The Churchill-Stalin Secret "Percentages" Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944

Author(s): Albert Resis

Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Apr., 1978), pp. 368-387
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association
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 The Churchill-Stalin
Secret"Percentages"Agreement
on theBalkans,
Moscow,October I944

ALBERT RESIS

AMONG ALL THE BOOKS ON WORLD WAR ii published since I 945, none can
challenge the supremacy of Winston Churchill's six-volume TheSecondWorld
War. A unique blend of memoir, document, and narrative, his work-pub-
lished between 1948 and 1953-continues to dominate the field. And rightly
so, unmatched as the work is in color, sweep, and power. In all the historyof
diplomacy surely no passage is more dramatic or more shocking than Church-
ill's account of the meeting he held withJoseph Stalin in the Kremlin on the
evening of October 9, 1944. Churchill tells us that, immediately aftera brief
discussion on Poland, he and Stalin moved to Balkan problems. No para-
phrase can do justice to Churchill's own account. Churchill said to Stalin,
"Let us settleabout our affairsin the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and
Bulgaria. We have interests,missions,and agents there.Don't let us get at cross-
purposesin small ways. So faras Britainand Russia are concerned,how would it do
foryou to have ninetyper centpredominancein Rumania, forus to have ninetyper
cent ofthe say in Greece,and go fifty-fifty
about Yugoslavia?" While thiswas being
translatedI wroteout on a half-sheetof paper:
Rumania
Russia 90%
The others lo%
Greece
GreatBritain(in accordwithU.S.A.) 90%
Russia Io
Yugoslavia 50-50%
Hungary 50_50%
Bulgaria
Russia 75%
The others 2s%
I pushed thisacross to Stalin,who by thenhad heard the translation.There was a
slightpause. Then he tookhis blue penciland made a largetickupon it,and passed it
back to us. It was all settledin no moretimethan it takes to set down.

The author wishes to express his appreciationto the PhotographicDepartmentof the Public Record
Office,London, forthe kind assistance in photocopyingPRO materialsused in this article.

368

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 Churchill-Stalin
Secret"Percentages"Agreement 369

Then, Churchill reports,therewas a long silence while the penciled paper lay
on the center of the table. "At length I said, 'Might it not be thought rather
cynical ifit seemed we disposed of these issues, so fatefulto millions of people,
in such an off-handmanner? Let us burn the paper.' 'No, you keep it,' said
Stalin. "'
Churchill leaves the distinct impression that Stalin fullyagreed with this
arrangement. Not until I958, fiveyears afterChurchill published his account,
did Soviet authoritiesor historianscomment on this claim. Then they bitterly
denied and continue to deny that Stalin had accepted this imperialist
proposal. According to I. Zemskov, a leading Soviet diplomatic historian,the
Soviet record of the Churchill-Stalin meeting of October 9, I944, states,
"Churchill announced that he had prepared a rather dirty,crude [grubyi]
document that showed the distribution of Soviet and British influence in
Rumania, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The table was drawn up by him
to show what the British think about the question." Dividing southeastern
Europe into spheres of influence was, according to this Soviet historian, an
obsession of Churchill and the British government.Churchill actually made
the proposal. But Churchill's assertion that Stalin had given his assent was
belied by the absence of a copy of Churchill's table in the Soviet record. Nor
did Churchill and Stalin in theirsubsequent meetings ever again allude to the
alleged deal.2 In short, the Soviets claim that Stalin treated the proposal as
unworthyof his notice.
Churchill's account and the Soviets' repudiation ofit prompt serious histor-
ical questions. Was the agreement in factconcluded as Churchill described it?
If the agreement was so concluded, what exactly did its sibylline terms
mean percentages of what? What was the intended duration of the agree-
ment? What, ifany, was the character and extent of Franklin D. Roosevelt's
involvement?Answers to these questions would throw light not only on the
reliability of Churchill's account but also on wartime diplomacy and the
immediate causes of the Cold War in southeastern Europe. In addressing

1 Churchill,TheSecondWorldWar,vol. 6: Triumph (New York, 1962),196-97.

and Tragedy
2
Zemskov,"O tak nazyvaemom'razdele' Iugoslaviina 'sferyvliianii'," MeZhdunarodnaia zhitn',no. 8
(1958): 74. Zemskov'sarticle,based on part ofthe Sovietrecordofthe Churchill-Stalin meeting,offersno
convincingproofthat Stalin rejectedChurchill'soffer.The articlewas a Sovietreplyto Yugoslav leaders
who charged in 1958that the Soviet Union had enteredinto an imperialistagreementwith Britainto
dividethe Balkan nationsintospheresofinfluence;ibid.,72-73.The Sovietrecordofthe Churchill-Stalin
conversations has notbeen published.Untilthe Zemskovarticle,Sovietdiplomaticand militaryhistorians
got around the embarrassment of the "percentages"agreementby simplyignoringthe Churchill-Stalin
meetings.See, forexample,G. A. Deborin, Vtoraia mirovaia ocherk
voina:voenno-politicheskii (Moscow, 1958),
translatedby Vic Shneersonas The SecondWorldWar: A Politico-Military Survey(Moscow, n.d.); L. N.
Ivanov,Ocherki mezhdunarodnykh v periodvtoroi
otnoshenii mirovoivoiny(Moscow, 1958); I. F. Ivashin,Ocherki
istoriivneshneipolitikiSSSR (Moscow, 1958); and S. Boratynskii,Diplomatiiaperiodavtoroimirovoi voiny
(Moscow, 1959),a work by a Polish historiantranslatedinto Russian. Soviet scholars have followed
Zemskovin contendingthat Stalin spurnedChurchill'soffer.See, forexample,V. I. Israelian,Diplomat-
icheskaiaistoriia
velikoiotechestvennoi koalitsiia
voiny(Moscow, 1959),260, and Antigitlerovskaia ('Diplomaticheskoe
'SSSR,SShA,i Angliiv godyvtoroi
sotrudnichestvo mirovoivoiny(Moscow, i964), 472; V. Trukhanovsky, British
Foreign PolicyduringWorldWarII (Moscow, 1970),407-08; Istoriiadiplomatii, 4 (Moscow, 1975): 499; and
Istoriiavneshnei SSSR, 1: 19I7-I945 (Moscow, 1976),467.RecentSovietbiographiesofChurchilland
politiki
Eden simplyignorethemeeting.See, forexample,V. Trukhanovsky, UinstenCherchill:
Politicheskaia
biografiia
(Moscow, i969), and Antoni Eden: Stranitsyangliiskoi 30-5o-e gody(Moscow,1974), 256-58.
diplomatii,

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37( AlbertResis

these questions, the inaccessibility of the Soviet archives and the non-
publication of the relevant Soviet documents preclude definitive answers.
Nevertheless, the large body of memoir literature now available and, above
all, the release to the public of the top-secret British record of the Churchill-
Stalin meetings afforda much clearer picture of the Moscow talks of October
1944 than that previously possible.3

WHAT IS CHURCHILL'S OWN EXPLANATION of the meaning of the agreement?

Troubled by the shocking impression the account might make on the reader,
Churchill took great pains to persuade us that it was not a long-term,spheres-
of-influencearrangement. Churchill claimed that he and Stalin "were only
dealing with immediate war-time arrangements" and that all major questions
were reserved forthe postwar peace table.4 On October i i, Churchill wrote to
Roosevelt to reaffirmthat agreements reached at Moscow would in no way
commit the president. But it is absolutely necessary, he wrote, that
[Stalin and l] should tryto get a commonmindabout the Balkans, so thatwe may
preventcivilwar breakingout in severalcountries,whenprobablyyou and I wouldbe
in sympathywithone side and U.J. [Stalin]withtheother.I shall keep you informed
ofall this,and nothingwill be settledexceptpreliminary
agreementsbetweenBritain
and Russia, subjectto further discussionand meltingdown withyou. On thisbasis I
am sure you will not mind our tryingto have a full meetingof minds with the
Russians.5

