BALAQUIT v.
CFI The heirs of the deceased sued the municipality and the councilors for
FACTS:
This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and
constitutionality of Ordinance No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the
City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, penalizing any person, group of persons,
entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to
any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances
to require children between 7 and 12years of age to pay full payment for
tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket.
Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a
Complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan
City docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on June 30,1969, praying that the
subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and
unenforceable. The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of
the City of Butuan constitutional and valid.
ISSUE:
WON Ordinance No. 640 is a valid exercise of police power – NO
RULING:
Ordinance No. 640 infringes theater owners’ right to property.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory
ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of
regulation.
A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be
unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. A police
measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business
should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of
their property rights. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his
property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and,
as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors
of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what
prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any
person who did not approve could stay away.
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of
petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was
reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it
is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights
of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot,
under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
Wherefore, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
TORIO v. FONTANILLA
FACTS:
Pursuant to Sec. 2282 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal
Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, resolved to celebrate the town fiesta and
created a "Town Fiesta Executive Committee" to undertake, manage and
supervise the festivities. The Executive Committee created a sub-committee
on "Entertainment and Stage", which constructed two stages, one for the
"zarzuela" and another for "cancionan." During the program people went up
the "zarzuela" stage and before the play was over the stage collapsed, pinning
underneath one of the performers, resulting in Fontanilla’s death.
damages. The municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that the
holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental function from
which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents.
The councilors maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality
in carrying out the municipal ordinance.
The trial court dismissed the complaint of a finding that the petitioners
exercised due diligence and care of a good father of a family in selecting a
competent man to construct the stage and if it collapsed it was due to forces
beyond the control of the committee on entertainment and stage. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision stating that petitioners were guilty of
negligence when they failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the
mounting of onlookers on the stage resulting in the collapse thereof.
ISSUE:
1. WON the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal
council a governmental or a corporate function of the municipality
– NO
2. WON the Municipality is liable for the death of Fontanilla – YES
3. WON the councilors are liable for the death of Fontanilla – NO
RULING:
1. Holding of town fiesta was an exercise of a private/ propriety
function of the municipality.
Sec. 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised
Administrative Code simply gives authority to the municipality to
celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to
observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to
commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in
essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for
the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a
policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed
was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide
entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. No
governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the
celebration of a town fiesta.
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions
are two fold. In one they exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining
thereto, their acts are political and governmental Their officers and
agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by the are
nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and
as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the
other capacity, the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or
corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and
not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the
performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in
their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or
sovereign power.
2. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality
is liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla because
the accident was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's
officers, employees, or agents.
It was found that the stage was not strong enough considering that
only P100.00 was appropriate for the construction of two stages
and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks,
the post and braces used were of bamboo material. The collapse of
the stage was also attributable to the great number of onlookers
who mounted the stage. The municipality and/or its agents had the
necessary means within its command to prevent such an
occurrence. But they failed take the necessary steps to maintain the
safety of the stage, particularly, in preventing non-participants or
spectators from mounting and accumulating on the stage.
Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the fact
that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The
municipality acting through its municipal council appointed
Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and
in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg
acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of
respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or
liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned
tasks.

3. The celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui
was not a governmental function. The legal consequence thereof is
that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary
private corporation with the municipal council acting as its board
of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a
personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or
persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible
in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla
committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless there is
a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part.
The records do not show that municipal councilors directly
participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or
that they personally permitted spectators to go up the platform.
Thus, they are absolved from liability.
MACASIANO v. DIOKNO
FACTS:
On June 13, 1990, the municipality of Paranaque passed an ordinance
authorizing the closure of some streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro
Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. By virtue of this
Paranaque Mayor Ferrer was authorized to enter into a contract to any service
cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of
flea market and/or vending areas. Because of this purpose, respondent
Palanyag entered into an agreement with the municipality of Paranaque with
the obligation to remit dues to the treasury. Consequently, market stalls were
put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
On September 30, 1990, Brig. Gen Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of
Metropolitan Traffic Command ordered the destruction and confiscation of the
stalls. These stalls were later returned to Palanyag. Petitioner then sent a letter
to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea market otherwise
the market stalls shall be dismantled. Hence, respondents filed with the court a
joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for
preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his
memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner from
enforcing his letter pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary
injunction.
