The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory-Toward A New Research Agenda

International Studies Quarterly (2010) 54, 705–732
The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence

Theory—Toward a New Research Agenda
Amir Lupovici1
Tel-Aviv University
In this paper, I aim to review recent empirical and theoretical develop-

ments in the study of deterrence. I suggest that an emerging wave of
literature currently represents a revival in this field. However, unlike
the previous waves, in which theoretical and empirical questions were
studied together (realism and nuclear deterrence), in the emerging
deterrence literature these two are isolated from each other. The theo-
retical trend of this wave is evident in new constructivist and interpreta-
tive scholarship that explores the practices of deterrence and has
provided significant insights, chiefly with regard to classical empirical
questions of state versus state and nuclear deterrence. The empirical
trend of this wave can be seen through the work of scholars who are
considering how to deter ‘‘new’’ threats—such as terrorism, rogue
states, and ethnic conflicts—mainly by incorporating the traditional
realist approach to deterrence. By reviewing these two trends in the
current wave of deterrence writing, I demonstrate the advantages of
each and suggest that the study of deterrence may benefit from their
integration.
Following Robert Jervis’ seminal work of 1979, in which he reviewed the theories
of deterrence and differentiated among their three waves of development,2 I sug-
gest that we are currently facing the emergence of a fourth wave. More specifi-
cally, I posit that this wave is made up of two isolated trends. The first trend is
theoretical and is evident through emerging interpretative deterrence research.
The second trend is empirical and has evolved around the questions of how to
deter terrorists and rogue states and to prevent ethnic conflicts. In general, these
studies counter the ‘‘new’’ threats through extensions of traditional Cold War
deterrence theories.3 I argue that these two trends have surprisingly little influ-
ence on each other.
1
Author’s note. For all their help and comments, I am grateful to Emanuel Adler, Janice Gross Stein, Gallia
Lindenstrauss, Vincent Pouliot, Galia Press-Barnathan, Colette Stoeber, two anonymous reviewers, and the journal’s
editors. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2008 Annual Meeting of American Political Science
Association in Boston, and I would like to thank participants for their comments. I would also like to thank the Hal-
bert fellowship program at the Munk Centre for International Studies at The University of Toronto and the Leon-
ard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for their generous support.
2
Other scholars have suggested similar distinctions in categorizing the periods of the waves of the development
of deterrence theories. Most scholars agree that the golden age of deterrence literature—the period in which it
had the greatest influence on policymakers—was the late 1950s and early 1960s, but they debate over the duration
of this period. Compare Gray (1977:25) and Jervis (1979) with Booth (1975:35), Kolkowicz (1987:2), and Trachten-
berg (1991:4).
3
These of course are not new threats; what is new is the interest of deterrence literature in studying them.
doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00606.x
2010 International Studies Association
706 The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory
I suggest that the main contribution of the interpretative approach to deter-

rence is the acknowledgment of the context: not only is there a social context
through which deterrence ideas are better adopted and understood, but the
social context that is created following the internalization of deterrence ideas
further shapes actors’ behavior. The interpretative approach then does not nec-
essarily refute classical deterrence explanations; rather, it emphasizes the impor-
tance of factors taken for granted by most positivist scholars. More specifically, it
can be suggested that deterrence by punishment4 can be learned by the actors, that
deterrence is a social construction, and that discourse is an important aspect of
understanding this strategy. I contend that further elaborating on the interpreta-
tive approach to deterrence—which is currently less developed than the empiri-
cal trend—and combining the insights of both trends may enhance our
understanding of this strategy. It is important to note as well that a significant
number of scholars of formal models also challenge classical deterrence litera-
ture; this research can be categorized as another trend of the fourth wave. How-
ever, for analytic clarity and due to limitations of space, although I attempt to
integrate some notions of the formal models approach, I will focus mainly on
the former trends.
This paper has four parts. In the first, I briefly discuss the previous waves of
deterrence theory and present their contributions as well as their difficulties. In
the second, I review the emerging interpretative approaches of deterrence. I
elaborate on how insights garnered through these approaches may strengthen
the explanatory power of deterrence theory. In the third part, I review the char-
acteristics of the empirical study of deterring the ‘‘new’’ threats. Finally, in the
fourth part I demonstrate the importance of combining the fourth wave’s theo-
retical and empirical trends.
The First Three Waves of Deterrence Theory

Given the abundance of literature on deterrence, it is not surprising to find
many excellent thematic and chronological review articles on this concept (for
example, Raser 1966; Jervis 1979, 1989; Huth 1999; Zagare and Kilgour 2000:
3–64; Morgan 2003:1–171). For this reason, I will briefly review the previous
waves of deterrence as presented by Jervis, and then consider the contributions
of this literature—as well as the challenges it is facing. This will provide the
context for discussion of the emerging fourth wave of this literature and the
possible solutions it provides.
The Emergence of the First Three Waves

The first wave of deterrence theory was developed after World War II, as schol-
ars such as Brodie, Wolfers, and Viner grasped the strategic implications of
nuclear weapons. However, at this stage, deterrence ideas had relatively little
impact on policy and they lacked the systematization and richness of the follow-
ing waves (Jervis 1979:291). The second wave emerged in the late 1950s and
incorporated game theory models (in particular the Chicken Game) into the
study of deterrence. The perceptions of this wave succeeded in becoming con-
ventional wisdom, enabling scholars to better understand actors’ tactics. How-
ever, because there was little evidence to support or validate these ideas (Jervis
4
In this paper, I discuss mainly the concept of deterrence by punishment, which is defined as the persuasion
of an opponent that the risk ⁄ cost of an undesirable action it may take will exceed any possible gains (George and
Smoke 1974:11). For an excellent discussion of definitions of deterrence, see Morgan (2003:1–2 note 2). For the
basic distinction between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial, see Snyder (1961). Another impor-
tant distinction is between deterrence and compellence (see Schelling 1966:69–70).
Amir Lupovici 707
1979:291–292), this wave, despite its popularity, attracted much criticism. The
third wave of deterrence theory grappled with the difficulties of the sec-
ond—such as its lack of supporting evidence and its heavy reliance on deduc-
tion. The empirical research of the third wave revealed that deterrence theory
needed to be modified with regard to risk taking, rewards, probabilities, misper-
ceptions, and domestic and bureaucratic politics (Jervis 1979:303–314). The
third wave of deterrence thus provided important solutions to the above-men-
tioned problems. As Walt stated, dealing with these challenges produced ‘‘a
lively debate on the requirements of deterrence, the utility of the rational deter-
rence framework, and the appropriate strategies for evaluating it’’ (Walt
1991:217–218).
The Contribution of the Three Waves and Why They Were so Influential
The first three waves of deterrence theory made some significant theoretical con-
tributions not only to the study of deterrence but with regard to security studies
in general. These theories constituted how scholars thought about deterrence
for many years, and in this way they helped to solidify the realist school of inter-
national relations (Jervis 1979:290–291).5 Essential influences of the third wave
can also be seen in the framing of theoretical issues, such as enduring rivals
(Huth and Russett 1993; and compare Lieberman 1995 with Stein 1996), conven-
tional deterrence (Mearsheimer 1983; Shimshoni 1988), extended deterrence
(Huth 1988), and psychological and cognitive understanding of decision making
(Jervis 1985; Lebow and Stein 1987, 1989; Morgan 2003:134–142, 149–151; see
also Levy 1992).6 Furthermore, the methodological impact of this wave can also
be seen (Achen and Snidal 1989:161; Lebow and Stein 1990:346–351), not only
in the field of security studies but in international relations and political science
as well (Maoz 2002:172–174; see also King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:24, 134–
135).
The first three waves of deterrence theory also significantly influenced policy-
making. The un-intuitive implications of deterrence literature were evident in
the strategies and relations of the superpowers, in particular with regard to the
strategy of MAD aimed at stabilizing relations between opponents, as demon-
strated in the SALT agreements of 1972 (Adler 1992; Garthoff 1994:647, 849–
852; Evangelista 1999). Deterrence theories allowed policymakers to organize
strategic knowledge into a clear conceptual framework that was easier to ‘‘sell,’’
providing them with strategic language and jargon (Jervis 1979:291; Kaplan
1991:171–172) that included concepts such as massive retaliation, invulnerability,
assured destruction, counterforce, pre-emptive strike, first strike, second strike,
and flexible response. While some of these concepts were not completely new
(Quester 1966:1–2; Chilton 1985:115), they gained influence primarily in the
context of deterrence.
Scholars, mainly of the first two waves, based the idea of deterrence upon
apolitical and ahistorical arguments (Jervis 1979:322–323; Kaplan 1991:109;
Trachtenberg 1991:40, 44–46), and as a result paid very little attention to its
operation in reality. Ironically, this obfuscation of empirical contradictions and
problems led to the consensus on its validity.7 As Adler argues, ‘‘because the
5
However, it should be noted, as Morgan suggests, that ‘‘deterrence was not equivalent to realist thinking.’’
For example, the theory of deterrence concluded that hostile opponents can cooperate in achieving arms control
agreements (Morgan 2003:12). Similarly, practicing deterrence may limit actors’ ability to use military power and
undermine alliances, which are also considered important factors emphasized by realist scholars. I would like to
thank an anonymous reviewer for helping me elaborate on this point.
6
On biases and cognitive barriers that affect deterrence strategy, see for example Jervis (1985:24–26, 28, 30),
Lebow (1985:231), and Lebow and Stein (1989:221, 223).
7
For a review of the abstract thinking on nuclear weapons, see Cohn (1987) and Luke (1989:212).
science of nuclear strategy has no empirical reference points and data banks, it
cannot be falsified’’ (Adler 1992:107).8 In other words, deterrence could become a
heuristic tool, supplying simple, and even simplistic, solutions to complicated
foreign policy problems. This made it more attractive than other strategic options
to decision makers. Moreover, the concept of deterrence could force rationality on
decision making, so that deterrence practices became a convincing—and even
justifiable—option (Kaplan 1991:72–73; Morgan 2003:13).
The Difficulties in Deterrence Literature