On the same day Churchill drafted a letter and a memorandum to Stalin,

which set forthChurchill's interpretationof the "percentages" agreement.
3The record-printed presumably for top-level, restrictedcirculation-is titled "Anglo-Russian
PoliticalConversationsat Moscow, October 9-October 17, 1944." It is depositedat the Public Record
Officeas Prem. 3 434/49565. An Associated Press dispatchfromLondon reportedthat release of the
papers in 1973was delayed eighteenmonthsowing to the disorderin which the papers were found.
Moreover,a sectiondealing withpoliticalconversationsbetweenChurchilland Stalin was missing,and
officialscould notexplainthedisappearance;New York Times,August5, 1973.This recordofthetalksdoes
notincludeChurchill's"percentages"table,whichis, however,in theChurchillPapers; E. L. Woodward,
Brll'sh1%oreign PolicyintheSecondWorldWar,3 (London, 1971): 150,n. b. In 1961F. W. D. Deakin,countering
Sovietassertionsthattherewas no agreementbetweenStalinand Churchillon spheresofinfluence, stated
thathe had seen the relevantdocumentin the archives;it showedtheexistenceofan "understanding,"if
nota contractualtreaty,betweenStalinand Churchillon thisquestion.On theBritishside,Deakin said, it
was an attempt to discern"in good faithwhatthepolicyofthe Russianswould be in certaincountries......
I)eakin in European Resistance
Movements,i939-i945, Proceedingsofthe Second InternationalConferenceon
the Historyofthe'ResistanceMovementsheld at Milan, March 26-29,196I (New York, 1964),644-45.But
in July1973 Deakin said that Churchill's"percentages"table was only a trialballoon intendedto elicit
fromStalin information on wherethe Russian armywas goingand was not intendedas an agreementto
divide up the Balkans; Deakin in PhyllisAuty and Richard Clogg, eds., BritishPolicytowardsWartime
Resistance in Yugoslavia andGreece (London, 1975), 247-48.The BritishinterpreterforChurchilland Eden at
the Moscow meetingsis silentabout the contentofthe conversations;A. A. Birse,Memoirs ofan Interpreter
(New York, 1967). AnthonyEden adds nothingsignificant to Churchill'saccount; TheMemoirs ofAnthony
E'den,Earl ofAvon;vol. 2: TheReckoning(Boston, i965). C. L. Sulzbergerclaims thathe has a photocopyof
the Churchill"percentages"table; see A LongRowofCandles:Memoirs andDiaries,I934-1954 (New York,
1969), photographfollowing525.
4 Churchill,Triumph and Tragedy,197.Also presentwere ForeignSecretaryAnthonyEden and British
Ambassadorto the SovietUnion Sir ArchibaldKerr. People's CommissarforForeignAffairsViacheslav
Molotov accompanied Stalin. Ambassador AverellHarriman,PresidentRoosevelt'sobserver,was not
invitedto attendthismeeting.
5 Ibid., 198.

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 Secret"Percentages"Agreement
Churchill-Stalin 371

Churchill did not, however, send the letter, "deeming it wiser to leave well
alone," but he did reprint it to present an "authentic account" of his
thoughts.6He pointed out to Stalin that any agreement between them should
be acceptable to the United States and could only be preliminary to agree-
ment at the peace table. Nevertheless, Britain and the Soviet Union were
bound by a twenty-year alliance, and it was imperative that they reach
"understandings" and in some cases "agreements" that would smooth the
way through present emergencies to a lasting peace. The "percentages" were
no more than "a method by which in our thoughtswe can see how near we are
together" and then decide upon the steps required to attain fullagreement. As
Churchill understood the agreement,neitherside should impose its systemon
another people. The British, however, had special obligations toward the
kings of Greece and Yugoslavia. Of course, the peoples, once liberated, should
be freeto choose any kind of governmentthey wanted except fascism. But,
once tranquility had been restored, Britain and Russia should not have to
worry about or interferewith these governments. Finally, he wrote, the
"'percentages" were designed to indicate the degree of interesteach side took
in these countries "with the full assent of the other" and subject to the
approval of the United States.7
Writingto the War Cabinet on October 12, 1944, Churchill denied that the
"'percentages" were intended to prescribe the number of members sittingon
commissions for the differentBalkan countries or to set up a rigid systemof
spheres of interest. But it was only right that Britain show "particular
respect" to the Russians' desire to take the lead in Rumania, which had
attacked the Soviet Union, and in Bulgaria, with which the Russians had
ancient ties. Similarly, the Soviet Union was prepared to concede to the
British the same role in Greece that Britain conceded to the Russians in
Rumania. Thus, a civil war in Greece with Britain and Russia each taking
opposing sides could be prevented. The fifty-fifty agreement for Yugoslavia
entailed joint action on agreed policy there to foster a united Yugoslavia.
Since the Soviet armies were in Hungary, the Soviet Union would naturally
take the "lead" there, subject to the assent of Great Britain and probably the
United States. Nevertheless, the Balkan arrangement was "only an interim
guide for the immediate wartime future. ..."8
Thus, after implying that he and Stalin had entered into an agreement
worthyof eighteenth-centurymonarchs or nineteenth-centuryempire-build-
ers, Churchill strained to persuade his associates and his readers that the
agreementwas not what it seemed. Instead, this temporary,wartime measure
merely delimited zones of military and political responsibilityand entailed
neither partition of third countries nor old-fashioned spheres of influence.
And any agreement he and Stalin reached was subject to approval by the
6
Ibid., 200. He did not reprintthe memorandum,nor did he send the letter,because Ambassador
Harrimantold him that PresidentRooseveltand Secretaryof State Cordell Hull would repudiateit; W.
andStalin,194I-1946
AverellHarrimanand Elie Abel, SpecialEnvoytoChurchill (New York, 1975),358.
7 Churchill,Triumph and Tragedy,200-01.
8 Ibid., 202-03.

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372 AlbertResis

president of the United States. The British record shows, however, that both
Churchill's account of the "percentages" agreement in Triumphand Tragedy
and the Soviet claim that Stalin had tacitly dismissed the proposal do not
correspond with the evidence now available. Churchill and Stalin did reach
an agreement; but it was an agreement both on less and on more than
Churchill revealed in his published account: the deal was not concluded with
the extreme ease, with the entire purport, or with the specific reservations
claimed by Churchill.

THE BRITISH RECORD REPORTS that Churchill, in his meeting with Stalin in the
Kremlin on October 9, I944, aftera briefexchange with Stalin on the Polish
question,9 turned to the Balkans. There were two countries,he said, in which
the British had a particular interest. Rumania "was very much a Russian
affair" and the armistice terms that the Soviet governmenthad proposed to
Rumania in September were "reasonable and showed much statecraftin the
interests of general peace in the future." But Greece was another matter.
"Britain must be the leading Mediterranean power," Churchill said, "and he
hoped Marshal Stalin would let him have the firstsay about Greece" in the
same way as Marshal Stalin had in Rumania. The British governmentwould
of course keep the Soviet governmentinformedon events in Greece."0 Stalin
for his part sympathized with Churchill for the hardships Britain suffered
owing to the severance of Britain's Mediterranean communications by the
Germans. Stalin agreed that, in order to safeguard these lines, Britain
"'should have the firstsay in Greece. " Having traded offRumania forGreece,
Churchill said it would be better to avoid the phrase "dividing into spheres"
because that might shock the Americans. "But as long as he and Stalin
understood each other he could explain matters to the President."" This
trade, in effect,extended into perpetuity the Anglo-Soviet agreement of May
I944, which allowed Britain the predominant voice in Greek affairsand the
Soviet Union the predominant voice in Rumanian affairs-an agreement to
which in June President Roosevelt had consented to give a "three months trial
period," afterwhich it would be reviewed by the three great powers.'2
Warming to his subject, Churchill proceeded to sound out Stalin on still
wider spheres of interest.Regarding disputes involvingthe great powers in the
futureUnited Nations Organization, Churchill said that he now favoredthe
Soviet view: a great power should not be excluded froma vote in a dispute to

'"Anglo-Russian Political Conversations,"4-5. The record reveals littlethat is new on the Polish
question,exceptto show thatChurchillwas farmoreexasperatedwiththe anti-Sovietpredilectionsofthe
London Poles than was generallybelieved.He evenexpressedsatisfaction that GeneralTadeusz Bor, the
commanderof the Warsaw uprisingwho had just surrenderedto the Germans,would no longerbe a
problemforChurchilland Stalin. "The Germanswere lookingafterhim." Ibid.,4-5.
15 Ibid., 5.
Ibid.
12 On this agreement, see ForeignRelationsofthe UnitedStates: DiplomaticPapers (hereafter cited as FRUS),
1944, 6:fi o- i l, 5: 112-2 1; Churchill, Triumphand Tragedy,62-69; and Cordell Hull, The Memoirsof Cordell
Ilull, 2 (New York, 1948): 1451-58.

