RUFO, CYRENE S.

1LM2

Case Digests for Fourth Meeting:

G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.

FACTS:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010. These cases are the beginning to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential
election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy.” The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered”
for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined
their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.

ISSUE:

Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.

RULING:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or
to other appointments to the Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.

This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was
their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

G.R. No. 231658

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND
TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners
vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF
OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents

FACTS:

On May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No.
216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao. Moreover, in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President, on May 25,
2017, submitted to Congress a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.

On May 23, 2017, as the President stated in his Report, the Maute terrorist group took over a hospital in Marawi
City; established several checkpoints within the city; burned down certain government and private facilities and
inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces; and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby indicating a removal of allegiance from the Philippine Government and their
capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities – the President, foremost – of their powers and prerogatives.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate declared that it found “no compelling reason to
revoke Proclamation 216. The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned the
Supreme Court, questioning the factual basis of President Duterte’s Proclamation of martial law.

ISSUE:

Whether there is sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of Martial Law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
RULING:

The series of violent attacks committed by the ISIS-backed Maute Group, their brazen display of DAESH flags, and
their attempt to establish a DAESH wilayat or province in Marawi constitute a clear and open attempt to remove
from the allegiance of the Philippine Government, the city of Marawi, a part of Mindanao, and deprive the Chief
Executive of his power, authority, and prerogatives to enforce laws of the land and to maintain public order and
safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion. Hence, the factual basis for the Proclamation No. 216 is
sufficient.

It is concluded that there is sufficient basis for the proclamation of Martial Law.

Fifth meeting:

G.R. No. 237428

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner

vs.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Respondent

FACTS:

From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of Law.
While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal
counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner
of the Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on Sereno’s file of
any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only
nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a
manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or
“drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the
existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.

• On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was
declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous
SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for
those from the private sector.

• On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that
Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to hear
the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC
 then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces
of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior
years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN
only in 2003.

• On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of
the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original
jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under
Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo
warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude
Sereno therefrom.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto.

RULING:

A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction.

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto.
A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and
important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the action is directed
against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching
implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition
based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty
to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it.

Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s
constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be
abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including the
Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case
No. MDD-1)

FACTS:

The respondent is a licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On November 29, 1975, the IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues”. On January 21, 1976, the President of IBP, Liliano B.
Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section
24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP.
Edilion contends that the stated provisions deprive him of his constitutional rights which are rights to liberty and
property in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good
standing to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a consequence of this,
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic. Thus, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal
force and effect.

ISSUES:

• Whether the Court has the power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
• Whether the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void.
• Whether the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without
due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
• Whether the power of Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is valid.

RULING:

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. The IBP is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of. Moreover, it is distinguished
from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply
with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment of reasonable annual fees as one of the
requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues, hence he is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The Supreme Court
concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal for the practice of law is not a property right but
a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.

The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

G.R. No. 89252 May 24, 1993

RAUL SESBREÑO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION AND PILIPINAS BANK, respondents.

Salva, Villanueva & Associates for Delta Motors Corporation.

Reyes, Salazar & Associates for Pilipinas Bank.

FACTS:
On February 9, 1981, Raul Sesbreño made a money market placement in the amount of PHP 300,000 with the
Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation (PhilFinance), with a term of 32 days. PhilFinance issued to Sesbreño
the Certificate of Confirmation of Sale of a Delta Motor Corporation Promissory Note (2731), the Certificate of
Securities Delivery Receipt indicating the sale of the note with notation that said security was in the custody of
Pilipinas Bank, and postdated checks drawn against the Insular Bank of Asia and America for PHP 304,533.33
payable on 13 March 1981. The checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

Petitioner approached private respondent Pilipinas Bank and handed her a demand letter informing the bank that
his placement with PhilFinance had remained unpaid and outstanding, and that he in effect was asking for the
physical delivery of the underlying promissory note.

Pilipinas Bank never released the note, nor any instrument related to Sesbreño. Moreover, he learned that the
security was issued April 10, 1980 maturing on April 6, 1981, has a face value of PHP 2,300,833.33 with PhilFinance
as payee and Delta Motors as maker, and was stamped “non-negotiable” on its face. As the petitioner couldn’t
collect his investment and interest, he filed an action for damages against Delta Motors and Pilipinas Bank in which
the former contends that the said promissory note was not intended to be negotiated nor transferred by
PhilFinance as manifested by the word "non-negotiable" stamped across the face of the Note.

ISSUES:

• Whether Pilipinas Bank is liable for its action.

• Whether non-negotiable instruments are transferrable.

RULING:

Pilipinas Bank is liable for damages and legal interest thereon by arising out of its breach of duty. By failing to
deliver the Note to the petitioner as depositor-beneficiary of the thing deposited, Pilipinas Bank unlawfully
deprived petitioner of the Note deposited with it. Instead of complying with the demand of the petitioner, Pilipinas
Bank claimed to require and await the instructions of PhilFinance, in obvious contravention of its undertaking
under the DCR to effect physical delivery of the Note upon receipt of “written instructions” from petitioner the
petitioner.

