De Leon v.

Esguerra
153 SCRA 602

FACTS:
Alfredo De Leon was elected Barangay Captain in the elections on May 17, 1982. On
February 9, 1987, petitioner received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986,
but signed by OIC Governor Esguerra on February 8, 1987, designating Florentino
Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores Taytay, Rizal. Petitioners pray that the
memorandum is null and void in accordance with Section 3 of Barangay Election Act of
1982. Petitioner further that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent
OIC governor no longer has authority to designate successors and replace them.

ISSUE:
Is the dismissal order of De Leon et. Al. by respondent OIC Governor valid?

HELD:
The constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the
Provisional Constitution has been superseded. As such, respondent OIC Governor
could no longer rely on Section 2 Article III of said Constitution. The Memoranda was
declared to be of no legal force and the writ of prohibition enjoining respondents from
proceeding with the take-over was granted.

https://www.micvillamayor.com/de-leon-v-esguerra/
 GP vs Monte de Piedad
Doctrine of Parens Patria
 

GP VS MONTE DE PIEDAD

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the Philippine
Islands, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.

 
 

Facts:

A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions amounting
to $400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake.
Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need
for more working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.

In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000. The
respondent bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General
of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement.

On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General,
bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the
benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff
for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from
February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.
 

The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to question the
competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be
instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.

Issues:

Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent
bank for the reimbursement of the money of the intended beneficiaries?

Discussions:

In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights
of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public
interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the
government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.

 
 

Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae in
representation of the legitimate claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens
patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending
authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that
power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often
necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who
cannot protect themselves. The beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their
rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show
that this beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a
monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into
exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being
exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.

https://casedigest.asialighttravel.com/gp-vs-monte-de-piedad/
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA
v. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO,

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc]

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act
or omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions,
even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless
committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the
subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is
impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

FACTS:

From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-
College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was
concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the
PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on
Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20
years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on
the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she
supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no
record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In sum,
for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice
was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all
previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December
31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants
with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and
became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted
three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise
added that “considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years
old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance
issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was
deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete
requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging
that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives
proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta,
the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other
findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her
1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to
sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation
of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s
original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil
action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to
oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for
Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual
bias for having testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.

Contentions:

Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question
the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v.
Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the
phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that
Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than impeachment.

OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11,
Rule 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings.
Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the
maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate
against the government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of its
sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is applicable to the OSG,
considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know the
disqualification.

Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a
permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving
graft and corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that this is not
a political question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of
the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.

OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she
is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the
Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG
failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven.
The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from
being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be considered as a
defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus
governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is completely
immaterial.

Sereno (respondent):

Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing
Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon.
Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment
Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by
impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing certain high-
ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will prevent them from
performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno further
argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the
impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the
SC has no jurisdiction.

Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because
the President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on
the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the
“sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President.
There is no such provision for other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by
the OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.

Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would
result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary
power and administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is
contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary
and administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof.

Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by
the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.
 Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition
for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the
“discovery” of the disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because
as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed
to overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared
of all administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only
be decided by the JBC and the President.

Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give
rise to the inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an
inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:

The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the
integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for
the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what
is only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications”
such as citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence,
integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations.

ISSUES:

Preliminary issues:

1. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention

2. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices

Main Issues:

3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition
for quo warranto.
4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the
fact that an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.
6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of
separation of powers
7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a
political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of
Chief Justice.
10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as
mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations
11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed
properly and promptly.
12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs to
the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;
14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the
subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto  officer.

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

HELD:

Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right
or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of
right but rests on the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement
on legal interest and the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. The
justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and uphold the
Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ intervention that their
would-be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment
will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment court will be taken away is not sufficient. The
interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not
simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo warranto is brought in the name of the
Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private individual or group, because disputes over
title to public office are viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy and not merely a
private quarrel among rival claimants.

Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit
in the case.