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 Secret"Percentages"Agreement
Churchill-Stalin 373

which it was a party. As a reason forrejecting the opposing American view,

Churchill cited the possibility that China might demand that Britain relin-
quish Hong Kong."3 Stalin did not say a word. But Churchill's message was
clear: if the Soviets would not oppose Churchill's effortsto recoverthe empire
that Britain temporarily lost to Japan, Churchill would not oppose Stalin's
effortsto realize the legitimate territorialaspirations of the Soviet Union. In
these matters,both had a common interestagainst the United States, which,
in the person of Roosevelt, hoped to reduce the British Empire forthe benefit
of a Nationalist China and which continued to withhold recognition of the
Soviet territorialgains of 1939-40. Readiness to support each other on a global
scale meant that Churchill and Stalin could surely work out problems of
southeastern Europe, where their political allies were already clashing and
their own armed forces might soon meet.
At the point at which Churchill and Stalin began their bargaining over
spheres of influence in southeastern Europe, there is a gap in the British
record. It simply shows that after lengthy discussion "it was agreed that as
regards Hungary and Yugoslavia each of the two Governments were equally
interested; that Russia had a major interest in Rumania; and that Great
Britain was in the same position with regard to Greece. "14 Despite Churchill's
account, which reports agreement to a seventy-five-twenty-five division for
Bulgaria in favor of the Russians, he and Stalin in fact failed to reach any
agreement on that country. Churchill conceded Soviet primacy in Bulgaria,
but he insisted that Britain be given a greater voice in Bulgarian affairsthan
in Rumanian. The dispute widened to include Turkey and the Dardanelles,
when Stalin, for the firsttime in the conversations, took the initiative on a
territorialquestion. He insisted on revision of the Montreux Convention on
the Straits, because, "if Britain were interested in the Mediterranean, then
Russia was equally interestedin the Black Sea. " Churchill assured Stalin that
Britain no longer grudged Soviet Russia access to warm-water ports and to
the great oceans and seas of the world. On the contrary,it was part of British
friendship to help the Soviet Union. What changes did Stalin think were
required in the Montreux Convention?'5
Stalin declared that the entire convention should be scrapped, because it
was pointed against Russia. The Soviet Union could no more tolerate a
Turkish stranglehold on the Straits than Great Britain could tolerate an
Egyptian stranglehold on the Suez Canal or the United States could tolerate a
PoliticalConversations,"6; and FRUS, 1944, 4: 1017.
"3'Anglo-Russian
14 "Anglo-RussianPoliticalConversations,"6.
Ibid.,6-7; and Churchillto Roosevelt,London, October 22, 1944,FRUS, 1944,4: 1024.The British
ForeignOfficehad argued in April 1944that Britishinterestlay in preventingthe extensionof Soviet
influencetowardthe Straitsand the Mediterranean.To thisend a Britishmilitaryforceshouldbe sentto
Greece to supportthe interimGreek administration;thereoughtto be Britishmembershipon the Allied
ControlCommissionforBulgaria; and a Britishforceoughtto be sent thereto "show the flag" and, if
necessary,to ensureBulgarianevacuationofGreekand Yugoslavterritory. But therecould be no question
of any Britishoccupationof Bulgaria except in agreementwith the Russians, and the same applied to
Hungary.Failureto act would encouragethe growthofzones ofinfluencedividingEurope intorivalcamps
led respectivelyby Great Britain and the Soviet Union. "Memorandum Prepared in BritishForeign
Office,April 17, 1944,"FRUS, 1944, ,: 596-99.

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374 AlbertResis
Latin Americanstrangleholdon the Panama Canal. Churchillconcededthat
the Montreux Convention was "inadmissible" and "obsolete"; Russia
"had a right and moral claim" to freepassage of the Turkish Straits.
But Turkey had to be broughtalong gradually,to which Stalin agreed."6
Churchilland Stalin had moved closer to an understandingof the need to
respecteach other's core securityinterests;but theystill could findno fair
divisionofinfluenceforBulgaria.Yet thereis nottheslightestevidencein the
Britishrecord that Stalin concurredin, or agreed to, any comprehensive
''percentages" arrangement;nor is there evidence that he indignantly
spurnedChurchill'soffers.In fact,a comprehensive informalunderstanding
on the Balkans-except forBulgaria-had been accepted by Stalin. Despite
Churchill'srepeatedassurancesin Triumph andTragedy thatthe arrangements
concluded with Stalin in Moscow were only temporary,wartimemeasures
and subject to approval by the presidentof the United States, the British
recordshowsthatneitherChurchillnorStalin attachedany such reservations
to the agreed terms. Thus, the two leaders' informalunderstandingwas
exclusivelybilateraland of unspecifiedduration.
What was the meaningof the understandingand what rightsand obliga-
tions did it entail? First of all, Churchillsaid, he and Stalin "should do
somethingto preventtheriskofcivilwar betweenthepoliticalideologies"and
to preventtheoutbreakoflittlewars in theBalkan countriesafterthedefeatof
Hitler.Stalin agreed."7Both Britainand the SovietUnion had the capability
of creatinga good deal of mischiefin the sphereallottedto the other,where
each had indigenousallies,friends,sympathizers, and secretagents.But given
the powerof its armiesofoccupation,the SovietUnion had less to fearin its
sphere than did Britainin the Mediterranean.Moreover,pro-Sovietresis-
tance forcesin the Britishspherewere more powerfulmilitarilythan were
pro-Westernresistanceforcesin the Sovietsphere.Churchillwas, therefore,
much the weaker party in the bargaining.Even beforethe meetingwith
Stalin, Churchillhad soughtand secured fromthe Russians the assurance
that they would not send their armed forcesto Greece.'8 Consequently,
Britainwas freeto suppresstheGreekresistancemovement, whichthreatened
the existenceof the British-backedroyalgovernment. Partiallyreassuredon
Greece,Churchillwas stillhauntedbythefearthattheformidableantifascist
resistanceforcesmightseize power in Italy's industrialnorth,stilloccupied
by the Germans. Churchill,therefore, flatlyasked Stalin "to soft-pedalthe
Communistsin Italyand notto stirthemup." Let "pure" democracydecide
whetherthe Italians wanted a republicor a monarchy.'9
Again the talkshad leaped beyondthe Balkans. Stalin's replyto Churchill
is astoundingevidenceofhow farStalinwas willingto go, verballyat least,in

'` Anglo-RussianPoliticalConversations,"7, 41-42.

17
Ibid.,7.
18 ElisabethBarker,British EuropeintheSecondWorldWar(London, 1976),144;and see
Policyin South-East
pages 38o-81,below.
19 "Anglo-Russian PoliticalConversations,"7.

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 Churchill-Stalin
Secret"Percentages"Agreement 375

sacrificing the revolutionary interests of Communist parties abroad for the

sake of preserving Big Three unity. He said that
itwas difficultto influenceItalian Communists.The positionofCommunistsdiffered
in differentcountries.It dependedupon theirnationalsituation.If Ercoli [Palmiero
Togliatti,secretary-general of the Communistpartyof Italy] were in Moscow Mar-
shal Stalin mightinfluencehim. But he was in Italy,wherethe circumstanceswere
different.He could send Marshal Stalin to the devil. Ercoli could say he was an
Italian and tell Marshal Stalin to mindhis own business.... However,Ercoli was a
wise man, not an extremist, and would not startan adventurein Italy.

Ercoli, Stalin assured Churchill, had said that he would collaborate with the
king "if the King stood by the people."20
So far Churchill and Stalin had agreed to recognize the other's primacy in
the Mediterranean and the Black Sea areas respectively.For that veryreason,
Bulgaria, which had been both a Black Sea and a Mediterranean state, and
Turkey, which still was both, posed great difficulties.Stalin turned to Bul-
garia. He had just implied that he had no intention of communizing Italy,
which lay in the British sphere. Now he also claimed that he had even put a
stop to the communization of Bulgaria, which lay in the Soviet sphere.
Bulgarian Communists, Stalin said, had proceeded to organize soviets in the
wake of the Red Army, but the Red Army stopped them. The Bulgarian
Communists had arrested the Bulgarian police, but the Red Army freed
them.2' Bulgaria, afterall, was a Black Sea country. Why did Britain demand
a greater say in Bulgaria than in Rumania? The Soviet Union intended
neither to attack Turkey by way of Bulgaria nor to treat Bulgaria too
leniently,forthat countryhad to be punished forher two wars on the side of
Germany. Anthony Eden interjected that Britain had been at war with
Bulgaria for three years and, accordingly, wanted a "small share" in the
control of that countryafterGermany's defeat. Churchill suggested that Eden
and Viacheslav Molotov thresh out the details of a settlementon Bulgaria,
and Stalin agreed.22
On the evening of October io, Eden and Molotov met to work out the
details of the "percentages" agreement reached by their chiefs the night
before. The Russians now retracted their assent to a fifty-fifty agreement
respecting Hungary. Molotov said that Stalin now proposed a seventy-five-
twenty-fivedivision, because Hungary "had been and always would be" a
20
Ibid., 7-8. AlthoughItaly had capitulatedin September1943,Togliattidid not returnto Italy from
Moscow untilApril 1944.And Maxim Litvinov,DeputyCommissarforForeignAffairs, told Ambassador
Kirkthatthe Russians "do notwantrevolutionsin theWest,but iftheyhappenwe mustapprove."Kirkto
Hull, Rome, September9, 1944,FRUS, 1944,3: 1149.
21 "Anglo-RussianPolitical Conversations,"8. GeorgiDimitrov,head of the Comintern(1935-43)and
Bulgaria'smostrenownedCommunistleader,did notreturnfromMoscow to SofiauntilNovember6, 1945,
more than a year afterthe liberationof Bulgaria. Meanwhile, he had been urgingthe Bulgariansto
recognizethatfuturepeace dependedprimarilyon preservation of"Big Three comradeshipand collabora-
tion." Therefore,it was vital for Bulgaria's futurethat Bulgarians foil "intriguesor actions aimed at
rousingmutualsuspicionsand misunderstandings betweenthe Allies," no mattertheirsource.G. Dimit-
rov,"All For the Front,"Moscow, September28, 1944,in Selected Works, 2 (Sofia, 1972): 238.No doubt he
had in mind the formationof Bulgarian sovietsas an example of such disruptiveaction.
22 "
"Anglo-RussianPoliticalConversations, 8.