Only an instrument qualifying as a negotiable instrument under the relevant statute may be negotiated either by
indorsement thereof coupled with delivery, or by delivery alone where the negotiable instrument is in bearer
form. A non-negotiable instrument may not be negotiated, but it may be assigned or transferred, absent an
express prohibition against assignment or transfer written in the face of the instrument. Moreover, the
negotiation of a negotiable instrument must be distinguished from the assignment or transfer of an instrument
whether that be negotiable or non-negotiable.

A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA March 20, 2007

RE: COMPLAINT AGAINST JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

x----------------------------x

A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J March 20, 2007

ATTY. ROBERTO C. PADILLA, Complainant,

vs.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION, COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
FACTS:

There are two administrative cases against Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals.

The first one is about an unsigned letter of complaint that Justice Asuncion has been sitting on motions for
reconsideration for six months to more than one year unless the parties come across. Justice Asuncion strongly
denied this charge of inaction, yet he admitted to some delays in the resolution for some MRs and cited “justifiable
reasons” such as the CAs reorganization and his heavy caseloads.

An investigating committee asked a report from Justice Asuncion regarding his backlogs. He reported nine cases
allegedly unresolved by and pending with him. The findings of the investigator belie this assertion. The record
shows that, as of September 30, 2006, the respondent had not resolved seventy-one motions for reconsideration
within the prescribed ninety-day period, and he had resolved one hundred seventy-nine motions for
reconsideration beyond the reglementary period. As of the same date, eighty-two cases submitted for decision
were still undecided, even after the lapse of the twelve-month period prescribed by the Constitution. He had also
decided four hundred nine cases beyond the one-year period. Notably, of the seventy-one motions for
reconsideration pending resolution, forty-six were filed in 2004 or earlier, with one dating all the way back to 2000.
Five were filed in 2001, sixteen in 2002, ten in 2003, and thirteen in 2004

The second case is based on a verified complaint filed by Atty. Roberto C. Padilla, charging Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion with "culpable dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the administration of justice and gross ignorance of
the law", in connection with CA-G.R. SP No. 60573, entitled "Philippine National Bank vs. NLRC and Erlinda
Archinas".

Complaint: On May 28, 2001, with respondent Justice as ponente, the First Division of the Court of Appeals
dismissed the PNB petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, affirming
in its entirety the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. On June 13, 2001, PNB filed a motion for
reconsideration. On June 25, 2001, Archinas (private respondent in the petition for certiorari) filed her opposition
to PNB’s motion for reconsideration. On July 24, 2001, acting upon PNB’s urgent motion for issuance of a TRO,
respondent issued the resolution enjoining the public respondent from implementing the Writ of Execution. On
October 30, 2001, the resolution ordering the maintenance of the status quo was issued. On November 5, 2001,
Archinas filed her motion seeking reconsideration of the October 30, 2001 resolution. Archinas filed four (4) urgent
motions for early resolution of the pending motion/s for reconsideration, on December 28, 2001, June 13, 2002,
September 24, 2002, and August 23, 2005, Meantime, on July 5, 2004, respondent Justice Asuncion was assigned
to CA Cebu Station. With this transfer, respondent’s caseload was assigned to Justice Zenarosa. On November 3,
2004, respondent was reassigned back to Manila. It was only on August 7, 2006 that respondent finally resolved
the PNB motion for reconsideration. The Investigating Justice in his Report also found out that: "His ‘interest’ in
the case is ‘manifest’ in that, despite his assignment in Cebu City on July 7, 2004, he did not unload the case to
Justice Zenarosa (Office Order No. 212-04-CG). Worse, he recalled the case upon his return to the CA Manila
station.

ISSUE:

Whether the failure of a Judge/Justice to decide a case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency
and would later on become serious misconduct that would justify dismissal from the service?

RULING:

In this case of Justice Asuncion, the prolonged delay in deciding or resolving such a staggering number of
cases/matters assigned to him, borders on serious misconduct which could subject the respondent to the
maximum administrative sanction. To the court, these are acts of bad faith, hence manifest undue interest
attributable only to the respondent, and not to the other two justices of the CA Division. Accordingly, only the
respondent must be made to suffer the consequences.

Besides, the five-year delay in the resolution of the PNB motion for reconsideration would already constitute
serious misconduct that would justify dismissal from the service. Such failure to follow basic legal commands
embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused. While a
judge is presumed to act with regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions, a blatant disregard
of the clear and unmistakable provisions of a statute, as well as Supreme Court circulars enjoining strict
compliance therewith, upends this presumption and subjects the magistrate to administrative sanctions.

As recommended by the Investigating Justice, Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals is
suspended from office without pay, allowances and other monetary benefits for a period of three months.

In A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, for gross ignorance of the law and manifest undue interest, Associate Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion of the Court of Appeals is hereby ordered dismissed from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
except leave credits.