personnel to handle extension classes of existing public schools, as well as non-teaching
personnel in connection with the establishment and maintenance of these extension classes. The salaries of the
personnel hired were charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF).
Audit Team Leader and Supervising Auditor-in-Charge issued Notice of Disallowance No. 2011-200-
010(08)8 dated November 15, 2011 disallowing the payments of allowances/honoraria to locally funded teaching
and non-teaching personnel of DepEd-Division of Camarines Sur which were charged to the 2008 SEF for the
following violations: 1. The payments for the allowances of locally funded teachers were in violation of the
provisions of Section 272 of RA 7160 which explicitly provide that the proceeds of Special Education Fund shall be
allocated for the operation and maintenance of public schools and DECS-DBM-DILG Joint Circular No. 01 s of 1998
dated April 14, 1998, clarified under JC No. 01-A dated March 14, 2000 and JC No. 01-B dated June 25, 2001 which
state that payments of salaries, authorized allowances and personnel-related benefits are only for hired teachers
that handle new classes as extension of existing public elementary [or] secondary schools established and
approved by DepEd; and others.
ATL and the Supervising Auditor (SA) maintained that the payments of allowances/honoraria to locally
funded teachers were rightfully disallowed for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of law and joint
circulars on the utilization of SEF, particularly the establishment of extension classes wherein the approval of the
DECS Secretary, upon the recommendation of the DECS Regional Director is necessary, as well as the certification
of the division superintendent concerned of the necessity or urgency of establishing such extension classes.
In asserting non-culpability, the petitioner attacks the validity of DECS-DBM-DILG Joint Circular No. 1-A,
alleging that it constitutes an invalid exercise of the administrative rule-making power of the concerned agencies
and violates the principle of local autonomy granted to LGUs.
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Issue:
Whether petitioner, through the approving officers, is liable to refund the disallowed fund subject of ND
No. 2011-200-101(08) in the total amount of P5,820,843.30.

Held:
No; this provision [Sec.4, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution] has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control. In Mondano v. Silvosa, the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government
officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized
that the two terms — supervision and control — differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as
follows: In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
In Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of
checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the
fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope
of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an
inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body," we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision was further
delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules
are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even
decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials
merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but
only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no
discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
In this case, petitioners failed to question the validity of the subject circular at the earliest opportunity. It
was only before this Court, that they are now raising the circular's validity vis-a-vis the principle of local autonomy.
Our concurrence with respondent on this point, notwithstanding, still, we find that petitioner is not liable to pay
for the disallowed funds.
Under the principle of quantum meruit, a person may recover a reasonable value for the thing he
delivered or the service that he rendered. Literally meaning "as much as he deserves," this principle acts as a
device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain
benefit without paying for it.
It is apparent, based on the rulings of the COA, COA-RO V, Auditor and ATL that, the disallowance was
made not because no service was rendered by the concerned recipients. Rather, it was due to the failure of
petitioners to comply with the mandatory requirements of DECS-DBM-DILG JCs particularly as to: (1) the prior
approval of DECS (now DepEd) Secretary of the extension classes; and (2) the recommendation of the DECS
Regional Director. It is only the third requirement, certification by the division superintendent as to the necessity
and urgency of establishing extension classes in the LGUs, which petitioners were able to meet.
In light of the principles of quantum of meruit and unjust enrichment, we find that it would be the height
of injustice if the personnel who rendered services for the period in question would be asked to return the
honoraria and allowances they actually worked for, simply because the approving officers failed to comply with
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certain procedural requirements. By necessary implication, it would also be inequitable if the approving officers
would be required to shoulder the return of the disallowed funds, even though such were given for actual service
rendered.
Indeed, it cannot be said that the approving officers acted in bad faith as the COA did not question the
subject allowances/honoraria from 1999 to 2008. Thus, there were no indicia that would have alerted them that
there was something remiss or irregular with the questioned allowance.
As for the non-teaching personnel, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the authority to expend the
SEF for the operation and maintenance of extension classes of public schools carries with it the authority to utilize
the SEF not only for the salaries and allowances of the teaching personnel, but those of the non-teaching
personnel alike who were hired as a necessary and indispensable auxiliary to the teaching staff. It is beyond
question that the services of these non-teaching personnel are essential to the sound and efficient operation and
maintenance of these extension classes. Without them, it would be impossible to hold these extension classes as
teachers would have to concern themselves not only with their duty to teach, but also the maintenance of
classrooms and other logistical needs pertaining to the holding of these extension classes.

c. Villafuerte vs Robredo
G.R. No. 195390 December 10, 2014
Facts:
Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination and audit on the manner the local government
units (LGUs) utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the calendar years 1993-1994. The examination
yielded an official report, showing that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not
actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses properly chargeable against the
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of R.A. No. 7160.
DILG issued MC No. 95-216, enumerating the policies and guidelines on the utilization of the development
fund component of the IRA. It likewise carried a reminder to LGUs of the strict mandate to ensure that public
funds, like the 20% development fund, "shall be spent judiciously and only for the very purpose or purposes for
which such funds are intended."
DILG Secretary, issued the assailed MC No. 2010-83, entitled "Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances,
and Bids and Public Offerings," which aims to promote good governance through enhanced transparency and
accountability of LGUs.
The petitioners argue that the assailed issuances of the respondent interfere with the local and fiscal
autonomy of LGUs embodied in the Constitution and the LGC. In particular, they claim that MC No. 2010-138
transgressed these constitutionally-protected liberties when it restricted the meaning of "development" and
enumerated activities which the local government must finance from the 20% development fund component of
the IRA and provided sanctions for local authorities who shall use the said component of the fund for the
excluded purposes stated therein. They argue that the respondent cannot substitute his own discretion with that
of the local legislative council in enacting its annual budget and specifying the development projects that the 20%
component of its IRA should fund.