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376 AlbertResis

countryborderingon the Soviet Union and because the Red Army had
sufferedsuch great losses in that country.The Russians had no territorial
claim in Hungary,but theywantedto makecertainthatHungarywould not
be on the side ofa futureaggressor.23Eden complainedthatthe Britishwere
beingpresentedwitha seriesoffaitsaccomplisin the Balkans.The Britishhad
saved Josip Broz Tito, yetthe ingratedecamped to Moscow withoutnotice.
He was makingan agreementwiththe Bulgariansto fightthe Germansin
Yugoslavia, despite Britishoppositionto cobelligerencystatusforBulgaria.
Britishofficersin GrecianThrace werebeingmistreatedby Bulgariantroops.
Eden wantedthe Russians to orderthe Bulgariansto treatthe Britishrepre-
sentativeswithrespect.At firstMolotovdemurred.Afterall, theSovietUnion
had agreed not to interfere in affairsbeyondthe bordersof Bulgaria,espe-
cially in Greece. He finallyconsented,however,to speak to Marshal Stalin
about the matter.24 Next theyturnedto the questionof the Bulgarianarmi-
stice. Eden agreed that termsought to be workedout in Moscow, then
coordinatedin London withthe Americansin the European AdvisoryCom-
mission(EAC), thetripartite Alliedbodychargedwithsuch matters.Ameri-
can concurrence,he said, wouldbe easy to obtainonce Britainand theSoviet
Union reachedagreement.But, he warned Molotov,Britaincould make no
concessionon one issue: theBulgarianarmistice.The Britishmusthavesome
share in the AlliedControlCommission(ACC) forBulgariaafterthecapitu-
lationof Germany.25
This markeda sharp break withpreviousBritishpractice.Hitherto,both
the UnitedStates and Great Britainhad acquiesced in the Rumanian armi-
stice (September 12, 1944) and the Finnish armistice (September 19, 1944),
whichgave the SovietUnion the decisivevoice in each countryboth before
and afterthe cessationofhostilitieswithGermany.The identicalclause that
the Russians had draftedforthe Allied ControlCommissionsforRumania
and Finland providedthat,untilthe conclusionofpeace, the regulationof-
and controlover-the termsof the armisticewould be vestedin an Allied
ControlCommissionoperating"underthegeneraldirectionand ordersofthe
Allied (Soviet) High Command,actingon behalfof theAllied Powers."26In
short,theclause notonlygavethe SovietUnionthemajorvoicein overseeing
executionofthe armistices;it also gave theSovietUnion therightto exercise
thispowerin the name ofitsAllies.The Russiansweredeterminedto employ
the same clause in the Bulgarianand Hungarianarmistices.
At thispointtheUnitedStatesmade itsfirst, in Balkan
decisiveintervention
affairsduringthewar. For theAmericansas well as theBritishnowrefusedto
allow the Russians to exerciseunilateralcontrol,in the name of the Allied
Powers,overthefuturearmisticeswithHitler'slastallies.The Americandraft
article,which Eden pressed on Molotov,proposedthat the Allied Control
23Eden and MolotovMeeting,October io, 1944,ibid.,io.
24Ibid.,i i. On October io Moscow instructedMarshal Tolbukhinto orderBulgarianforcesin northern
Greece to treatthe Britishproperly;ibid.,i6.
25 Ibid., ii.

26 AndrewRothstein, ed., SovietForeign

Policyduring War,2 (London, 1946): 123-25 (textofthe
thePatriotic
Rumanianarmistice),128-32 (textof the Finnisharmistice).

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 Agreement
Secret"Percentages"
Churchill-Stalin 377

Commissionsupervisethe executionof the Bulgarianarmistice"under the

general directionof the Allied (Soviet) High Command." This clearlyac-
knowledgedSovietsupremacyin Bulgaria forthe wartimeperiod. Afterthe
cessationofhostilitiesin Europe and pendingthepeace treatywithBulgaria,
however,thecommissionwould superviseexecutionofthearmistice"accord-
ingto theinstructions ofthe Governments ofthe UnitedStates,SovietUnion
and UnitedKingdom. Such an articlewould ensurethattheUnitedStates
"27
and GreatBritaineach wouldhave a voiceequal to thatoftheSovietUnionin
controlling the Bulgarianarmisticein thepostwarperiod.In effect theAmeri-
cans and the Britishbegan to insistthattheyhave a greatervoicein Bulgaria
and Hungarythan theyhad been allowed by the Russians in Rumania and
Finlandand a greatervoicethanthe Russianshad been allowed in controlof
the Italian armisticeconcludedthe year before.
Molotovimmediately challengedthefeasibility and equityoftheAmerican
draftof this article,numbereighteen.In the Italian and Rumanian armi-
stices,he said, theresponsibilityforAlliedcontrolwas clear-cut.But thenew
approachrecommendedforBulgariaduringthepostwarperiodwould divide
responsibilitythreewaysand onlycreateconfusion.Marshal Stalinhad said a
ninety-ten agreementforBulgaria would be acceptable, and, if both sides
agreed on that,the restwould be easy. Eden refusedbecause Britainwould
thenbe no morethan a powerlessobserverin Bulgaria.Britainwantedmore
than it had in Rumania. Molotovrejectedthe Americanplan, because that
would leave the SovietUnion withonlya 34 percentvoicein Bulgariaduring
the postwarperiod.The Russians could accept no less than go percent.The
Sovietswerealreadymakinga greatconcessionby not demandingiOO per-
cent.Eden persisted.
Molotovthenreopenedthe entire"percentages"issue. He nextproposeda
seventy-five-twenty-five division for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.
Eden said thatthe new proposalwas worsethan the Russian positionofthe
previousday. Molotovthenrevertedto a ninety-ten divisionforBulgariaand
divisionforYugoslavia. Eden repliedthatthisofferstilldid not
a fifty-fifty
giveBritainthevoiceitwantedin Bulgaria.Molotovfinallysuggestedseventy-
five-twenty-five forHungaryand sixty-forty forYugoslavia,an arrangement
that would enable the Soviet Union to accept a seventy-five-twenty-five
divisionforBulgaria. He could go no furtherthan that. Eden presenteda
counteroffer: seventy-five-twenty-five for Hungary,eighty-twenty for Bul-
for
garia,and fifty-fiftyYugoslavia. Molotov returnedto hisstartingpoint.He
forYugoslaviaifBulgariawereninety-ten.
could agreeto fifty-fifty He argued
thatthe Britishshouldhave as littleinterestin Bulgariaas in Rumania,since
both states were Black Sea, not Mediterranean,countries.The Russians
hoped thatthe Britishwould do forthe SovietUnion in the Black Sea what
the Russianswerepreparedto do forBritainin the Mediterranean.Bulgaria,
afterall, was not Greece,Italy,Spain, or even Yugoslavia.28
Eden remainedadamant. Molotov now said thathe thoughtStalin might
27
"Anglo-RussianPoliticalConversations,"1l, 48. Also see FRUS, 1944,3: 446.
28 "Anglo-RussianPoliticalConversations,"12-14.