It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a
manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of
a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s
sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Bias must be proven with clear and convincing
evidence. Those justices who were present at the impeachment proceedings were armed with the
requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the Members are to testify only on matters
within their personal knowledge. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for
inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.
Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context
and meaning of the answers the Justices may have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings
before the House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in
entertaining the quo warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of
mistrust and discordance between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden
to no one, except to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It
is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who has supposedly met consistent litigation
success before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be received in the present quo
warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The best
person to determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be
disqualified. [yourlawyersays]

Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has
jurisdiction.

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs,
including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is
justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is
likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to
exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s
appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on
speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s
duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are
essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty
and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be
abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including
the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility

or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while
impeachment is a political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of
the appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly,
by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries
with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is
given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only
by the national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.

Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not
forum shopping and is allowed.
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded
on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his
chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for determining
forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or
causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is
the determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered
as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s
prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office
is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally
holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she
committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.

Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be
adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover,
impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the
respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach
or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or
occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is
not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The
impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the
Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process
before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a person may be
reasonably charged with a crime.

Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or
invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action
against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision
uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In American
jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to
be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate reasons to
account for this express provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally
prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be
members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment.
The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he
or she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or
a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of
whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If
other causes of removal are available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To
subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial
review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the
Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment
proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to
be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she
fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.

Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition
is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who
would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of
the core constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the
Senate. Again, the difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An
action for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a
writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its
jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own
prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of
Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of
impeachment.

However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out
the conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if
indeed Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a
legal controversy simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case
impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and
arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their
legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a public official,
who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the
requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it
relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of
a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public
official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or
disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to
authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold
such office or position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases
where private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case where no private
individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself which
commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person
holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the
President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that
any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.”
It may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo
warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of action
in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the
Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action
for quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of
limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an
unqualified person to hold public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover,
the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon discovery
of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether she
filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible,
but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.

Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the
JBC complies with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing
or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s
absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s
reach is therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to
recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor
unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in
wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers.
While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not
give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination
by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the
same category as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving. [yourlawyersays]

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or
bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person
of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if
not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise
imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the
Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must
be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under
oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA
6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained
wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of
the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so important
for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may
result not only in dismissal from the public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A.
No. 6713 even provides that  non-compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by
imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to
perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her
dissenting opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden,
and are considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby
subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to
perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the performance of those
duties. More importantly, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not

merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect
Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum
prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by the
law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been
violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution,
the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno
could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by
presenting them before the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence,
if at all, for no clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the
Doblada case, there was a letter of the head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the
missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository agency. In
Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of nor was proven to have
been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these
SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof constituting substantial
evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based
on records on file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN
ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.

For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP
HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of
evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by
the State in that the burden rests upon the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her
SALN because it is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did
not receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker
“serving in an honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on RA
6713. [yourlawyersays]

Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the
period when Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the
President or the Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of
SALNs filed by officials and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial
duty of the head of office to issue compliance order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As
such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing
compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the
clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing
Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and
from administrative charges as of the date of her resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the
shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her
inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply
her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover,
the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible because it does not appear
that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the
shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this
Court from looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or
conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake

Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation
of the Constitutional and statutory requirements    .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the
same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious
circumstances include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in
2003; 1997 SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years
when she received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended to be
for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in
personal properties were seen in her first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day
that Sereno failed not only in complying with the physical act of filing, but also committed
dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose
the supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained
discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination
pursuant to the JBC rules.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent
Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been
considered for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was
singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her
years of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still
required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno who was not able
to substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter
containing justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned
from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her government service is
not continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to
retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs
to the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to
comply. Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the
course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof
from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme
Court. [yourlawyersays]

Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but
there was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is
dismissal from the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe
honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a
malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the integrity and
uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no longer
have considered Sereno for interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false
representations that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel
for the government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance
with SALNs requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in
her ITRs for the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least
P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused P3,000,000
of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3 rd ASEAN
Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition
of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of
the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the
release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the
processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential
document involving national security against the latter among others, all belie the fact that Sereno
has integrity.

