SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131457. November 17, 1998.]

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL, GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,

HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON,
NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ,
petitioners, vs . HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE
REFORM respondents.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF COURT; PROCEDURAL RULES SHOULD BE

TREATED WITH UTMOST RESPECT AND DUE CARE; RATIONALE. — Procedural rules
should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they are designed to facilitate
the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of
rival claims and in the administration of justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill
of rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that "all persons shall have a right
to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies." The adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide
strictly by the rules. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. There have been
some instances wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but
this exibility was "never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules
with impunity." A liberal interpretation and application of the rules of procedure can be
resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
2. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF A BODY, COURT OR TRIBUNAL; ESSENTIAL AND
MANDATORY REQUIREMENT BEFORE IT CAN ACT ON A CASE OR CONTROVERSY. — It
must be emphasized that a decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or
tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, is by no means a mere technicality
of law or procedure. It is elementary that jurisdiction of a body, court or tribunal is an
essential and mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or controversy. And even
if said body, court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, but has acted in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, such act is still invalid. The decision nullifying
the questioned act is an adjudication on the merits.
3. ID.; ID.; INTERVENTION; WHEN ALLOWED; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT
BAR. — The rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who wishes to intervene must have a
"certain right" or "legal interest" in the subject matter of the litigation. Such interest must be
"actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant." Here, the applicants for intervention categorically admitted that they were not
tenants of petitioner NQSR Management and Development Corporation, but were merely
seasonal, farmworkers in a pineapple plantation on the subject land which was under lease
for ten (10) years to the Philippine Packing Corporation. Respondent, then DAR Secretary
Ernesto Garilao. also admitted in his Order of June 7, 1995 that "the subject land is neither
tenanted nor validly covered for compulsory acquisition . . . ." Under Section 4, Article XIII
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 of the 1987 Constitution, the right to own directly or collectively the land they till belongs
to the farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, and in the case of other
farmworkers, the latter are entitled "to receive a just share of the fruits" of the land. The
pertinent portion of the aforecited constitutional provision mandates: "Sec. 4. The State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and
regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or,
in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. . . ."
Commenting on the above-quoted provision, the eminent constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., one of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, declares that under the agrarian
reform program the equitable distribution of the land is a right given to landless farmers
and regular farmworkers to own the land they till, while the other or seasonal farmworkers
are only entitled to a just share of the fruits of the land. Being merely seasonal
farmworkers without a right to own, the applicants' motion for intervention must
necessarily fail as they have no legal or actual and substantial interest over the subject
land. CaDATc

4. ID.; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES; BINDING

AND CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURT. — It is axiomatic that factual ndings of
administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in their eld are binding and
conclusive on the Court, considering that the O ce of the President is presumed to be
most competent in matters falling within its domain.
PUNO, J.: separate opinion:
REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF COURT; PROCEDURAL RULES; THE PREROGATIVE TO
SUSPEND OR GRANT AN EXCEPTION IN A PARTICULAR CASE LIES IN THE AUTHORITY
THAT PROMULGATED IT; RATIONALE. — It is true that procedural rules are necessary to
secure just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
Procedure, however, is only a means to an end, and they may be suspended when they
subvert the interests of justice. It is self-evident that the prerogative to suspend
procedural rules or to grant an exception in a particular case lies in the authority that
promulgated the rules. Rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts are
promulgated by this Court. On the other hand, it is the President as administrative head
who is vested by the Administrative Code of 1987 to promulgate rules relating to
governmental operations, including administrative procedure. These rules take the form of
administrative orders. This power is necessary for the President to discharge his
constitutional duty of faithfully executing our laws. Under exceptional circumstances, this
Court has suspended its rules to prevent miscarriage of justice. In the same breath, we
should hold that the President has the power to suspend the effectivity of administrative
rules of procedure when they hamper, defeat or in any way undermine the effective
enforcement of the laws of the land. Indeed, we already recognize that Congress can
suspend its own rules if doing so will enable it to facilitate its task of lawmaking. The three
great branches of our government are co-equal and within their own sphere they have the
same responsibility to promote the good of our people. There is no reason to withhold the
power to suspend rules from the President and grant it alone to the two other branches of
government. IAaCST

OPINION

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 MARTINEZ J :
MARTINEZ, p

This pertains to the two (2) separate motions for reconsideration led by herein
respondents and the applicants for intervention, seeking a reversal of our April 24, 1998
Decision nullifying the so-called "win-win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued by
the O ce of the President in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, and denying the applicants' Motion
For Leave To Intervene.
Respondents' motion is based on the following grounds:
"I.