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378 AlbertResis

agree to seventy-five-twenty-five for Bulgaria if Britain agreed to sixty-forty

forYugoslavia. At this point Molotov hinted at a partitionof Yugoslavia. Since
the Soviet Union claimed pre-eminence in the Black Sea and Britain in the
Mediterranean, the Russians disclaimed interestin the Yugoslav littoral and
were ready to stay in their own "lake." But Eden favored a joint policy to
achieve a united Yugoslavia under a coalition government.Summing up the
discussion, Eden stated that the outstanding question pertaining to Bulgaria
was the power of the Allied Control Commission afterGermany's surrender.
The two sides had already agreed on Moscow as the venue fordiscussions of
the matter and on a joint Soviet-British signature on the Bulgarian armi-
stice.29
The next day, October iI, Molotov offereda compromise formula, which
conceded to the British a 20, rather than a io, percent voice in Bulgaria.
Overall, Molotov now proposed an eighty-twentydivision for Hungary and
Bulgaria and stayed with fifty-fifty
forYugoslavia. But what was the practical
differencebetween i0 and 20 percent? This new division for Hungary and
Bulgaria, as Molotov explained it, indicated Soviet acceptance of Eden's idea
that the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria should act on the instructions
of the Soviet High Command but "with participation" of British and Ameri-
can representatives.Aftersome discussion Eden said he thought that the new
formulationfor Article i8 on the proportioned responsibilities forthe Allied
Control Commission in Bulgaria would be acceptable. Molotov hoped that
the same formula would be applied to Hungary.
And so matters rested. Churchill's original proposal was applied to Ru-
mania, Greece, and Yugoslavia, but an eighty-twentydivision was applied to
Bulgaria and Hungary. Stalin and Molotov had extracted fromChurchill and
Eden a higher percentage forthe Soviet Union than the seventy-five-twenty-
fivedivision forBulgaria and the fifty-fifty
division forHungary that Churchill
reported in his Triumph and Tragedy. The Russians had successfully blocked
British and American effortsto gain substantial participation in the Bulgar-
ian armistice and control equal to that of the Soviet Union forthe Hungarian
armistice. Molotov's concession assured his Allies nothing more than "partic-
ipation" in the Allied Control Commissions under the chairmanship and
" general direction" of the "Allied (Soviet) High Command."30 The British
seemed to have sufferedcomplete diplomatic defeat in Moscow at the hands
of Stalin and Molotov, but this was not entirelythe case.

THE QUESTION NATURALLY ARISES, why so much concern with Bulgaria just at
this time? And what took the Allies so long to draftan agreed armistice text
29Ibid., 14-15. Churchilland Stalin agreed on the possibilityof an independentSerbia if Yugoslav
federationfailed, and Stalin acknowledgedthe primacyof Britishinterestson the Dalmatian coast:
Harrimanto Roosevelt,Moscow, October 12, 1944,FRUS, 1944,4: 1013-14.
30 "Anglo-Russian Political Conversations,"16-17,49-50. For textof the Bulgarian armistice,dated
October 28, 1944,signedforthe Allied side by F. Tolbukhin,representative
ofthe SovietHigh Command.
and James Gammell,representative of the SupremeAllied Commanderin the Mediterranean,see Roth-
stein, SovietkoreignPolicy, 170-73.

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 Agreement
Secret"Percentages"
Churchill-Stalin 379

forBulgaria?Since Britishand Americaneconomicand politicalinterestsin

thatcountrywereminimal,thedifficulties at firstglanceseempuzzling.3"But
the picturebecomes clear when we retracethe discussionsamong the Big
Three over the Bulgarianarmistice.
GivenGreek,Yugoslav,and Rumanianterritory heldbyHitler,theBulgar-
ian dictatorshiphad joined theAxis and on December 13, I94I, declaredwar
on Britainand theUnitedStates. But the bitterly anti-Communist Bulgarian
regimedared not declare war on the Soviets-the grandsonsofthe Russian
Orthodox,Slavic brethrenwho had liberatedBulgaria fromthe Turks in
1877-78.In the European AdvisoryCommissionthe Americans,who still
recoiledfromBalkan entanglements, let the Britishtake the lead in drafting
armisticetermsforHitler'sEast Europeansatellites.The SovietUnion,stillat
peace withBulgaria,eitherabstainedfromworkon theBulgarianarmisticeor
let the Britishand Americans take the lead. The problem of an Allied
occupationofBulgariaprovedvexatious.Hithertothelead in drafting, negoti-
ating,and supervisingan armisticehad been takenby the Allied occupying
power, as in the case of Italy or Rumania, or by the Ally most directly
concerned,as in thecase ofFinland.But Bulgariawas an exception.Here was
a Germansatellitepreparedto capitulateto theAllies in the summerof I944,
althoughno Alliedarmyyetoccupiedor evenapproacheditsterritory. Which
Ally,then,wouldprevailin Bulgaria?At thattimeBritainprevailedby Soviet
and Americandefault.
But the Red Armybreakthroughin Rumania changed everything. On
Septemberi, 1944, the Red Armyreached the Bulgarian border in the south
Dobrudja area. On September5, 1944, the Soviet Union declared war on
Bulgaria,because Sofia had refusedto declare war on Berlin.32 Moscow had
givenWashingtonand London hardlymore than an hour's notice of the
Sovietdeclarationofwar on Bulgaria.33But Soviettroopsdid notimmediately
enterBulgarianterritory; Moscow had decidedto letthe Bulgarians"stew in
theirjuice" a bit. The Bulgariangovernment severedrelationswithGermany
on September7 and declaredwar on Germanythe following day, whereupon
the Red Armycrossedthe Bulgarianfrontier. On September9 the Bulgarian
governmentwas deposed in favorof a Communist-ledFatherland Front
government, which requestedthat Moscow forwardarmisticeterms;and,
aftera brief,bloodless war, Soviet troops ceased hostilitiesin Bulgaria.
Ambassador Gusev, the Soviet representativeon the European Advisory
Commission,asked thatdiscussionsofBulgarianarmisticetermsbe resumed,
now withfullSovietparticipation,and suggestedthat negotiationswiththe
Bulgariangovernment ought to be transferred fromCairo to Moscow or to
Ankara.34 On Septemberio Moscow announcedthattheSovietgovernment-
31"Why did Churchillask formoreofa say in Bulgariathanin Rumania? And howdoes 25 percentsay
reallycomparewitha io percentsay? These questionsmustremainunanswered."RobertLee Wolff,The
Balkansin Our Time(Cambridge,1956),260.
32 "The BreakingOffof Soviet-BulgarianRelations" in Rothstein,SovietForeign
Policy,I 19.
3 Hull to Steinhardt(Ankara), Washington,September9, 1944,FRUS, 1944, 3: 407.
" Gusev to Winant,London, September9, 1944,ibid.,405-o6.

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380 AlbertResis

jointly with the governments of Great Britain and the United States-was
drawing up terms fora Bulgarian armistice.35On September I5 Soviet troops
entered Sofia.
The surge of Soviet militarypower in Bulgaria nullifiedBritain's primacy in
that country. Soviet-controlled Bulgaria-abutting Greece, Yugoslavia, and
Turkey-posed a threat to Britain's position in the Balkans. The SovietUnion,
which had previously sought the evacuation of Bulgarian occupation forces
fromThrace and Macedonia in order to aid Marshal Tito, now endeavored to
keep them there. Ambassador Gusev tried to persuade the European Advisory
Commission that, since the Bulgarian army was now aiding the Red Army
against the Germans, the Allies should not require the Bulgarians to with-
draw fromGrecian Thrace.36
These events found Churchill and Eden preparing for their meeting with
Roosevelt at the Second Quebec Conference (September I2-I6). Churchill
feared that the Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria might lead to a Soviet
invasion of Greece or to Soviet sponsorship of Bulgarian claims to western
Thrace. Either could make a Soviet-backed "greater Bulgaria" an Aegean
power at the expense of Greece or a threat to the Straits. To secure Greece,
Churchill proved willing to recognize Soviet primacy in Bulgaria as well as in
Rumania. From Quebec Eden wired to the Foreign Office Britain's willing-
ness to accept a Soviet chairman of the Allied Control Commission for
Bulgaria, providing that the British were "full members" and that the Soviet
Union recognized the predominant position of Britain in Greece "now and
after the actual state of war has ended."37
When Eden returned to London, the Foreign Office persuaded him that
such a concession would undermine British authority in Greece and Turkey.
He wired Churchill that Britain could affordto allow the Russians to take the
lead in Rumania, but, if Bulgaria-which threatened all of her neighbors-
were abandoned to the Russians, Britain's credit would sufferthroughoutthe
Balkans. We must, he wrote, "stake our claim to a predominant position in
Greece, but we can do this without selling out over Bulgaria."138 With the Red
army in Bulgaria and British troops not yet in Greece, the British were
horrified by the prospect of Soviet troops turning south to Athens. On
September 2I London thereforeinstructed Ambassador Clark Kerr in Mos-
cow to informthe Russians that a British force was about to land in Greece
and that London hoped "the Soviet Government would not find it necessary
to send Russian troops into any part of Greece except in agreement with His
Majesty's Government." Two days later, Deputy Commissar for Foreign
AffairsAndrei Vyshinsky said that the Soviet government "confirmed" the

3 For textofthe Sovietpressbulletin,see Sovetsko-Bolgarskie

otnosheniia,
I944-z948gg:Dokumentyi materialy
(Moscow, 1969),14.
" Phillip Mosely, The Kremlin and WorldPolitics(New York, 1960),230. Mosely, U.S. spokesmanon
the European AdvisoryCommissionduringthe talkson Bulgaria,stronglyopposed Sovietefforts to leave
Bulgarianforcesin Greekterritories.
3 Barker,BritishPolicyin South-East
Europe,143.
38 Ibid.;and Woodward,BritishForeignPolicyintheSecondWorldWar,139-40.