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means
that her integrity was not established at the time of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position
of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition
of the requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone
through. Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are
divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or
dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits would
be practically useless for the years that she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify
whether the same matches the entries indicated in the SALN.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of
appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing
requirement. The voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding
that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be
nominated for said position follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so
without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations
from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the power to
issue such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or
franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an
office constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination
process is evident from the composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to

the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the
Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is
subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal
requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his
presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto
officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief
Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the
status of an impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is
justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust
Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice. [yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY

HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno
is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar
Council is directed to commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be
sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for
transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

https://yourlawyersays.com/2018/05/13/digest-republic-v-sereno-g-r-no-237428-may-11-2018/
Lambino vs COMELEC G.R. No. 174153 - Case Digest
Lambino vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006

FACTS:

On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article
VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article
XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and

HELD:

1.       The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should
be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that
“before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people
should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature
sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October
2006.

2.       A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.
There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An
affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court
must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

http://lawandbar.blogspot.com/2017/06/lambino-vs-comelec-gr-no-174153-case.html
AGUSTIN V. EDU - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
AGUSTIN V. EDU                     G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

FACTS:

Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires an early warning device to
be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and
transgresses the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the implementing
rules and regulations of the said instruction.

Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped
when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early
warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the
implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,"

Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will
make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set
of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." are unlawful and unconstitutional
and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part
of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the
specified set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."

This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on streets and highways, including
expressways or limited access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles without
appropriate early warning devices. The hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety. The Philippines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals and the United Nations Organizations and the said Vienna Convention was ratified by the Philippine
Government under PD 207.

ISSUE:

WON the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due process.

HELD:

NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful delegation of
legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular
exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety.
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: “The
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” 

Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it
had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague
and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 .

The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the
principle of international morality.

Petition dismissed.

http://thebattybarrister.blogspot.com/2018/02/agustin-v-edu-case-digest.html
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208;
G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram

operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creating
the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise
the videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended
the National Internal Revenue Code provided that:

"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-
tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five
pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall
be subject to sales tax."

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. —

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a
tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may
be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction
of any motion picture or audiovisual program.”

“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the
province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality
where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall
be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.”

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and
unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes,
discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly
prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated
circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty
percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's
specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses
estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum

from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not
been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately
P180 Million in taxes each year.

The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the

viability of the movie industry.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police
power.

(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The
levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer
the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant
film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the
proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of
the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in

pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While
the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie
industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,
considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of
the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of
unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films
with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the
drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video
establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and
municipal license fees are required to engage in business."