ISSUE:
WON an ordinance issued by the municipality of Parañaque authorizing the
lease and use of public streets or thoughfares as sites for flea market is valid –
NO
RULING:
Article 424 lays down the basic principle that properties of public domain
devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside
the commerce of man and cannot be disposed or leased by the local
government unit to private persons.
Aside from the requirement of due process, the closure of the road should be
for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from
public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended
or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn
from public use, the property becomes patrimonial property of the local
government unit concerned. It is only then that respondent municipality can
use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to
the local unit concerned might lawfully used or conveyed.
Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and
ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property
devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power to use
it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons. Hence the
ordinance is null and void.
HEIRS OF ARDONA v. REYES
FACTS:
The PH Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu City for
the expropriation of 282ha of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and
Bagbag, Cebu City for the development into integrated resort complexes of
selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value.
The PTA will construct a sports complex, club house, golf course, playground
and picnic area on said land. An electric power grid will also be established by
the NPC as well as deep well and drainage system. Complimentary support
facilities such as malls, coffee shops, will also be created.
The defendants alleged that the taking is allegedly not impressed public use
under the Constitution. Also, assuming that PTA has such power, the intended
use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform
area; that limiting the amount of compensation by legislative flat is
constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform
program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the CFI has jurisdiction
over the expropriation cases.
The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with PNB, an amount
equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to PD1533, the
lower court issued a separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate
possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.
The petitioners who are occupants of the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in
the SC and contended that:
1. Taking was not for public use
2. Land was covered by the land reform program
3. Expropriation would impair the obligation of contracts
ISSUE:
WON the public use requirement has been complied with – YES
RULING:
There are 3 provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Sec. 2 Art IV states that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation to
transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be
operated by the government. Sec. 13, Art. XIV states that the BP may
authorize upon payment of just compensation the expropriation of private
lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving
citizens.
The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the
construction of roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that “public use” means
“use by the public” has been discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to
state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
The petitioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform
area and that the affected persons have been given emancipation patents and
certificates of land transfer. The contract clause has never been regarded as a
barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain.
TAN v. COMELEC
FACTS:
BP Blg. 885, Creates a New Province to be known as the Province of Negros
del Norte. COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. The
plebiscite was confined only to certain inhabitants of Negros del Norte,
without including everyone in Negros Occidental. Petitioners opposed,
contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional. In Art. XI, Sec. 3 of our
Constitution, it is expressly mandated that:
See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
However, the boundaries of Negros Occidental would necessarily be
substantially altered by the division of its exsiting boundaries in order to
create province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate
than that 2 political units would be affected, Negros Occidental and Negros
del Norte.
ISSUE:
WON BP Blg. 885 is constitutional – NO
RULING:
The proclamation of the new province Negros del Norte and the appointment
of its officials were declared null and void. Pursuant to Article 11 Section 3, it
si imperative to obtain approval of majority of votes in a plebiscite in the units
affected whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is
substantial alteration of the boundaries. The boundary of Negros Occidental
would be altered by the division of its exiting boundaries to create the new
province. There is no way to reconcile in holding a plebiscite that eliminates
the participation of the two component political units.
PADILLA v. COMELEC
(Interpretation of Sec. 10)
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 7155 created the new municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the
Province of Camarines Norte and pursuant to this law, the COMELEC (D)
conducted a plebiscite for its approval. In its resolution for the conduct of the
plebiscite, the COMELEC (D) included all the voters of the Municipality of
Labo—the parent unit of the new municipality.
The result of the plebiscite showed that the majority rejected the creation of
the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. The governor, Hon. Roy Padilla, Jr.
(P), petitioned the court to set aside the result arguing that the phrase "political
units directly affected" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution does
not include the parent political unit—the Municipality of Labo.
ISSUE:
WON the result of the plebiscite is valid – YES
RULING:
When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political
units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who
would be economically dislocated by the separation thereof have a right to
vote in said plebiscite. What is contemplated by the phrase "political units
directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in
the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the
inhabitants of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those
living in the the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
FLORES v DRILON
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as
the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which
respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the
President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in
the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as
chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain
that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-
B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible
for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or
position during his tenure," The petitioners also contend that Congress
encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional
prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.
