Here are my problems with Coggins’ book and what I would like to do differently:

Defining nothingness

This is what I understand by absolute nothing:

Absolute nothingness is a state which can be defined as that which has no prior possibility to
originate from, and no posterior possibilities arising from it.

In this sense, it is complete ontological barrenness. There is nothing before or after. A seed is not a
tree but it has the potential to become a tree. Thus the tree is non-existent only now but not in the
absolute sense.

Argument for impossibility of absolute nothingness

P1. Out of nothing, nothing comes.

P2. But there is something

P3. This something could not have come out of nothing (from P1)

C. Thus, there could not have been nothing.

We can know a posteriori that there could not have been nothing. Thus, there must be something
about reality that makes it impossible to be nothing. But what is it I don’t know.

My basic intuition is that if there is something, then there always must have been something. In
short, the answer to the question, “could there have been nothing” is NO. My problem with Coggins
is that she does not talk of this absolute nothing and neither is her starting point (concreta) neutral.

Problems with Possible Worlds Semantics

The notion of a world seems to be ultimately based on coherence or some form of intelligibility of
reality. Some have seen possible worlds to be maximally the way concrete things could have been
interrelated. But interrelation seems to presuppose causation. Causation seems to presuppose
consistency and consistency seems to be based upon rationality of reality. Something like Principle
of Sufficient Reason or intelligibility seems to be built into nature or reality. I would like to see
whether this possible world talk is neutral and can it be used to assess my question.

Another topic that interests me is to see how these supposed absolute principles fit into a complete
theory of modality and their epistemology. Are these principles at the foundation of all reality and if
that is so, what does that say about reality, a reality where certain abstract principles are at the
foundation or is it some other larger thing that they are manifestations of?

Methodological and esoteric in nature

I find Coggins to be low on Ontology and high on Methodology. What I mean by this is that whereas I
would like to discuss issues like nature and architecture of matter, physical or quantum laws, space
and time etc, she focuses more on issues like metaphysics of subtractibility, dependence, criteria of
concreteness etc. Now, these are not unimportant but to my (possibly naive) mind they seem like
hair splitting which only reinforces our original assertions. Her emphasis on the existence or non-
existence of the null set seems exactly what I don’t want to do(too esoteric). Maybe you can correct
me here, showing me how these considerations are important.

Low on common sense

One attribute I think is paramount to any philosophical theory is that it should not lose sight of
common sense. This does not mean blindly following whatever appears to us as common sense but
giving it due consideration. Coggins seems to be not highly committed to this principle. I am afraid of
the slippery slope that some theoretical assumptions may lead us far away from common sense and
intelligibility.

What I would like to do instead is to base my thesis on as few theoretical assumptions and even
lesser technical scientific assertions. I would like to take simple phenomena like the perception of
the colour black, the perception (or not) of space and feeling of time. It seems like space is a
something that seems like nothing. These three facts amaze me to a great degree. The perception of
these absences or seeming absences is interesting. I would like to do something like this.

In the end I will summarise my objections as follows:

1. Analysis of causation seems lacking

2. Possible worlds not neutral
3. Nature of contingency not explained
4. Physical science not given as much importance as I would like to
5. Ontology of metaphysical principles like ex nihilo nihil fit, PSR, Causality, Identity of
Indiscernibles etc not properly evaluated.
6. Relation between metaphysics and logic not present.