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/tio-vs-videogram-regulatory-board-151.html
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE,
GR No. 175356, 2013-12-03
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7432,[3] as
amended by RA 9257,[4] and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD
and DOF insofar as these allow business establishments to... claim the 20% discount given
to senior citizens as a tax deduction.
tax credit as the 20 percent discount deductible from gross income for income tax
purposes,... Petitioners emphasize that they are not questioning the 20% discount granted
to senior citizens but are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme
prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD
and the DOF
Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the
Constitution, which provides that: "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation."... petitioners cite
Central Luzon Drug Corporation,[12] where it was ruled that the 20% discount privilege
constitutes taking of private property for public use which requires the payment of just
compensation
Issues:
WHETHER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 AND X X X ITS IMPLEMENTING
RULES AND REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY PROVIDE THAT THE TWENTY
PERCENT (20%) DISCOUNT TO SENIOR CITIZENS MAY BE CLAIMED AS A TAX
DEDUCTION BY THE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, ARE INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Ruling:
The Petition lacks merit.
The validity of the 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme under RA 9257,
as an exercise of police power of the State, has already been settled in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation.
The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the
taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for
which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation.
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it
would not meet the definition of just compensation.
Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the health and
welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of
partly subsidizing a government program.
The Court believes so.
As a form of reimbursement, the... law provides that business establishments extending the
twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by
due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if
on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the
questioned provision is invalidated.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount
is unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate
correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to... show
properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage.
We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid
exercise of the police power of the State.
The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are
less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus,
in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities.
the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to price their
products and services relative to a special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the
Constitution affords preferential concern... it does... not purport to appropriate or burden
specific properties, used in the operation or conduct of the business of private
establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that matter
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from,
price control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as
police power measures.[77] These laws generally regulate public... utilities or
industries/enterprises imbued with public interest in order to protect consumers from
exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as temper corporate greed by controlling the rate
of return on investment of these corporations... considering that they have a monopoly...
over the goods or services that they provide to the general public.
On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure.
The obiter in Central Luzon Drug Corporation,[78] however, describes the 20% discount as
an exercise of the power of eminent domain and the tax credit, under the previous law,
equivalent to the amount of discount given as the just compensation... therefor.
It presupposes that the subject regulation, which impacts the pricing and, hence, the
profitability of a private establishment, automatically amounts to a deprivation of property
without due process of law.
If this were so,... then all price and rate of return on investment control laws would have to
be invalidated because they impact, at some level, the regulated establishment's profits or
income/gross sales, yet there is no provision for payment of just compensation
The obiter is, thus, at odds with the settled doctrine... that the State can employ police
power measures to regulate the pricing of goods and services, and, hence, the profitability
of business establishments in order to pursue legitimate State objectives for the common
good, provided that the regulation does not go too far as to... amount to "taking."
Principles:
Police power versus eminent domain.
Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty
and property for public welfare.[58] The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should
be reasonable, not oppressive.
"property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in... order to fulfill
the objectives of the government.
The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare [as long as] the interference [is] reasonable and not
arbitrary.
Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take or appropriate
private property for public use.
private property shall not be taken without due process of law and the... payment of just
compensation
In the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation,[65] or the use of
property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted[66] to promote public welfare.
payment of just compensation is not required.
in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, property interests are appropriated and
applied to some public purpose which necessitates the payment of just compensation
therefor.
Normally, the title to and possession of the property are transferred to the... expropriating
authority.
http://lawyerly.ph/digest/cdc3d?user=448
REPUBLIC v.   VS.  LUCENITO N. TAGLE, GR No. 129079, 1998-12-02
Facts:
Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land
(483,331) square... meters more or less.
Among the five (5) main programs of the proposed project was Program III (Construction
Manpower Development) which involved the establishment of a Construction Manpower
Development Center (CMDC for short), an agency now under the Department of Trade and
Industry.
PHRDC and private respondent Helena Z. Benitez (BENITEZ for short), signed a
Memorandum of Agreement (Annex 'C', Petition) which provides, among others, [that]
BENITEZ 'undertakes to lease within the period of twenty (20) years and/or sell a portion of
that... property (which is no less than ten-hectares)' in favor of PHRDC 'which likewise
agrees to lease' within a period of twenty (20) years and/or buy said property site'.
Philippine Women's University (PWU for short) and BENITEZ granted a permit to PHRDC
'to occupy and use' the land in question an
CMDF took possession of the property and erected buildings and other related facilities
necessary for its operations.
PWU entered into a purported contract of lease with PHRDC on a ten (10)-hectare piece of
land which stipulated, among other things, a rental of P200,000.00 per annum for an initial
term of four (4) years from January 1, 1984 to January 1, 1988,... with an option granted to
PHRDC to renew the lease, upon agreement of both parties, 'for a further period up to, but
not exceeding twenty (20) years from the e... purporting to be the donee of the property
involved in a deed of donation executed by BENITEZ in its favor; which deed of donation...
avite' and 'confirme(d) that the agreed purchase price in 1989 [was] P70.00 per sq. m...
view of the agreement on the sale of the land in question, PHRDC prepared a Deed of
Absolute Sale with BENITEZ, as vendor, and PHRDC and CMDF, as vendees,... BENITEZ
and PHRDC, represented by PHRDC General Manager Juvenal Catajoy, Jr., agreed that
the payment of 'rentals for the Dasmariñas lot [would] cease effective July 1, 1989 in view of
on-going negotiations for the e
BENITEZ did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale thus reneging on her commitment to sell
the lot in question.
BENITEZ and PWU demanded from PHRDC the payment of rentals and to vacate the
premises within 30 days from notice. It later filed an unlawful detainer suit against petition...
petitioner, through the Department of Trade and Industry, to which CMDF is attached,
instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain,... petitioner deposited with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), Makati Avenue Branch, in favor of defendant, Seven Hundred Eight
Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Pesos (P708,490.00)... an amount equivalent to the
provisional value of the land sought to be expropriated.
"On May 16, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
granting petitioner's Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
"Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration... defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration is granted.
The Writ of Possession issued in consonance therewith is hereby quashed... respondent
Judge denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration (... petitioner thus elevated the matter
to this Court.[7]... respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the
expropriating government agency is already occupying the property sought to be
expropriated.
xpropriation proceeding in the case at bar involves a development project covered by EO
1035. The site, which is being used by the Philippine Human Resources Development
Center (PHRDC), is sought to be expropriated for the establishment and operation... of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Human Resources Development Project
of the Philippines, a component of which is the Construction Manpower Development
Center (CMDC), an agency now under the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
when the government or its authorized agent makes the required deposit, the trial court has
a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.
The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of
land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be
compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property interests in the... bundle of rights
that constitute ownershi
In exercising this power, petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but
also... the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere
physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title,... actual...
occupation... does not by itself include its acquisition of all the rights of ownership.
n short, petitioner wanted not merely possession de facto but possession de jure as well.
legally absurd, for this Court to require petitioner to first vacate the property in view of the
adverse judgment in the unlawful detainer case, and soon afterwards, order the trial court to
issue in petitioner's... favor a writ of possession pursuant to the expropriation proceedings.
writ is both necessary and practical, because mere physical possession that is gained by
entering the property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the aim of acquiring...
ownership... well-settled that eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that need
not be granted even by the fundamental law
"[p]rivate property shall not be... taken for public use without just compensation," merely
imposes a limit on the government's exercise of this power and provides a measure of
protection to the individual's right to property.
petitioner has deposited not just the 10 percent required under EO 1035, but the whole
amount of the just compensation that private respondent is entitled to. Thus, we are unable
to find any legal impediment for the issuance of a writ of... possession in favor of petitioner.
n quashing the writ of possession, respondent judge violated EO 1035 on the quaint and
whimsical ground that petitioner was already in actual possession of the property.[22] His
assailed Orders dated July 26, 1996 and February 20, 1997... are therefore void for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion.[2
Issues:
respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the expropriating
government agency is already occupying the property sought to be expropriated.
http://lawyerly.ph/digest/c8e31?user=1663
PEOPLE V. FAJARDO - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
PEOPLE V. FAJARDO                         G.R. No. L-12172; August 29, 1958