I suggest that deterrence literature faces three interrelated problems that go
back to basic theoretical, methodological, and empirical difficulties. Although
third wave scholars acknowledged these difficulties, they were unable to com-
pletely resolve them and fully explain how deterrence, in fact, works. Thus, as
Morgan suggests, after more than five decades of intensive thought on deter-
rence, scholars face the same questions they did when they started (Morgan
2003:xv–xvi; but see Zagare 2006:115).
On the theoretical level, it has been suggested that third wave scholars did not
solve some of deterrence literature’s internal contradictions: first it was argued
that, in effect, it is difficult to create credible deterrence between coherent
rational actors. In order for rational deterrence theory to work, either the
deterred or the deterrent actor will have to behave irrationally (Morrow
2000:165–168, 170; Zagare 2004:114–116). This problem is especially prominent
with regard to nuclear deterrence, as retaliation in a MAD world should not be
credible—because implementing this threat would mean suicide (see Achen
1987:92, 95; Luke 1989:211; Zagare 1990:250; Nicholson 1992:46; Williams
1992:73, 76–77; Morgan 2003:47). Solutions put forward to solve this problem
have created further problems or contradictions.9 For example, some scholars
have acknowledged the advantages of strategically acting irrationally and pointed
to the ‘‘rationality of irrationality’’ (Kahn 1962:129–130; Schelling 1960:chapter
5, 1966:99–105; Dror 1971:67–70; see also Morgan 2003:58–65).
This is closely related to another problem: in contrast to the implied assertion
of most classical approaches to deterrence, actors do not always prefer preserving
the status-quo (Zagare 2004:128; Quackenbush and Zagare 2005:101; Langlois
and Langlois 2006:161–162). In fact, formal models scholars demonstrate that
interactions among opponents are much more complicated than envisioned by
classical deterrence approaches (for example, Powell 1990:70; Werner 2000:
8
This also demonstrates that these theoretical ideas influenced not just the strategic discussions and debates.
Indeed, ‘‘real decision makers do not think like deterrence theorists’’ (DeNardo 1995:227, 244; Wohlforth 1999:53;
see also Morgan 2003:115, 140). However, these theoretical ideas influenced not only actors’ rhetoric but also their
behavior as well, even if they did not fully follow the theatrical arguments as demonstrated above. This process is
well captured by the cognitive evolution approach. According to Adler, cognitive evolution is a theory of interna-
tional learning that does not emphasize the validity of the learnt knowledge, but rather its political selection (by
international actors) (Adler 1997:399). As Morgan (2003:141) concludes regarding the effects of deterrence ideas
on practice, ‘‘it was not what was true, but what people felt was true that mattered.’’
9
For proposed solutions, see Achen (1987:96–97), Zagare (1990:251–252, 255–257), and Nicholson (1992:78–
79). For theoretical, philosophical, and empirical criticisms on some solutions, see Achen (1987:94–95, 104 note 2),
Luke (1989:213–214), and Zagare (1990:258, 2004:115). Other kinds of solutions were suggested by formal models
scholars, who contend that credible threats are precisely those that are consistent with rational choice: that is, those
that really hurt and which the threatener prefers to execute (Zagare and Kilgour 2000:54–56, 67–68; Zagare
2004:125; Quackenbush and Zagare 2005:105–106). For another solution, see Powell (1990:23, 131–147). Following
this, scholars of formal models emphasize the importance of some factors that allow deterrence to be both rational
and successful, such as perfect information (Langlois and Langlois 2006:161; see also Morrow 2000:170) as well as the
use of costly signals and the creation of domestic audience costs (Partell and Palmer 1999:391; Morrow 2000:172–
173; Fearon 2002:13–16). For a more limited view of the influences of costly signals on deterrence outcomes, see
Danilovic (2002:130–40).
Amir Lupovici 709
721–722, 729–730; Danilovic 2001:102–103, 2002; Fearon 2002:20–22; Carlson

and Dacey 2006).
A further difficulty is that although third wave scholars have acknowledged the
importance of studying threat formation and how deterrence is affected by the
policymaker’s interpretation of reality, from a constructivist point of view it
would seem that they have generally considered the interest as given (Luke
1989:212; Carlsnaes 1992:251; Wendt 1999:36; Guzzini 2000:149; Tannenwald
2007:33–34).10 As Nicholson (1992:50) suggests, these approaches do not allow
for the exploration of how actors’ preferences are formed in the first place.
Thus, the difficulty in identifying the effects of ‘‘national interests’’ on the prac-
tices of deterrence stems not only from the facts that they can be understood as
social constructions and that they are closely related to actors’ identities (Weldes
1999:3–16, 118–119; Tannenwald 2007:18), but from the fact that even positivist
scholars do not agree on how national interests are translated into specific for-
eign policy (for example, Allison and Zelikow 1999:298). As Lebow and Stein
(1989:215–217) conclude, deterrence theory is limited because actors’ prefer-
ences change through interactions that cannot be predicted by deterrence the-
ory, and as a result the most important parts of the explanation are excluded
from it (see also Carlsnaes 1992:251–252; Wendt 1999:36, 115; Tannenwald
2007:36–37). Constructivist approaches, by emphasizing the importance of the
‘‘context’’ (a point I will later elaborate on), provide some directions for solving
these problems.
Other prominent unresolved challenges in deterrence theory concern method-
ological issues. First, formal models scholars have convincingly shown that a bias
exists in the research of deterrence toward the study of much more resolute
actors—those ‘‘who select themselves into crises’’ and therefore are less likely to
be deterred (Fearon 1994, 2002:6, 14; Werner 2000:722; Danilovic 2001:103,
2002:117–119). Second, a difficulty exists with regard to the question of what
deterrence is, which makes it harder to determine what deterrence success is.11
Furthermore, although scholars tend to agree that the success of deterrence
strategy is dependent on the defender’s capability and resolve—and their ability
to communicate these two factors (Morgan 2003:15–20)—there is a methodologi-
cal challenge to exploring this theory. This is because the tautology according to
which deterrence fails when war erupts leads to a bias in the case selection
(Achen and Snidal 1989:161; Lebow and Stein 1990:347). In spite of the impor-
tant methodological progress in the field,12 this major problem has not been
resolved. Deterrence theory and most deterrence scholars are only able to show
a correlation between deterrence strategy and avoidance of violence, and they
find it difficult to establish the causal connections between the two (see Bern-
stein, Lebow, Stein, and Weber 2000:45; Freedman 2004:13). This has resulted in
10
Although the implementation of prospect theory to the study of deterrence provides some important
perceptions (Levy 1992:289–292; Schaub 2004), it does not solve the above-mentioned criticism regarding the
psychological-cognitive extensions.
11
For an excellent review of quantitative research that discusses deterrence success and deterrence failure, see
Morgan (2003:152–164). This review also demonstrates the difficulties in defining deterrence success. See also Huth
(1999:35).
12
Scholars have suggested solving these difficulties by focusing on the conditions in which credible threats con-
strain the behavior of the opponent. They suggest developing hypotheses regarding the defender, the challenger,
and the conflict (Lebow and Stein 1987:36, 64; Levy 1989:120–121, 150–156; Zagare 1990:258; Nicholson 1992:135;
Downs 1993:63). In addition, it has been emphasized that scholars need to better establish causality between deter-
rence and the avoidance of violence (George and Smoke 1989:178; Lebow and Stein 1989:221; Huth and Russett
1990:489–491). Another solution is to study both deterrence failures and deterrence successes (Huth and Russett
1990:468–473; but see Jervis 1989:194). The longitudinal case study methodology involving the interactions over
time of ‘‘enduring rivals’’ has also been suggested as a solution to the problems of selection bias and identifying
deterrence success, see Lieberman (1995) and Stein (1996).
the argument that deterrence literature provides us with a description of, rather
than an explanation for, deterrence success (Achen 1987:95–96; Luke 1989:214).
These problems are also related to some empirical challenges.13 Basically,
rational deterrence theory, even with cognitive and psychological extensions, fails
to provide a convincing account for some significant empirical puzzles (Farkas
1996:346; Zagare 2004:113).14 In addition, the three waves of deterrence theory
cannot explain, for example, why over the course of the Cold War the number
of severe crises between the superpowers decreased (see Morgan 2003:131–132).
In other words, why was deterrence strategy more successful toward the end of
the Cold War than in its early stages?15 To some extent, the third wave of deter-
rence theory has difficulty explaining not only the avoidance of violence but the
continuous avoidance of violence, issues that are closely related to general deter-
rence and the conditions for attaining it.16
The Fourth Wave