THE SO-CALLED WIN-WIN RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 7, 1997 IS NOT A

VOID RESOLUTION AS IT SEEKS TO CORRECT AN ERRONEOUS RULING. THE
MARCH 29, 1996 DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COULD NOT AS
YET BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS TO BE BEYOND MODIFICATION.

"II.

THE PROPER REMEDY OF PETITIONERS IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER

RULE 43 AND NOT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES
OF COURT.

"III.

THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A CONDITION SINE QUA

N O N BEFORE A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI MAY BE FILED BECAUSE THE
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION IS NOT PATENTLY ILLEGAL.

"IV.

PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF FORUM-SHOPPING BECAUSE ULTIMATELY

PETITIONERS SEEK THE SAME RELIEF, WHICH IS TO RESTRAIN THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM FROM PLACING THE SUBJECT 144-
HECTARE PROPERTY UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
(CARL)." 1

For their part, the grounds relied upon by the applicants for intervention are as
follows:
"I.

THE INTERVENORS POSSESS A RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THESE PROCEEDINGS.

"II.

THE MODIFICATION BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (OP) OF ITS 29 MARCH

1996 DECISION, THROUGH THE 7 NOVEMBER 1997 'WIN-WIN' RESOLUTION,
WAS NOT ERRONEOUS BUT WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF ITS POWERS AND
PREROGATIVES.

"III.

THE 'WIN-WIN' RESOLUTION PROPERLY ADDRESSES THE SUBSTANTIAL

ISSUES RELATIVE TO THIS CASE." 2

Both movants also ask that their respective motions be resolved by this Court en
banc since the issues they raise are, as described by the respondents, "novel," 3 or, as
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 characterized by the applicants for intervention, of "transcendental signi cance." 4 Most
speci cally, movants are presenting the issue of whether or not the power of the local
government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR).
The instant motions are being opposed vehemently by herein petitioners.
The grounds raised here were extensively covered and resolved in our challenged
Decision. A minute resolution denying the instant motions with nality would have been
su cient, considering that the same follows as a matter of course if warranted under the
circumstances as in other equally important cases. However, in view of the wide publicity
and media coverage that this case has generated, in addition to the demonstrations
staged at the perimeter of this Court, as well as the many letters coming from different
sectors of society (the religious and the NGOs) and even letters from abroad, we deem it
necessary to write an extended resolution to again reiterate the basis for our April 24,
1998 Decision, and hopefully write finis to this controversy.
To support their request that their motions be referred to the Court en banc, the
movant cited the Resolution of this Court dated February 9, 1993, in Bar Matter No. 209,
which enumerates the cases that may be resolved, en banc, among which are the
following:
"xxx xxx xxx

3. Cases raising novel questions of law;

xxx xxx xxx

8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three

(3) members thereof merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable
to a majority of the actual membership of the Court en banc; and

xxx xxx xxx"

Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no

extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc. Speci cally, the issue of
whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the
approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been decided by this Court in the case
o f Province of Camarines Sur, et al . vs. Court of Appeals 5 wherein we held that local
government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The dispositive portion of the Decision in the
aforecited case states:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nulli es the trial court's order
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private
respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

