GSIS v.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ISSUE/S with RATIO:
G.R. No. 98395 & 102449
Forms of Compensation
FACTS:
• In a Decision dated 28 October 1994, the Supreme Court held that
government service rendered on a per diem basis is not creditable in
computing the length of service for retirement purposes.
• However, private respondent Matilde Belo in G.R. No. 102449 filed
motion for reconsideration.
o She insists that the services she rendered as Vice Governor of
Capiz between December 1975 to January 1979 should be
considered as creditable for purposes of retirement.
• The GSIS likewise filed a motion for reconsideration in behalf of both
Belo and private respondent Manuel Baradero (G.R. No. 98395)
G.R. No. 102449
• Respondent Belo held the position of Vice-Governor of Capiz
continuously between January 5, 1972 up to February 1, 1988. From
January 25, 1972 up to December 31, 1979, she held office by virtue of
an election and was paid a fixed salary.
o She also held the same in a holdover capacity with per diem
payment from December 31 1976 to December 31, 1979 and on
a fixed salary basis from January 1, 1980 to February 1, 1988.
• The CSC held that the services rendered for the first holdover period
between January 31, 1976 to January 1, 1979 was creditable for purposes
of retirement.
o Disagreeing with the CSC’s insistence that the period in which
respondent Belo was paid on a per diem basis should be credited
in computing the number of years of creditable service to the
government, GSIS subsequently filed a petition for certiorari
G.R. No. 98395
• The period disputed was served by respondent Baradero as a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of La Castellana, Negros
Occidental between January 1, 1976 to October 10, 1978 where he was
likewise paid on a per diem basis.
o Baradero rendered full services to the government as a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan.
1. Whether regular service in government on a per diem basis, without any
other form of compensation or emolument, is compensation within the
contemplation of the term ‘service with compensation’ under the
Government Service Insurance Act of 1987
YES. What is controlling is the nature of the renumeration, not the label
attached to it.
• While what respondents Belo and Baradero received were denominated
as “per diem,” the amounts received were actually in the nature of a
compensation or pay.
• The Court is convinced that the are convinced that the “per diem” Belo
received was actually paid for in the performance of her duties as Vice-
Governor of Capiz in a holdover capacity not as the per diem referred
to by section 1(c) of R.A. No. 1573
o A closer look at the aforecited provision, reveals a legislative
intent to make a clear distinction between salary, pay or
compensation, on one hand, and other incidental allowances,
including per diems on the other
• Since it is generally held that an allowance for expenses incident to the
discharge of an office is not a salary of office, it follows that if the
remuneration received by a public official in the performance of his
duties does not constitute a mere “allowance for expenses”
o It would grossly violate the law’s intent to reward the public
servant’s years of dedicated service to government for us to
gloss over the circumstances surrounding the payment of the
said remunerations
• A per diem is a daily allowance given for each day an officer or employee
of government is away from his home base. This is its traditional
meaning: its usual signification is as a reimbursement for extra expenses
incurred by the public official in the performance of his duties.
o A per diem could rightfully be considered a compensation or
remuneration attached to an office
• Under the circumstances obtaining in the case of respondent Belo the
per diems received by her during the period that she acted in holdover
capacity obviously were in the nature of compensation or remuneration
for her services as Vice Governor of the Province of Capiz, rather than
as a reimbursement for incidental expenses incurred while away from her
home base.
o The same could be said for respondent Baradero.
 • What ought to be controlling in the cases at bench therefore,
should be the nature of the remuneration rather than the label
attached to it.
• The clear intent of the Government Insurance Law was to exclude those
extra incidental expenses or incurred on a daily basis covered by the
traditional definition of the term per diem.
o An important that the SC missed in the previous decision was
that, while respondent Belo was paid on a per diem basis during
her first holdover period as Vice Governor, she was
subsequently paid a fixed salary, which apparently
rectified an otherwise anomalous situation.
• It cannot be convincingly asserted that petitioners could not avail
themselves of the benefits of the policy because no deductions were
made from their salaries during the disputed periods when they were paid
on a per diem basis.
o If the GSIS did not deduct, it was by its own choice:
contributions were exacted from petitioner before and after the
disputed period.