It is widely accepted that the eruption of the Cold War, the introduction of
nuclear weapons, and the dominance of the realist paradigm significantly
advanced the early stages of the study of deterrence (Kratochwil 1978:70, 155–
156; Jervis 1979). In a similar line, I argue that the end of the Cold War, the
emergence of ‘‘new’’ threats, and the development of interpretative approaches
prompted the fourth wave in the study of this strategy.17 However, in this wave,
unlike the previous, the empirical and theoretical trends were somewhat isolated
from each other.18 Realists continued to utilize their framework of deterrence,
attempting to implement it with regard to ‘‘new’’ threats such as rogue states
and terrorists. At the same time, constructivists and other interpretative scholars
started focusing mainly on nuclear deterrence between the superpowers. Interest-
ingly, within this interpretative research, the study of deterrence and its implica-
tions were in some cases part of a more general argument rather than the main
focus, which further emphasizes that constructivists can take a more active part
in the study of deterrence.
The Interpretative Turn

I suggest that the main theoretical difference between the interpretative research
of deterrence and rational (classical and formal models) studies of deterrence
lies in the former’s acknowledgment of the importance of the intersubjective
context. However, non-interpretative scholars have also sought a better under-
standing of contexts in studying deterrence, these contexts are mainly material
(Mearsheimer 1983:63), situational (Morgan 1983:45), political (Evron
1987:202), cultural (Jervis 1979:322–323; Garfinkle 1995), and of strategic culture
(Snyder 1977; Gray 1986). In contrast, scholars of the fourth wave argue that the
13
For a good empirical discussion on deterrence success and failure, see Huth (1999:35–43).
14
Lebow, for example, demonstrates such a problem when he discusses Israeli deterrence in 1973 (Lebow
1985:214–215, 221–222).
15
These findings cannot be explained simply by referring to periods of detente versus periods of hostility,
because there is no full correlation between the time period and the success of deterrence.
16
This problem of the continued avoidance of violence, of course, cannot and does not aim to refute the
rational theories of deterrence, but it invites a more interpretative exploration. Furthermore, this argument is
alluded to in the assertion that the study of general deterrence is much less developed than the study of immediate
deterrence (Huth 1999:27; Morgan 2003:xvi, 10). On the basic distinction between immediate and general deter-
rence, see Morgan (2003:xvi).
17
For important constructivist contribution to the study of security, see Hopf (1998), Farrell (2002), Barkin
(2003), Adler (2009:90–92); see also Desch (1998:142–143, 148–150, 166–169).
18
In this respect, Adler (2009) is an exception.
Amir Lupovici 711
intersubjective context plays an important role in creating the actors’ understand-

ings of deterrence (see Bernstein et al. 2000:47; Milliken 2001:135).19
The origins of the study of the interpretative dimension of deterrence can be
traced to the 1950s and 1960s. For example, in June 1959, social scientists met
with strategic military officers in Inyokern, California in order to provide a com-
prehensive theory of deterrence. The result of that meeting was bitter criticism
of the simplistic American thinking regarding this strategy (see Raser 1966:300–
301), and some of the suggestions made at that time are quite similar to those
constructivist scholars currently propose. Among the few scholars who empha-
sized the need to conduct interpretative research to better understand deter-
rence was Brodie, who suggested decades ago that good strategy is based on
good anthropological and sociological analysis (quoted in Gray 1986:40). Schol-
ars studying distinct issues in deterrence have made similar arguments. Schelling
for example referred to the importance of expectations with regard to ‘‘rational
games’’ (Schelling 1960)20; Kratochwil (1978:56–57) proposed that doctrines can
be studied as rules; and Booth emphasized the importance of culture (Booth
1979:41).
However, and unfortunately, this research was not directly or systematically
incorporated into the study of deterrence. Furthermore, it was not until the late
1980s that interpretative scholars began to explore issues in deterrence: these
included the linguistic and semiological contexts in which deterrence strategy
operates (Chilton 1985; Dillon 1989; Falk 1989; Luke 1989:214–223; Klein
1994:77; Frederking 2000:15–16); and the interpretative version of the concept
of strategic culture (Johnston 1995:46, 51–52).
It is also rare to find attempts to combine the concepts of deterrence with
either norms21 or identity in international relations literature; and most of these
attempts, although insightful, do not provide a comprehensive (constructivist)
framework for the study of deterrence and its effects on avoidance of violence.22
A good starting point for discussing the connection between deterrence and
norms is Freedman’s book Deterrence (2004) and the debate it provoked in the
Journal of Strategic Studies. Freedman implies that norms and deterrence can have
three possible types of connection. In the first, norms are seen as structures that
increase the chances of deterrence success (Freedman 2004:67). In the second,
Freedman argues that behavioral norms can be internalized by the threat of
deterrence to the point that this threat is no longer needed (Freedman
2005:791; see also Morgan 2005:753–755).23 In the third, deterrence itself is a
norm (for example, MAD) (in Freedman 2004:31–32, 42; 2005:793).24 A similar
approach was taken by Tannenwald (2007:19), who claims that the question
should not be ‘‘norms’’ versus ‘‘deterrence,’’ but rather, ‘‘how norms are part of
the practices of deterrence.’’ One finds similarly lacking results with regard to
19
On the importance of the social context for deterrence, see also Tannenwald (2007:36, 291–292).
20
For an interpretative reading of Schelling, see Adler (1997:346) and Luke (1989:217–218).
21
It should be noted, however, that the connection between moral norms and deterrence has been acknowl-
edged in scholarly literature (Nye 1986; Walzer [1977] 2000:260–283).
22
Also in this respect, Adler (2009) is an important exception.
23
It was suggested that deterring inappropriate behavior with the threat of punishment and with enforcement
mechanisms may strengthen adherence to international norms (Axelrod 1997:47; Freedman 2004:69, 72–74; see
also Bull 1977:122–155; Press-Barnathan 2004:197). However, according to interpretative scholars, deterrence is not
just an institution aimed at sustaining the international order as suggested by the English School (see Bull
1977:119–124; Press-Barnathan 2004:200). Rather, deterrence has reflexive influences that constitute the actors as
well. See also, hereinafter, footnote. 46.
24
In this respect, it is also worth mentioning other studies that at least partly converge with the study of deter-
rence itself as the norm developed. For an international law perspective, see Farrell and Lambert (2001). Other
studies acknowledge subnorms that constitute deterrence, such as the norm of ‘‘no-strategic defenses’’ (Cortell and
Davis 2000:78–79) and the norm of equality (Krause and Latham 1999:30). See also Tannenwald (2007), regarding
the norm of the nuclear taboo.
scholarly attempts to link the study of deterrence with the concept of identity:
researchers have not directly explored the effects of these connections on actors’
behavior—in particular, on the avoidance of violence. For example, some schol-
ars have had insights closely related to the identity-deterrence connection in
their study of the identities of nuclear states (Klein 1994:107, 109, 129; Sagan
1996–1997:73–76; Gusterson 2004:25; Varadarajan 2004:329–340)25 or in explora-
tions of the discourse of deterrence (Dillon 1989; Jeonniemi 1989). Other schol-
ars have made only a few specific references, focusing on identity-related issues
regarding deterrence (Bially-Mattern 2005:22–23; Wendt 1999:358–359; see also
Tannenwald 2007:45–46). What is needed, then, is a greater focus on the
explained phenomenon of avoidance of violence (or outbreak of violence) and
more systematic concepts to deal with these phenomena.
However, despite its problems, the interpretative school provides important
insights, developed mainly with regard to state versus state deterrence. These can
be categorized into four distinct themes: acknowledgment that (i) deterrence
can be learned, (ii) socialization processes affect the practices of deterrence, (iii)
deterrence is affected by social constructions, and (iv) deterrence can be studied
as a discourse that consists of speech acts.
Deterrence Can be Learned26

One of the main problems in classical approaches to deterrence is that they
tended to see deterrence as self-evident (Smith 2006:25). Indeed, some scholars
were cautious regarding the direct effects of power on the strategy of deter-
rence (for example, Nye 1987), and others, as mentioned above, emphasized
the need to take into account actors’ perceptions and other cognitive factors.27
However, rational research of deterrence tends to assume that the processes of
learning28 have limited influence on the practices of deterrence, which are
mainly determined by the actors’ power. Such view is especially prominent in
what Zagare and Kilgour (2000:8–16) term ‘‘structural deterrence theory.’’29
Emerging interpretative writing on deterrence, on the other hand, emphasizes
that the strategy of deterrence itself depends on processes of learning30 (and
socialization), and therefore learning these practices affects the chances of
their success.
This is not to argue that successful practices of deterrence are exclusively
dependent on a process of learning, but rather that such learning influences the
chances of avoiding violence, especially in cases of mutual deterrence. Thus, not
only does deterrence strategy work better when an actor has knowledge of its
opponent’s capability and resolve, but it can be enhanced in situations in which
actors understand the meaning of the concept of deterrence. A brief discussion
of the historical context provides some general insights regarding how deter-
rence is influenced by learning processes and how these processes can be further
integrated into the research.
Elements of deterrence thinking appeared before the Second World War
(Quester 1966; Overy 1992:74; Morgan 2003:4; Mueller 2004:46) and were
25
In addition, the identity-deterrence link can relate to other identities a state may hold, such as the identity
of ‘‘security provider.’’ Regarding the constitutive influence of the state role as a security provider, see Stein
(2000:21–22).
26
Although some of the references in this review are indeed not of ‘‘constructivist’’ (or interpretative) scholars,
it nevertheless helps to demonstrate the advantage of framing these studies within the context of ‘‘learning deter-
rence.’’
27
See above pp. 709.
28
Theories of learning differ in their view of the depth of the cognitive and behavioral change that the actors
go through; see Levy (1994); Nye (1987:378) (that is, complex learning or adaptation).
29
For this approach, see for example Waltz (1979).
30
A similar argument is suggested by DeNardo (1995:240–241), who claims that deterrence literature itself is
not intuitive, but see also note 8 above.
Amir Lupovici 713
enhanced by the increasing destructiveness of weapons—especially the advent of