xxx xxx xxx" (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous

vote of all ve (5) members of the Second Division of this Court. Stated otherwise, this
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 Second Division is of the opinion that the matters raised by movants are nothing new and
do not deserve the consideration of the Court en banc. Thus, the participation of the full
Court in the resolution of movants' motions for reconsideration would be inappropriate.
We shall now resolve the respondents' motion for reconsideration.
In our Decision in question, we struck down as void the act of the O ce of the
President (OP) in reopening the case in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424 through the issuance of
the November 7, 1997 "win-win" Resolution which substantially modi ed its March 29,
1996 Decision that had long become nal and executory , being in gross disregard of the
rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. It will be
recalled that the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared by the same o ce as nal and
executory in its Order dated June 23, 1997 after the respondent DAR's motion for
reconsideration of the said decision was denied in the same order for having been led
beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
In their instant motion, the respondents contend that the "win-win" Resolution of
November 7, 1997 "is not a void resolution as it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling,"
hence, "(t)he March 29, 1996 decision of the O ce of the President could not as yet
become final and executory as to be beyond modification." 6
The respondents explained that the DAR's failure to le on time the motion for
reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was "excusable:"
"The manner of service of the copy of the March 29, 1996 decision also
made it impossible for DAR to le its motion for reconsideration on time. The
copy was received by the Records Section of the DAR, then referred to the O ce
of the Secretary and then to the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance. By the time
it was forwarded to the litigation o ce of the DAR, the period to le the motion
for reconsideration had already lapsed. Instead of resolving the motion for
reconsideration on the merits in the interest of substantial justice, the O ce of
the President denied the same for having been filed late." 7 (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot agree with the respondents' contention that the June 23, 1997 OP Order
which denied the DAR's motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision for
having been led late was "an erroneous ruling" which had to be corrected by the
November 7, 1997 "win-win" Resolution. The said denial of the DAR's motion for
reconsideration was in accordance with Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated
February 12, 1987, which mandates that "decisions/resolutions/orders of the O ce of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become nal after the
lapse of fteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof . . ., unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period." 8
Contrary to the respondents' submission, the late ling by the DAR of its motion for
reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is not excusable. The respondents'
explanation that the DAR's o ce procedure after receiving the copy of the March 29, 1996
OP Decision "made it impossible for DAR to le its motion for reconsideration on time"
since the said decision had to be referred to the different departments of the DAR, cannot
be considered a valid justi cation. There is nothing wrong with referring the decision to the
departments concerned for the preparation of the motion for reconsideration, but in doing
so, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary period xed by law, rule or regulation . In
other words, the DAR must develop a system of procedure that would enable it to comply
with the reglementary period for ling the said motion. For, the rules relating to
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 reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal o ce procedure of an
administrative body. Otherwise, the noble purpose of the rules prescribing a de nite
period for ling a motion for reconsideration of a decision can easily be circumvented by
the mere expediency of claiming a long and arduous process of preparing the said motion
involving several departments of the administrative agency.
The respondents then faulted the O ce of the President when they further stressed
that it should have resolved "the (DAR's) motion for reconsideration on the merits in the
interest of substantial justice," instead of simply denying the same for having been led
late, 9 adding that "technicalities and procedural lapses" should be "subordinated to the
established merits of the case." 1 0 Respondents thus plead for a relaxation in the
application of the rules by overlooking procedural lapses committed by the DAR.
We are not persuaded.
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due
regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed in the Constitution
which guarantees that "all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. " 1 1 The adjudicatory
bodies and the parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. 1 2 While it
is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must
be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice. 1 3 There have been some instances wherein this Court
allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but this exibility was "never intended to
forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity." 1 4 A liberal
interpretation and application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
In the instant case, we cannot grant respondents the relief prayed for since they
have not shown a justi able reason for a relaxation of the rules. As we have discussed
earlier, the DAR's late ling of its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision was not justi ed. Hence, the nal and executory character of the said OP Decision
can no longer be disturbed, much less substantially modi ed. Res judicata has set in and
the adjudicated thing or affair should forever be put to rest. It is in this sense that we, in
our decision under reconsideration, declared as void and of no binding effect the "win-win"
Resolution of November 7, 1997 which substantially modi ed the March 29, 1996
Decision, the said resolution having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and in arrant
violation of the fundamental and time-honored principle of nality to administrative
determinations.
The movants, however, complain that the case was decided by us on the basis of a
"technicality," and, this has been the rallying cry of some newspaper columnists who insists
that we resolve this case not on mere "technical" grounds.
We do not think so.
It must be emphasized that a decision/resolution/order of an administrative body,
court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was rendered without
o r in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, is by no means a mere
technicality of law or procedure. It is elementary that jurisdiction of a body, court or
tribunal is an essential and mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or
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 controversy. And even if said body, court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, but has
acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, such act is still invalid.
The decision nullifying the questioned act is an adjudication on the merits.
In the instant case, several fatal violations of the law were committed, namely: (1)
the DAR led its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision way
beyond the reglementary period; (2) after the said motion for reconsideration was denied
for having been led late, the March 29, 1996 Decision was declared nal and executory,
but the DAR still led a second motion for reconsideration which is prohibited by the rules;
1 5 (3) despite this, the second motion for reconsideration was entertained by herein
respondent, then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, and on the basis thereof,
issued the "win-win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997, substantially modifying the
March 29, 1996 Decision which had long become nal and executory; and (4) the
reopening of the same case through the issuance of the November 7, 1997 "win-win"
Resolution was in agrant infringement of the doctrine of res judicata. These grave
breaches of the law, rules and settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical
nature.
It should be stressed that when the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared nal
and executory, vested rights were acquired by the herein petitioners, namely, the province
of Bukidnon, the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and the NQSR Management and
Development Corporation, and all others who should be bene ted by the said decision.
Thus, we repeat, the issue here is not a question of technicality but that of substance and
merit. In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in the case of Videogram
Regulatory Board vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1 6 (j)ust as a losing party has the right to le
an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case."
Another matter which the movants bring to our attention is that when the DAR's
Order denying petitioners', application for conversion was rst brought by petitioner
Carlos O. Fortich to the O ce of the President, the appropriate administrative rules were
not complied with. We wish to point out that, apparently, movants had the opportunity to
question this alleged lapse in procedure but chose not to avail of the same. For the "win-
win" Resolution itself never mentioned this supposed procedural lapse as an issue. Here,
the issue which has been brought to the fore is the validity of the "win-win" Resolution of
November 7, 1997, not that of any other previous proceedings. The movants cannot now
question the supposed procedural lapse for the rst time before us. It should have been
raised and resolved at the first opportunity, that is, at the administrative level.
The other grounds raised by respondents in their instant motion for reconsideration
concerning the propriety of petitioners' remedy, the absence of a motion for
reconsideration of the "win-win" Resolution before resorting to the present petition for
certiorari, and forum shopping have already been extensively dealt with in our challenged
decision. We need not further elaborate on these grounds except to state that the same
lacks merit.
With respect to the motion for reconsideration led by the applications for
intervention, we likewise nd the same unmeritorious. The issue of the applicants' right to
intervene in this proceedings should be laid to rest. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a
party who wishes to intervene must have a "certain right" or "legal interest" in the subject
matter of the litigation. 1 7 Such interest must be "actual, substantial, material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant." 1 8
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 Here, the applicants for intervention categorically admitted that they were not
tenants of petitioner NQSR Management and Development Corporation, but were merely
seasonal, farmworkers in a pineapple plantation on the subject land which was under lease
for ten (10) years to the Philippine Packing Corporation. 1 9 Respondent, the DAR Secretary
Ernesto Garilao, also admitted in his Order of June 7, 1995 that "the subject land is neither
tenanted nor validly covered for compulsory acquisition . . . " 2 0
Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the right to own directly or
collectively the land they till belongs to the farmers and regular farmworkers who are
landless, and in the case of other farmworkers, the latter are entitled "to receive a just
share of the fruits" of the land. The pertinent portion of the aforecited constitutional
provision mandates:
"Sec. 4. The State shall by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers,
to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
Commenting on the above-quoted provision, the eminent constitutionalist, Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., one of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, declares that under
the agrarian reform program the equitable distribution of the land is a right given to
landless farmers and regular farmworkers to own the land they till, while the other or
seasonal farmworkers are only entitled to a just share of the fruits of the land. 2 1 Being
m er ely seasonal farmworkers without a right to own, the applicants' motion for
intervention must necessarily fail as they have no legal or actual and substantial interest
over the subject land.
It is noteworthy the even the "win-win" Resolution of November 7, 1997 which the
herein respondents and the applicants for intervention seek to uphold, did not recognize
the latter as proper parties to intervene in the case simply because the quali ed farmer-
bene ciaries have yet to be meticulously determined as ordered in the said resolution . The
dispositive portion of the "win-win" Resolution reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the O ce of the
President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"(3) The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully

and meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified beneficiaries.

xxx xxx xxx

"We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention led by 113 farmers on

October 10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is
unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.

"SO ORDERED." 2 2 (Emphasis supplied)

These are all that are necessary to dispose of the instant separate motions for
reconsideration considering that the crucial issue in the present petition for certiorari is
simply the validity of the "win-win" resolution.
But even if we tackle the other issues which the movants describe as "substantial,"
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 namely: (1) whether the subject land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation
facility; (2) whether the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition
(NCA); (3) whether the land is tenanted, and if not, whether the applicants for intervention
are quali ed to become bene ciaries thereof; and (4) whether the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land into industrial/institutional use, to our
mind, the March 29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed of the
aforementioned issues. We quote the pertinent portions of the said Decision:
"After a careful evaluation of the petition vis-a-vis the grounds upon which
the denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we nd that the instant
application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed
with merit. To be sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-
industrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real
development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the
municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be bene ciaries
(who are not even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits.
"Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural
land with irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by
petitioner, while it is true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the
same merely passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water to the
ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself, subject of the
instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with
pineapple by the Philippine Packing Corporation.

"On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of
Compulsory Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting
on areas covered by NCA is not applicable, su ce it to state that the said NCA
was declared null and void by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the
DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject
property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the
expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National
Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional O ce and the Land
Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to desist from pursuing any activity
or activities covering petitioner's land.

"On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing
family has already contributed substantially to the land reform program of the
government, as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija In the 70's and
another 100 hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten
(10) years ago, for which they have not received 'just compensation' up to this
time.

"Neither can the assertion that 'there is no clear and tangible compensation
package arrangements for the bene ciaries' hold water as, in the rst place, there
are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.

"Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the

subject property for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very
purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in the
management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section
20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other
interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units
autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their
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 agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition
to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.

"WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal

mandate and in view of the favorable recommendations of the various
government agencies abovementioned, the subject Order, dated November 14,
1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE
and the instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED." 2 3
(Emphasis supplied)
It is axiomatic that factual ndings of administrative agencies which have acquired
expertise in their eld are binding and conclusive on the Court, 2 4 considering that the
O ce of the President is presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its
domain.
The interest of justice is invoked by movants. We are aware of that famous adage of
the late President Ramon Magsaysay that "those who have less in life should have more in
law." Our a rmation of the nality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is precisely pro-poor
considering that more of the impoverished members of society will be bene ted by the
agro-economic development of the disputed land which the province of Bukidnon and the
municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake. To our mind, the OP Decision of
March 29, 1996 was for the eventual bene t of the many, not just of the few. This is clearly
shown from the development plan on the subject land as conceived by the petitioners. The
said plan is supposed to have the following components as indicated in the OP Decision of
March 29, 1996:
"1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the
following: Institute for Continuing Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood
Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute for Agribusiness Research;
Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports Development Complex
which covers an area of 24 hectares;

"2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing

for corn oil, corn starch, various corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based
snacks, exportable: rice; cassava processing for starch, alcohol and food
delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products such as juices; processing
plants for vegetables processed and prepared for market; cold storage and ice
plant; cannery system; commercial stores; public market; and abattoir needing
about 67 hectares;

3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for

recreation, horse-back riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33
hectares; and

"4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room

hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a housing project covering an area of 20
hectares." 2 5

Expressing full support for the proposed project, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying the
subject 144-hectare land from agricultural to industrial/institutional use with a view of
providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide
more jobs and raise the income of its people. The said project was also supported by the
Bukidnon Provincial Board which, on the basis of a Joint Committee Report submitted by
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 its Committee on Law, Committee on Agrarian Reform and Socio-Economic Committee,
approved the said ordinance on February 1, 1994, now docketed as Resolution No. 94-95.
Impressed with the proposed project, several government agencies and a private
cooperative, including the people of the affected barangay, recommended the same.
Again, we quote the pertinent portion of the OP Decision of March 29, 1996:
"The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certi cation dated January 4,
1995, adopted by the Department of Trade and Industry , Bukidnon Provincial
O ce, as one of its agship projects . The same was likewise favorably
recommended by the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the municipal,
provincial and regional o ce of the DAR; the Regional O ce (Region X) of the
DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance Certi cate on June 5, 1995);
the Executive Director, signing 'By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ,' O ce of
the President — Mindanao; the Secretary of DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS
Wilfredo D. Clemente.

"In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial

Irrigation O ce, Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling,
Chief, Provincial Irrigation O ce, interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed
conversion . . . Also, the Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative,
San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no objection to the proposed
conversion of the land in question 'as it will provide more economic bene ts to
the community in terms of outside investments that will come and employment
opportunities that will be generated by the projects to be put up . . ..'
"On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation
held at the Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose
Macalindong of DAR Central O ce and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the
people of the affected barangay rallied behind their respective o cials in
endorsing the project." 2 6 (Emphasis supplied)

In this regard, the petitioners gave this assurance: "The proposed project is
petitioners' way of helping insure food, shelter and lifetime security of the greater majority
of Sumilao's 22,000 people. It is capable of employing thousands of residents, enabling
them to earn good income ranging about P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 for each." 2 7
We express our grave concern with the manner some sectors of society have been
trying to in uence this Court into resolving this case on the basis of considerations other
than the applicable law, rules and settled jurisprudence and the evidence on record. We
wish to emphasize that notwithstanding the previous adverse comments by some
columnists in the print media, the assailed Decision was arrived at in the pursuit of justice
and the rule of law.
Finally, for those who refuse to understand, no explanation is possible, but for those
who understand, no explanation is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration of the April 24, 1998
Decision of this Court, led by the respondents and the applicants for intervention, are
hereby DENIED with FINALITY .
SO ORDERED.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur

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 Separate Opinions
PUNO, J ., dissenting:

The salient facts are well established. The instant controversy originated from an
application for land use conversion led on December 11, 1993 before the DAR by Mr.
Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association
(BAIDA) and petitioner NQSR Management and Development Corporation concerning its
144-hectare land in San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon. In an Order 1 dated November 14,
1994, DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao denied the application for conversion of the land
from agricultural to agro-industrial use and ordered its distribution to quali ed landless
farmers. BAIDA and NQSR Management and Development Corporation led a motion for
reconsideration 2 dated January 9, 1995, which was, however, denied in an Order 3 dated
June 7, 1995. Thereafter, Bukidnon Governor Carlos O. Fortich sent a letter 4 to President
Fidel V. Ramos requesting him to suspend the Garilao Order and to con rm the ordinance
enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao converting the subject land from
agricultural to industrial/institutional land. Acting on the letter, then Executive Secretary
Torres reversed the Garilao Order and upheld the power of local government units to
convert portions of their agricultural lands into industrial areas. 5 Respondent DAR
Secretary Garilao led a motion for reconsideration, admittedly tardy, which was denied by
then Executive Secretary Torres on the ground that his March 29, 1996 decision had
already become nal and executory in view of the lapse of the fteen-day period for ling a
motion for reconsideration. A second motion for reconsideration was led during the
pendency of which President Ramos constituted the Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force.
On November 7, 1997, Deputy Executive Secretary Corona issued that herein-assailed "win-
win" resolution which, pursuant to the recommendations of the task force, substantially
modi ed the Torres decision by awarding one hundred (100) hectares of the Sumilao
property to the quali ed farmer bene ciaries and allocating only forty four (44) hectares
for the establishment of an industrial and commercial zone.
In our decision promulgated in Baguio City on April 24, 1998, we annulled the "win-
win" resolution on the ground that public respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona committed grave abuse of decision in modifying an already nal and executory
decision of then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres. It is undisputed that the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) failed to comply with the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. 6 It received the Torres decision on April 10, 1996 but transmitted its
motion for reconsideration to the DAR Records Management Division for mailing to the
O ce of the President only on May 23, 1996. 7 The O ce of the President received the
motion on July 14, 1997. Forthwith, we applied the rule on nality of administrative
determinations and upheld the policy of setting an end to litigation as an indispensable
aspect of orderly administration of justice. In their motions for reconsideration,
respondents and intervenors protest the technical basis of our decision.
I vote to grant their motions for reconsideration and remand the case to the Court of
Appeals.
First. It is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 8 Procedure, however, is only a
means to an end, 9 and they may be suspended when they subvert the interests of justice.
It is self-evident that the prerogative to suspend procedural rules or to grant an exception
in a particular case lies in the authority that promulgated the rules. 1 0
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 Rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts are promulgated by
this Court. 1 1 On the other hand, it is the President as administrative head who is vested by
the Administrative Code of 1987 to promulgate rules relating to governmental operations,
including administrative procedure. These rules take the form of administrative orders. 1 2
This power is necessary for the President to discharge his constitutional duty of faithfully
executing our laws. 1 3 Under exceptional circumstances, this Court has suspended its rules
to prevent miscarriage of justice. In the same breath, we should hold that the President
has the power to suspend the effectivity of administrative rules of procedure when they
hamper, defeat or in any way undermine the effective enforcement of the laws of the land.
Indeed, we already recognize that Congress can suspend its own rules if doing so will
enable it to facilitate its task of lawmaking. The three great branches of our government
are co-equal and within their own sphere they have the same responsibility to promote the
good of our people. There is no reason to withhold the power to suspend rules from the
President and grant it alone to the two other branches of government.
A closer scrutiny of the records in the instant case reveals that the fteen-day rule
for ling a motion for reconsideration under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 was
suspended by the President when he constituted, on October 15, 1997 or some six (6)
months after the promulgation of the Torres decision, the Presidential Fact-Finding Task
Force to conduct a comprehensive review of the proper land use of the 144-hectare
Sumilao property. At that time, then Executive Secretary Torres had already denied the rst
motion for reconsideration of the DAR on the ground that his March 29, 1997 decision had
already become nal and executory. This notwithstanding, the President treated the case
as still open and stated in his memorandum that the ndings of the Presidential Fact-
Finding Task Force "will be inputs to the resolution of the case now pending at the O ce
of the President regarding the said land" (emphasis ours). 1 5 The President took
cognizance of the special circumstances surrounding the tardy ling by the DAR of its
motion for reconsideration. The DAR lawyers assigned to the Sumilao case received the
Torres decision only after the lapse of the reglementary fteen-day period for appeal. The
copy of the decision intended for them was passed from one o ce to another, e.g., the
Records Section of the DAR, the O ce of the DAR Secretary, the Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance, before it nally reached the DAR Litigation O ce. It does not appear to be just
that DAR will be made to lose a signi cant case because of bureaucratic lapses. Viewed in
this context, we should rule that the President suspended the effectivity of Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and that his exercise of discretion in this regard cannot be
assailed as whimsical.
I also respectfully submit this act of the President also nds full sanction under the
corollary principles of presidential power of control and qualified political agency.
"This presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive o cers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs.
Silvosa to mean 'the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate o cer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.' It is said to be at the
very 'heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.'

Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the

President, is the 'Doctrine of Quali ed Political Agency.' As the President cannot
be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he
will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

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 Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, 'all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person o[r] the exigencies
of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.' . . .

Thus, and in short, 'the President's power of control is directly exercised by

him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the
bureaus and other o ces under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department.'" 1 6

By suspending the fteen-day-period for ling a motion for reconsideration and re-
opening the Torres decision, the President clearly exercised his control power over an
alter-ego within the framework of a constitutional and presidential system of
governance.
The President's suspension of the fteen-day rule for ling a motion for
reconsideration cannot be characterized as arbitrary. The Sumilao problem raises
fundamental issues which con ict between land reform and the industrialization of the
countryside, the power of control by the President over his alter egos vis-a-vis the power
of local governments to convert agricultural land to industrial land. The resolution of these
issues has far reaching implications on the success of our land reform program. Indeed,
their successful resolution can bring peace or rebellion in our countryside. The President
should not be frustrated by an administrative procedural rule that he himself promulgated,
from formulating a creative, legal solution to the Sumilao problem. There is no denying the
liberal interpretation equally accorded to both administrative and judicial rules in order to
promote their object to the extent that technicality be not a bar to the vindication of a
legitimate grievance. We have trumpeted the truism that when technicality ceases to be an
aid to justice, the courts are justi ed in excepting from its operation a particular case. 1 7
We ought not to deny the same power to the Chief Executive who heads a co-equal branch
of government.
Second. The petitioners are estopped from assailing the authority of the O ce of
the President to re-open the Sumilao case and resolve it based on the report of the
Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force. Undeniably, petitioners participated in the processes
conducted by the task force. Their participation in the administrative proceedings without
raising any objection thereto, bars them from raising any jurisdictional in rmity after an
adverse decision is rendered against them. 1 8 Petitioners Carlos O. Fortich and Rey B.
Baula, Bukidnon Governor and Sumilao Mayor, respectively, were named members of the
task force. 1 9 The president ordered the task force to confer with the representatives of,
among others, the landowner, namely petitioner NQSR Management and Development
Corporation. 2 0 In a letter dated October 20, 1997 addressed to the President, the counsel
for NQSR Management and Development Corporation expressed its reluctance "to
comment on the merits and demerits of the [motion for intervention and motion to admit
additional evidence led by the farmer bene ciaries] out of respect of the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals where these cases are presently pending''. 2 1 NQSR
Management and Development Corporation, however, did not question the authority of the
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 President to constitute the task force despite its express adherence to the declaration
made by then Executive Secretary Torres as to the nality of his March 29, 1997 decision.
It was con dent that its interests would be promoted and protected by Bukidnon
Governor Fortich who himself led the appeal from the order of DAR Secretary Garilao 2 2
and Sumilao Mayor Baula who certi ed as correct Resolution No. 24 approved by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao on March 4, 1993 converting the 144-hectare property
from agricultural to industrial/institutional land. 2 3 But when the "win-win" resolution was
issued by the O ce of the President on November 7, 1997, allowing the conversion into
industrial land of only forty four (44) hectares of the 114-hectare Sumilao property and
ordering the distribution of the rest to quali ed farmer bene ciaries, petitioners were
abbergasted. Mr. Norberto Quisumbing, Jr. could hardly hide his disdain over that
resolution in his letter to the provincial agrarian reform o cer protesting as absurd and
arbitrary the valuation of the 100 hectares at P5.1 million pesos. That resolution was
allegedly an "unprecedented turn-around which is most di cult for the discerning public to
appreciate". 2 4
The "win-win" resolution being adverse to petitioners, they now assail the authority
of the President to modify the Torres decision. Under the above-mentioned circumstances,
however, the principle of estoppel applies to effectively bar petitioners from raising the
issue of jurisdiction. 2 5 While lack of jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body may be
assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before it will estop
him from assailing its lack of jurisdiction. 2 6 This Court has always frowned upon the
undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. 2 7
Third. Considering the special circumstances of the case as detailed above, it would
better serve the ends of justice to obtain a de nitive resolution of the issue raised in the
instant petition and remand the same to the Court of Appeals where jurisdiction over this
appeal lies. Noteworthy, is the pendency in the Court of Appeals of two more cases
involving the Sumilao property: (1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, entitled, "N.Q.S.R.
Management & Development Corporation and Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Association,
Petitioners, vs. Hon. Ernesto Garilao, Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform;
Rogelio E. Tamin, DAR Regional Director, Region X; Nicanor Peralta, Provincial Agrarian
Reform O cer, Region X; Dolores Apostol, Municipal Agrarian Reform O cer, Sumilao,
Bukidnon, Respondents"; 2 8 and (2) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, entitled, "Rodolfo
Buclasan, et al., Petitioners, vs. Hon. Leonardo N. Demecillo, as Judge of RTC, Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, Branch IX and NQSR Management and Development Corporation, Respondents".
29

The remand of the instant petition to the Court of Appeals would enable said court
to consolidate the same with the two other cases pending there which undoubtedly
contemplate of the same factual milieu and raise invariably the same issues as in this
petition, leaving no room for further confusion that will surely be wrought by the rendition
of conflicting decisions affecting a single controversy.
For the above reasons, I vote to grant the motions for reconsideration led by the
respondents and the intervenors who should be allowed to intervene pursuant to sec. 1,
Rule 19 and to remand the instant petition to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
proceedings.