• It would be grossly inequitable—as it would violate the spirit of the
government retirement and insurance laws—to permanently penalize
both respondents Belo and Baradero by ignoring the fact of actual period
of service to government with compensation, and deny them the
retirement privileges that they, for their unselfish service to the
government justly deserve.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby GRANTED, our

decision dated October 28, 1994 RECONSIDERED and the questioned
resolutions and orders of the CSC requiring GSIS to consider creditable the
services of private respondents on a per diem basis AFFIRMED.
 BITONIO v. COA
G.R. No. 147392
Basis of Right to Compensation
FACTS:
• Petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV
of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and
Employment.
• Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes of the Department of Labor and
Employment designated the petitioner to be the DOLE representative
to the Board of Directors of PEZA pursuant to Sec. 11 of RA 7916.
o The pertinent paragraph provides that the members of the
Board shall receive a per diem.
• As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner
was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the
years 1995 to 1997
• However, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the
petitioner. It stated that Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants
holding other offices other than their primary office shall not be allowed
to receive additional compensation as the same is unconstitutional
following the the case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary.
• Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COA, alleging that
appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered
by the prohibition and that Sec. 11 of RA 7916 provides a legal basis for
the per diem payment.
o COA denied the motion.
ISSUE/S with RATIO:
1. Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the
petitioner
YES.
• Pursuant to the Court’s ruling in CLU v. Executive Secretary and the Senate
Committee Report on the Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon), the COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038
which authorized the issuance of the Notices of Disallowances for the
per diems received by the petitioner.
• The memo stated:
o In the Civil Liberties Union case, the Supreme Court ruled that
Cabinet Secretaries, their deputies and assistants may not hold
any other office or employment. It declared Executive Order
No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members,
their deputies and assistants to hold other offices in addition to
their primary office and to receive compensation therefor.
o All unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national
government agencies and government-owned or controlled
corporations which have effected payment of subject allowances
are directed to implement the recommendation contained in the
subject Senate Committee Report
• The petitioner maintains that he is entitled to the payment of per diems,
as R.A. No. 7916 specifically and categorically provides for the payment
of a per diem for the attendance of the members of the Board of
Directors at board meetings of PEZA.
o The petitioner stresses that R.A. No. 7916 is a statute more
superior than an administrative directive and the former cannot
just be repealed or amended by the latter.
• It must be noted that the petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board
meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the
Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was no
separate or special appointment for such position
• In Dela Cruz v. COA, the Court ruled that:
o The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation
part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned
has no right to receive additional compensation for his services
in the said position. The reason is that these services are already
paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his
principal office.
o For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any
extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or
an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism.
By whatever name it is designated, such additional
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution
• Similar to the case at bar, the SC cannot allow the petitioner who sat as
representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a
better right than his principal. As the representative of the Secretary of
Labor, the petitioner sat in the Board in the same capacity as his principal.
o Whatever laws and rules the member in the Board is covered, so
is the representative; and whatever prohibitions or restrictions
the member is subjected, the representative is, likewise, not
exempted.
 • There is also no merit in the allegation that the legislature was certainly
aware of the parameters set by the Court when it enacted R.A. No. 7916,
four (4) years after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union case.
o It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be
repugnant to the highest law of the land which is the
Constitution. No law can render nugatory the Constitution
because the Constitution is more superior to a statute.
o The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the
law which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A.
No. 8748 to cure such defect. The paragraph allowing for the
payment of per diems to the members of the Board was deleted.

DISPOSITIVE: IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is

DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the COA is AFFIRMED
 DE LA VICTORIA v. BURGOS
G.R. No. 11190
Salary not Subject to Garnishment
FACTS:
• Raul H. Sesbreño filed a complaint for damages against Assistant City
Fiscals Bienvenido N. Mabanto, Jr., and Dario D. Rama, Jr.
o After trial judgment was rendered ordering the defendants to
pay P11,000.00 to the plaintiff, private respondent herein.
o The decision having become final and executory, the trial court
ordered its execution.
• A notice of garnishment was served on petitioner Loreto D. de la
Victoria as City Fiscal of Mandaue City where defendant Mabanto, Jr.,
was then detailed.
o The notice directed petitioner not to disburse, transfer, release
or convey to any other person except to the deputy sheriff
concerned the salary checks belonging to Mabanto.