RULING:
The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold
multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full
time job to let them function without the distraction of other governmental
duties.
The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot
limit by providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the
Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out
that the appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no power at
all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of whom to
appoint by limiting his choice.
MARQUEZ v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor of
the province of Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted Marquez
to file a quo warranto proceedings against Marquez for being disqualified as a
candidate because he is a “fugitive from justice” which is against Sec. 40 (e)
of the Local Government Code.
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad
Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal
charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal
property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA.
A warrant was issued for his arrest, but which remained unserved because he
already went to the Philippines then.
Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive from
justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution.
Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight Committee
who drafted the IRR for the Local Government Code. In the deliberations, it
could be seen that there was confusion as to the implications of defining what
a fugitive from justice really is. There was a pronouncement from the
Chairman that fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment,
and this was adapted verbatim in Art. 73 of the IRR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is
said to be facing criminal charges before a foreign court and evading a warrant
of arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice” – NO
RULING:
Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 that for a person to be
considered a fugitive from justice, he or she has to be convicted by final
judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the
law. For the term fugitive from justice includes not only those who after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from
jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and ordinary
connotation of the term.
GREGO v. COMELEC
FACTS:
In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff for serious
misconduct. Subsequently, he ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second
District of the City of Manila during the 1988, local elections. He won and
assumed office. After his term, Basco sought re-election. Again, he won.
However, he found himself facing lawsuits filed by his opponents who wanted
to dislodge him from his position.
Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any
elective position since he had been “removed from office as a result of an
administrative case” pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160.
For a third time, Basco was elected councilor in 1995. Expectedly, his right to
office was again contested. In 1995, petitioner Grego filed with the
COMELEC a petition for disqualification. The COMELEC conducted a
hearing and ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May 1995, as a duly
elected councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among
several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco immediately took his oath of
office.

COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of said resolution was later denied by the
COMELEC,, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC acted in with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition for disqualification – NO
RULING:
The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in dismissing the petition for disqualification, however, the Court
noted that they do not agree with its conclusions and reasons in the assailed
resolution.
The Court reiterated that being merely an implementing rule, Sec 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure must not override, but instead remain
consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.
Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to
supplant nor to modify, the law. The law itself cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress.
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to
implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Since Section 6 of
Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word “may,” it is, therefore,
improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the
word “shall” in its rules.
Still, the Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit.
BORJA v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros in 1988 for a term
ending in 1992. In 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the
death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and
served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. In 1998, Capco filed
a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought
Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served
as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be
ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec
declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision
and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted
and proclaimed as mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by
operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have
served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit – NO
RULING:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was
not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself
thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because
he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.
The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is
more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office
should not be counted in the application of any term limit.
The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to
prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the
freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background
of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the
Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the
freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of
the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were
serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term
in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not
only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to
choose whom they wish to govern them.
TEOTICO v. CITY OF MANILA
FACTS:
In 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P.
Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a
jeepney. When a jeepney came along to a stop, he stepped down from the curb
to board the jeepney but he fell inside an uncovered manhole. Due to the fall,
his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing
broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. Several persons pulled him out
of the manhole and one of them brought him to the hospital, where his injuries
were treated. Thereafter, he sued for damages, under Article 2189 of the Civil
Code, the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer,
the city treasurer, and the chief of police. CFI Manila ruled against him but the
CA, on appeal, ruled that the City of Manila should pay damages. The City of
Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of
Manila states that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence
of the city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special law and
shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the accident
happened in national highway.
ISSUE:
WON City of Manila is liable – YES
RULING:
It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law and
that the charter of Manila is a special law while the Civil Code is a general
law. However, looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned, the
charter of Manila establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City
of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the
failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other
law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or
other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." There
is no particular exemption but merely a general exemption. Upon the other
hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription making
"provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or
injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works
under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 of the
charter of Manila refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,
regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only
raised for the first time in the City’s motion for reconsideration in the Court of
Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it is a
national highway, the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not the
road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the City’s
control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the
defective conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have
control and supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City alleged
that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the city’s roads, P.
Burgos included.