LEO ARTEMIO A.

PUERTOS
 RULE 65

Punongbayan-Visitacion vs People
GR No. 194214
January 10, 2018

Facts:

Petitioner Punongbayan-Visitacion was the corporate secretary and assistant

treasurer of St. Peter's College of Iligan City. Acting on the advice of her counsel,
she wrote a letter to private respondent Carmelita P. Punongbayan regarding the
alleged misrepresentation of the latter as the school’s President. In the letter, she
accused the private respondent of committing acts of falsification when she
misrepresented to the bank that her signature is required in disbursements above
P5,000.00.

Insulted, Punongbayan filed a Complaint for Libel against Visitacion. Thereafter,

the RTC convicted Visitacion for Libel. Aggrieved, Visitacion filed a petition for
certiorari with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the CA.

The CA, on the other hand, dismissed Visitacion's petition. The CA expounded
that Visitacion should have filed an appeal and not a petition for certiorari. It noted
that at the time Visitacion filed her petition, the period to file an appeal had yet to
expire. Thus, the CA concluded that the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is
cause for dismissal of the petition for certiorari because it is not a substitute for a
lost appeal.

Hence, this petition before the SC. Visitacion assails that her petition for certiorari
should have been treated as an appeal. On the other hand, both public and private
respondents counter that the CA correctly dismissed Visitacion's petition for
certiorari because it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal and that a wrong mode
of appeal is dismissible.

Issue:

WON the CA erred when it denied the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner.
Ruling:

Yes, as a general rule, the special civil action of certiorari is not a substitute for an
appeal. Remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal,
especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned
such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available,
certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.

However, that general rule admits exceptions. The Court held in Department of
Education v. Cuanan the exceptions to this rule, to wit:

(a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;

(b) when the broader interest of justice so requires;

(c) when the writs issued are null and void; or

(d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial

authority. As will be shown forthwith, exception (c) applies to the present case.

At any rate, Cuanan's petition for certiorari before the CA could be treated as a
petition for review, the petition having been filed on November 22, 2004, or
thirteen (13) days from receipt on November 9, 2004 of CSC Resolution No.
041147, clearly within the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a petition
for review. Such move would be in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the
Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice.

In this case, the Court finds that the interest of substantial justice warrants the
relaxation of the rules and treats Visitacion's petition for certiorari as an appeal.
This is especially true considering that the same was filed within the reglementary
period to file an appeal. It is noteworthy that in the litany of cases where the Court
did not consider certiorari as an appeal, the former remedy was filed beyond the
15-day period to interpose an appeal.
 RULE 65

Araullo vs Aquino
GR No. 209287
July 01, 2014

Facts:

On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech
in the Senate to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an
additional ₱50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment
of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.

Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Abad of the DBM issued a

public statement. He explained that the funds released to the Senators had been
part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to
accelerate economic expansion.

The revelation of Sen. Estrada brought the DAP to the consciousness of the Nation
for the first time, and made this present controversy inevitable. Nine petitions
assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP
were filed within days. In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), challenged the
constitutionality of the DAP and all other executive issuances allegedly
implementing the DAP before the SC. Petitioners filed petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus to assail the constitutionality and validity of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). On the Other hand, the respondents
aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition are not proper actions
for directly assailing the constitutionality and validity of the DAP.

In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no authorized

proceeding under the Constitution and the Rules of Court for questioning the
validity of any law unless there is an actual case or controversy the resolution of
which requires the determination of the constitutional question; that for a court of
law to pass upon the constitutionality of a law or any act of the Government when
there is no case or controversy is for that court to set itself up as a reviewer of the
acts of Congress and of the President in violation of the principle of separation of
powers.
Issue:

WON the certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

Ruling:

Yes, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Hence, the judiciary is the
final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or
lack of jurisdiction. 

What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government may be determined under the Constitution?

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are
governed by Rule 65.

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the
judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary manner, such as when
such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted
in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

On the other hand, Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any

tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist
from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said
entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion.

However, with respect to the courts, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition
may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions but also to set right and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality
of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative
and executive officials. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by
necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in
appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This
entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.
 RULE 69

Dadizon vs Bernadas
GR. No. 1723367
June 05, 2009

Facts:

Petitioners and respondents are the children of the late Diosdado Bernadas, Sr.
leaving in co-ownership with his then surviving spouse, Eustaquia Bernadas
several parcels of land in Naval, Biliran.

Respondents filed a Complaint against petitioners to compel the partition of the

one-half (1/2) conjugal share of the properties left by their late father based on the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated February 24, 1996.

In their Answer, petitioners averred that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated

February 24, 1996, was revoked by the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated
February 10, 1999. During trial, on June 13, 2000, both parties manifested that in
view of the death of their mother, Eustaquia Bernadas, they have an ongoing
negotiation for the extrajudicial partition of the subject properties to end their
differences once and for all.