• On 24 November 1992 private respondent filed a motion to require
petitioner to explain why he should not be cited in contempt of court for
failing to comply with the order of 4 November 1992 ordering her to
show the amount of the garnished checks.
• On 19 January 1993 petitioner moved to quash the notice of garnishment
claiming that he was not in possession of any money, funds, credit,
property or anything of value belonging to Mabanto, Jr.
o Only the salary and RATA checks were in the possession of the
petitioner but the same were still considered public funds not
subject to garnishment.
• The trial court denied both motions and ordered the petitioner to
immediately comply with the 4 November Order.
o The motion for reconsideration was also denied. The trial court
stated that it is not the duty of the garnishee to inquire whether
the issuance of the order or notice of garnishment was justified.
ISSUE/S with RATIO:
1. Whether a check still in the hands of the maker or its duly authorized
representative is owned by the payee before physical delivery to the latter
NO. Delivery is required.
• Garnishment is considered as a species of attachment for reaching
credits belonging to the judgment debtor owing to him from a stranger
to the litigation.
o Emphasis is laid on the phrase “belonging to the judgment
debtor” since it is the focal point in resolving the issues raised.
• Under Sec. 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, every contract on a
negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the
instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto.
o As ordinarily understood, delivery means the transfer of the
possession of the instrument by the maker or drawer with intent
to transfer title to the payee and recognize him as the holder
thereof.
• Inasmuch as said checks had not yet been delivered to Mabanto, Jr., they
did not belong to him and still had the character of public funds
2. Whether the salary check of a government official or employee funded
with public funds can be subject to garnishment
NO. It is still considered as public funds pending its delivery and cannot
be subject to garnishment.
• The thesis of petitioner is that the salary checks still formed part of public
funds and therefore beyond the reach of garnishment proceedings.
• Tiro v. Hontanosas: The salary check of a government officer or employee
such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered
to him. Until that time the check belongs to the government.
o As a necessary consequence of being public fund, the
checks may not be garnished to satisfy the judgment.
• Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego: The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law.
• The trial court erroneously applied the ruling in PCIB v. CA which stated
that the garnishee is not required to judge for itself the validity of an
advance execution.
o However, the trial court failed to include the exceptions such as
a defect in the face of the writ or actual knowledge of the
garnishee.
DISPOSITIVE: The petition is GRANTED. The notice of garnishment served
on petitioner dated 3 February 1992 is ordered DISCHARGED.
 RE: GROSS VIOLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW ON
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DUAL EMPLOYMENT
AND DOUBLE COMPENSATION IN THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE COMMITTED BY MR.
EDUARDO V. ESCALA
A.M. No. 2011-04-SC
Prohibition against Receiving Addition, Double, or Indirect Compensation
FACTS:
• Respondent was appointed by the Court as SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer, Security Division, OAS on July 14, 2008.
o Immediately upon his appointment on July 14, 2008, respondent
was allowed to assume office and perform his duties, for reasons
of exigency in the service although he has yet to comply with the
submission of all the documentary requirements for his
appointment.
• During the course of his employment, an anonymous letter reached the
OAS reporting the respondent’s gross violation of the Civil Service Law
on the prohibition against dual employment and double compensation
in the government service.
o It alleged that respondent received salaries and other benefits,
from the Court and also from the PNP of which he remained
an active member.
• The OAS inquiries on the allegations confirmed that While employed in
the Court and receiving his regular compensation, he continued to be a
bona fide member of the PNP assigned with the Aviation Security Group
with the same status and rank of Police Chief Inspector until the date
when he optionally retired on September 30, 2009.
• The OAS was also informed that the Internal Affairs Office (IAO) of
the PNP is likewise carrying out a separate probe and investigation on
respondent for the same alleged gross violation of the Civil Service Law.
• Respondent was preventively suspended by the Court pending the results
of the IAO’s investigations and the separate administrative investigation
of the OAS.
• In the OAS Memorandum dated May 6, 2011, respondent was directed
to explain why he should not be administratively charged with gross
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
violation of the Civil Service Law on the prohibition against dual
employment and double compensation in the government service.