air strike capability—developed during this war (Mueller 2004:32). These techno-
logical developments had a crucial influence on the ability to learn deterrence,
as they allowed one side of a conflict to inflict a painful strike on a large number
of civilians without first militarily defeating its adversary. The first implication of
this was a clearer recognition of (i) how threats could be used in a deterrent
mode (mostly by Britain and the United States), and (ii) the difficulties of imple-
menting other strategic alternatives (Quester 1966:3; Overy 1992:80–81, 84; Mor-
gan 2003:6–7; Mueller 2004:34, 42). A second implication was that policymakers
needed to consider the vulnerability of their own population in their strategic
planning (Quester 1966:2; Overy 1992:74–6; Mueller 2004:17–23, 45).
The emerging knowledge of deterrence in the pre-Cold War era had important
implications on learning deterrence in the nuclear age. First, this strategy
attempted to provide a solution to the long-standing problem of the destructive-
ness of modern wars (Morgan 2003:4–6).31 Second, strategic ideas, conceptualiza-
tions, and distinctions that were highly relevant during the nuclear age
had already attained much attention in the context of air strike capability.32 Third,
what helped to further intensify the lessons learned about massive air bombard-
ment in the nuclear age was that nuclear deterrence in itself was still based on air
strike capability (Overy 1992:74, 94). And finally, it is important to note that the
obstacles to learning (not merely the learning itself) that limited the pre-World War
Two reliance on deterrence similarly limited the adoption of the modern theories
of deterrence in the nuclear age.33
Along with the influences of the Second World War on learning deterrence,
the combination of a hostile opponent and the destructiveness of nuclear weap-
ons pushed the development and writing on deterrence (Williams 1975:67–68;
Mearsheimer 1983:8; Shimshoni 1988:1). The Cold War provided a context in
which the existence of an ideological and expansionist rival was assumed; con-
tainment based on deterrence seemed to provide a solution for the Americans,
who wished to prevent any Soviet success (Buzan 1987:147; Walt 1991:215; Mor-
gan 2003:9–10, 36–37). The introduction of nuclear weapons helped to coalesce
the strategic thinking about deterrence into a theory, particularly the perception
of deterrence by punishment (rather than deterrence by denial) (Evron
1987:177; Shimshoni 1988:25; Morgan 2003:7, 239). Some scholars contend that
these changes became significant only after the introduction of the hydrogen
bomb (for example, Kratochwil 1978:155–156)34; whether or not this is the case,
the destructiveness of these new weapons helped to clarify and simplify the idea
of deterrence (Quester 1966:2; Jervis 1979:290; Rosenberg 1984:120; Shimshoni
1988:16; Morgan 2003:239). These combined factors—the destructiveness of this
weapon,35 the difficulty of defending a nuclear attack, the potential for quick
wars, and the lessons drawn from the Second World War (which nuclear weap-
ons enhanced)—solidified the need to use these weapons in a deterrent mode
31
Furthermore, the destructiveness of the Second World War had another influence on deterrence, as it set a
precedent regarding policymakers’ willingness to execute such annihilation. As Morgan (2003:30) suggests ‘‘[s]ome
analysts insisted it would readily accept World War II scale losses again.’’
32
For example, strategic questions—regarding how much power is enough, second strike capability, ‘‘counter
force’’ ⁄ ‘‘counter value’’)—were discussed before the introduction of the nuclear weapon (Overy 1992:82–83; see
also Quester 1966:157).
33
These obstacles were exemplified in debates on morality and effectiveness (Quester 1966:50–74, 92–94; Overy
1992:75–76; Mueller 2004:27–28), the feasibility of defense (Overy 1992:84); and other political and bureaucratic
constraints (for example, arms control, disarmament, war-fighting) (Quester 1966:81; Overy 1992:80–81, 92).
34
On the strategic implications of the hydrogen bomb to deterrence, see also Rosenberg (1984:154–155);
Kaplan (1991:79, 111).
35
It was suggested that although conventional punishment might be extensive, it is only local and is ‘‘not
overwhelmingly shocking to the receiving nation’’ (Buzan 1987:136–137; Shimshoni 1988:12; but see Mueller 1988).
(Williams 1975:67; Carnesale, Doty, Hoffmann, Huntington, Nye, and Sagan

1983:30–32).
Nevertheless, although many strategists came very quickly to acknowledge
these arguments, a shift toward a strategy of deterrence had still not taken place
within the American administration in the 1950s (Kratochwil 1978:175; Trachten-
berg 1991:6). This disparity between the policy level and the theoretical level
clearly demonstrates that nuclear weapons do not automatically or deterministi-
cally deter a potential challenger, nor do they guarantee the adoption of this
strategy.36 Deterrence, thus, is not a strategy inherent to nuclear weapons (Mor-
gan 2003:40; and compare with Waltz 1995); rather, it is advanced through social
agents who develop and distribute these ideas and help to overcome learning
obstacles.
Framing deterrence within the context of learning processes allows us to bet-
ter understand how these ideas are developed and disseminated, not only within
a state (for example, the process that took place in the United States), but
among different international actors.37 Here, the contribution of the constructiv-
ist approach—which emphasizes the need to acknowledge the ideational and the
material context, and the interaction between them38—becomes very important.
In order for the relationship between the involved actors39 and their capabilities
to promote practices of deterrence, social agents would have to first successfully
disseminate their interpretation of the implications of these weapons and help
to socially construct how these weapons should be used (for example, Kaplan
1991; Adler 1992; Evangelista 1999).
Considering deterrence as a learning process also points to the significance of
learning obstacles40 that burden such strategic shift. For example, scholars have
referred to the strategic culture demonstrated in the institutionalization of the
ideas of war-fighting in both superpowers (for example, Falk 1989:68; Johnston
1995:32, 41, 61–62), as well as to the existence of a bureaucratic struggle among
security agencies in the United States (for example, Rosenberg 1984) and
bureaucratic factors in Soviet Union (for example, Allison and Zelikow
1999:183–184)—all of which slowed down and limited the learning and imple-
menting of ‘‘deterrence.’’
Finally, acknowledgment of these learning processes has interesting implica-
tions for mutual deterrence, as actors can better understand and reflect on the
deep meaning of this strategy when they serve simultaneously as a deterrer and
deterred actor. This point relates in part to another important issue: mutual
deterrence, especially institutionalized practices of deterrence, is about the pres-
ervation of the status quo (Catudal 1989:147) and therefore helps to legitimize
the actors involved (Buzan 2004:145)—and even the international order (Klein
1994:26, 41, 102).
36
For example, during their initial stages of nuclear capability building, the strategy of nuclear deterrence was
not adopted in the United States, USSR, or in China (Freedman 2003). In addition, there was a debate over the
best way to implement this strategy—minimal deterrence, massive retaliation, or even war-fighting (compare Rosen-
berg 1984:121–126 with Freedman 2003:216–217; see also Morgan 2003:23–25). In some cases, actors even adopted
strategies that contradict the strategy of deterrence. See, for example, the strategies of nuclear war-fighting (Booth
1979:82–83; Rosenberg 1984; Buzan 1987:137, 197–209).
37
On the influences of Cold War practices of deterrence on the conflict between India and Pakistan, see Kre-
pon (2001:83–84).
38
On the emphasis of the constructivist approach on both material and ideational contexts, see Adler
(1997:322).
39
Interactions between the superpowers, such as in the Berlin crisis and especially during the Cuban Missile
Crisis, had important implications that eased the ability to learn and implement deterrence (for example, Thies
1991:177–178; Weber 1991:796–798).
40
For a more general discussion on learning obstacles, including cultural, social, and psychological factors, see
Levy (1994:306–307), Checkel (1999:86–87), and Cortell and Davis (2000:67–68, 73–74, 77).
Amir Lupovici 715
Socialization Affects the Practices of Deterrence

An actor that is fully aware of strategic balance and has learned the idea of deter-
rence may still decide for various reasons (for example, political gains) to imple-
ment other strategies. Thus, as I will later demonstrate, although in some cases
learning deterrence enhances the practices of avoidance of violence, in others it
may increase the likelihood of violent acts. It is thus not merely knowledge but
common knowledge that is important: a shared knowledge regarding rationality,41
weapons, capabilities, and the willingness to use these, as well as shared values
(for example, respect for human life), all of which solidify the understanding of
‘‘deterrence’’ itself.42 Therefore, socialization also influences the practices of
deterrence,43 because actors need to learn not only the general strategic ideas,
but that these ideas can be implemented in their strategic relations. Further-
more, socialization helps to maintain the practices of deterrence by preserving
the knowledge that drives them.44 Both learning and socialization help, for
example, to explain the creation of common knowledge between the superpow-
ers, and thus to explain why and how the strategy of deterrence was gradually
adopted by the United States and the USSR, as well as how nuclear deterrence
was successfully stabilized through institutionalization of arms control (Adler
1992; Evangelista 1999; see also Nye 1987; Lavoy 1991:758). However, since most
scholars neglect the effects of these processes on the attainment of stable deter-
rence practices, these influences have become latent assumptions in their
research.
Deterrence Is a Social Construction