On January 30, 2001, the counsel of respondents filed a Project of Partition dated

October 23, 2000. However, the same was not signed by all of the heirs. On the
hearing of February 6, 2001, the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000 was
discussed by both parties, and the RTC ordered petitioners to submit their
comment thereon within 15 days. Petitioners did not file any comment. In its Order
dated March 22, 2001, the RTC noted that at the last pre-trial conference, both
parties informed the court that they already have an extrajudicial partition of the
subject properties and ordered both parties to submit the extrajudicial partition for
its approval.

On July 16, 2001, respondents filed a Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000.
On July 23, 2001, the RTC issued an Order approving the Project of Partition dated
October 23, 2000.

Petitioners, thereafter, filed an appeal before the CA alleging that the RTC erred in
finding that their counsel agreed to the approved Project of Partition dated October
23, 2000, and that it should be noted that the said document does not bear the
signature of their counsel.

The CA ruled that the appeal is without merit. Hence, this appeal before the SC.

Issue:

WON the approval of the RTC of the project of partition was proper.

Ruling:

No, there are two stages in every action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court.

The first stage is the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists
and a partition is proper and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. The second stage commences when it appears that "the
parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event,
partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners.

In this case, it is clear that the RTC departed from the procedure mandated by Rule
69. The records show that the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000 was filed
only by respondents’ counsel, and that the same was not signed by the respondents
or all of the parties.

Even if petitioners did manifest in open court to the RTC that they have already
agreed with the respondents on the manner of partition of the subject properties,
what is material is that only the respondents filed the Project of Partition dated
October 23, 2000 and that the same did not bear the signatures of petitioners
because only a document signed by all of the parties can signify that they agree on
a partition.

Hence, the RTC had no authority to approve the Project of Partition dated October
23, 2000, which did not bear all of the signatures of the parties. Likewise, the
failure to file any comment or suggestion as to manner of distribution of the
subject properties does not justify the RTC’s non-observance of the procedure
mandated by Rule 69. When the parties were unable to submit the signed Project of
Partition despite being ordered to do so, the RTC should have ordered the
appointment of commissioners to make the partition as mandated by Section 3,
Rule 69.
In partition proceedings, reference to commissioners is required as a procedural
step in the action and is not discretionary on the part of the court.
 RULE 71

Lorenzo Shipping Corporation vs Distribution Management Asso. of the

Philippines (DMAP)
GR. No. 155849
August 31, 2011

Facts:

On June 4, 2001, the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-

Resolution, advising DMAP that a computation of the required freight rate
adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight rates officially
considered or declared deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum
Circular No. 153 (MC 153). DMAP challenged the constitutionality of MC 153 in
the Court of Appeals (CA) as special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or temporary restraining order.
However, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upheld
the constitutionality of MC 153. DMAP appealed to the SC (G.R. No. 152914)
but the Court denied DMAP’s petition for review on certiorari due technicalities of
the petition.

Thereafter, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM), it publicly

circulated the Sea Transport Update, it provides that the Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was denied based on technicalities
and not on the legal issue DMAP presented. It also stated that the SC ruling was
issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months.

Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt against the
respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted
indirect contempt of court since the publication unfairly debased the Supreme
Court by making "scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo that the
Supreme Court had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as to lead the
respondents to conclude that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only,
normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months.

In their comment, the respondents denied any intention to malign or criticize the
Court. They explained that their statement that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in
one month time only, normal lead time is at least three to six months"  was not per
se contemptuous, because the normal and appropriate time frame for the resolution
of petitions by the Court was either less than a month, if the petition was to be
denied on technicality, and more or less from three to six months, if the petition
was to be given due course. The respondents further stated that the lead time was
indicated in the presentation simply to tell DMAP members that the lead time to go
back to MARINA had been cut short in view of the denial of the petition for
review.

Issue:

WON the respondent is guilty of indirect contempt.

Ruling:

No, Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is

committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the
administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of
willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.

Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court.

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a

charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard
by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official

duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or

judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of
any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces

another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing
acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
 (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of
this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,

obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such

without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of

an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

In his case, here the petitioners’ mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly
debases the Supreme Court because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and
baseless innuendo therein that the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the
petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of the respondents thus leading said
respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only,
normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months," was insufficient to sustain the charge of
indirect contempt.

Nor do does the court consider contemptuous either the phrase contained in the Sea
Transport Update stating: "The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme
Court was denied based on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP
presented", or the phrase in the Sea Transport Update reading "Supreme Court
ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months." These
phrases are not critical of the Court and how fast the resolutions in G.R. No.
152914 were issued. The unmistakable intent behind the phrases was to inform
DMAP’s members of the developments in the case, and on the taking of the next
viable move of going back to MARINA on the issues, as the ruling of the Court of
Appeals instructed.

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of
their performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary
is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of
the citizens whom it is expected to serve. It is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety.
Here, the Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and
did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents
were not guilty of indirect contempt of court.