• Respondent submitted to the findings of the OAS but “humbly implore
your magnanimity not to charge him with gross dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service”. In his letter, he stated that;
o He originally applied for retirement with the PNP but the
effectivity was moved from 3 months to 6 months, with the last
day being 14 July 2008.
o He was approved to work with the SC on the same day that his
retirement with the PNP became effective.
o He had no reason to doubt that my optional retirement would
be deemed effective on July 14, 2008-which date actually
coincided with the effectivity of my employment with the
Honorable Supreme Court. However, the same was not acted
upon by the PNP.
o He had returned the total amount of P560,982 representing his
salary with the PNP.
ISSUE/S with RATIO:
1. Whether the respondent violated the prohibition on double
compensation
YES. The Court adopted the OAS recommendation in full.
• The Service Record issued by the PNP in his favor for retirement
purposes was dated August 26, 2008.
o The OAS found respondent’s claim that he applied for optional
retirement as early as January 2008 to be merely an afterthought.
• The OAS thus found respondent’s indirect claim of good faith
unavailing. His regular receipt of his salaries from the PNP despite
presumably exclusively working with the Court implies a deliberate intent
to give unwarranted benefit to himself.
o The OAS also found that respondent became aware of the
approval of his application for retirement as early as September
30, 2009. Notwithstanding such knowledge, he did not
immediately refund his overpayment, if that was indeed the case,
and that his act of returning his salaries after the period of 20
months was also a mere afterthought as he did so only because
the Court became aware of it
• The OAS found respondent’s actuation even amounts to gross
dishonesty. His receipt of salaries from the PNP despite not rendering
any service thereto is a form of deceit.
• Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution:
 o Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries
• Sections 1 and 2, Rule XVIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of E.O. No. 292:
o Sec. 1. No appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters or their
subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position.
o Sec. 2. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall
receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless
specifically authorized by law
• With the undisputed facts of the case, the OAS considers that there is
sufficient evidence to support a finding that respondent is liable for gross
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
o Indeed, respondent has transgressed the Constitution and the
Civil Service law on the prohibition on dual employment and
double compensation in the government service.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Eduardo V.

Escala, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, OAS GUILTY of gross
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and imposes
on him the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service and forfeiture of all benefits
with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.
 SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 85279
Executive Order 180
FACTS:
• SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages against petitioners.
o They allege that the officers and members of SSSEA staged an
illegal strike and barricaded the entrance to the SSS Building;
that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor
Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to
work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the
SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
• It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after SSS failed to act on the
union’s demands regarding the old SSS-SSSEA CBA and other unfair
labor practices.
• Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court’s lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
• The court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted the
restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding
that the strike was illegal.
o The motion for reconsideration was also denied.
• Petitioners then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
o The SC referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
• The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS as jurisdiction lay with
the Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor
Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.
o On the other hand, SSS advances the contrary view, on the
ground that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service
laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore
they do not have the right to strike
• The Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are
government employees, they are not allowed to strike.
ISSUE/S with RATIO:
1. Whether the employees of SSS have the right to strike
NO. As government employees, there do not enjoy the right to strike.
• The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights, provides that the State “shall guarantee the rights of all workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law”
o However, the Constitution is silent as to whether government
employees enjoy the right to strike.
• The Court then proceeded to the intent of the framers.
o According to Commissioner Lerum, the approval of the
resolution to grant government employees the right to organize
does not carry with it the right to strike.
• It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was
repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes
by employees in the Government
o No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at
one time it recognized the right of employees of government
corporations established under the Corporation Code to
organize and bargain collectively and those in the civil service to
“form organizations for purposes not contrary to law”
o Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not
government employees may strike, for such are excluded from
its coverage
• Section 14 of Executive Order 180 provides that the Civil Service law
and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government
service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted
by Congress.
o It refers to Memorandum Circular No. 6 Series of 1987 of the
CSC which enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass
action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service.
• In the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to
strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the
right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of
Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
• The Court then resolved whether SSS employees are government
employees.
• Under the 1987 Constitution “[t]he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
 including government-owned or controlled corporations with original DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by
charters” the Court of Appeals, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the
o The SSS is one such GOCC having been organized under RA decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is
1161. AFFIRMED.
• In Alliance of Govenrment Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, the
rationale for distinguishing between workers in the private sector and
government employees with regard to strike is because terms and
conditions of government employment are fixed by law. Hence,
government employees cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers.