The practices of deterrence are affected not only by learning and socialization
but also, as some scholars acknowledge, by social constructions. First, deterrence,
like any strategy, is dependent on ideas and knowledge and on the interpreta-
tion of these. Doctrines can therefore be understood as rules (Kratochwil
1978:56; Kowert and Legro 1996:491, note 94). Furthermore, as Guzzini suggests,
analysis of the social world can affect that world itself (Guzzini 2000:175). Thus,
the practitioners’ interpretations are themselves part of the data that analysts
must make sense of (Klein 1994:76). As Lebow puts it, ‘‘The big question for
historians may not be why deterrence worked, but why so many leaders and
lesser officials on both sides thought it was so necessary, and how until
the advent of Gorbachev, they repeatedly confirmed this belief tautologically’’
(Lebow 2005:769).
Second, deterrence strategy and its development are affected by social con-
structions such as rationality (Falk 1989:59; Luke 1989:212), threat, and security
(Lipschutz 1995:224; Buzan, Ole, and de Wilde 1998:204; Hopf 1998:186–187;
Weldes 1999:2, 7, 18–19; Mutimer 2000:26). Scholarly acknowledgment of these
constructions is useful in considering the issues of resolve and credibility. The
importance of resolve and credibility has been emphasized both by scholars and
by practitioners over the years (see Schelling 1960, 1966; Williams 1975:75, 83).
However, recent scholarship has criticized the overly simplistic presentation of
these concepts (Mercer 1996; Tang 2005:34–35). Constructivist scholars contend
41
For example, Skyrms (2000:270) refers to the common knowledge of rationality.
42
For a similar elaboration of the concept of common knowledge in the context of deterrence, see Adler
(2009:93–94, 99).
43
By socialization I mean an interactive process of learning that creates internalization of the knowledge of
deterrence between (or among) specific opponents. As with theories of learning, theories of socialization can also
be mapped according to the profundity of the process and the internalization of the related knowledge. See, for
example, in Schimmelfennig (2000:112–114).
44
These processes are most likely to take place between ‘‘enduring rivals,’’ since they have a continuous inter-
action. In addition, acknowledgment of the processes of socialization may shed light on some difficulties concern-
ing learning deterrence, see Morgan (2003:72–73).
that resolve and credibility are social constructions (Hopf 1994:9–11, 65, note 2;
Milliken 1996:218, 228). Thus, more attention should be placed on the context
and the intersubjective understandings that allow for an actor to perceive specific
threats as credible or to be able to pose a credible threat. For example, it is sug-
gested that transparency (which can be considered as a norm)45 and the norm
of the nuclear taboo may in fact challenge an actor’s ability to pose a credible
threat (Tannenwald 2007:18; also compare Morgan 2003:17, 63 with Crawford
2003:211).
Finally, it has been argued that the strategy of deterrence can be understood
as a self-fulfilling prophecy—and even as a myth (Jeonniemi 1989:45; Luke
1989:214). Actors that believe they are in a game of deterrence (and share com-
mon knowledge about it) will try to develop, strengthen, and institutionalize
practices suitable for preserving it. This is to a large extent what happened
between the superpowers in the 1970s. Because they shared common knowledge
regarding deterrence, American and Soviet decision makers acted as if their
expectations about this strategy were true, and this helped to validate them
(Adler 1992:108; see also Jeonniemi 1989:45; Luke 1989).
The importance of these social mechanisms in the practice of deterrence is
evident in the fact that, as Williams argues, paradoxes and contradictions in the
deterrence literature stem in part from how this strategy was developed and con-
structed (Williams 1992:89). For example, constructivists argue that rationality is
socially constructed; the practice of deterrence defines who is a rational actor,
and, in this way, affects an actor’s behavior. In this respect, I argue that viewing
deterrence as a way—and to some extent as the only way—to provide security in
the nuclear age is itself the social construction. Indeed, this does not mean that
material factors (nuclear weapons) did not provide the context for such changes,
simplifying the implications of a next war. But as I earlier demonstrated, this
process was not deterministic; rather, it was dependent on social, cultural, and
political processes that helped to emphasize the interests of the state—survivabil-
ity—and the means to achieve it—the unintuitive ideas of (mutual) nuclear
deterrence. To put it another way, deterrence is in fact not the only rational
strategy that can guarantee a state’s survival (for example Weber 1991:805). This
aim could be attained by for example war-fighting, mutual deterrence based on
defense systems, or simply by nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, according to
the critics of classical deterrence theory, deterrence is not a credible strategy for
coherent rational actors, because carrying out the deterrent threat is suicidal
and thus irrational.46 Acknowledging, then, that deterrence is a social construc-
tion, defined by actors as the only ‘‘rational’’ strategy for the nuclear age, helps
to explain how actors continued to practice and be affected by this strategy
despite its contradictions. In this respect Payne (2001:17–18) suggests,
In the context of mutual vulnerability confidence in deterrence became a tautol-

ogy; any rational leader would be deterred from severe provocation by the fear
of mutual nuclear destruction; national leaders are rational…thus, nuclear weap-
ons would deter. In short, rational leaders would be deterred via mutual nuclear
threats because, by definition, they would be irrational if they were not so
deterred.
In this vein, Windsor referrers to Weber’s concept of ‘‘rationalization’’ in

order to describe the process through which ‘‘[d]eterrence became its own
45
On the emerging norm of transparency and its impact on the field of military security, see (Florini 2003:
32–33).
46
See above pp. 710.
Amir Lupovici 717
institution, its own form of rationality, its own bureaucracy’’ (Windsor 2002:169;
see also Freedman 2004:14).
The Importance of Discourse (or Speech Acts)

Acknowledging that deterrence is affected by social constructions emphasizes the
need to study the discourse that shapes actors’ knowledge, and how actors com-
municate and act.47 According to the interpretative school, discourse not only
enables actors to communicate and understand reality, it constructs reality (Searle
1995:76–77; Milliken 1999:229, 236). In this respect, the utterance itself can be
the act (the speech act) (for example, see Buzan et al. 1998:26–27).
It has been suggested that the discourse of deterrence is more than just a
means of communication. As Jeonniemi argues, deterrence is a textual field. The
language and discourse of deterrence includes rules and routines that allow for
interpretation by a domestic and internal audience. In this manner, the dis-
course of deterrence both represents this practice and constructs it (Dillon
1989:97; Jeonniemi 1989:45; Dauber 1993; Gusterson 1996:2; see also Cohn
1987). The discourse of deterrence helps actors to better understand reality and
better interpret their opponents’ actions. Moreover, while deterrence is self-evi-
dent in that it is used so widely in societies, this discourse as elaborated in theory
and practice is affected by contemporary processes of learning, socialization, and
social constructions.
One of the fascinating facts about the language of deterrence is the difficulty of
translating the word ‘‘deterrence’’ (and deter) into different languages (for exam-
ple, French, German, Russian) (see Jukes 1975:484; Vigor 1975; Trofimenko
1980:53, note 29; Chilton 1985:104, 107–110).48 This suggests that concepts of
deterrence are not the outcome of a neutral language but of a social process
(Chilton 1985:116). The lack of this word in some languages demonstrates not
only the difficulty of thinking in terms of deterrence, but the absence of a linguis-
tic need for such a word. It is not merely that actors tend to see themselves as the
defenders and their opponents as the aggressors (for example, Falk 1989:65;
Lebow and Stein 1989:221, 223), but that actors do not necessarily share the same
notion of deterrence with their opponents. In such cases, while one actor declares
that it aims to practice deterrence, the opponent may perceive it as a provocation.
Furthermore, because an actor’s identity depends upon discourse, discourse is
also part of the mechanism through which actors can become attached to their
strategies. By practicing the strategy of deterrence, actors shape their own and
others’ perceptions of their role in the international arena. This constitutive
effect, acknowledged to some extent by scholars (Wendt 1999:358–359; Bially-
Mattern 2005:22–23; see also Tannenwald 2007:45–46), is closely related to the
concept of role identity.49 Actors may thus act not only for strategic reasons, but
47
In this respect, exploring the question of whether deterrence is a new strategy (Cioffi-Revilla 1999) misses
one important element that demonstrates the difference between current and past practices of deterrence. As
opposed to earlier time periods, modern practices of deterrence are also connected to language and discourse
regarding this strategy, which not only help the actors to communicate and organize their knowledge but may have
constitutive influences. In this respect, see Adler (2009:91) on the reflexive dimension of deterrence in the current
age.
48
For example, the Soviets used one word to describe their deterrence vis-à-vis the West—sderzhivaniye—which
carries a meaning close to the English word ‘‘containment.’’ Nevertheless, when describing the West’s deterrence
vis-à-vis the Soviets, they used the word ustrashenie, which has a meaning close to the English word ‘‘blackmail’’
(Jukes 1975:484; Vigor 1975:473–478). It is interesting however to note that the Russian description of American
deterrence has shifted during the years from meaning ‘‘compellence’’ and ‘‘intimidation’’ to a meaning closer to
that of dissuading an opponent from an attack (Trofimenko 1980:10–11). Although some rationalist scholars refer
to the implications of these issues, they have not paid enough attention to them (see, for example, Betts 1987:5).
49
According to Wendt, role identities exist only in relation to ‘‘Others.’’ One can have a specific role identity
‘‘only by occupying a position in a social structure and following behavioral norms towards others possessing rele-
vant counter-identities’’ (Wendt 1999:227).
also to (re)validate their identity (that is, as a deterrer actor). In some cases, this
need to deter may enhance the practices of deterrence; however, in other cases,
it aggravates the sense of insecurity and intensifies the need to use force (rather
than to avoid violence).50
To sum up this section, social context is created through learning, socializa-
tion, and social constructions, producing a discourse and even constituting the
actors themselves. Acknowledging the importance of this context allows us to
better establish the connections between the strategy of deterrence and the
avoidance of violence, and helps to clarify and explain contradictions in deter-
rence research. It also provides scholars with a richer framework through
which to understand how deterrent threats may influence the behavior of
actors.
The ‘‘New’’ Empirical Questions51