FACTS:

Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in law) are charged with violation of Ordinance 7 Series of 1950 of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur which penalizes a person who constructs a building without permit from the mayor.

After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station near the town plaza. His
request was repeatedly denied due to the reason that it “hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the
public plaza”.

Appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence
very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased
property.

Appellants were charged and convicted by peace court of Baoo for violating such ordinance.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of property.

HELD:
NO. The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited
conferment.

The subject ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor ’s action. The
standards of the ordinance are entirely lacking making it unreasonable and oppressive, hence, not a valid ordinance.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate structures offensive
to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically
confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.

Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do this legally, there must
be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose
goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.

Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs de oficio. 

http://thebattybarrister.blogspot.com/2018/02/people-v-fajardo-case-digest.html
City of Manila vs Judge
Perfecto Laguio
Published November 22, 2010

G.R. No. 118127 – 455 SCRA 308 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Police Power

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE
ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars,
motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed
as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation
avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration
of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not
market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that
under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The
City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well
in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote
morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed
by law, it  must also conform to the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to
the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise
must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the
Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.

uberdigests.info/2010/11/city-of-manila-vs-judge-perfecto-laguio/
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works Digest
G.R. No. L-10405 December 29, 1960
Ponente: Concepcion, J.

Legal Standing

Facts:
1. Petitioner was the governor of Rizal, filed a petition assailing the validity of R.A. 920 which contains an item
providing for an appropriation of P85,000.00 for the construction and repair of a feeder road in Pasig. The
said law was passed in Congress and approved by the President.

2. The property over which the feeder road will be constructed is however owned by Sen. Zulueta. The
property was to be donated to the local government, though the donation was made a few months after the
appropriation was included in RA 920. The petition alleged that the said planned feeder road would relieve
Zulueta the responsibility of improving the road which is inside a private subdivision.