Issue:
Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy
enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC.

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Held:
No; local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization. In Limbona v. Mangelin, the Court elaborated on the concept of
decentralization, thus: “autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables
it to concentrate on national concerns. x x x. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication
of political power in the favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities.
To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution confines the power of the President over
LGUs to mere supervision. "The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over them, but only to ‘ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law.’ He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own."
A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It
was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize
the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if
they have been complying with the law. It must be recalled that the assailed circular was issued in response to the
report of the COA that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized
for development projects but was diverted to expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section
287 of the LGC. This intention was highlighted in the very first paragraph of MC No. 2010-138, which reads:
Section 287 of the Local Government Code mandates every local government to appropriate in its annual budget
no less than 20% of its annual revenue allotment for development projects. In common understanding,
development means the realization of desirable social, economic and environmental outcomes essential in the
attainment of the constitutional objective of a desired quality of life for all.
That the term development was characterized as the "realization of desirable social, economic and
environmental outcome" does not operate as a restriction of the term so as to exclude some other activities that may
bring about the same result. The definition was a plain characterization of the concept of development as it is
commonly understood. The statement of a general definition was only necessary to illustrate among LGUs the
nature of expenses that are properly chargeable against the development fund component of the IRA. It is expected
to guide them and aid them in rethinking their ways so that they may be able to rectify lapses in judgment, should
there be any, or it may simply stand as a reaffirmation of an already proper administration of expenses.
Contrary to the petitioners’ posturing, however, the enumeration was not meant to restrict the discretion of
the LGUs in the utilization of their funds. It was meant to enlighten LGUs as to the nature of the development fund
by delineating it from other types of expenses. It was incorporated in the assailed circular in order to guide them in
the proper disposition of the IRA and avert further misuse of the fund by citing current practices which seemed to
be incompatible with the purpose of the fund. Even then, LGUs remain at liberty to map out their respective
development plans solely on the basis of their own judgment and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the only
restriction that 20% thereof be expended for development projects. They may even spend their IRAs for some of
the enumerated items should they partake of indirect costs of undertaking development projects. In such case,
however, the concerned LGU must ascertain that applicable rules and regulations on budgetary allocation have
been observed lest it be inviting an administrative probe.
Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the
central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has
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not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however
limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government. Thus,
notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the supervision of the
President and maybe held accountable for malfeasance or violations of existing laws. "Supervision is not
incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be
construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his
opinion the good of the public service so requires."
Atty. Reserva’s Notes:
“Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of
local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires”

d. Pimentel vs Ochoa
G.R. No. 195770 July 17, 2012
Facts:
DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as target beneficiaries.
Dubbed "Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino," it was pre-pilot tested in the municipalities of Sibagat and Esperanza in
Agusan del Sur; the municipalities of Lopez Jaena and Bonifacio in Misamis Occidental, the Caraga Region; and
the cities of Pasay and Caloocan upon the release of the amount of P50 Million Pesos under a Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO).
DSWD issued A.O. No. 16, s. 2008) setting the implementing guidelines for the project renamed "Pantawid
Pamilyang Pilipino Program" (4Ps). This government intervention scheme, also conveniently referred to as CCTP,
"provides cash grant to extreme poor households to allow the members of the families to meet certain human
development goals."
Congress, for its part, sought to ensure the success of the CCTP by providing it with funding under the
GAA of 2008 in the amount of Two Hundred Ninety-Eight Million Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos. This
budget allocation increased tremendously to P5 Billion Pesos in 2009, with the amount doubling to P10 Billion
Pesos in 2010. But the biggest allotment given to the CCTP was in the GAA of 2011 at Twenty One Billion One
Hundred Ninety-Four Million One Hundred Seventeen Thousand Pesos.
Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a former Senator, joined by Sergio Tadeo, incumbent President of the
Association of Barangay Captains of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, and Nelson Alcantara, incumbent Barangay
Captain of Barangay Sta. Monica, Quezon City, challenges before the Court the disbursement of public funds and
the implementation of the CCTP which are alleged to have encroached into the local autonomy of the LGUs.

Issue:
Whether the 4Ps program is unconstitutional as it encroached the Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.

Held:
No; the essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been
provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
The Court held in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals that while it is through a system of decentralization
that the State shall promote a more responsive and accountable local government structure, the concept of
local autonomy does not imply the conversion of local government units into "mini-states." We explained
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that, with local autonomy, the Constitution did nothing more than "to break up the monopoly of the national
government over the affairs of the local government" and, thus, did not intend to sever "the relation of partnership
and interdependence between the central administration and local government units." In Pimentel v. Aguirre, the
Court defined the extent of the local government's autonomy in terms of its partnership with the national
government in the pursuit of common national goals, referring to such key concepts as integration and
coordination. Thus: under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers
over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance
more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at
the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the
country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated
towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.
Certainly, to yield unreserved power of governance to the local government unit as to preclude any and all
involvement by the national government in programs implemented in the local level would be to shift the tide of
monopolistic power to the other extreme, which would amount to a decentralization of power explicated in
Limbona v. Mangelin as beyond our constitutional concept of autonomy, thus: Now, autonomy is either
decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments ‘more responsive and accountable’ and ‘ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress.’ At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises ‘general
supervision’ over them, but only to ‘ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.’ He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional
author, decentralization of power amounts to ‘self-immolation,’ since in that event, the autonomous government
becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
Atty. Reserva’s Notes:
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been
provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. The national government is, thus, not precluded from
taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

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