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 Secret"Percentages"Agreement
Churchill-Stalin 38I

agreement of May I944 about theaters of operations and had no intentionof

sending forces to Greece.39
Buoyed by this news, the British redoubled effortsto prevent Soviet dicta-
tion of Bulgarian armistice terms. Meanwhile, British troops had landed in
Greece on October 4 and expected to reach Athens on October I 5. Greece was
more or less safe. But the Bulgarian armistice discussions remained dead-
locked over two issues: withdrawal of Bulgarian troops and civil authorities
from occupied Greece and Yugoslavia and the distribution of power within
the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria. Eden dug in his heels to win an
equal share in the control of Bulgaria; to give way, he reasoned, would signal
abdication of responsibility. Alternatively,the British might sign a separate
armistice with Bulgaria. But that would be futile,as the Britishwould have no
troops on the spot to enforceterms.40Instead, Churchill and Eden decided to
raise the matter with Stalin and Molotov. The British leaders hoped that in
Moscow they somehow might salvage something fromthe usurpers of Brit-
ain's primacy in Bulgaria.41
By the time Churchill and Eden arrived in Moscow on October 9, I944, the
British bargaining position in the Balkans had crumbled. The three-month
trial period of the Anglo-Soviet agreement giving Britain the lead in Greece
and the Soviet Union the lead in Rumania had expired in September,
evidentlywithout renewal by Churchill and Roosevelt at Quebec. Churchill's
latest effortto obtain American support for an Allied landing at Istria
(Yugoslavia)-for a drive through the Ljubljana Gap to reach Vienna before
the Russians-had failed to win wholehearted American support at the
Quebec meeting.42Britain's own militarypower was already stretchedso thin
that, even positing a sudden militaryand political collapse of Germany, the
British could not move large forces into southeastern Europe. The British
chiefsof staffhad no intentionof stationingforcesother than supply guards in
Yugoslavia and Albania and anticipated no immediate action in Hungary or
Rumania. And for the present the British chiefs also had no intention of
sending troops into Bulgaria. Furthermore,on no account would Britishnaval
forcesenter the Danube except afterprior agreement with the Russians.43
Confronted by the overwhelming power of the Red Army everywhere in
southeastern Europe except in Greece and Albania, the British asked for an
equal share of power within the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria but
were willing to settle for"some share" in that body, theirparticipation to take
effectat the end of hostilities in Europe. They regarded securing the with-
drawal of Bulgarian occupation troops from Thrace and Macedonia as the

3 Barker,BritishPolicy in South-EastEurope, 144.Also see page 374, above.

40Barker,BritishPolicyin South-East Europe, 144.
41This battle promisedto be tough,since the Russians backed theirdemand fortermsthat ensured
Sovietpredominancein Bulgariathenand afterthe war by citingtwo precedents:Italy,wherethe Soviet
Union had been excluded fromall power and responsibility, and Rumania; ibid., 222.
42 FRUS, 1944, The Conferenceat Quebec,304-05; and Churchill,Triumphand Tragedy,127, 133, 136.
4" Memorandumby the BritishChiefsof Staff,Septemberi5, 1944,"FRUS, 1944, Conference at Quebec,
439.

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382 AlbertResis

mosturgenttask,especiallysincetheoccupationwas nowundertheCommu-
nist-ledPatrioticFrontgovernment. The British,therefore, asked the Euro-
pean AdvisoryCommissionto demandthatBulgariawithdrawitsoccupation
forceswithinfifteen as the indispensableprerequisiteto
days of notification
the opening of armisticenegotiations."The Soviet representativeon the
commissionreluctantlyaccepted the proposal on September20.4 But the
Allies did not reachagreementon the textofsuch an ultimatumto Bulgaria
untilOctober i i. In the interimthe Bulgariansclaimedthattheyhad evacu-
ated all of theiroccupationforcesbut had leftcombat units (under Soviet
command) formilitaryoperationsagainstthe Germansin Thrace, Macedo-
nia, and Serbia.46The Britishfeared,however,that this claim was only a
subterfugeto leave Bulgarianforcesin controlof Greekand Yugoslav terri-
tories;Britaintherefore opposed any semblanceof cobelligerency statusfor
Bulgaria. The Russians, fortheirpart,would not accept the Britishdraftof
the ultimatum,because it providedan equal voice for each of the three
membersof the Joint MilitaryMission that would verifywithdrawalof
Bulgarianforces.47
On October i i, however,everything fellintoplace. Eden accepted Molo-
tov's demand thatthe Sovietrepresentative chairtheJointMilitaryMission.
Since on the same day Eden had also acceptedMolotov'sphrasingofArticle
I8 on the Allied ControlCommissionforBulgaria,the threeAllied govern-
mentsnotifiedthe Bulgariangovernment thattheprerequisitefortheopening
of armisticenegotiationswas the evacuationofall Bulgariantroopsand civil
authoritiesfromoccupied Greek and Yugoslav territory withinfifteendays.
The evacuationwould be supervisedand verifiedby representatives of the
threeAllied governments who would "act as a joint Allied MilitaryMission,
withtheSovietrepresentative as Chairman." Bulgariaacceptedthecondition
on October I 2.48 The agreedtermsofthe Bulgarianarmisticewerethensent
to the European AdvisoryCommissionin London forcoordinationwiththe
Americans.
In Moscow, Eden had takena beatingat the hands of Molotovregarding
thepercentagesforBulgaria.Eden failedto win Molotov'sunequivocalagree-
mentto an equal voiceforeach ofthethreepowerswithintheAlliedControl
CommissionforBulgaria duringthe postwarperiod. But the Britishand

Winantto Hull, London, September17,1944, FRUS, 1944,3: 423-24.

4 Winantto Hull, London, September20, 1944, ibid.,431.
46 Steinhardtto Hull, Ankara,October3, 1944,ibid.,442. On October5,theFatherlandFrontofBulgaria
and the Yugoslav National LiberationCommitteesignedan Agreementon MilitaryCooperationagainst
Germany,whichprovidedthat Bulgarianforcesin Yugoslavia wouldparticipatewithYugoslavia injoint
militaryoperationsagainstthe Germans;--Diplomaticheskii slovar',i (Moscow, 1960): 200. Also see "Anglo-
Russian PoliticalConversations,"37.
47 For the Britishdraft,see Winantto Hull, London, September21, 1944,FRUS, 1944,3: 432.
48 Incompletetextofthe Alliedultimatum publishedin Izvestiia, October 12, 1944.The lettersentbythe
Sovietscontaineda secret"explanation," whichstatedthattheevacuationorderdid notapplyto Bulgarian
troops conductingoperationsin Yugoslavia in collaborationwith Marshal Tito and the Soviet High
Command. For completetext,see Colonel-GeneralBiriuzovto K. Georgiev,chairmanof the Council of
Ministersof Bulgaria,October i i, 1944,in Sovetsko-Bolgarskie
otnosheniia,
22. Molotov,however,informed
Eden ofthisreservation on October i6 and Eden approved;"Anglo-RussianPoliticalConversations,"37.