3. The lower court (RTC) ruled that the petitioner has standing to assail the validity of RA 920, due to the
public interest involved in the appropriation. However, he does not have a standing with respect to the
donation since he does not have an interest that will be injured by said donation, hence it dismissed the
petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the standing to file the petition

YES.

1. Petitioner has standing. He is not merely a taxpayer but the governor of the province of Rizal which is
considered one of the most populated biggest provinces during that time, its taxpayers bear a substantial
portion of the burden of taxation in the country.
2. Public funds can only be appropriated for a public purpose. The test of the constitutionality of a statute
requiring the use of public funds is whether it is used to promote public interest. Moreover, the validity of a
stature depends on the powers of the Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events
occurring, or acts performed subsequent thereto, unless it is an amendment of the organic law.

http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/pascual-v-secretary-of-public-works.html

CASSANOVAS VS. HORD [8 Phil 125; No. 3473; 22 Mar 1907]

Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The Spanish Govt. by virtue of a royal decree granted the plaintiff

certain mines. The plaintiff is now the owner of those mines. The Collector of
Internal Revenue imposed tax on the properties, contending that they were
valid perfected mine concessions and it falls within the provisions of sec.134 of
Act No. 1189 known as Internal Revenue Act. The plaintiff paid under protest.
He brought an action against the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue to
recover the sum of Php. 9, 600 paid by him as taxes. Judgment was rendered in
favor of the defendant, so the plaintiff appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 164 is void or valid.

Held: The deed constituted a contract between the Spanish Government and

the plaintiff. The obligation of which contract was impaired by the enactment of
sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law infringing sec. 5 of the Act of Congress
which provides that “no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
enacted”. Sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law of 1904 is void because it
impairs the obligation of contracts contained in the concessions of mine made
by the Spanish Government. Judgment reversed.
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/cassanovas-vs-hord-8-phil-125-no-3473.html

G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.

ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

FACTS:

A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino citizen

who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation

cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the

Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the

Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then

suspended; and that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the

proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE

GOVERNMENT BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING ENEMY OCCUPATION.

WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 114 OF THE REVISED

PENAL CODE.
HELD:

No. The absolute and permanent allegiance (Permanent allegiance is the unending

allegiance owed by citizens or subjects to their states. Generally, a person who owes

permanent allegiance to a state is called a national.) of the inhabitants of a territory occupied

by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated (repealed) or

severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign

de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate

government. (Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the

people and all government authority emanates from them.")

What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and

government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The

political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and

citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military occupation.

The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government

does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an

offense to the same government and same sovereign people. (Art. 114. Treason. — Any

person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government of the Philippine

Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving

them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion

temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos.)

DISSENT:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were

suspended. This is full harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law

adopted by our Constitution [ Art. II, Sec. 3 ] as part of law of the nation.

The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of

the invading power whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of

displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand and enforce from

the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the

maintenance of the law and order, and for the proper administration of the country
https://dokumen.tips/documents/laurel-v-misa-77-phil-856-case-digest.html

Republic vs Villasor
government funds are not subject to garnishment
 
REPUBLIC VS VILLASOR
G.R. No. L-30671 54 SCRA 83 November 28, 1973
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I,
THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE
SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of
Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents
 
 
 
Facts:
The case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines requesting to nullify the ruling of The
Court of First Instance in Cebu in garnishing the public funds allocated for the Arm Forces of the
Philippines.
 
A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd.,
Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein,
confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings.
The respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the said decision
final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and Manila to execute
the said decision. The corresponding Alia Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the
aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of
Garnishment with several Banks. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit
with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the AFP.
 
Petitioner, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of
jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the
issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of the AFP, hence the notices and
garnishment are null and void.
 
Issues:

1. Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

2. Whether or not the notice of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor is valid.

 
Discussions:

1. The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares that “the State may not be sued without its consent”.
This provision is merely a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and express an
affirmation of the unwritten rule insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice. Another
justification is the practical consideration that the demands and inconveniences of litigation will
divert time and resources of the State from the more pressing matters demanding its attention, to
the prejudice of the public welfare.
2. As a general rule, whether the money is deposited by way of general or special deposit, they
remain government funds and are not subject to garnishment. An exception of the rule is a law or
ordinance that has been enacted appropriating a specific amount to pay a valid government
obligation.