In this section, I will consider the empirical trend of the fourth wave of deter-
rence.52 I suggest that this trend is characterized by scholarly attempts to imple-
ment classical (realist) deterrence theories mainly with regard US deterrence of
the ‘‘new’’ threats—threats of terrorism, rogue states, and, to some extent, eth-
nic conflicts. It should be noted that whether or not these threats are ‘‘new,’’
interest in the study of these threats has significantly increased since the end of
the Cold War (Saideman 2002:63) and has further increased since 9 ⁄ 11.
Deterrence and Terrorism

The study of deterrence and terror has mainly revolved around the debate over
whether states can implement the criteria for deterrence success of traditional
deterrence theory in the context of dissuading terrorists and terror organiza-
tions. On the one hand, scholars argue that deterring terrorists is most likely
to fail. One challenge is that when it comes to deterring terrorists, whose aim
is to change the status-quo, the defender’s capabilities (a theoretical criterion
for successful implementation of deterrence strategy) are limited. This is
because of the different value system of the terrorist ‘‘decision makers’’ (Davis
and Jenkins 2002:5). In this respect, in many cases, deterring terrorists is prob-
lematic as a result of their maximal aims (for example, religious, ideological)
(Davis and Jenkins 2002:4–5; Ganor 2005:65). The deterring actors will lack suf-
ficient capabilities to effectively threaten actors who may actually want to
become the target of an attack in order to increase their legitimacy and sup-
port base (Freedman 2004:122; Paul 2005:55; Löwenheim 2007:179–180). More-
over, the maximal aims of terrorists also create a problem of credibility, since
the balance of interests53 may in these cases be in their favor, creating doubts
about the defender’s resolve and willingness to deliver the threat (Bowen
2004:55, 62–63).54 Deterrence strategy against such actors may thus become
irrelevant and even counterproductive (Frey 2004:33–34; Ganor 2005:67; Trager
and Zagorcheva 2005:111; see also Adler 2009:99–102). These two basic
50
This also raises interesting questions concerning the connections among physical security, deterrence, and
ontological security (the security of identity). On ontological security, see Wendt (1999:131) and Mitzen (2006:342–
343).
51
For a similar discussion of this trend, mainly with regard to deterring terrorists and rogue states, see Knopf
(2008).
52
On the debate over whether post-Cold War threats can be deterred, see Zagare (2006:115–116).
53
On the influence of the balance of interests on deterrence and on deterrence credibility see (Mearsheimer
1983; Shimshoni 1988).
54
For a further discussion of deterrence credibility of ‘‘collective actors’’ vis-à-vis terrorists (which is also rele-
vant to other ‘‘new threats’’), see Morgan (2003:177–178); see also Knopf (2008:10).
Amir Lupovici 719
problems—the limited influence of the defender’s capabilities and credibility—are

exacerbated by the difficulty of communicating the threat to the terrorists,
who are not always identifiable (Paul 2005:55), and even further aggravated
when confronting suicide terrorism55 (Pape 2003:346–347; Ganor 2005:76;
Pedahzur 2005:12).56
However, some scholars suggest that deterring terrorists is possible. Trager
and Zagorcheva argue that many indications oppose the assertion that terrorists
are not rational (Trager and Zagorcheva 2005:93–94; Lebovic 2007:105–115; also
compare with Payne 2001:7–11; Davis and Jenkins 2002:5; Ganor 2005:74). Fur-
thermore, they contend that even highly motivated terrorists can be deterred
through various means as long as the preferences of the deterrer states and the
terrorists to some extent overlap (Trager and Zagorcheva 2005:96–105). In addi-
tion, it has been suggested that one must employ different deterrent threats
against the different actors involved in the terror act: the individuals who com-
mit terrorist attacks, the leaders of terrorist organizations ordering the attacks
(Almog 2004:513–414), and the states that support and sponsor these attacks
(Press-Barnathan 2004:201; Ganor 2005:81–82). Various methods of communicat-
ing threats to terrorists have also been suggested, such as the legal system (inter-
nal law, international law, the various courts) or the armed forces (Wheatley and
Hayes 1996:13, 19–20; Ganor 2005:67).
Deterrence and Rogue States

Despite the criticism and problems associated with the fluidity of the concept of
‘‘rogue states,’’ mainly with regard to the definition of what makes a state
‘‘rogue’’ (see Smith 2006:13–14), the deterrence of rogue states has attracted
the attention of security scholars. Since the arguments on this issue have devel-
oped in a similar line to those of terror deterrence, I will focus mainly on argu-
ments specific to rogue states.
A main question here again is whether rogue states are deterrable. Some schol-
ars emphasize the special difficulties involved with deterring these actors (for
example, Payne 2001:195–196; Pollack 2002; Adler 2009:102). Notably, Smith sug-
gests that the imbalance of interests and commitment, psychological barriers, and
the rationality of irrationality are especially challenging in this regard (Smith
2006:26–41). Therefore, Smith argues that deterrence against rogue states is very
limited and can be effective ‘‘only against those regimes that accept the status-
quo and judge that the balance of deterrence is not in their favor’’ (Smith
2006:157). The balance of interests may be in favor of the rogue state in those
cases in which it ‘‘has nothing left to lose.’’ This especially true, as Smith argues,
when the state also holds weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Smith 2006:28).57
Furthermore, the problem defining ‘‘rogue states’’ poses a great challenge to any
discussion of deterrence vis-à-vis these actors, since this concept implies, almost
by definition, that rogue states cannot be deterred. Once they are deterred from
their ‘‘inappropriate behavior’’ they stop being rogue states.58
55
In this respect, the problem stems not only from the difficulties in physically locating the ‘‘terrorists’
address’’ (an issue discussed and to some extent solved by Trager and Zagorcheva 2005:108–112) but the challenge
of finding targets that would threaten the terrorists. For this reason, some neo-conservatives endorse pre-emption
over deterrence, as reviewed in Adler (2009:106, note 33).
56
Similarly, it was suggested that successfully implementing deterrence against information warfare is impro-
bable, and that the significant difficulties posed by this type of warfare require measures other than deterrence
(Harknett 1996:96–100, 103–104; Wheatley and Hayes 1996:9, 13, 19–20; Arquilla 2004:210–213).
57
Regarding the destabilizing effects of WMD, and especially nuclear weapons, on deterring a rogue state that
holds them, see Sagan (1995); see also Morgan (2003:269–271).
58
In fact, the interpretative approach provides some solutions to this problem, mainly since it can better
capture the fact that sometimes threats as well as their magnitude are socially constructed.
However, some scholars highlight the possibility of successfully deterring

rogue states (see Lebovic 2007:26–103). More specifically, they emphasize that
Smith’s arguments, rather than undermining deterrence strategy, can in fact
work to successfully implement it. For example, Morgan argues that threatening
the regime can have a deterrent effect, and he further contends that ‘‘a state
that is not a great power but has WMD should be easier for the US to deter
than one without them.’’ Morgan suggests that WMD encourages a cautious
policy and simplifies the risks involved for the actors (Morgan 2003:271–273;
see also Waltz 1995). This type of argument has also been made regarding spe-
cific states, such as Iran (in Adler 2009:101), Iraq (Nolan and Strauss 1997:33;
Jervis 2003:323–324; Morgan 2003:271), and North Korea (Nolan and Strauss
1997:34–35).
The debate regarding deterring rogue states deals almost exclusively with
American deterrence (Morgan 2003; Litwak 2007), providing policy suggestions
(mainly) with regard to US decision makers: for example, whether the United
States should preempt, deter, or establish a global quarantine against WMD (see
Smith 2006; Lebovic 2007; Litwak 2007). This tendency is not surprising, given
that ‘‘rogue state’’ is an American concept defined by threats to America. How-
ever, and as scholars have noted, the ability of rogue states to deter the United
States from acting against them (see Litwak 2007:158; Jervis 2003:324, 328; Mor-
gan 2003:269–270; Smith 2006) is an important issue that requires elaboration in
future research.
Deterrence and Ethnic Conflicts