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 Secret"Percentages"Agreement
Churchill-Stalin 383

Americans,by forcingthe withdrawalof Bulgarian occupation forces,did

succeed in beatingback the threatofa "greaterBulgaria,"whichunderSo-
vietaegis mighthave challengedBritishcontroloverGreece.49
But complicationsimmediatelyarose. On October 13, Eden informedthe
Russians thathe "was in troubleover Bulgaria"; the Americanswould not
acceptArticlei8 on theAlliedControlCommission.Eden triedto harmonize
theAmericanand Sovietviews.But Molotovrejectedthisattemptas reneging
on an agreementand declared the Anglo-American proposalsunacceptable
because theywould impose harshertermson Bulgaria than those imposed
earlieron Rumania.50For its part, the Departmentof State was highlydis-
satisfiedwith Article i8 of the agreed Anglo-Sovietdraft,because it failed
to givetheUnitedStatesa voiceequal to thatofthe SovietUnion in Bulgaria
afterthesurrenderofGermany.CordellHull instructed AmbassadorWinant
to obtaina moresatisfactory versionofthe articlein the European Advisory
Commission,althoughWinantwas not to insistto the pointof rejectingthe
armisticeagreement.But,ifWinantfailed,Hull said, "we wantit to be clear
toall concernedthatwe mayfindit necessaryat some laterdate to reopenthe
questionof interpretation of thisarticle."51At the nextsessionof the Euro-
pean AdvisoryCommission,Winant,failingto win adoptionofan American
draftof Articlei8, reservedthe rightof the U.S. government to reopenthe
questionat a laterdate. Nevertheless, WinantbelievedthatAmericanefforts
"may have slowed down somewhatthe tendencyto harden Europe into
spheresofexclusiveinfluence."52 Bulgariasignedthearmisticein Moscow on
October 28, 1944.
Thus, the stage was set forthe endless challengesthrowndown by the
UnitedStatesto Sovietprimacyin Bulgaria-a harbingerofthe Cold War in
southeasternEurope. Ambassador Averell Harriman was already asking
Washingtonhow farhe shouldgo in resistinginevitableSovietdemandsthat
theforthcoming armisticewithHungaryassign the UnitedStatesand Great
Britainno voice, or only a tokenvoice, in controllingthe executionof the
armistice.
513

A FINAL QUESTION REMAINS: To whatextentwas PresidentRooseveltprivyto

the Churchill-Stalinunderstanding?During theirdiscussionof a "percent-
ages agreement, neitherChurchillnorStalinso muchas suggestedthattheir
bilateralarrangementswere conditionalupon Americanapproval. What is
more,at no timedid eitherChurchillor Stalin,directlyor throughHarriman,
48 Eden exaggerated whenhe claimed that "we obtainedwhatwe wantedon all points.I shouldsay go
claimvictorywhenhe said thatthe"SovietswillsummontheBulgars
percentoverall."Buthe could rightly
outofGreeceand Yugoslavia tonight."Eden, TheReckoning, 559-60.
50 "Anglo-RussianPoliticalConversations,"19,48. A convolutedcorrespondenceensuedbetweenEden
and Molotovin Moscow (October 13-I 7). Eden insistedthateach Ally would have an equal voice in
BulgariaafterGermany'ssurrender;Molotovtenaciouslydeniedthisinterpretation. Ibid.,55-60.
51 Hull to Winant,Washington, October 21, 1944,FRUS, 1944, 3: 469-70.
52 Winantto Hull, London,October 22, 1944,ibid.,473-74.
5 Harriman to Hull,Moscow,October17, 1944, ibid.,460-6I.

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384 Resis
Albert
informthe presidentor the Departmentof State of the exact details of the
"percentages"agreement.In fact,the Britishand the Russianswentthrough
an elaboratepretensethattheirinformalunderstanding was not a divisionof
southeasternEurope into spheres of interest,while theywere makingjust
such a division.On October IO, forexample,Churchillsubmittedhis draftof
a joint message,whichreportedto Rooseveltthe gistofthe Churchill-Stalin
conversation ofthepreviousevening.WithChurchill'sapprovalStalincrossed
out thephrase"havingregardto ourvaryingdutytowardsthem"(theBalkan
countries),whichimplieda spheres-of-influence arrangement.Later thatday
Harriman told Stalin that Roosevelt would be very glad that Stalin had
deletedthatphrase,because Rooseveltbelievedthatall such questionsought
to be dealt withby the threeleaders. Accordingto Harriman,Stalinreplied
that "he was glad to hear thisand reachingbehindChurchill'sback, shook
my hand.""
On the next day Harrimanwas able to send the presidenta fairlyaccu-
rate-though incomplete- accountofthe arrangement the Britishand Rus-
sians were workingout foreach country.But therewas no mentionof a
"percentages"agreement.55 Harrimanasked the presidentif SecretaryHull
was beingkeptinformed. But Hull heardabout the"percentages"agreement
only in a roundaboutway. Winant in London reportedthat Eden's cable-
gramsto the ForeignOfficereferred to various"percentages"ofcontrol,the
exact meaningofwhichwas notclear.56Hull cabled Winanttwodays laterto
say that he would be gratefulforwhateveradditional information Winant
could obtain on the question.In AnkaraAmbassadorSteinhardthad heard
the Britishambassador there speak of the "percentages"arrangementin
termsof"Anglo-American"to describethenon-Sovietsphere.Hull could not
understandhow percentagesof responsibility mightbe distributedand had
no knowledgeof any U.S. participationin such a plan.57
Thus, the "percentages"agreementconcludedbetweentheBritishand the
Soviets on the Balkans was not leftin abeyance pendingapproval by the
UnitedStates. Indeed,theUnitedStateswas notevencompletelyinformed of
the terms.And the Departmentof State was leftto shiftforitselfin running
down the details.58Rooseveltand Hull showeda puzzlinglack ofcuriosityin
5 Harrimanto Roosevelt,Moscow,October io, 1944,FRUS, 1944,4: 0oo6-07.GabrielKolkoerroneously
tookStalin'sgesturesas proofthatStalinhad notacceptedthe"percentages"agreement;ThePolitics ofWar
(New York, 1968),145-46.
5 Harrimanto Roosevelt,Moscow, October i i, 1944,ibid.,i009-i0. Harrimanbelievedthatguiltpangs
doubtlessled Churchill"not to tellHarrimanofhis strangebargainwithStalin,exceptin bitsand pieces,
spaced overseveraldays"; Harrimanand Abel, SpecialEnvoy,357.
56 Winantreportedthat Eden's cables spoke of 75-25percenton Hungaryand on Rumania, and Eden
insistedon joint British-Soviet
policyforYugoslavia,althoughthe Russians referredto 60-40percentand
Eden insistedon a 5o-5opercenton Yugoslavia.Winantto Hull, London,October 12, 1944,FRUS, 1944,3:
452.
5 Hull to Winant, Washington,October 14, 1944,ibid., 456. Steinhardtreportedthat the British
ambassadorto Ankara informedhim thatChurchilland Stalin had agreedon 8o percentRussian and 20
percent"Anglo-American"representationin Bulgaria and Hungary and 50 percentRussian and 50
percentAnglo-Americanrepresentationin Yugoslavia; Steinhardtto Hull, Ankara, October 13, 1944,
FRUS, I944, 4: 1015.
58 Knowledge of the "percentages" arrangementin the Departmentof State remained scantyand
uncertain,and seniorofficials
could onlyspeculateon thedetails.See, forexample,FRUS, 1944, 4: 1016-19,

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 Secret"Percentages"
Churchill-Stalin Agreement 385

not directlyaskingthe Britishor the Sovietsfordetailsofthe "percentages"

agreement.Perhapsthepresidentand thesecretaryofstatedeliberately chose
to ignorethearrangement so longas Churchilland Stalinclearlyunderstood
thatno agreementon theirpartwas bindingon theUnitedStates. (Roosevelt
had forcefully put that reservationto Stalin on October 4.) Or perhaps the
U.S. government did notyetthinktheproblemimportantenoughto warrant
a directinquiry.5"Washington,afterall, had generallyregardedsoutheastern
Europe as an area in whichthe United States had littleinterest.American
leadersgladlyleftresponsibility forthatarea to Britain,despitetheirresent-
ment of Churchill'sseemingdetermination to divertAmericantroopsand
resourcesintoa Balkan invasion.
At theend ofSeptemberand in earlyOctober 1944,however,a turnaboutin
United States policytoward southeasternEurope fromminimumto great
concernwas underway.60The rapid advance of the Red Armyinto south-
eastern Europe, which made anotherBig Three conferenceurgent,found
Rooseveltunable forthe momentto attendsuch a conferencebecause ofthe
presidentialcampaign. The prime ministerhad suggestedto the president
thatChurchilland Eden shouldnevertheless proceedimmediately to Moscow
and tryto reachan understanding withStalinand Molotovon delimitation of
spheresof interestin the Balkan area.61But on October 3 Harry Hopkins
dissuaded RooseveltfromcablingChurchilla good-luckmessagethatmight
be construedas implyingthat the United States stood aloof fromBalkan
affairsor thatChurchillshouldspeak fortheUnitedStateson such mattersin
Moscow. Advisedby Charles Bohlen,Hopkinsthenpersuaded Rooseveltto
send Churchilland Stalinseparatemessagesthat,in effect, servednoticethat
the United States no longerpursued a passive policytoward southeastern
Europe. Thus, on October 4 RooseveltinformedStalin thathe regrettedhis
inabilityto join his colleagues in Moscow; but the presidenthad to tell the
marshalthat"in thisglobalwar thereis literallyno question,politicalor mili-
tary,in which the United States is not interested."Only the threeof them