Footnotes
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 1. Rollo, pp. 1003-1004.
2. Rollo, p. 1029.

3. Rollo, p. 1101.
4. Rollo, p. 1029.

5. 222 SCRA 173, 182 [1993].

6. Rollo, p. 1004, (Emphasis supplied].
7. Rollo, pp. 1009-1010.

8. See also Eugenio vs. Drilon, 252 SCRA 106, 108, 114-115 [1996].
9. Rollo, p. 1010 (Emphasis supplied).

10. Rollo, p. 1009 (Emphasis supplied).

11. Article III, Section 16, 1987 Constitution.

12. Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 258 SCRA 159, 163 [1996].
13. Dulos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 188 SCRA 413, 422 [1990].

14. Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.

15. Second paragraph of Section 7, Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987. See
also Section 4, Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

16. 265 SCRA 50-51, 56 [1996].

17. Garcia vs. David, 67 Phil. 279-280, 283-284 [1939].

18. Ibid.
19. Rollo, p. 654. See also OP decision dated March 29, 1996, Rollo, p. 166.

20. Rollo, p. 111.

21. The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Reviewer-Primer, Third Edition (1997), p. 441.

22. Rollo, 61-62.

23. Rollo, pp. 166-167.

24. Matalam vs. Commission on Elections, 271 SCRA 733 [1997].

25. Rollo, p. 164.

26. Rollo, pp. 164-165.

27. Consolidated Comment/Opposition to Respondents' Motions for Reconsideration, p. 25;
Rollo, p. 1082.
PUNO, J., dissenting:

1. Rollo, pp. 89-98.

2. Rollo, pp. 99-106.

3. Rollo, pp. 107-114.

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 4. Dated June 28, 1995, Rollo, pp. 115-120.

5. Decision dated March 29, 1996, p. 5, Rollo, p. 167.

6. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 which governs appeals to the Office of the President
provides:
"SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except
as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration
thereof is filed within such period.
"Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and
entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases."
7. Order dated June 23, 1997, issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, Rollo, p. 192.

8. Section 6, Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

9. Torres v. Caluag, et al., 17 SCRA 808, 811 (1966).

10. Paras, Edgardo L., Rules of Court Annotated, 1989 Edition, Volume 1, pp. 17-18,
commenting on People's Homesite & Housing Corp. v. Tiongco, 12 SCRA 471 (1964).

11. Section 5(5), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

12. Section 3, Chapter 2, Title I, Book III, Administrative Code of 1987.

13. Cortes, Irene R., The Philippine Presidency: A Study of Executive Power, 1966 Edition, p. 75,
citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 32 (1926).
15. Memorandum from the President dated October 15, 1997, Rollo, p. 807.

16. Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290, 295-296 (1992), citing Mondano v. Silvosa, 97
Phil. 143 (1955); Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939); Lacson-Magallanes
Co., Inc. v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895 (1967); De Leon v. Carpio, 178 SCRA 457 (1989).
17. People's Homesite & Housing Corp. v. Tiongco, 12 SCRA 471, 475-476 (1964).

18. Realty Exchange Venture Corporation v. Sendino, 233 SCRA 665, 671 (1994).
19. Memorandum from the President dated October 15, 1997, Rollo, p. 807.

20. Ibid.
21. Rollo, p. 806.

22. Letter-Appeal dated June 28, 1995, Rollo, pp. 115-120.

23. Excerpt from the Minutes of the Sangguniang Bayan Regular Session held on March 4,
1993, Rollo, pp. 73-74.

24. Letter dated December 29, 1997, p. 1, Rollo, p. 808.

25. Zamboanga City Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Buat, 243 SCRA 47, 51 (1995); Romualdez v.
RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 414 (1993); Aquino v. Court of Appeals, 204
SCRA 240 (1991); Salen v. Dinglasan, 198 SCRA 623 (1991); Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23
SCRA 29 (1968).

26. Ibid.
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 27. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 36 (1968).
28. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, Rollo, pp. 121-146.

29. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905, Rollo, pp. 652-687.

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