Most studies of deterrence in ethnic conflicts are based on extending traditional
deterrence theories and revolve mainly around the feasibility of achieving imme-
diate, extended deterrence of interventionist actors. These studies are usually
focused on deterring further escalation of violence rather than on preventing
violence in the first place.
More specifically, these studies acknowledge the difficulty actors face in using
practices of extended deterrence to prevent the eruption and escalation of eth-
nic conflicts (Morgan 2003:280–281).59 Fundamental challenges for actors are a
lack of information and the necessity of intervening in time. Furthermore,
because some ethnic conflicts occur in strategically less important areas—endan-
gering only minor interests of potential interventionist states—it is difficult for
actors to present appropriate and credible threats (Posen 2001:202–206; Said-
eman and Zahar 2008:8). Nevertheless, these problems do not mean that
(extended) deterrence in ethnic conflict is impossible (Morgan 2003:281). For
example, based on his empirical research regarding NATO policy toward the
conflict in Bosnia, Harvey (1997:203–206) demonstrates that by fulfilling the clas-
sical requirements for successful deterrence, NATO members succeeded in
deterring the Serbs.
Despite the crucial contribution of this literature, a few theoretical and
empirical concerns arise. First, empirical research up to now focuses specifically
on the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo. Although scholars arrive at different conclu-
sions on the questions of whether or not these were cases of successful deter-
rence and why (see Carment and Harvey 2001; Crawford 2001–2002; Saideman
2002:72–73; Quackenbush and Zagare 2005:104–105, 108–109), the research
should be extended to consider other cases. Second, studies of deterrence
between the rivals themselves (rather than of the extended deterrence of
59
It was suggested that following political and strategic difficulties that constrain the ability of interventionists
to act in time and to pose a credible threat, the interventionist states ‘‘more often find themselves in the active
compellence mode than deterrent mode’’ (Posen 2001:202–203; see also Morgan 2003:101, 280–281).
Amir Lupovici 721
interventionist actors) are mostly limited (but see Saideman and Zahar 2008).60
Thus, studying direct deterrence among rival ethnic groups has not been the
main research aim of either ethnic conflict scholars or deterrence experts. For
example, Kaufmann (2001:458) suggests that one of the advantages of separa-
tion is that it strengthens an actor’s ability to successfully implement deter-
rence. In such situations, he claims, ‘‘the conflict changes from one of mutual
pre-emptive ethnic cleansing to something approaching conventional interstate
war in which normal deterrence dynamics apply.’’ Similarly, deterrence scholars
have provided some insights that may contribute to the study of deterrence in
ethnic conflict (for example, Bar-Joseph 1998:180; regarding the Israeli Palestin-
ian conflict). This, of course, is not necessarily a problem in these specific stud-
ies; however, it demonstrates the need to further elaborate on the
implementation of this concept. A third problem is that not enough scholarly
attention has been given to the special characteristics of (extended) deterrence
in ethnic conflicts. For example, although Harvey (1997) provides important
insights in this regard, he does not elaborate on the difference between
extended deterrence in ethnic conflicts and extended deterrence in state versus
state conflicts.
To sum up this section, the research of deterrence in ethnic conflict is still in
the very early stages, and relevant cases need further theoretical and empirical
examination. In such research, it is important to distinguish between different
kinds of deterrence (immediate, general) and between actors making the deterrent
threat (direct deterrence between two sides of conflict or extended deterrence of inter-
ventionist actors).
Combining the ‘‘New’’ Threats Trend with the Interpretative Trend

The discussion above suggests that the two trends that constitute the fourth wave
of deterrence have had almost no influence on each other. However, in this sec-
tion, I aim to identify the theoretical and empirical implications of applying the
interpretative insights to the study of deterring the ‘‘new’’ threats, focusing
mainly on learning processes, constitutive elements and identity.
To start with, it is necessary to consider the influences of learning and learn-
ing obstacles in deterring these threats. But any consideration of this
issue—especially concerning deterring terrorists and violence in ethnic con-
flicts—should address the problem of communication between states and non-
state actors. In other words, an important question is whether the classical
deterrence theory and discourse is meaningful when confronting actors whose
goals and interests are significantly different. However, I suggest that taking a
discursive approach to study deterrence vis-à-vis these actors and discussing learn-
ing processes are important for several reasons.
First, as illustrated above, adopting, learning, and being socialized into these
practices may enhance the stability of deterrence; therefore, if these actors can-
not be thus socialized, it complicates the problem of deterring them. Second,
even if these actors were to adopt the ideas and discourse of deterrence, this
would not necessarily increase international stability. Remaining attentive to the
discursive dimension will allow further exploration of how practicing deterrence
with these actors may become counterproductive, as I will elaborate below.
Finally, despite the skepticism with regard to the feasibility of deterring these
actors, one must still acknowledge that in most cases both terrorists and ethnic
groups—albeit to different extents—are attached to territory and to state(s). This
60
An exception and a promising new venue is the recently published edited volume of Saideman and Zahar
(2008), which emphasizes the importance of the deterrent power of the state itself vis-à-vis potential violence of
ethnic groups.
implies that we should differentiate among distinct kinds of actors61; and fur-
ther, since statehood and territory increase the chances of achieving successful
deterrence (for example, Bar-Joseph 1998:180), this differentiation may have
important implications with regard to the prospects of deterring them and their
willingness to be socialized into these practices.
Nevertheless, one of the most important conclusions of a constructivist read-
ing of deterrence is that learning deterrence is not easy. For example,
although, as some scholars argue, learning may increase the potential of deter-
ring terrorists (see Almog 2004–2005; Ganor 2005:66–67, 74–76), whether this
will strengthen the deterrent posture remains a question. There are major diffi-
culties in teaching terrorists (or rogue states) deterrence (Adler 2009:96–92,
102–103) or socializing them in these practices. Teaching deterrence through
the use of force (for example, repeated retaliation) may not create the cumula-
tive learning effects as expected, for example, by Almog (2004–2005), but may
in fact lead the terrorists to the exact opposite conclusion—that deterrence fails
over and over again.
The interpretative approach may help to explain this result. The difficulties of
capability and credibility, as seen above, burden the ability to deter terrorists (or
rogue states); furthermore, these problems are aggravated by the fact that deter-
rence to some extent also depends upon the process of defining ‘‘rational’’
acts.62 In other words, ‘‘learning deterrence’’ is more than a process of acquiring
knowledge of the opponents’ capabilities or resolve: it also depends on establish-
ing common knowledge that allows an actor in the first place to become sensi-
tive to threats and be influenced by their credibility. The creation of such
common knowledge provides a more suitable foundation and context through
which to perpetuate, support, and reinforce deterrence practices. The interpreta-
tive approach, then, helps to identify the common and distinct values, norms,
constructions, and knowledge that affect the feasibility of successfully implement-
ing this strategy. For example, there are situations in which international norms,
such as the norm of self-determination, constitute the interests of actors (for
example, terrorists), therefore decreasing their sensitivity to deterrent threats
that aim at preventing them from achieving their goals. In these situations, the
defender and the challenger have different conceptions of ‘‘what is rational to
do,’’ which affects their balance of interests and hence the practices of deter-
rence. To put it differently, these social factors may become learning obstacles
that limit the ability to socialize these actors with the practices of deterrence.
Furthermore, acknowledging the importance of learning processes allows us to
look at the field from different angles. Whereas learning deterrence can some-
times decrease the likelihood of violence, as for example during the Cold War, it
may in other situations increase the chances of violence, as challengers who
learn the ideas of deterrence may use this knowledge to provoke actors who have
learned and internalized these ideas, forcing them to retaliate (Adler 2009:85–
86). Iraq’s policy during the Gulf War (1991) is a good illustration of this point.
Iraq launched Scud missiles against Israel in order to lead to an Israeli response
that would provoke the rest of the Arab world against Israel, thus dismantling
the American coalition and increasing the chances of Arab violence against the
United States and other members of the coalition (Feldman 1992:190). As Karsh,
Rautsi, and Stowell (2003:249) suggest, ‘‘Saddam’s aggression was designed to
trigger response, not to avoid one.’’
61
For example, on the need to distinguish among different types of terrorists who have different aims and
interests, see Löwenheim (2007:190–191).
62
To some extent this also derives from cultural, political, and social processes, which define the sensitivity of
actors to the threat as these factors are closely related to the interests and values of decision makers and ⁄ or the
society involved.
Amir Lupovici 723
Another main implication of the interpretative approach concerns the constit-