and 1945, Conferenceat Malta and ralta, 103-o6, 237, 257, 262-64.When two wartimesecretariesof state
publishedtheirmemoirs,theyprovidedthepublicwiththefirstauthoritative evidencethatan Anglo-Soviet
"'spheres-of-influence"agreementhad been concluded,but they,too, were uncertainof the details. See
James Byrnes,Speaking Frankly(New York, I947), 53; and Hull, Memoirs,1458. For a differentview,see
LynnEtheridgeDavis, TheColdWarBegins:Soviet-American Conflict Europe(Princeton,1974),158-
overEastern
59. Churchilldid, however,divulgethe details to De Gaulle; see Charles De Gaulle, The Complete War
Memoirs(New York, 1964),724-25.
"Davis holds that the U.S. governmentchose to ignorethe Anglo-Sovietagreement;The Cold War
Begzns,159. HerbertFeis concluded that Rooseveltagreed that such an agreementwas advisable but
wanted to keep the United States aloof fromBalkan problems;Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They
Wagedand thePeaceTheySought(Princeton,1957),450-51.
80 No Americanmilitary occupationwas intendedanywherein southeasternEurope; FRUS, Conference at
Quebec,1944,212-I8. The turnaboutwas probablyprecipitatedbyHarriman'swarningsfromMoscow that,
unless the United States took issue with the presentSoviet "strong-arm"policy, there was "every
indicationthe SovietUnion willbecome a worldbullywherevertheirinterestsare involved";Harrimanto
Harry Hopkins, Moscow, September io, 1944,FRUS, 1944, 4: 989; and Harriman to Hull, Moscow,
September20, 1944,ibid.,992-98. George F. Kennan's memorandum,"Russia Seven Years Later," may
also have had an impact; Moscow, September,1944, ibid.,902-14.
81 RobertSherwood,Roosevelt andHopkins(New York,1948),832;and Churchill,7friumph andTragedy, i8i,
86-88.

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386 AlbertResis

could find the solution to questions still unsolved. Roosevelt suggested that
Stalin and Churchill allow Ambassador Harriman to act as the president's
observer at the Churchill-Stalin meetings-without the power to commit the
United States on any major issue. This message disabused Stalin of the as-
sumption that Churchill would be empowered to speak forRoosevelt in Mos-
cow.62 Although Roosevelt's turnabout struck a final blow at Churchill's
bargaining position, the prime ministerwas not deflectedfromhis determina-
tion to reach an agreement on spheres of influence with Stalin.63

IF,THEN, WE WANTED TO FIX AN EXACT DATE for the beginning of the Cold War
in southeastern Europe, that date would be October 4, 1944. For on that day
President Roosevelt informedStalin that the president reservedforthe United
States the rightto nothing less than a voice at least equal to that of each ofthe
other Big Three powers in arriving at and executing decisions on all inter-
national problems-including those in southeastern Europe-while denying
the Soviet Union the same right in the Western spheres-in Italy, for ex-
ample. In short, the United States now embarked on a policy that clearly
denied to the Soviet Union status equal to that of the United States. For
Washington would not accede to Moscow's exercise of undivided control, in
the name of the Big Three, over the futurearmistices for Bulgaria and for
Hungary, although each draft armistice followed the Italian precedent with
regard to the Allied Control Commission. Since the Russians regarded their
hegemony over the southeastern European approaches to the Soviet Union as
crucial to Soviet security, Stalin's ire over Roosevelt's pretensions can be
imagined.64Whether Roosevelt's assertion of boundless American interestsis
termed "internationalism," "globalism," or "imperialism," this turnabout
certainly set American policy concerning southeastern Europe on a new
course.
As for Britain, Churchill and Eden had maintained since 1941 that it was
impractical to assume that Great Britain and the United States could compel
a victorious Soviet Union to accept frontiersshallower than those it had had in
1940. London contended that the surest way forGreat Britain and the United
States to check Soviet expansion beyond those borders in Europe was to reach
a wartime agreement that would tie Moscow to the western frontiersStalin
had claimed since I941. A similar rationale governed the subsequent British
62 Sherwood, Rooseveltand Hopkins, 833-34; Charles Bohlen, Witnessto History(New York, 1973), 162-63;

Roosevelt to Harriman, Washington, October, 1944, FRUS, 1945, Malta and Yalta, 6-7; and Stalin to
Roosevelt, Moscow, October 8, 1944, Correspondence betweenthe Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R. and thePresidentsof the U.S.A. and thePrimeMinistersof GreatBritain duringtheGreat PatrioticWar of
941-1I945, 2 (Moscow, 1957): i62-63.
63 The prime minister informed the president that he would be glad to have Harriman sit in at all
principal conferences but he hoped that Roosevelt would not preclude private meetings between himself
and Stalin or Eden and Molotov; Churchill, Triumphand Tragedy,igo-gi. The meeting of October 9, when
the "percentages" agreement was concluded, was just such a tete-a-tete without Harriman's presence.
64 On October 9 Stalin told Churchill that he did not like Roosevelt's message of October 4, because "it
seemed to demand too many rights for the United States leaving too little for the Soviet Union and Great
Britain, who, afterall, had a treatyof common assistance"; "Anglo-Russian Political Conversations," 5.

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 Secret"Percentages"Agreement
ChAurchill-Stalin 387

decision to divide southeastern Europe into Anglo-Soviet spheres of interest.

But the U.S. governmentopposed this approach, contending that such war-
time agreements would feed-not curb-Soviet expansion,65violate the Atlan-
tic Charter, and increase the danger of war between Britain and Russia.
Failing to win fullAmerican support forhis militarysolution-an invasion of
the Balkans-or for his political solution-a division of southeastern Europe
into Anglo-Soviet spheres of interest-Churchill tried to go it alone in treating
with Stalin. Hence, the "percentages" agreement.
The agreement was put to the test almost immediately. And fora time it
worked. Churchill ordered the British army to suppress leftistarmed resis-
tance to the royal house in Athens. He covered himself against political
attacks fromthe Left and from the East by charging in the House of Com-
mons that the Greek rebels were the worst kind-"Trotskyists."66 But he did
not have to worry about any Soviet disapproval of British pacification of the
Greek Left; Stalin honored his understanding with Churchill and remained
silent on Greece.67 When Stalin intervened in Rumania in February 1945 to
install a Communist-dominated governmentthere,Churchill kept his peace.68
To the displeasure of both Churchill and Stalin, the U.S. government and
sections of the American press stronglycondemned British action in Greece
and then Soviet action in Rumania. Stalin was nettled by American attacks
on Soviet conduct in Rumania and Bulgaria, despite Soviet forebearance in
Greek affairs.69Churchill's exasperation with Americans, who accused British
imperialists of playing "power politics" in Greece, erupted in a caustic but
prescient rebuff.Firing offa tu quoqueat his American critics, he said,
What are powerpolitics?. .. Is havinga Navy twiceas big as any otherNavy in the
worldpowerpolitics?Is havingthelargestAir Forcein theworld,withbases in every
partoftheworldpowerpolitics?Is havingall thegold in theworldpowerpolitics?If
so, we are certainlynot guiltyoftheseoffences,I am sorryto say. They are luxuries
thathave passed away fromus.70

The "percentages" agreement worked until Britain proved too weak to sus-
tain its side of the bargain. The United States inserted itselfincreasingly into
Balkan affairsand finally,in March 1947,replaced falteringBritish power in
that area. Few would now say that America's enormous power inspired a
wiser, more effectivepolicy toward southeastern Europe than Churchill's
brand of "power politics" expressed in the "percentages" agreement.

65 For a succinctaccount of thisdivergenceof views,see Eden, The Reckon'ng,370-71.

66 WinstonChurchill,Speech to the House of Commons,January i8, 945, in House of Commons,
ParliamentaryI)ebates, 5th ser., 1944-1945, 407: col. 405; and Churchill, Triumphand Tragedy,270.
87 Churchill,Triumphand Tragedy,246, 252.
88 Churchillto Roosevelt,March 8, 1945,in F. Loewenheimet al., eds., Roosevelt and Churchill:TheirSecret
WartimeCorrespondence (New York, 1976), 660-62; and Eden, The Reckoning,604-05.
69 Churchill,Triurmph and Tragedy,543.
70 Churchill,Speech to the House ofCommons,January!8, 1945,in Parliamentary Debates, 1944-1945, 407:
cols. 425-26.

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