• The Acting Commissioner of Civil Service has stated in a position paper
submitted to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that:
o The Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects
the interest of all people in the public service, and that
accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private
labor relations could not exist in the relations between
government and those whom they employ.
• Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms
and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation
or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of those which are not fixed by law.
o If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be
referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for
appropriate action.

2. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

YES.
• It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional
Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the
continuance of the strike.
• The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of
employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations.
o Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
 TANTUICO, JR. v. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 96422
Construction of Retirement Laws
FACTS:
• Petitioner was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA)
to serve a term of seven years expiring on January 26, 1987. Petitioner
had discharged the functions of Chairman of the COA in an acting
capacity since 1975.
o Petitioner applied for clearance from all money, property and
other accountabilities in preparation for his retirement. He
obtained the clearance applied for, which covered the period
from 1976 to December 31, 1985
• Petitioner submitted his courtesy resignation to President Corazon C.
Aquino. He relinquished his office to the newly appointed Chairman,
now Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr. on March 10, 1986. That
same day, he applied for retirement effective immediately.
o Petitioner sought a second clearance to cover the period from
January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. Chairman Guingona,
however, failed to take any action thereon.
• Chairman Guingona was replaced by respondent Chairman.
o He indorsed petitioner’s retirement application to the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), certifying,
among other matters, that petitioner was cleared of money and
property accountability.
o Respondent Chairman also issued an Order which created a
committee to inventory all equipment acquired by the 2
preceding Chairs.
• The inventory committee finally submitted its report, recommending
petitioner’s clearance from property accountability.
o Respondent Chairman issued a Memorandum directing the
inventory committee to explain why no action should be filed
against its members for failure to complete a physical inventory
and verification of all equipment. They were subsequently
administratively charged.
• Respondent Chairman created a special audit team for the purpose of
conducting a financial and compliance audit of the COA transactions
and accounts during the tenure of petitioner from 1976 to 1984.
o The team rendered a report stating that the prior audit was
selective, that there were a number of deficiencies which
affected the operations of COA, and that there were constraints
in the conduct of the audit.
• Respondent Chairman informed petitioner of the approval of his
application for retirement under R.A. No. 1568, effective as of March 9,
1986.
o However, payment of only one-half (1/2) of the money value of
the benefits due to petitioner by reason of such retirement will
be allowed in view of the audit findings and inventory report
• Petitioner submitted a letter-comment, wherein he cited certain defects
in the manner the audit was conducted. He further claimed that the re-
audit was not authorized by law since it covered closed and settled
accounts
• Petitioner sought several clarifications and specifications, and requested
for 90 days within which to submit his comment, considering that the
report covered a ten-year period of post-audited transactions.
o Ignoring petitioner’s request, respondent Chairman demanded
an accounting of funds and a turnover of the assets of the Fiscal
Administration Foundation, Inc. within 30 days.
• Hence this petition.
ISSUE/S with RATIO:
1. Whether the retirement benefits of the petitioner may be withheld
following the audit reports
NO.
• Petitioner was already issued an initial clearance. Petitioner also applied
for a second clearance to cover the period from January 1 to March 9,
1986.
o Whatever infirmities or limitations existed in said clearances
were cured after respondent Chairman favorably indorsed
petitioner’s application for retirement to the Government
Service Insurance System.
• Regardless of petitioner’s monetary liability to the government,
respondent Chairman cannot withhold the benefits due petitioner under
the retirement laws.
• Romana Cruz v. Hon. Francisco Tantuico - Pension in this case is a bounty
flowing from the graciousness of the Government intended to reward
past services and, at the same time, to provide the pensioner with the
 means with which to support himself and his family. Unless otherwise
clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the benefit of the
pensioner.
• The Court also cited pertinent laws on retirement benefits of government
officials:
o Under Sec. 4 of RA 1568, the benefits granted by said law to the
Auditor General and the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment,
levy or execution.
o Under Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, the benefits granted
thereunder “shall not be subject, among others, to attachment,
garnishment, levy or other processes”
• Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because
the intention is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and comfort, when
he is no longer capable of earning his livelihood.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks

to compel respondent Chairman of the COA to pay petitioner’s retirement
benefits in full and his monthly pensions beginning in March 1991.