 
 
 
Rulings:

1. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of

sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends. A continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be
deplored for as against the inconvenience that may cause private parties, the loss of government
efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater is such a
fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
restricted.
2. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.
From a logical and sound sense from the basic concept of the non-suability of the State, public funds
cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Disbursements of public funds must be covered
by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered
by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

 https://casedigest.asialighttravel.com/republic-vs-villasor/
Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land

reform program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in
the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres.
Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose
of conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the
Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be
compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims
of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the
military/police officers involved in the incident.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages
Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as
claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean
that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the
creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the
Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party
decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does
not in any way bind the State.

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who
allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers
acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a
person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were
responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they
exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/republic-vs-sandoval-220-scra-124.html
 USA vs Guinto
Doctrine of incorporation; Doctrine of Immunity from Suit
 

USA VS GUINTO

G.R. No. 76607     182 SCRA 644     February 26, 1990

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City,
ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, respondents.

Facts:

The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in
the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to
which it has not consented.

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection
with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. Among those
who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and
Pablo C. del Pilar.

The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed
that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in
the invitation to bid.

The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine Area Exchange
(PHAX) and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the
barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to
continue operating the concessions pending litigation.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on
the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability,
but trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America.
2. Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts
done by them in the performance of their official duties.

Discussions:

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally accepted principles
of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority
of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition
and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the
state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in
the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the
state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign
immunity from suit with its implied consent.
 

Rulings:

1. The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to
be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United
States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American
servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers. This being
the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private
respondents in the court below.
2. Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or
agents of the United States. They are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which
the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the
judgment.

The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except for the paucity of
the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop
concessions is not before the Court. The respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so
it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek.
Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

http://casedigest.asialighttravel.com/usa-vs-guinto/

Amigable v. Cuenca (G.R. No. L-26400) Case Digest

SEPTEMBER 24, 2018  ~ PINGTHINGLAW

Amigable v. Cuenca

G.R. No. L-26400

February 29, 1972

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as

Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
defendants-appellees

Facts:

Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in
Cebu City. She had a transfer certificate title issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu
on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest
 in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or
negotiated sale, 6,167 square meters of land was used for the construction the Mango
and Gorordo Avenues.

On March 27, 1958, AMigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines,
requesting the payment for her lot. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General and
was disallowed it in his 9thIndorsement dated December 9, 1958.

Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas
Cuenca in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of the
portion of the lot used. In answer, the defendants interposed the following defenses:

1.     The action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the office of the
Auditor General

2.     The right of action for the recovery of the any amount which might be due to
Amigable had already prescribed.

3.     The action being a suit to the government, the claim for moral damages and other
costs have no valid basis since the government did not give its consent to be sued.

4.     Since it was only the province of Cebu who had misappropriated the lot, Amigable
has no cause of action against the defendants.

Issue:

Can Amigable properly sue the government?

Ruling:

Yes. In its decision, the Court cited Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu,
which also involved a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the
widening of Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City. Where the government takes away
property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain
a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent.
https://pingthing.law.blog/2018/09/24/amigable-v-cuenca-g-r-no-l-26400-case-digest/

Municipality of San Fernando vs Judge

Firme
Doctrine of non-suability
 

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS JUDGE FIRME

G.R. No. L-52179       195 SCRA 692       April 8, 1991

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner

vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA
BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R. BANIÑA, respondents.

 
 

Facts:

The case was filed by petitioner, which is a municipal corporation existing under and in accordance
with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

 
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel
and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando,
La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including
Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four others suffered varying
degrees of physical injuries.

The private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras
and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the
defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of
petitioner. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action,
non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver
of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.

The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. The owner
and driver of the jeepney were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

Issues:

Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed
to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to
dismiss.

Discussions:

The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver acting in behalf of the
municipality is performing governmental or proprietary functions. Municipal corporations are suable
because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can
be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the
defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the
case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.

 
 

Rulings:

Yes. In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State
until trial. However, the respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial
and thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver.

 
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its judgment it
arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality.
However, the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision, he held the municipality
liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.

Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable;
on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable. Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its
employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in
behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions.

http://casedigest.asialighttravel.com/municipality-san-fernando-vs-judge-firme/