utive effects of deterrence strategy. As noted earlier, an actor’s attachment to
strategies may affect its behavior. For example, the internalization of Cold War
practices of deterrence may explain why the United States tries in the post-Cold
War era to achieve a deterrent posture against terrorists and rogue states, even
though it is not clear that this is a feasible aim. The interpretative approach
would suggest that the 9 ⁄ 11 attacks were perceived as threats not only to the
physical security of the United States, but also to its role identity as a security
provider and as a deterrer actor. Furthermore, because deterrence is embedded
in political discourse, such discourse may turn into a political tool to justify, bur-
den, or even prevent political moves. Thus, although within the Bush administra-
tion doubts were expressed about the feasibility of deterring terrorists, officials
stated that the aim of the war in the Gulf was to restore the deterrent posture
against terrorists (compare Bush 2002 with Fleischer 2003). Further, some
assumed that this strategy would inevitably work against any challenger: as Rums-
feld (2002:23) put it, even against ‘‘adversaries that have not yet emerged to
challenge us.’’ This inconsistency is the result of the compelling nature of the
rhetoric developed and enabled through the institutionalization of deterrence
ideas. The constitutive effects of these ideas shaped the American identity as a
deterrer and became a discursive tool for policy justification—and even for con-
tradictory policies. This also explains why the Bush administration’s perceived
need to go to war against Iraq was justified by the argument that Saddam
Hussein is not a rational actor and hence not deterrable (Fleischer 2002); war
thus became the reasonable option for dealing with him.
Similarly, in Israel in the late 1990s, while opponents of IDF’s (Israeli Defense
Forces) withdrawal from South Lebanon claimed that such a move would erode
the Israeli deterrent posture vis-à-vis Hizbullah, the Palestinians, and the Arab
world, the advocates of this move contended not only that this move would not
erode the Israeli deterrent posture, but that it would actually enhance it (Kaye
2002–2003:561, 569, 579–581). Beyond the common argument that states need
to show resolve, this posture demonstrates the constitutive effects and prevalence
of deterrence in Israel’s strategic thinking, which (while its success is taken for
granted) limits other strategic alternatives and is used to justify contradictory
policies.63 In other words, it is its internalization that allows for opponent camps
to use the ‘‘discourse of deterrence’’—internalization among the elites, in the
security establishment, and in the public sphere. When deterrence is internal-
ized—as a result becoming a goal rather than a security measure—politicians on
the one hand are constrained by the need to convince the public that the state’s
actions do not erode the deterrent posture, but on the other hand, they can
justify specific actions by suggesting that they will contribute to the deterrent
posture.
Adler (2009:101) has acknowledged one of the important implications of this
argument, suggesting that states would respond differently to terror attacks
depending on whether they have internalized the ideas of deterrence (for exam-
ple, the United States) or not (for example, Spain). In other words, because the
constitutive effects of the practice of deterrence limit strategic alternatives, actors
who have adopted a role identity of deterrer are more compelled to respond to
such provocations than actors who have not.
The implications of the constitutive effects of deterrence, especially with
regard to terrorists and rogue states, help us to understand some of the difficul-
ties involved in deterring these actors as well as their disinclination to be
deterred. These actors, almost by definition, desire to challenge the status quo,
63
On how the assumptions of deterrence theory squeezed out other strategic alternatives in the West during
the 1980s, see Dauber (1993).
and deterrence is about preservation of the status quo; thus, they would be will-
ing to practice deterrence only in very specific situations. Furthermore, adopting
the identity of a deterred actor implies a submissive posture, and as such may
challenge the agenda of the terrorist or of the rogue state. For example, toward
the end of the operation in Gaza in December 2008–January 2009, Israel
declared that it had achieved its aims of restoring its deterrent posture vis-à-vis
Hamas; therefore, it could withdraw its forces (see Israeli Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2009). However, officials in Hamas counter-claimed that they were not so
deterred, see Reuters (2009). In other words, while Israeli officials saw (political)
advantages in framing Israel’s relations with Hamas as those of successful deter-
rence, Hamas was reluctant to accept the role of being the deterred.
In some ways, the relationship between the deterrer and the deterred actor
overlaps with feminist writings on the matter. According to some feminist schol-
arship, security practices in general—and particularly deterrence—emphasize
rationality, strength, power, and independence, and as such are attached to mas-
culine discourse (Cohn 1987; Tickner 1992:3, 6; Blanchard 2003:1304)64; being
deterred, therefore, can be understood as a feminine practice, and therefore
might be perceived in contemporary strategic discourse as undermining security
and dangerous.65 Within such an approach, it would follow, for example, that it
is more likely that terrorists or rogue states would be more willing to ‘‘be
deterred’’ in a context of mutual deterrence, which may dull the hierarchical
relations that are emphasized in cases of unilateral deterrence. The problem,
however, is that powerful ‘‘status-quo’’ actors would be reluctant to accept such
‘‘symmetric’’ relations with terrorists and rouge states, which may be perceived
as undermining their own international status and enhancing the internal and
external legitimacy of these challenging actors.66 In this respect, it is also inter-
esting to note that although some scholars have discussed the scenarios in which
weaker actors deter stronger ones (for example, when rogue states deter a status-
quo power) (Morgan 2003:269–270; Adler 2009:102) or of mutual deterrence
between such actors (for example, ‘‘red lines’’ agreement of 1996 between Israel
and Hizbullah) (Byman 2005:104–105; Trager and Zagorcheva 2005:102–103),
the deterrence literature suffers from a strong bias toward symmetrical oppo-
nents (who usually hold nuclear capabilities) or asymmetrical conflicts in which
the United States is involved.
Lastly, acknowledging the importance of social constructions and actors’ iden-
tities has interesting implications for the study of the practices of deterrence,
especially with regard to deterring the ‘‘new’’ threats. Thus, for example,
although scholars have studied the influences of social constructions on the
dynamics of ethnic conflicts (for example, Arfi 1998; Kaufman 1998:3–4), these,
surprisingly, were not integrated into the study of deterrence in ethnic conflicts.
For this reason, acknowledging possible threats to actors’ identities seems to be a
very promising way to understand some of the driving forces that aggravate these
conflicts and therefore affect the practices of deterrence. Identities create the
‘‘context’’ that provides actors with tools to understand, construct, and interpret
reality, and to feel secure or insecure (Hopf 2002:1; Hansen 2006:44). A context
not only revolves around actors’ knowledge of the opponent’s capabilities, but
64
I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this comment.
65
A similar argument is advanced by Leatherman (2005:113–114), who argues that the September 2002
National Security of the United States report takes a (masculine) deterrer perspective when describing the Ameri-
can practices, while terrorists and rogue states are feminized for their desire to attain a masculine status of parity
and for being undeterrable.
66
For similar arguments regarding negotiating with terrorists, see Paul (2005:57). Questions of opponents’
legitimacy are closely related to the debate over whether hostility or cooperation with an opponent increases the
chances of successfully implementing deterrence, compare Kahn (1962:30), Schelling (1966:259), Morgan (2003:57
note 16, 60), and Guzzini (2004:44).
Amir Lupovici 725
concerns the more general knowledge the actors have about each other. Thus,
the context and the way identities are formed play an important part in initiat-
ing, interpreting, and judging the credibility of threats.
Furthermore, collective identity or enunciating a collective identity may help
to enhance extended deterrence, as for example in ethnic conflicts. In such
cases, the defender provides an ‘‘ultimate’’ demonstration of its credibility by
emphasizing its close relations with its protégé. This makes it clear to a potential
challenger that the defender’s motivation is derived from fundamental affection
and interests. This argument is closely related to the emphasis Danilovic
(2002:98–99, 116–123, 168–169) places on how the existence of strong interests
on the interventionist side demonstrates its resolve.
A fascinating example in this regard concerns the credibility of the Turkish
threats initiated against Armenia in order to prevent it from attacking Nakhich-
evan.67 It can be suggested that the Turkish credibility was enhanced by two
identity related issues: the fact that the Azeris were seen by the Armenians as
Turks, and the Armenian interpretation of these threats in the context of the
traumatic events of 1915, events that had had a constitutive effects in shaping
Armenian identity (Rieff 1997:128; Herzig 1999:60; Kaufmann 2001:49).
To conclude, while there is a revival now in both the empirical and theoretical
study of deterrence, the isolated trends in the literature can and should be com-
bined. Classical study of deterrence could benefit from interpretative insights
about learning, social constructions, and discourse that emphasize the impor-
tance of the social context and actors’ identities. These insights may provide
explanations complementary to existing rational theories without necessarily
refuting them. At the same time, extending the empirical research of the inter-
pretative trend may be beneficial to further testing and developing these
insights.
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The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory-Toward A New Research Agenda

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International Studies Quarterly (2010) 54, 705–732

The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence

In this paper, I aim to review recent empirical and theoretical develop-

I suggest that the main contribution of the interpretative approach to deter-

The First Three Waves of Deterrence Theory

The Emergence of the First Three Waves

The Difficulties in Deterrence Literature

721–722, 729–730; Danilovic 2001:102–103, 2002; Fearon 2002:20–22; Carlson

The Fourth Wave

The Interpretative Turn

intersubjective context plays an important role in creating the actors’ understand-

Deterrence Can be Learned26

enhanced by the increasing destructiveness of weapons—especially the advent of

(Williams 1975:67; Carnesale, Doty, Hoffmann, Huntington, Nye, and Sagan

Socialization Affects the Practices of Deterrence

Deterrence Is a Social Construction

In the context of mutual vulnerability confidence in deterrence became a tautol-

In this vein, Windsor referrers to Weber’s concept of ‘‘rationalization’’ in

The Importance of Discourse (or Speech Acts)

The ‘‘New’’ Empirical Questions51

Deterrence and Terrorism

problems—the limited influence of the defender’s capabilities and credibility—are

Deterrence and Rogue States

However, some scholars highlight the possibility of successfully deterring

Deterrence and Ethnic Conflicts

Combining the ‘‘New’’ Threats Trend with the Interpretative Trend

Another main implication of the interpretative approach concerns the constit-

Guzzini, Stefano. (2000) A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations. European

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